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flit  HENRY 
Of  THE 

UiflYEBSilY  Of  ILUsiiiS 


dSrcat  Captains 


NAPOLEON 


A HISTORY  OF  THE  ART  OF  WAR,  FROM  LUTZEN 
TO  WATERLOO,  WITH  A DETAILED  ACCOUNT  OF 
THE  NAPOLEONIC  WARS 

WITH  167  CHARTS , MATS,  PLANS  OF  BATTLES  AND 
TACTICAL  MANOEUVRES , PORTRAITS,  CUTS 
OF  UNIFORMS , ARMS,  AND  WEAPONS 


BY 

THEODORE  AYRAULT  DODGE 

BREVET  LIEUTENANT-COLONEL  UNITED  STATES  ARMY,  RETIRED  LIST  J AUTHOR  OF  “THE 
CAMPAIGN  OF  CHANCELLORSVILLE,”  “ A BIRD’s-EYE  VIEW  OF  OUR  CIVIL  WAR,” 

“ PATROCLUS  AND  PENELOPE.  A CHAT  IN  THE  SADDLE,”  “GREAT  CAP- 
TAINS,” “ALEXANDER,”  “HANNIBAL,”  “CESAR,”  ETC.,  ETC. 

IN  FOUR  VOLUMES 
VOLUME  IV 


BOSTON  AND  NEW  YORK 
HOUGHTON  MIFFLIN  COMPANY 
(£be  fiidersibe  press  Cambridge 


Copyright,  1907, 

By  THEODORE  AYRAULT  DODGE, 


All  rights  reserved. 


Published  November,  1907. 


5 

[\|  Ifi  Wdir 


v.  4 

toto.S. 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  PAGE 

LVII.  Lutzen.  January  to  May,  1813  1 

LVIII.  Bautzen.  May  4-21,  1813 44 

LIX.  The  Armistice.  May  22  to  August  16,  1813  . 80 

LX.  Hostilities  Reopen.  August  16-26,  1813  . . 115 

LXI.  Dresden.  August  26-31,  1813 147 


LXII.  The  Elbe  Abandoned.  August  30  to  September 

24,  1813  172- 

LXIII.  Leipsic  Manceuvre.  September  25  to  October  16, 

1813  ...  - 203 

LXIV.  Leipsic  Battle.  October  16-19,  1813  . . . 246 

LXV.  Wellington  invades  France.  1813  to  1814  . . 282 

LXVI.  The  Allies  invade  France.  November,  1813,  to 

January,  1814  305 

LXVII.  La  Rothiere  and  Montmirail.  February,  1814  344 

LXYIII.  Craonne,  Laon.  February  15  to  March  13,  1814  385 
LXIX.  Arcis-sur-Aube.  March  14  to  April  11,  1814  . 435 


LXX.  Toulouse.  January  to  April  10,  1814  . . 472 

LXXI.  The  Last  Strategic  Thrust.  March  to  June, 

1815 503 

LXXII.  Ligny  and  Quatre  Bras.  June  16,  1815  . . 553 

LXXIII.  The  Campaign  lost.  June  17  and  18,  1815  . . 590 

LXXIY.  Waterloo.  June  18,  1815 627 

LXXV.  The  Man  and  Soldier 671 

LXXYI.  Early  Military  Critics.  Bulow.  Jomini.  Na- 
poleon   719 


Appendix  A. 
Appendix  B. 

Appendix  C. 
Appendix  D. 
Appendix  E. 
Appendix  F. 

Index  . 


Marshals  of  France  ...... 

Some  of  Napoleon’s  Lieutenants  and  Ministers,  with 
their  Titles,  if  any  ...... 

Titles  and  Names  ....... 

Some  Noteworthy  Marches 

Modern  Casualties  ....... 

Partial  List  of  Sources  consulted  in  writing  this  His- 
tory of  the  Art  of  War  >/  . 


743 


744 

746 

747 

748 

757 

769 


573v*57 


LIST  OF  ILLUSTRATIONS. 


PAGB 

Napoleon,  Emperor  .....  Frontispiece 

(From  an  engraving  by  Lefevre,  after  the  painting  in  1815  by  Muneret.) 

French  Dragoon  .........  3 

Confederation  Foot  ........  4 

Warsaw  Foot  . .......  5 

Eugene  ..........  7 

Map  of  1813  Campaign  .......  12 

Prussian  Landwehr  ......  13 

Prussian  Musketeer  ........  14 

Prussian  Landwehr  Cavalry  ......  15 

Woronzov  ..........  21 

Bessikres  .........  27 

Liitzen  Country  .........  28 

Russian  Cossacks  ........  33 

Battle  of  Liitzen  .........  35 

Prussian  Grenadiers  .......  37 

Prussian  Musketeer  ........  40 

Prussian  Pioneer  ........  41 

Prussian  Hussar  .........  43 

Dresden-Bautzen  Country  ......  50 

Battle  of  Bautzen,  May  20  . . . . . . .64 

Prussian  Staff  Officer  . ...  ...  73 

Battle  of  Bautzen,  May  21  . . . . . . .75 

Imperial  Body-Guard  . . . . . . . 77 

Prussian  Musketeer  . . . . . . . .78 

Russian  Infantrymen . 79 

Duroc  ..........  81 

Prussian  Volunteer  Lancer 84 

Davout  ..........  89 

Metternich  .........  94 

French  Mounted  Grenadier  ......  110 

Swiss  Grenadier  Ill 


vi  LIST  OF  ILLUSTRATIONS . 

Prussian  Pioneer  ...... 

Prussian  Volunteer  Rifleman  .... 

Prussian  Hussar  ...... 

Schwartzenberg  ...... 

French  Hussar  Officer 

Westphalian' Grenadier  ..... 

Hanseatic  Footman  ..... 

Battle  of  Gross  Beeren  ..... 

Macdonald  ....... 

Battle  of  the  Katzbach  ..... 

Prussian  Body-Guard  ..... 

Sword  of  the  Period  ..... 

Gouvion  St.  Cyr  ..... 

Grenadier,  Imperial  Guard  .... 

Battle  of  Dresden,  August  26 

Russian  Grenadier  ...... 

Wurzburg  Rifleman  ..... 

Battle  of  Dresden,  August  2*7  . 

Frederick  William  III.  .... 

Napoleon  after  Bellange  ..... 

Saxe-Coburg  Rifleman  .... 

Empress  Dragoon  ...... 

Prussian  Reservist  . .... 

Dresden-Kulm  Country  ..... 

Kulm  Country  . . . . . . 

Kettled  rummer  of  Chasseurs  .... 

Dennewitz  Country  . . . . . 

Battle  of  Dennewitz  ..... 

Bavarian  Grenadier  ..... 

Prussian  Grenadier  ...... 

Saxon  Drum  Major  ..... 

Prussian  Dragoon  ...... 

French  Lancer  ...... 

Prussian  Lancer  ...... 

Bavarian  Artilleryman  .... 

French  Staff  Officer  ..... 

Hanseatic  Infantryman  .... 

Brunswick  Rifleman  ..... 


. 114 
116 
. 118 
122 
. 126 
130 
. 132 
135 
. 139 
140 
. 144 
146 
. 149 
150 
. 152 
154 
. 155 
156 
. 159 
161 
. 164 
165 
. 166 
167 
. 169 
177 
. 183 
184 
. 186 
189 
. 194 
195 
. 197 
199 
. 200 
202 
. 205 
207 


LIST  OF  ILLUSTRATIONS.  vii 


Saxon  Hussar  Officer 

. 

. 209 

Silesian  Hussar  .... 

. 

213 

Dresden-Leipsic-Magdeburg  Country 

. 216 

Pomeranian  Dragoon 

6 

221 

Hanoverian  Infantryman 

. 229 

Swiss  Guard  ..... 

232 

Battle  of  Leipsic,  October  16 

. 237 

Lobau  ...... 

243 

Battle  of  Leipsic,  October  18 

. 259 

Saxon  Sharpshooter 

261 

Saxon  Musketeer 

. 263 

Battle  of  Leipsic,  October  19  . 

268 

Poniatowski  .... 

. 269 

Leipsic  to  the  Rhine 

275 

Battle  of  Hanau  .... 

Bavarian  Artilleryman 

279 

Prince  Eugene  .... 

. 280 

Salamanca  to  Toulouse 

283 

Pampeluna  Manoeuvre 

. 286 

San  Sebastian  .... 

287 

Battle  of  Sauroren 

. 290 

Erlon  ...... 

Crossing  the  Bidassoa 

. 295 

Sword  of  the  Period 

304 

European  Theatre  of  War  in  1814 

. 309 

French  Theatre  of  War  in  1814 

314 

Austrian  Hussar 

. 317 

French  Fusiliers  . 

324 

Russian  Grenadiers 

. 327 

Theatre  of  Napoleon’s  Manoeuvres  in 

1814 

330 

Russian  Hussar  .... 

. 336 

Gerard  ...... 

341 

Coat  worn  by  Napoleon 

. 

. 343 

Marne-Seine-Aube  Country 

. 

346 

Prussian  Mounted  Artilleryman  . 

. 

. 347 

Battle  of  La  Rothiere 

. 

349 

Officers  of  Cossacks 

0 . . 

. 358 

Prussian  Rifle  Officer 

... 

363 

viii  LIST  OF  ILLUSTRATIONS. 


Battle  of  Montmirail  . 

. 

369 

Montmirail-Etoges  Country 

373 

Prussian  Hussar 

. 

376 

Trumpeter  of  Imperial  Guard  . 

379 

Chair  of  Imperial  Throne.  (Garde  Meuble.) 

384 

Battle  of  Montereau 

391 

French  Grenadier 

393 

Westphalian  Mounted  Artilleryman  . 

399 

Rheims-Laon-Soissons  Country 

417 

Battle  of  Craonne  .... 

421 

Battle  of  Laon  .... 

424 

Prussian  Train  Officer 

425 

French  Grenadier 

434 

Austrian  Infantryman 

441 

Battle  of  Arcis-sur-Aube,  March  20 

446 

Battle  of  Arcis-sur-Aube,  March  21  . 

448 

Westphalian  Cuirassier  Officer 

453 

Austrian  Cavalry  Officer  . 

455 

Moncey  ..... 

465 

Battle  at  Paris  Gates 

466 

Bavarian  Cannoneer 

471 

Operations  around  Bayonne 

477 

Battle  of  Orthez 

479 

English  Foot  Guard 

480 

Spanish  Fusilier  .... 

481 

The  March  on  Toulouse  . 

483 

English  Dragoon  Officer 

484 

Spanish  Sapper  .... 

486 

Battle  of  Toulouse 

490 

Spanish  Grenadier  Officer 

491 

English  Line  Officer  . 

492 

Silver  Washstand,  St.  Helena  . 

502 

Grenadier  of  Elba 

505 

Paris-Brussels-Cologne  Country 

514 

Sambre-Scheldt  Country 

532 

Napoleon’s  Engraving  Rack 

552 

Blucher  ..... 

569 

Battle  of  Ligny  .... 

574 

LIST  OF  ILLUSTRATIONS.  ix 

Wellington  ..........  581 

Battle  of  Quatre  Bras  .......  585 

Napoleon’s  Library  Chair.  (Garde  Meuble.)  . . . 589 

Sambre-Brussels  Country  ......  592 

Waterloo.  (Siborne’s  Sketch.)  . ....  614 

Waterloo.  Position  at  Opening  .....  616 

Waterloo.  No.  1 620 

Charts  of  French  Troops  Ready  to  Charge.  (From  “ Maximes 

de  1815.”) 623 

Sword  of  the  Period  . . ...  . . . . 626 

Battle  of  Waterloo.  No.  2 . . . . . 633 

Officer  of  King’s  Own  .......  637 

English  Dragoon  ........  639 

Mounted  Rocket  Corps  . . . . . . .641 

Battle  of  Waterloo.  No.  3 . . . . . 644 

English  Dragoon  ........  647 

King’s  Dragoon  . . . . . . . . 651 

Battle  of  Waterloo.  No.  4 . . . . . . . 654 

Wellington  .........  669 

Napoleon’s  Desk  Chair.  (Prince  Victor’s  Collection.)  . 670 

Rustan  . . . . . . . . . . 697 

Bed  on  which  Napoleon  died.  (Prince  Murat’s  Collection.)  . 718 

Meissonier’s  French  Eagle  . . . . . . 741 


NAPOLEON, 


LVII. 

LUTZEN.  JANUARY  TO  MAY,  1813. 

The  Russian  campaign  was  the  beginning  of  the  end,  but  Napoleon  rose  to 
the  situation.  Europe  scarcely  knew  the  extent  of  the  disaster,  and  France  sus- 
tained him.  Troops  and  war  material  were  rapidly  collected.  He  still  held 
Italy,  Holland  and  part  of  Germany,  and  Spain  was  not  lost ; but  England  was 
stirring,  Prussia  burned  to  regain  her  rights,  the  Confederation  was  lukewarm, 
Russia  still  pushed  the  war  with  France,  and  Austria  was  arming  as  mediator. 
The  Russian  army,  joined  by  the  Prussian,  gradually  forced  the  French  back 
from  the  Oder  to  the  Elbe,  and  later  to  the  Saale.  Eugene,  commanding  the 
wrecked  Grand  Army,  was  unequal  to  the  situation ; but  Napoleon  was  planning 
soon  to  cross  the  Elbe  offensively,  and  French  garrisons  still  held  many  Vistula 
and  Oder  fortresses.  By  mid- April  a new  army  near  Erfurt  was  reaching  out 
towards  Eugene.  Napoleon  was  nearer  ready  than  the  allies  except  in  cavalry ; 
but  they  had  crossed  the  Elbe  and  were  advancing  on  the  Saale,  with  much  less 
dread  of  him.  The  French  were  largely  fresh  levies  with  few  experienced  offi- 
cers, but  Napoleon  had  plenty  of  artillery,  and  introduced  simple  manoeuvres  by 
which  the  foot  could  hold  itself  against  cavalry.  On  April  28  the  two  French 
armies  joined  on  the  Saale  and  moved  on  Leipsic  ; though  much  inferior,  the 
allies  determined  to  do  battle  on  Leipsic  plain,  crossed  the  Elster,  and  on  May  2 
advanced  so  as  to  strike  Napoleon’s  right  on  the  march.  Wanting  cavalry  to 
reconnoitre,  Napoleon  was  surprised  by  the  enemy  about  noon  ; but  he  at  once 
gave  orders  to  meet  the  danger,  and  himself  led  the  troops.  Ney  held  himself 
in  a group  of  villages  near  Liitzen,  as  a central  nucleus,  and  the  onslaught  of 
the  enemy  was  slow.  The  rearward  corps  came  up  and  strengthened  the  French 
right ; Napoleon  brought  up  the  French  left  with  effect,  and  by  nightfall  the 
allies  were  driven  back  across  the  Elster,  whence  they  retired  behind  the  Elbe 
at  Dresden. 

Although,  as  Talleyrand  remarked,  the  Russian  disaster 
was  the  beginning  of  the  end,  it  was  no  time  for  Napoleon  to 
think  of  peace ; he  was  sure  to  have  another  coalition  against 


2 


A STUPENDUOUS  TASK. 


him,  and  it  was  more  consonant  with  his  character  to  assume 
a bold  front.  He  was  still  at  war  with  Russia,  whom  Prussia 
would  now  join.  Austria  had  begun  by  assuring  him  that  she 
would  maintain  the  existing  alliance,  and  Schwartzenberg  was 
sent  as  minister  to  Paris ; but  as  the  price  for  this  loyalty 
was  to  be  the  return  of  many  of  the  provinces  seized  at 
Schonbrunn,  Napoleon  avoided  any  promises,  in  the  belief 
that  a battle  won  on  the  Elbe  early  in  1813  would  modify  the 
terms.  Time  without  entanglements  was  all-important,  and 
to  gain  this  he  played  his  cards ; but  the  game  was  intricate, 
for  England  was  ready  with  a subsidy  and  the  promise  of 
Illyria,  or  even  Italy,  if  Austria  would  openly  oppose  France. 
Napoleon  harbored  the  idea  of  returning  Ferdinand  to  the 
Spanish  throne;  but  as,  despite  Salamanca,  Wellington  again 
retired  to  Portugal,  this  wise  restitution  lapsed.  Peace  was, 
however,  made  with  the  Holy  See. 

Napoleon’s  task  was  stupendous.  As  Lossau  states  it,  he 
had  to  seek  his  opponents,  the  allied  Prussians  and  Russians, 
to  drive  them  back  into  the  climate  which  had  been  so  fatal 
to  himself,  and  to  utilize  the  astonishment  which  would  be 
caused  by  a decisive  victory  to  win  peace.  This  was  a sensi- 
ble programme,  and  one  to  which  the  emperor  would  have 
done  well  strictly  to  adhere.  At  several  moments  during  this 
eventful  year,  it  could  have  been  carried  out. 

Outranking  the  political  embarrassments  was  the  question 
of  a new  army ; and  Napoleon  succeeded  in  a masterful  way 
in  transferring  his  own  enthusiastic  courage  to  the  nation,  and 
in  turning  this  sentiment  into  men  and  weapons.  “ I have 
been  extremely  satisfied  with  the  spirit  of  the  nation.  It  is 
disposed  to  make  every  kind  of  sacrifice,”  he  wrote  Murat  De- 
cember 19.  In  three  months,  six  hundred  guns  and  two  thou- 
sand caissons  were  started  for  the  Elbe.  The  cohorts  of  the 
premier  ban  (there  were  two  bans  or  levies  in  mass  in  1812) 


TROOPS  COLLECTED. 


3 


were  turned  into  one  hundred  and  fifty  line  regiments  by  add- 
ing twenty  new  cadres,  and  the  conscripts  filled  them  all. 
The  depot-troops  of  the  forces  in  Spain  were  organized  into 
one  hundred  and  eighty  provisional  battalions.  The  Young 
Guard  was  raised  to 
sixteen  regiments,  to 
enter  which  was  pa- 
raded as  an  honor. 

Courage  poured  from 
the  breast  of  this 
wonderful  man  upon 
his  subordinates,  and 


French  Dragoon. 


through  them  flowed 
into  a thousand  chan- 
nels, down  to  the  last 
Gallic  conscript : but 
what  the  new  army 
would  sadly  lack  was 
the  habit  of  war,  fire 
discipline,  that  bear- 
ing under  danger 
which  experience  alone  can  give  ; and  seasonably  to  provide 
them  with  veteran  leaders,  on  January  22  Eugene  was  ordered 
to  send  back  to  France  all  supernumerary  officers.  Artillery- 
men had  been  drilled  in  the  reserves  ; seventy  companies  could 
be  sent  into  Germany ; and  to  these  might  have  been  added  six 
regiments  of  good  sea  coast  cannoneers ; but  by  appealing  to 
their  patriotism,  Napoleon  turned  these  into  infantry,  except 
a few  companies  reserved  for  the  artillery  of  the  Guard.  The 
cavalrymen  who  returned  were  partly  remounted  in  Hanover ; 
postilions,  young  post-road  employees  and  other  men  used  to 
the  saddle  were  conscripted,  and  horses  seized  right  and  left ; 
and  the  gendarmerie  furnished  a reserve  from  which  to  draw 


4 


S TILL  FORMIDABLE. 


officers.  Out  of  the  debris  of  the  Grand  Army,  battalions 
had  been  made  of  six  companies  of  one  hundred  men  each, 
most  of  which  had  remained  in  Glogau,  Stettin  and  Ciistrin, 
and  some  had  retired  with  Eugene.  Of  these  latter,  the 
cadres  of  one  battalion  per  regiment  of  the  1st,  2d  and  3d  Corps 
remained  at  Leipsic  and  Erfurt  as  nucleus  for  fresh  con- 
scripts, the  other  cadres  returned  to  France.  The  1st  Corps 
retained  its  formation,  the  2d  and  3d  were  later  merged  into 
Victor’s  2d  Corps.  Before  spring  opened,  to  the  astonishment 
of  Europe,  Napoleon  again  headed  an  army  numerically  equal 

to  his  former  ones. 
And  he  was  not  slow 
to  let  his  allies  know 
it,  writing  on  Janu- 
ary 22  to  the  King 
of  Saxony,  whose 
loyalty  he  hoped  to 
retain  : w The  events 
which  happened  after 
my  leaving  the  army, 
the  treachery  of  Gen- 
eral Yorck,  have  done 
harm  to  my  affairs 
in  the  north  ; but 
I have  on  the  way 
such  forces  that  when 
a good  season  comes, 
the  enemy,  whatever 
progress  he  may  make,  will  be  driven  back  faster  than  he 
came.” 

Napoleon  was  still  formidable.  He  held  Italy,  Holland  and 
a large  part  of  Germany.  Except  Andalusia  and  Galicia,  the 
army  in  Spain  retained  its  conquests,  and  thirty  thousand 


Confederation  Foot. 


AGAINST  NAPOLEONISM. 


5 


conscripts  would  replace  it  on  a good  footing  for  the  coming 
campaign.  Territory  had  not  been  lost,  and  forfeited  prestige 
might  be  regained  by  one  great  victory.  On  the  other  hand, 
opposition  had  increased.  England  was  busy  stirring  up  an- 
other coalition.  Austria  was  arming,  ostensibly  as  a peace- 
maker. The  Confederation  of  the  Rhine  was  lukewarm  ; from 
Kalish,  Kutusov,  in  the  name  of  Russia  and 
Prussia,  called  on  it  to  throw  off  Napoleon’s 
protectorate,  and  secret  societies  everywhere 
preached  a crusade  against  Napoleonism. 

Prussia,  burning  for  war,  and  with  Russian 
recruits  joining  her  armies,  might  at  any  mo- 
ment burst  into  flame.  Though  conservative, 

Frederick  William  was  loyal  to  his  Father- 
land,  and  among  the  people,  crazy  with  patri- 
otic fervor,  “Liberty  and  Equality”  was  the 
watchword.  Finally  came  the  rupture.  Prus- 
sia made  a claim  on  Napoleon  for  ninety  mil- 
lion francs  for  stuff  furnished  the  army  in 
Russia.  This  claim  was  refused  even  a hear- 
ing, and  Prussia  openly  joined  the  Russian 
alliance  ; a treaty  was  signed  at  Kalish  Feb- 
ruary 27,  and  the  czar  met  Frederick  William 
at  Breslau  in  March.  Russia  agreed  to  bring  on  one  hun- 
dred and  fifty  thousand  men ; Prussia  was  to  put  afoot  a 
minimum  of  eighty  thousand,  and  approaches  were  made  to 
Austria. 

It  is  characteristic  that,  after  the  Russian  campaign,  Napo- 
leon looked  on  his  situation  as  by  no  means  desperate.  He 
at  first  hoped  to  hold  on  to  Warsaw,  and  felt  that  he  could 
still  rely  on  the  aid  of  Schwartzenberg ; then  Posen  became 
his  point  d’appui , and  twisting  the  facts  from  what  they 
meant  into  what  he  desired,  he  wrote  Eugene  from  Fontaine- 


6 


UNEQUAL  TO  THE  SITUATION. 


bleau,  January  26:  “From  the  moment  you  shall  have  as- 
sembled six  thousand  cavalry  and  forty  thousand  infantry, 
with  fifty  guns,  you  should  organize  the  Posen  magazines. 

. . . From  all  the  facts  I possess,  I harbor  no  doubt  that 
you  will  maintain  yourself  in  Posen.  ...  It  does  not  ap- 
pear possible  to  me  that  the  Russians  should  cross  the 
Vistula,  unless  it  be  some  Cossacks.”  As  a first  step  he 
desired  to  relieve  Danzig,  with  its  enormous  garrison,  and  to 
encourage  the  viceroy,  he  spoke  lightly  of  the  situation  there. 

As  already  narrated,  early  in  February,  1813,  Biilow  had 
opened  the  Prussian  lines  to  Wittgenstein,  who  crossed  the 
Vistula  above  Danzig  and  moved  towards  the  Oder ; Schwart- 
zenberg,  under  a truce,  had  retired  from  Warsaw  to  Cracow  ; 
Reynier  had  fallen  back  to  Kalish,  but  could  not  hold  it  ; 
Poniatowski,  permitted  to  withdraw  unarmed  through  Ga- 
licia, had  rejoined  the  French  army.  But  these  forces  were 
not  only  trivial  in  number,  they  were  still  under  the  spell  of 
the  horrible  disaster  just  ended.  When  the  emperor  learned 
that  Murat  had  left,  he  wrote  Eugene,  January  22 : “ My 
Son,  take  over  the  command  of  the  Grand  Army.  I am 
sorry  that  I did  not  leave  it  to  you  on  my  departure.”  And 
next  day  he  wrote : “ I find  the  conduct  of  Murat  very  ex- 
travagant, and  such  that  I am  almost  tempted  to  have  him 
arrested  as  an  example.  He  is  a brave  man  on  the  field  of 
battle,  but  he  lacks  combination  and  moral  courage.” 

Quite  excusable  for  being,  with  his  handful  of  men,  unable 
to  bear  up  against  his  difficulties,  Eugene  left  Posen  Febru- 
ary 12,  and  reached  Frankfort-on-the-Oder  the  18th.  How- 
ever necessary  this  step,  it  evoked  Napoleon’s  criticism,  as 
not  keeping  up  appearances.  The  Russians  had  slowly  ad- 
vanced into  Prussia,  and  Napoleon  thought  Eugene  should 
have  threatened  their  flank  rather  than  retire  to  a line  nearly 
abreast  of  Berlin.  “ If  what  I ordered  for  the  Elbe  had  been 


FRANKFORT  UNTENABLE. 


1 


done  on  the  Oder,”  he  wrote  him  March  15,  “ and  if  instead  of 
retiring  on  Frankfort  you  had  assembled  in  front  of  Ciistrin, 
the  enemy  would  have  looked  twice  before  throwing  anything 
over  to  the  left  side.  You  would  have  won  at  least  twenty 
days,  and  given  time  to  the  Corps  of  Observation  of  the 
Elbe  to  come  up  and 
occupy  Berlin.”  But 
in  a day  or  two  Eugene 
found  even  Frankfort 
untenable,  and  when 
the  Russians  moved 
around  both  his  flanks, 
he  had  difficulty  in  fall- 
ing back  to  the  Spree, 
where,  February  22,  he 
drew  up  with  his  main 
body  in  Kopenik,  his 
centre  in  Liibben,  his  T„ 

Jlugene. 

right  in  Bautzen. 

Here,  under  orders  to  remain  as  long  as  possible,  he  made 
an  attempt  to  put  on  a bold  front,  but  the  conditions  were  all 
against  him,  and  he  probably  did  as  well  as  any  other  of  the 
marshals  would  have  done.  In  these  days  the  emperor  made 
several  complaints  about  the  surrender  of  fortresses  with 
insufficient  defense. 

He  wrote  to  Eugene,  March  4 : “ My  Son,  they  tell  me  that  Pillau 
has  capitulated,  without  trenches  being  opened  or  a breach  having  been 
made  in  the  place.  As  soon  as  the  general  who  commanded  Pillau 
reaches  you,  have  him  arrested,  as  well  as  the  commandant  of  the  engi- 
neers, unless  this  last  named  protested,  and  have  them  conducted  under 
good  escort  to  the  citadel  of  Wesel.  They  say  that  a Russian  officer 
accompanies  them.  As  soon  as  this  officer  shall  have  arrived  at  the  out- 
posts, send  him  back.” 


8 


EUGENE  AT  WITTENBERG. 


And,  anxious  to  keep  Eugene  from  further  retreat,  the 
emperor  wrote  him,  March  5 : “ Kemain  in  Berlin  as  long 
as  you  can.  Make  examples  to  maintain  discipline.  At  the 
least  insult  from  a Prussian  town,  from  a village,  have  it 
burned,  were  it  even  Berlin,  if  it  acted  badly.”  “ If  you 
leave  Berlin  at  this  moment,  I fear  this  corps  ” (Gerard’s) 
“ will  be  lost.  I can  give  you  no  order  nor  any  direction, 
because  you  fulfill  no  duty,  in  not  sending  me  any  details,  nor 
any  accounts,  and  that  you  tell  me  nothing,  neither  you  nor 
your  staff.”  But  the  orders  came  too  late,  and  Eugene  was 
unequal  to  the  pressure ; for  when  Wittgenstein  crossed  the 
Oder  between  Frankfort  and  Ciistrin  and  moved  on  Berlin, 
turning  Eugene’s  left,  the  French  retired  behind  the  Elbe. 
On  March  6 Eugene  was  at  Wittenberg,  hoping  by  drawing 
in  Lauriston  from  Magdeburg,  and  Victor  from  the  Saale,  to 
hold  the  great  river.  Headquarters  came  to  Leipsic. 

Later  the  emperor  wrote  him  : “ I do  not  see  what  made  you  quit 
Berlin.  Had  you  taken  up  a position  in  front  of  Berlin,  the  enemy 
would  have  believed  you  ready  to  deliver  battle,  and  would  not  have 
crossed  the  Oder  before  he  had  assembled  sixty  or  eighty  thousand  men; 
but  he  was  far  from  able  to  do  this.  To-day  the  Russians  cannot  have  an 
army  equally  as  available  as  yours;  they  weaken  and  you  strengthen.” 
And,  dissatisfied  with  Eugene’s  retiring  to  Wittenberg,  he  wrote,  March 
7 : “ You  are  to  defend  Magdeburg,  cover  the  32d  military  division,  the 
kingdom  of  Westphalia,  Hanover  and  Cassel.  You  can  take  a good 
position  in  front  of  Magdeburg,  occupying  Torgau  with  a good  Saxon 
garrison.  If  you  are  obliged  to  quit  the  Elbe,  you  have  the  Hartz  moun- 
tains for  first  line,  covering  Cassel  and  Hanover;  then  a second  line 
between  the  Hartz  and  Cassel,  finally  the  Weser.”  In  this  letter  the 
emperor  wrote  : “ I have  always  told  you  that  you  ought  to  retire  on 
Magdeburg.  In  retiring  on  Wittenberg,  in  taking  your  line  of  opera- 
tion on  Mainz,  not  only  do  you  compromise  the  32d  division,  but  you 
even  compromise  Holland,  and  my  squadron  in  the  Scheldt.  . . . As  soon 
as  you  shall  have  taken  position  at  Magdeburg,  and  when  you  shall  have 
cut  off  all  communications  with  the  enemy,  you  will  take  every  disposi- 


THE  FRENCH  FORCES. 


9 


tion  proper  to  make  people  believe  that  I am  coming  to  Magdeburg,  and 
that  the  army  is  going  to  move  forward.”  And  again,  March  11  : “It  is 
in  front  of  Magdeburg  that  you  are  to  assemble  eighty  thousand  men, 
and  from  there,  as  a centre,  protect  the  entire  Elbe.” 

The  retreat  of  the  Grand  Army  thus  finally  came  to  an 
end  at  the  Elbe,  over  twelve  hundred  miles  from  Moscow. 

Of  the  French  forces,  in  March,  Keynier,  with  twelve  thou- 
sand men  brought  back  from  Warsaw,  was  in  Dresden  and 
Meissen ; Davout  with  the  skeleton  of  the  new  1st  Corps  of 
ten  thousand  men,  in  and  about  Dresden ; Victor  with  that  of 
the  2d  Corps,  eight  thousand  strong,  on  the  Saale  at  Bern- 
burg ; Grenier  at  Wittenberg  with  nineteen  thousand  men  ; 
Lauriston  with  the  Army  of  Observation  of  the  Elbe,  some 
twenty  thousand  strong,  at  Magdeburg,  and  Vandamme  at 
Bremen  with  six  thousand  effective:  a total  of  seventy-five 
thousand  men.  With  this  number  back  of  him  Napoleon 
regarded  Eugene’s  action  as  extraordinary. 

“We  must  finally  begin  to  wage  war,”  ...  he  wrote  him  March  11. 
“ Our  military  operations  are  a matter  of  laughter  to  our  allies  in  Vienna 
and  our  enemies  in  London  and  St.  Petersburg,  because  the  army  habitu- 
ally decamps  a week  before  the  enemy’s  infantry  comes  up,  on  the  ap- 
proach of  light  troops,  or  on  simple  rumors.  It  is  time  you  should  work 
and  act  in  a military  fashion  ; I have  traced  out  for  you  all  you  have  to  do. 
You  can  reunite  at  Magdeburg  and  under  cover  of  this  place  more  troops 
than  the  enemy  can  oppose  to  you.  From  then  on,  it  is  there  you  should 
hold  on  : and  the  enemy  is  not  fool  enough  to  advance  with  all  his  forces 
while  exposing  himself  to  be  cut  off  by  the  army  assembled  on  the 
Main.” 

Unsparing  in  criticism,  the  emperor  taxed  Eugene  with 
believing  the  enemy  stronger  than  he  actually  was ; and  to 
enforce  the  fact  that  Magdeburg,  not  Wittenberg,  was  the 
proper  place  on  which  to  retire,  so  as  to  protect  Holland  by 
holding  the  lower  Elbe,  he  ordered  Duroc  to  gather  his  per- 
sonal entourage  and  have  them  sent  to  Magdeburg. 


10 


THE  STRATEGIC  DEFENSIVE. 


And  on  March  13  lie  wrote  Eugene  : “ Finally,  because  your  movement 
at  Wittenberg  has  attracted  the  enemy  thither,  execute  your  manoeuvres 
at  Magdeburg  with  the  art  necessary  for  the  enemy  to  follow  you  there, 
and  to  make  him  fear  that  you  are  going  to  take  the  offensive  by  way  of 
Magdeburg.”  Should  the  enemy  march  on  Dresden  and  Hanover  at  the 
same  time,  he  said  it  would  be  Dresden  which  would  have  to  be  given  up. 
“ Obliged  to  choose  between  the  defense  of  the  lower  Elbe  and  the  upper, 
I desire  to  defend  the  lower.  I would  rather  see  the  enemy  in  Leipsic, 
Erfurt  and  Gotha  than  in  Hanover  or  Bremen,”  he  wrote  Eugene,  March 
15.  An  offensive  position  in  front  of  Magdeburg  would  in  fact  protect 
Dresden,  he  again  wrote,  three  days  later.  “If  there  is  a fine  position, 
it  is  the  one  in  front  of  Magdeburg,  where  you  threaten  every  moment  to 
attack  the  enemy,  and  from  whence  you  will  actually  attack  him  if  he  does 
not  appear  in  great  strength.” 

Indeed,  Napoleon  ordered  Lauriston  to  assemble  his  four 
divisions  three  miles  in  front  of  Magdeburg,  protect  them  by 
works,  and  to  spread  the  rumor  everywhere  that  he  was  about 
to  assume  the  offensive.  W e remember  the  strategic  value  of 
Magdeburg  in  the  days  of  Gustavus  and  Tilly.  The  city 
had  a corresponding  value  now. 

The  letters  to  Eugene  at  this  time  are  a text-book  on  the 
strategic  defensive.  Of  the  many  dicta  the  following  is  a 
sample : — 

“ You  must  make  it  a principle  that  the  enemy  will  cross  the  Elbe  where 
and  how  he  wishes,”  the  emperor  wrote  March  15.  “ Never  has  a river 

been  considered  as  an  obstacle  which  would  retard  more  than  a few  days. 
. . . Nothing  is  more  dangerous  than  to  try  seriously  to  defend  a river 
by  occupying  the  opposite  bank  ; because  once  the  enemy  has  surprised 
the  passage,  and  he  always  does  surprise  it,  he  finds  the  army  in  a defen- 
sive order  very  much  extended,  and  prevents  its  rallying.” 

On  the  health  of  the  army  Napoleon  also  wrote  Eugene, 
instructing  him  to  select  healthful  camps.  “ It  is  better  to 
deliver  the  bloodiest  battle  than  to  locate  one’s  troops  in  an 


TO  RESUME  THE  OFFENSIVE.  11 

unhealthfnl  place,”  he  once  wrote  Davout,  in  1811 ; and  now, 
on  March  28,  he  impressed  this  on  Eugene : — 

“ Choose  especially  ground  which  is  quite  healthy.  Consult  with  regard 
to  this  the  doctors  and  the  inhabitants  of  the  country.  ...  If  you  are  near 
marshy  or  inundated  fields,  whatever  they  may  say,  it  is  an  unhealthful 
situation.  You  must  move  higher.  You  must  feel  that  in  a month’s 
stop  in  the  springtime  I should  there  lose  my  army.  I desire  that  you 
should  consult  the  doctors  less  than  your  own  good  sense  and  the  inhab- 
itants.” And,  March  15,  about  victualing  : “ As  to  the  difficulty  of 
living,  you  have  before  you  the  most  beautiful  provinces  of  Prussia,  from 
which  you  can  draw  by  following  the  principles  of  military  execution, 
that  is,  by  designating  to  each  village,  even  at  ten  leagues  distance,  the 
quantities  it  is  to  furnish  to  your  camp,  and  in  case  a village  did  not  exe- 
cute your  order,  sending  a detachment  there  to  subject  it  to  contribution, 
and  if  necessary  to  burn  down  some  houses.” 

To  resume  the  offensive,  as  soon  as  he  could  assemble  on 
the  Elbe,  was  the  emperor’s  one  desire : he  would,  he  origi- 
nally thought,  cross  at  Havelberg,  push  on  Stettin,  anticipate 
the  enemy  on  the  Oder,  and  advance  to  the  relief  of  Danzig  — 
to  save  which  fortress  should  be  the  first  object  of  the  army, 
he  wrote  Eugene.  The  Army  of  the  Elbe  could  be  assembled 
at  Magdeburg,  Havelberg  and  Wittenberg,  and  the  Army  of 
the  Main  at  Wurzburg,  Erfurt  and  Leipsic ; and  both  could 
simultaneously  debouch  across  the  Elbe  and  march  concentric- 
ally on  Stettin.  In  two  weeks,  by  forced  marches,  three  hun- 
dred thousand  men  could  reach  Danzig  by  way  of  Stettin,  and 
by  the  twentieth  day  this  fortress  could  be  relieved  and  the 
lower  Vistula  occupied.  Havelberg  at  this  moment  seemed 
the  most  important  place  on  the  Elbe.  “ As  a defensive 
measure,  the  principal  aim  being  to  cover  the  32d  military 
division,  Hamburg  and  the  kingdom  of  Westphalia,”  on 
March  11  he  wrote  Eugene,  “ it  is  the  point  of  Havelberg 
which  accomplishes  all  that ; also  for  the  offensive  it  would 
be  much  better  if  Magdeburg  were  opposite  Werben;”  and  it 


12 


POSITIONS  ON  APRIL  1. 


was  a pity,  he  said,  that  it  had  not  been  made  a fortress. 
This  entire  plan  savors  of  Napoleon’s  best  thought  in  bold- 
ness and  sagacity ; under  cover  of  the  Thuringian  Forest  and 
the  Elbe  he  would  concentrate,  debouch  and  advance  with  his 
left  flank  secured  by  the  sea;  and  by  a rapid  march  prevent 
the  enemy  from  arresting  his  manoeuvre  until  he  had  rees- 
tablished himself  at  the  most  important  place  east  of  Berlin. 
He  was  right  in  assuming  that  the  moral  influence  of  such  a 
march  would  do  more  to  restore  his  prestige  than  any  other 
thing ; and  under  the  reiterated  orders  of  his  chief,  Eugene 
did,  by  March  21,  assemble  Grenier,  Lauriston  and  Victor 
in  front  of  Magdeburg.  But  the  Great  Captain  alone  could 
carry  out  such  a scheme.  Not  one  of  his  lieutenants  was 
abreast  of  it. 

On  April  1 the  Army  of  the  Elbe  under  Eugene  stood 
around  Magdeburg,  and  contained  Macdonald’s  corps,  with 
part  of  Augereau  and  Grenier ; Lauriston’s  corps,  composed 
of  new  regiments  organized  in  Magdeburg  of  1812  levies ; 
Victor’s  corps,  organized  in  Erfurt  with  old  cadres  and  young 
recruits  of  1818 ; Durutte  and  the  Saxons  under  Reynier ; 
and  the  1st  and  2d  Cavalry  Corps,  being  the  relics  of  the 
cavalry  from  Russia,  remounted  in  Germany.  The  Army  of 
the  Main  under  Ney  consisted  of  his  8d  Corps,  made  up 
from  conscripts  of  1813  and  others,  at  Wiirzburg;  of  Mar- 
mont’s  6th  Corps,  made  up  at  Frankfort  with  provisory  regi- 
ments and  marines ; of  Bertrand’s  4th  Corps,  made  up  at 
Verona  with  provisory  regiments,  cohorts  (National  Guards  of 
1812)  and  Italian  troops,  and  marched  to  Bamberg  through 
the  Tyrol  and  Bavaria ; of  the  Imperial  Guard  at  Frank- 
fort, with  a few  old  battalions,  but  mostly  young  conscripts ; 
and  of  some  troops  of  the  Confederation.  The  cavalry  was 
slowly  organizing  with  the  old  cadres,  conscripts  and  new 
levies. 


THE  IIRRIRY 
OF  IDE 

UNIVERSITY  OF  ILLINOIS 


CAMPAIGN 


THE 
of  n»t 

UKIVERSITt  Of  lit  WHS 


COSSACKS  UNDER  TETTENBORN. 


13 


On  the  same  date  the  Prussian  army  had  over  one  hundred 
and  twenty-five  thousand  men,  not  counting  the  landwehr, 
which  was  assembling.  After  Jena,  Napoleon  had  reduced 
the  Prussian  army  to  forty-two  thousand  men,  but  Scharn- 
horst  had  successively  passed  through  the  ranks  of  this  army 
nearly  all  the  youth  of  Prussia,  giving  them  a half-way  train- 
ing which  they  completed  in  the  reserve.  One  hundred  and 
twelve  thousand  Russians  had  crossed  the  Niemen,  of  which 
a third  was  regular  and  Cossack  cavalry,  and  twelve  thousand 
artillery  with  eight  hundred  and  fifty  guns.  This  force  was 
later  followed  by  over  fifty  thousand  men ; but  a‘s  the  for- 
tresses of  Danzig,  Thorn,  Modlin,  Zamosc,  Stettin,  Ciistrin, 
Glogau  and  Spandau  were  still 
held  by  French  garrisons,  at  least 
sixty  thousand  men  had  to  block- 
ade or  besiege  them. 

In  front  of  the  allied  armies, 
a body  of  ten  thousand  Cossacks 
under  Tettenborn  raided  the 
unoccupied  country  to  the  lower 
Elbe,  drove  the  French  out  of 
Pomerania  so  as  to  isolate  Den- 
mark, opened  the  road  for  the 
Swedish  contingent  which  Berna- 
dotte  was  sending,  and  on  March 
12  seized  Hamburg.  Napoleon’s 
plan  to  hold  the  lower  Elbe  neces- 

. ill!  p -n.  Prussian  Landwehr. 

sitated  the  abandonment  of  Dres- 
den ; and  to  retake  Hamburg  he  instructed  Eugene,  March  15 
and  18,  to  place  Davout  with  his  four  divisions  on  the  left  of 
the  army,  and  let  him  handle  the  matter,  as  being  most  famil- 
iar with  it.  Although  Davout’s  natural  place  was  on  the  fight- 
ing line,  the  charge  was  important.  He  broke  an  arch  of  the 


14  THE  ALLIED  CORPS. 

ancient  Dresden  bridge,  March  19,  not  without  protest  (and 
later  the  emperor’s  disapproval,  because  he  desired  to  keep 

the  people  friendly),  left  the  Saxon 
troops  at  Torgau,  and  inarched  on 
Liineburg.  On  the  26th  the  rest  of 
the  French  vacated  Dresden,  and 
next  day  it  was  occupied  by  the  Rus- 
sian vanguard. 

Late  in  March  Wittgenstein  with 
thirteen  thousand  Russians,  and 
Yorck  with  twenty  thousand  Prus- 
sians, lay  near  Berlin,  while  Billow 
with  twelve  thousand  and  Borstell 
with  five  thousand  Prussians  were 
approaching  from  the  Oder,  the 
Prussian  generals  being  under  Witt- 
genstein’s control.  The  rest  of  the 
allied  corps  were  farther  back,  but 
all  advancing:  Blucher  in  Silesia, 
Kutusov  with  the  Russian  main  army 
at  Kalish.  But  here  the  gallant  old  soldier  died,  worn  out 
with  years  and  hard  work.  Napoleon’s  strategic  foresight 
was  quickly  proved  by  the  fact  that,  when  Wittgenstein,  in 
following  up  Eugene,  advanced  on  Rosslau  in  order  to  reach 
out  towards  Blucher,  who  was  to  move  on  Saxony,  the  threat 
against  Berlin  of  Eugene’s  presence  at  Magdeburg  com- 
pelled him  to  turn  aside  to  march  on  the  viceroy.  This  he 
did:  on  April  5 he  pushed  back  the  French  outlying  parties; 
Eugene  withdrew  behind  the  Elbe,  broke  the  bridges  and  took 
up  a position  from  the  lower  Saale  to  the  Hartz  mountains, 
fronting  the  upper  Saale.  The  result  of  the  manoeuvring  up 
to  this  date  had  been  that  the  allies  had  occupied  the  Elbe 
and  the  French  were  striving  to  retain  the  Saale. 


ORDERS  TO  EUGENE. 


15 


Meanwhile  conscripts  and  new  artillery  had  been  for  some 
weeks  pouring  out  of  France  to  swell  the  cadres  in  Ger- 
many. On  April  11  Napoleon  wrote  Eugene : “ My  Son,  it 
is  probable  that  I shall  be,  from  the  20th  to  the  22d,  with  two 
hundred  thousand  men,  at  Erfurt.  I do  not  quite  know 


Prussian  Landwehr  Cavalry. 


what  you  will  do.  Manoeuvre  in  accordance  with  this,  and 
act  so  that  I shall  have  communications  assured  with  you. 
. . . Keep  in  touch  with  me,  and  in  condition  to  execute  the 
manoeuvres  that  I shall  indicate  to  you.  Procure  four  days’ 
bread.  Maintain  yourself  in  front  of  Magdeburg  as  long 
as  you  can,  and  especially  notify  me  exactly  of  all  the  news 
you  shall  get  out  of  the  enemy.  As  soon  as  I shall  arrive  at 
Erfurt,  our  natural  communications  will  be  made  behind  the 
Saale.” 

On  April  9 Napoleon  ordered  Ney  to  take  position  in  the 


16 


NAPOLEON  AT  MAINZ. 


Meiningen-Gotha-Erfurt  country,  Marmont  at  Eisenach  and 
Bertrand  at  Bamberg;  and  told  him  that  the  enemy  could 
not  approach  by  way  of  Dresden  with  more  than  twenty-five 
thousand  men.  “ From  your  position  of  Meiningen  you 
would  be  able  to  judge  the  forces  and  intentions  of  the 
enemy.  I should  like  to  see  you  take  position  in  front  of 
Erfurt,  which  would  tranquillize  all  Westphalia,  and  might 
enable  us  to  seize  the  debouches  of  the  Saale,  while  sustain- 
ing the  viceroy.  In  this  case  Marmont  would  move  on  Gotha, 
and  Bertrand  would  push  his  head  to  Coburg.  In  every  case 
it  is  necessary  that  your  corps  should  be  at  the  debouches 
of  the  Thuringian  mountains.”  The  emperor’s  object  was 
to  move  the  Army  of  the  Main  on  Naumburg,  while  Eu- 
gene would  march  up  to  Merseburg  and  thus  touch.  “ For 
the  moment  my  great  affair  is  to  join  the  viceroy  and  oc- 
cupy the  whole  Saale  from  Saalfeld  to  the  mouth.”  At  the 
time,  they  were  cut  apart  by  the  enemy’s  presence  near  Mer- 
seburg. 

Leaving  Paris  April  15,  in  forty  hours  Napoleon  was  in 
Mainz,  where  he  found  the  entire  forces  thus  distributed : 
The  Guard,  eighteen  thousand  strong,  was  in  that  city, 
Eugene  with  seventy  thousand  men  on  the  Saale,  the  left 
standing  at  the  mouth,  the  right  near  the  Hartz  mountains,  the 
centre  at  Bernburg,  the  reserve  at  Magdeburg ; Davout  on 
the  march  to  Liineburg  with  thirty  thousand  men ; Ney  had 
crossed  the  Thuringian  Forest  and  was  marching  on  Erfurt 
with  the  “ First  Observation  Army  of  the  Rhine,”  fifty  thou- 
sand strong,  while  the  “ Second  ” under  Marmont  and  Bes- 
sieres,  numbering  twenty-seven  thousand  men,  was  heading 
for  Eisenach  and  Gotha ; Bertrand  with  the  “ Observation 
Army  of  Italy,”  forty  thousand  effective,  was  nearing  Bam- 
berg, on  the  way  to  Coburg.  These  numbers  were  paper 
figures,  to  be  reached ; but  there  were  doubtless  two  hun- 


THE  ARMY  DIVIDED. 


17 


dred  thousand  men  converging  towards  the  old  campaigning- 
ground  of  1806.  The  names  of  these  several  armies  were 
provisional. 

On  April  13,  in  a Note,  the  emperor  said:  “I  divide  the  army  into 
two.  I await  several  days  before  issuing  the  decree.  The  Army  of  the 
Elbe  . . . forms  the  actual  army  . . . with  line  of  operation  through 
Wesel.  . . . The  other  army  is  the  Army  of  the  Main.  . . . The  Army 
of  the  Elbe  is  commanded  by  the  viceroy.  It  has  the  intendant  and 
the  body  of  the  entire  old  army.  The  Army  of  the  Main  has  nothing. 
It  needs  ...  all  that  is  required  by  an  army  of  two  hundred  thousand 
men.”  To  the  King  of  Wurtemberg,  April  18,  he  wrote  : “I  am  going 
myself  to  debouch  on  the  enemy  with  nearly  two  hundred  thousand  men, 
not  counting  the  one  hundred  thousand  that  the  viceroy  has  in  hand.” 
And  next  day  he  wrote  Bertrand  that,  from  what  he  heard  from  Eugene 
and  Ney,  the  allies  had  crossed  the  Elbe  with  not  exceeding  sixty  or 
seventy  thousand  men. 

The  army  Napoleon  was  himself  to  command,  which  later  in 
the  campaign  is  often  called  the  Grand  Army,  with  Berthier 
as  Chief  of  Staff,  was  as  follows.  The  numbers  cannot  be 
definitely  established,  but  they  were  not  far  from  these. 
Later  they  increased. 


The  Guard,  under  Mortier. 

15,000 

men. 

1st  Corps 

3 divisions 

Vandamme. 

15,000 

tt 

3rd  “ 

5 “ 

Ney. 

40,000 

(( 

4th  “ 

3 

Bertrand. 

20,000 

tt 

5th  “ 

3 

Lauriston. 

15,000 

« 

6th  “ 

3 

Marmont. 

25,000 

ft 

7th  “ 

Saxons 

Reynier. 

14,000 

tt 

11th  “ 

3 divisions 

Macdonald. 

15,000 

a 

12th  “ 

3 “ 

Oudinot. 

25,000 

tt 

184,000  “ 


There  were  three  hundred  and  fifty  guns.  The  2d  Corps, 
two  divisions  under  Victor,  was  yet  organizing;  the  8th 
was  Poniatowski’s  in  Galicia ; the  9th,  five  divisions,  was 


VOL.  IV. 


18  MARCHING  INTO  DANGER. 

Augereau’s,  stationed  in  Bavaria  to  hold  that  land,  impose 
on  Austria  and  observe  Bohemia ; the  10th  was  Rapp’s  big 
garrison  in  Danzig.  There  was  no  cavalry  corps,  but  later, 
under  Latour-Maubourg  and  Sebastiani,  sixteen  thousand 
horse  were  collected.  Eugene  and  Davout  had  special  com- 
mands consisting  of  one  or  more  corps  each,  the  former  of 
over  forty  thousand  men  (Lauriston,  Macdonald  and  Rey- 
nier),  and  the  latter  of  twenty  thousand  men. 

Napoleon  believed  himself  to  be  in  greater  readiness  and 
numbers  than  the  allies.  The  Russian  army,  he  argued,  had 
marched  all  the  way  from  Moscow,  and  the  winter  campaign 
must  have  left  its  mark  ; and  besides  the  corps  investing 
Danzig,  Thorn,  Modlin  and  Zamosc,  and  back  at  Ciistrin, 
another  body  had  occupied  Poland  and  followed  Poniatowski. 
It  could  scarcely  have  over  sixty  thousand  combatants  left ; 
and  Prussia,  trodden  in  the  dust  since  1806,  could  not  have 
put  in  line  more  than  fifty  thousand  men.  To  oppose  these 
Napoleon  could  count  on  a quarter  million  men,  of  whom  one 
hundred  and  eighty  thousand  in  the  field  army ; and  he 
would  have  these  at  the  key-point  before  the  enemy  could 
place  as  many  there.  Wittgenstein  he  opined  was  marching 
into  danger  with  the  same  confidence  which  ruined  the  Prus- 
sians in  1806,  and  the  Elbe  country  was  not  the  steppes  of 
Russia,  where  he  could  fight  in  retreat.  Moreover,  the  allies 
were  acting  on  eccentric  lines.  To  the  fact  that  Westphalia 
and  Hanover  were  ripe  for  a rising,  except  for  the  fear  of  the 
French,  Napoleon  paid  small  heed. 

The  emperor  strove  to  cut  down  his  personal  surroundings.  On  March 
12  he  had  written  to  Duroc:  “ I wish  that  my  equipages,  now  numbering 
seventy-two  carriages,  were  only  ten;  and  instead  of  five  hundred  horses 
and  mules,  I consider  as  being  of  any  use  only  one  hundred  and  ten. 
See  in  what  manner  this  can  be  arranged.”  . On  April  13  he  wrote  Cau- 
laincourt:  “These  are  my  dispositions  for  my  departure.  I will  leave 


THE  EMPEROR  REACHES  ERFURT. 


19 


with  you  in  a light  carriage,  the  Grand  Marshal  with  Count  Lobau  in 
another  carriage,  Fain  and  Yvan  in  a third  carriage.  These  three  car- 
riages are  to  be  equally  light.  ...  In  my  carriage  will  be  put  a choice 
of  books,  the  maps  of  the  post-roads,  the  sketches  lately  made  in  my 
topographical  bureau,  a few  maps  of  the  country  between  the  Elbe  and 
Main.  Fain  will  have  in  his  carriage  my  morning  reports  ” (situations) 
“and  my  correspondence  with  the  army.  . . . The  topographical  engi- 
neer who  remains  here  will  leave  with  the  rest  of  my  maps  and  papers, 
and  will  follow  the  route  of  Tr&ves.  Ma  Chamlre  ” (my  personal  be- 
longings) “ will  leave  also  by  the  route  of  Tr&ves.  I shall  have  disposed 
of  all  my  aides-de-camp  and  orderly  officers.” 

On  the  19th  the  emperor  wrote  Bertrand : “ It  seems  that 
the  enemy  has  sixty  or  seventy  thousand  men  on  the  left  bank 
of  the  Elbe ; ” and  to  Ney : “ The  news  that  I receive  from 
all  sides  tends  to  make  me  think  that  there  have  passed  to 
the  left  bank  of  the  Elbe  only  the  corps  of  Wittgenstein, 
Yorck  and  Blucher,  and  some  partisans.  That  all  this  is  not 
in  condition  to  hold  head  to  us,  but  that  this  cavalry  may  dis- 
quiet us,  which  makes  it  necessary  to  open  the  lines  of  the 
Saale  and  seize  the  debouches  of  Jena,  Saalfeld,  Naumburg, 
Merseburg  and  Halle,  so  as  to  keep  all  the  light  cavalry  of 
the  enemy  on  the  right  of  that  river,  and  place  ourselves  in 
perfect  communication  with  the  viceroy.” 

On  April  25  Napoleon  reached  Erfurt.  The  lack  of  cav- 
alry kept  him  ignorant  of  what  the  enemy  was  doing ; there 
was  less  than  ten  thousand  horse,  and  this  arm  cannot  be  at 
once  created  — new  troops  can  soon  be  made  into  infantry, 
but  not  into  cavalry.  No  one  better  gauged  this  arm.  A 
defensive  campaign,  especially  behind  works,  can  be  carried 
on  with  a small  amount  of  horse,  but  if  you  are  beaten  in 
battle  in  the  open  and  have  no  cavalry  while  the  enemy  has, 
you  are  lost ; as,  conversely,  if  you  win  and  have  no  cavalry, 
you  cannot  make  victory  decisive.  Superiority  in  cavalry 
can  hide  the  movements  of  the  army,  develop  those  of  the 


20 


LACK  OF  CAVALRY. 


enemy.  Few  instances  of  its  value  are  more  pronounced 
than  the  influence  the  South  exerted  in  the  Civil  War  for  the 
first  two  years,  by  reason  of  its  better  cavalry.  Napoleon 
had  always  much  relied  on  his  horse,  and  gave  it  heavy  work 
to  do ; and  now  he  must  get  along  without  horse  of  his  own, 
while  preparing  his  young  soldiers  to  meet  the  enemy’s.  On 
this  most  important  subject  he  wrote  Marmont,  April  17 : — 

“Of  all  manoeuvres”  (drill),  “I  should  recommend  to  you  the  most 
important,  which  is,  ploying  into  square  by  battalion.  The  chief  of  bat- 
talion and  the  captains  should  know  how  to  make  this  movement  with 
the  greatest  rapidity.  It  is  the  only  means  of  providing  against  cavalry 
charges  and  saving  an  entire  regiment.”  And,  conscious  that  his  new 
squadrons  were  not  yet  reliable,  he  wrote  Ney,  April  20  : “Recommend 
General  Souham  not  to  leave  his  cavalry  without  infantry  ; and  the  infan- 
try which  is  with  this  cavalry  must  intrench  and  post  itself  in  the  great- 
est circumspection,  so  as  to  have  no  cavalry  skirmishes.”  To  Bertrand 
he  had  written  April  12  : “ What  it  is  convenient  to  recommend  to  you 
is  to  march  in  close  order,  your  two  divisions  assembled,  your  artillery  well 
placed,  having  no  tail,  bivouacking  every  evening  as  soon  as  you  shall 
have  left  Bamberg,  and  having  your  cartridges  in  the  bags.  The  enemy  is 
far  from  guessing  the  considerable  forces  which  will  move  upon  the  Saale. 
. . . The  best  means  of  having  your  divisions  bivouac  is  in  square,  unless 
you  are  backed  up  on  a river  or  some  obstacle  which  makes  this  unneces- 
sary. Avoid  cavalry  skirmishes,  and  especially  take  measures  to  assure 
your  provisions.”  This  lack  of  cavalry  was  the  more  serious,  because  the 
foot  had  to  hold  head  against  the  enemy’s  excellent  light  horse,  and  after 
a long  day’s  march,  infantry  battalions  had  to  do  the  duty  of  mounted 
men.  The  emperor  did  what  he  could  to  fill  this  gap,  writing,  e.  g.,  to  the 
King  of  Saxony,  April  20,  “ I beg  Your  Majesty,  if  you  remain  on  the 
political  side  that  you  have  taken,  to  send  me  at  once  all  the  cavalry  you 
can  dispose  of.  It  is  the  only  help  that  I can  await  from  you,  and  it  is 
what  you  can  do  most  advantageously  to  save  your  states.”  And,  on  April 
24,  he  wrote  the  King  of  Wurtemberg,  “I  should  find  myself  in  a posi- 
tion to  end  affairs  very  promptly  if  I only  had  fifteen  thousand  more  Cav- 
alry, but  I am  rather  weak  in  this  arm.  ...  I have  on  the  way  more  than 
thirty  thousand  cavalry,  which  will  rejoin  me  during  the  coming  May.” 


A POLICY  OF  ACTION. 


21 


While  the  heavy  French  columns  with  the  reserve  trains 
were  moving  towards  Leipsic  from  Bamberg,  Wurzburg, 
Frankfort,  Eisenach,  the  Russo-Prus- 
sian  field  army,  which  had  assembled 
near  the  Elster  early  in  May  with 
less  than  one  hundred  thousand  men, 
was  so  placed  that  it  must  evacuate 
the  left  bank  of  the  Elbe  or  meet 
superior  forces.  It  could  not  hold 
the  Elbe,  which  was  not  difficult  for 
the  French,  who  had  Wittenberg,  to 
cross  ; but,  believing  that  Napoleon 
had  not  yet  concentrated,  the  allies 
chose  a policy  of  action  ; for  on  the 
Leipsic  plain,  with  the  Saale  in  the 
French  rear,  they  thought  their  excess  of  cavalry  would  enable 
them  to  win.  They  had  many  more  old  soldiers  in  their  ranks, 
and  the  Russian  campaign  had  lent  them  confidence.  They 
had  cheerfully  advanced  under  energetic  Wittgenstein,  no 
longer  terrorized  by  the  great  conqueror.  While  Woronzov 
and  Billow  masked  Magdeburg  and  covered  Berlin,  Wittgen- 
stein had  crossed  the  Elbe  at  Dessau,  and  with  twenty-five 
thousand  men  lay  between  the  lower  Mulde  and  the  lower 
Saale,  in  the  Halle-Dessau  region ; Bluclier  with  twenty-three 
thousand  men  had  advanced  to  Altenburg  on  the  Pleisse ; 
the  Russian  van,  fifteen  thousand  strong  under  Milorado- 
vich,  lay  at  Chemnitz  with  the  main  Russian  force  under 
Tormasov,  eighteen  thousand  effective,  still  in  Dresden  ; at 
Merseburg,  in  the  advance,  stood  ten  thousand  men  under 
Winzingerode,  who  later,  as  Eugene  advanced,  withdrew  to 
Liitzen. 

Napoleon’s  plan,  when  he  discovered  that  the  enemy  was 
marching  on  Saxony  and  that  it  was  too  late  to  move  to  Dan- 


Woronzov. 


22 


TACTICAL  NEEDS. 


zig,  was  enunciated  in  a letter  to  Bertrand  of  April  12 : Ney 
44  will  have  made  you  understand  that  my  intention  is  to  refuse 
my  right  and  to  let  the  enemy  penetrate  towards  Bayreuth, 
making  a movement  inverse  to  what  I made  in  the  Jena  cam- 
paign, so  that,  if  the  enemy  penetrates  towards  Bayreuth,  I 
may  arrive  before  him  at  Dresden,  and  cut  him  off  from  Prus- 
sia.” This  shows  how  the  emperor’s  broad  mind  constantly 
reverted  to  certain  simple  but  set  forms  of  strategy.  In  his 
way,  with  his  maps  and  pins,  he  was  as  much  of  a diagram- 
matist  as  Jomini  with  his  charts  is  accused  of  being  by  some 
who  forget  what  we  all  owe  to  this  first  great  military  critic. 
And  mindful  of  tactical  needs  he  wrote  Ney,  April  20,  to 
44  choose  a good  battlefield  near  Erfurt,  have  a plan  made  of  it, 
and  send  it  to  me,  as  well  as  the  project  of  fortification  which 
should  be  erected  there.”  On  April  22  Ney  replied  that  Blu- 
cher  was  at  Altenburg  and  Prince  William  at  Chemnitz,  with 
the  light  cavalry  raiding  everywhere,  and  that  Winzingerode 
still  cut  the  communication  between  him  and  Eugene.  But  the 
French  advance  soon  compelled  the  allies  to  decamp,  and  on 
April  24  Napoleon  wrote  to  Cambaceres  that  they  were  moving 
back  on  their  bridges  at  Dessau.  And  as  to  all  appearances 
they  simply  lay  still  in  Saxony,  he  changed  his  plan  and,  as  he 
wrote  the  King  of  Wurtemberg  the  same  day  : 44  The  first  aim 
of  my  operations  is  to  throw  the  enemy  over  to  the  right  bank 
of  the  Saale,  then  over  to  the  right  bank  of  the  Mulde,  and 
even  over  to  the  right  bank  of  the  Elbe.”  For  this  manoeu- 
vre Leipsic  was  the  key -point ; and  to  join  the  viceroy  the 
main  object ; and  next  day  Eugene  was  ordered  to  recapture 
Halle  and  Merseburg,  and  from  there  to  move  forward  on 
that  city. 

On  April  27  Napoleon  wrote  Ney:  44 1 hope  that  to-day  the 
viceroy  will  be  at  Querfurt  and  that  the  junction  will  be  made. 
The  occupation  of  Jena,  Dornburg,  Naumburg,  Merseburg, 


CONCENTRATING  ON  THE  SAALE. 


23 


Halle,  that  is  my  first  project.  One  might  also  occupy  Weis- 
senfels,  if  there  is  a bridge  on  the  Saale  and  a route  by  the 
left  bank.  All  the  movements  are  to  be  made  behind  the 
Saale  as  behind  a curtain,  and  none  on  the  right  bank.”  He 
had  placed  the  force  of  the  enemy  too  low,  and  hoped  to  cut 
him  off  from  Berlin,  or  perhaps  catch  Wittgenstein  separated 
from  the  Prussians,  and  “as  Wittgenstein  is  rather  bold,  if 
we  break  out  with  heavy  masses,  we  can  inflict  great  losses 
upon  him.”  From  his  point  of  view,  the  enemy  had  come  up 
to  the  Saale  for  the  mere  purpose  of  being  beaten ; and  with 
his  superiority  he  was  confident  of  the  result,  though  to  gain 
the  result  might  require  heavy  fighting. 

By  inflicting  great  losses  on  the  enemy,  Napoleon  meant  to 
do  him  a substantial  and  legitimate  damage,  not  merely  put  a 
given  number  of  men  hors  de  combat.  The  latter  was  no  part 
of  his  scheme.  “ In  war,”  he  once  said,  “ every  harm,  even 
if  within  the  rules,  is  excusable  only  when  absolutely  neces- 
sary. Everything  beyond  this  is  a crime.”  And,  reckless  as 
he  was  of  human  life,  he  always  acted  on  this  theory. 

On  April  25  the  French  lay  as  follows : “ The  Guard  in 
Erfurt ; Eugene  with  Lauriston,  Macdonald  and  Reynier  on 
the  lower  Saale  holding  Wittenberg,  which  was  blockaded  by 
the  Russians;  Ney  in  front  of  Weimar,  with  a detachment 
holding  the  Kosen  defile ; Marmont  at  Gotha ; Bertrand  at 
Saalfeld  ; Oudinot  at  Coburg.  As  the  emperor  had  deter- 
mined, the  Grand  Army  began  to  concentrate  on  the  Saale, 
Eugene  with  the  left  wing  moving  on  Merseburg,  Napoleon 
with  the  right  wing  on  Weissenfels. 

On  April  27  the  emperor  wrote  Berthier  to  send  out  geo- 
graphical engineers  to  make  reconnoissances  of  certain  roads 
in  his  front:  “They  will  report  if  they  are  practicable  or  not 
for  artillery,  will  describe  the  defiles,  woods,  rivers,  their 
width,  their  depth,  the  bridges,  the  brooks,  fords.  They  will 


24 


RAWNESS  OF  THE  FOOT. 


indicate  the  positions  which  are  susceptible  of  defense,  the 
towns  and  villages  susceptible  of  being  easily  put  beyond  cap- 
ture out  of  hand.”  Everything  was  made  ready  for  contact 
with  the  enemy. 

It  had  been  a wonderful  feat  for  Napoleon  to  leave  the 
wreck  of  the  Grand  Army  at  Smorgoni  the  beginning  of  De- 
cember, and  to  be  on  the  Elbe  again  with  a new  army  of  two 
hundred  thousand  men  before  the  end  of  April  — but  this 
huge  company  of  uniformed  men  was  not  the  Grand  Army. 
The  soldiers  were  there,  armed  and  equipped  ; but  they  were 
not  the  corps  that  had  assembled  on  the  Vistula  the  spring  be- 
fore, and  much  less  the  veterans  of  1809.  “ We  must  be  care- 

ful,” Napoleon  had  said  in  a former  campaign,  “not  to  bring 
bad  troops  into  danger,  and  not  be  so  mad  as  to  believe,  as 
many  do,  that  a man  is  a soldier.  ...  A body  of  troops  requires 
the  more  artillery  the  less  it  is  good.  There  are  army  corps 
with  which  I would  demand  only  a third  of  the  artillery  which 
I would  deem  necessary  with  others.”  Previous  to  Gustavus 
Adolphus,  the  number  of  guns  per  thousand  men  varied  from 
one  to  five.  Gustavus  generally  had  three,  but  at  one  time 
six.  In  the  Seven  Years’  War  the  average  number  was  four, 
though  Frederick  once  increased  it  to  ten  per  thousand. 
Napoleon  rarely  got  more  than  five  or  six  per  thousand.  On 
account  of  the  rawness  of  the  foot,  the  emperor  had  now 
striven  to  make  the  artillery  arm  strong.  He  made  every  one 
believe  it  so  at  the  beginning ; and  later  it  really  did  reach 
the  enormous  total  of  thirteen  hundred  guns.  He  said  after 
Liitzen  and  Bautzen  that  “it  is  the  artillery  of  the  Guard 
which  decides  most  battles,  because,  having  it  always  at 
hand,  I can  send  it  wherever  it  is  necessary,”  and  on  June  2 
he  wrote  Clarke,  “Great  battles  are  won  with  artillery.”  Yet 
to  combat  the  general  and  dangerous  feeling  that  the  troops 
were  of  poor  quality,  he  insisted  that  his  lieutenants  might 


DUTIES  LACK  IN  PERFORMANCE. 


25 


place  confidence  in  the  men ; and  he  himself  fought  these 
youngsters  as  if  they  had  been  veterans.  Napoleon  had  the 
gift  of  using  masses  of  men  with  a touch  no  one  else  could 
approach. 

While  the  emperor  still  had  some  of  his  famous  marshals, 
and  could  rely  on  intelligent  obedience,  even  these  were  no 
longer  as  active  as  of  old  ; some  were  weary  of  war,  and  many 
spoiled  by  excesses.  Instead  of  the  ancient  pride  in  their  pro- 
fession, in  their  success,  in  their  commands,  there  is  testimony 
that  self-indulgence  was  common,  and  that  unless  the  master 
was  at  hand  — and  this  was  less  frequently  than  of  yore  — the 
duties  of  high  and  low  lacked  in  the  performance.  Nor  was 
the  blind  faith  in  Napoleon’s  powers  left  which  once  carried 
general  and  soldier  so  far ; and  with  the  regimental  officers 
and  sub-officers  — most  of  whom  were  without  experience  — 
it  was  worse.  Young  troops  with  old  officers  are  one  thing ; 
young  troops  with  young  and  ignorant  leaders  are  another. 
No  one  appreciated  this  fact  more  than  Napoleon.  “The 
bearing  of  a corps  resides  in  the  officers  and  sub-officers,”  he 
wrote  Deeres,  December  15,  1806 ; and  now  he  made  loud 
complaints. 

On  April  27  he  wrote  Marmont:  “ You  will  send  back  to  the  depot  of 
Erfurt  ...  all  the  captains  who  have  not  made  war.  . . . You  will  do 
the  same  by  the  sub-lieutenants  and  lieutenants  who  may  be  in  the  same 
case.  It  is  absurd  to  have  in  a regiment  captains  who  have  not  made 
war.”  And  to  Clarke  he  wrote  the  same  day:  “ It  is  impossible  to  see  a 
finer  corps  of  soldiers,  but  it  is  impossible  at  the  same  time  to  see  a 
worse  one  in  officers.  If  your  bureau  had  taken  as  a task  to  name  the 
most  inefficient  officers  in  France,  it  could  not  have  better  succeeded. 
These  officers  are  the  laughter  of  the  soldiers.  . . . Most  of  the  cap- 
tains have  never  seen  fire.  . . . You  send  me  also  young  men  who  come 
out  of  college,  and  who  have  not  been  to  the  school  at  St.  Cyr,  so  that 
they  know  nothing,  and  it  is  in  new  regiments  you  place  them.  It  is  im- 
possible to  do  worse  service  than  this  bureau  of  your  ministry  has  done.” 


26 


THE  JUNCTION  COMPLETED. 


Napoleon  must  have  been  conscious  that  it  was  his  cease- 
less wars  that  had  killed  off  the  officers  he  now  needed ; 
yet  he  permitted  no  one  to  guess  his  thoughts,  and  dealt  with 
the  existing  conditions,  not  their  history. 

Though  Austria  continued  friendly,  yet  matters  in  Vienna 
looked  threatening,  and  Napoleon  had  quietly  suggested  to 
his  father-in-law  that  Silesia  might  again  be  added  to  his 
dominion ; but  Austria  was  not  to  be  thus  cajoled,  she  was 
negotiating  with  England,  Prussia  and  Russia ; Napoleon’s 
position  was  too  delicate  to  take  a positive  step,  and  Austria 
was  not  ready  for  an  open  rupture.  She  declared  herself 
ready  for  armed  mediation,  but  this  meant  as  a condition  pre- 
cedent the  independence  of  the  Confederation  of  the  Rhine, 
the  breaking  up  of  the  Duchy  of  W arsaw,  and  the  restitution 
of  Illyria ; and  Napoleon  was  unwilling  to  lop  off  these  pro- 
vinces, which  he  had  virtually  added  to  France, 

Towards  the  end  of  April,  as  we  have  seen,  the  situation 
was  improved  by  the  French  wings  getting  closer ; and  the 
emperor,  on  the  28th,  wrote  to  Ney : “ The  great  affair  at 
this  moment  is  the  junction  ; ” to  Berthier  : “ Have  it  known 
. . . that  I shall  arrive  at  Weimar  at  the  moment  the  infan- 
try leaves,  desiring  to  march  at  its  head  ; ” and  to  Eugene : 
“You  know  that  my  principle  is  to  debouch  in  mass.  It  is 
then  in  mass  that  I wish  to  pass  the  Saale  with  three  hundred 
thousand  men.” 

The  junction  was  completed  April  28  and  29  by  Eugene 
with  the  left  wing  reaching  Merseburg,  which  Macdonald 
seized,  and  Napoleon  with  the  centre  and  right  reaching 
Weissenfels,  and  the  French  army  was  put  over  the  Saale 
and  moved  forward  on  Leipsic,  the  cross-roads  of  that  section 
of  Germany.  Somewhat  parallel  to  Eugene’s  march,  Witt- 
genstein wras  moving  from  the  Dessau  country  to  join  forces 
at  or  east  of  Leipsic  with  Blucher.  On  April  29  Ney’s  van- 


BESSIERES  KILLED. 


27 


guard  under  Souham  struck  some  Russian  cavalry  under 
Landskoi  at  Weissenfels,  the  French  recruits  behaved  well, 
and  the  Russians  retired.  Next  morning,  when  the  French 
started  to  march  through  the  Rippach  defile,  which  leads  out 
of  the  deep  Saale  channel  into  the  Leipsic  plain,  Winzin- 
gerode  held  the  road,  but  the  French  assaulted  the  defile  and 
the  allies  fell  back.  In  this  unimportant  action,  Bessieres 


Bessieres. 


was  killed  — a grievous  loss.  The  French  army  followed  on, 
the  emperor  remained  in  place  waiting  for  Eugene  to  de- 
bouch, and  sent  him  orders  to  deploy  in  front  of  Merseburg ; 
and  near  Liitzen  Ney  reached  out  to  Macdonald,  who  com- 
manded Eugene’s  right.  At  9 P.  M.  Eugene  wrote  the  em- 
peror : “ It  seems  that  the  enemy  has  assembled,  at  Leipsic, 
the  corps  of  Yorck,  Wittgenstein,  Miloradovich  . . . and 
probably  Blucher.  . . . Kleist  has  retired  to  Leipsic.  It  is 
probable  . . . that  they  will  defend  the  Elster  on  their  new 


28 


DISPOSED  IN  ECHELON. 


lines  of  operation  on  Dresden.  All  their  right  appears  at 
least  to  have  withdrawn  upon  the  centre.” 

On  May  1 Ney  moved  forward  to  Liitzen  and  occupied 
Starsiedl  and  Kaja  on  the  Flossgraben ; Marmont  was  be- 
tween Weissenfels  and  Liitzen  marching  through  Rippach 
defile  ; Bertrand  through  Dornburg  was  nearing  Poserna, 
with  orders  to  move  to  Kaja ; Oudinot,  through  Kahla,  was 
reaching  Naumburg ; Eugene  with  Lauriston  was  at  Mark- 


Liitzen  Country, 


THE  ENEMY  CONCENTRATING . 


29 


ranstadt ; Reynier  was  in  Merseburg,  and  Macdonald  still 
near  Liitzen.  The  French  were  thus  echeloned  on  the  sev- 
eral routes  from  Naumburg  to  Leipsic.  Headquarters,  with 
Ney  and  the  Guard,  was  at  Liitzen,  covered  by  a detachment 
of  Ney  at  Pegau  to  protect  the  French  right. 

That  the  old  marauding  trouble  continued  is  shown  by 
a letter  to  Ney  : “ They  complain  that  your  troops  commit 
many  disorders,  so  that  the  villages  are  deserted.  It  is  a 
great  misfortune.  Put  an  end  to  it.”  And  to  keep  every 
able  man  with  the  colors,  Napoleon  wrote  to  Berthier,  April 
30  : “ Name  a commandant  for  Naumburg.  Give  orders  that 
the  Young  Guard  shall  leave  there  a company  of  disabled 
men  who  can  do  the  service.  Bertrand  and  Marmont  can 
also  leave  there  their  disabled  men.” 

The  enemy  had  likewise  been  concentrating,  though  how, 
with  his  lack  of  cavalry,  Napoleon  could  not  ascertain ; and 
Wittgenstein,  Blucher  and  Winzingerode  lay  along  the  Elster 
and  Pleisse,  at  Zwenkau  and  Rotlia ; Tormasov  was  at  Lob- 
stadt,  and  the  van  of  the  main  army  under  Miloradovich 
was  protecting  the  left  flank  at  Altenburg.  Despite  the  anti- 
Napoleon  ic  crusade,  the  czar  soon  learned  that  all  Germany 
was  not  rising  to  welcome  the  allies,  and  also  that  Napoleon 
had  reached  the  Saale  with  a new  army  ; but  he  still  believed 
that  the  veterans  of  Moscow  and  the  Beresina,  backed  by  the 
finely  drilled  Prussian  battalions,  which  since  1806  had  been 
under  constant  discipline,  could  easily  overthrow  the  con- 
script youth  of  France.  He  underrated  the  numbers  the  em- 
peror had  brought  to  the  Elbe ; he  did  not  credit  the  French 
army  with  being  well  in  hand,  and  fancied  he  could  attack 
the  separate  corps  before  they  had  joined.  Victory  was 
essential  to  hold  Saxony  in  the  Coalition,  whose  troops  under 
Thielemann  were  already  standing  neutral  at  Torgau,  while 
the  king  had  been  invited  by  Francis  to  make  Prague  his 


30 


THE  ALLIES  CROSS  THE  ELS  TER. 


headquarters,  and  had  fallen  under  Austrian  influence.  The 
czar  and  Wittgenstein  were  anxious  to  do  battle,  and  when 
they  heard  that  Napoleon  was  debouching  into  the  Leipsic 
plain,  a council  of  war  decided  to  move  forward  so  as  to  come 
to  the  front  facing  north,  attack  the  French  army  with  its 
back  to  the  marshy  river  below  Leipsic,  and  thus  have  it  at 
a disadvantage.  In  the  night  of  May  1-2  the  allies  crossed 
the  Elster  near  Pegau,  from  which  Ney’s  party  seems  to  have 
retired,  while  Kleist  held  the  defile  of  Lindenau,  and  sent  out 
detachments  to  engage  the  French  attention,  which  they  suc- 
ceeded in  doing.  Finding  no  opposition,  Miloradovich  moved 
on  Zeitz,  to  watch  the  roads  from  Camburg  to  Naumburg, 
and  cover  the  allied  left  and  rear.  The  Russian  Guards, 
grenadiers  and  cuirassiers  had  been  moving  up  from  Dresden 
as  reserve.  The  czar  and  the  King  of  Prussia  were  both 
present,  and  Wittgenstein  was  in  command  of  the  joint 
forces. 

Excluding  Kleist  and  Miloradovich,  there  were  not  over 
seventy  thousand  men  in  the  allied  army.  Having  crossed 
the  Elster,  these  moved  in  little  columns  over  the  Flossgraben, 
and  during  the  morning  of  May  2,  came  into  line  to  the  right 
so  as  to  lean  the  right  flank  on  Werben,  and  be  hidden  by 
a rolling  ridge  south  of  Gorschen,  the  left  extending  towards 
Taucha.  Noon  was  approaching,  and  the  troops  were  given 
some  rest,  as  the  Prussians  had  been  afoot  nearly  thirty- 
six  hours.  Napoleon  did  not  expect  their  offensive  at  so 
early  a moment,  and  was  far  from  anticipating  that  the  allies 
could  so  manoeuvre  as  to  draw  up  athwart  his  right  flank. 
Though  for  want  of  horse  he  had  not  efficiently  reconnoi- 
tred, he  had  guessed  that  they  were  concentrating  behind 
the  Elster  near  Zwenkau,  and  had  heard  that  Wittgenstein 
was  in  command  ; but  he  still  deemed  his  own  direction  on 
Leipsic  a correct  one,  for  he  was  debouching  on  their  stra- 


LUTZEN  THE  KEY-POINT. 


31 


tegic  flank,  and  might  cut  them  off  from  Berlin.  Liitzen  was 
the  key-point,  for  it  was  obvious  that,  by  occupying  it,  the 
enemy  might  cut  the  French  in  two ; and  early  in  the  day  he 
ordered  Lauriston  on  Leipsic,  with  Macdonald  in  support  to 
Markriinstadt  ; Ney,  to  whom  Liitzen  was  committed,  was 
bid  to  reconnoitre  out  towards  Pegau,  Zwenkau  and  Zeitz, 
Marmont  was  to  advance  on  Pegau,  with  Ney  in  support,  and 
Bertrand  to  reach  Taucha. 

All  the  French  army  corps  would  thus  be  properly  moving 
with  relation  to  the  key-point,  but  their  heads  did  not  get  up 
in  season  to  forestall  the  enemy’s  action ; the  reconnoitring 
appears  to  have  been  ill  done ; and  not  foreseeing  what  was 
to  happen,  the  emperor  elected  to  accompany  Lauriston’s 
column.  In  the  Bulletin  of  the  Grand  Army,  dated  Liitzen, 
May  2,  we  find  : “ At  nine  o’clock  in  the  morning  His  Majesty, 
having  heard  a cannonade  in  the  direction  of  Leipsic,  gal- 
loped thither.  The  enemy  was  defending  the  little  village  of 
Lindenau  and  the  bridges  in  front  of  Leipsic.  His  Majesty 
was  only  awaiting  the  moment  when  these  last  positions  should 
be  taken  to  put  all  his  army  in  movement  in  this  direction, 
have  it  pivot  on  Leipsic,  cross  to  the  right  of  the  Lister,  and 
take  the  enemy  in  reverse.”  Kleist,  however,  gave  so  good 
an  account  of  himself  as  to  strengthen  Napoleon’s  belief  that 
the  allies  must  be  in  and  about  Leipsic,  and  that  he  had  their 
right  wing  in  his  front ; indeed,  so  well  persuaded  was  he  of 
this,  that  to  aid  in  throwing  back  the  enemy,  he  called  in 
Ney  personally,  while  his  divisions  remained  in  and  south  of 
Liitzen.  Meanwhile  the  rising  dust  seen  from  neighboring 
hillocks  indicated  to  the  main  allied  army  that  the  French 
were  moving  through  and  beyond  Liitzen  on  Leipsic ; and  the 
troops  which  could  be  seen  in  the  Gorschen,  Raima  and  Kaja 
villages  were  thought  to  be  flanking  parties. 

The  general  and  excellent  plan  of  the  allies  was  to  move 


32 


OUTFLANKED. 


forward,  capture  these  villages,  and  then,  having  taken  Liitzen, 
to  throw  the  bulk  of  their  forces  around  what  would  be  the 
French  right  when  it  faced  for  battle,  and  attack  it  with  all 
arms.  Neither  side  knew  just  what  the  other  was  doing. 

Shortly  after  eleven  the  emperor,  Eugene  and  Ney  had  met 
near  the  Gustavus  Adolphus  monument,  erected  on  the  1632 
battlefield,  and  the  French  van  could  be  seen  making  its  way 
into  Leipsic  suburbs  ; Napoleon  had  dismounted,  and  scanning 
the  city  with  his  glasses,  was  unable  to  discover  any  large 
force  this  side  the  town,  though  the  roofs  were  covered  by  the 
populace,  eager  to  view  the  approaching  battle,  when  suddenly 
a furious  cannonade  was  heard  from  the  right  and  rear, 
apparently  not  far  from  where  Ney  had  bivouacked  the  night 
before.  Thus  came  the  announcement  that  he- had  been  out- 
flanked. Napoleon  did  not  move,  says  Odenleben,  a Saxon 
officer  in  the  French  service,  noted  for  a few  minutes  the  dis- 
tant smoke  and  noise,  and  on  the  instant  changed  his  plan. 
“We  have,”  said  Napoleon,  “no  cavalry,  but  never  mind, 
this  is  going  to  be  an  Egyptian  battle.  Good  infantry,  sus- 
tained by  artillery,  should  suffice  for  itself.  We  have,  to  be 
sure,  only  recruits  to  oppose  to  the  old  soldiers  of  the  enemy, 
but  we  must  rely  on  the  natural  courage  of  the  French.  Ney 
will  hold  himself  till  we  all  get  to  the  place  where  the  battle 
began.”  His  orders  were  simple.  “ Lauriston  was  to  push  the 
attack  on  Lindenau,  Eugene  was  to  march  with  Macdonald 
across  the  country  to  take  place  on  Ney’s  left,  Marmont  was 
to  march  to  the  guns  and  fall  in  on  Ney’s  right,  Bertrand  and 
all  troops  in  the  rear  were  to  come  up  at  a double  towards 
the  sound  of  the  guns,”  which  would  bring  them  in  on  the 
left  of  the  enemy.  “ The  Guard  and  all  troops  marching 
towards  Leipsic  were  to  file  to  the  right  and  move  up  to  the 
sound  of  the  guns.”  Ney  was  to  hold  the  centre  at  all  hazards. 
Lauriston  was  later  to  support  Macdonald.  After  issuing 


A RECURRENCE  OF  OPERATIONS. 


33 


these  orders,  the  wording  of  which  is  slightly  at  fault  in 
describing  the  movement,  the  emperor  galloped  to  Liitzen,  to 
head  the  Guard,  and  lead  it  up  to  sustain  the  centre  and  act 
as  reserve. 

Napoleon’s  battle  of  Liitzen  was  fought,  not  on  the  ground 
which  the  Hero  of  the  Reformation  hallowed  with  his  blood, 
but  several  miles  to  the  south  of  it.  Similar  strategic  reasons 


Russian  Cossacks. 


led  the  two  armies  into  conflict  here,  for  topography  always 
dictates  military  manoeuvres,  and  we  find  all  over  Central 
Europe  a recurrence  of  the  same  operations  in  different  cen- 
turies. Had  the  allies  debouched  from  Leipsic  with  their  main 
force,  they  would  probably  have  met  on  the  field  of  1632. 

The  Leipsic  country  is  a big  rolling  plain  which  reaches 
up  to  the  Bohemian  mountains,  is  cut  through  by  the  Elster, 
the  Pleisse  and  the  Flossgraben,  and  is  covered  by  villages 


VOL.  IV. 


34 


UNEXPECTANT  OF  BATTLE. 


and  farms.  Some  three  miles  south  of  Liitzen  lies  a group  of 
villages,  Gross  Gorschen,  Klein  Gorschen  and  Rahna  close 
together,  Kaja  somewhat  to  the  rear  of  them,  and  Eisdorf.  The 
Flossgraben,  originally  a brook,  is  a slow,  canal-like  stream, 
with  artificial  banks,  kept  up  as  a drain  of  the  Elster,  and 
running  down  towards  Zeitz  through  the  theatre  of  the  battle  ; 
it  can  be  passed  at  need  by  cavalry  and  infantry.  To  the 
west,  a trifle  higher,  lies  another  village,  Starsiedl.  The  Rip- 
pacli  brook,  running  somewhat  parallel  to  and  west  of  the 
Flossgraben,  limits  the  field  on  that  side,  though  it  had  no 
influence  on  the  battle,  which  was  fought  in  and  about  the 
villages  named. 

At  the  first  sound  of  the  firing,  Ney  galloped  towards  his 
own  troops,  upon  whom,  stationed  in  the  villages,  — cooking 
their  dinner,  quite  unexpectant  of  battle,  — the  force  of  the 
allied  onset  had  suddenly  fallen.  Had  the  allies  cleverly 
used  their  twelve  thousand  cavalry,  it  is  hard  to  say  what 
damage  Ney’s  divisions  might  have  suffered,  left  alone  with 
but  six  hundred  horsemen  of  poor  calibre.  Blucher,  on  the 
right  in  first  line,  attacked  sharply  ; but  Winzingerode  was 
slow  in  marshaling  his  squadrons  on  the  Russian  left,  when 
he  might  have  ridden  around  and  crushed  the  French  right ; 
and  four  of  Ney’s  divisions  had  time  to  prepare  themselves 
for  the  fray  without  the  flurry  of  a cavalry  attack.  The 
fifth,  composed  of  Germans,  on  the  left  of  Souham,  was  first 
reached  about  2 p.  M.  ; and  the  young  eighteen-year-old  con- 
scripts— especially  Souham’s  — held  themselves  as  young 
troops  often  will,  with  astonishing  constancy,  later  aided  by 
Gerard  of  Macdonald’s  corps,  who  came  up  to  sustain  them. 
The  allied  attack  lacked  ensemble;  its  delivery  in  successive 
waves  saved  the  French  from  an  initial  defeat.  Two  thirds  of 
the  allies  were  at  times  spectators  merely.  Klux,  later  sus- 
tained by  Ziethen,  advanced  on  Gross  Gorschen,  with  Roder 


THE  CONTEST  SEVERE . 


35 


in  reserve  ; Dolf’s  cavalry  rode  on  towards  Starsiedl.  Yorck’s 
corps  and  Berg’s  Russian  division  were  in  second  line ; Eu- 
gene of  Wurtemberg  was  coming  up  on  the  left  to  sustain 
Winzingerode.  Though  a decided  lack  of  momentum  was  in 
the  onset,  yet  the  contest  was  severe.  Furiously  the  French 
strove  with  the  Russians  and  Prussians  for  the  possession  of 
the  villages  ; and  one  and  another  went  lost  and  was  re- 
taken, without  a definitive  holding  by  either  side,  though  the 
overmatched  3d  Corps  was  gradually  pushed  back  on  Klein 
Gorschen  and  Rahna,  and  beyond.  The  arrival  of  Ney  him- 


36 


VILLAGES  TAKEN  AND  RETAKEN. 


self  lent  fresh  vigor  to  his  legions.  Souham,  Gerard  and 
Brenier  were  again  launched  on  the  foe,  and  recovered  Klein 
Gorschen  and  Raima ; and  this  enabled  reinforcements  to 
come  up  on  both  French  flanks,  which  were  leaning  on  Eis- 
dorf  and  Starsiedl.  It  was  past  two  when  Marmont  fell  in 
on  Ney’s  right,  driving  back  Winzingerode,  now  deployed 
near  Kolzen.  Charged  by  these  heavy  squadrons,  Compans 
and  Bonnet  formed  square,  each  time  with  success ; and 
finally  Marmont  took  post  at  Starsiedl,  where  he  maintained 
himself.  By  their  initial  slowness,  the  allies  had  let  the 
auspicious  moment  pass. 

The  Prussians  fought  stanchly,  Yorck  and  Berg’s  Rus- 
sians in  the  second  line  relieving  the  first,  in  the  attempt  to 
take  and  hold  Gross  and  Klein  Gorschen  and  Rahna,  and 
gallant  Ney  had  to  yield,  though  he  retook  the  villages  twice ; 
and  finally  the  enemy  got  possession  of  Kaja  by  a last  effort 
of  Berg.  Although  Marmont  had  just  arrived,  the  battle  was 
clearly  being  won  by  the  allies  when  Ney,  under  the  eye  of  Na- 
poleon, made  one  more  effort  with  Ricard’s  division  to  regain 
the  lost  ground.  Lobau  headed  this  column,  and  Ney  followed 
along  with  Brenier,  Gerard  and  Souham.  Kaja  was  recap- 
tured at  the  point  of  the  bayonet,  and  a bloody  contest  ensued 
for  Klein  Gorschen,  still  held  by  the  enemy.  To  sustain 
Blucher,  Wittgenstein  ordered  Eugene  of  Wurtemberg  over 
from  the  left  to  the  right : one  of  his  divisions  debouched 
through  Eisdorf  and  blocked  oncoming  Marchand,  whom 
Ney  had  ordered  to  the  left  while  refusing  his  right ; the  other 
came  up  to  Berg’s  support ; and  not  only  was  Gross  Gor- 
schen again  taken,  but  Ney  was  driven  out  of  Kaja  for  the 
third  time.  Meanwhile  the  Prussian  left  had  assailed  Star- 
siedl ; but  here  they  met  Marmont’s  fresh  troops,  which 
fended  them  off,  and  held  this  village  firmly  as  a pivot  on  the 
French  right,  while  on  the  French  left,  at  Eisdorf,  the  Rus- 


THE  ALLIED  RIGHT  THREATENED. 


37 


sians  were  equally  unable  to  gain  a permanent  footing.  Fear- 
ing that  his  efforts  in  the  centre  would  not  alone  win  the  day, 
Wittgenstein  had  launched  the  Russian  grenadiers  under 
Konovnitzin  on  Eisdorf  and  Klein  Gorschen  ; and  this  ma- 
noeuvre would  have  broken  the  French  left  had  not  Eugene’s 
head  of  column  arrived  from  Leipsic.  Reaching  Kitzen  with 
Macdonald,  — though  somewhat  belated,  — his  arrival  checked 


not  only  this  last  onset,  but  was  felt  at  the  centre  also ; and 
its  direction  so  markedly  threatened  the  allied  right  that  this 
fell  back,  and  weakened  the  hold  of  the  centre  on  the  villages. 
By  four  o’clock  Bertrand,  heading  Morand’s  division,  put  in 
an  appearance  on  the  allied  left  at  Gosserau  and  Pobles, 
seeing  which,  Wittgenstein  withdrew  the  Russian  support 
from  the  right,  to  save  himself  from  being  turned. 

Well  aware  how  important  it  was,  after  the  1812  disaster, 


38 


THE  MASTER-STROKE  SUCCEEDS. 


to  win  the  first  battle,  if  only  as  a moral  effect  on  the  eagerly 
watching  politicians  of  Europe,  Napoleon  had  been  all  day 
riding  to  and  fro  over  the  battlefield,  encouraging  the  young 
troops,  cheering  them  to  further  efforts,  and  seeing  to  every 
detail  with  his  ancient  vigor.  His  presence  doubled  his  forces, 
and  Marmont  says  that  on  this  day  he  probably  ran  the 
greatest  personal  danger  of  his  life.  The  battle  in  the  centre 
gave  him  no  little  solicitude,  as  he  watched  the  allied  line 
fight  its  way  closer  and  closer,  and  saw  the  key-point  of  the 
field,  Kaja,  in  real  peril.  When,  about  5 P.  M.,  this  village 
went  lost  for  the  third  time,  “ His  Majesty  judged  that  the 
critical  moment  which  decides  the  gain  or  the  loss  of  battles 
had  arrived,”  says  the  Bulletin.  “ There  was  not  a moment 
more  to  lose.  He  ordered  Mortier  to  move  with  sixteen  bat- 
talions of  the  Young  Guard  on  Kaja,  to  attack  head  down 
( tete  baissee)  and  to  drive  out  the  enemy,  to  take  the  village, 
and  to  cut  down  everything  that  was  found  there.  At  the 
same  moment  His  Majesty  ordered  his  aide-de-camp,  Drouot, 
to  assemble  a battery  of  eighty  pieces  and  to  place  it  ” on  the 
hill  back  of  Starsiedl,  “ in  front  of  the  Old  Guard,  which  was 
disposed  in  echelon,  like  four  redoubts,  to  sustain  the  centre, 
all  our  cavalry  ranged  in  line  of  battle  behind  it.”  This 
was  just  prior  to  the  time  when  Eugene  was  deploying  on 
Kitzen,  the  other  side  of  the  Flossgraben,  and  Bertrand  had 
got  ready  to  strike  the  allied  left.  The  master-stroke  suc- 
ceeded ; Kaja  was  retaken,  the  Prussians  fell  back  all  along 
the  line  to  behind  Gross  Gorschen,  where  for  a while  they 
held  themselves  by  the  aid  of  the  Russian  Guard,  which  was 
put  in  to  reestablish  the  fight,  and  for  a bare  moment  suc- 
ceeded in  so  doing ; but  when,  some  time  after  six  o’clock, 
the  body  of  Macdonald’s  corps  debouched  from  Eisdorf  on 
the  allied  right,  all  the  Russian  reserve  could  accomplish  was 
to  obtain  a short  halt  for  the  retiring  Prussians  between 


AN  ESSENTIAL  RETREAT.  39 

Gross  Gorschen  and  the  Flossgraben.  The  battle  of  Liitzen, 
or  of  Gross  Gorschen,  had  been  won  by  the  French. 

After  dark  there  was  a further  flurry  of  arms : Marmont’s 
outposts  ran  into  the  Prussians  south  of  Starsiedl,  and  in 
the  darkness  pushed  them  back.  To  reestablish  the  matter, 
and  if  possible  to  create  a stampede,  over-eager  Blucher  and 
his  cavalry  rode  blindly  forward  and  even  penetrated  the 
French  lines,  creating  a momentary  panic.  The  second  line 
of  Marmont  fired  on  the  first,  as  will  often  happen  with 
young  troops  engaged  at  night,  and  the  Prussian  lancers  rode 
as  far  as  the  Young  Guard.  At  the  same  moment  some  Cos- 
sacks galloped  around  to  the  rear  of  the  French  army  and 
gave  an  alarm,  which,  among  the  camp  followers,  came  close 
to  being  disastrous ; but  the  panic  did  not  last  long,  and 
Blucher’ s horsemen  suffered  severely  for  what  was  a plucky 
but  unwise  onset  in  the  dark. 

During  the  afternoon,  Lauriston  had  occupied  Leipsic  and 
forced  back  Kleist  towards  Wurzen  ; and  he  was  then  or- 
dered to  leave  a detachment  in  the  city  and  march  down  the 
Elster  right  bank  to  threaten  the  enemy’s  bridges.  Under 
these  adverse  conditions,  the  allies  recrossed  the  Flossgraben 
during  the  night  of  May  2-3,  and  started  what  was  now  an 
essential  retreat  behind  the  Elbe  in  two  main  columns,  head- 
ing for  Dresden  and  Meissen,  Wittgenstein  marching  via 
Altenburg  and  Chemitz,  followed  by  Bertrand  and  Oudinot, 
and  Blucher  by  way  of  Colditz,  pursued  by  Napoleon  with 
Marmont  and  the  Guard,  and  Macdonald  under  Eugene. 
Ney  with  the  3d  and  5th  Corps  marched  through  Leipsic  on 
Torgau,  where  he  was  to  take  over  Victor,  coming  from  Mag- 
deburg to  Wittenberg.  Lauriston  was  ordered  via  Wurzen 
on  Meissen,  to  open  the  road  to  Dresden  and  cover  Ney’s 
right.  Davout  and  Vandamme,  with  the  1st  Corps,  remained 
in  Hamburg. 


40  THE  THREE-COLUMN  PURSUIT. 

At  headquarters,  May  5,  at  Colditz,  Napoleon  ascertained 
that  all  the  corps  of  the  enemy  had  come  his  way,  and  that 
nothing  considerable  was  opposite  Ney.  On  May  6,  at  3.30 
A.  M.,  he  wrote  him  : “ I am  very  impatient  to  know  that  you 
are  at  Torgau  and  to  see  you  raise  the  blockade  of  Wittenberg^ 
because  things  take  a turn  such  that  it  might  be  possible  that 
I should  seize  the  occasion  to  move  at  once  on  Berlin.” 

Blucher’s  rearguard  was  struck  at  Gersdorf  on  the  Mulde, 
but  Miloradovich  came  up  and  rescued  it ; Eugene  had  small 
combats  at  Eisdorf,  Nossen  and  Wildsruf.  The  French  kept 
up  their  three-column  pursuit  as  best  they  might ; but  there 
being  no  effective  cavalry  at  hand,  it  lacked  practical  value. 
From  Borna,  May  5,  2 a.  m.,  the  emperor  had  Berthier  write 
Eugene  “ that  he  marches  much  too  slowly,  that  he  occupies 
far  too  much  room,  which  embarrasses  the  march  of  the  army ; 
that  there  are  far  too  many  wagons  in  his  corps,  and  that 
there  is  not  order  in  them  ; that  the  cav- 
alry drags  along  behind  it  as  usual  a 
great  quantity  of  useless  stuff  and  dis- 
abled men.  . . . Let  him  carry  out  the 
regulations.”  On  May  6,  at  3.30  A.  M., 
he  also  wrote  him : “ Put  a little  order 
into  your  corps,  which  needs  it  very 
much.  The  Italians  especially  commit 
horrors,  pillage  and  steal  everywhere. 
Have  one  or  two  of  them  shot.”  On  the 
7tli  headquarters  got  to  Nossen,  the  vice- 
roy at  Wildsruf,  and  the  allies  crossed  to 
the  right  bank  of  the  Elbe,  the  Russians 
at  Dresden  and  the  Prussians  at  Meissen  ; 
and  when  Napoleon  reached  the  Saxon 
capital  on  the  8th,  he  found  it  vacated,  and  the  several  tem- 
porary bridges,  as  well  as  the  repaired  old  stone  bridge,  afire 


Prussian  Musketeer. 


SAXONS  RESUME  ALLIANCE. 


41 


and  the  military  magazines  destroyed.  The  French  occupied 
Dresden  city,  while  Miloradovich  left  a force  in  the  Neustadt 
on  the  right  bank,  which,  when  an  attempt  was  made  to  cross 
and  oust  it,  retired.  With  some  reproaches  for  their  recent 
lack  of  fealty,  Napoleon  forgave  the  Saxons,  who  resumed  the 
alliance,  and  the  king  was  urged  to  return  to  Dresden.  On 
his  arrival  May  12,  the  Saxons  again  became  part  of  Rey- 
nier’s  corps.  Fouche  was  brought  to  Dresden  as  chief  of 
secret  service. 

Napoleon  could  congratulate  himself  on  a brilliant  and 
necessary  victory.  The  losses  had  been  very  severe,  as  the 
young  troops  had  not  the  experience  of  vil- 
lage fighting  which  enabled  them  to  use 
cover  to  advantage.  Ney  is  said  to  have  lost 
over  a quarter  of  his  corps.  There  was  such 
a vast  number  of  conscripts  wounded  in 
the  hand,  that  it  could  not  be  determined 
whether  it  was  the  awkwardness  of  a first 
battle,  or  an  intentional  maiming  to  escape 
further  service,  of  which  this  battle  was  such 
a rough  prophecy.  “ His  Majesty  cannot  too 
highly  praise  the  army  for  its  good-will, 
its  courage  and  its  intrepidity,”  says  the 
Bulletin.  “ Our  young  soldiers  did  not  con- 
sider the  danger.  In  this  great  circumstance 
they  have  revealed  all  the  nobility  of  the 
French  blood.  . . . The  Old  Guard  did  not 
fire  a shot.  Half  of  the  army  was  not  put  in.  . . . The 
allied  army,  one  hundred  and  fifty  to  two  hundred  thousand 
strong,  commanded  by  the  two  sovereigns,  . . . was  there- 
fore defeated  and  put  into  rout  by  less  than  half  of  the 
French  army.” 

Berndt  gives  the  losses  as  thirteen  thousand  French  killed 


Prussian  Pioneer. 


42 


LOSSES  REPAIRED . 


and  wounded,  out  of  one  hundred  and  sixteen  thousand  pre- 
sent in  the  battle  ; and  ten  thousand  allies,  out  of  sixty-nine 
thousand  engaged. 

The  loss  of  the  battle  of  Liitzen  was  alleged  by  the  Prus- 
sians to  have  occurred  from  lack  of  support  by  the  Russians, 
and  the  two  armies  separated,  Blucher  moving  towards  Gros- 
senhayn  and  Elsterwerda,  as  if  to  protect  Berlin,  while  the 
Russians  marched  on  Bautzen ; but  after  a week  the  Prus- 
sians came  back  again  towards  their  allies.  Reinforced  by 
the  Saxon  contingent  and  the  Wurtembergers,  Napoleon  at 
once  repaired  his  losses.  The  allies  could  not  do  so  until  later, 
but  they  were  still  superior  in  cavalry. 

On  May  3 Napoleon  issued  a 

PROCLAMATION  TO  THE  ARMY. 

Soldiers,  I am  content  with  you.  You  have  filled  my  expectations. 
You  have  made  up  for  everything  by  your  good-will  and  by  your  bravery. 
You  have,  in  the  celebrated  day  of  May  2,  defeated  and  put  into  rout  the 
Russian  and  Prussian  armies,  commanded  by  the  Emperor  Alexander  and 
the  King  of  Prussia.  You  have  added  a new  lustre  to  the  glory  of  my 
eagles.  You  have  shown  all  of  which  the  French  blood  is  capable. 

On  May  4 Napoleon  wrote  the  Emperor  of  Austria  : “ Monsieur  my 
Brother  and  very  dear  Father-in-Law,  Knowing  the  interest  that  Your 
Majesty  has  in  anything  happy  which  comes  to  me,  I hasten  to  announce 
the  victory  which  Providence  was  pleased  to  accord  to  my  arms  on  the 
field  of  Liitzen.  . . . Let  Your  Majesty  believe  in  the  sentiments  of 
esteem  and  of  perfect  consideration  that  I bear  you.” 

On  May  5 he  wrote  Clarke  : “ In  the  last  battle  I saw  with  the  greatest 
pain  that  a good  third  of  the  shells  did  not  burst.  . . . That  comes  from 
their  having  been  loaded  for  many  years.  . . . There  is  no  but  or  if  which 
can  justify  the  artillery  corps  for  such  negligence.  ...  A director  of 
artillery  who  sends  out  munitions  not  in  condition  deserves  death.” 

In  the  shifting  of  commands  Victor  felt  neglected,  and  wrote  May  7 
to  Berthier  : “ I owe  it  to  myself  and  to  the  consideration  due  to  my 
grade  to  represent  to  the  Emperor  that  in  placing  me  in  a subaltern  rank, 


VICTOR  TO  BERTHIER. 


48 


with  a command  of  five  thousand  men,  while  several  division  generals 
command  army  corps,  His  Majesty  condemns  me  to  a public  degradation 
and  the  most  shameful.  I should  be  desperate  at  this  disgrace  if  I had 
merited  it  ; but  having  nothing  to  reproach  myself,  having  been  con- 
stantly, as  I shall  always  be,  one  of  the  most  faithful  and  most  devoted 
subjects  of  His  Majesty,  I shall  support  it,  if  it  is  decided,  with  the 
calm  of  my  conscience.  All  my  ambition  consists  solely  in  serving  His 
Majesty  with  honor.”  . . . 


LVIII. 


BAUTZEN.  MAY  4-21,  1813. 

As  Austria  became  uncertain,  Eugene  was  sent  to  hold  Italy,  for  Napoleon 
would  not  negotiate  on  terms  which,  as  matters  stood,  were  reasonable.  The 
Elbe  was  reached,  and  the  enemy  withdrew  May  10.  From  Dresden  Napoleon 
could  march  on  Berlin,  or  follow  the  enemy  to  Silesia.  He  believed  he  could 
reach  the  Oder,  relieve  the  fortresses,  and  reestablish  himself  on  the  Russian 
frontier.  But  by  mid-May  he  learned  that  the  enemy  stood  at  Bautzen ; and 
Ney,  who  was  demonstrating  on  Berlin,  was  drawn  in  and  Napoleon  advanced 
towards  the  enemy.  His  plan  was  to  attack  the  allies  in  front  while  Ney  moved 
around  their  right  on  their  rear.  On  May  18  the  allies  sent  out  to  oppose  Ney’s 
approach,  but  a heavy  fight  accomplished  little.  On  May  20  the  French  moved 
on  Bautzen.  Napoleon  had  nearly  one  hundred  and  fifty  thousand  men  ; the 
allies,  led  by  Wittgenstein,  with  one  hundred  and  ten  thousand,  were  strongly 
posted  behind  the  Spree,  with  an  intrenched  second  line  in  the  rear.  Napoleon 
forced  the  Spree  and  they  fell  back  to  their  second  line,  while  Ney  moved  well 
around  their  right.  At  daylight.  May  21,  the  emperor  purposed  only  to  demon- 
strate along  the  allied  front  until  Ney  could  reach  their  rear,  and  then  to  give 
the  coup  de  grace.  But  he  failed  to  instruct  Ney  definitely,  and  instead  of 
moving  upon  the  allied  communications,  Ney  was  arrested  by  Barclay  and 
Blucher,  and  did  not  move  far  enough.  At  the  sound  of  Ney’s  fighting,  Napo- 
leon ordered  an  advance  in  force.  The  onslaught  was  heavy,  and  the  allies  pru- 
dently retired  before  their  army  was  routed.  Had  Ney  pushed  on  vigorously 
toward  their  lines  of  retreat,  the  battle  would  have  been  decisive,  but  the  allies 
got  away  in  good  order,  though  with  heavy  losses. 

When  the  Austrian  outlook  became  less  favorable,  the 
viceroy  was  sent  home  to  recreate  the  army  of  Italy,  wrecked 
by  the  drafts  made  upon  it  in  1812,  and  now  promising  to  be 
an  essential  factor  in  the  military  problem. 

On  May  12  Napoleon  wrote  him  from  Dresden  : “My  Son,  leave  this 
evening  and  repair  to  Munich,  and  from  there  to  Italy.  I instruct  the 
Minister  of  War  to  put  under  your  orders  the  troops  which  are  in  my 


AUSTRIA  UNCERTAIN. 


45 


kingdom  of  Italy  and  the  Illyrian  provinces.  You  will  find  in  Italy  the 
orders  I have  given  for  the  formation  of  a Corps  of  Observation  of  the 
Adige.  My  intention  is  to  augment  it  up  to  eighty  or  ninety  battalions, 
half  French,  half  Italian,  and  to  exaggerate  this  number  by  public  opin- 
ion so  as  to  have  by  that  means  the  ascendant  on  Austria,  so  that  it  shall 
be  I who  menace,  and  not  she.”  And  on  May  18  : “ It  is  necessary  that 
you  should  form  with  all  the  activity  of  which  you  are  capable  the  army 
which  will  be  under  your  orders.  . . . Engage  the  King  of  Bavaria  to 
fortify  some  defiles  in  the  Tyrol  so  as  to  be  master  of  the  outlets,  and 
to  control  the  inhabitants.” 

On  May  12  the  Army  of  the  Elbe  was  dissolved,  and  Mac- 
donald put  in  command  of  the  11th  Corps. 

Despite  her  friendly  utterances,  Austria  had  determined  to 
recover  part  of  her  lost  provinces,  and  the  victory  of  Liitzen, 
indecisive  from  want  of  cavalry,  affected  the  political  status 
little.  “ The  Emperor  Alexander  and  the  King  of  Prussia  at- 
tributed the  loss  of  the  battle  of  Liitzen  to  faults  which  their 
generals  had  committed  in  directing  the  combined  forces,” 
says  the  Bulletin,  “ and  especially  to  the  difficulties  attached 
to  an  offensive  movement  of  one  hundred  and  fifty  to  one 
hundred  and  eighty  thousand  men.”  The  matrimonial  alli- 
ance went  for  little,  but  the  fear  that  Napoleon  might  come 
to  an  understanding  with  Alexander  by  ceding  to  Russia  the 
Duchy  of  Warsaw  kept  Austria  from  open  antagonism ; and 
acting  the  ingenuous  part  of  mediator,  she  pressed  her  influ- 
ence all  over  Europe.  Napoleon  was  ready  for  an  armistice, 
with  a Congress  in  view  which  should  frame  terms  of  peace ; 
but  he  was  not  willing  to  have  conditions  precedent  thrust  upon 
him  after  a victory.  The  terms  suggested  by  Austria  — the 
dissolution  of  the  Confederation  and  the  Duchy  of  Warsaw, 
and  the  return  to  Austria  of  Illyria,  Galicia  and  Innviertel  — 
seemed  to  Napoleon  excessive ; but  desiring  to  settle  differ- 
ences between  Russia  and  France,  he  proposed  to  Alexander 
conditions  which  he  thought  might  lead  to  universal  peace. 


46 


NEGOTIATION  FOR  PEACE. 


On  May  17  he  wrote  Caulaineourt : “ The  essential  thing  is  to  have  a 
talk.  . . . My  intention,  moreover,  is  to  make  a bridge  of  gold  for  the 
Emperor  Alexander.  ...  If  I have  sacrifices  to  make,  I prefer  that  they 
should  be  to  the  profit  of  the  Emperor  Alexander,  who  conducts  a frank 
war  against  me,  and  of  the  King  of  Prussia,  in  whom  Russia  is  interested, 
rather  than  to  the  profit  of  Austria,  which  has  betrayed  the  alliance.  . . . 
Beside,  before  the  battle  which  is  going  to  be  delivered,  the  Emperor  of 
Russia  ought  not  to  consider  himself  very  far  engaged  in  the  struggle. 
...  In  treating  to-day  and  in  getting  good  conditions  for  his  ally  the 
King  of  Prussia,  and  without  the  intervention  of  Austria,  the  Emperor 
Alexander  would  prove  to  Europe  that  peace  is  due  to  his  efforts,  . . . 
and  would  leave  the  struggle  in  an  honorable  manner.” 

On  the  same  day  he  wrote  to  Alexander  that  “ what  Your  Majesty 
tells  me  in  your  letter  about  the  interest  you  bear  me  has  touched  me 
greatly.  If  Your  Majesty  takes  some  interest  in  my  happiness,  have  an 
eye  to  my  honor.  I am  decided  to  die,  if  necessary,  at  the  head  of  all 
France  has  of  generous  men,  rather  than  become  the  laughter  of  the 
English,  and  to  let  my  enemies  triumph.”  And  after  an  interview  with 
Count  Bubna,  he  wrote  Francis  : “ I desire  peace  more  than  anybody. 
I consent  to  the  opening  of  a negotiation  for  a general  peace  and  the 
assembling  of  a Congress.”  And  next  day  to  Caulaineourt  : “ Having 
resolved  by  every  means  to  reestablish  peace,  general  or  Continental,  we 
have  proposed  the  reunion  of  a Congress.  ...  We  hope  that  this  Con- 
gress will  promptly  conduct  to  the  reestablishment  of  peace,  of  which  so 
many  peoples  feel  the  need.  We  have  therefore  determined  to  conclude 
an  armistice  ora  suspension  of  arms  with  the  Russian  and  Prussian  armies 
for  the  time  the  Congress  shall  last,  desiring  to  avoid  the  battle  which, 
by  the  position  that  the  enemy  has  taken,  seems  imminent,  and  to  save 
humanity  a useless  effusion  of  blood.  Our  intention  is  that  you  shall  pro- 
ceed to  the  outposts,  where  you  are  to  ask  to  be  admitted  to  the  Emperor 
Alexander,  to  make  him  this  proposition,  and  to  negotiate,  conclude  and 
sign  every  military  convention,  having  for  aim  to  suspend  hostilities.  It 
is  to  this  effect  that  we  write  you  the  present  closed  letter,  to  make  use 
of  it  if  it  shall  be  demanded,  and  to  stand  as  full  power.  Napoleon.” 

The  terms  Napoleon  seems  to  have  had  in  mind  were  that 
the  Confederation  of  the  Rhine  should  be  limited  to  the  Oder  ; 
that  Prussia,  thus  denuded  of  territory  and  her  chief  city, 


UNCERTAIN  OPERATIONS. 


47 


should  receive  the  Duchy  of  Warsaw,  by  which  she  would 
become  part  of  the  Russian  system  ; and  thus  separated, 
France  and  Russia  could  have  no  further  disagreement.  But 
such  a shuffling  of  peoples  and  capitals  was  a mere  dream, 
contrary  to  the  trend  of  nationalities,  and  unreasonable  to 
any  but  one  whose  ideas,  intensely  practical  in  most  things, 
were  highly  imaginative  in  others.  Alexander’s  answer, 
received  the  day  after  Bautzen,  that  he  could  consider  no 
proposition  not  satisfactory  to  Austria,  proved  that  the  two 
monarchs  had  come,  or  were  fast  coming,  to  an  understand- 
ing ; but  as,  while  waiting,  Napoleon  had  pressed  forward  at 
all  points  the  operations  of  the  army,  no  military  factor  had 
been  weakened. 

From  lack  of  information,  the  emperor’s  operations  during 
a couple  of  weeks  succeeding  Liitzen  were  more  than  com- 
monly uncertain,  while  always  strategically  sound  and  abreast 
of  whatever  might  happen ; and  as  typical  of  his  method  of 
providing  against  all  manner  of  contingencies,  a few  of  his 
orders  will  be  quoted.  Some  are  most  important  as  a part  of 
the  military  narrative.  From  Pegau,  early  May  4,  he  wrote 
Ney  : “ My  intention  is  to  move  my  headquarters  to-day  to 
Borna,  to  follow  the  enemy  sharply.  There  I shall  decide 
perhaps  to  move  on  Dresden,  but  in  this  case  I shall  leave  you  on 
my  left  to  move  on  Wittenberg,  after  having  raised  the  block- 
ade of  Torgau  aiad  put  Reynier  at  the  head  of  his  7th  Corps. 
...  I would  like  at  Wittenberg  to  join  to  you  Sebastiani,  who 
has  fourteen  thousand  men,  of  whom  four  thousand  cavalry, 
which  could  not  fail  to  make  there  a very  fine  army.  This 
would  permit  me,  according  to  the  ulterior  news  which  I 
might  receive,  either  to  hold  myself  on  the  Elbe,  or  to  debouch 
through  Wittenberg  and  to  move  immediately  on  Berlin.” 
Later  in  the  morning  he  wrote  : “ I am  marching  on  Dresden. 

. . Assemble  Victor  to  raise  the  blockade  of  Wittenberg.” 

O 


48 


THE  PASSAGE  AT  DRESDEN. 


On  reaching  Dresden  the  emperor  rescued  the  bridge  not 
wholly  consumed,  and  prepared  for  a crossing  ; and  here  the 
Guard,  Bertrand,  Marmont,  Macdonald  and  Oudinot  assem- 
bled, Lauriston  having  marched  on  Meissen.  As  we  have 
seen,  Ney,  after  reorganizing  his  depleted  corps  in  Leipsic, 
was  to  advance  on  Torgau,  and  to  his  command  were  added 
Reynier  coming  up  from  Halle  and  the  Saxons,  Victor  from 
Bernburg,  and  Sebastiani  from  Liineburg ; the  whole  being 
intended  as  a distant  threat  to  Berlin,  and  a nearer  one  to 
the  allied  right,  which  might  drive  the  enemy  away  from  the 
east  bank  of  the  Elbe ; for  Napoleon  doubted  his  ability  to 
force  a passage  at  Dresden  without  too  much  delay,  should 
the  enemy  impede  him,  the  pontoon  equipment  abandoned  in 
Russia  not  yet  having  been  fully  replaced.  From  Colditz, 
May  6,  he  wrote  Ney  : “ I do  not  know  if  I can  cross  at  Dres- 
den. I fear  to  find  difficulty  in  crossing,  for  I have  ponton- 
iers  and  no  pontoons.  These  will  not  arrive  for  a fortnight. 
If  I have  no  boats,  and  if  the  enemy  seriously  defends  the 
crossing  and  exposes  Dresden  to  the  circumstances  of  war, 
I shall  be  obliged  to  go  back  to  Torgau  ; but  your  presence  at 
Torgau  with  your  army  corps  must  impose  on  the  enemy,  and 
make  him  renounce  the  project  of  defending  the  Elbe.”  For 
the  moment,  indeed,  the  allies  opposed  the  crossing,  and  erect- 
ing on  May  9 a battery  of  forty  guns  at  Uebigau,  just  below 
Dresden,  from  whence,  owing  to  a bend  in  the  river,  they  could 
take  the  French  in  flank,  they  cannonaded  the  bridges  ; but 
on  Drouot’s  replying  vigorously  with  sixty  guns,  they  retired 
from  the  Neustadt.  This  permitted  the  repair  of  the  old  stone 
bridge ; during  the  10th  and  succeeding  night  this  work  was 
pushed  under  Napoleon’s  personal  inspection,  and  by  next 
forenoon  seven  wooden  trestles  had  been  placed  between  the 
two  blown-up  arches,  and  Macdonald,  who  was  to  be  the  van- 
guard,, headed  the  passage. 


A CHOICE  OF  THREE  COURSES. 


49 


Napoleon  always  believed  in  the  dramatic.  From  headquarters  at 
Pegau,  May  4,  he  wrote  Ney  : “ I desire  that  you  should  go  to  Leipsic. 
Make  there  the  finest  entry  possible  and  pass  the  review  of  your  corps.” 
And  later  at  Dresden,  order  was  given  to  the  troops  which  were  to  march 
through  the  town  that  they  should  “ traverse  it  in  handsome  shape  and 
in  a military  manner.”  And  Marmont,  who  was  to  pass  Dresden  May 
11,  was  to  have  “his  corps  in  full  dress,  with  his  guns,  and  in  the  best 
order.  He  will  cross  his  baggage,  with  everything  which  is  not  hand- 
some to  see,  by  the  boat  of  rafts.  His  cavalry  is  to  be  at  the  head  ” of 
his  parade  column. 

To  guard  even  against  the  improbable,  Bertrand  was  or- 
dered to  send  a division  up  to  Pirna,  and  to  scout  out  all  the 
roads  to  Bohemia. 

The  emperor  with  the  Guard  and  Oudinot  remained  in 
Dresden,  and  the  successively  crossing  corps  were  advanced 
May  13  along  the  roads  leading  east  and  northeast  from  the 
right  bank  : Macdonald  on  Bischofswerda,  whence  he  drove 
the  Russians,  Marmont  towards  Kamenz,  and  Bertrand  on 
Konigsbruck,  while  a reconnoissance  moved  to  Grossenhayn. 

Napoleon  now  had  a choice  of  three  courses  — to  march 
on  Berlin,  or  on  the  enemy’s  army,  which  he  supposed  was 
retiring  to  Silesia,  or  to  combine  the  two  operations.  But  it 
was  some  days  before  he  was  sure  as  to  what  his  movements 
would  be,  for  the  operation  on  Berlin  seemed  to  fascinate  him. 
From  Dresden,  May  9,  at  3 A.  M.,  he  wrote  to  Ney  that  it  was 
important  he  should  rapidly  reach  Wittenberg ; that  he  was 
to  assemble  his  corps,  Victor  and  Sebastiani ; that  he  was  to 
leave  Reynier  in  the  position  where  he  had  placed  him;  that 
he  had  given  orders  to  Lauriston  to  leave  a division  at  Meis- 
sen and  to  move  between  Torgau  and  Meissen,  to  be  able  to 
sustain  Reynier.  And  he  ordered  Lauriston  to  keep  up  con- 
nection with  Ney.  Next  day,  at  4 a.  m.,  he  wrote  Ney:  “You 
are  the  master  to  cross  at  Torgau  or  Wittenberg,  but  as  I 
suppose  you  are  already  at  Wittenberg,  I send  the  order  to 


VOL.  IV. 


PQ 


'i 


ABUNDANTLY  EQUIPPED. 


51 


Lauriston  to  enter  Torgau,  and  to  Reynier  to  take  the  com- 
mand of  the  Saxon  corps.”  This  the  latter  did,  after  some 
opposition  by  Thielemann,  who  afterwards  went  over  to  the 
enemy.  “ My  intention  is  that  Reynier  with  his  corps 
should  be  under  your  orders.  These  twelve  thousand  men 
joined  to  Victor  and  Sebastiani  should  put  you  in  condition 
to  do  something.  Lauriston  might  debouch  through  Torgau. 
If,  on  the  contrary,  you  have  not  left  and  you  should  prefer  to 
debouch  through  Torgau,  Lauriston  will  also  be  under  your 
orders.” 

And  to  Berthier  he  wrote  : “ Ney  can  debouch  from  Torgau,  if  he  is  still 
within  reach  of  Torgau,  but  as  I suppose  he  is  already  at  Wittenberg,  he 
will  be  more  abreast  of  menacing  Berlin.”  And  he  told  Berthier  to  notify 
Ney  “that  the  Russians  were  retiring  through  Silesia,  that  of  the  Prus- 
sians, not  more  than  twenty  thousand  came  out  of  the  battle,  and  suppos- 
ing they  receive  ten  thousand  reinforcements  on  the  way,  they  cannot 
be  more  than  thirty  thousand  men.”  On  May  13  Berthier  was  ordered  to 
write  Ney:  that  Victor  and  Sebastiani,  with  twenty-five  thousand  men, 
would  be  that  day  at  Cothen,  and  had  been  ordered  to  debouch  at  Witten- 
berg in  the  morning  of  the  15th  and  make  a half  march  in  the  direction  of 
Liickau  and  Berlin  ; that  the  Dessau  bridge  was  to  be  destroyed  if  the 
enemy  had  one  there;  that  Ney  was  to  move  with  his  five  divisions  May  14 
on  Liickau,  which  his  van  should  reach  the  15th  and  headquarters  the 
16th  ; that  he  was  to  order  Victor  to  be  between  Wittenberg  and  Liickau 
and  menacing  Berlin  the  16th,  that  Reynier  was  to  be  placed  between 
Liickau  and  Victor,  and  Lauriston  sent  to  Dobriluk  ; that  Bertrand  on 
the  13th  was  at  Konigsbruck,  and  on  the  14th  would  be  near  Hoyers- 
werda;  that  Macdonald  the  13th  was  at  Bischofswerda  and  would  be  the 
14th  probably  at  Bautzen  ; that  by  the  15th  the  emperor  would  make  his 
definitive  determination  according  to  what  the  enemy  might  have  done 
either  to  occupy  Berlin  or  to  order  any  other  movement.  Corresponding 
orders  were  sent  to  Victor,  Reynier  and  Lauriston. 

Thus  abundantly  equipped  with  an  army  of  fourscore 
thousand  men,  and  a prime  factor  in  the  coming  manoeuvres,. 
Ney  on  May  8 debouched  at  Torgau  and  Wittenberg,  and 


52 


MUCH  IN  THE  DARK. 


advanced  to  the  Berlin  roads ; while  the  rest  of  the  Grand 
Army  was  again  across  the  Elbe  and  deployed  to  face  the 
allies,  who  had  taken  up  a position  on  the  right  bank  of  the 
Spree  near  Bautzen,  determined  to  fight  another  battle.  Still 
lacking  his  cavalry  feelers,  and  having  only  common  report, 
and  such  information  as  light  infantry  could  pick  up,  to  rely 
on,  Napoleon,  although  with  definite  plans,  was  much  in  the 
dark.  He  guessed  that  the  allies  had  separated,  and  wrote, 
May  13,  in  the  evening,  to  Ney  : “ I do  not  yet  quite  see  what 
the  Prussians  have  done.  It  is  very  certain  that  the  Russians 
are  retiring  on  Breslau,  but  are  the  Prussians  retiring  on 
Breslau,  as  they  say,  or  have  they  thrown  themselves  on 
Berlin,  as  seems  more  natural,  to  cover  their  capital?  This 
is  the  news  that  I expect  to-night  from  Bertrand ; and  that 
which  I shall  receive  from  your  side  will  let  me  perfectly 
understand.  You  feel  that  with  forces  as  considerable  as 
those  you  command,  it  is  not  a question  of  remaining  quiet. 
To  disengage  Glogau,  to  occupy  Berlin,  so  that  Davout  may 
reoccupy  Hamburg  and  advance  with  his  five  divisions  into 
Pomerania,  to  seize  Breslau,  these  are  the  three  important 
objects  which  I propose  to  myself,  and  that  I would  fulfill,  all 
three,  this  month.  By  the  position  which  I make  you  take 
we  shall  always  find  ourselves  assembled,  able  to  move  to  the 
right  or  the  left  with  the  greatest  masses  possible,  according 
to  the  news.” 

The  immediate  plan  thus  was  for  Ney,  basing  on  the  Elbe 
at  Torgau  and  Wittenberg,  to  threaten  Berlin,  while  the  em- 
peror, operating  by  his  left,  should  sustain  the  manoeuvre 
and  at  the  same  time  definitely  separate  the  Russian  and 
Prussian  armies,  and  threaten  the  Russian  right  at  Bautzen. 
This  was  an  admirable  conception,  on  Napoleon’s  usual  gigan- 
tic scale. 

At  3 A.  m.,  May  14,  the  emperor  wrote  Ney  again : “ I am 


VARIED  ORDERS  TO  NEY. 


53 


receiving  positive  news  as  to  the  movements  of  Blucher, 
Yorck,  Kleist,  the  King  of  Prussia.  ...  It  seems,  then,  not 
doubtful  that  they  are  disgarnishing  Berlin,  and  that  there 
are  to  cover  this  town  only  a few  horsemen  and  Billow’s  corps ; 
that  makes  all  the  more  necessary  the  movement  ordered. 
Have  everything  belonging  to  Lauriston  rejoin  him,  so  that 
he  may  reinforce  the  army,  if  the  enemy  desires  to  receive 
battle,  as  they  say  that  the  Russians  and  Prussians  are  assem- 
bled. Their  rearguard  shows  thirty  thousand  men  and  much 
artillery.  They  are  covering  the  little  town  of  Bautzen.” 

Key  meanwhile  was  equally  in  the  dark  as  was  his  master, 
but  in  order  to  be  prepared  for  either  a march  on  Berlin  or 
one  to  the  main  army,  on  May  14  he  ordered  Victor,  after 
debouching  from  Wittenberg,  to  head  in  two  columns  on 
Treuenbrietzen  and  J uterbog,  and  then  to  file  by  his  right  on 
Dahme,  Sebastiani  to  protect  his  left.  These  forces  would 
thus  be  better  in  hand. 

Napoleon  now  balanced  for  two  or  three  days  between  the 
dash  on  Berlin  and  a battle  if  the  enemy  should  resolve  to 
stand  in  lieu  of  withdrawing  to  Silesia  ; and  his  orders  to 
Ney  varied  from  hour  to  hour  as  information  ran  in  from  the 
front  to  one  or  other  purport.  This  attitude  is  in  the  highest 
degree  interesting  to  the  student  of  war. 

Early  Maj'  16  Ney  was  notified  that  the  enemy  was  cer- 
tainly at  Bautzen  in  force,  and  that  he  was  to  send  Lauris- 
ton to  Hoyerswerda,  while  he  himself  moved  to  Spremburg. 
Macdonald  was  notified  that  Ney  would  be  at  Hoyerswerda 
on  the  18th,  on  which  day  the  emperor  was  thinking  of  forc- 
ing the  enemy’s  position.  Meanwhile  Macdonald  was  to 
keep  in  connection  with  Bertrand,  intrench  his  position,  and 
not  leave  himself  open  to  attack.  At  1 p.  M.  Ney  was  ordered 
on  Hoyerswerda  instead  of  on  Spremburg.  “ His  Majesty 
desires  that  you  should  arrive  as  early  as  possible  with  your 


54 


IN  FRONT  OF  BAUTZEN. 


corps  and  Lauriston’s  at  Hoyerswerda,  where  you  will  be  but 
one  march  from  Bautzen,  where  the  enemy  appears  to  be  in 
force  and  to  desire  to  hold  himself.”  On  the  same  day  Ber- 
thier  wrote  Ney  : “ The  intention  of  the  emperor  is  that  Victor, 
under  whose  orders  you  will  place  Reynier,  shall  manoeuvre 
on  Berlin,  shall  take  possession  of  this  town,  reoccupy  Span- 
dau  . . . pursue  Billow  . . . and  go  to  the  aid  of  Stettin, 
Ciistrin  or  Glogau.  . . .You  will  have  a care  to  prescribe 
to  Victor  to  place  himself  in  a military  manner  at  Berlin, 
not  to  let  troops  enter  it,  but  to  put  them  in  barracks,  so  as 
to  dispose  promptly  of  them  in  every  direction.  Thus  the 
first  operation  which  Victor  will  have  to  undertake  will  be 
to  oblige  Billow  to  recross  the  Oder.” 

During  these  days,  Macdonald  in  front  of  Bautzen  had 
been  the  one  in  contact  with  the  enemy.  On  May  13  Ber- 
thier  wrote  him : “ The  emperor  expected  to  receive  several 
letters  from  you  each  day.  You  are  at  his  vanguard.  It  is 
then  for  you  to  give  news  of  the  enemy,  to  interrogate,  to 
send  spies,  seize  letters  in  the  village  post-offices,  and  finally 
employ  every  means,  all  the  ruses  of  war,  to  know  what  is 
going  on.”  Bertrand,  with  headquarters  at  Kamenz,  was 
moving  towards  Macdonald’s  left,  Oudinot  was  to  move  for- 
ward from  Bischofswerda  to  his  right.  Still  the  purpose  of 
the  enemy  was  blind  to  the  emperor,  for  at  9 A.  M.,  May  14, 
he  wrote  Macdonald  : “ The  news  I receive  leads  me  to  think 
that  the  enemy  has  ceased  the  works  he  was  making  at 
Bautzen,  that  the  bulk  of  his  army  has  left,  and  that  he 
has  renounced  the  project  of  making  at  that  point  a strong 
resistance.  You  will  already  have  some  indication  as  to  this. 
It  is  advantageous  that  you  should  enter  this  town,  so  as 
to  extend  ourselves,  if  that  can  be  done  with  a simple  affair 
of  the  vanguard.  If  you  go  to  Bautzen,  you  will  notify  Mar- 
mont  to  come  to  Bischofswerda.”  But  on  May  15,  at  10  p.  M., 


TO  SCOUR  THE  COUNTRY. 


55 


he  heard  from  Macdonald  that  the  enemy  had  definitely 
drawn  up  at  Bautzen,  and  wrote  him  that  Ney  and  Lauriston 
were  already  moving  down  to  turn  the  position.  Even  then 
he  suspected  the  allies  would  retire  to  Silesia,  and  not  until 
the  17th  did  the  reports  satisfy  him  that  they  proposed  to 
accept  battle  on  the  Spree.  Hereupon  he  notified  Ney  that 
he  might  entirely  give  up  the  Berlin  project  and  oblique  to 
the  right  towards  Bautzen,  where  the  enemy  had  made  a 
stand,  which,  having  received  notice  of  Barclay’s  arrival, 
Ney  was  already  prepared  to  do. 

Meanwhile  the  emperor  had  undertaken  to  utilize  his  cav- 
alry, and  on  May  16  it  was  all  put  under  Mortier,  who  was 
sent  out  to  Grossenhayn  to  get  into  communication  with 
Lauriston  at  Dobriluk  and  Ney  at  Liickau,  pursue  the  enemy 
and  generally  to  scour  the  country.  But  next  day  he  was 
ordered  back  to  a point  between  Dresden  and  Bischofswerda, 
so  as  to  reach,  the  18th,  the  camp  in  front  of  Bautzen.  Ber- 
trand was  ordered  to  join  Macdonald,  leaving  an  observation 
corps  at  Kamenz  ; Macdonald  was  notified  that  both  he  and 
Oudinot  would  smartly  come  up  to  sustain  his  flanks,  and 
on  May  18  Mortier  was  ordered  into  line.  Oudinot  was  to 
occupy  Neukirch  and  Neustadt  and  scour  the  woods  there,  so 
as  to  lean  his  right  on  the  Bohemian  frontier.  Referring  to 
this,  the  emperor  says : u This  position  of  the  enemy  on  our 
right  is  disgraceful,  and  contrary  to  all  the  principles  of  war. 
It  is  from  Bautzen  and  Bischofswerda  to  Bohemia  only  three 
or  four  leagues.  The  enemy  must  be  chased  from  there.’’ 
Each  corps  commander  was  ordered  to  clear  the  country  well 
in  front  of  him.  The  Guard,  at  8 A.  M.  of  the  18th,  was  to 
march  towards  Bautzen,  and  Bertrand  to  keep  up  commu- 
nication with  Lauriston  and  Ney,  who  were  to  arrive  this  day 
at  Hoyers^erda.  Beaumont  was  to  cover  Dresden,  Durosnel 
to  command  the  city;  and  the  pontoon  equipages,  artillery, 


56 


A LAPSE  IN  DATES. 


caissons,  hospitals,  to  be  ready  to  cross  to  the  right  bank. 
On  May  18  the  emperor  wrote  Durosnel:  “Be  careful  that 
the  service  is  done  militarily.  The  artillery  will  park  on  the 
left  bank  until  the  issue  of  a battle,  so  that  should  the  battle 
be  lost,  one  might  pass  to  the  left  bank  without  loss.”  “Have 
prepared  the  palisades  of  the  town,  so  that  everything  shall 
be  in  good  state  and  well  closed,  that  the  troops  shall  be  pro- 
tected behind  them  against  constant  attacks  of  the  Cossacks. 
Have  barriers  with  palisades  erected  on  the  chaussees.” 

Matters  now  became  more  definite  ; and  during  the  morning 
of  May  18  the  emperor  wrote  to  Berthier  to  notify  Ney  in 
cipher : “ That  we  are  at  a gun’s  carry  from  the  little  town  of 
Bautzen,  where  the  enemy  is  occupying  his  head  of  position, 
and  where  he  has  made  intrenchments ; that  on  the  right  are 
placed  the  Prussians  and  on  the  left  the  Russians ; that 
I desire  that  with  Lauriston  and  all  his  forces  assembled, 
in  military  march  he  should  move  on  Drehsa;  having  thus 
passed  the  Spree,  he  will  find  himself  to  have  turned  the 
position  of  the  enemy.  He  will  take  there  a good  position ; 
but  I suppose  that  he  is  able  to  arrive  with  his  entire  force 
the  19th  at  Hoyerswerda.  He  will  approach  us  the  19th ; 
and  on  the  20th  he  can  move  to  the  position  which  will  have 
the  effect  either  that  the  enemy  will  evacuate  it  to  withdraw 
farther,  or  to  place  us  where  we  can  attack  with  advantage.” 
Berthier  wrote  Ney  at  10  A.  m.  by  a staff  officer  : “ His  Maj- 
esty supposes  that  you  are  able  to  arrive  at  Hoyerswerda  the 
19th  quite  completely.  You  will  approach  us  the  19th  and  the 
20th,  and  you  will  be  able  the  21st  to  move  to  the  position 
which  will  have  the  effect  either  that  the  enemy  will  evacuate 
to  withdraw  farther,  or  to  enable  us  to  attack  with  advantage.” 
Here  is  a curious  lapse  in  dates.  In  the  evening  of  the  same 
day  Ney  wrote  in  cipher  to  Berthier  that  he  had  ordered  Vic- 
tor, who  had  been  about  to  move  on  Berlin,  and  Reynier  to 


THE  POSITION  OF  DREHSA.  57 

march  with  the  greatest  diligence  to  Bautzen,  so  as  to  arrive 
there  the  20th  or  21st. 

About  midday,  May  18,  Bertrand  was  informed  that 
Lauriston  and  Ney  would  arrive  at  Gross  Dobern  and 
Hoyerswerda  that  evening : “ Send  a strong  reconnoissance 
in  infantry  and  cavalry  in  that  direction,”  Berthier  wrote. 
“ And  have  it  told  by  an  officer,  or  by  one  of  your  aides, 
but  without  writing,  or  else  by  writing  in  cipher,  that  Ney 
is  to  manoeuvre  to  turn  the  position  of  the  enemy  so  as  to 
move  on  Drehsa.  As  Lauriston  and  Ney  are  approaching 
us,  it  is  indispensable  to  keep  in  communication  with  them 
by  your  left.  . . . Lauriston  is  to  send  and  notify  Ney  that 
the  emperor  will  sleep  to-night  in  the  camp  in  front  of 
Bautzen.” 

At  11a.  m.,  May  19,  Ney  wrote  Berthier  from  Hoyerswerda 
that  he  had  interrogated  the  officer  bringing  him  a letter  from 
Lauriston,  “ and  that  what  he  has  told  me  has  confirmed  me 
that  the  intention  of  the  emperor  was  that  I should  move  on 
Drehsa.”  The  Lauriston  letter  states  that  “ it  is  the  emper- 
or’s desire  that  Ney’s,  Lauriston’s  and  Reynier’s  corps,  Vic- 
tor’s and  Sebastiani’s,  should  manoeuvre  to  debouch  by  Drehsa, 
which  is  between  the  two  Sprees.  This  Drehsa  is  written 
Brosa  on  the  map  of  the  Institute  of  Weimar.”  It  seems 
that  there  is  another  Brosa  close  to  Gotamelde  and  out  of 
Ney’s  intended  line  ; but  there  is  no  evidence  that  this  misled 
Ney.  An  hour  later  Ney  wrote  Berthier:  “I  will  manoeuvre 
to-morrow,  the  20th,  towards  the  position  of  Drehsa,  but  I 
believe  it  to  be  very  important  to  have  my  movement  sus- 
tained, so  that  if  the  enemy  has  decided  to  await  battle  on 
the  heights  of  Bautzen,  I might  be  in  measure  to  contain  him, 
in  case  he  marched  on  me  by  way  of  Bautzen.” 

This  indication  of  Drehsa  as  the  battlefield  objective  whence 
Ney  could  debouch  on  the  allied  right  and  rear,  instead  of 


THE  COLUMNS  DELAYED . 


58 

Wurschen  and  Hochkircli,  had  perhaps  to  do  with  this  village 
being  given  undue  prominence  on  the  map  Napoleon  was 
using.  There  are  two  Drehsas,  one  of  which  is  placed  about 
where  Napoleon  would  wish  the  blow  to  fall,  between  the  two 
roads  on  which  the  enemy  must  retreat. 

The  emperor’s  first  dispatches,  giving  Ney  directions  to 
move  on  Spremburg,  had  been  countermanded,  because  a 
manoeuvre  so  far  beyond  their  right  flank  might  lead  the  allies 
to  quit  their  position  at  Bautzen,  — as  he  had  feared  Kutusov 
would  do  at  Borodino,  — and  his  later  order  to  oblique  towards 
Senftenberg  and  Konigswartha  was  in  a direction  which  the 
allies  would  interpret  as  merely  a junction  of  Ney’s  forces 
with  those  of  his  master.  Lauriston  had  accordingly  headed 
from  Dobriluk  on  Senftenberg,  while  Ney  marched  from 
Luckau  on  Kalau,  followed  by  Reynier  from  Dahme  to 
Liickau.  The  columns  were  delayed  by  the  low-lying,  forest- 
covered,  marshy  ground  between  the  Elster  and  the  Spree ; 
but  no  special  harm  ensued.  It  happened,  too,  that  Liitzow’s 
light  horse  had  intercepted  a number  of  French  dispatches ; 
but  though  they  gave  notice  of  the  French  advent,  the  gen- 
eral direction  of  Ney  did  not  arouse  allied  suspicion.  On  the 
19th  Ney  was  at  Hoyerswerda ; Reynier  reached  Kalau,  and 
Lauriston  Weissig,  while  the  main  French  army  was  con- 
centrating west  of  Bautzen. 

Napoleon  had  been  expecting  several  divisions  of  cuirassiers 
and  light  horse,  reorganized  by  Latour-Maubourg,  as  well 
as  two  fresh  divisions  of  the  Young  Guard.  These  having 
come  to  hand,  he  wrote  Macdonald  from  Dresden  the  18th : 
“ I leave  Dresden  with  all  my  Guard  to  move  half-way  to 
Bautzen.  I shall  be  at  your  headquarters  -at  point  of  day  to 
reconnoitre  the  enemy.  Have  a sketch  prepared  in  which  is 
set  down  all  you  have  seen,  to  facilitate  my  reconnoissance. 
Lauriston  and  Ney  are  to  arrive  at  Hoyerswerda.  Bertrand 


BARCLAY  SURPRISES  PEYRI. 


59 


will  have  put  himself  into  communication  with  you.”  He 
then  personally  left  Dresden,  stopped  over  night  at  Harthau, 
and  early  on  the  19th  he  reached  and  established  his  head- 
quarters at  Klein  Forstgen,  to  the  west  of  Bautzen ; and  here 
he  learned  that  Barclay,  Langeron,  Sass  and  Kleist  had 
joined  the  allies,  which  led  him  to  estimate  them  at  one  hun- 
dred and  fifty  thousand  men. 

The  emperor  at  once  began  reconnoitring  the  enemy’s  posi- 
tion, and  spent  the  day  studying  it  from  various  heights  near 
by.  Heavy  cannonading  had  been  heard  towards  Konigs- 
wartha  during  the  day,  but  though  increasing  at  evening,  it 
died  down  at  midnight.  It  seems  that  on  learning,  May  18, 
of  the  advance  of  Lauriston  by  way  of  Hoyerswerda,  Alex- 
ander seized  the  initiative,  and  sent  out  eighteen  thousand 
men  under  Barclay  and  twelve  thousand  under  Yorck  in  the 
general  direction  of  Senftenberg,  hoping  to  cut  off  and  beat 
that  general,  who  was  thought  to  be  there  alone.  Bertrand 
had  also  sent  out  Peyri’s  Italian  division  to  get  into  touch,  as 
ordered,  with  Ney  at  Konigswartha ; Peyri  had  made  poor 
dispositions,  did  not  reconnoitre  the  neighboring  forests,  and 
placed  his  outlying  forces  badly.  At  4 p.  M.  he  was  surprised 
by  Barclay  between  Konigswartha  and  Klix,  and  quite  cut 
up,  with  loss  of  two  thousand  prisoners  and  all  the  guns. 
This  fight  occurred  within  three  miles  of  Key’s  van  under 
Kellermann,  who  came  up  and  rescued  what  was  left.  Mean- 
while Lauriston  met  Yorck’s  smaller  detachment  at  Weissig, 
and  after  many  hours’  grim  fighting,  forced  it  back  to  Bautzen, 
Maison’s  division  earning  the  honors  of  the  encounter,  which 
cost  the  Prussians  five  thousand  men.  Yorck  “ would  have 
been  crushed  unless  there  had  been  a defile  to  pass,  through 
which  our  troops  could  arrive  only  successively,”  says  the 
Bulletin.  From  Konigswartha  Ney  duly  debouched  on  Leich- 
nam  and  Klix,  keeping  on  the  left  bank  of  the' Spree.  This 


60 


CLASSIC  GROUND. 


was  the  fighting  the  emperor  had  heard,  and  he  later  criti- 
cised it,  writing,  June  6,  to  Bertrand:  — 

“ I have  received  your  letter.  It  is  true  that  I was  not  satisfied  with 
the  manner  in  which  your  troops  were  placed  the  19th,  and  that  at  the 
first  gun  you  did  not  inform  yourself  of  what  it  was,  and  did  not  march 
to  the  relief  of  the  Italian  division.  . . .You  have  given  proof  in  different 
circumstances  that  you  have  distinguished  talents,  but  war  can  be  made 
only  with  vigor,  decision  and  constant  will.  You  must  neither  fumble 
nor  hesitate.  . . . Believe,  moreover,  that  my  sentiments  for  you  are  always 
the  same,  and  that  I expect  that  with  a little  experience  in  handling- 
troops  you  will  merit  from  me  in  the  infantry  arm,  as  you  have  merited 
in  your  original  arm.” 

At  10  A.  m.,  May  20,  Ney  wrote  the  emperor  : “ This  morn- 
ing the  troops  are  moving  on  Drehsa.  I do  not  know  whether 
the  enemy  will  permit  us  to  take  position  on  his  flank  and 
rear  without  delivering  battle.  ...  I believe  that  Your  Maj- 
esty will  have  ordered  to  sustain  me  in  the  new  direction  I 
have  taken.” 

Napoleon  was  again  approaching  classic  ground.  It  was 
here  on  the  hillocks  of  Klein  Bautzen  and  Kreckwitz  that 
Frederick,  after  his  defeat  at  Hochkirch,  sat  down  opposite 
Daun  and  bade  stern  defiance  to  the  twofold  superior  numbers 
of  the  enemy.  The  country  is  full  of  these  hillocks,  increas- 
ing in  height  near  the  mountains  which,  on  the  south,  form 
the  frontier  of  Bohemia.  Small  streams  wander  around  them 
to  the  Spree,  and  villages  are  dotted  over  the  landscape.  Sev- 
eral groups  of  ponds  lie  about  Malscliwitz  and  Baruth  in 
the  northern  section,  and  a few  woods  on  the  outskirts  of  the 
battlefield  proper  ; but  it  is  mostly  open,  strongly  accentu- 
ated country. 

When  they  drew  up  at  Bautzen  for  another  trial  of  strength, 
the  allies  mustered  scarcely  more  than  one  hundred  and  ten 
thousand  men  ; and  indeed,  the  number  has  been  set  down  by 
Berndt  as  ninety-six  thousand  five  hundred,  about  three  fifths 


.THE  FIGURES  OF  FOUCART. 


61 


Russians.  If  Napoleon  could  bring  all  his  troops  into  action, 
he  would  number  one  hundred  and  fifty  thousand  men,  but 
in  cavalry  he  was  deficient. 

Quite  at  variance  with  this  estimate  are  the  figures  of  Foucart,  who 
from  the  French  archives  gives  us  morning  reports  of  May  10  to  May  19, 
from  which  it  appears  that  their  numbers  at  Bautzen  were  as  follows  : — 

Guard.  Mortier.  (Dumoustier,  Barrois,  Roguet,  Wal- 

ther’s  3800  cavalry.)  110  guns  . . . 20,000  men. 

Army  under  the  Emperor. 

4th  Corps.  Bertrand.  (Morand,  Peyri,  Franquemont  and 
1300  Neapolitan  and  Wurtemberg  cavalry.) 

49  guns  ...  ....  25,700  44 

6th  Corps.  Marmont.  (Compans,  Bonet,  Friedrichs.)  65  guns  24,800  44 
11th  Corps.  Macdonald.  (Fressinet,  Gdrard,  Charpentier.) 

52  guns  ........  14,800  44 

12th  Corps.  Oudinot.  ‘(Pacthod,  Lorencez,  Raglowich  and 

700  Bavarian  cavalry.)  50  guns  . . . 23,700  44 

1st  Cavalry  Latour-Maubourg.  (Bruyere,  Bordesoulle,  Dou- 

Corps.  mere.)  18  guns 6,000  44 

115,000  “ 

Army  under  Ney. 

3d  Corps.  Ney.  ‘(Souham,  Delmas,  Albert,  Ricard,  Mar- 

chand,  Laboissiere’s  1200  cavalry.)  84  guns.  52,000  44 
5th  Corps.  Lauriston.  (Maison,  Lagrange,  Rochambeau, 

Puthod,  Guyon’s  1600  cavalry.)  99  guns  . 25,000  44 
7th  Corps.  Reynier.  (Durutte,  Sahr,  Saxon  300  cavalry.) 

16  guns 10,500  44 

87,500  44 

Army  under  the  Emperor  . 115,000  men  and  344  guns. 

Army  under  Ney  . . . 87,500  44  44  199  44 

202,500  44  44  543  44 

The  allies,  nominally  under  Alexander,  really  led  by  Witt- 
genstein as  chief  of  staff,  as  we  should  now  phrase  it,  were 
drawn  up  back  of  the  Spree,  its  banks  marshy  in  places,  with 


62 


POSITION  OF  THE  ENEMY . 


Bautzen  as  a redoubt  in  the  first  line,  and  the  Russian  army 
holding  the  left,  Blucher’s  Prussians  the  right.  The  allied 
left  leaned  on  the  foothills  of  the  Lusatian  mountains,  part 
of  the  Riesen  Gebirge,  where  there  was  small  chance  of  turn- 
ing them ; their  right  was  protected  by  the  Malschwitz  ponds, 
approachable  only  by  a circuit.  The  position  was  strong,  but 
it  had  only  one  outlet  for  retreat,  that  through  Wurschen  and 
Hochkircli  on  Reichenbach  and  Lobau ; for  on  their  left  lay 
neutral  Bohemia,  on  which  they  might  not  trespass;  and  this 
placed  them  in  danger  of  being  trapped,  if  the  right  and  rear 
could  be  reached  in  force. 

In  the  Bulletin  of  May  24  the  emperor  says  : “ The  19th  in  the  even- 
ing the  enemy’s  position  was  as  follows  : his  left  leaned  on  wooded 
mountains  at  right  angles  to  the  Spree  about  a league  from  Bautzen, 
which  sustained  his  centre.  This  town  had  been  .crenelated,  intrenched, 
and  covered  with  redoubts.  The  right  of  the  enemy  leaned  on  fortified 
hillocks,  which  defended  the  debouches  of  the  Spree  near  the  village  of 
Niminschutz.  His  whole  front  was  covered  by  the  Spree.  This  very 
strong  position  was  only  a first  position. 

“ One  could  distinctly  perceive,  three  thousand  fathoms  to  the  rear, 
freshly  moved  ground,  and  works  which  marked  their  second  position. 
Their  left  still  leaned  on  the  same  mountains,  two  thousand  fathoms  in 
rear  of  the  first  position,  and  much  in  advance  of  the  village  of  Hoch- 
kirch.  The  centre  leaned  on  three  intrenched  villages,  where  they  had 
done  so  much  work  that  they  could  consider  them  as  strong  places. 
Marshy  and  difficult  ground  covered  three  quarters  of  the  centre.  Finally, 
their  right  leaned  in  the  rear  of  the  first  position,  on  villages  and  hillocks 
equally  intrenched. 

“ The  front  of  the  enemy’s  army,  either  in  first  or  second  position, 
would  be  a league  and  a half  long.  After  this  reconnoissance  it  was 
easy  to  conceive  how,  despite  a battle  lost  like  that  of  Lfitzen,  and  eight 
days’  retreat,  the  enemy  might  yet  have  hopes  in  the  chance  of  fortune 
According  to  the  expression  of  a Russian  officer,  of  whom  it  was  asked 
what  they  intended  to  do  : ‘We  intend,’  said  he,  ‘ neither  to  advance  nor 
to  retreat.’  ‘ You  are  masters  of  the  first  point,’  replied  a French  officer ; 
‘ in  a few  days  the  event  will  prove  if  you  are  masters  of  the  other.’  ” 


POSITION  OF  THE  FRENCH. 


63 


On  the  left  bank  of  the  Spree,  on  the  evening  of  the  19th, 
the  French  lay  in  the  following  position  : Ney’s  head  of  col- 
umn under  Lauriston  was  at  Weissig,  his  own  corps  at  Mau- 
kendorf,  and  Reynier  away  back  at  Kalau.  Bertrand  was 
to  march  to  the  aid  of  Lauriston  as  soon  as  he  heard  guns, 
so  as  to  make  the  junction,  and  Marmont  was  to  support 
him  if  necessary.  The  right  of  the  main  force,  Oudinot,  at 
Grubschiitz,  leaned  on  the  hills,  the  centre  under  Macdonald 
faced  Bautzen  astride  the  Dresden  road,  on  his  left  Marmont 
between  Ohne  and  Nimmschiitz,  with  Bertrand  on  the  left  of 
the  line  near  Jescliiitz,  and  the  Guard  in  reserve  at  Forstgen. 
About  8 A.  M.  the  20th,  Soult,  who  since  the  death  of  Bessieres 
had  headed  the  Old  Guard,  was  ordered  to  take  command 
of  Bertrand  and  Latour-Maubourg,  to  reestablish  communica- 
tion with  Hoyerswerda  and  help  Ney  debouch. 

At  8 A.  M.  of  the  20th,  the  emperor  (who  had  heard  of 
Peyri’s  fight,  but  not  Lauriston’s)  took  post  on  the  Schmoch- 
titz  hill  to  direct  the  battle,  and  ordered  Oudinot  to  cross 
and  threaten  the  enemy’s  left,  Macdonald  to  throw  three 
truss  bridges  just  above  Bautzen,  and  Marmont  to  throw  two 
others  half  a league  below.  Soult,  “ to  whom  His  Majesty 
had  given  superior  command  of  the  centre,”  was  to  cross  the 
Spree  to  disquiet  the  right  of  the  enemy,  and  finally,  says 
the  Bulletin,  Ney,  who  had  his  own  corps,  Lauriston  and 
Reynier,  was  “ to  approach  Klix,  to  cross  the  Spree,  to  turn 
the  right  of  the  enemy,  and  to  advance  on  his  headquarters 
at  Wurschen,  and  from  there  on  Weissenberg.”  It  does 
not,  however,  appear  that  Ney’s  orders  were  precisely  these. 
About  4 p.  m.,  May  20,  Berthier  wrote  Ney : “ On  the  bat- 
tlefield in  front  of  Bautzen,  May  20,  1813.  The  emperor 
orders,  Prince,  that  you  should  direct  yourself  on  Drehsa, 
driving  the  enemy  from  his  position,  getting  into  connection 
with  us,  and  that  from  there  you  should  direct  yourself  on 


64 


SIGNAL  GIVEN  FOR  ACTION. 


Weissenberg  in  such  a manner  as  to  turn  the  enemy.”  Napo- 
leon’s idea  would  have  been  more  clearly  expressed  had  he 
told  Ney  to  move  from  Klix  to  cut  the  two  roads  by  which  the 
enemy  must  retreat,  and  then  left  him  to  act. 

About  noon  the  signal  for  action  was  given,  the  artillery 
opened,  and  Macdonald,  with  the  Guard  back  of  him,  ad- 
vancing on  Bautzen  and  finding  the  stone  bridge  over  the 


THE  RESULT  OF  MAY  20. 


65 


Spree  still  intact,  — for  Alexander  had  fancied  he  might  fight 
an  offensive  battle,  — promptly  moved  across  without  throw- 
ing his  truss  bridges,  while  Oudinot  took  Doberschau  and 
Strehla,  and  forged  on  to  Binowitz.  Marmont  and  Bertrand 
put  over  their  troops  on  four  boat  bridges,  and  by  three  the 
French  army,  substantially  on  the  right  bank,  had  begun 
the  attack  of  Bautzen.  Although  stoutly  defended,  by  six 
the  town  fell  to  Compans,  and  having  also  lost  Nadelwitz  and 
Nieder  Keina  to  Bonnet;,  the  allies  fell  back  to  the  real  line 
where  it  was  intended  to  fight.  Kleist,  after  gallantly  hold- 
ing the  Burck  hillocks  all  the  afternoon  against  Bertrand 
and  part  of  Marmont,  also  fell  back  by  eight,  especially  when 
some  of  Marmont’s  battalions  had  debouched  from  Baut- 
zen, and  seized  the  Nieder  Keina  hills  on  his  left.  Oudinot, 
who  had  crossed  at  Grubschiitz,  drove  the  left  wing  allies 
from  the  hills  they  occupied,  but  was  compelled  to  give  them 
up  at  nightfall.  Firing  was  kept  up  until  11  p.  m.  Ney’s 
foremost  column  advanced  into  touch  with  Barclay’s  outposts 
at  Klix,  but  did  not  cross  the  Spree ; and  Reynier  came  up 
within  a dozen  miles  of  the  field  at  Hoyerswerda.  The  re- 
sult of  May  20  for  the  French  had  been  that  they  had  crossed 
the  Spree  in  the  teeth  of  the  enemy,  and  had  gained  firm 
footing  on  the  right  bank ; that  the  allies  had  fallen  back 
into  the  previously  selected  second  line,  which  had  been  pro- 
tected by  elaborate  earthworks ; and  that  Ney  had  reached 
Klix,  from  which  place  he  could  emerge  on  the  allied  right 
and  rear,  although  he  was  still  separated  from  the  main  army. 
At  10  P.  M.  he  wrote  the  emperor  : “ The  troops  are  ordered 
to  be  ready  to  march  to-morrow  morning  by  way  of  Baruth 
on  Weissenberg.  I desire  to  know  the  intentions  of  Your 
Majesty,  whether  you  approve  my  movement  or  prescribe 
me  a new  direction.  The  officer  whom  I sent  yesterday  to 
the  emperor  has  just  arrived.  He  has  given  me  the  note 


VOL.  IV. 


66 


DESTINY  OF  THE  BATTLE. 


by  virtue  of  which  I am  to  move  on  Weissenberg,  but  as 
the  cannonade  and  fusillade  begin  again  in  the  direction  of 
Hochkirch  and  Bautzen,  I will  not  make  the  movement  on 
Weissenberg  until  I receive  new  orders.” 

“ This  day,”  says  the  Bulletin,  “ which  one  might  call,  if  isolated,  the 
battle  of  Bautzen,  was  only  the  prelude  of  the  battle  of  Wurschen.  The 
enemy,  however,  commenced  to  understand  the  possibility  of  being  forced 
out  of  his  position.  His  hopes  were  no  longer  the  same,  and  from  this 
moment  he  must  have  had  presage  of  his  defeat.  Already  all  his  dispo- 
sitions were  changed.  The  destiny  of  the  battle  was  no  longer  to  be  de- 
cided behind  his  intrenchments.  His  immense  works  and  three  hundred 
redoubts  became  useless.  The  right  of  his  position,  which  was  opposite 
the  4th  Corps,  became  his  centre,  and  he  was  obliged  to  throw  his  right, 
which  formed  a considerable  part  of  his  army,  to  oppose  Ney,  in  a place 
which  he  had  not  studied  and  which  he  believed  outside  his  position.” 

On  the  other  hand,  the  allied  reports  claim  that  the  French 
had  lost  so  heavily  on  this  day  that  they  were  much  weakened 
for  the  morrow’s  fighting. 

In  the  evening  of  the  20th  the  French  battle  line  was  nearly 
a dozen  miles  long,  with  fo.ur  army  corps  deployed,  and  the 
left  wing  with  two  corps  moving  to  turn  the  enemy.  The 
Guard  was  in  reserve  between  the  right  and  centre ; Reynier 
was  fast  coming  up.  Grouard  suggests  that  after  the  battle 
of  the  20th  Napoleon  would  have  done  better  to  move  by  his 
left  in  such  a way  as  to  strike  with  the  bulk  of  his  force  the 
enemy’s  right  flank,  and  push  them  up  against  the  mountains, 
— in  other  words,  to  fight  an  oblique  battle.  There  was  little 
danger,  with  his  superior  numbers,  of  his  losing  his  commu- 
nications with  Dresden,  and  he  had  another  line  on  Torgau 
if  needed.  But  the  ground  did  not  lend  itself  so  well  to  this 
manoeuvre,  and  Napoleon’s  plan  of  battle  was  good  enough  ; 
it  was  the  execution  that  was  lacking. 

In  the  coming  battle,  to  which  the  operations  of  the  20th 


FRENCH  FLANKING  MOVEMENT. 


67 


hacl  but  led  up,  Ney’s  manoeuvre  was  intended  to  be  the  im- 
portant one.  He  was  to  bring  the  heavy  column  originally 
intended  for  an  advance  on  Berlin  down  to  the  rear  of  Bautzen, 
turn  the  allies’  right  and  cut  them  off.  As  May  20  closed,  it 
looked  as  if  the  morrow’s  operations  must  succeed  as  planned ; 
for  Napoleon  was  in  a good  position  to  contain  the  allied 
main  force,  while  Ney  moved  his  heavy  column  upon  their 
only  line  of  retreat.  At  11  P.  M.,  May  20,  Soult  reported 
that  the  communication  with  Ney  was  established.  There 
might,  however,  be  trouble  in  crossing  the  Spree  in  the  front 
of  Ney’s  position. 

Although  aware  of  the  French  flanking  movement,  Alex- 
ander had  not  made  up  his  mind  whether  it  was  a mere 
demonstration,  or  a manoeuvre  to  turn  his  right ; for  Bar- 
clay and  Yorck  had  not  discovered  that  the  troops  they  had 
fought  belonged  to  Ney  as  well  as  Lauriston.  No  finer  battle 
plan  had  ever  been  perfected  by  the  emperor ; and  by  9 p.  M., 
in  excellent  spirits,  he  returned  to  headquarters  at  Bautzen, 
and  spent  three  hours  in  arranging  with  Berthier  the  de- 
tails of  the  morrow’s  manoeuvres ; then,  dismissing  him,  he 
worked  with  other  officers  most  of  the  hours  until  5 A.  M.  of 
the  21st,  when  he  mounted  and  rode  out  to  the  front.  Roused 
by  the  probability  of  winning  a decisive  victory,  his  ancient 
power  had  returned  to  him,  and  despite  scant  sleep,  he  was 
alert  and  active.  In  a defile,  from  which  he  could  see  the 
plain  of  Jenkowitz  and  Baschiitz,  Napoleon  dismounted  and 
viewed  the  field.  His  plan  as  stated  was  to  contain  the 
enemy  in  his  works  by  feigned  attacks  until  Ney  should 
debouch  in  force  on  his  right  and  rear,  and  then  to  throw 
forward  all  his  troops,  line  and  reserve,  and  give  the  coup  de 
grace . 

At  this  moment  the  emperor  had  no  news  of  Ney,  whose 
report  of  10  p.  M.,  May  20,  saying  that  he  would  await  new 


68 


INSTRUCTIONS  TO  NEY. 


orders,  was  not  dispatched  till  4.30  A.  M.  the  21st.  From  Sdier 
it  was  nearly  nine  miles  to  the  emperor’s  headquarters,  and 
the  aide  only  reached  the  emperor  after  seven  o’clock.  The 
latter  was  examining  the  enemy’s  lines.  He  pointed  out  these 
lines  to  Ney’s  aide,  and  had  Berthier  send  back  instructions  by 
him,  and  a duplicate  by  another  aide.  “ In  bivouac  in  front  of 
Bautzen,  May  21,  1813,  8 A.  M.  The  intention  of  the  em- 
peror is  that  you  shall  constantly  follow  the  movements  of  the 
enemy.  His  Majesty  has  shown  your  staff  officer  the  position 
of  the  enemy,  which  appears  definitive  by  the  redoubts  he 
has  constructed  and  is  occupying.  The  intention  of  the 
emperor  is  that  }rou  should  be  this  morning  at  eleven  at  the 
village  of  Preititz.  You  will  be  on  the  extreme  right  of 
the  enemy.  As  soon  as  the  emperor  shall  see  you  engaged 
at  Preititz,  we  will  frankly  attack  at  all  points.  Have  Lau- 
riston  march  on  your  left,  to  be  able  to  turn  the  enemy  if  your 
movement  decides  him  to  abandon  his  position.”  A copy  of 
this  order  to  Ney  was  sent  to  Soult,  with  orders  to  “ attack 
the  enemy  vigorously  with  your  three  divisions  by  marching 
between  Ney  and  Marmont.”  These  two  letters,  in  the  ar- 
chives, appear  to  have  been  hurriedly  written. 

Jomini,  still  Ney’s  chief  of  staff,  in  this  case  a most  relia- 
ble witness,  tells  us  that  this  order  was  on  a paper  written  in 
pencil,  merely  instructing  Ney  to  be  in  Preititz  at  11  A.  M., 
and  to  attack  the  enemy’s  right  wing  ; and  at  the  moment  of 
writing,  Napoleon  probably  felt  that  no  more  need  be  said  to 
a man  like  Ney,  who  had  acted  with  such  vigor  at  Elchingen, 
Friedland  and  Borodino.  Therefore,  after  giving  instructions 
to  the  right  wing  to  get  into  touch  with  the  enemy,  push  him, 
but  not  bring  on  a general  engagement,  he  then  lay  down, 
under  fire,  to  snatch  an  hour’s  sleep  to  make  up  for  the  labor 
of  the  past  night.  He  had  always  believed  that  it  worked 
well  to  rest  at  such  a season,  and  give  time  to  all  the  corps  to 


LINES  OF  FRENCH  ATTACK . 69 

work  out  their  operations,  instead  of  taking  action  on  what 
might  happen  to  one  or  two  of  them. 

The  allied  army  had  taken  up  its  second  position  on  a line 
eight  miles  long,  and  fully  prepared  for  artillery  work  (sev- 
enty-eight earthworks  were  demolished  after  the  battle  by  the 
French  engineers),  with  light  troops  occupying  all  the  villages 
in  front.  On  the  right,  Barclay  de  Tolly,  after  his  withdrawal 
from  Weissig,  had  occupied  the  hills  between  Gleina  and  the 
Malschwitz  ponds,  and  back  to  Preititz,  his  guns  covering  all 
the  Spree  crossings ; in  the  centre  stood  Blucher  along  the 
Kreckwitz  heights,  with  Kleist  and  Yorck  somewhat  back  of 
his  left  from  Litten  to  Baschiitz  ; the  main  Russian  army  and 
the  late  van,  now  in  the  left  wing,  held  the  hills  and  woods 
south  of  Baschiitz,  with  the  reserve  in  rear  of  this  village ; 
the  cuirassiers  stood  back  of  Baschiitz.  According  to  the 
emperor’s  plan,  the  three  lines  of  French  attack  were  to  be 
against  Miloradovich,  who  was  holding  the  road  of  retreat  to 
Hochkirch ; against  Blucher,  who  covered  the  road  of  retreat 
to  Wurschen  ; and  against  Barclay,  who  protected  the  right 
against  a French  advance  from  Konigswartha,  the  last  attack 
being  the  important  one. 

After  his  sleep  Napoleon  took  position  on  a hill  “three 
quarters  of  a league  in  advance  of  Bautzen,”  near  Nieder 
Keina.  Oudinot  and  Macdonald  had  been  sent  in  “so  as  to 
prevent  the  enemy  from  disgarnishing  his  left,  and  to  mask 
the  real  attack,  of  which  the  result  could  not  make  itself  felt 
before  noon  or  one  o’clock.”  Oudinot  began  by  pushing 
through  Kunitz,  hoping  to  reach  Rachlau;  and  this  he  did 
in  good  style,  but  Miloradovich  met  him  heartily  and  forced 
him  back  to  Binow  itz,  where  Macdonald  came  up  to  his  sup- 
port. The  French  centre  was  at  first  not  heavily  engaged. 
The  line  was  active,  but  did  not  invite  a general  engagement, 
aware  that  the  allies  would  remain  in  their  strong  position  : 


TO 


NEY  MOVES  ON  DREHSA. 


just  enough  was  doing  to  monopolize  their  attention,  and  let 
Ney  put  in  his  important  work.  Marmont  was  held  ready  to 
advance,  Sou.lt  was  alert.  The  Guard  and  the  reserves  were 
kept  behind  hillocks,  with  easy  debouches.  The  enemy  was 
as  yet  uncertain  as  to  the  French  purpose. 

Meanwhile,  under  his  general  instructions  of  the  day  before 
and  without  the  further  orders  requested,  Ney  had  started 
about  9 A.  M.  to  move  on  Drelisa;  he  had  crossed  the  Spree 
at  Klix,  put  out  Maison’s  division  as  flankers  near  the  Mal- 
schwitz  ponds,  — by  a misunderstanding  Maison  got  too  far 
away  to  the  right,  — pushed  Lauriston  with  the  rest  of  his 
corps  on  Gotamelde,  with  orders  to  keep  on  towards  Baruth 
and  Belgern,  and  led  Souham,  Delmas  and  Albert  towards 
the  windmill  of  Gleina.  Difficult  debouches  and  heavy  firing 
from  the  Gleina  hill  made  the  work  slow.  At  half  past  nine 
Souham  had  debouched,  and  learning  that  Lauriston  was 
moving  on  Gotamelde  and  that  Delmas  and  Albert  were 
ready  to  sustain  him,  Ney  attacked,  Delmas  in  close  column, 
Albert  in  reserve  deployed  on  two  lines.  These  divisions 
shortly  drove  Barclay  out  of  Gleina  back  on  Preititz  and  Ba- 
ruth, and  about  ten,  on  the  heights  of  Gleina,  Ney  received 
the  emperor’s  penciled  order,  which  had  been  delayed  by  the 
detour  the  aide  had  made,  thinking  to  find  Ney  at  Klix.  To 
this  order  Jomini  states  that  he  himself  added  : u These  forces 
will  be  directed  afterwards  on  the  steeples  of  Hochkirch,” 
which  in  effect  conveyed  the  entire  theory  of  the  day’s  battle- 
tactics,  Hochkirch  being  on  the  prolonged  line  of  Drehsa, 
and  to  reach  it  involving  the  cutting  of  the  allied  roads  of 
retreat ; but  these  words  were  no  part  of  Napoleon’s  orders. 
Being  ahead  of  time,  and  Marchand  and  Bicard  being  still  in 
the  rear,  Ney  awaited  the  closing  up  of  these  divisions  and  of 
Beynier  before  pushing  on  Preititz,  where  he  was  due  at  eleven. 

Ney  was  used  to  obeying  orders  strictly:  he  had  personally 


PENCIL  ORDER  TOO  INEXPLICIT. 


71 


felt  the  ill  result  of  not  so  doing ; and  as  on  the  receipt  of 
the  penciled  order  he  was  over  an  hour  ahead,  he  did  not  ad- 
vance farther  towards  Hochkirch,  as  he  would  no  doubt  have 
done,  had  the  order  read  to  cut  off  their  retreat  by  moving  on 
the  allies’  communications.  Or  had  it  explained  to  him  that 
Napoleon  would  wait  to  deliver  his  massed  attack  until  from 
the  firing  he  knew  that  Ney  had  got  established  on  the  allied 
communications,  he  would  naturally  have  kept  on  towards 
Wurschen  and  Hochkirch.  It  was  this  Jomini  had  suggested, 
and  Ney  saw  the  wisdom  of  the  suggestion ; but  Jomini  was 
his  subordinate,  not  his  chief.  Napoleon’s  keeping  all  strate- 
gical and  tactical  initiative  in  his  own  hands  was  a sign  of 
genius ; but  at  times,  as  here,  it  worked  poorly.  He  had 
never  allowed  his  lieutenants  much  leeway  for  their  own  ac- 
tion, keeping  to  himself  the  credit  for  all  that  was  accom- 
plished, as  well  as  the  secret  of  how  it  was  done.  This 
worked  well  so  long  as  the  leader  could  oversee  everything ; 
but  with  the  enormous  forces  of  these  late  years,  and  with 
his  habit  of  no  longer  going  to  all  parts  of  the  field,  it  was 
capable  of  working  mischief.  As  Ney’s  manoeuvre  was  to 
be  the  decisive  one,  Napoleon  should  have  gone  to  Ney’s 
column,  leaving  Soult  in  command  of  the  main  force,  or  else 
have  called  Ney  to  him,  as  he  could  well  have  done,  and  ex- 
plained what  he  was  expected  to  accomplish  ; in  other  words, 
have  put  him  in  possession  of  the  tactical  plan  of  the  day’s 
work.  The  pencil  order  was  too  inexplicit,  for  the  capture 
of  Preititz  only  turned  the  allies’  right,  it  by  no  means  seized 
their  communications  and  thus  led  up  to  a decisive  victory. 
Had  Ney  felt  authorized  to  go  ahead  on  his  own  ideas,  or  had 
he  listened  to  the  suggestion  of  Jomini,  he  would  have  acted 
wisely ; and  at  times  in  his  career,  Ney  had  done  just  this  sort 
of  thing,  so  that  Napoleon  might  perhaps  have  been  reckoning 
on  his  again  putting  his  judgment  and  his  own  natural  vigor 


72  A NOBLE  OPPORTUNITY  LOST. 

into  the  scale.  At  the  same  time,  the  fault  was  distinctly 
Napoleon’s  in  giving  so  partial  an  order  in  so  important  a 
matter.  But  Ney  lost  a noble  opportunity.  He  was  playing 
against  the  allies  the  same  tactical  part  which  made  his  pre- 
sent opponent,  Blucher,  forever  famous  on  the  field  of  Water- 
loo ; but  he  did  not  play  out  the  part,  for  what  specific  reasons 
we  do  not  know.  It  must,  however,  be  noted  that  Blucher  at 
Waterloo  was  commander-in-chief,  and  free  to  act,  as  here 
Ney  was  not. 

Alexander  could  now  see  that  the  attack  on  the  right  was 
not  a mere  demonstration,  for  Ney  with  seventy  thousand  men 
was  moving  towards  his  rear,  and  his  dispositions  had  not 
been  such  as  to  meet  this  threat. 

Ney’s  position  back  of  the  allied  right  compelled  Blucher 
to  reinforce  Barclay,  and  Kleist  left  the  Kreckwitz  lines  to 
help  free  the  right  flank.  It  was  about  this  time  that  Souham 
and  Kellermann,  with  Delmas  in  support  but  not  near  enough, 
and  Albert  too  far  back  in  reserve,  penetrated  to  Preititz, 
and  falling  foul  of  both  these  allied  corps,  got  roughly  han- 
dled and  retreated  in  marked  disorder;  and  though  Ney 
sustained  them  as  best  he  might,  after  a stout  contest,  about 
11.80.  A.  M.,  the  Prussians  won  back  the  village.  “Not  being 
able  to  engage  myself  completely  without  drawing  upon 
myself  the  whole  effort  of  the  enemy,  Preititz  was  for  a 
moment  evacuated.”  Thus,  in  reality,  Ney  had  not  got  to 
Preititz  at  eleven,  as  the  emperor  had  calculated  on  his  doing, 
and  in  several  respects  the  czar  was  now  able  to  mend  his 
line  to  conform  to  the  fresh  danger.  About  one,  Beynier 
came  up  to  Klix.  In  his  march  through  Gotamelde  Lauris- 
ton  had  been  held  back  by  Chaplitz  with  a small  body  that 
he  should  have  sharply  brushed  aside.  There  had  been  no 
advance  in  force  on  the  allied  rear. 

All  this  pottering  was  unlike  Ney.  What  was  needed — - 


NAPOLEON’S  PLAN  ALL  ASTRAY . 


73 


as  he  well  knew  — was  to  reach  the  main  road  in  force,  to 
cut  off  the  allied  retreat ; but  instead  of  his  wonted  vigorous 
action,  he  here  merely  fumbled  around  Gleina,  Preititz  and 
Klein  Bautzen,  while  he  should  have  been  massing  for  a 
dash  on  Wurschen  and 
Hochkirch  ; this  was  the 
beginning  of  the  inde- 
cision that  made  his  in- 
action so  fatal  in  1815  ; 
and  Napoleon’s  plan,  well 
conceived  but  ill  com- 
municated to  his  princi- 
pal lieutenant,  went  all 
astray.  And  when  Ney 
was  a second  time  pushing 
into  Preititz,  Blucher, 
thus  attacked  in  rear, 
sent  a few  battalions  and 
twenty  guns  from  the 
Klein  Bautzen  hills  to 
take  the  French  in  flank, 
and  probably  not  appre- 
ciating the  real  purpose 
of  his  onset,  Ney  took  post  on  the  hills  to  the  north  of  Klein 
Bautzen,  which,  while  they  commanded  the  country,  had  no 
real  tactical  value,  and  failed  to  carry  out  the  theory  of  the 
battle.  Without  cavalry  he  feared  to  adventure  in  the  plain, 
where  stood  a considerable  body  of  Prussian  horse,  and  the 
value  of  his  entire  manoeuvre  was  lost. 

Meanwhile,  from  8 a.  m.  the  emperor  had  no  communication 
with  either  Ney  or  Soult.  Although  he  could  see  much  of 
the  field  from  headquarters  on  the  hill,  all  he  could  especially 
control  was  Marmont  in  his  front,  and  the  reserve.  On  the 


Prussian  Staff  Officer. 


74 


BLUCHER  FAILS  TO  HOLD  HIMSELF. 


French  extreme  right,  Oudinot  — though  once  driven  back  — 
and  Macdonald,  who  supported  him,  could  be  seen  containing 
Miloradovich  sustained  by  Eugene  of  Wurtemberg,  in  front 
of  Binowitz  and  Rabitz.  In  the  centre,  Marmont  and  Mor- 
tier  helped  keep  the  Russian  and  Prussian  divisions  in  place, 
and  when  the  emperor  at  eleven  o’clock  heard  Ney’s  heavy 
firing  at  Preititz,  and  could  see  that  his  position  flanked 
Blucher  on  the  Kreckwitz  heights,  he  ordered  Marmont  to 
attack,  in  the  expectation  that  Ney  would  soon  move  down 
on  Wurschen.  Marmont  advanced  through  Basankwitz  and 
opened  artillery  about  noon,  the  emperor  sustaining  his  left 
by  Barrois’  brigade  of  the  Young  Guard.  -Opposite  Bertrand 
the  enemy  was  firing  heavily  from  the  Kreckwitz  plateau,  and 
in  accordance  with  his  general  instructions,  Soult  and  he  de- 
bouched between  one  and  two  through  Nieder  Gurik,  towards 
the  plateau,  fiercely  opposed  by  the  enemy,  who  strove  to 
prevent  these  corps  from  debouching,  so  as  the  better  to  han- 
dle Ney.  To  sustain  Soult,  who  could  make  no  headway,  the 
Young  Guard  and  Latour-Maubourg  with  his  horse  advanced 
between  Marmont  and  Bertrand,  towards  Litten,  where  they 
could  reach  the  flank  of  the  enemy’s  right,  now  centre,  and 
use  artillery  briskly.  Between  Ney’s  presence  and  the  em- 
peror’s attack  Blucher  was  hard  put  to  it  to  hold  himself,  for 
he  had  largely  disgarnished  his  lines  to  head  off  Ney.  He  had 
to  make  front  towards  three  directions,  to  meet  troops  coming 
from  Burck,  to  defend  the  Spree,  and  to  forestall  Ney.  The 
latter  was  the  most  important.  If  Preititz  were  taken,  Blu- 
cher would  now  be  cut  off  from  Barclay,  and  if  the  French 
advanced  to  Klein  Bautzen  and  Burschwitz,  his  only  line  of 
retreat  would  be  through  Kreckwitz,  and  this  might  be  taken. 
The  Prussians  made  a stanch  defense,  and  Bertrand  had  hard 
work  to  drive  them  in ; but  under  the  flank  and  front  fire, 
and  a heavy  cannonade  from  the  French  batteries,  Blucher 


NEY  GIVEN  HIS  CHANCE. 


75 


failed  to  hold  himself,  and  vacated  the  Kreckwitz  heights ; 
and  Yorck,  whom  Wittgenstein  sent  up  to  sustain  him,  found 
the  French  in  possession.  Finally  the  Young  Guard  and 
Latour-Maubourg’s  cavalry,  in  reserve  at  Nadelwitz,  were 
ordered  forward  on  Litten.  This  gave  Ney  his  chance  : “ It 
was  essential  to  overturn  everything  in  front  of  me  to  touch 


76 


RETREAT  OF  THE  ALLIED  LINE. 


my  right  to  Your  Majesty,  and  be  able  to  enter  into  action,” 
says  his  report.  Kellermann  and  Souham  being  exhausted, 
Delmas  was  ordered  on  Preititz  again,  Picard  and  Albert  to 
sustain  his  right.  Delmas  took  the  village,  but  was  thrown 
out  again  by  the  Prussians,  until  Picard  and  Albert  moved 
on  the  heights  north  of  Klein  Bautzen,  passing  to  the  west 
of  Preititz,  when  the  French  finally  remained  masters.  All 
three  divisions  were  then  ordered  forward  on  Klein  Bautzen. 
But  Ney’s  advance  was  far  too  late,  for  at  three  o’clock  u the 
emperor  announced  that  the  battle  was  won.” 

Napoleon’s  massed  advance  definitely  settled  the  retreat  of 
the  allied  line,  which,  as  was  clear  to  the  czar,  could  not  hold 
itself  ; and  preferring  to  retire  in  good  order,  not  long  after 
three  the  enemy  started  to  the  rear,  the  Russians  through  Hoch- 
kirch  and  the  Prussians  down  the  Wurschen  road.  All  this 
occurred  in  such  season  that  Ney,  who  had  now  established 
himself  on  the  Klein  Bautzen  hills,  not  only  had  no  enemy  in 
his  front,  but  could  see  them  filing  away  to  the  east  along 
the  road  he  himself  could  have  seized  two  hours  before ; and 
yet  he  stood  there,  and  did  not  fall  on  their  exposed  flank. 
Between  four  and  five,  when  Soult’s  attack  had  been  fatal  to 
the  Prussians,  Ney  threw  in  Marchand  and  Maison  on  Klein 
Bautzen.  Lauriston  was  sustained  by  Reynier  and  Pacthod, 
and  Picard  sent  on  Burschwitz  sustained  by  Souham  and 
Delmas,  who  formed  on  the  right  of  Reynier  and  Lauriston. 
Barclay,  who  had  retired  towards  Wurschen,  covered  the 
allied  retreat  by  taking  up  a position  at  Belgern  to  fend  off 
Lauriston  and  Reynier  from  that  key-point.  These  officers 
and  Ney  cannonaded  Barclay  as  best  they  might,  but  he  held 
firm,  and  at  nightfall  retired  in  good  order.  Miloradovich 
held  Oudinot  and  Macdonald  until  Marmont  threatened  his 
right  and  rear,  when  he  also  made  good  his  escape  through 
Hochkirch.  Napoleon  followed  up  this  retrograde  movement 


NEY  LESS  AT  FAULT  THAN  NAPOLEON. 


77 


but  absence  of  cavalry  prevented  his  being  able  to  work  havoc 
in  the  enemy’s  ranks,  especially  as  the  allies  had  yielded  the 
field  before  they  had  been  seriously  damaged  by  his  infan- 
try, and  were  yet  in  good  order.  The  Bulletin’s  claim  that 
“seeing  his  right  turned,  the  enemy  began  his  retreat,  and 
soon  his  retreat  became  a flight,”  is  not  sustained  by  the 
evidenced. 

In  this  battle  Ney  and  Lauriston,  with  eight  divisions,  had 
only  Kleist  and  Barclay,  with  twenty  thousand  men,  in  their 
front.  Had  Ney  with 
half  his  usual  energy 
carried  out  the  idea 
penned  by  Jomini,  to 
march  towards  the 
steeples  of  Hochkirch, 
the  bulk  of  the  allied 
army  and  all  its  guns 
and  train  could  have 
been  taken.  The  left 
wing  alone  and  the 
cavalry  could  have  got 
away,  and  Bautzen 
would  have  been  an- 
other typical  Napo- 
leonic victory.  Austria 
might  have  joined  Na- 
poleon’s cause,  and  the 
French  eagles  again 

* & Imperial  Body-Guard. 

have  stood  on  the  Nie- 

men.  But,  let  it  be  once  more  said,  the  fault  was  less  Ney’s 
than  Napoleon’s.  As  this  marshal’s  command  was  to  do  the 
most  important  work,  either  Napoleon  should  have  given  him 
more  specific  directions,  or  should  have  gone  over  to  his  column 


78 


LITTLE  ACTUAL  GAIN. 


in  person,  with  part  of  the  Guard  and  the  cavalry.  Had 
Latour-Maubourg  come  up  to  sustain  Ney,  and  the  latter  been 
given  the  clear  idea  that  he  was  to  move  forward  far  enough 
to  cut  off  the  enemy  from  his  line  of  retreat,  Bautzen  could 
have  been  made  one  of  Napoleon’s  most  noted  triumphs,  with 
all  that  that  implies.  As  it  was,  the  French  took  no  prisoners 
and  only  a few  dismounted  guns.  Berndt  gives  the  French 
losses  as  twenty  thousand  men  out  of  one  hun- 
dred and  sixty  thousand,  and  the  allied  as 
thirteen  thousand  five  hundred  out  of  ninety- 
six  thousand  — killed  and  wounded  for  little 
actual  gain. 

In  this  1813  campaign,  owing  to  their  dis- 
sensions in  Russia,  Davout  was  given  a role 
inferior  to  Ney.  Remembering  Auerstadt,  Egg- 
miihl,  Wagram,  and  here  seeing  a decisive  vic- 
tory lost  by  Ney’s  slackness,  one  is  tempted 
to  wonder  whether  Davout,  in  Ney’s  place, 
would  not  have  done  work  more  valuable  to 
his  master. 

The  emperor’s  bivouac  was  pitched  at  Klein 
Burschwitz.  At  7 P.  M.  Marmont  moved  on 
Hochkirch  in  pursuit  of  the  enemy,  Reynier 
took  Wursclien  at  10  P.M.,  Soult  and  Bertrand, 
Drehsa.  Marmont  pushed  as  far  as  Steindor- 
fel,  Macdonald  to  Meschwitz.  The  front  of  the 
army  was  substantially  through  Wurschen  and 
Hochkirch.  The  rest  of  the  army  occupied  the  field  it  had 
won.  On  the  22d  the  allies  retired  from  Weissenberg  and 
Lobau  to  Gbrlitz.  At  Gorlitz  they  divided  into  two  columns, 
Barclay  moving  in  command  of  the  Prussian  column,  with 
Blucher  serving  unwillingly  under  him.  Shortly  new  arrange- 
ments were  made : Barclay  was  given  the  chief  command, 


THE  CIPHER  OF  THE  DAY.  79 

Wittgenstein  remained  at  the  head  of  the  Russians,  and 
Blucher  at  the  head  of  the  Prussian  troops. 

By  decree  of  June  4,  a monument  was  ordered  erected  on 
Mont  Cenis  with  this  inscription:  “The  Emperor  Napoleon, 
on  the  field  of  battle  of  Wurschen,  has  ordered  the  erection 
of  this  monument,  as  a witness  of  his  great  gratitude  towards 
his  people  of  France  and  Italy,  and  to  transmit  to  the  most 
distant  posterity  the  remembrance  of  this  celebrated  epoch, 
where  in  three  months  twelve  hundred  thousand  men  ran  to 
arms  to  assure  the  integrity  of  the  empire  and  of  its  allies.” 
As  a sample  of  the  cipher  of  the  day,  this  postscript  of 
Ney’s  to  Berthier,  May  17,  will  serve.  “ P.  S.  698.  641.  782. 
673.  652.  1106.  18.  609.  103I±.  307 . 886.  66Jf.  307.  757. 
1057.”  Being  translated  this  means:  “To-morrow  I will 
move  on  Hoyerswerda.” 


Russian  Infantrymen. 


LIX. 


THE  ARMISTICE.  MAY  22  TO  AUGUST  16,  1813. 

At  daybreak,  May  22,  the  pursuit  was  pushed  as  fast  as  the  lack  of  cavalry 
would  permit.  The  allies  headed  for  Schweidnitz,  and  Napoleon  followed 
towards  Breslau.  Everything  looked  favorable.  Had  he  kept  on  pushing,  he 
could  have  caught  the  allies  where,  without  Austria,  they  would  have  been 
compromised ; but  though  in  his  old  form  he  would  certainly  have  done  this, 
have  won  one  more  victory,  and  then  perhaps  have  treated  with  the  enemy,  he 
weakly  accepted  an  armistice,  and  forfeited  the  results  of  Liitzen  and  Bautzen. 
An  armistice  could  help  only  by  increasing  his  forces  and  decreasing  the 
enemy’s,  but  it  had  the  reverse  effect.  Still,  while  it  lasted,  from  June  4 until 
August  16,  there  were  occasions  on  which  he  could  have  brought  Austria  to  his 
side,  have  finished  the  war,  and  retained  for  France  a splendid  frontier;  but  he 
was  obstinate  in  his  requirements,  and  would  not  recognize  the  danger  of  having 
all  Europe  against  him.  He  no  longer  drew  true  conclusions  from  facts.  Austria 
approached  him,  but  Napoleon  was  unreasonable ; and  while  the  Congress  of 
Prague  was  wasting  time,  Austria  threw  in  her  lot  with  Prussia  and  Russia. 
The  new  coalition  determined  to  move  upon  Napoleon  from  Berlin,  from  Silesia 
and  from  Bohemia,  and  adopted  the  sensible  plan  of  having  the  minor  armies 
under  Blucher  and  Bernadotte  retire  from  the  French  whenever  Napoleon  was 
present,  and  advance  when  he  was  not.  Napoleon  held  the  Elbe  from  Dresden 
to  Magdeburg,  and  for  the  first  time  worked  on  a broad  defensive  scheme,  in 
which,  from  Dresden  as  the  centre  point,  he  could  debouch  alternately  upon  the 
allied  armies.  He  seriously  considered  a movement  on  Prague,  but  kept  to  the 
idea  of  a first  advance  on  Berlin  with  his  left,  while  containing  the  Silesian 
and  Bohemian  armies  with  his  right.  The  Congress  of  Prague  accomplished 
nothing  : Napoleon  desired  peace,  but  would  not  yield  enough  to  bring  it  about. 
As  the  armistice  closed,  he  made  ready  to  move  Oudinot  on  Berlin,  sustained 
by  Davout  from  Hamburg  and  Girard  from  Magdeburg,  while  himself  at  Dres- 
den confronting  the  Sovereigns  and  Blucher. 

At  daybreak  on  the  morning  of  May  22  the  victorious 
French  followed  in  the  track  of  the  enemy,  whose  legions 
the  day  before  they  had  beaten,  but  not  demoralized.  The 


DUROC  KILLED. 


81 


emperor  presumed  the  allies  would  aim  for  Breslau.  The 
left  wing  was  headed  by  Reynier,  sustained  by  Lauriston ; 
Macdonald  led  the  right  wing.  The  allies  reassembled  at 
Gorlitz,  where  reinforcements  reached  them.  At  Reichenbach 
Lefebvre-Desnouettes  had  a sharp  cavalry  combat  with  the 
enemy’s  rearguard,  and  a 
large  body  of  allied  horse 
was  put  in ; but  Latour- 
Maubourg  came  up  to  his 
aid,  and  astonished  the 
enemy  by  deploying  fifteen 
thousand  cavalry.  The  new 
French  squadrons  behaved 
well.  “ We  have  acquired 
a certainty  that  our  young 
cavalry  in  equal  numbers 
is  superior  to  the  enemy’s.” 

Reynier  arrived  in  support, 
and  Napoleon  rode  to  the 
front  to  lend  the  resulting 
combat  more  energy ; but  it  was  at  grievous  personal  loss, 
for  Duroc,  Duke  of  Friuli,  Grand  Marshal  of  the  Palace,  his 
closest  intimate,  was  killed  by  a stray  cannon-ball  almost  at 
his  side,  two  other  general  officers  being  also  wounded,  one 
mortally.  Thenceforward  the  emperor’s  entourage  was  limited, 
his  military  f amity  remaining  half  a mile  in  the  rear  with 
the  headquarters  cavalry,  and  those  with  him  keeping  in  twos 
and  threes  instead  of  in  a body.  Daru  was  made  custodian, 
vice  Duroc,  of  the  private  treasury. 

An  order  was  given  May  23  as  to  who  might  personally  follow  the 
emperor  : the  Grand  Equerry,  the  Major-General,  the  emperor’s  aides, 
the  officers  of  the  day,  the  marshals  whose  duty  was  near  the  emperor, 
two  of  the  Major-General’s  aides  and  two  staff  officers,  the  commandants 


Duroc. 


VOL.  IV. 


82 


ADVANCE  CONTINUED. 


of  artillery  and  engineers.  Excepting  the  emperor’s  aide  on  duty,  two 
orderly  officers,  the  marshals,  two  aides  of  the  staff  generals,  an  aide  of 
the  Major-General,  all  others  to  remain  fifteen  paces  in  the  rear.  When 
His  Majesty  reconnoitres  alone,  he  is  to  be  followed  only  by  the  Grand 
Equerry,  the  Major-General,  his  aide  on  duty,  two  orderly  officers  and 
the  page  with  field-glasses,  if  called.  “ It  is  imperatively  ordered  to 
. . . every  person  not  above  designated  to  march  with  the  squadrons  of 
the  Guard  on  duty.”  Another  group  in  the  rear  to  be  formed  of  the  led 
horses. 

The  allies  retired  in  two  columns,  via  Lowenberg-Gold- 
berg  to  avoid  the  Bohemian  frontier,  and  by  Bunzlau-Hainau, 
and  on  the  23d  crossed  the  Neisse.  Napoleon  kept  close  be- 
hind, getting  beyond  Gorlitz  by  noon  of  the  same  day ; Victor 
was  at  Rothenberg,  Reynier  on  the  road  to  Lauban,  sustained 
by  Bertrand,  Macdonald  at  Schonberg,  Ney  back  at  Weissen- 
berg,  Lauriston  still  at  Hochkirch,  Oudinot  at  Bautzen.  On 
the  24th  Napoleon  dispatched  Oudinot  on  Hoyerswerda  and 
Liickau  towards  Berlin,  with  orders  to  contain  Biilow,  who 
previous  to  the  battle  had  followed  Victor  down  from  Wit- 
tenberg, had  disquieted  Dresden,  and  was  threatening  the 
French  communications.  The  Grand  Army  continued  its 
advance,  and  “ All  Saxony  is  delivered  of  its  enemies,  and 
from  to-morrow,  the  24th,  the  French  army  will  be  in  Silesia,” 
says  the  Bulletin.  At  evening,  May  25,  Ney  had  come  up 
and  crossed  the  Queisse,  and  Reynier  had  reached  Bunzlau ; 
Lauriston  was  half-way  to  Hainan,  Bertrand  was  beyond 
Lauban,  Macdonald  had  almost  reached  Lowenberg,  Marmont 
was  east  of  Naumburg,  Victor  was  at  Wehrau  on  the  Queisse, 
Oudinot  marching  on  Liickau,  the  outposts  within  a march 
of  Glogau,  imperial  headquarters  at  Bunzlau. 

The  allies  now  headed  towards  Schweidnitz,  the  right  wing 
marching  on  Liegnitz,  the  left  wing  tarrying  in  Goldberg. 
On  May  26  Blucher  caught  one  of  Lauriston’s  divisions  in 
an  ambuscade,  the  French  cavalry  not  having  cleared  the 


M A ISON’S  DIVISION. 


83 


front.  The  Prussians  were  retiring  by  way  of  Naumburg 
and  Bunzlau  to  Liegnitz,  followed  by  Lauriston,  Reynier, 
Ney  and  the  Guard.  Near  Hainau,  Blucher,  now  in  com- 
mand of  his  own  column,  drew  up  on  a rugged  ground  in 
ambush.  Maison  was  leading  the  van  rather  cautiously, 
when  just  beyond  Hainau  the  Prussian  cavalry,  from  its 
hiding,  fell  upon  the  French  van,  quickly  dispersed  what 
there  was  of  French  horse,  and  as  the  young  foot  troops  were 
not  speedy  enough  to  form  squares,  cut  down  or  captured 
three  or  four  hundred  men,  with  all  their  guns. 

With  regard  to  this  affair,  the  allied  official  Bulletin  at  Breslau,  May 
27,  reported  : “For  several  days  Maison’s  division  was  on  the  heels  of 
our  rearguard.  Behind  Hainau,  where  the  ground  favored  an  ambuscade, 
General  Blucher  headed  the  Prussian  cavalry  on  both  sides  of  the  route, 
while  the  Russian  cavalry  was  placed  to  sustain  it.  The  rearguard  re- 
ceived orders  to  remain  constantly  engaged  in  such  manner  as  to  draw 
the  enemy  into  the  snare  offered  him.  . . . The  enemy  had  scarcely  time 
to  form  masses  when  he  was  attacked  in  front  and  on  the  wings.  After 
some  resistance,  half  of  Mais’on’s  division,  which  had  passed  the  defile, 
was  partly  cut  to  pieces,  in  part  taken  prisoner.  Eleven  guns  and  cais- 
sons were  also  taken.” 

From  Bunzlau,  May  26,  where  he  paused,  Napoleon  ad- 
vanced Ney,  with  Lauriston  and  Reynier,  on  Liegnitz,  Ney’s 
own  corps  remaining  in  Bunzlau  with  the  Guard,  and  sent 
Bertrand  and  Macdonald  forward  on  Goldberg.  Marmont, 
to  whose  command  Latour-Maubourg’s  cavalry  was  added, 
took  a central  route  to  ascertain  the  direction  of  the  allied 
army.  Victor  was  ordered  on  Sprottau  to  follow  any  force 
which  had  moved  towards  Berlin,  and  to  get  news  of  Biilow. 
If  the  siege  of  Glogau  had  been  raised,  he  was  to  go  there. 
“ But  his  principal  aim  is  to  be  to  hold  himself  ready  to  move 
on  Berlin,  to  sustain  Oudinot,  who  is  marching  on  that  city, 
and  to  fall  on  the  rear  of  Biilow.” 

Matters  looked  well.  Odenleben  tells  us  that  Napoleon  was 


84 


A SPLENDID  CONCEPTION. 


merry  in  these  days,  liis  vanity  being  tickled  by  the  enemy 
promptly  retiring  before  him,  as  of  old.  And  when,  instead  of 
retreating  to  the  Oder,  the  allies  turned  southerly,  Napoleon 
divined  that  their  negotiations  with  Austria  were  progressing. 
On  the  28th  he  was  with  the  Guard  in  Liegnitz  ; Ney,  with  his 


occupied  Breslau,  he  could  go  on  up  river  and  seize  the  allies’ 
communications,  which  from  Schweidnitz  would  run  through 
Strehlen  on  Brieg  or  Oppeln  ; having  done  which,  he  could 
then  turn  on  them,  drive  them  up  against  the  Giant  (Sudetic) 
mountains  in  their  rear,  and  destroy  them.  The  time  to  strike 
was  at  just  this  moment,  before  the  Austrians  were  ready ; 
for  they  could  not  enter  the  campaign  until  July. 

So  much  for  the  theory,  as  perfect  as  any  other  of  Napo- 
leon’s creation : in  practice,  the  operation  was  weakened  by 
his  no  longer  commanding  the  veterans  of  1805  and  1806, 
nor  indeed  being  himself  the  same  man.  It  was  not  only  his 


Prussian  Volunteer  Lancer. 


-■  own,  Lauriston’s  and  Rey- 
nier’s  corps,  was  echeloned 
along  the  road  to  Neumarkt, 
* and  had  sent  a party  to  raise 
the  blockade  of  Glogau ; 
Marmont  was  in  Jauer ; 
Macdonald  and  Bertrand 
between  Jauer  and  Gold- 
berg. Napoleon  was  aiming 
to  contain  the  allies  with  the 
two  latter,  and  with  the  rest 
to  turn  their  right  flank  by 
a -march  in  force  on  Bres- 
lau, — the  same  splendid 
conception  as  at  Ulm  and 
Jena.  When  he  should 
w have  reached  the  Oder,  and 


AN  ARMISTICE  ACCEPTED. 


85 


physique  which  years  of  hard  work  and  self-indulgence  had 
sapped,  his  force  of  character  had  equally  suffered  ; and  under 
the  most  favorable  conditions,  the  emperor  of  1813  might  not 
have  pushed  through  such  an  operation  to  a successful  issue. 
Along  with  his  capacity  for  bodily  exertion,  his  moral  courage 
had  shrunk,  and  we  see  the  effect  of  it  now.  Instead  of  push- 
ing home  relentlessly,  he  sought  the  line  of  least  resistance, 
and  as  he  had  done  after  the  incomplete  success  in  the 
Wagram  campaign,  he  now  accepted  an  armistice,  founded  on 
the  advances  he  had  recently  made  to  the  Emperor  Alex- 
ander, and  supposed  to  be  at  the  intercession  of  Austria. 
Thus  occurred  a fatal  pause  in  the  great  soldier’s  onward 
sweep  at  the  moment  of  victory. 

Caulaincourt  had  been  sent  on  May  26  with  negotiations 
to  this  end  ; and  on  June  1 an  armistice  was  entered  into,  to 
begin  at  2 P.  M.,  June  2,  and  last  thirty-six  hours.  Out  of 
this  preliminary  truce  grew  a second  one  until  July  20,  and 
then  a third  one,  to  last  until  August  10,  with  six  days’  notice  ; 
so  that  the  real  armistice  was  in  effect  from  June  2 to  August 
16.  During  this  time  a Congress,  to  be  held  at  Prague, 
was  to  decide  upon  terms  of  permanent  peace. 

The  reasons  alleged  by  the  emperor  for  the  armistice  — the 
hostile  position  of  Austria  and  his  own  want  of  cavalry,  as 
well  as  the  desire  to  gather  an  army  at  Laybach,  and  another 
at  Pirna  — are  quite  insufficient ; and  in  the  instructions  given 
to  Caulaincourt  we  fail  to  recognize  the  man  who  browbeat 
the  negotiators  at  Cherasco  and  at  Udine,  who  forced  his  own 
terms  on  the  vanquished  after  Austerlitz  and  Jena,  who  won 
such  a diplomatic  triumph  at  Tilsit. 

The  conditions  desired  for  the  armistice,  dictated  by  the  emperor 
May  26,  were  that  Danzig,  Modlin  and  Zamosc  should  receive  subsist- 
ence meanwhile,  and  a courier  enter  weekly.  “ As  to  the  length  of  the 
armistice,  an  essential  condition  is  that  it  should  be  extended  to  the  whole 


86 


WAR  STILL  TO  BE  EXPECTED. 


time  of  the  negotiations.  If  the  enemy’s  plenipotentiaries  do  not  consent, 
one  might  limit  the  length  of  the  armistice  to  three  months,  that  is,  to  the 
1st  of  September.  Finally,  after  having  insisted  strongly,  one  might  re- 
duce the  armistice  to  two  months,  on  condition  that  notice  should  be  given 
fifteen  days  in  advance,  . . . as  an  armistice  which  should  be  less  than  two 
months  and  a half  would  be  of  no  good  to  the  emperor  : he  would  not 
have  time  to  reestablish  his  cavalry.” 

And  the  same  want  of  incisiveness  may  be  seen  in  the  letter  to  Clarke 
of  June  2 : “ You  will  see  by  the  news  in  the  Moniteur  that  we  are  nego- 
tiating an  armistice.  It  is  possible  that  it  may  be  signed  to-day  or 
to-morrow.  This  armistice  stops  the  course  of  my  victories.  I decided 
upon  it  for  two  reasons  : my  want  of  cavalry,  which  prevents  my  striking 
great  blows,  and  the  hostile  position  of  Austria.”  . . . He  then  says  he 
hopes  during  June  and  July,  the  term  of  the  armistice,  that  Eugene  will 
be  at  Laybach  with  sixty  thousand  men  and  one  hundred  guns,  and  that 
the  Mainz  Corps  of  Observation  can  be  on  the  Regnitz  and  at  Pirna,  “ so 
that  Austria  will  see  that  I have  one  hundred  and  fifty  thousand  men  to 
oppose  to  her.  . . . Redouble  in  effort,  so  that  the  artillery,  cavalry  and 
infantry  shall  march  in  the  different  directions  that  I have  commanded. 
If  I can,  I shall  await  the  month  of  September  to  strike  big  blows.  I 
want  then  to  be  in  position  to  crush  my  enemies.  . . . Let  everything 
leave  as  fast  as  it  is  clothed,  cavalry,  infantry  and  artillery,  the  artillery 
especially.” 

On  June  1 the  emperor  wrote  Eugene  from  Neumarkt  that 
the  armistice  was  practically  concluded,  that  he  was  at  Breslau, 
that  war  was  still  to  he  expected,  and  that  Italy  must  be  kept 
ready. 

“ Austria  seems  very  exacting.  W e must  expect  war  with  her.  Keep  back 
the  conscripts  that  were  to  come  here.  . . . Retain  everything  in  Italy. 
Leave  Milan.  Inspect  your  troops  yourself  and  get  organized.  . . . Act 
as  if  you  were  to  be  attacked  at  the  end  of  June  by  Austria.  Write 
secretly  to  Murat  to  this  effect.  As  soon  as  you  shall  have  your  army  at 
Verona,  you  will  be  able  to  move  it  to  Laybach.  How  many  men  do  you 
think  to  have  at  the  end  of  June  ? Shall  you  then  have  one  hundred  and 
twenty  guns  harnessed  ? This  letter  contains  everything.  Act  accord- 
ingly. Do  not  lose  a moment.”  And  next  day  he  wrote  more  detailed 


OBJECT  OF  THE  ARMISTICE. 


87 


reasons  for  his  action  than  appear  elsewhere  : “ I must  not  dissimulate 
to  you  that  what  leads  me  to  stop  the  course  of  my  victories  are  the  arma- 
ments of  Austria,  and  the  desire  to  gain  time,  so  that  your  army  might 
be  encamped  at  Laybach  ; and  to  have  two  armies,  one  camped  on  the  Reg- 
nitz  and  the  other  in  the  camp  at  Pirna.  The  insolence  of  Austria  has 
no  limit.  With  a honeyed,  I might  say  sentimental  style,  she  would  like 
to  take  away  from  me  Dalmatia,  Istria  and  perhaps  more  than  to  the 
Isonzo.  She  would  like  to  dismember  the  Bavarian  frontier,  retake  the 
left  bank  of  the  Inn,  and  recover  that  part  of  Galicia  which  she  ceded  by 
the  Peace  of  Vienna.  They  have  lost  their  heads,  but  they  are  far  from 
their  reckoning.  It  is  impossible  to  be  more  perfidious  than  this  court. 
If  we  ceded  what  it  now  asks,  it  would  later  want  Italy  and  Germany. 
It  will  certainly  get  nothing  from  me.  ...  I hope  by  the  first  days  of 
July  you  can  have  camped  at  Laybach,  with  fifty  thousand  men  and  one 
hundred  guns:  This  is  necessary  to  influence  the  negotiations,  if  they 

shall  be  going  on  well,  as  I doubt;  but  this  will  be  possible  only  by  means 
of  the  position  of  your  army,  menacing  a march  on  Vienna,  and  the  posi- 
tion of  the  army  of  Mainz  on  the  Regnitz  and  in  the  camp  at  Pirna,  which 
I count  upon  going  and  inspecting  myself.  When  Austria  shall  thus  see 
three  armies  ready  to  be  opposed  to  her,  she  will  commence  to  open  her 
eyes  on  the  folly  and  ridiculousness  of  her  pretensions.” 

The  sole  object  of  the  armistice  was  to  increase  the  power 
of  the  emperor,  and  decrease  that  of  the  allies.  But  judi- 
cious estimates,  not  undervaluing  the  enemy,  must  have 
proved  that  at  the  end  of  the  term  Napoleon  could  have  only 
four  hundred  thousand  men,  with  no  more  coming  up,  while 
the  allies  would  have  over  half  a million  men,  with  abundant 
reserves  to  draw  on.  Had  Napoleon  been  reasonable  in  his 
demands  during  the  armistice  and  given  up  his  position  on  the 
Oder  and  Vistula,  he  could  have  drawn  in  garrisons  amount- 
ing to  sixty  thousand  men,  which  would  have  added  great 
relative  strength.  If  he  was  not  prepared  to  do  everything 
to  increase  his  forces,  he  ought  to  have  signed  no  armistice. 

There  was  a good  deal  of  fault  found  by  the  emperor  with 
the  progress  of  the  negotiations.  The  Russians  desired  to 


88 


LETTER  TO  CAULAINCOURT. 


keep  Breslau.  Napoleon  finally  agreed  that  it  should  be  neu- 
tral, although  “ the  principle  of  every  suspension  of  arms  is 
that  each  one  should  remain  in  the  position  where  he  finds 
himself,”  he  said ; “ the  lines  of  demarcation  are  afterwards 
the  application  of  this  principle.”  This  faultfinding  is  ex- 
pressed several  times,  much  in  the  manner  of  the  letter  to 
Caulaincourt  of  June  8 : — 

“We  must  not  dissimulate  that  this  armistice,  such  as  I propose  it 
in  my  ultimatum,  is  not  honorable  for  me.”  That  is,  the  yielding  up  of 
Breslau.  “ It  is  I who  abandon  everything,  the  enemy  nothing.  . . . 
Thus  the  enemy  wish  to  humiliate  me  in  chasing  me  by  an  armistice  from 
the  town  into  which  I have  entered  as  the  result  of  the  battle.”  “ Tell 
them  then,  in  breaking,  that  it  was  with  the  sole  desire  of  peace  that  I 
consented  to  so  disadvantageous  an  armistice,  and  that  by  pure  cajolery 
I consented  to  abandon  the  capital  of  Silesia.  Tell  them  that  before 
eight  days  I shall  be  in  Berlin  ; that  they  will  not  be  more  happy  in  the 
battle  which  will  take  place  than  in  the  two  preceding  ones  ; and  that 
finally,  they  will  have  shown,  instead  of  pacific  dispositions,  that  they 
wanted  to  amuse  me  and  gain  a few  days.  ...  As  to  the  delay  in  the 
armistice,  the  proposed  term  is  an  insult.  Would  one  not  say  that  I am 
in  a besieged  place  ? . . . I want  an  armistice,  but  I want  it  as  a states- 
man and  a sovereign.  . . . Experience  has  proved  that  they  have  con- 
stantly deceived  themselves.  Notify  them  that  they  will  be  beaten  in 
the  coming  battle,  that  I shall  remain  master  of  Breslau  . . . that  I 
shall  remain  master  of  Berlin.  . . . That  I have  with  me  and  behind  me 
such  forces  that  nothing  can  prevent  my  reaching  the  Oder  from  every 
side.” 

But  finally,  on  June  4,  at  Poichwitz,  the  armistice  was 
signed. 

Meanwhile  the  movements  had  been  continued,  and  the 
allies  had  got  into  a general  line  from  Nimptsch  to  Strehlen. 
French  headquarters  and  the  Guard  were  at  Neumarkt;  Ney, 
Lauriston  and  Beynier  were  near  Breslau;  Macdonald  and 
Bertrand  near  Schweidnitz  ; Victor  had  relieved  Glogau.  On 
the  27th  Oudinot  at  Hoyerswerda  had  driven  back  Biilow’s 


HAMBURG  VACATED . 


89 


corps,  but  advancing  on  the  capital  and  failing  in  a second 
attack  at  Liickau,  had  retired  to  Uebigau  on  the  Schwarze 
Elster.  Davout  and  Vandamme  had  moved  on  Hamburg, 
held  by  a weak  allied  corps,  awaiting  twenty-five  thousand 


Davout. 


Swedes  from  Mecklenburg  under  Bernadotte,  who  from  now 
on  was  a part  of  the  coalition  forces  on  the  Elbe.  But,  owing 
to  a recent  alliance  with  Denmark,  the  Danes  reinforced  the 
French,  Hamburg  was  vacated  in  the  night  of  May  29-80; 
and  this  great  city,  bulwark  of  the  lower  Elbe,  came  into 
Davout’s  hands  June  9,  when  the  news  of  the  armistice 
arrived,  and  so  remained  until  Napoleon’s  downfall. 

We  have  heretofore  seen  how  much  dependence  Napoleon 
placed  on  the  lower  Elbe ; and  on  May  24  he  had  already 
sent  orders  to  Davout,  in  anticipation  of  this  event,  to  “ fortify 


90 


CANTONMENTS  OF  THE  TROOPS. 


Hamburg  with  a citadel  or  redoubt,  where  four  thousand  men 
can  defend  themselves  a long  time.  By  this  means  these  men 
will  defend  the  ramparts  all  the  time  necessary  and  always 
have  for  refuge  this  citadel.”  And  for  greater  precaution: 
“ I have  the  intention  to  establish  a place  at  the  mouth  of  the 
Havel.  This  place  will  fill  the  same  role  as  Wittenberg, 
which  is  the  point  the  nearest  Berlin  on  the  upper  Elbe  ; 
this  Havel  place  is  the  point  the  nearest  to  it  on  the  lower 
Elbe,  and  will  complete  the  defense  of  the  Elbe.” 

The  armistice  limits  for  the  French  ran  from  the  Bohe- 
mian frontier  straight  via  Lahn  to  the  Katzbach,  along  this 
and  the  Oder,  the  Saxon  frontier  and  thence  to  the  Elbe,  and 
down  that  river  ; for  the  allies,  from  the  Bohemian  frontier 
via  Landshut  and  along  Striegauwasser  to  Kanth,  thence, 
excluding  Breslau,  to  the  Oder,  and  then  followed  substan- 
tially the  same  course,  there  being  between  both  armies  in 
Silesia  a neutral  zone  about  twenty  miles  broad.  By  orders 
of  June  5 Ney  was  to  be  cantoned  at  Liegnitz,  with  his  corps 
at  Breslau  and  Goldberg,  Lauriston  at  the  latter  place,  Rey- 
nier  at  Gorlitz,  Macdonald  at  Lowenberg,  Marmont  at  Bunz- 
lau,  Bertrand  at  Sprottau,  Latour-Maubourg  and  Victor  at 
Sagan,  Sebastiani  at  Steinau  along  the  Oder,  Mortier  at  Glo- 
gau,  imperial  headquarters  at  Liegnitz,  the  troops  to  move 
by  little  marches  to  their  cantonments.  Poniatowski  was  at 
Zittau,  Oudinot  at  Baruth.  Soult  was  put  in  command  in 
Dresden,  to  which  city  the  emperor  personally  went,  to  be 
nearer  the  centre  of  operations  and  the  business  of  state. 

On  June  4 the  emperor  wrote  Arrighi  that  he  intended  to 
assemble  in  Leipsic  a body  of  seven  thousand  horse,  twelve 
thousand  foot  and  twelve  guns,  that  this  force  would  constantly 
increase,  and  he  gave  him  the  superior  command  of  Witten- 
berg and  Magdeburg,  with  orders  to  scour  the  Elbe  left  bank. 
Latour-Maubourg  led  the  1st  Cavalry  Corps ; Sebastiani  the 


THE  MOST  GRIEVOUS  ERROR. 


91 


2d;  Arrighi  was  to  have  the  8d,  and  the  emperor  was  ex- 
pecting to  raise  his  force  of  horse  up  to  sixty  thousand  men. 

Of  all  the  reasons  given  above,  perhaps  the  most  powerful 
influence  persuading  the  emperor  towards  an  armistice  was 
that  he  could  not  see  clearly  into  the  position  of  his  old  ally, 
Austria,  and  he  hoped  yet  to  effect  such  an  arrangement  with 
Alexander  as  to  handle  Austria  singly.  He  wrote  Clarke, 
June  2,  in  similar  terms  as  to  Eugene,  adding  : “ She  hopes 
to  reach  these  advantages  by  the  mere  presence  of  some  hun- 
dred thousand  men  and  without  real  hostilities.”  This  the 
emperor’s  soldier  nature  could  not  brook. 

This  armistice  was  perhaps  the  most  grievous  error  of 
Napoleon’s  life.  It  is  hard  to  comprehend  it.  Apparently  on 
the  eve  of  a strategical  and  diplomatic  standing  broad  enough 
to  satisfy  even  him,  yet  by  ceding  to  the  formal  mediation 
of  Austria,  he  gave  that  nation  an  exaggerated  idea  of  her 
strength,  whereas  firmness  would  have  imposed  on  Francis, 
for  Austria  had  really  sunk  to  a second-rate  power.  He  had 
just  won  two  victories ; and  the  allied  army,  with  its  right 
flank  threatened  from  Breslau,  stood  in  parlous  case.  Had 
Napoleon  advanced  against  it  with  his  old  vigor,  he  could 
almost  certainly  within  a few  days  have  dictated  peace ; Aus- 
tria would  not  have  dared  to  give  the  allies  passage  across  her 
territory,  and  backed  up  against  the  mountains,  Napoleon  had 
prepared  for  the  Russo-Prussian  army  a very  Caudine  Forks. 
Had  Austria  permitted  the  passage,  Napoleon’s  position  would 
not  have  been  worse  than  it  became  after  the  armistice  ; for 
although  the  French  conscripts  gained  in  discipline  during 
these  weeks,  and  though  Napoleon  was  reinforced  by  one  hun- 
dred thousand  men,  the  allies  received  double  this  number, 
not  to  count  the  Austrian  accession  to  the  allied  fighting 
strength,  which  resulted  from  it. 

It  is  clear  that  the  doubtful  position  of  Austria  was  a reason 


92 


LAPSE  OF  RESOLUTION. 


why  Napoleon  should  keep  on  hammering,  instead  of  pausing 
for  breath.  Although  his  army  was  crude,  it  had  yet  shown 
that  it  could  fight,  and  his  strategic  position  was  as  perfect  as 
his  numbers  were  superior.  Nor  does  the  want  of  cavalry  go 
to  the  root  of  the  matter.  Two  handsome  though  indecisive 
victories  had  been  won  without  its  use ; and  while  in  the  past 
he  had  utilized  his  cavalry  in  a masterful  way,  it  was  neither 
this  arm  nor,  despite  his  dictum,  the  artillery  which  had 
won  his  campaigns,  his  victories  ; it  was  the  keen  eye  of  the 
strategist,  the  choice  of  the  right  direction  of  his  masses  and 
their  speed ; it  was  his  ability  in  recognizing  the  key-points 
and  his  skill  in  placing  a superior  number  of  men  at  these 
points.  These  very  factors  had  won  him  Liitzen  and  Baut- 
zen. He  had  known  as  no  one  else  how  to  push  his  army 
over  unheard-of  distances,  without  regard  to  its  discipline 
or  condition,  provided  only  at  the  proper  moment  it  would 
fight.  He  had  done  this  now ; and  yet  he  paused  on  the  thresh- 
old of  success.  It  was  not  want  of  cavalry,  it  was  not  fear  of 
Austria,  it  was  not  to  place  three  armies  at  key -points,  — it 
was  a certain  loss  of  moral  energy  in  the  man  himself.  At 
Ratisbon  and  at  Wagram  there  had  been  early  symptoms  of 
this  lapse  of  resolution,  from  which  the  necessities  of  the  mo- 
ment would  rouse  him  into  all  his  ancient  fervor.  The  same 
thing  was  apparent  in  1812  ; yet  after  the  failure  in  Russia, 
Napoleon  was  himself  again ; he  raised  an  army,  marched  to 
the  Elbe,  and  fought  his  initial  battle  in  his  old  style.  Then 
at  Bautzen  he  failed  to  direct  the  essential  stroke  by  Ney’s 
forces,  and  lost  his  chance  of  winning  a decisive  victory  and 
dictating  to  his  enemies ; and  now  he  asked  for  an  armistice 
at  a moment  when  he  was  strategically  well  placed,  and  his 
army,  though  unseasoned,  was  in  proper  mood  to  win  a third 
victory, — when  the  old  Napoleon  would  assuredly  have  dealt 
another  blow  to  intimidate  Austria. 


TO  INFLUENCE  PUBLIC  OPINION. 


93 


Be  it  noted  that  fortune  has  nothing  to  do  with  this  fail- 
ure: up  to  this  moment  fortune  had  in  this  year  favored 
Napoleon.  It  was  due  to  the  weakening  of  the  man  himself 
he  was  wearing  out.  That  the  numbers  and  difficulties  were 
greater  will  not  explain  his  action : he  had  handled  equal 
forces  in  1805,  1806  and  1809.  These  initial  stops  were  the 
first  slight  breaks  in  the  structure  of  the  machine ; they  got 
repaired  by  the  demands  of  the  occasion  and  the  machine 
went  on.  But  the  breaks  grew  in  frequency  and  importance. 
He  himself  told  the  whole  story  from  headquarters  at  Passa- 
riano,  September  26,  1797,  when  he  wrote  the  Minister  of 
Exterior  Relations  : “ All  great  events  hang  always  only  by  a 
hair.  The  able  man  profits  by  everything,  neglects  nothing  of 
all  which  may  yield  him  some  chances  more.  The  less  able 
man,  sometimes  by  neglecting  a single  one  of  these,  makes 
everything  fail.”  Napoleon  had  been,  above  all  others,  the 
able  man  described.  Was  he  such  now  ? 

In  order  to  influence  public  opinion,  Napoleon  ordered 
Augereau,  June  11,  to  “ have  put  in  the  journals  of  Frank- 
fort and  other  places,  as  the  battalions  arrived,  that  many 
troops  coming  from  Spain  are  passing  the  Rhine,  and  that 
this  army  is  finer  and  older  than  that  which  distinguished 
itself  at  Lutzen  and  Wurschen.”  And  Eugene  was  “to  so 
act  as  to  cause  talk  about  his  army.” 

Meanwhile  the  allies  were  strengthening  their  bonds  of 
union.  The  Austrian,  Russian  and  Prussian  monarchs  were 
near  their  armies ; and  at  Reichenbach  future  plans  were  dis- 
cussed, in  which  England  had  her  share.  Russia  agreed  to 
put  one  hundred  and  sixty  thousand  men  in  the  field,  not 
counting  garrisons;  Prussia  eighty  thousand  ; and  in  the  event 
this  was  largely  exceeded.  England  was  to  furnish  subsidies ; 
and  no  treaty  was  to  be  separately  made  by  any  one  of  the 
powers.  Austria  was  accepted  as  a so-called  mediator,  though 


94 


IMPATIENCE  REGRETTED . 


she  had  already  come  to  terms  with  Russia  and  Prussia,  and 
Metternich  came  to  Dresden  to  discuss  the  situation  with 
Napoleon,  just  as  if  Austria  were  not  pledged.  Early  in  life 
Napoleon  could  be  diplomatic ; he  now  sauk  the  statesman  in 
the  soldier,  and  acted  with  unwise  haste.  Indignant  that  ces- 
sions should  be  asked  of  the  victor  in  two  battles,  he  vented 
his  ill-nature  on  the  wily  diplomat,  the  man  who  of  all  others 
could  aid  or  injure  him  the  most,  and  made  of  him  an  enemy 
forever.  This  was  as  ill-advised  an  act  as  any  of  his  life,  and 
Napoleon  shortly  regretted  his  impatience,  upon  receiving 

the  news  of  the  dis- 
aster at  Vittoria  on 
June  21.  But  the 
harm  was  done.  He 
would  have  been 
wiser,  under  the 
cloak  of  a peace 
lover,  frankly  to  ac- 
cept the  situation 
at  first  blush,  as  he 
eventually  did  at 
the  end  of  the  armis- 
tice as  if  from  fear, 
— it  would  have  left 
France  her  natu- 
ral boundaries,  plus 
Holland,  Italy  and  Naples ; but  his  ancient  sense  of  perspec- 
tive was  gone.  He  did  not  gauge  the  earnestness  of  the  new 
coalition,  nor  recognize  that  they  were  now  to  act  together  to 
the  end. 

Fain’s  account  of  the  meeting  of  Napoleon  and  Metternich 
at  Dresden  June  23  is  given  at  length  in  the  Correspondence. 
It  is  as  good  as  any.  None  can  be  accurate. 


Metternich. 


NAPOLEON  AND  METTERNICH. 


95 


“‘There  you  are,  Metternich,’  said  Napoleon,  when  he  saw  him.  ‘Be 
welcome,  but  if  you  desire  peace,  why  have  you  come  so  late  ? . . . I 
have  won  two  battles  ; my  weakened  enemies  are  losing  their  illusions. 
You  come  in  among  us,  . . . and  everything  is  embroiled.  Without  your 
unlucky  intervention,  peace  between  the  allies  and  me  would  be  made  to- 
day. . . . Agree  with  me.  Since  Austria  has  taken  the  title  of  mediator, 
she  is  no  longer  on  my  side,  she  is  no  longer  impartial,  she  is  my  enemy. 

. . . To-day  your  two  hundred  thousand  men  are  ready  ; Schwartzen- 
berg  commands  them,  he  assembles  them  at  this  moment  nearby,  there 
behind  the  curtain  of  the  mountains  of  Bohemia,  and  because  you  believe 
yourself  in  condition  to  dictate  the  law,  you  come  to  find  me.  ...  I have 
divined  you,  Metternich.  Your  cabinet  wishes  to  profit  by  my  embarrass- 
ments. . . . The  great  question  for  you  is  to  know  whether  you  can  buy 
me  off  without  fighting,  or  if  you  are  to  find  yourself  positively  in  the 
ranks  of  my  enemies,  . . . and  you  perhaps  come  here  only  to  get  better 
light  on  the  question.  Well,  then,  let  us  see  ; let  us  treat.  I consent. 
What  do  you  want  ? ’ This  attack  was  lively  ; Monsieur  de  Metternich 
threw  himself  into  the  breach  with  a complete  equipment  of  diplomatic 
phrases.  . . . ‘ Speak  more  clearly,’  said  the  emperor,  interrupting  him, 
* and  come  to  the  point,  but  do  not  forget  that  I am  a soldier,  who  better 
knows  how  to  break  than  bend.  I have  offered  you  Illyria  to  remain 
neutral  ; does  that  suit  you  ? My  army  is  quite  sufficient  to  bring  the 
Russians  and  Prussians  to  reason,  and  your  neutrality  is  all  I ask.’ 

“ ‘ Ah,  Sire,’  Monsieur  de  Metternich  replied  quickly,  ‘ why  should  Your 
Majesty  remain  alone  in  this  struggle  ; why  not  double  your  forces  ? 
You  can  do  so,  Sire,  for  it  only  depends  on  you  to  entirely  dispose  of  ours. 
Yes,  things  are  at  such  a point  that  we  can  no  longer  remain  neutral. 
We  must  be  for  or  against  you.’ 

“ At  these  words  the  tone  of  the  conversation  quieted.  The  emperor  led 
Metternich  into  the  chart-room.  After  a rather  long  interval,  the  em- 
peror’s voice  again  rose  : ‘ Why,  not  only  Illyria,  but  half  of  Italy,  and 
the  return  of  the  Pope  to  Rome,  and  Poland,  and  abandoning  Spain  and 
Holland,  and  the  Confederation  of  the  Rhine  and  Switzerland  ; that  is, 
then,  what  you  call  the  spirit  of  moderation  that  animates  you.  You  are 
thinking  only  of  making  profit  out  of  the  chances.  You  are  busy  only  in 
transporting  your  alliance  from  one  camp  to  another,  so  as  always  to  be 
on  the  side  where  things  are  being  divided.  ...  In  fact,  you  want  Italy, 
Russia  wants  Poland,  Sweden  wants  Norway,  Prussia  wants  Saxony,  and 
England  wants  Holland  and  Belgium.  In  a word,  peace  is  only  a pretext. 


96 


CAMPAIGN  PLAN  DISCUSSED. 


You  all  aspire  only  to  the  dismemberment  of  the  French  empire.  And 
to  crown  such  an  enterprise,  Austria  thinks  it  is  sufficient  to  declare  her- 
self. . . . And  I am  obediently  to  evacuate  Europe  . . . and  deliver 
myself  like  a fool  to  my  enemies,  . . . and  this  while  my  flags  yet  float 
at  the  mouths  of  the  Vistula  and  on  the  borders  of  the  Oder,  when  my 
triumphant  army  is  at  the  gates  of  Berlin  and  Breslau,  when  I am  per- 
sonally here  at  the  head  of  three  hundred  thousand  men,  it  is  that  Aus- 
tria, without  a blow,  without  even  drawing  a sword,  flatters  herself  to 
make  me  subscribe  such  conditions.  . . . Oh,  Metternich,  how  much  did 
England  give  you  to  decide  you  to  play  this  role  against  me  ? ’ . . . 
Metternich  changed  color.  A profound  silence  succeeded.  Each  walked 
rapidly  up  and  down.  The  emperor’s  hat  fell  on  the  ground.  . . . The 
emperor  picked  it  up  himself.  Napoleon  resumed  the  conversation  with 
more  coolness,  and  declared  that  he  did  not  yet  despair  of  peace,  if 
Austria  would  listen  to  her  veritable  interests.  He  insisted  that  the 
Congress  should  assemble  and  should  continue,  even  if  hostilities  were 
resumed,  ...  ‘ so  that  this  door  should  at  least  remain  open.’  In 
sending  away  Metternich,  the  emperor  was  careful  to  tell  him  that  the 
cession  of  Illyria  was  not  the  last  word.” 

“ On  June  30  Napoleon  wrote  Francis  : ‘ I desire  peace.  If  the  Rus- 
sians are  as  moderate  as  I am,  it  will  be  promptly  made.  If,  on  the 
contrary,  they  wish  to  carry  me  to  concessions  repulsive  to  my  honor  and 
the  interests  of  my  allies,  they  will  gain  nothing.  They  will  succeed  in 
nothing.  Your  Majesty  knows  the  sentiments  I bear  you.  I hope  you 
will  not  be  drawn  into  a war  which  will  cause  the  unhappiness  of  your 
states  and  increase  the  evils  of  the  world.’  ” 

While  the  Congress  of  Prague  was  assembling,  a full  dis- 
cussion of  a campaign  plan  between  the  allied  sovereigns  was 
had  at  Trachenberg  Castle,  near  Breslau,  and  on  July  12  an 
agreement  was  signed.  Of  three  armies,  each  of  one  hundred 
and  fifty  thousand  men,  one  under  Bernadotte,  of  Russians, 
Prussians  and  Swedes,  was  to  operate  to  cover  Berlin  and 
threaten  Hamburg,  with  Leipsic  as  eventual  objective  in  the 
French  rear;  one  under  Blucher  in  Silesia  was  to  advance  on 
the  French  army  through  Lusatia;  the  Austrian  army  was  to 
move  through  Bohemia  on  the  French  flank  at  Dresden.  The 


TO  AVOID  THE  EMPEROR’S  BLOWS. 


97 


allies  had  guessed  Napoleon’s  maxim  of  moving  against  the 
enemy’s  armies  instead  of  against  geographical  points.  Alex- 
ander desired  Blucher  to  operate  in  Bohemia  so  as  to  cover 
Prague,  while  the  main  force  should  advance  down  the  left 
bank  of  the  Elbe.  Though  this  was  the  better  plan,  the  Aus- 
trians opposed  it,  with  the  purpose  of  keeping  large  armies 
out  of  Bohemia ; the  Prussians  because  they  desired  to  cover 
Silesia  and  be  near  Bernadotte  to  protect  Berlin  ; and  the 
three-army  plan  was  adopted,  despite  its  converging  lines. 
But  Alexander  insisted  that  the  Army  of  the  Sovereigns,  so 
called  because  the  three  monarchs  had  headquarters  with  it, 
should  have  part  of  Blucher’s  force  ; and  it  was  finally  agreed 
that  one  hundred  thousand  Russians  and  Prussians  should 
move  from  Silesia  to  Bohemia,  under  Barclay  de  Tolly,  Witt- 
genstein and  Kleist,  and  cooperate  with  the  equal  number  of 
Austrians  who  would  advance  down  the  Elbe  left  bank  on 
Dresden.  This  left  Blucher  the  corps  of  Langeron,  St.  Priest, 
Sacken  and  Yorck.  There  was  thus  to  be  one  large  force  in 
two  bodies  under  the  monarchs,  and  two  secondary  armies 
under  Blucher  and  Bernadotte ; and  in  order  to  avoid  the 
defeat  of  the  secondary  armies,  — and  this  was  the  motif  of 
the  campaign,  — it  was  agreed  that  Blucher  and  Bernadotte 
should  never  accept  battle  when  Napoleon  in  person  advanced 
against  them,  but  should  always  act  offensively  against  his 
lieutenants.  Had  Napoleon  known  this,  he  would  have  left 
Blucher  alone,  merely  containing  him  writh  a suitable  force ; 
that  he  did  not,  led  to  much  trouble.  It  has  been  claimed 
that  Moreau,  who  had  joined  the  enemies  of  France,  sug- 
gested this  very  wise  plan  of  avoiding  the  emperor’s  blows ; 
but  it  is  not  proved. 

The  allied  plan,  with  their  superior  forces,  although  con- 
centric, was  good  enough.  The  Army  of  the  Sovereigns  was 
to  turn  Napoleon’s  right  flank,  Bernadotte  to  turn  his  left 


VOL.  IV. 


98 


TO  STRENGTHEN  THE  BASE. 


flank,  and  Blucher  to  harass  the  emperor  in  front.  “ All  the 
coalition  armies,”  say  the  Trachenberg  instructions,  “ will 
take  the  offensive,  and  the  enemy’s  camp  is  to  be  their 
rendezvous.”  Despite  the  general  weakness  of  concentric 
operations,  it  still  remains  a fact  that,  owing  to  Napoleon’s 
laxness,  the  upshot  of  this  plan  was  the  battle  of  Leipsic,  the 
main  point  aimed  at. 

As  soon  as  the  armistice  was  signed,  Napoleon  had  begun 
studying  the  theatre  on  which  the  fresh  struggle  was  to  come 
in  case  no  terms  were  made  at  Prague ; and  he  was  inclined 
to  count  Austria  as  one  of  his  enemies.*  Along  the  entire  half 
circle,  through  Prussia  and  Silesia  from  Hamburg  to  Prague, 
fresh  armies  would  arise  to  outnumber  his ; and  to  meet  this 
gigantic  array  with  his  lesser  numbers,  he  must  use  his  inter- 
nal lines  to  the  utmost  advantage.  The  Elbe  was  the  chord 
of  the  arc  of  the  coming  theatre  of  operations ; it  was  his 
base,  and  he  set  to  work  to  strengthen  it.  He  held  Torgau, 
Wittenberg,  and  Magdeburg  on  the  middle  Elbe,  and  began 
improving  their  defenses  ; he  would  have  liked  to  intrench 
the  mouth  of  the  Havel  and  of  the  Plauen  canal,  but  the 
ground  on  the  left  bank  was  bad,  and  during  the  armistice 
he  could  not  cross  to  the  right  bank  at  this  point;  For  the 
upper  and  lower  Elbe,  Dresden  and  Hamburg  were  the  key- 
points.  The  latter  could  at  need  rely  on  a mere  garrison  ; the 
former  would  be  covered  by  the  main  French  army ; and  as 
Napoleon  might  have  to  defend  the  right  bank,  he  ordered 
the  Neustadt  to  be  made  an  intrenched  camp,  while  on  the 
left  bank  he  provided  only  against  a sudden  onset:  being 
blockaded  in  Dresden  would  mean  the  loss  of  his  communica- 
tions with  France,  and  could  not  be  considered. 

In  1810  the  King  of  Saxony,  anxious  not  to  invite  a cam- 
paign on  his  territory  by  having  a fortified  capital,  had  begun 
to  dismantle  the  works  of  Dresden ; but  workmen  were  set  at 


HAMBURG  IMPORTANT. 


99 


repairing  them  during  the  armistice,  and  the  walls  were  put 
beyond  danger  of  being  rushed,  while  the  suburbs  were  sur- 
rounded by  an  enceinte  having  thirteen  redoubts,  and  space  in 
the  rear  to  move  batteries  to  and  fro  at  a trot.  It  could  not 
sustain  a siege,  nor  resist  a heavy  assault,  with  a mere  garrison ; 
but  with  an  army  in  the  town,  it  was  inexpugnable,  although 
all  that  was  done  did  not  transform  Dresden  into  a fortress. 
Hamburg,  on  the  other  hand,  was  in  a military  and  a political 
sense  alike  of  the  highest  importance ; and  on  June  15  Napo- 
leon wrote  Davout,  for  whom  the  13th  Corps  had  been  created 
to  protect  this  region,  that  he  could  not  be  satisfied  unless 
the  city  could  be  deemed  a “ strong  place,”  and  was  provided 
with  everything  needed  for  defense  for  several  months.  It 
ought  to  have  at  least  twenty-five  thousand  men  as  garrison, 
and  enormous  supplies,  and  be  so  fortified  as  to  hold  out  two 
months  after  the  opening  of  parallels.  To  do  this  properly 
would  take  ten  years  and  thirty  or  forty  million  francs ; yet 
he  insisted  that  it  could  and  should  be  put  in  such  a state  of 
defense  as  to  hold  out  three  weeks  against  even  fifty  thousand 
men. 

In  Napoleon’s  scheme  to  defend  the  Elbe  there  is  an  inter- 
dependence between  army  and  strong  places,  which  shows  a 
clear  conception  of  how  the  art  of  fortification  can  be  best 
applied,  and  of  its  value  to  armies  in  the  field.  No  better 
study  exists.  Napoleon  was  sure  he  could  hold  the  middle 
Elbe,  which  was  well  fortified ; he  believed  he  could  hold 
the  lower  Elbe  some  weeks  by  Hamburg  alone ; but  he  knew 
he  could  not  hold  Dresden  without  the  army. 

With  his  base  well  secured,  the  emperor  devoted  himself  to 
reconnoitring  the  country  from  the  Elbe  towards  Silesia  and 
Bohemia.  He  had  written  from  Schonbrunn,  August  9, 1809, 
“When  I demand  a reconnoissance,  I do  not  wish  to  have  a 
plan  of  campaign  brought  me.  The  engineer  should  not  use 


100  MANCEUVRING  BROUGHT  TO  NAUGHT. 


the  word  4 enemy.’  He  is  to  reconnoitre  the  roads,  their  char- 
acter, the  hills,  defiles,  obstacles,  decide  whether  vehicles  can 
pass,  and  absolutely  refrain  from  plans  of  campaign.”  Such 
reconnoissances  he  now  had  made  in  plenty. 

On  the  theatre  of  war  was  a choice  of  four  schemes  of  cam- 
paign. The  entire  situation  is  fully  set  forth  in  the  Corre- 
spondence. First,  holding  all  the  strong  places  on  the  Elbe, 
Konigstein,  Dresden,  Torgau,  Wittenberg,  Magdeburg,  these, 
added  to  Stettin,  Custrin  and  Glogau  on  the  Oder,  enabled 
Napoleon  to  manoeuvre  as  he  chose  between  the  rivers,  against 
an  enemy  who  had  no  fortified  crossing  on  either.  Jutting 
out  like  Switzerland,  Bohemia  in  a sense  took  the  Elbe  posi- 
tion in  reverse;  but  if  the  enemy  operated  against  Saxony 
along  the  left  bank,  Napoleon  could  destroy  whatever  stood 
between  the  Elbe  and  Oder,  and  then  turn  on  the  invading 
army.  This  was  a sound  calculation,  entirely  justifiable,  but 
under  the  shrewd  Trachenberg  plan,  Blucher  neutralized  it  by 
constant  retreat  from  Napoleon’s  personal  advance.  Konig- 
stein and  the  Zittau  passes  enabled  Napoleon  to  operate,  him- 
self, towards  Prague  on  the  allies’  communications  if  they  came 
far  into  Saxony  ; indeed,  the  position  on  the  middle  Elbe  was 
so  strong  that  he  might  well  have  calculated  to  let  them  operate 
against  it,  while  he  turned  alternately  against  the  Army  of 
the  North  or  the  Army  of  Silesia.  But  this  scheme  also  the 
allies  had  counteracted  by  having  their  flank  armies  yield 
ground  to  Napoleon’s  personal  onset.  Despite  all  his  ability, 
this  simple  plan  (but  the  highest  in  all  arts  is  the  simplest) 
brought  much  of  his  manoeuvring  to  naught.  Second,  with 
his  firm  hold  on  Magdeburg,  Torgau  and  Dresden  fully  gar- 
risoned, Napoleon  might  let  the  allies  seize  on  the  middle  Elbe, 
draw  in  Macdonald,  and,  placing  Oudinot  to  keep  open  the 
Zittau  route,  operate  towards  Jung  Bunzlau  or  Prague,  and 
take  the  Army  of  the  Sovereigns  in  reverse,  basing  at  need 


SCHEMES  OF  CAMPAIGN. 


101 


on  the  Danube  and  Bavaria.  This  was  a Napoleonic  opera- 
tion, bold  and  with  attendant  dangers,  requiring  the  crossing 
of  the  mountain  chain  on  poor  roads,  but  promising  great  re- 
sults; for  assuming  that  Napoleon  had  done  this,  had  beaten 
the  allies  in  the  Laun  region  and  forced  them  back  on  Eger 
and  the  Bohmer  Wald,  he  would  have  cut  them  from  Ber- 
nadotte  and  Blucher,  seized  all  their  great  magazines,  and 
won  the  campaign  by  one  grand  stroke.  Third,  Napoleon 
might  abandon  the  right  bank  of  the  Elbe  and  draw  a de- 
fensive line  from  Dresden  to  the  Erzgebirge  at  Plauen  or 
Zwickau,  and  thus  fend  off  allied  attacks  from  Bohemia  ; 
but  the  allies  would  then  operate  in  force  against  the  French 
left  at  Dresden,  and  draw  Napoleon  back  to  the  Elbe.  This 
was  too  tame  a plan.  Fourth,  the  emperor  might  aban- 
don the  Elbe  and  retire  behind  the  Rhine ; and  this  plan 
was  much  in  favor  among  the  French  generals ; but  this  was 
yielding  more  than  all  the  allies  demanded ; it  was  inviting 
the  coalition  to  make  a battle-ground  of  France,  without  a 
struggle  for  all  he  had  won  by  his  life’s  work ; it  meant  to 
abandon  the  Confederation  of  the  Rhine,  Italy,, Switzerland, 
Holland,  to  throw  half  the  four  hundred  thousand  men  he 
had  into  the  frontier  fortresses,  and  to  fight  the  huge  allied 
army  with  the  two  hundred  thousand  left.  This  scheme  was 
rejected  by  Napoleon  as  absurd : it  was  better  to  accept  any 
allied  terms. 

It  was  natural  for  Napoleon  to  first  revert  to  an  offensive 
plan.  As  early  as  July  17  he  planned  that,  the  armistice 
ended,  Davout  with  his  thirty  thousand  men  should  debouch 
from  Hamburg,  and  by  a bold  front  draw  to  the  lower  Elbe 
as  much  as  possible  from  the  main  allied  army  and  Berlin ; 
failing  to  accomplish  this,  he  was  to  be  joined  by  Oudinot 
and  Victor,  and  his  operation  was  to  be  turned  into  an  offen- 
sive thrust  on  the  lower  Oder. 


102 


THE  EMPEROR  TO  DAVOUT. 


On  August  5 Napoleon  wrote  him  : “ I have  already  notified  you  to 
assemble  all  your  disposable  troops  as  well  as  the  Danes,  so  as  to  have  a 
corps  of  thirty  thousand  men  in  front  of  Hamburg,  to  take  the  offensive 
against  the  enemy.  My  intention  is  to  have  sixty  thousand  men  march 
by  way  of  Liickau  on  Berlin,  which  will  make  with  your  corps  nearly 
one  hundred  thousand  men.  They  say  that  the  Prince  Royal  commands 
Billow’s  corps.  His  first  care  will  certainly  be  to  defend  Berlin.  Oudi- 
not  will  be  there  the  third  day  after  the  expiration  of  the  armistice. 
Make  an  early  diversion  with  your  army  by  threatening  to  move  on 
Mecklenburg  and  on  Berlin.”  Again  he  wrote  on  August  8 : “ There  is 
no  manner  of  doubt  that  the  enemy  will  break  the  armistice  the  10th,  and 
that  hostilities  will  recommence  the  16th  or  17th.”  The  emperor  then 
renews  his  orders,  and  adds  : “ You  object  that  the  enemy  can  pass  the 
Elbe  and  ravage  the  country.  There  is  no  remedy  for  that;”  and  then  he 
shows  him  that  with  his  movement  in  advance,  there  was  little  danger  of 
it.  “ Austria  is  against  us.  This  power  has  three  hundred  thousand  men 
afoot,  effective,  which  will  furnish  it  an  army  of  one  hundred  and  twenty 
thousand  to  march  against  me  in  Dresden;  another  of  thirty  thousand 
men  against  Bavaria;  finally,  a third  of  fifty  thousand  against  the  viceroy, 
who  is  at  Laybach.  . . . Whatever  strengthening  of  forces  this  gives  the 
allies  I am  ready  to  meet,  but  you  must  feel  that  you  need  energy,  and 
if  your  corps  . . . was  disseminated  and  did  not  absolutely  fulfill  its 
role  of  holding  superior  numbers  in  check,  that  would  compromise  all 
the  affairs.  ...  I count  that  Oudinot  will  be  in  Berlin  the  fourth  day, 
. . . and  if  there  was  an  affair  in  which  they  could  beat  the  enemy,  break 
up  the  landwehr  and  disarm  the  landsturm,  that  would  enable  me  to 
send  you  on  Stettin,  to  follow  the  Swedes,  by  increasing  your  forces  with 
Vandamme,  and  permit  me  to  call  back  . . . thirty  thousand  men.  . . . 

. . . “ Or  else  I would  leave  you  all  these  men  to  raise  the  blockade 
of  Custrin  and  Stettin,  march  on  Stettin,  threaten  to  raise  the  block- 
ade of  Danzig  and  oblige  the  Russians  to  move  in  all  diligence  thither, 
and  detach  them  from  the  Austrians.  There  is,  in  all  this  army  which  is 
opposed  to  you,  much  scum  ( canaille ),  ...  so  that  eight  days’  campaign 
even  without  great  success  will  reduce  by  half  the  enemy’s  forces  in  that 
country.  ...  As  soon  as  you  shall  hear  that  the  armistice  is  broken, 
leave  Hamburg  in  pomp  ; exact  that  your  entire  headquarters  shall  leave 
there,  and  that  your  troops  shall  be  camped  or  cantoned,  according  to  the 
maxims  of  war.” 


THE  CONGRESS'  OF  PRAGUE. 


103 


Davout  was  to  be  too  active  for  the  enemy  to  neglect 
him,  was  “ so  to  manoeuvre  as  to  disquiet  the  enemy  on  the 
right  flank,  and  to  unite  with  the  corps  of  Oudinot  towards 
Berlin  ; ” and  while  Davout  was  attracting  the  allies’  eye, 
Oudinot  would  deal  the  real  blow  with  three  infantry  and 
one  cavalry  corps,  some  seventy  thousand  men.  Once  in 
Berlin,  he  was  to  throw  the  enemy  behind  the  Oder,  relieve 
Stettin  and  Ciistrin,  and  thus  raise  the  siege  of  Spandau.  It 
has  been  said  that  Davout’s  thirty  thousand  men  were  in  a 
sense  lost  to  usefulness  because  Napoleon’s  fortune  depended 
on  success  on  the  upper  and  not  the  lower  Elbe  ; but  Davout 
did  fend  off  the  English,  who  might  have  seized  Hamburg,  and 
by  raising  Hanover  and  Westphalia,  or  even  Denmark,  have 
done  vast  damage.  Moreover,  he  contained  an  equal'  number 
of  allies,  and  threatened  Bernadotte’s  base  at  Stralsund. 
But  his  personal  military  capacity  was  not  utilized. 

So*  far  as  Napoleon’s  offensive  was  concerned,  this  soon 
changed  to  a general  defensive,  — the  first  defensive  plan  on 
the  great  scale  he  had  ever  undertaken,  and  one  quite  un- 
natural to  his  bent.  And  as  part  of  it,  orders  were  issued 
July  28  to  the  War  Minister  to  “ have  Cologne  and  Coblenz 
fortified  so  as  to  complete  the  line  of  the  Rhine.” 

The  Congress  of  Prague,  meanwhile,  dragged  on  slowly, 
wasting  time  on  form  rather  than  discussing  substance.  Its 
“ proceedings  were  farcical  from  the  outset.”  Napoleon  jour- 
neyed to  Mainz  during  the  first  few  days  of  the  Congress, 
but  on  his  return  found  from  the  reports  of  his  representa- 
tives that  nothing  was  being  accomplished.  He  wrote,  August 
4,  to  Ney : “ My  Cousin,  they  are  doing  nothing  at  the  Con- 
gress at  Prague.  An  English  agent  is  mixing  up  in  it.  They 
will  not  be  able  to  arrive  at  any  result,  and  the  allies  have 
the  intention  to  break  the  armistice  the  10th.”  And  the 
same  day  he  wrote  Eugene,  stating  the  same  facts:  “As  the 


104 


REASONABLE  TERMS. 


enemy  does  not  appear  to  be  much  prepared  on  your  side, 
you  ought  to  reach  Gratz.”  Recognizing  that  no  end  would 
be  arrived  at,  Napoleon  instructed  Caulaincourt,  August  6, 
to  demand  of  Metternich  succinctly  what  were  the  conditions 
on  which  peace  would  be  made.  The  answer  was,  the  restitu- 
tion of  Illyria,  the  reconstruction  of  Prussia  with  an  Elbe 
frontier;  the  abandonment  of  the  Duchy  of  Warsaw,  to  be 
divided  among  Austria,  Russia  and  Prussia  ; the  renuncia- 
tion of  the  protectorate  of  the  Confederation  of  the  Rhine; 
and  the  independence  of  Holland  and  Spain,  to  be  later 
established.  From  the  standpoint  of  the  allies,  who  had  con- 
cluded to  forget  their  differences  and  stand  together  against 
Napoleon’s  dictation,  these  were  reasonable  terms,  and  they 
were  right  in  fighting  for  them  to  the  end;  but  to  Napoleon 
the  position  seemed  strained,  when  he  held  the  keys  of  both 
Elbe  and  Oder,  and  was  constructing  intrenched  camps  at 
Dresden  and  Pirna,  and  a bridge-head  at  Konigstein.  Bavaria 
was  still  faithful,  and  less  statesman  than  soldier,  he  could  not 
bring  himself  to  permit  this  ultimatum  to  be  forced  on  him. 
He  could  not  see  that  if  he  yielded  all  this  for  the  sake  of 
peace,  he  would  yet  leave  France  great  and  glorious  beyond 
any  dream  of  his  when  first  he  drew  sword  for  her  cause  ; or  if 
he  saw  it,  yet,  remembering  Presburg,  Tilsit  and  Schonbrunn, 
in  which  the  vanquished  had  long  argued  for  better  terms,  he 
determined  to  reject  this  standing,  to  play  the  gambler’s  game 
and  bluff  his  opponent’s  hand.  This  he  did.  According  to 
his  view,  it  was  humiliation  for  the  victor  in  two  battles  to  be 
thus  approached  with  an  ultimatum,  and  he  wrote,  August  9, 
to  Cambaceres : “ I hope  to  make  Austria  repent  of  her  foolish 
pretensions  and  infamous  treason,  but  in  any  event  nothing  can 
happen  worse  than  what  she  proposed.”  Worse  did  happen. 

Yet  Napoleon  desired  peace.  He  was  not  so  blind  that  he 
could  not  see  that  here  was  at  last  all  Europe  arrayed  against 


A MATTER  OF  MONTHS. 


105 


him  ; he  must  have  remembered  his  own  theory  of  the  equal- 
ity of  thousands ; he  must  have  seen  the  wisdom  of  yielding 
for  the  sake  of  building  up  France  after  her  long  drain  of 
men  and  treasure ; he  began  to  recognize  the  unity  of  the 
allied  nations ; and  finally,  on  the  last  night  of  the  armistice, 
August  9-10,  he  weakened  and  accepted  the  conditions,  but 
insisted  on  keeping  Trieste,  and  that  Denmark  should  be  left 
intact.  These  two  exceptions  were  perhaps  pardonable,  and 
ten  days  before  might  have  been  accepted,  but  it  was  then  too 
late  to  make  them.  Napoleon’s  note  reached  Prague  on  the 
11th,  and  found  the  Congress  broken  up  the  day  before,  the 
allies  deeming  the  chances  of  war  better  than  negotiation.  A 
few  days  later,  Napoleon  is  said  to  have  signified  his  willing- 
ness to  accept  the  ultimatum,  but  the  cards  had  then  been 
played,  and  he  had  lost.  He  had  gambled  away  his  chances, 
and  now  had  to  meet  the  three  Continental  powers,  not  singly 
as  heretofore,  but  in  hearty  cooperation,  and  backed  by  Eng- 
lish gold.  When  Napoleon  entered  the  armistice,  his  strong 
chance  lay  in  frankly  saying  he  was  tired  of  war,  and  would 
agree  to  any  reasonable  plan  which  should  restore  peace.  He 
had  not  done  this,  he  had  shuffled  and  bluffed,  and  his  downfall 
was  now  only  a matter  of  months.  It  is  difficult  for  one  who 
looks  upon  Napoleon’s  greatness  with  the  eye  of  the  hero-wor- 
shiper, who  sees  in  him  the  strongest  and  most  useful  man  of 
modern  times,  to  forgive  him  for  thus  wrecking  his  own  future. 

The  coming  campaign,  then,  was  to  include  an  advance  on 
Berlin  and  to  the  Oder  by  Davout  and  Oudinot  with  the  left 
wing,  while  the  right  wing,  under  the  emperor,  was  to  defend 
the  Elbe. 

On  August  11  Napoleon  wrote  Davout : “ Everything  leads  one  to 
think  that  the  enemy  means  to  pass  the  Elbe  and  advance  on  the  Weser, 
but  your  movement  on  the  right  bank,  which  cannot  be  upset,  because 
you  have  as  leaning  point  a place  like  Hamburg  and  Holstein,  will  dis- 


106 


INSTRUCTIONS  ISSUED. 


concert  this  project,  at  the  same  time  that  the  movement  from  Liickau 
on  Berlin  will  oblige  the  enemy  to  return,  and  will  put  everything  in  con- 
fusion.” And  on  August  12  Napoleon  gave  Oudinot  orders  for  his  move- 
ment : “ There  will  then  be  against  Berlin  your  corps  of  seventy  thousand 
men,  Girard’s  of  twelve  thousand  men,  and  Davout’s  of  forty  thousand 
men.  . . . After  having  occupied  Berlin,  you  will  manoeuvre  to  establish 
your  communications  with  Wittenberg  and  Magdeburg,  and  Girard  will 
be  marvelously  well  placed  for  that.  You  will  relieve  Ciistrin  and  re- 
victual the  place  . . . and  you  will  throw  the  enemy  beyond  the  Oder.” 

Napoleon  wished  to  hold  as  much  of  Lusatia  as  would  not 
place  him  too  far  from  the  Elbe,  nor  divide  his  forces  too 
much.  Let  him  speak  for  himself ; his  own  words  are  an  in- 
teresting study.  There  were  issued,  August  12,  instructions 
for  Ney  and  Marmont : “ Austria  has  declared  war.  The 
armistice  is  broken.  Hostilities  will  recommence  the  17th. 
This  is  the  plan  of  operation  which  it  is  possible  that  I shall 
adopt,  but  which  I shall  decide  on  definitely  before-midnight,” 
which  is  to  establish  his  base  on  the  Konigstein-Dresden  line, 
and  send  Oudinot  on  Berlin,  while  Girard  debouched  from 
Magdeburg,  and  Davout  from  Hamburg.  He  assumes  the 
allies  to  be  still  in  the  Schweidnitz  country. 

“ With  these  three  hundred  thousand  men  I will  take  position  between 
Gorlitz  and  Bautzen,  so  as  not  to  be  cut  off  from  the  Elbe,  to  keep  the 
mastery  of  the  course  of  this  river,  to  ration  from  Dresden,  to  see  what 
the  Russians  and  the  Austrians*  want  to  do,  and  to  profit  by  the  circum- 
stances. ...  I should  prefer  to  remain  at  Liegnitz,”  but  it  is  too  far 
from  Dresden  : between  Gorlitz  and  Bautzen  is  better.  “Meanwhile  my 
left  will  enter  Berlin  ; disperse  all  that  is  found  there,  and  if  the  Austri- 
ans and  Russians  should  deliver  battle,  we  will  crush  them.  If  we  should 
lose  the  battle,  we  should  be  nearer  the  Elbe,  and  more  able  to  take 
advantage  of  their  follies.  . . . Give  me  to  understand  what  you  think 
of  all  this.  I suppose  that  everything  will  finish  by  a great  battle,  and 
I think  it  more  advantageous  to  deliver  it  near  Bautzen,  two  or  three 
marches  from  the  Elbe,  than  at  five  or  six  marches.  . . . Still,  I feel  some 
regret  at  abandoning  Liegnitz,  but  in  occupying  it,  it  would  be  difficult  to 
assemble  all  my  troops.” 


A NEW  DEPARTURE.  107 

The  asking  of  the  opinion  of  his  lieutenants,  so  as  to 
strengthen  his  own,  is  a new  departure. 

He  also  wrote,  August  13,  to  Berthier : — 

“ My  Cousin,  you  will  find  joined  hereto  the  manner  in  which  I propose 
to  place  my  army.  I desire,  then,  that  you  should  order  the  topographical 
engineers  to  reconnoitre  on  the  spot  a fine  position  in  front  of  Gorlitz, 
facing  towards  Zittau.  ...  I have  written  to  Marmont  to  have  the  posi- 
tion of  Bunzlau  well  reconnoitred.  Finally,  we  must  have  reconnoitred 
a third  position  between  Bautzen  and  Gorlitz.”  And  in  instructions  for 
Hey,  St.  Cyr,  Macdonald  and  Marmont,  he  says  : “ This  is  the  plan  I 
have  arrived  at.  If  you  have  any  observations  to  make,  I beg  you  to 
make  them  frankly.  Oudinot  with  the  12th,  4th  and  7th  Corps  and  the 
3d  Cavalry  Corps  will  march  on  Berlin,  while  Girard  . . . will  debouch 
by  Magdeburg,  and  Davout  . . . will  debouch  by  Hamburg  . . . which 
has  become  a place  of  first  importance.  ...  I have  ordered  Oudinot 
to  move  on  Berlin,  while  Davout  will  overturn  what  is  before  him.  . . . 
On  this  side,  Dresden  is  fortified  so  as  to  defend  itself  eight  days,  even 
the  suburbs,”  under  St.  Cyr,  who  occupies  the  Konigstein  bridges,  the 
debouches  on  Bautzen,  and  Neustadt.  Pajol  is  on  the  roads  from  Leipsic 
to  Carlsbad,  scouting  out  to  Hof,  Durosnel  in  Dresden.  My  headquarters 
will  be  in  Gorlitz  the  16th  with  five  infantry  divisions,  the  Guard,  the 
2d  Corps  between  Gorlitz  and  Zittau,  and  the  8th  Corps  out  towards 
Bohemia  as  a vanguard.  Marmont  is  at  Bunzlau,  Macdonald  at  Lowen- 
berg,  Lauriston  at  Griinberg,  Ney  between  Hainau  and  Liegnitz.  “ The 
Austrian  army,  taking  the  offensive,  can  do  so  only  in  three  manners  ; 
first  in  debouching  with  the  great  army,  which  I estimate  one  hundred 
thousand  strong,  via  Peterswalde  on  Dresden,”  where  it  would  meet  St. 
Cyr,  who  would  retire  to  Dresden,  and  in  a day  and  a half  be  joined 
by  the  1st  Corps,  making  sixty  thousand  men  ; and  in  four  days’  march 
I can  myself  move  there  with  the  Guard  and  the  2d  Corps.  Dresden 
can  defend  itself  eight  days.  “ The  2d  debouch  by  which  the  Austrians 
might  take  the  offensive  is  that  of  Zittau.  Here  they  will  meet  Ponia- 
towski,  the  Guard  . . . and  2d  Corps,  and  before  they  can  arrive,  I shall 
have  assembled  more  than  one  hundred  and  fifty  thousand  men.  At  the 
same  time  . . . the  Russians  could  move  on  Liegnitz  and  Lowenberg, 
when  the  6th,  3d,  11th  and  5th  Corps,  with  . . . cavalry,  would  reunite 
on  Bautzen,  which  would  make  more  than  one  hundred  and  thirty  thou- 
sand men,  and  in  a day  and  a half  I should  send  thither  from  Gorlitz  ” 


108 


ADVANTAGES  RENOUNCED. 


what  was  needed.  “ The  third  movement  of  the  Austrians  would  be  to 
move  from  Josephstadt,  and  to  unite  with  the  Russian  and  Prussian 
army,  so  as  to  debouch  all  together.  In  that  case  all  the  army  would 
assemble  at  Bunzlau.  It  would  therefore  be  necessary  that  the  principal 
position  of  Ney  should  be  on  a level  with  ours  in  occupying  Liegnitz,  if 
he  deems  it  wise.  In  this  case  Macdonald  would  reconnoitre  the  enemy. 
He  would  notify  Ney  and  Lauriston,  and  Macdonald  would  fall  back  on 
the  position  indicated,  on  Bunzlau.  In  this  case  Marmont  would  have 
to  choose  the  battlefield  at  Bunzlau,  in  front  or  in  rear.  I have  already 
notified  him  to  perform  this  important  work.” 

These  instructions  Ney  and  Macdonald  both  approved ; St. 
Cyr  and  Marmont  did  not.  St.  Cyr  was  a sound  soldier.  He 
had  been  deprived  of  his  command  in  Spain  with  scant  reason 
by  Napoleon,  who  did  not  like  his  somewhat  rugged  ways ; 
but  yet  he  gave  him  a marshal’s  baton  for  Polotsk.  Both  St. 
Cyr  and  Marmont  objected  to  detailing  troops  for  an  opera- 
tion on  Berlin,  when  the  success  of  the  campaign  must  be  won 
against  the  Sovereigns.  Neither  believed  that  Oudinot  or  Mac- 
donald could  succeed  alone.  “ By  the  division  of  your  forces,” 
said  Marmont,  “ by  the  creation  of  three  distinct  armies  sepa- 
rated by  such  great  distances,  Your  Majesty  renounces  the 
advantages  which  your  presence  on  the  battlefield  assures 
you,  and  I much  fear  that  the  day  when  you  shall  have  carried 
off  victory,  and  believe  that  you  have  won  a decisive  battle, 
you  may  learn  that  you  have  lost  two.”  This  was  almost 
prophetic. 

Even  at  the  risk  of  repetition,  we  may  quote  the  emperor’s 
written  scheme  of  August  6 : — 

“ Here  is  the  project  which  I have  determined  on,  and  the  position  of 
my  army  the  17th  and  18th.”  The  13th  Corps  with  the  Danes  in  front  of 
Hamburg.  As  garrison  of  Hamburg  ten  thousand  men.  Girard  in  front 
of  Magdeburg.  Dombrovski  in  front  of  Wittenberg.  Durosnel  and 
eight  battalions  in  Dresden.  Oudinot  with  the  12th,  4th,  and  7th  Corps 
and  3d  Cavalry  Corps  at  Liickau  and  Baruth,  manoeuvring  towards  Berlin. 


THE  SCHEME  OF  AUGUST  6. 


109 


St.  Cyr’s  4th  Corps,  with  headquarters  at  Pirna,  holding  the  roads  from 
Prague  to  Dresden.  Pajol  with  one  division  each  of  foot  and  horse  on 
the  road  from  Leipsic  to  Carlsbad,  outposts  at  Hof.  Vandamme,  1st  Corps 
and  5th  Cavalry  Corps  at  Bautzen.  Headquarters  at  Gorlitz  with  the 
Guard,  its  cavalry,  2d  Army  Corps  and  1st  Cavalry  Corps.  The  8th  at 
Zittau.  The  6tli  at  Bunzlau.  The  lltli  at  Lowenberg.  The  5th  at  Gor- 
litz. The  3d  at  Sagan,  also  holding  Liegnitz.  “ The  enemy  may  debouch 
by  the  left  bank,  and  in  this  case  St.  Cyr  . . . would  fall  back  to  the  in- 
trenched camp  of  Dresden,  and  would  be  joined,  before  the  enemy  could 
get  up,  by  the  1st  Corps,  and  successively  by  those  I should  send  from 
Gorlitz.  The  second  operation  is  by  way  of  Zittau  towards  Gorlitz.  In 
this  case  they  would  find  the  8th  Corps,  the  Guard,  three  divisions  of 

St.  Cyr.  In  this  case  I should  give  battle  between  Gorlitz  and ” 

(gap).  “It  is  probable  that  at  the  same  moment  when  the  Austrian  army 
shall  attack  by  way  of  Zittau,  the  Russians  will  attack  by  way  of  Gorlitz. 
The  3d  Corps  and  2d  Cavalry  Corps  will  then  rally  on  the  6th  Corps  at 
Bunzlau.  The  three  points  of  resistance,  then,  are  Bautzen,  Gorlitz,  and 
Bunzlau.” 

It  is  interesting  to  study  the  map  with  Napoleon’s  detailed 
project  before  one ; but  to  resume  all  the  above  defensive 
scheme:  a stand  at  Bunzlau  would  keep  the  allies  from  cut- 
ting between  the  French  and  the  Oder,  but  it  was  too  far 
from  Dresden ; a point  between  Gorlitz  and  Bautzen  seemed 
preferable,  combined  with  holding  the  Dresden-Ivonigstein 
line,  “ so  that  I cannot  be  cut  off  from  the  Elbe,  that  I can 
remain  master  of  this  watercourse,  and  ration  from  Dresden,” 
“ watch  the  enemy  and  utilize  his  errors.”  Napoleon  was 
again  underestimating  the  allies  and  overestimating  his  own 
strength : he  could  not  reach  four  hundred  thousand  men  in 
all,  and  the  allies  would  have  about  that  number  on  this  part 
of  the  theatre  alone.  There  were  three  things  the  enemy 
might  do : either  advance  on  Dresden  from  Prague  via  Peters- 
walde,  in  which  case  the  Konigstein  and  the  Bautzen  corps 
would  come  to  its  defense,  and  give  him  ample  time  to  bring 
up  the  Guard  and  the  2d  Corps  from  Zittau.  Or  they  would 


110  THE  OFFENSIVE  IN  MASS. 

advance  via  Zittau,  where  the  2d  and  8th  would  hold  them 
until  the  Guard,  the  1st  and  two  cavalry  corps  could  arrive. 
Should  either  of  these  advances  be  accompanied  by  one  of  the 

Army  of  Silesia,  there 
would  still  be  four  corps 
and  a cavalry  corps  to  as- 
semble and  fend  them  off 
at  Bautzen.  Should  the 
allies  concentrate  and  ad- 
vance via  Josephstadt, 
the  whole  French  army 
would  assemble  in  Bunz- 
lau.  And  Napoleon  nat- 
urally looked  forward  to 
a great  battle  at  the  re- 
opening of  the  campaign 
as  the  best  solution. 

For  the  offensive  in 
mass,  there  were  three 
directions  to  take  : to  the 
left  against  the  army  pro- 
tecting Brandenburg ; to  the  right  against  the  main  allied 
army,  which  was  to  advance  on  him  from  Bohemia ; in  the 
centre  against  the  force  coming  on  through  Lusatia.  But  as 
he  could  scarcely  permit  the  main  allied  army  to  debouch 
from  Bohemia  on  Dresden  to  find  it  disgarnished,  two  of  these 
directions  were  unavailable.  If  he  marched  into  Bohemia, 
the  other  allied  armies  might  combine  and  march  on,  or  even 
take  Dresden ; but  this  would  be  counteracted  by  a victory 
over  the  Army  of  the  Sovereigns.  Should,  however,  this 
latter  army  retire  instead  of  fighting,  might  the  other  allied 
armies  not  seize  upon  his  base  and  cut  him  off  from  his  com- 
munications ? It  was  a scrupulous  care  for  his  base  and  the 


THE  BEST  DEFENSE. 


Ill 


fact  tliat  the  allies  outnumbered  him  — and  this  was  the  first 
time  they  had  done  so  — which  led  Napoleon  to  a defensive 
attitude,  rather  than  make  his  usual  offensive  thrust.  When, 
in  1805  and  1806,  he  was  far  from  his  base,  he  had  such  a 
superiority  that,  should  the  enemy  assail  it,  the  enemy  rather 
than  himself  would  stand  in  danger.  Under  the  present  con- 
ditions, he  was  wise  in  selecting  the  defensive. 

Napoleon’s  form  of  defense  was  well  suited  to  the  condi- 
tions. Against  concentrically  approaching  armies  the  best 
defense  is  one  which  permits 
offensive  thrusts  against  those 
most  easily  reached  or  most 
dangerous  ; and  when  a great 
river  protects  the  position, 
these  thrusts  can  be  delivered, 
as  Napoleon  well  knew,  to  the 
best  advantage.  The  Elbe 
could  not  be  turned  on  the 
left  if  effectively  protected  by 
Hamburg  ; on  the  right,  by  a 
long  circuit,  it  might  be  done ; 
but  of  this  Napoleon  had 
small  fear.  “ If  the  enemy 
penetrates  by  way  of  Bayreuth  and  reaches  Germany  with  all 
his  forces  assembled,  as  he  says  he  shall,  I shall  wish  him 
bon  voyage  and  let  him  go,  quite  sure  that  he  will  come  back 
quicker  than  he  will  have  gone.  What  is  important  to  me 
is  that  they  shall  not  cut  us  off  from  Dresden  and  the  Elbe ; 
little  I care  whether  they  cut  us  off  from  France,”  he  wrote 
St.  Cyr,  August  17,  from  Bautzen.  This  was  a slight  exag- 
geration. The  first  offensive  on  Berlin  and  the  Oder  was  also 
commendable  because  it  outflanked  Saxony  and  Silesia,  while 
the  relief  of  Ciistrin  and  Stettin,  and  the  siege  of  Spandau, 


Swiss  Grenadier. 


112 


DISPATCHES  TO  LIEUTENANTS . 


not  to  speak  of  the  capture  of  Berlin,  would  have  a great 
moral  effect.  It  put  at  risk  a hundred  thousand  men,  but 
in  case  of  failure,  there  was  a safe  retreat  on  Wittenberg  or 
Magdeburg.  Napoleon  did  not  consider  Bernadotte  formida- 
ble. That  the  operation  failed  through  the  incapacity  of  his 
lieutenants  does  not  weigh  against  its  wisdom : had  Davout 
got  to  Ciistrin,  while  Napoleon  held  the  upper  Elbe,  the 
result  would  have  been  different. 

Dispatches  were  sent  out,  generally  through  Berthier,  to  all 
lieutenants,  giving  them  full  instructions  to  operate  in  accord- 
ance with  the  plan  described.  A few  items  may  be  quoted  : — 

On  August  12  Berthier  was  told  to  “ write  along  the  whole  line  of  the 
Elbe  and  of  the  army  to  let  nobody  pass  nor  communicate  with  the  enemy, 
and  that  everything  going  towards  the  enemy’s  country  be  stopped,  so  as 
to  prevent  as  far  as  possible  the  enemy  from  having  positive  news  of  our 
movements.” 

On  August  13  to  St.  Cyr,  to  cover  Dresden  and  Konigstein  and  the 
frontier  beyond  Neustadt  to  Hof.  “ You  will  make  him  understand  that 
this  can  be  considered  only  as  general  instructions.  His  aim  is  to  cover 
Dresden  on  both  banks,  to  assure  the  communications  of  the  Konigstein 
bridge  to  Bautzen,  and  to  see  to  it  that  the  enemy’s  partisans  do  not  get 
on  the  road  from  Neustadt  to  Bautzen.  . . . Make  him  understand  that 
he  is  authorized  to  attack  the  enemy,  and  to  make  incursions  into  Bohe- 
mia in  all  directions,  whether  to  disquiet  the  enemy,  to  glean  news,  or  to 
exercise  his  troops.” 

On  August  14  to  Eugene  : “ The  King  of  Naples  arrived  to-day  at  the 
army.  Hostilities  are  to  commence  the  17th.  Cover  the  Illyrian  pro- 
vinces and  Italy.  . . . Attack  the  enemy,  if  he  is  inferior  to  you.” 

On  August  15  to  Cambac^res  : “ General  Moreau  has  arrived  in  Ber- 
lin. He  left  America  before  having  heard  of  the  battle  of  Liitzen,  and 
when  those  gentlemen  thought  to  enter  France.”  And  on  the  18th  to 
Clarke  : “ Moreau,  arrived  at  the  army  of  the  allies,  has  thus  entirely 
thrown  off  the  mask  and  taken  up  arms  against  his  country.” 

On  August  15  to  Oudinot  : “ Here,  then,  are  one  hundred  and  twenty 
thousand  men  manoeuvring  on  Berlin.  Give  me  news  of  yourself  twice  a 
day  and  especially  many  details.” 


JOMINI  LEAVES  THE  FRENCH  ARMY . 


113 


On  August  16  to  Cambacdr&s  : “ My  Cousin,  Austria  has  declared  war. 
The  armistice  is  broken  and  hostilities  are  recommencing.  We  are  in 
great  manoeuvres.  A part  of  the  Russian  and  Prussian  army  has  entered 
Bohemia.  I augur  well  for  the  campaign.  Moreau  has  arrived  at  the 
Russian  army.” 

August  16  to  Maret  : “ According  to  all  the  news  from  the  outposts, 
a large  part  of  the  Russian  army  has  been  in  Bohemia  since  the  lltli, 
so  you  see  that  all  Metternich  has  told  you  is  a tissue  of  lies.  Blucher 
passed  Breslau  the  12th,  and  from  then  on  commenced  hostilities.  The 
15th  he  presented  himself  before  Liegnitz,  where  there  was  some  firing. 
. . . Affairs  present  themselves  under  an  advantageous  look.  The  enemy 
is  manoeuvring  as  if  he  counted  on  my  having  evacuated  the  right  bank 
of  the  Elbe.” 

The  following  extracts  have  their  interest  : June  17  Berthier  was 
ordered  to  write  to  General  Arrighi  that  the  emperor  had  received  com- 
plaints of  bribery;  “that  this  conduct  is  unworthy  of  the  rank  and  situa- 
tion in  which  he  is  placed,”  and  that  he  is  at  once  to  restitute.  Berthier 
was  also  to  write  to  Augereau  to  the  same  effect.  “ This  conduct  has 
caused  me  much  pain,  in  a moment  when  the  peoples  are  crushed  by  the 
lodging  of  the  soldiers  and  the  cost  of  war.  They  are  to  take  nothing  and 
to  see  that  nothing  is  taken.”  June  21  to  Lacu^e,  disapproving  the  pay- 
ment of  five  hundred  and  eighty  francs  for  cuirassier  horses,  five  hundred 
and  twenty  for  dragoon  horses  and  four  hundred  and  twenty  for  light 
cavalry  horses.  “ There  are  to  be  found  horses  all  through  Germany  at 
a much  less  price.”  Also  disapproving  the  purchase  of  four-year-olds. 

It  was  during  the  armistice  that  Jomini  left  the  French 
army  and  took  service  with  the  Russians.  Of  this  Napoleon 
wrote:  “Jomini,  Ney’s  chief  of  staff,  has  deserted.  It  is  he 
who  has  published  several  volumes  on  the  campaigns,  and 
whom  for  a long  while  the  Russians  strove  to  get.  He  has 
ceded  to  corruption.  He  is  a military  man  of  little  value,  but 
is  nevertheless  a writer  who  has  seized  some  healthy  ideas  on 
war.  He  is  a Swiss.”  And  again  : “ General  Jomini,  Ney’s 
chief  of  staff,  has  deserted  to  the  enemy,  without  having 
beforehand  thrown  up  his  functions.  He  is  to  be  judged, 
condemned  and  executed  for  contumacy  ” in  his  absence.  As 


VOL.  IV. 


114 


GENDARMES  TRIED. 


a fact,  Jomini  was  a Swiss,  owing  no  allegiance  to  France. 
Berthier  did  not  like  him,  and  when  a question  of  his  promo- 
tion came  up,  is  said  to  have  opposed  it.  Nettled  at  what  he 
considered  to  be  unfair,  Jomini  threw  over  his  position  with 
Ney,  and  joined  the  allies. 

On  May  24  the  emperor  ordered  an  immediate  inquiry  and  an  extraor- 
dinary court  to  try  some  gendarmes  who  allowed  Cossacks  to  capture  part 
of  a convoy.  The  court  found  the  men  not  guilty,  and  on  May  27  the 
emperor  wrote  to  Berthier  : “ I am  extremely  discontented  with  the  in- 
quiry . . . and  more  so  with  the  commission.  It  is  not  thus  that  my 
intention  should  be  executed.”  He  then  explains  why  the  convoy  was  ill- 
organized,  and  the  guards  behaved  badly. 


Prussian  Pioneer. 


LX. 


HOSTILITIES  REOPEN.  AUGUST  16-26,  1813. 

During  the  armistice  Napoleon  collected  four  hundred  thousand  men  and 
over  twelve  hundred  guns,  extending  on  a line  from  the  Bavarians  at  Munich, 
backed  by  Augereau  at  Wurzburg,  along  the  Elbe  to  Davout  in  Hamburg.  He 
underrated  Bernadotte,  and  forgot  that  the  defeat  of  the  Army  of  the  Sovereigns 
under  Schwartzenberg  would  jeopardize  the  others.  The  total  force  raised  by 
the  allies,  including  militia  and  reserves,  was  nearly  nine  hundred  thousand 
men  and  some  two  thousand  guns,  of  which  over  five  hundred  thousand  men 
were  opposite  Napoleon.  Their  plan  was  to  move  the  main  army  through  Bohe- 
mia on  the  rear  of  Dresden,  while  Blucher  and  Bernadotte  should  advance  or 
retire,  as  agreed.  Napoleon  stood  based  on  the  Elbe,  with  his  main  force  out 
towards  Silesia,  the  enemy  occupying  a huge  semi-circle  around  this  position ; 
and  from  Bautzen  he  watched  matters  and  reconnoitred  through  the  mountains 
towards  Prague.  Blucher,  advancing  from  Silesia,  threw  back  Macdonald,  but 
when  Napoleon  went  out  to  attack  him,  retired  behind  the  Katzbach.  Mean- 
while, as  Schwartzenberg  was  approaching,  Napoleon  went  to  Dresden,  leaving 
Macdonald  to  push  back  Blucher.  The  Sovereigns  started  for  Leipsic,  but 
changed  to  an  operation  on  Dresden,  and  slowly  crossed  the  mountains.  Thus 
all  three  allied  armies  were  to  be  met  at  once.  Oudinot,  with  definite  orders  to 
attack,  moved  on  Bernadotte.  Unequal  to  his  task,  he  was  badly  defeated  by 
Bernadotte  and  Biilow  at  Gross  Beeren  August  23  ; and  this  arrested  Davout’s 
advance.  At  the  same  time  Macdonald,  moving  upon  Blucher  on  the  Katzbach, 
could  scarcely  have  done  his  work  worse,  and  attacking  Blucher  blindly  on 
August  26  in  five  separate  columns,  was  utterly  defeated  with  loss  of  twenty  thou- 
sand men  and  one  hundred  guns.  Thus  within  ten  days  after  the  end  of  the 
armistice,  Napoleon’s  two  subsidiary  armies  had  been  defeated,  and  the  Sover- 
eigns were  on  the  point  of  attacking  Dresden  ; and  to  this  city,  unaware  as  yet 
of  the  disasters  to  his  lieutenants,  Napoleon  moved  with  the  bulk  of  his  forces. 

During  the  armistice,  as  we  have  seen,  Napoleon  had  not 
been  idle.  He  had  provisioned  and  supplied  all  his  strong 
places  on  the  Elbe  ; had  raised  the  effective  of  his  armies  in 
Germany  to  a paper  strength  of  four  hundred  thousand  men, 
and  had  brought  the  artillery  up  to  twelve  hundred  and  fifty 


116 


A MARVELOUS  SHOWING. 


field  guns.  On  his  extreme  right,  facing  an  equal  Austrian 
force  at  Linz,  were  the  Bavarians  at  Munich,  whom  Augereau 
was  to  sustain  by  a force  he  was  raising  in 
the  Wurzburg  country.  On  his  extreme 
left  Davout  held  Hamburg  and  Liibeck 
with  the  13tli  Corps  of  French  and  Danes, 
facing  Walmoden’s  Prussians.  The  flying 
left  wing  under  Oudinot  stood  near  Dalime 
facing  Bernadotte,  and  threatening  Berlin. 
The  Army  of  the  Elbe  under  Napoleon, 
eleven  corps  of  forty-three  divisions,  was 
cantoned  from  Liegnitz  back  to  Dresden. 
Murat  had  returned  from  Naples  express- 
ing penitence,  and  been  placed  in  command 
of  the  cavalry  reserve  of  four  hundred  and 
twenty-nine  squadrons.  Considering  his 
military  standing  after  the  Russian  cam- 
Prussian  Volunteer  paign,  this  was  a marvelous  showing.  But 
though  Napoleon’s  intellectual  work  was 
still  the  same,  and  he  was  strong  in  his  position  and  his  cam- 
paign plans,  he  was  weaker  than  his  wont  in  morale,  and  in 
the  growing  habit  of  perverting  facts  even  to  himself.  He 
paid  too  little  heed  to  the  earnestness  of  the  coalition,  which 
was  waging  really  what  the  Germans  termed  it,  the  War  of 
Independence.  He  underrated  the  allied  Army  of  the  North, 
and  overrated  the  effect  of  a possible  capture  of  Berlin.  Mar- 
mont  suggests  that  it  was  revenge  that  led  him  to  this  raid ; 
he  wished  the  first  shells  to  be  thrown  into  this  city.  He 
could  not  appreciate  Prussian  patriotism  and  recognize  how 
brutally  he  had  downtrodden  this  proud  and  Fatherland-lov- 
ing race,  when  to  his  own  vast  gain  he  might  have  made  a 
friend  of  it.  He  constantly  concealed  essential  facts  from  his 
lieutenants  and  sent  them  on  errands  beyond  their  strength. 
The  desire  to  keep  the  threads  of  his  manoeuvres  in  his  own 


ORGANIZATION  AND  LOCATION. 


117 


hands  was  proper  enough  ; but  as  a corollary  he  should  have 
been  able  to  give  each  one  attention,  and  this  he  was  now  with 
every  year  less  and  less  able  to  do.  All  this  criticism  may 
appear  strained  ; but  as  Napoleon’s  marvelous  success  has  so 
far  been  proved  to  be  due  to  his  astonishing  equipment  of 
mind,  body  and  character,  so  now  his  failure  was  due  to  the 
weakening  of  physique  and  resolution. 

Just  before  the  reopening  of  the  campaign  the  entire  army 
was  organized  and  located  substantially  as  follows  : — 

The  Emperor,  Berthier  Chief  of  Staff,  Headquarters  Dresden. 


Cantonments  in 


The  Guard, 

58,000  men 

in  Liegnitz-Glogau  Country. 

1st  Corps,  Vandamme,  3 div’ns. 

, 33,000 

66 

marching  on  Dresden. 

2d  “ 

Victor,  3 

66 

25,000 

66 

in  Rothenburg-Sagan 

66 

CO 

Ney,  later, 

Souham,  5 

66 

40,000 

66 

“ Liegnitz 

66 

4th  “ 

Bertrand,  3 

66 

21,000 

66 

“ Sprottau 

66 

5th  “ 

Lauriston,  3 

66 

28,000 

66 

“ Goldberg 

66 

6th  “ 

Marmont,  3 

66 

28,000 

66 

“ Bunzlau 

66 

7th  “ 

Reynier,  3 

66 

21,000 

66 

“ Gorlitz 

66 

8th  “ 

Poniatowski,  2 

66 

7,000 

66 

“ Zittau 

66 

9th  « 

Augereau,  2 

66 

“ Wurzburg. 

10th  « 

Rapp  gar. 

“ Danzig. 

11th  “ 

Macdonald,  3 

66 

24,000 

66 

“ Lowenberg 

66 

12th  “ 

Oudinot,  3 

66 

19,000 

66 

“ Baruth 

66 

13th  “ 

Davout,  3 

66 

30,000 

66 

“ Hamburg 

66 

14th  “ 

Gouvion  St. 

Cyr,  3 

66 

36,000 

66 

“ Pirna  Camp 

Cavalry  Reserve,  Murat. 
1st  Corps,  Latour-Mau- 

bourg,  4 

66 

16,000 

66 

“ Gorlitz-Sagan 

66 

2d  Corps,  S^bastiani,  3 

66 

10,000 

66 

“ Katzbach 

66 

CO 

Arrighi,  4 

66 

11,000 

66 

“ Dahme 

66 

4th  “ 

Kellermann, 

CO 

s*‘ 

66 

5,000 

66 

“ Zittau 

66 

u 


Total, 


412,000 


for  the  field. 


118 


ONLY  APPROXIMATELY  CORRECT. 


There  were  over  twelve  hundred  field  guns,  for  which  ammunition  was 
plentiful.  On  August  18  Napoleon  wrote  Clarke:  “I  have  here  three 
hundred  and  sixty-five  thousand  gun  cartridges,  in  caissons  and  wagons. 
This  is  equal  to  four  battles  like  Wagram  ; and  I have  eighteen  millions 
of  ” (musket)  “ cartridges.” 

These  are  the  figures  it  was  purposed  to  reach ; there  may 
not  have  been  exceeding  three  hundred  and  fifty  thousand 

men.  Napoleon  liked 
to  deal  in  round  num- 
bers ; and  as  usual  be- 
fore action,  he  over- 
rated the  men  on  hand, 
as  after  victory  he  un- 
derstated them.  But 
there  are  so  many 
estimates  of  the  rival 
armies,  made  at  the 
time  and  from  various 
data  since,  that  any 
numbers  given  to-day 
can  be  deemed  only 
approximately  correct. 

A first  line  was  thus 
on  the  Katzbach ; a 
second  line  on  the  Bo- 
ber; a third  line  on  the  Neisse,  with  a reinforced  flank  at 
Zittau ; the  reserve  in  Dresden  and  Pirna.  In  German  for- 
tresses were  enormous  garrisons  ; flying  wings  stood  at  Wurz- 
burg on  the  right,  and  at  Magdeburg  and  Hamburg  on  the 
left ; and  several  bodies  were  echeloned  back  to  the  Rhine. 

During  the  Congress  the  allies  had  made  heroic  efforts  to 
raise  men  and  material,  but  the  reports  appeared  to  Napoleon 
vastly  exaggerated.  Prussia  had  put  on  foot,  according  to 


Prussian  Hussar. 


ACTIVE  ALLIED  TROOPS . 119 

Plotho,  two  hundred  and  forty  thousand  men,  of  whom  thirty- 
two  thousand  were  cavalry,  a force  twice  what  Napoleon 
gauged  it.  The  Russians,  not  counting  Sacken  and  Langeron, 
received  one  hundred  thousand  reinforcements,  of  which  half 
were  veterans  returned  from  hospital,  and  the  other  half  from 
the  call  made  in  1812  by  the  czar  at  Moscow,  which  had  been 
organizing  and  marching  to  destination  all  these  months.  The 
total  of  active  allied  troops,  including  the  forces  in  Italy,  ran 
up  to  six  hundred  and  fifty  thousand  men,  backed  by  eighteen 
hundred  guns ; reserves  of  one  hundred  and  sixty  thousand 
men  were  in  second  line  to  fill  gaps ; aggregate  eight  hundred 
thousand  men.  This  did  not  include  the  allies  in  Spain  or  the 
Sicilians  in  Italy;  but  it  covered  militia  and  irregulars  who 
could  wage  small  war,  or  so  cooperate  as  to  call  for  detach- 
ments from  the  French  army.  From  England  came  subsi- 
dies, small  arms  and  guns ; whole  batteries  with  their  person- 
nel, and  companies  of  Congreve-rocket  men,  were  furnished 
Prussia  and  Sweden ; a total  of  four  hundred  thousand  mus- 
kets and  one  hundred  thousand  swords  found  their  way  from  the 
workshops  of  Great  Britain  to  the  arsenals  of  the  Continent. 

According  to  Jomini,  who  had  access  to  the  best  records,  the  allied 


forces  were  thus  divided : — 

Under  Barclay  : Wittgenstein,  Russians 23,000 

Platov,  “ 6,000 

Constantine,  “ 36,000 

Kleistj  “ 48,000 

113,000 


Under  Schwartzenberg  : Lichtenstein,  Austrians, 
Bubna,  “ 

Colloredo,  “ 

Meerfeld,  “ 

Giulay,  “ 

Klenau,  “ 

Hesse-Homburg,  “ 


126,000 


120 

THE  GRAND 

TOTAL. 

Under  Blucher  : 

Sacken, 

Russians  . . 

16,000 

Langeron, 

a 

29,000 

St.  Priest, 

a 

14,000 

Yorck, 

Prussians 

38,000 

97,000 

Under  Bernadotte  : 

Winzingerode, 

Russians  . . 

9,000 

Woronzov, 

a 

12,000 

Walmoden, 

Swedes  . . 

24,000 

Mixed, 

28,000 

Biilow, 

Prussians  . . 

41,000 

Tauenzien, 

66 

40,000 

154,000 

Under  Bennigsen  : 

Markov, 
Doctorov  and 

Russians 

16,500 

Paskiewitz, 

66 

26,500 

Tolstoy, 

66 

Total, 

17,000  60,000 
550,000 

In  addition  to  the  above  there  were,  of  Russians  and  Prussians  mixed, 
besieging  or  observing  the  eighty  thousand  of  French  garrisons:  — 


Under  Wurtemberg  at  Danzig 35,000  men. 

“ Plotz  “ Stettin 35,000  “ 

“ Hinrichs  “ Ciistrin 15,000  “ 

“ Rosen  “ Glogau 8,000  “ 

“ X “ Zamosc 29,000  “ 


Total,  122,000  « 

Or  counting  later  accessions  in  Austrian  and  Prussian  militia  and 
garrisons  : — 


The  Army  of  the  Sovereigns  had 
“ “ “ Silesia  “ 

“ “ “ the  North  “ 

Coming  on, 

In  Bavaria, 

In  Italy, 

Russian  reserve, 

Austrian  militia, 

Prussian  garrisons  and  militia, 
Besiegers, 

Total, 

This  grand  total  was  sustained 
thousand  and  fifty-six  guns. 


239.000  men  under  Schwartzenberg. 

97.000  “ “ Blucher. 

154.000  “ “ Bernadotte. 

60.000  “ “ Bennigsen. 

55.000  « “ Wrede 

50.000  « “ Hiller. 

40.000  “ “ Labanov. 

60.000  “ 

32,000  “ 

122.000  “ 


909,000  “ 

by  artillery  estimated  as  high  as  two 


CLOSE  OF  THE  ARMISTICE. 


121 


Of  this  enormous  force  there  was  substantially  a third  each 
of  Austrians,  Prussians  and  Russians,  plus  twenty-five  thou- 
sand Swedes.  The  latter  were  in  one  body;  the  other  armies 
were  compounded  of  various  nationalities,  so  as  to  avoid  in- 
ternal conflict.  When  later,  in  December,  1813,  the  French 
had  been  crowded  back  across  the  Rhine,  the  German  Con- 
federation ordered  a levy  of  one  hundred  and  forty-five  thou- 
sand regulars  and  an  equal  number  of  militia,  part  of  which 
force  was  set  at  besieging  fortresses  on  the  Rhine,  and  in 
Belgium  and  Champagne,  so  that  far  exceeding  a million  of 
men  were  put  afoot  by  the  allies,  for  the  campaigns  of  1813 
and  1814. 

From  August  12  on,  the  allies  worked  on  the  Trachenberg 
plan.  Barclay  moved  into  Bohemia  to  join  the  Army  of  the 
Sovereigns,  which  was  to  head  for  Leipsic  (later  changed  to 
Dresden)  along  the  left  bank  of  the  Elbe.  The  Army  of  Silesia 
under  Blucher,  in  defiance  of  the  armistice,  moved  into  the 
neutral  zone,  took  Breslau,  and  advanced  to  the  Katzbach, 
the  French  retiring  to  the  Bober.  Ignorant  of  these  disposi- 
tions, Napoleon  expected  the  main  body  through  Lusatia,  and 
not  exceeding  one  hundred  thousand  men  to  operate  on  his 
right  from  Bohemia  ; and  his  general  idea  of  the  campaign 
was  that  he  would  observe  each  army  with  eighty  thousand 
men,  and  with  an  equal  flying  corps  join  one  or  the  other  wing, 
to  throw  himself  on  whichever  threatened  most. 

As  the  armistice  closed,  the  allies  were  in  three  groups. 
The  Army  of  the  Sovereigns,  mainly  the  force  which  after 
Bautzen  had  retired  towards  Schweidnitz,  stood  under 
Schwartzenberg,  nominally  commander-in-chief,  really  chief 
of  staff  to  the  Sovereigns,  not  far  from  Melnik  in  northern 
Bohemia,  the  mountain  chains  of  which  protected  the  allies 
when  taking  in  reverse  the  position  of  Dresden.  The  Army 
of  Silesia  under  Blucher,  on  August  14,  was  at  Striegau. 


122 


IN  TRIANGULAR  FASHION. 


The  Army  of  the  North  under  Bernadotte,  of  which  a third 
had  been  detached  on  one  duty  or  another,  stood  about  Berlin. 
The  allies  were  thus  markedly  stronger  than  the  French. 

The  army  immediately  operating  under  Napoleon,  about 
two  hundred  and  seventy-five  thousand  strong,  stood  in  a tri- 


SchwartzenTberg1. 


angular  fashion,  with  the  middle  Elbe  as  base,  and  the  sides 
drawn  from  the  mouth  of  the  Katzbach  to  Wittenberg  and 
Konigstein.  Around  this  triangle  stood  the  allies  in  a semi- 
circle, holding  the  roads  to  Dresden  from  both  Bohemia 
and  Silesia.  As  indicated,  Napoleon’s  general  plan  was  to 
seize  the  initiative,  and  attacking  each  allied  army  in  turn,  to 
destroy  it ; and  a decisive  victory  over  the  Austrians  was 
especially  demanded. 

The  emperor  left  Dresden  in  the  afternoon  of  August  15, 
the  day  before  the  expiration  of  the  armistice,  and  after 


VAN  DAMME  ORDERED  TO  BAUTZEN. 


123 


inspecting  the  Lilienstein  camp  opposite  Konigstein,  reached 
Bautzen  during  the  night,  where  he  remained  the  17th.  The 
Guard  followed  him.  He  had  heard  a rumor  that  part  of  the 
Russians  had  left  Silesia  to  swell  the  Army  of  the  Sovereigns, 
and  to  meet  this  he  increased  his  force  behind  Zittau,  where 
he  expected  the  main  advance,  by  ordering  Victor  thither. 
Blucher  he  gauged  at  not  over  fifty  thousand  men  after  the 
above  detachment,  and  thought  he  might  take  him  unawares ; 
and  if  for  a short  time  he  could  eliminate  the  middle  army, 
he  might  from  his  central  position  successively  march  on  each 
of  the  others  with  a fine  chance  of  beating  it.  Counting  the 
Guard,  he  could  assemble  one  hundred  and  eighty  thousand 
men  at  Bunzlau ; and  on  August  16  he  wrote  Macdonald : 
“ When  I shall  be  assured  that  Blucher,  with  Yorck,  Kleist 
and  Sacken,  which  does  not  make  fifty  thousand  men,  is  ad- 
vancing on  Bunzlau,  and  that  Wittgenstein  and  Barclay  de 
Tolly  are  in  Bohemia,  to  move  on  Zwickau  or  Dresden,  I will 
march  in  force  to  destroy  Blucher.  ...  I conceive  rather  fine 
hopes  of  all  this.  It  seems  to  me  that  the  enemy  is  opening 
himself  to  heavy  blows.”  With  this  in  view,  he  ordered  Van- 
damme  to  Bautzen,  ready  to  draw  him  in  to  Zittau,  or  send 
him  back  to  sustain  St.  Cyr  at  Dresden,  should  the  allies  ad- 
vance up  the  left  bank  of  the  Elbe.  Having  instructed  St. 
Cyr  to  dispute  every  step,  to  hold  Dresden,  and  to  keep  close 
touch  with  Vandamme,  Napoleon  went  on  to  Gorlitz  the  18th, 
where  he  heard  that  forty  thousand  Russians  under  Wittgen- 
stein had  crossed  from  Silesia  to  Bohemia  and  had  reached 
Bohmisch-Leipa,  and  that  the  Austrians  were  moving  on 
Dresden  or  on  the  Rhine ; and  he  thought  to  debouch  with  a 
large  force  from  Zittau  on  this  body  and  catch  it  on  the  march. 
But  to  cross  the  mountains  was  no  easy  task,  and  as  his  news 
was  sparse,  he  decided  to  wait,  and  let  Oudinot  push  the 
manoeuvre  on  Berlin  instead. 


124 


THE  EMPEROR  TO  ST.  CYR. 


He  wrote,  August  17,  to  St.  Cyr  : “Either  the  Russians  and  the  Aus- 
trians together  will  debouch  in  force  on  Zittau  and  Gabel  ...  in  which 
case  Vandamme  will  join  ” the  forces  there,  which  will  make  seventy 
thousand  men,  and  I will  join  them  with  fifty  thousand  men  ; “ or  else,  if 
all  the  Austrian  and  Russian  forces  should  move  on  Dresden  by  the  left 
bank,  Vandamme  will  march  on  Dresden.  . . . You  will  thus  assemble 
near  sixty  thousand  men  in  Dresden  camp.  . . . The  camp  at  Zittau,  be- 
coming useless,  will  move  on  Dresden  . . . and  you  will  have  more  than 
one  hundred  thousand  men  in  Dresden.  Finally,  I will  move  with  the 
fifty  thousaud  men  of  my  Guard  also  to  Dresden,  if  the  circumstances 
demand  it,  and  in  four  days  we  would  find  ourselves  with  . . . one  hun- 
dred and  eighty  thousand  men  around  Dresden.  ...  Yet  the  army  of 
Bunzlau  . . . can  be  reinforced  by  the  Guard,  and  I can  debouch  on 
Blucher  with  one  hundred  and  eighty  thousand  men.  . . . And  once  that 
I have  destroyed  or  neutralized  this  corps,  the  equilibrium  will  be  broken, 
and  I shall  be  able,  according  to  the  success  of  the  army  that  is  march- 
ing on  Berlin,  to  sustain  it  towards  Berlin,  or  else  march  by  Bohemia 
behind  the  army  which  may  have  advanced  into  Germany.  All  this  is 
not  yet  clear  ; what  is  clear  is  that  four  hundred  thousand  men,  leaning 
on  a system  of  strong  places,  on  a river  like  the  Elbe,  cannot  be  turned.” 

If  the  allies  were  coming  up  on  the  right  bank,  he  wrote 
Clarke,  August  15,  they  must  come  by  way  of  Zittau,  the  only 
good  road  ; and  here  he  would  meet  them  ; or  if  they  advanced 
on  the  left  bank  via  Toplitz  and  Peterswalde  on  Dresden,  St. 
Cyr  could  in  two  days  have  sixty  thousand  men,  and  in  four 
days  he  himself  could  concentrate  one  hundred  and  fifty  thou- 
sand men  there.  Should  the  enemy  undertake  a wider  opera- 
tion, as  into  the  Niirnberg  region,  or  on  Munich,  all  Bohemia 
would  be  open  to  him  for  manoeuvring  on  his  communications. 
Or  should  it  prove  false  that  a heavy  detachment  had  gone  to 
the  Army  of  the  Sovereigns,  he  could  invade  Silesia  with  two 
hundred  thousand  men.  But  acting  on  the  probability  that 
Schwartzenberg  was  to  cross  the  Elbe,  the  emperor  determined 
to  return  to  Konigstein,  so  as,  when  the  allies  should  have 
neared  Dresden,  to  have  them  between  two  fires,  or  should 


APPARENT  HESITANCY. 


125 


they  retire  by  Commotau,  to  reach  Prague  before  them.  Ancl 
to  aid  the  simultaneous  operation  on  Berlin,  Davout,  on 
August  18,  was  ordered  to  move  across  the  Stettnitz  to  seize 
Lauenburg,  while  Girard  left  Magdeburg  the  20th,  moving 
on  Brandenburg. 

In  order  to  get  oriented,  the  emperor  went  back  to  Zittau 
August  19,  and  from  here  headed  a reconnoissance  under 
Poniatowski  as  far  as  Gabel ; and  on  ascertaining  that 
Schwartzenberg  had  been  in  Melnik  the  17th  and  at  Schlan 
the  18th,  and  that  he  appeared  to  be  marching  west  with  the 
Russians  in  support,  he  returned  to  Zittau,  and  wrote  Maret,. 
August  20,  that  “ they  say  that  the  three  sovereigns  came 
together  yesterday  at  Prague  to  confer  on  operations  ; ” and 
to  Berthier,  after  giving  orders  to  fortify  the  Zittau  gap,  and 
showing  that  sixty-five  thousand  men  would  be  there  “ in  in- 
trenched positions  prepared  in  advance,”  he  wrote:  “ Van- 
damme  can  crush  the  enemy  and  defend  himself  five  or  six 
days.  When  the  enemy  learns  that  I have  been  at  Gabel,  he 
may  march  on  this  point  with  all  his  force,  and  St.  Cyr  can 
come  to  the  help  of  Yandamme  with  two  or  three  divisions. 
The  intention  of  the  emperor  is  that  they  shall  fight  to  ex- 
tinction.” Yet  he  soon  recognized  that  there  'vyas  no  present 
danger  of  the  enemy’s  advance  through  the  mountains  here, 
nor  any  immediate  good  to  be  accomplished  by  an  advance 
on  Jung  Bunzlau  ; and  his  thoughts  reverted  to  an  attack  on 
Blucher.  Should  the  allies  still  attempt  the  Zittau  route,  it 
would  consume  five  days  at  least  to  make  the  countermarch ; 
and  Victor  and  Poniatowski  here,  and  Yandamme  in  the 
Rumburg  pass,  could  fend  them  off  until  Napoleon  could  get 
back  from  his  operation  into  Silesia  and  fall  upon  them. 
Napoleon’s  apparent  hesitancy,  so  marked  in  these  days,  was 
due  to  his  being  on  the  defensive,  and  illustrates  the  constant 
value  of  the  initiative. 


126 


READY  TO  COME  TO  BATTLE. 


For  the  purpose  of  an  advance  into  Silesia,  Napoleon  went 
back  to  Gorlitz.  Ever  since  August  16,  Blucher  had  been  push- 
ing the  French  line,  which  steadily  retired,  and  on  the  20th, 
Macdonald,  Lauriston,  Marmont  and  Ney  all  stood  on  the 
left  bank  of  the  Bober  at  Lowenberg  and  opposite  Bunzlau, 
Blucher  drawing  up  on  the  other  side.  It  looked  very  much 
as  if  doughty  Marschal  Vorwarts  was  ready  to  come  to  battle. 

Napoleon  could  now  better  gauge  the  enemy’s  purpose. 
Though  tempted  to  go  on  with  the  Jung  Bunzlau  project, 
neither  Oudinot  nor  Macdonald  was  ready,  and  Blucher  was 


French  Hussar  Officer. 


a present  peril ; it  was  uncertain  whether  the  Army  of  the 
Sovereigns  was  to  cross  the  Elbe ; and  as  a thrust  into  Bo- 
hemia might  result  in  a mere  attack  on  their  front,  he  decided 
instead  to  rid  himself  of  his  nearest  enemy.  Everything  was 
ready  for  it.  St.  Cyr  was  protecting  Dresden;  Yandamme, 


LACK  OF  BROAD  MILITARY  SKILL. 


127 


Poniatowski  and  Victor  were  so  placed  as  to  hold  the  frontier, 
support  either  St.  Cyr  or  the  emperor,  and  guard  the  French 
communications  on  the  Elbe ; his  own  hands  were  free. 

Napoleon  reached  Lauban  in  the  evening  of  August  20, 
and  prepared  to  cross  the  Bober  next  day  and  attack.  Mac- 
donald, Marmont,  Lauriston,  the  Guard  and  Latour-Mau- 
bourg  assembled  at  Lowenberg,  while  Ney  was  to  cross  at 
Bunzlau  and  turn  Blucher’s  right  flank  at  Alt-Giersdorf  ; but 
though  Napoleon  rapidly  pushed  the  crossing  at  Lowenberg 
early  on  the  21st,  Blucher  declined  the  contest  and  retired 
behind  the  Schnelle  Deichsel.  This  retreat  Napoleon  as- 
cribed to  his  lack  of  confidence  in  his  new  troops ; he  had  no 
idea  that  Blucher’s  withdrawal  was  a well-considered  strategic 
scheme.  Earlier  in  life  he  might  have  guessed  it;  now  he 
gauged  facts  less  well.  Had  he  suspected  the  truth,  he  would 
have  pushed  his  advance  on  Prague ; as  it  was,  he  had  given 
up  this  for  a thrust  in  the  air,  for  he  dared  not  go  so  far  from 
Dresden  as  to  follow  Blucher  to  Silesia. 

One  thing  especially  annoyed  the  emperor : his  corps  com- 
manders appeared  to  lack  initiative.  “ In  general  what  is 
annoying  in  the  position  of  things  is  the  little  confidence  the 
generals  have  in  themselves,”  he  wrote  Maret,  August  22. 
“ The  forces  of  the  enemy  seem  to  them  to  be  considerable 
everywhere  I am  not  present.”  Yet  these  were  lieutenants  he 
had  trained  — or  failed  to  train,  and  this  grew  worse  as  the 
campaign  went  on.  The  marshals  knew  how  to  obey,  they 
did  not  know  how  to  lead  large  forces  when  left  to  their  own 
devices.  They  saw  it  themselves  : all  through  life  they  had 
served  under  the  first  of  captains,  and  they  had  lost,  not 
gained,  in  self-reliance.  When  the  plan  of  campaign  required 
that  one  or  another  marshal  should  operate  alone,  in  Branden- 
burg or  Silesia,  against  Blucher  or  Billow  or  Bernadotte,  he 
failed.  Spain  had  already  shown  how  little  the  best  of  these 


128 


A MATTER  OF  INCENTIVE. 


marshals  could  do  when  faced  by  the  exceptional  ability  of 
Wellington;  the  present  campaign  was  to  exhibit  still  more 
this  lack  of  broad  military  skill. 

While  on  August  28  Macdonald  and  Lauriston,  with 
Latour-Maubourg  and  Sebastiani,  continued  to  push,  the  en- 
emy retired  behind  the  Katzbach.  Napoleon,  who  had  ridden 
half-way  to  Goldberg,  returned  to  Lowenberg  August  22, 
and  when  that  evening  news  came  from  St.  Cyr  that  the  Army 
of  the  Sovereigns  was  entering  Saxony  on  the  way  to  Dres- 
den, and  that  he  feared  for  the  safety  of  the  city,  the  emperor 
decided  to  go  there  at  once.  His  advance  on  Blucher  had 
miscarried,  while  one  on  Prague  might  have  brought  the 
Army  of  the  Sovereigns  to  a standstill. 

He  wrote  Maret,  August  22  : “ Tell  St.  Cyr  that  I am  far  from  having 
renounced  my  operation  into  Bohemia,  and  that  the  operation  of  Silesia 
is  an  episode  of  it.  . . . The  enemy’s  army  of  Silesia  moved  on  ours, 
and  on  the  20th  we  entered  Bunzlau,  Goldberg  and  Lowenberg.  I at  once 
went  there  personally.  I had  the  enemy  attacked  again  the  same  day, 
and  he  was  overturned  in  all  his  positions,  and  we  are  pursuing  him  with 
the  sword  in  his  ribs.”  And  next  day  to  Vandamme  : “ On  the  21st  I 
beat  the  Army  of  Silesia,  composed  of  Russians  and  Prussians,  in  front  of 
Bunzlau  and  Lowenberg,  I had  it  pursued  to  Jauer.”  And  on  August 
24  to  Cambacdr&s  : “ I have  just  come  from  Lowenberg,  where  I beat  the 
enemy’s  army  of  Silesia.  I entered  Bohemia  and  seized  the  principal 
debouches.  My  troops  pushed  forward  to  within  sixteen  leagues  of  Prague. 
I am  at  the  moment  moving  on  Dresden  to  attack  the  enemy’s  corps 
which  have  moved  in  that  direction.”  Then  follows  an  encouragement 
item.  “ The  army  which  I have  directed  on  Berlin  ought  to-day  to  be  in 
that  town.” 

All  this  is  well  as  a matter  of  incentive ; but  the  emperor 
was  no  longer  drawing  the  proper  conclusions  from  the  facts. 

Leaving  the  Lusatian  forces  to  Macdonald,  with  orders  to 
throw  Blucher  back  beyond  J auer,  and  then  intrench  and  hold 
the  line  of  the  Bober  from  Bunzlau  to  Hirschberg,  cover  the 


NAPOLEON  TO  MARET. 


129 


approach  to  Dresden,  and  prevent  the  enemy  from  moving 
from  Silesia  around  his  right  towards  Zittau,  or  around  his 
left  to  annoy  the  Berlin  column,  lie  assigned  him  Lauriston’s 
corps,  and  Ney’s  corps  under  Souham,  in  addition  to  his  own 
under  Gerard,  together  with  Sebastiani’s  cavalry.  And  he 
had  Berthier  write  him : “ That  my  opinion  is  that  in  the 
moral  state  of  his  troops  and  the  enemy,  there  is  nothing  bet- 
ter for  him  to  do  than  to  march  against  him  the  moment  he 
wishes  to  take  the  offensive;  that  in  taking  the  offensive  the 
enemy  will  move  on  several  points ; that  on  the  contrary, 
Macdonald  is  always  to  keep  his  troops  assembled  on  one 
point,  so  as  to  debouch  in  force  on  him,  and  retake  at  once 
the  initiative.” 

Key,  in  person,  went  with  the  emperor,  who  was  becoming 
used  to  having  the  marshal  near  him  to  carry  out  immediate 
orders;  the  Guard,  followed  by  Marmont  and  Latour-Mau- 
bourg,  Victor,  and  Vandamme  from  Stolpen,  were  ordered 
towards  the  Elbe.  Poniatowski  and  Kellermann  remained 
at  the  Gabel  defile.  Should  the  enemy  march  on  the  Saxon 
capital,  Napoleon  determined  to  fight  him  in  the  defenses  of 
the  place,  as  he  wrote  Maret,  August  22 : — 

“ What  is  satisfying  is  that  their  infantry  is  extremely  bad.  Anyhow, 
as  one  can  arrive  at  no  result  without  battle,  the  most  happy  thing  that 
can  happen  is  that  the  enemy  should  inarch  on  Dresden,  because  there 
will  then  be  a battle.  . . . They  thought  they  had  nothing  to  do  but  to 
pursue  us,  for  as  soon  as  they  saw  our  columns  debouch  to  retake  the 
offensive,  terror  seized  them.  . . . All  the  plan  of  the  allies  has  been 
founded  on  the  assurances  which  Metternich  gave  them  that  we  should 
be  recrossing  the  Elbe.” 

The  emperor  had  manifestly  not  divined  the  Trachenberg 
plan. 

As  in  an  advance  on  Dresden  the  allies  would  in  a way  be 
backing  on  the  Rhine  and  he  on  the  Oder,  the  emperor  could 


VOL.  IV. 


130 


INSTRUCTIONS  FOR  MACDONALD. 


retire  in  case  of  mishap  into  his  intrenched  camp ; or  at  the 
worst,  cross  to  the  right  bank,  join  Macdonald  and  debouch 
again  to  the  left  bank,  through  one  of  his  fortresses,  on  the 
enemy’s  flank.  Should  the  advance  on 
Dresden  prove  to  be  in  small  force, 
he  could  resume  the  march  on  Prague 
through  Zittau,  Macdonald  covering  his 
line  back  to  Bautzen,  until  Prague  was 
reached  and  a fresh  line  to  Dresden  won, 
when,  Macdonald’s  task  being  ended,  he 
could  act  as  the  occasion  demanded.  In 
this  scheme  Napoleon  shows  us  how  a 
detachment  should  base  itself  on  the  main 
army  instead  of  on  a place,  which  might 
at  any  moment  go  lost. 

Napoleon  left  thorough  instructions  for 
Macdonald,  explaining  to  him  the  plan  of 
an  advance  on  Prague  via  Zittau,  or  that 
of  debouching  from  Dresden.  Should  he 
be  attacked  by  a superior  enemy,  he  was 
Westphalian  Grenadier.  fan  back  behind  the  Queisse,  hold  Gor- 
litz  and  keep  in  communication  with  Napoleon ; or  at  worst  he 
could  retire  on  Dresden. 

The  corps  intended  for  Dresden  were  promptly  afoot,  and 
Napoleon  remained  on  the  24th  in  Gorlitz.  He  purposed  to 
assemble  the  25th  and  26th  at  Stolpen ; then  via  Konigstein, 
early  the  27th,  he  would  reach  the  Pirna  camp  with  one  hun- 
dred thousand  men,  whence  he  would  at  once  seize  Hellendorf 
and  sit  down  astride  the  main  road  from  Bohemia,  holding  at 
Pirna  town  two  bridges  in  readiness  to  throw,  and  thus  taking 
in  reverse  any  allied  force  in  front  of  Dresden. 

From  the  Prague  region  to  Saxony  are  two  main  roads,  one 
from  Toplitz  or  Aussig  via  Berggiesshiibel,  the  other  from 


A CLEAR-SIGHTED  PLAN. 


131 


Commotau  via  Marienburg.  There  are  several  minor  roads, 
across  the  range  or  connecting  the  main  ones.  In  order  to 
pass  the  mountains,  the  Army  of  the  Sovereigns  had  to  form 
front  along  the  whole  range,  and  move  over  in  several  col- 
umns, the  right  one  of  which  would  pass  Pirna,  and  the  left 
one  make  a considerable  detour.  Either  they  would  debouch 
by  Peterswalde,  where  Napoleon,  well  concentrated,  could  at- 
tack their  head  of  column,  or  let  them  file  on  Dresden  and 
take  them  in  flank  on  the  march ; or  should  they  debouch  via 
Commotau  and  march  on  Leipsic,  Napoleon  would,  by  diver- 
sions along  the  Elbe,  lead  them  to  think  he  was  holding 
Dresden  in  force ; and  vacating  that  city,  would  march  via 
Commotau  on  Prague,  thus  cutting  them  from  their  line  of 
retreat ; and  so  soon  as  they  turned  back  in  their  tracks,  as 
they  would  be  sure  to  do  when  they  found  themselves  im- 
periled, St.  Cyr  would  follow  them  and  operate  on  their  rear. 
This  plan  for  taking  the  enemy  doubly  in  reverse  was  clear- 
sighted in  the  highest  degree. 

Although  Napoleon’s  march  on  Silesia  had  been  so  near 
the  Austrian  frontier  that  numberless  Austrian  officials  must 
have  known  it,  no  report  had  reached  the  Army  of  the  Sov- 
ereigns, which  argues  poor  means  of  procuring  information. 
Schwartzenberg  assumed  Napoleon  to  be  still  in  Dresden, 
and  slowly  and  with  many  precautions  began  to  cross  the 
Erzgebirge  at  various  points  on  August  22.  Wittgenstein 
marched  from  Toplitz  through  Peterswalde,  Kleist  from  Top- 
litz  through  Altenburg  and  Dippoldiswalde,  the  Austrians  from 
Commottau  through  Marienburg  towards  Chemnitz,  Klenau 
with  the  new  Austrian  levies  from  Carlsbad  through  Zwickau. 
This  march  in  isolated  columns  was  a risky  business ; and 
Jomini  pointed  out  to  the  czar  that  if  these  four  columns 
moved  past  Napoleon’s  forces  at  Dresden  towards  Leipsic  by 
the  flank,  the  emperor  could  debouch  from  Dresden,  cut  their 


132 


TO  MARCH  ON  DRESDEN. 


communications  and  compromise  them.  The  allies’  first  plan, 
in  marching  on  Leipsic,  was  to  have  Bernadotte  there  join  them, 
after  brushing  aside  Oudinot  and  crossing  the  Elbe  at  Dessau. 
They  had  not  supposed  Dresden  so  defenseless  until  they  cap- 
tured, August  23,  a dispatch  of  St.  Cyr’s.  Had  they  marched 
on  Leipsic,  and  had  Napoleon  drawn  in  Oudinot,  debouched 
from  Dresden  on  their  rear  and  beaten  them  in  a decisive  bat- 
tle, they  would  have  been  irretrievably  lost,  for  he  would  have 
held  their  line  of  retreat  and  all  the  fortified  crossings  of  the 
Elbe  and  lower  Oder,  and  they  would  have  had  to  cut  their 
way  out  or  surrender.  But  shortly  Schwartzenberg  changed 
his  mind  — he  may  have  feared  Bernadotte  could  not  reach 
him  — and  determined  to  march  on 
Dresden,  the  three  columns  filing  on 
Dippoldiswalde,  and  Klenau  through 
Chemnitz  on  Freiburg;  and  on  the 
24th,  when  Napoleon  was  still  at  Gor- 
litz,  the  allied  right  under  Barclay 
reached  the  vicinity  of  the  capital, 
after  brushing  aside  Claparede  at 
Pirna.  The  main  force  was  assembling 
at  Dippoldiswalde,  and  Ostermann 
was  left  to  observe  the  Konigstein 
intrenched  camp,  held  by  Mouton-Du- 
vernet.  This  oncoming  of  a huge  army 
obliged  St.  Cyr  to  withdraw  into  Dres- 
den, where  he  had  orders  to  defend 
himself  to  the  last  extremity;  and  in 
this  the  allied  slowness  helped  him. 
Yet  in  effect  Schwartzenberg  had  stolen  a march  on  the 
emperor,  who  had  at  once  felt  compelled  to  give  up  his 
Prague  scheme  and  march  straight  on  Dresden.  It  was  as 
well  he  did  so,  for  Oudinot’s  defeat  at  Gross  Beeren,  August 


Hanseatic  Footman. 


LETTERS  TO  STOLPEN  AND  ROGNIAT.  133 

23,  of  which  he  learned  two  days  later,  would  in  any  event 
have  nullified  his  Bohemian  project. 

From  Stolpen,  August  25,  Napoleon  wrote  St.  Cyr:  “ It  is  indispensable 
that  I should  be  without  disquiet  as  to  Dresden,  during  the  days  of  the 
26th  to  30th.  Dresden  should  hold  more  than  six  days  . . . with  deter- 
mination fifteen  to  twenty  days.  . . . My  intention  is  to  occupy  the  camp 
of  Pirna  with  all  my  army.  I will  have  Vandamme  debouch  to-mor- 
row to  seize  the  woods  and  defiles  of  Hellendorf.  ...  I shall  throw  two 
bridges  opposite  Pirna.  ...  If  the  enemy  separates  or  makes  a bad 
break,  I will  try  to  profit  by  it.  If  he  has  taken  the  line  of  operation 
of  Leipsic,  I shall  find  myself  nearer  than  he  is  to  Prague.” 

And  to  Rogniat,  Chief  Engineer  at  Dresden  : “ The  chess-board  of 
actual  warfare  is  complicated.  The  number  of  the  enemies  whom  I have 
to  combat  is  formidable.  If  the  three  redoubts  already  traced  had  been 
finished,  if  the  barricades  had  been  terminated  in  the  town,  and  if  the 
ditch  of  Pirna  had  been  well  established,  I should  have  had  more  confi- 
dence in  Dresden,  ...  I should  have  marched  on  Bohemia.  . . . Give 
orders  to  have  the  three  redoubts  finished  . . . and  to  establish  three 
others  according  to  the  first  plan.  . . . Nothing  must  be  forgotten  to  well 
establish  the  equilibrium  between  the  defense  of  the  left  and  that  of  the 
right  bank,  so  that  I may  have  the  conviction  that  a corps  of  twenty  thou- 
sand men,  throwing  itself  into  the  place,  thus  raising  its  garrison  to  nearly 
thirty  thousand  men,  can  defend  itself  fifteen  to  twenty  days.” 

Every  lapse  in  wise  conduct  is  not  summarily  followed  by 
its  legitimate  consequences  ; but  Napoleon’s  gambling  policy, 
in  not  treating  with  the  allies  while  yet  there  was  time,  was 
to  result  in  evil  for  the  French  cause  before  it  might  naturally 
have  been  expected.  While  the  emperor  was  hurrying  his 
best  troops  towards  t)resden  to  meet  the  Army  of  the  Sover- 
eigns, his  two  most  important  lieutenants,  Oudinot  and  Mac- 
donald, were  seriously  defeated  by  Biilow  and  Blucher.  Why 
Napoleon,  when  of  all  things  he  needed  success,  put  Oudinot 
in  charge  of  a big  army,  when  Davout  was  at  hand,  it  is  hard 
to  say,  but  the  Davout-Ney  quarrels  in  Russia  and  a certain 


134 


BERNADOTTE  AT  GROSS  BEEREN. 


dislike  Berthier  had  for  the  marshal  prevented  this  great 
soldier  from  taking  a worthy  part  in  the  campaign  of  1813. 
Just  as  Jerome  was  put  in  command  beyond  his  ability  in 
1812,  so  here  Oudinot  and  Macdonald  were  charged  with  work 
that  Davout  and  St.  Cyr  would  have  done  far  better. 

Oudinot  had  left  Wittenberg  and  was  at  Baruth  August 
18,  when,  obliquing  somewhat  to  the  left  towards  Liicken- 
walde  to  pick  up  his  other  troops,  he  took  up  the  route  from 
Juterbog  to  Berlin  and  advanced  on  Trebbin.  Misled  as 
to  the  enemy’s  forces,  he  marched  in  a haphazard  way,  and 
without  the  precautions  which  alone  insure  success.  He  had 
nearly  seventy  thousand  men,  the  advance  of  which  Girard, 
with  Lanusse  from  Magdeburg  and  Dombrovski  from  Wit- 
tenberg, was  to  aid  by  an  attack  on  Bernadotte’s  right,  while 
Davout  was  to  march  on  Wralmoden  and  strategically  join 
the  operation.  This  made  one  hundred  thousand  men;  and 
Napoleon  gauged  Bernadotte  at  not  over  eighty  thousand, 
including  Walmoden  opposite  Davout  at  Hamburg,  and  a 
flying  corps  opposite  Magdeburg ; which  calculation  would 
leave  him  only  fifty  thousand  men  in  his  working  army.  But 
Napoleon  was  much  in  error ; Bernadotte  commanded  a fine 
body  of  ninety  thousand  men,  including  twenty  thousand  cav- 
alry, plus  two  light  corps,  Hirschfeld  at  Brandenburg  and 
Wobeser  at  Baruth.  He  had  been  nearly  ready  to  evacuate 
Berlin,  but  Biilow  swore  that  the  Prussian  bones  should  blanch 
in  front  of  the  capital,  not  in  its  rear ; and  thus  backed,  he 
changed  his  mind.  Nor  was  Napoleon  right  in  saying  he 
would  only  “ piaffer  ” (prance  in  place),  — a phrase  horsemen 
will  appreciate,  — for  being  offensively  inclined,  he  moved  from 
Potsdam  on  Juterbog,  and  after  demonstrating  for  a while 
against  Oudinot,  retired  and  took  position  at  Gross  Beeren, 
covering  Berlin,  the  left  under  Tauenzien  leaning  on  the  lake 
of  Rangsdorf,  the  centre  under  Biilow  astride  the  Berlin  post- 


COLUMNS  NOT  INTERSUPPORTING.  135 

road,  the  Russians  under  Winzingerode  and  Woronzov,  and 
the  Swedes,  on  the  right. 

Oudinot,  whose  orders  were  positive  to  attack,  moved  for- 
ward in  three  columns,  his  own  corps  on  the  left,  Reynier  in 
the  centre,  Bertrand  on  the  right.  On  August  21  he  seized 
Trebbin.  On  the  22d  the  advance  continued,  Billow  with 
Tauenzien  retiring  after  a sharp  combat,  and  next  day,  still 
in  three  columns,  he  advanced  on  the  Army  of  the  North. 


Bertrand  headed  for  Blankenfeld  through  Johnsdorf ; Reynier 
and  the  Saxons  marched  on  towards  Gross  Beeren  on  the 
main  road ; Oudinot  leading  the  12th  Corps  was  to  advance 
on  Potsdam  via  Arensdorf.  The  three  columns  were  not 
intersupporting. 

The  ground  was  badly  cut  up  by  woods  and  marshes,  and 
the  main  roads  all  led  in  one  direction,  converging  on  Berlin, 
good  cross-roads  by  which  the  columns  might  rapidly  sustain 
each  other  being  absent.  Neither  were  the  columns  timed  so 
as  to  act  together.  Bertrand  first  got  into  contact  at  Blank- 


136 


GIRARD  DRIVEN  BACK. 


enfeld  with  Tauenzien,  who  defended  the  village  with  such 
gallantry  that  he  made  no  headway,  and  the  French  were 
practically  checked  here  when  Reynier  struck  Billow’s  van  at 
Gross  Beeren,  and  drove  it  from  the  village  — as  he  imagined, 
for  good.  Before  securing  the  place,  and  while  the  men  were 
getting  dinner,  Blilow  with  his  main  body  fell  sharply  on  him ; 
and  though  doing  his  best,  he  was  hustled  out  with  loss  of 
three  thousand  men.  Many  Saxons  deserted.  On  hearing 
the  cannonading  in  the  centre,  the  van  of  Oudinot’s  column 
promptly  headed  for  Gross  Beeren,  but  could  do  no  more  than 
cover  Reynier’s  withdrawal.  The  French  cavalry,  deployed 
west  of  the  village,  was  charged  in  flank  by  the  Prussians,  and 
some  French  squadrons,  following  up  Prussian  foot  towards 
Hennersdorf,  got  roughly  handled.  When  on  arrival  Oudi- 
not  learned  the  defeat  of  his  centre,  he  retreated  on  Witten- 
berg, the  nearest  point  on  the  Elbe,  but  eccentric  to  the  line 
of  communication  with  Napoleon,  which  ran  through  Liickau 
on  Bautzen.  He  had  prior  to  the  battle  failed  to  assemble 
his  forces  beyond  reach  of  the  enemy’s  attack  ; and  had 
Bernadotte  followed  him  up  with  his  fine  body  of  cavalry,  he 
would  not  easily  have  escaped. 

Girard,  advancing  from  Magdeburg  towards  the  enemy  on 
Oudinot’s  flank,  and  unaware  of  the  Gross  Beeren  defeat,  was 
met,  August  27,  by  Hirschfeld  and  Czernichev’s  Cossacks  at 
the  Hagelberg  near  Belzig,  and  driven  back  with  grievous 
loss,  he  himself  being  wounded.  These  victories  raised  the 
tone  of  the  new  Prussian  levies,  which  had  behaved  well ; and 
by  August  31  the  Army  of  the  North  had  followed  Oudinot 
to  Treuenbrietzen,  and  thousands  of  the  German  auxiliaries 
in  French  service  had  disbanded. 

At  the  same  time  Davout  with  thirty  thousand  men  left 
Hamburg,  and  throwing  back  Walmoden’s  British,  Hanove- 
rian and  Hanse  troops,  reached  Schwerin ; but  as  his  opera- 


ORDERS  MISUNDERSTOOD. 


137 


tions  were  secondary  to  Oudinot’s,  and  the  Gross  Beeren  de- 
feat turned  his  flank,  he  retired.  Had  the  hero  of  Auerstadt 
and  Eggmiihl  been  in  command  of  the  army  manoeuvring  on 
Berlin,  this  backset  would  scarcely  have  been  suffered;  as  it 
was,  he  resumed  the  defensive. 

Oudinot’s  defeat  upset  all  the  emperor’s  calculations  look- 
ing towards  the  capture  of  Berlin  and  the  relief  of  his  for- 
tresses, and  markedly  limited  his  offensive-defensive  scheme. 
This  was  bad  enough,  but  a worse  disaster  was  to  happen  to 
Macdonald.  As  we  have  seen,  Napoleon  had  advised  him, 
after  pushing  Blucher  beyond  Jauer,  to  intrench  on  the 
Bober,  wait  for  his  advance,  which  would  probably  be  on 
several  lines,  and  to  meet  him  by  a sharp  offensive  in  one 
well-concentrated  body.  Napoleon  left  Macdonald  opposite 
Blucher  too  soon;  he  might  have  started  his  troops  towards 
Dresden  and  himself  remained  longer,  for  he  could  easily 
overtake  the  column.  The  two  days  spent  at  Gorlitz  and 
Stolpen  would  have  been  better  used  in  pursuing  Blucher ; 
for  imagining  himself  able  to  cope  with  the  Prussian  general 
on  equal  terms,  and  assuming  him  to  be  withdrawing  on 
Breslau,  Macdonald  thought  it  would  be  well  to  quicken  his 
retreat.  When  Napoleon  had  ordered  Ney  to  follow  him,  the 
orders  had  been  misunderstood  to  mean  Ney’s  corps,  and  Sou- 
ham  had  started  towards  Dresden.  As  this  left  Macdonald 
only  two  corps  with  which  to  follow  Blucher  towards  Jauer, 
he  had  to  wait  for  Souham  to  come  back,  thus  losing  August 
24  and  25 ; and  when  he  was  ready  to  advance,  Blucher  was 
ready  to  meet  him.  Still,  he  might  not  have  done  better  two 
days  before,  though  Blucher’s  troops  were  still  somewhat 
shaken  by  Napoleon’s  blows.  For  August  26  Macdonald 
ordered  an  advance  across  the  Katzbach  and  the  Raging 
Neisse,  over  difficult  ground  that  might  be  used  to  entrap 
him ; and  instead  of  marching  in  one  body,  he  started  his 


138 


BLUCHER  ASSUMES  THE  OFFENSIVE. 


march  in  five  columns,  over  a front  of  sixteen  miles,  from 
Liegnitz  to  Schonau  — the  very  reverse  of  his  orders.  The 
Prussians  were  reported  on  the  plateau  facing  the  defile  of 
Krain,  and  though  he  was  unfamiliar  with  the  country,  Mac- 
donald advanced  without  reconnoitring  his  front.  On  August 
24  Blucher  had  divined,  from  hasty  movements  in  one  place 
and  gaps  in  another,  added  to  sundry  dispatches  and  the 
French  cipher  captured  by  Cossacks,  that  Napoleon  was  no 
longer  present,  and  had  determined  himself  to  assume  the 
offensive.  Drawing  up  in  the  country  north  of  Jauer,  he  was 
ready  when  the  French  reached  the  Katzbach.  Macdonald 
developed  his  three  infantry  corps  and  one  cavalry  corps  fan- 
fashion  and  prepared  to  cross  the  Katzbach  and  the  Raging 
Neisse  on  this  wide  front.  The  former  is  not  always  easy  to 
cross  ; the  latter  runs  in  a deep  valley  and  is  a most  unreli- 
able watercourse,  which  a little  rain  transforms  into  an 
impassable  torrent.  Macdonald  should  have  been  hypercau- 
tious,  but  he  went  blindly  ahead.  He  took  Puthod  and  Ledru 
from  Gerard  and  Lauriston,  and  sent  them  by  way  of  Schonau 
on  Hirschberg;  Lauriston’s  other  two  divisions  marched 
against  Langeron  at  Hennersdorf ; Gerard’s  column  started 
from  Goldberg  to  cross  both  the  streams  and  ascend  the 
Weinberg  by  way  of  Krain  ; Souham  made  a detour  by  way 
of  Liegnitz  to  fall  on  the  enemy’s  right  flank ; and  Sebastiani 
was  to  ascend  the  Raging  Neisse  on  the  right  bank  to  keep 
Gerard  and  Souham  in  touch. 

Blucher  was  himself  ready  to  march  on  Macdonald,  but 
arriving  on  the  heights  of  Triebelwitz,  he  learned  that  the 
French  were  busy  crossing  the  Raging  Neisse,  and  sent  out 
to  estimate  their  force.  Early  in  the  day  the  rain  prevented 
seeing  any  distance,  but  scouts  and  staff  officers,  among  them 
Muffling,  his  aide,  rode  out  and  ascertained  the  position  of 
the  French.  Arresting  his  advance,  he  withdrew  his  centre. 


FRENCH  MASSES  SEPARATED. 


139 


under  Yorck,  to  permit  the  French  to  come  on  up  the  Wein- 
berg hill,  where  he  stood  with  superior  numbers.  The  French 
march  had  begun  in  heavy  rain,  and  Souham,  finding  too 


Macdonald. 


much  water  at  Liegnitz,  crossed  above  and  marched  to  the 
right  on  the  same  road  as  Sebastiani.  B1  ocher  watched  them 
eagerly,  until  about  3 P.  m.,  when  he  found  out  how  the  two 
French  masses  were  separated;  and  leaving  Langeron  to  look 
after  Jauer,  he  instructed  Yorck  to  check  Gerard,  and  Sacken 
to  face  Souham  and  Sebastiani  on  the  plateau  of  Janowitz. 
In  the  midst  of  the  heavy  storm,  which  made  the  muskets 
almost  useless,  and  when  Gerard  was  partly  over  and  partly 
up  the  hill,  hoping  to  aid  Souham  and  Sebastiani  to  deploy, 
Blucher  sent  his  infantry  in,  covered  by  artillery  fire  ; and  as 
the  French  head  of  column  nearly  reached  the  top,  it  encoun- 
tered Yorck’s  fierce  attack.  The  French  right  was  fairly 
protected  by  the  ravine,  but  the  left  was  in  the  air,  and 
Sacken  fell  on  this  and  shook  it  severely,  while  the  Prussian 


140 


MACDONALD'S  MISHAP. 


centre  advanced,  and  by  a vigorous  charge  hurled  Gerard 
back  into  the  ravine.  At  this  sudden  onslaught,  the  discon- 
certed French,  horse  and  foot,  became  inextricably  mixed  in 
the  awkward  defile,  and  fell  into  disorder.  On  hearing  of  the 
check,  Souham  came  rapidly  up,  and  on  any  other  terrain 
might  have  retrieved  the  day ; but  in  the  deep  ravine,  he  only 
made  a bad  matter  worse  by  adding  to  the  number  who  had 
no  room  to  manoeuvre.  The  effort  to  turn  the  allied  right  had 
utterly  failed,  and  the  French  battalions  and  squadrons  were 
huddled  together  like  sheep  in  a pen. 

Meanwhile  Lauriston  was  fighting  Langeron  near  Henners- 
dorf.  Here  was  a key-point,  had  there  been  a sufficient  force 
to  take  Blucher  in  reverse,  but  the  Russians  threw  his  first 
onset  back,  and  a second  one  had  no  better  result ; by  five 
o’clock  the  Russians  had  driven  him  out,  and  on  hearing  of 
Macdonald’s  mishap,  Lauriston  had  to  retire.  The  battle  was 


BLUCHER  A MARKED  FEATURE.  141 

lost  beyond  redemption  before  Blucher  had  made  an  effort. 
Macdonald  had  defeated  himself  by  careless  conduct. 

Torrents  of  rain  had  fallen ; even  the  small  streams  could 
hardly  be  crossed,  and  many  bridges  were  carried  away. 
Lauriston  barely  got  back  to  Goldberg,  and  next  day  to 
Lowenberg;  his  detached  division  under  Puthod  was  cut 
off.  Only  the  Bunzlau  bridge  was  left ; to  this  Macdonald 
retreated  in  bad  order,  with  a loss  of  one  hundred  guns,  three 
hundred  wagons  and  over  twenty  thousand  men,  of  whom 
half  were  quoted  as  killed.  The  Prussians  learned  their  own 
value  in  the  field,  and  from  now  on  Blucher  became  a marked 
feature  in  opposing  the  Napoleonic  scheme. 

Macdonald  had  shown  at  the  Trebbia,  and  for  fifteen  years 
since,  that  he  was  incapable  of  commanding  large  bodies  of 
troops  on  the  battlefield ; he  was  a man  of  careful  detail 
rather  than  broad  views  ; why  Napoleon  chose  him  it  is  hard 
to  say.  Still,  Macdonald’s  disaster  was  due  to  himself  and  not 
to  Napoleon,  while  Oudinot’s  bad  luck  was  owing  to  his  posi- 
tive orders  to  attack  the  enemy,  when  he  had  scant  chance 
of  winning.  If  Napoleon  was  bound  to  march  on  Berlin,  he 
should  not  have  allowed  an  advance  to  be  made  on  several 
lines,  Oudinot,  Girard,  Davout.  This  was  in  direct  contra- 
vention of  his  own  principle  of  a single  line  of  operation.  It 
would  have  been  easy  to  leave  troops  in  Hamburg  and  Magde- 
burg, have  Davout  move  up  river,  join  to  his  own  force  Gi- 
rard, and  march  with  Oudinot  in  one  column  upon  the  enemy 
in  his  front.  But  instead  of  doing  this,  Napoleon  afforded  the 
enemy  the  interior  lines,  and  he  took  advantage  of  his  position. 
But  better  still  would  have  been  to  hold  back  the  Berlin  opera- 
tion until  he  had  disposed  of  the  Army  of  the  Sovereigns,  when 
he  could  have  joined  Oudinot  with  a considerable  force. 

These  two  disasters  could  not  be  repaired.  The  defeat  of 
Oudinot  and  Macdonald  by  Billow  and  Blucher,  added  to  the 


142 


A MULTIPLICITY  OF  ADVISERS. 


defeats  of  the  other  marshals  by  Wellington  in  Spain,  shows 
how  far  from  a perfect  training  in  arms  Napoleon  had  given 
them. 

Quite  unaware  that  defeat  lay  in  store  for  his  two  most  im- 
portant outlying  armies,  the  emperor  hurried  his  corps  on 
Dresden,  at  a rate  which  carried  them  forty  miles  in  two  days, 
although  on  scant  rations  and  wearied  by  the  Lowenberg 
manoeuvre.  He  was  confident  he  should  beat  the  Army  of 
the  Sovereigns. 

The  operation  of  the  allies  was  well  conceived,  but,  as  so 
often  occurs  with  divided  commands,  ill  executed.  In  his  sole 
leadership  Napoleon  had  a marked  advantage,  but  he  did  not 
appreciate  how  great  it  was.  There  was  a multiplicity  of 
allied  advisers  — Schwartzenberg,  Wittgenstein,  Barclay,  Toll, 
Knesebeck,  Jomini  and  Moreau  ; but  though  the  clearest- 
headed  man  was  the  czar,  and  he  remained  the  natural 
leader,  he  over-modestly  refused  the  supreme  command,  and 
even  permitted  the  dispersion  of  his  divisions  among  the 
armies,  whereupon  Schwartzenberg  was  appointed  to  act 
under  the  direction  of  the  council  of  sovereigns.  Later,  urged 
by  Moreau  and  Jomini,  Alexander  would  have  taken  the  labor- 
ing oar;  but  Francis  desired  to  keep  the  command  in  Austrian 
hands.  Schwartzenberg  was  brave  and  able  within  limits, 
but  not  capable  of  so  great  a charge  in  front  of  a Napoleon. 
He  was  too  tractable.  He  should  have  been  given  an  able 
chief  of  staff,  but  Badetzki,  Latour  and  Languenau,  his  gen- 
eral aides  and  advisers,  were  unequal  to  the  situation.  The 
Austrian  empire  disposed  of  many  good  officers  ; that  the 
army  kept  its  tone,  despite  constant  defeats,  showed  admirable 
constancy.  The  staff  was  especially  good  in  its  scientific 
attainments,  but  the  Austrians  had  lost  the  proper  theory 
of  war  since  Prince  Eugene  had  passed  away.  An  army 
which  produced  a Traun,  a Daun,  a Laudon,  a Kray,  not  to 


THEORY  AND  PRACTICE. 


143 


apeak  of  Prince  Charles,  should  have  found  a better  leader 
than  Schwartzenberg.  But  the  Aulic  Council  had  spoiled  the 
army  by  constant  interference,  and  by  appointing  poor  gen- 
erals who  would  obey  blindly,  when  there  were  good  ones  at 
hand  who  had  ideas  of  their  own.  Chief  among:  these  was 
Prince  Charles,  who  had  shown  ability,  but  his  health  was 
not  robust,  and  there  existed  private  reasons  against  his 
appointment.  The  method  used  at  allied  headquarters  was 
for  Schwartzenberg  to  draw  up  the  plans,  submit  them  to  the 
council  of  sovereigns,  and  then,  when  approved,  with  or  with- 
out changes,  to  issue  the  orders  for  their  execution.  In  theory, 
the  plans  were  passed  upon  by  a council  of  which  the  three 
monarchs  were  chiefs  ; but  in  practice  they  were  discussed  by 
the  English  and  Swiss  ambassadors,  and  at  least  half  a dozen 
generals,  each  of  whom  seemed  to  have  an  influence  of  his 
own.  When  time  was  lacking,  orders  were  often  issued  by 
Schwartzenberg  without  conference.  That  the  allies  accom- 
plished anything  is  a wonder. 

This  confusion  led  up  to  Napoleon’s  fighting  a defensive 
battle  at  Dresden  without  special  grand-tactics  ; and  while 
here  he  first  held  himself  behind  intrencliments,  he  did  not 
enact  a negative  part.  He  had  long  foreseen  that  he  might 
have  to  defend  Dresden  ; to  Maret  he  had  written  that  “ his 
plan  might  be  altered  by  the  operations  of  the  enemy,”  mean- 
ing an  attempt  to  seize  Dresden  out  of  hand ; and  when  he 
learned  that  the  allies  were  actually  approaching  Dresden, 
although,  as  he  wrote  Macdonald,  August  24,  he  could  be  in 
Prague  in  three  days,  he  preferred  the  more  prudent  method 
of  debouching  through  the  Saxon  capital.  The  troops  hurried 
along,  and  via  Bautzen  the  van  reached  Stolpen  early  August 
25,  the  Guard  and  Latour-Maubourg  not  far  behind ; Mar- 
mont  and  Victor  were  still  a day’s  march  back.  Vandamme 
was  in  Neustadt  and  Stolpen. 


144 


FRENCH  SITUATION  SAVED . 


On  August  20  and  21  Pajol  had  run  across  the  enemy’s 
van,  and  when,  on  the  22d,  Wittgenstein  attacked  two  French 
divisions  at  Gieshubel  and  Borna,  St.  Cyr  withdrew  to  Dres- 
den, leaving  one  division  at  Konigstein.  On  August  23  and 
24  only  the  right  column  of  the  Army  of  the  Sovereigns  had 
been  seen  by  the  Dresden  forces,  but  on  the  25th  the  two 
central  columns  had  come  up,  and  the  left  column  was  due 
the  26th.  St.  Cyr  had  only  three  divisions,  some  cavalry  and 
some  odd  garrison  troops,  twenty-five  thousand  men,  but  he 
took  up  his  position  with  skill.  It  had  shown  considerable 
cleverness  on  the  part  of  the  allies  to  come  so  close  to  suc- 
cess as  to  put  two  hundred  thousand  men 
opposite  twenty-five  thousand,  but  their  un- 
necessary delays  saved  the  French  situation. 

Napoleon’s  first  idea  was  to  meet  this 
movement  by  holding  Dresden  with  a smaller 
force  and  debouching  by  way  of  Konigstein 
on  the  enemy’s  flank  and  rear  with  the  larger 
one,  and  Vandamme  was  ordered  to  Lilien- 
stein,  and  Victor  to  Stolpen,  Marmont  and 
the  Guard  following.  Napoleon  reached  this 
place  at  7 a.  m.  the  25th,  and  received  the 
first  news  of  Gross  Beeren,  but  not  deem- 
ing it  important,  went  on  with  his  project. 
Shortly,  news  from  St.  Cyr  made  him  fear 
for  Dresden,  and  he  changed  his  plan,  send- 
ing only  Vandamme  to  Konigstein.  As 
alone  Vandamme  could  accomplish  nothing 
decisive  at  Konigstein,  a better  plan  would 
have  been  to  send  him  at  once  to  Dresden 
to  help  St.  Cyr  contain  the  enemy,  whereupon  Napoleon  could 
have  moved  all  the  rest  of  the  troops  on  Konigstein  to  de- 
bouch on  the  enemy’s  rear,  for  assuredly  St.  Cyr  and  Van- 


Prussian  Body- 
guard. 


DRESDEN  IN  DANGER. 


145 


damme  could  have  held  Dresden  a day  or  two.  To  move 
to  Dresden  and  fight  there  was  only  a tactical  operation,  that 
through  Konigstein  with  the  main  army  was  a beautiful 
strategic  manoeuvre.  Thus,  the  alleged  danger  to  the  city 
persuaded  Napoleon  merely  to  threaten  his  enemy’s  rear  with 
Vandamme’s  corps,  and  to  fight  his  battle  at  Dresden. 
This  was  not  a masterful  proceeding.  Napoleon  himself  left 
Stolpen,  and  reached  Dresden  August  26,  at  9 a.  m.  While 
purposing  to  undertake  the  larger  manoeuvre,  he  had  written 
St.  Cyr  how  to  conduct  the  defense  so  as  to  hold  on  several 
days;  but  now  Yandamme  was  ordered  to  assemble  all  his 
forces  in  the  Lilienstein  camp,  and  personally  to  cross  to 
Konigstein  and  reconnoitre  in  its  front.  Although  Napoleon 
learned  of  Oudinot’s  defeat,  whatever  he  may  have  thought, 
he  laid  no  great  stress  upon  it,  keeping  up  his  habit  of  en- 
couraging his  subordinates  ; and  having  got  a first  and  erro- 
neous report  from  the  Katzbach,  he  wrote  Maret : — 

“ In  exchange  for  the  bad  news  which  you  give  me  from  Oudinot,  I can 
send  you  good  ones  received  from  Lauriston.  The  news  from  Oudinot 
seems  to  me,  as  to  you,  to  that  extent  confused  that  I cannot  draw  a con- 
clusion. . . . Lauriston  beat,  between  Goldberg  and  Jauer,  the  army  of 
Silesia.  He  says  he  counted  on  the  battlefield  seven  thousand  of  the  enemy 
dead,  and  only  eight  hundred  French.  He  took  some  prisoners  and  sev- 
eral guns.  The  positions  of  the  enemy  being  very  fine,  the  intrepidity  of 
our  soldiers  was  all  the  more  noticed.” 

The  emperor’s  eye  was  on  Dresden,  and  his  hope  that  the 
works  would  be  far  enough  advanced  for  a small  force  to  hold 
it  while  he  might  debouch  from  Konigstein  was  defeated. 
Time  had  been  too  limited.  To  make  certain  of  the  status, 
he  sent  to  Dresden  his  aide,  Gourgaud,  who  came  back  late  at 
night  with  a report  that  convinced  Napoleon  that  only  haste 
would  save  this  city  and  his  base. 

The  Guard  and  Latour-Maubourg  were  started  at  daylight, 

4 VOL.  IV. 


146 


ARRIVAL  OF  THE  TROOPS. 


August  26,  for  Dresden,  while  Vandamtne  moved  on  Pirna. 
Marmont  and  Victor  forced  the  marching  ; and  personally 
Napoleon  hurried  on,  to  find  the  capital  less  endangered  than 
he  had  feared.  By  10  a.  m.  the  Guard  followed,  and  began 
to  cross  the  bridge ; it  had  marched  from  Lowenberg,  eighty- 
seven  miles  in  seventy-two  hours,  over  twenty-nine  miles  a 
day.  It  was  amazing  to  see  how  many  troops  poured  into  the 
city  in  a brief  space,  which  was  accomplished  by  marching 
the  men  in  close  order  and  by  wide  fronts,  and  crowding  the 
masses  along  the  roads  instead  of  marching  at  deploying  dis- 
tance. 

About  3 p.  m.  of  the  26tli  Napoleon  was  notified  that  the 
allied  army  was  advancing  to  the  attack.  He  mounted  and 
rode  to  the  castle  square  near  the  end  of  the  Elbe  bridge,  and 
here  remained  some  time,  giving  each  division  as  it  came  up 
the  proper  direction  to  its  place  in  the  defensive  line.  As  the 
troops  arrived,  Murat,  with  Latour-Maubourg  and  Pajol,  was 
put  on  the  right,  sustained  by  Teste’s  division,  on  the  way 
from  Hamburg  to  rejoin  Vandamme’s  corps.  The  rest  of  the 
troops  were  stationed  on  left  and  centre.  Although  the  enemy 
had  two  to  one  of  his  own  force,  Napoleon  never  doubted 
victory. 


Sword  of  the  Period. 


LXI. 


DRESDEN.  AUGUST  26  TO  31,  1813. 

The  allies  might  either  march  on  Dresden  and  take  it  by  assault,  or  stand 
across  the  French  communications  and  oblige  them  to  attack.  Believing  that 
Napoleon  was  still  in  pursuit  of  Blucher  and  that  Dresden  was  slightly  held, 
Schwartzenberg  waited  for  the  allied  army  to  close  up.  Napoleon’s  plan  was  to 
debouch  in  force  on  the  allied  rear  through  Konigstein,  but  lacking  time  to 
carry  this  out,  he  gave  Vandamme  this  errand  and  himself  marched  to  Dres- 
den. This  city  was  not  a fortress,  but  had  been  temporarily  strengthened.  Had 
the  allies  attacked  August  25,  it  would  have  fallen,  but  as  they  waited  till  the 
afternoon  of  August  26,  St.  Cyr  held  his  own  until  Napoleon  arrived  with  rein- 
forcements, when  a French  advance  was  made,  and  the  enemy  driven  back  from 
the  town.  Vandamme  crossed  the  Elbe  on  the  enemy’s  rear,  but  not  in  suffi- 
cient force.  On  August  27  the  battle  was  opened  in  a heavy  rain.  The  allied 
army  was  divided  by  a deep  defile ; and  of  this  Napoleon  took  advantage. 
Murat  and  Victor  moved  against  the  enemy’s  left,  while  Ney  attacked  their 
right  and  Marmont  contained  the  centre.  Though  on  good  ground  and  superior 
in  numbers,  the  allies  were  ill-posted  and  worse  handled,  and  were  thoroughly 
defeated.  Vandamme  strove  to  advance  against  their  rear,  but  was  held  in 
check.  At  nightfall  Napoleon  was  not  certain  whether  he  had  won  or  not,  and 
prepared  for  battle  next  day ; but  the  allies  retreated  at  daylight,  losing 
heavily  in  crossing  the  mountains.  Napoleon  was  not  as  active  as  usual  at 
Dresden.  The  battfe  might  have  been  made  decisive  by  a proper  movement 
upon  the  enemy  when  in  retreat.  Vandamme  was  sent  across  the  mountains 
in  pursuit,  hut  was  not  properly  sustained.  Napoleon  had  in  mind  a much  less 
important  movement  on  Berlin  and  neglected  him.  As  a result,  Vandamme 
was  surrounded  by  the  allies  and  his  corps  practically  destroyed  at  Kulm  on 
August  30. 

The  allies,  who  on  August  20  started  in  four  columns 
across  the  mountains  and  had  concluded  to  march  on  Dres- 
den, were  limited  to  a choice  of  two  courses.  They  might 
either  debouch  through  Peterswalde,  Altenburg  and  Marien- 
burg,  out  on  the  high  land  of  Dippoldiswalde,  assemble  with 


148 


TWO  COURSES. 


their  right  at  Gieshiibel  and  there  await  Napoleon’s  coming 
out  to  attack  them;  or  they  might  march  on  the  city  with 
fascines  and  ladders,  and  if  the  main  army  had  not  arrived, 
capture  it  out  of  hand.  The  campaign  depended  on  taking 
Dresden,  either  by  battle  or  a surprise ; the  only  risk  in  a 
surprise  was  the  loss  of  a few  thousand  men,  but  it  demanded 
speed;  and  if  they  delayed  until  Napoleon  arrived  with  rein- 
forcements, they  would  be  reduced  to  battle.  While  they 
lay  astride  his  communications,  he  must  in  time  come  out  and 
fight,  and  disgarnish  his  other  armies  to  gain  preponderance 
here.  If  they  won,  Napoleon  would  be  compromised  in  Dres- 
den; if  they  lost,  they  still  had  their  line  of  retreat  to  the 
Eger.  Curiously  the  allies  did  not,  on  August  21,  know  that 
Napoleon  was  still  beyond  the  Bober,  nor  on  the  25th  that 
with  a large  force  he  had  returned  to  Stolpen.  Schwartzen- 
berg  had  in  fact  just  received  a word  from  Blucher  that  Na- 
poleon was  pushing  him  hard  in  Silesia. 

As  we  have  seen,  Napoleon  had  hoped  to  cross  at  Konig- 
stein  and  cut  the  allied  communications  after  they  should 
have  passed  on  towards  Dresden,  and  to  protect  his  own  posi- 
tion, Poniatowski  was  holding  the  Gabel  and  Zwickau  passes. 
But  when  in  Stolpen  he  learned  that  the  allied  right  wing  and 
centre  were  in  front  of  Dresden,  only  awaiting  the  left  under 
Klenau  to  storm  the  town,  and  that  St.  Cyr  feared  he  could 
not  hold  out  more  than  twenty-four  hours,  while  the  turning 
manoeuvre  might  consume  three  days,  the  emperor  altered  his 
plan, — reluctantly,  as  it  might  have  yielded  an  immense 
gain, — and  gave  Vandamme  with  the  1st  Corps  the  task  to 
do  what  he  himself  was  to  have  done. 

“ Vandamme  is  to  go  to  the  left  bank  of  the  Elbe,  holding  himself 
under  the  cover  of  Konigstein  and  constantly  keeping  communication  with 
the  bridges  between  this  fortress  and  Lilienstein.  Had  I been  able  to 
carry  out  my  plan,  it  might  have  been  a means  to  deliver  a capital  blow 


SUMMARY  ATTACK  PROPOSED. 


149 


to  my  enemies.  But  the  condition  of  Dresden  worries  me.  I give  up  my 
plan  with  grief.  Vandamme  himself  awaits  the  events  at  Dresden.  The 
opportunity  may  become  his  to  pick  up  the  sword  of  the  vanquished.” 

During  the  forenoon,  August  26,  Napoleon  reached  Dres- 
den, and  little  by  little  his  troops  came  along,  very  tired  but 
full  of  ardor. 

On  the  previous  morning  the  sovereigns  had  assembled  on 
the  heights  of  Rocknitz,  to  decide  what  action  to  take.  Only 
two  divisions  of  St.  Cyr  held  Dresden,  backing  on  the  new 
works  between  the  Grosser  Garten  and  the  Dippoldiswalde 
road.  The  allies  knew  the 
state  of  the  defenses  a few 
months  before,  and  could 
judge  how  much  they  since 
could  have  been  repaired. 

Many  of  the  strong  generals 
proposed  summary  attack, 
the  usually  diffident  King  of 
Prussia  among  them ; and 
there  should  not  have  been 
a moment’s  hesitation  if  they 
believed  Napoleon  still  in 
Silesia,  or  even  one  march 
away.  Toll  (a  Russian  gen- 
eral of  German  birth)  and 
Moreau  were  for  delay : “ If  you  attack,  the  army  will  lose 
twenty  thousand  men,  and  break  its  nose,”  said  Moreau  to  the 
czar.  All  the  Austrians  were  not  yet  up  over  the  bad  roads 
from  Marienburg,  and  Schwartzenberg  insisted  on  waiting  for 
them,  though  the  allies  had  one  hundred  thousand  men  at  hand 
to  drive  back  St.  Cyr’s  one  corps.  Time  was  of  the  essence, 
but  the  allies  deliberately  played  into  Napoleon’s  hands,  and 
the  assault  was  deferred  to  the  next  afternoon.  This  delay 


Gouvion  St.  Cyr. 


150 


A MILITARY  ODDITY . 


brought  about  their  failure,  French  success.  Certain  victory 
was  heedlessly  thrown  away.  Fortune  was  still  willing  to 
smile  upon  Napoleon. 

The  instructions  issued  for  the  assault  were  lacking  in 
judgment,  being  an  order  to  make  “ a general  reconnoissance  ” 
against  Dresden,  in  five  columns,  to  carry  the  works  and  enter 
the  town.  A reconnoissance  with  one  hundred  and  eighty 
thousand  men  was  “ a confusion  of  ideas  ” — a military  oddity : 


the  intention  : Alexander  had  countermanded  the  so-called 
general  reconnoissance,  but  the  divided  command  caused  so 
much  delay  that  the  troops  had  got  beyond  recall. 

Napoleon  had  written  Yandamme,  August  26,  at  1 A.  M. — “All  the 
enemy’s  army  yesterday  at  midnight  showed  up  at  Dresden,  and  St.  Cyr 
feared  to  be  attacked  to-day.  I am  moving  thither,  but  that  is  one  prob- 


Grenadier,  Imperial  Guard. 

tion  of  his  arrival.  Na- 
poleon assumed  there  would  be  no  assault.  Indeed,  this  was 


what  was  really  contem- 
plated was  not  a recon- 
noissance, which  is  a pre- 
paration for  further  work, 
though  it  may  lead  up  to 
a battle,  but  a general 
assault,  to  be  carried 
through  if  found  practi- 
cable. There  was  now 
time  left  for  neither.  As 
the  emperor  approached 
the  Neustadt,  batteries 
were  driven  up  on  the 
hills  on  the  right  bank, 
Wittgenstein’s  flank  was 
cannonaded,  and  the  allies 
received  their  first  intima- 


DRESDEN. 


151 


ability  more  to  believe  that  the  forces  against  you  are  quite  inconsider- 
able. Debouch  as  quickly  as  possible  and  seize  the  plateau.  Master  of 
the  extremity  of  this  plateau,  you  will  be  so  of  the  town  of  Pirna,  and 
then  you  will  have  the  bridge  thrown  there.  Finally,  if  circumstances 
are  favorable,  debouch  to  move  on  Hellendorf.  This  operation  will  carry 
terror  to  the  enemy  and  may  bring  about  a great  result.”  At  the  same 
time  he  wrote  Berthier  that  Vandamme  was  “ to  seize  the  whole  plateau 
of  Pirna  camp,  occupy  Pirna,  and  cut  the  route  of  the  enemy,  to-day  or 
at  latest  to-morrow,  towards  Hellendorf  and  Berggiesliiibel,  at  the  time 
the  army,  which  shall  debouch  by  way  of  Dresden,  will  sharply  push  the 
enemy.  The  bridge  equipage  is  to  be  under  the  orders  of  Vandamme.” 

Dresden  lies  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Elbe,  in  a plain  averag- 
ing two  miles  wide  between  river  and  hills  and  extending  up- 
stream to  Pirna  ; and  in  a hollow  bend  where  the  river  curves 
down  into  the  town  in  a southerly  sweep  on  the  right  bank 
lies  the  Neustadt,  connected  with  the  city  by  an  old  stone 
bridge,  which  had  played  its  part  in  many  a celebrated  cam- 
paign. Up  river  the  right  bank  is  high,  and  there  is  a grad- 
ual rise  on  both  banks  until,  some  thirty  miles  above,  through 
the  Erzgebirge  or  Metal  Mountains,  the  Elbe  in  the  geologi- 
cal past  has  broken  its  rapid  way  in  a tortuous  defile.  Per- 
manent bridges  with  works  near  Dresden  have  peculiar  value* 
as  much  time  is  consumed  in  throwing  pontoons  on  the  rapid 
current ; still,  this  was  done  at  Pirna  village,  and  at  Konig- 
stein  fortress.  Three  main  roads  converge  on  Dresden  from 
south  and  southwest:  one  from  Freiburg,  one  from  Alten- 
burg  and  Dippoldiswalde,  and  one  from  Peterswalde  and 
Hellendorf.  From  these  towns  towards  Dresden  is  a steady 
slow  descent ; and  until  you  reach  the  vicinity  of  the  city, 
the  ground  is  strongly  accentuated.  It  was  along  the  roads 
named  that  the  allies  approached,  through  the  passes  in  the 
mountains,  which,  though  more  or  less  difficult,  are  practicable 
at  this  season.  On  the  southwesterly  side  of  Dresden  plain 
the  hills  provide  good  positions  for  an  army ; and  they  are 


152 


THE  SURROUNDING  COUNTRY. 


cut  in  two,  opposite  the  city,  by  the  long  Therandt  defile,  hard 
for  troops  to  cross,  through  which  runs,  northwesterly,  the 
Weisseritz  brook,  to  fall  into  the  Elbe  just  below  the  city. 
Other  brooks,  in  less  deep  ravines,  flow  towards  the  Elbe. 
On  the  right  bank  is  the  Dresden  Forest ; otherwise  the  coun- 
try has  only  an  occasional  wood.  Villages  dot  the  plain  and 


Battle  of  Dresden,  August  26. 


POSITIONS , AUGUST  26. 


153 


heights,  with  farms,  gardens  and  other  inclosures,  all  good 
points  to  defend ; and  southeast  of  the  city  is  a park,  the 
Grosser  Garten,  over  a mile  long  by  half  as  wide,  which  makes 
an  excellent  outwork.  Except  near  the  city,  there  is  no  clear 
ground  for  large  masses  of  cavalry  to  manoeuvre  ; but  in  open 
order,  or  smaller  bodies,  it  can  move  anywhere.  There  are 
many  roads  and  excellent  posts  for  artillery. 

While  there  had  been  no  attack  during  the  forenoon  of 
August  26,  yet  the  allies  had  pushed  forward  their  lines 
towards  Dresden  works,  and  the  French  outposts  had  gradu- 
ally drawn  within  the  lines,  with  covering  bodies  left  outside. 
To  the  repaired  enceinte  five  redoubts  (lunettes)  had  been 
added,  armed  with  field  guns  firing  over  the  rampart,  and  hav- 
ing a palisaded  ditch  ; and  although  everything  had  not  been 
completed,  St.  Cyr  had  cleverly  disposed  his  divisions,  and 
there  was  added  to  them  whatever  arrived  during  the  battle. 
The  Russians  were  drawn  up  on  the  allied  right  at  Griihna ; 
in  the  centre  the  Prussians  stood  at  Leubnitz,  Strehlen  and 
in  the  Grosser  Garten  ; on  the  left  the  Austrians  took  post  at 
Plauen,  having  driven  the  French  out  of  the  Feldschlosschen 
and  the  neighboring  gardens  and  inclosures;  and  finally 
Bianchi  also  captured  Lobtau  (Lobda).  About  four  came 
the  advance  all  along  the  line.  Barclay  went  forward  with 
his  right  hugging  the  Elbe,  and  threw  back  the  outlying 
French  to  the  town,  but  was  there  met  by  a cross  fire  from 
Redoubt  No.  1 and  a big  battery  across  the  river,  which 
brought  him  to  a standstill.  Meanwhile  Kleist’s  Prussians 
had  also  driven  the  French  out  of  the  Grosser  Garten,  and 
advancing  on  Redoubt  No.  2 and  the  town  enceinte,  had  been 
twice  thrown  back  with  heavy  losses,  when  the  Russians  on 
their  right  renewed  the  advance  in  common  with  them.  Col- 
loredo  and  Lichtenstein  had  made  an  onset  on  Redoubts 
No.  3 and  4,  at  first  without  result ; yet  after  a hard  tussle 


154 


RUSSIANS  OUSTED. 


they  captured  No.  3,  but  could  not  get  beyond  the  enceinte , 
which  was  manfully  defended  by  inferior  numbers. 

Every  assault  had  thus  failed  under  the  artillery  and  in- 
fantry fire  from  the  city  walls,  when,  about  six,  the  French 
reserve  went  forward  in  a countercharge.  Mor- 
tier,  with  two  divisions  of  the  Young  Guard, 
advancing  from  the  Pirna  suburb,  took  the 
Russians  by  surprise,  pushed  them  out  of  all  the 
captured  inclosures  and  groves,  and  forced  them 
back  on  Streisen.  By  eight  he  had  got  a footing 
in  the  village,  but  it  was  midnight  before  he 
could  fully  oust  the  Russians.  Against  the 
Austrians  Ney  led  two  other  divisions  of  the 
Young  Guard  on  the  Feldschlosschen  and  Re- 
doubt No.  3,  and  by  one  of  those  splendid 
onsets  which  few  marshals  of  Napoleon’s  ever 
equaled,  he  recovered  both,  and  the  Austrians 
fell  back  to  the  line  Plauen-Rocknitz  on  the  hill 
slope.  A division  of  St.  Cyr’s  was  meanwhile 
debouching  against  the  Prussians,  and  the  lat- 
ter, tired  by  their  efforts  against  the  town  wall, 
were  thrust  back  to  Strehlen.  Against  Giulay 
and  Metzko,  who  had  pushed  in  west  of  the 
Weisseritz  defile,  had  taken  Cotta  and  Schusterhausen,  and 
begun  throwing  shells  into  Friedrichstadt,  Murat,  about  six, 
also  debouched  with  his  infantry  division  and  Latour-Mau- 
bourg’s  cavalry,  and  quickly  hustling  them  back,  regained 
all  they  had  taken.  The  allies  had  failed. 

Napoleon  rode  the  line  during  the  evening,  complimenting 
the  troops  on  their  victory,  and  preparing  for  the  morrow’s 
battle.  He  was  in  happy  mood.  With  seventy  thousand 
French  he  had  held  back  one  hundred  and  fifty  thousand 
allies,  and  by  a countercharge  squarely  defeated  them ; and 


Russian 

Grenadier. 


VICTOR  AND  MARMONT  COME  UP. 


155 


this  he  had  done,  with  far  less  good  troops  than  his  oppo- 
nents, by  husbanding  the  forces  behind  the  works  and  hurling 
the  reserve  at  the  proper  moment  upon  the  enemy,  wearied  by 
vehement  assaults. 

Meanwhile  Vandamme  crossed  the  river  near  Pirna  and 
exchanged  shots  with  Ostermann,  who  had  been  detailed  to 
contain  him,  and  whom  shortly  Schwartzen- 
berg  reinforced.  During  the  night  Victor 
and  Marmont  came  up,  and  this  gave  Napo- 
leon a well-rounded  force,  and  added  to  his 
confidence  that  he  should  win  the  morrow’s 
battle ; for  it  was  indeed  essential  that  the 
enemy  should  be  defeated,  to  free  the  now 
closed  French  communications  with  the 
Rhine. 

The  morning  of  August  27  opened  with 
heavy,  disheartening  rain,  which  lasted  all 
day.  It  was  a continuation  of  the  same  storm 
which  had  contributed  to  the  defeat  of  Mac- 
donald at  the  Katzbach  — a day  for  artillery 
and  cavalry.  The  allies  had  been  drawn  up 
along  the  same  slopes,  with  their  right  lean- 
ing on  the  Elbe,  but  their  left  in  the  air,  Wurzburg- 
beyond  the  Therandt  defile.  They  ought  to 
have  kept  within  this  ravine ; but  as  Klenau  was  coming  up 
from  Freiburg  with  twenty-five  thousand  men,  Schwartzenberg 
thought  to  keep  the  way  open  for  him.  The  allied  centre  was 
strongly  posted,  the  right  had  not  so  good  a position,  and  the 
left  was  bare ; and  these  conditions  led  the  emperor  to  a ma- 
noeuvre novel  with  him,  that  of  containing  the  enemy’s  centre 
and  attacking  both  his  flanks.  While  Vandamme  was  threat- 
ening the  allied  communications  at  Konigstein,  Napoleon,  by 
six  o’clock,  began  marshaling  his  men  behind  the  works.  On 


156 


BEHIND  THE  WORKS. 


the  left  Mortier  faced  the  Russians,  drawn  up  from  Leubnitz 
through  Reisch  and  beyond ; in  the  centre  Ney  and  two  divi- 
sions of  the  Young  Guard,  the  Old  Guard  in  reserve,  St.  Cyr 
and  Marmont  stood  opposite  the  Prussians  from  Leubnitz  to 
beyond  Mockritz,  and  part  of  the  Austrians  between  Plauen 
and  Rocknitz  ; on  the  right  were  Victor  and  Latour-Maubourg 


Battle  of  Dresden,  August  27. 


VILLAGES  IN  FRONT  TAKEN. 


157 


under  Murat,  who  was  to  dispose  of  the  Austrian  left,  and  of 
the  force  under  Metzko  which  the  day  before  had  operated 
west  of  the  Weisseritz,  part  of  which  was  now  in  reserve  and 
part  still  beyond  the  defile,  holding  the  Freiburg  road.  This 
body  leaned  its  left  on  the  Elbe,  and  later  other  troops  filled 
the  gap  between  it  and  the  Weisseritz.  This  precaution  of 
Schwartzenberg’s  was  a mistake,  for  Klenau  being  astride  the 
road,  though  at  a distance,  was  better  able  to  hold  it  than  any 
troops  nearer  by ; and  he  was  in  position  to  threaten  Napo- 
leon’s retreat  to  the  Saale,  should  it  be  undertaken.  Of  this 
weak  left  flank  the  emperor  had  not  failed  to  make  a note. 
The  battle  opened  with  the  usual  cannonade. 

About  ten  Murat  was  ordered  forward  in  such  a direction 
as  to  open  the  French  line  of  retreat  through  the  gap  held 
by  troops  as  a mask  to  protect  Klenau.  The  fighting  soon 
became  severe  between  Lobtau  and  Gorbitz,  but  Murat  had 
plenty  of  cavalry,  and  at  this  point,  where  it  could  be  of 
peculiar  use,  the  Austrians  had  little.  Victor  moved  up  along 
the  ravine  with  the  cavalry  on  his  right.  The  rain  was  so 
heavy  as  to  dull  the  infantry  fire,  and  the  naked  weapon  had 
a decided  advantage.  One  by  one  the  French  took  the  vil- 
lages in  their  front,  Gorbitz,  Wolfnitz,  Nauslitz,  and,  attack- 
ing Giulay  in  front  with  his  foot  while  riding  around  his 
flank,  pushed  him  as  far  as  Potschapel  in  the  Therandt  defile, 
cut  off  the  allied  division  on  the  Elbe,  and  forced  that  part 
of  the  allied  left  which  stood  beyond  the  Weisseritz  to  fall 
back  on  Dohlen,  beyond  utility  for  the  rest  of  the  day.  See- 
ing the  enemy  weakening,  Murat  threw  upon  Metzko’s  iso- 
lated division  a mass  of  cavalry,  and  either  cut  up  or  captured 
the  entire  body,  ten  thousand  men  laying  down  their  arms ; 
and  Victor’s  left  took  Plauen,  the  key  of  the  Therandt  defile 
and  the  only  path  by  which  the  compromised  divisions  could 
be  succored,  thus  containing  the  left  of  the  allied  centre,  as- 


158 


MOREAU  KILLED. 


well  as  checking  any  advance  Klenau  might  make.  While 
the  French  right  was  thus  doing  excellent  work,  the  centre 
and  left  contained  the  allied  array  on  the  hills,  Marniont  and 
St.  Cyr  putting  their  artillery  and  that  of  the  Guard  to  good 
use.  The  Austrians  and  Prussians  made  several  assaults  on 
the  Grosser  Garten,  and  on  Strehlen,  which  Kleist  had  taken 
the  day  before,  had  been  ordered  to  evacuate,  and  now  es- 
sayed to  recapture.  The  heavy  allied  masses  near  Rocknitz 
and  their  strong  position  on  the  hills  made  it  inexpedient  for 
the  French  to  assault  them,  but  the  cannonade  never  ceased. 
It  was  here  that  Moreau  was  killed.  He  had  entered  the  Rus- 
sian service,  hoping  better  things  than  a subordinate  position. 
Many  had  thought  him  capable  of  holding  head  to  Napoleon, 
but  jealousy  kept  him  from  work  in  a line  with  his  high  na- 
tive ability.  On  the  left  Ney,  with  Mortier  and  the  Young 
Guard  and  Guard  Cavalry,  debouched  from  Griihna  against 
Wittgenstein.  The  Russians  under  Roth  defended  Seidnitz 
and  Dobritz  with  great  tenacity ; but  as  the  allies  had  with- 
drawn their  right  flank  masses  to  the  heights  of  Leibnitz,  not 
believing  that  the  French  would  move  up  the  Elbe  valley  with 
this  force  on  their  flank,  Ney  was  able  to  push  on  to  Reisch, 
down  the  Pirna  road,  from  which  he  forced  the  allies,  so  that 
they  retained  only  that  to  Dippoldiswalde.  Here  he  ran  some 
danger.  Kleist,  Miloradovich,  Colloredo  and  the  reserve 
under  Constantine  and  Hesse-Homburg  had  as  yet  not  been 
put  in,  and  it  was  proposed  by  Jomini  to  the  czar  to  throw  a 
heavy  column  upon  Ney.  The  beginning  of  such  a manoeuvre 
was  made ; but  Barclay,  on  whom  the  duty  devolved,  half- 
heartedly carried  out  the  plan,  alleging  the  deep  ground  over 
which  he  could  not  wheel  his  guns.  Yet  such  a manoeuvre,  if 
successful,  would  have  balanced  Murat’s  gain  on  the  other 
flank.  The  allied  cavalry  was  massed  in  the  centre,  where 
it  could  not  operate,  but  suffered  heavily  from  the  French 


VAN  DAMME  TAKES  PIRN  A. 


159 


artillery  fire.  Had  the  Austrian  cuirassiers  been  on  the  left, 
Murat  might  not  have  had  so  easy  a task  ; but  the  allies 
had  drawn  up  their  forces  with  inexpertness,  as  allies  often 
do.  At  places  the  fighting  was  heavy,  and  the  losses  severe ; 
but  nothing  approached  the  grand-tactical  motion  usual  in  the 
Napoleonic  battles. 

While  the  emperor  was  fighting  at  Dresden,  Vandamme 
debouched  from  Konigstein,  and  drove  back  Ostermann,  who 
was  observing  this  fortress  with  the 
Russian  Old  Guard  and  the  corps  of 
Eugene  of  Wurtemberg.  Either  be- 
cause ordered  to  retire  on  the  main 
army,  or  because  Vandamme  turned 
his  right,  Ostermann  fell  back  on 
Pirna.  Thus  the  entire  day  was  con- 
sumed, until  about  five  Schwartzen- 
berg  received  word  from  Ostermann 
that  he  had  been  all  day  in  touch  with 
Vandamme,  that  the  latter  was  now 
advancing,  that  Pirna  had  been  va- 
cated, and  he  might  lose  the  road  to 
Peterswalde.  Vandamme  indeed  took 
Pirna  and  sat  down  strongly  there- 

and  this  threat  to  his  line  of  operations,  added  to  the  disaster 
to  his  left,  induced  Schwartzenberg  to  think  of  retreat.  The 
heavy  rain  had  discouraged  the  troops ; the  Austrian  artillery 
had  fired  nearly  its  last  round ; the  train  with  the  victual 
had  not  yet  got  across  the  mountains.  Dresden  could  not  be 
captured.  The  Prussian  king  protested,  as  he  thought  victory 
yet  to  be  won,  and  he  was  supported  by  the  czar ; but  weak 
heads  prevailed,  the  order  was  issued,  and  the  left  fell  out  of 
range  on  the  road  via  Freiburg  and  Marienburg  on  Commot- 
tau,  the  centre  via  Dippoldiswalde  on  Altenburg,  and  the 


Frederick  William  III. 


160  OSTERMANN  REACHES  PETERSWALDE. 


right  wing  along  the  main  road  through  Hellendorf  on  Peters- 
walde.  The  retreat  began  early  August  28.  But  fearing 
that  Vandamme  would  bar  the  passage  at  Pirna,  though  he 
had  but  twenty-five  thousand  men  to  face  eighty  thousand, 
the  allied  right  wing  marched  by  way  of  Dolma  on  Gies- 
liiibel.  When  Ostermann,  with  Eugene  of  Wurtemberg, 
to  avoid  being  crushed  between  Napoleon  and  Vandamme, 
started  towards  Peterswalde,  he  found  the  French  established 
at  both  Gieshubel  and  Hellendorf,  and  prepared  to  cut  his 
way  through.  Knowing  nothing  of  the  victory  at  Dresden, 
Vandamme  was  uncertain  how  heavy  a body  of  the  enemy  was 
facing  him ; and  though  the  young  French  recruits  fought 
well,  the  Russian  veterans  were  too  stanch.  Ostermann  pierced 
their  long  line  of  defense,  and  reached  Peterswalde  in  fairly 
good  order.  After  bivouacking  there,  he  next  day  fought  in 
retreat,  defending  the  road  stubbornly  all  the  way  to  Kulm ; 
and  one  of  his  brigades  which  had  been  cut  off  managed  to 
rejoin  him. 

It  is  impossible  to  estimate,  from  the  many  conflicting  au- 
thorities, the  number  engaged  at  this  battle  of  Dresden.  The 
allies  probably  had  one  hundred  and  eighty  thousand  men,  the 
French  one  hundred  and  ten  thousand ; but  these  estimates 
might  be  considerably  varied.  The  enemy  lost  fifteen  thousand 
men  killed  and  wounded,  over  twenty  thousand  prisoners,  and 
much  artillery ; and  the  retreat'  was  so  ill  managed  that  the 
French  found,  abandoned  along  the  roads  and  in  the  moun- 
tains, two  hundred  guns  or  caissons  and  one  thousand  wagons. 
Their  own  losses  were  ten  thousand  killed  and  wounded. 

Napoleon  always  esteemed  this  one  of  his  most  glorious  vic- 
tories, because  in  it  he  had  less  than  two  thirds  (Berndt  says 
less  than  a half)  of  the  enemy’s  forces.  Yet  it  was  not  deci- 
sive. It  is  the  only  one  of  his  battles  in  which  he  advanced 
both  wings,  which  his  position  backing  on  Dresden  and  lean- 


SERIOUS  CRITICISM  ON  THE  BATTLE. 


161 


ing  on  the  Elbe  enabled  him  to  do,  and  as  it  happened  the 
only  two  lines  of  retreat  of  the  allies  lay  back  of  their  two 
wings.  This  in  a moral  sense  aided  the  two  attacks  of  Murat 
and  Ney,  because  in  case  of  defeat  the  allied  forces  would  be 
inevitably  broken  up  in  the  mountain  defiles  in  their  rear. 

Yet  a serious  criticism  must  be  made  on  this  battle.  Dur- 
ing the  27th  there  was  more  than  one  moment  when  the  par- 
tial victory  could  have  been  turned  into  a decisive  one  by  a 
sharp  advance  in  force ; but  the  emperor  was  inactive ; he 
lunched  with  Berthier  at  his  headquarters,  shunned  exposure 
to  the  dreary  rain,  and 
seemed  to  enjoy  his 
comfort,  satisfied  that 
his  lieutenants  would 
win  the  day.  His  eye 
was  not  on  the  field 
at  the  critical  moment. 

So  soon  as  the  enemy 
began  to  fall  back,  44  he 
demanded  his  horse, 
the  rain  dripped  from 
the  skirts  and  sleeves 
of  his  overcoat,  the 
rim  of  his  hat  was 
bent  down  over  the 

back  of  his  neck,”  says  Odenleben.  44  Thus  about  six  o’clock 
the  hero  of  battles,  the  terror-spreader,  accompanied  by  the 
general  staff  and  surrounded  by  the  huzzas  of  the  cold, 
closely  packed  troops,  rode  in  his  usual  butcher’s  trot  into  the 
castle.”  The  rain  had  impressed  itself  upon  him  more  than 
the  need  of  a decisive  victory.  As  at  Liitzen  and  Bautzen, 
so  here  half  a victory  sufficed,  when  the  enemy  might  have 
been  all  but  destroyed. 


Napoleon  after  Bellange. 


VOL.  IV. 


162 


WANT  OF  THE  MASTER’S  EYE. 


Napoleon  was  far  behind  his  best  standard ; he  had  driven 
back  the  enemy  on  the  26th  and  saved  Dresden ; this  day  he 
had  begun  well,  but  he  lost  the  chance  of  a complete  victory ; 
indeed,  for  lack  of  viewing  the  field,  he  had  misapprehended 
the  situation,  for  at  seven  he  told  Berthier  to 

“ write  to  Murat  that  the  enemy  is  not  in  retreat,  and  that  he  looks  on 
the  affair  of  yesterday  only  as  an  unsuccessful  attack,  and  that  it  is 
doubtful  if  he  retreats  to-night.”  And  again,  to  “ write  to  all  the  corps 
commanders  that  the  enemy  is  not  in  retreat,  and  that  to-morrow  at  the 
point  of  day  they  will  take  arms.  Every  corps  commander  will  report 
positively  the  position  of  his  corps.  Make  them  know  that  I shall  be  at 
my  headquarters  at  Redoubt  No.  4,  near  the  mill  on  the  Plauen  road 
and  an  hour  later,  in  giving  orders  for  holding  the  redoubts  in  the  Dres- 
den defenses:  “ There  is  to  be  a commander  for  each  redoubt  . . . and  a 
letter  is  to  be  written  to  each  commander  to  make  him  understand  that 
he  is  to  let  himself  be  killed  in  the  redoubt,  and  not  to  move  out  of  it 
under  any  pretext.” 

This  failure  to  recognize  how  marked  a retreat  it  was,  and 
this  want  of  energy  in  closing  the  battle  by  a rout,  are  not 
Napoleonic.  It  was  not  a question  of  numbers.  The  French 
force  sufficed  to  turn  the  allied  retreat  into  flight.  Read  the 
orders  after  Austerlitz ; they  should  have  been  duplicated 
here,  especially  as  the  retiring  enemy  had  a mountain  range 
to  cross,  and  could  be  herded  into  disaster  at  the  foot  of  it. 
That  Napoleon  did  not  recognize  that  the  allies  were  retreat- 
ing exhibits  want  of  the  master’s  eye,  for  even  a couple  of 
cavalry  brigades  sent  towards  Freiburg  and  Peterswalde 
could  within  three  hours  have  reported  all  the  facts  to  head- 
quarters. In  any  case,  the  beaten  enemy  should  have  been 
struck  again  and  again.  But  we  must  take  him  as  he  is. 
Except  at  intervals,  he  is  no  longer  the  leader  who  used  to 
prophesy  the  flight  of  the  enemy  at  early  dawn  of  the  day  of 
battle,  and  hang  to  his  skirts  until  midnight  with  all  his 
forces. 


RETREAT  OF  THE  ALLIED  ARMY.  163 

From  Dresden,  August  27,  6 a.  m.,  he  wrote  to  Kellermann 
at  Mainz : — 

“ Inform  the  empress  by  telegraph  that  I yesterday  won  a great  vic- 
tory at  Dresden  over  the  Austrian,  Russian  and  Prussian  armies,  com- 
manded by  the  Emperor  of  Austria,  the  Emperor  of  Russia  and  the  King 
of  Prussia.  They  are  bringing  in  many  prisoners,  flags  and  guns.”  And 
to  Cambacdres  : “My  Cousin,  I am  to  that  extent  tired  and  busy  that  I 
cannot  write  you  at  length.  Maref  will  do  so.  Affairs  here  go  very  well.” 

On  the  28th  Ostermann  continued  to  retreat  beyond  Peters- 
walde,  the  rest  of  the  allied  army  by  way  of  Pretschendorf, 
Dippoldiswalde  and  Glashiitte.  There  was  a perfunctory  fol- 
lowing of  the  enemy,  and  the  rival  forces  were  often  in  touch, 
Murat  advancing  on  Freiburg,  Mortier  and  St.  Cyr  in  sup- 
port of  Vandamme,  who  was  pushing  along  the  Peterswalde 
road,  and  Marmont,  whose  column  Napoleon  first  accompa- 
nied, heading  for  Altenburg.  One  can  imagine  how,  in  earlier 
days,  he  would  have  ordered  every  available  division  rapidly 
in  pursuit,  but  riding  during  the  forenoon  over  towards 
Pirna,  and  observing  the  road  to  Maxen  glutted  with  the 
Russian  and  Prussian  columns  seeking  to  avoid  Vandamme, 
the  emperor  merely  ordered  St.  Cyr  via  Dohna  to  outflank 
them  ; and  after  spending  some  hours  in  watching  the  enemy 
disappear  in  the  foothills  of  the  mountains,  the  main  Peters- 
walde road  being  in  his  possession,  he  ordered  the  Old  Guard 
back  to  Dresden,  and  the  Young  Guard  to  bivouac  where  it 
stood.  St.  Cyr’s  advance  was  also  arrested,  and  though 
Vandamme  was  thus  deprived  of  all  support,  Napoleon  had 
Berthier  write  him  from  near  Pirna  to  push  on  sharply  after 
the  enemy.  He  was  to  move  on  Peterswalde  with  his  entire 
corps,  Mouton-Duvernet’s  division  of  St.  Cyr’s,  Reuss’  brigade 
of  Victor’s  corps  and  Corbineau’s  division  of  light  cavalry. 
Pirna,  he  told  him,  was  to  be  held  by  Mortier,  and  his  own 
troops  in  the  Lilienstein  camp  were  to  be  relieved.  A twelve- 


164 


PURSUIT  A DAY  TOO  LATE. 


pounder  battery  was  to  follow  him.  This  was  a reinforce- 
ment ; but  one  of  the  above  divisions  had  previously  been 
detached  to  Murat,  and  Vandainme  was  adventuring  with 
some  forty  thousand  men  and  eighty  guns  in  the  midst  of  the 
whole  allied  army.  On  August  29,  at  6.30  a.  m.,  Murat  was 
ordered  “to  move  on  Frauenstein  to  fall  on 
the  flanks  and  rear  of  the  enemy,”  . . . 
Marmont  “ to  follow  the  enemy  sharply  on 
Dippoldiswalde  and  in  all  the  directions  he 
shall  have  taken,”  and  St.  Cyr  “to  follow 
the  enemy  on  Maxen  and  in  all  the  direc- 
tions he  shall  have  taken.  Instruct  these 
three  generals  of  the  positions  of  the  other 
two,  so  that  they  may  know  that  they  are 
sustaining  one  another.”  This  sounds  like 
pursuit ; but  it  was  a day  too  late,  and  a 
glance  at  the  map  will  show  how  far  it  fell 
short  of  what  was  needed  ; it  lacked  the 
personal  element  of  former  pursuits,  and  no 
division  went  far  enough  to  sustain  Van- 
damme. 

The  plateau  west  of  Pirna  commands  the 
three  roads  towards  Toplitz.  The  best  is 
through  Nollendorf  and  Kulm,  the  other  by  Zinnwalde,  and 
between  them  is  a third,  more  difficult. 

Next  day  Napoleon  wrote  Berthier,  pointing  out  “ that  the 
difficult  point  for  the  enemy  is  Zinnwalde,”  where  wheels  can 
pass  with  difficulty ; a that  it  is  then  on  this  point  that  we 
should  assemble  and  attack;  that  the  enemy,  turned  by  Van- 
damme,  who  is  marching  on  Toplitz,  will  find  himself  much 
embarrassed,  and  will  probably  be  obliged  to  leave  the  great- 
est part  of  his  material.”  And  the  same  day : •“  Write  to  Mor- 
tier  to  sustain  Vandamme  ” with  three  divisions  “if  he  needs 


Saxe-Coburg 

Rifleman. 


VAN  DAMME  TO  PUSH  ON. 


165 


it.  Send  an  officer  to  Vandamme  to  know  what  is  occurring, 
and  let  this  officer  come  back  at  once.”  This  again  shows  a 
purpose  to  pursue,  but  it  was  not  an  old  stamp  order  to  do  so. 
On  the  same  day  he  wrote  the  King  of  Wurtemberg:  “Van- 
damme has  moved  on  Toplitz,  and  during  this  time  four  army 
corps  are  following  the  enemy;  ” but  they  were  not  going  far 
enough ; and  no  one  was  leading  the  movement.  The  pursuit 
was  on  paper,  not  an  actual  one  of  the  Jena  pattern. 

After  having  been  uncertain  of  the  victory  the  evening  of 
the  27th,  Napoleon  next  day  seemed  to  think  it  was  greater 
than  it  was;  and  when  in  his  instructions  to  his  lieutenants 
he  says  that  Vandamme  had  thrown  terror  into  the  Russian 
army,  why  should  Mortier  and  St.  Cyr 
have  believed  that  their  colleague  needed 
help  ? 

From  Peters walde  Vandamme,  well  con- 
centrated, was  ordered  to  push  on  into 
Bohemia,  and  attack  the  enemy ; it  was 
thought  he  could  reach  his  communications 
at  Tetschen,  Aussig  and  Toplitz,  and  thus 
cut  off  his  train  ; and  the  pontoon  bridge 
at  Pirna  was  to  be  broken  so  as  to  be 
thrown  at  Tetschen  if  needed.  This  was 
a big  piece  of  work  for  one  corps.  Van- 
damme was  the  only  commander  who  was 
following  up  the  enemy  across  the  moun- 
tains, and  he  was  to  plant  himself  on  their 
communications  ; he  was  assured  he  would.  EmPress  Dragoon, 
be  supported ; he  had  the  right  to  assume  he  would  be ; and 
yet  the  other  French  columns  were  left  to  their  own  devices, 
and  Napoleon  rode  back  to  Dresden,  in  merry  mood,  says 
Odenleben,  as  if  he  had  done  all  that  was  essential.  The 
management  of  the  pursuit  was  not  even  committed  to  some 


166 


NAPOLEON  RETURNS  TO  DRESDEN. 


special  lieutenant,  but  was  to  be  continued  in  a haphazard 
way : content  with  having  fended  off  the  enemy,  the  great 
soldier  now  sought  his  ease.  In  driving 
the  allies  back  into  Bohemia  he  had  won  a 
noble  victory;  but  the  old  Bonaparte  would 
not  have  been  thus  satisfied ; and  if  this 
was  all  he  required,  he  need  not  have  sent 
Vandamme  across  the  range.  His  orders 
show  that  he  did  not  study  the  situa- 
tion, that  he  did  not  know  what  his  corps 
commanders  were  doing  to  support  Van- 
damme; he  was  no  longer  putting  his  own 
shoulder  to  the  wheel,  and  Hercules  would 
not  help  him.  It  is  said  he  had  got  a chill 
from  exposure  to  the  rain  on  the  27th,  that 
at  Pirna  next  day  he  was  seized  with  violent 
abdominal  pains,  and  for  this  reason  re- 
turned to  Dresden ; but  at  this  time  he  also 
had  a project  to  take  Ney  and  some  of  his 
_ . corps,  join  Oudinot,  and  make  a sudden  dash 

on  Berlin,  before  the  Army  of  the  Sover- 
eigns could  recover  its  equipoise ; and  this  plan,  added  to  the 
fact  that  in  the  night  of  August  28-29  he  got  full  reports  of 
Oudinot’s  and  Macdonald’s  defeats,  may  have  finally  diverted 
his  thoughts  from  Vandamme  and  the  pursuit.  But  this 
scheming  also  lacked  the  idea  of  unity  which  was  his  great 
characteristic : everything  should  have  been  held  subordinate 
to  completing  the  defeat  of  the  Army  of  the  Sovereigns. 

While  Napoleon  was  at  work  in  his  Dresden  bureau  on 
August  29  and  30,  writing  his  “Note  on  the  Situation,”  Van- 
damme, secure  of  being  supported,  and  hoping  to  win  his 
marshal’s  baton,  pushed  across  the  range  to  the  rugged  Kulm 
country,  — perhaps  farther  than  discretion  allowed,  — and  at 


NEUSTABT  fischback 


Dresden-Kulm  Country. 


168 


ATTACKED  ON  ALL  SIDES. 


Straden  first  got  into  touch  with  Ostermann,  but  after  attack- 
ing, could  not  drive  him  out  of  Priesen.  The  Russians,  aware 
that  Kulm  and  Toplitz  were  essential  to  secure  the  allied 
retreat,  fought  with  obstinacy ; and  towards  evening  of  the 
29th  Constantine  with  the  reserve  came  up,  imperiling  Yan- 
damme’s  standing.  Meanwhile  Scliwartzenberg,  forcing  his 
retreat,  had  got  a large  part  of  his  army  down  upon  the 
Bohemian  level,  and,  not  believing  the  French  force  large, 
undertook  the  offensive  himself.  The  Russians  had  got  to 
Altenburg,  the  Prussians  to  Fiirstenwalde,  the  Austrians  to 
the  Dux  country,  and  while  Yandamme  on  the  80th  stood  at 
Kulm,  on  the  defensive,  with  his  right  on  the  mountains  and 
his  left  on  Striesowitz,  expecting  to  hold  the  enemy  until  the 
other  corps  should  come  up  to  aid  the  manoeuvre,  St.  Cyr  was 
still  back  near  Maxen,  Marmont  near  Altenburg,  Murat  near 
Frauenstein,  and  Mortier  yet  in  Pirna.  Could  Yandamme 
have  guessed  he  had  been  thus  abandoned,  he  would  no  doubt 
have  saved  himself  by  a precipitate  withdrawal. 

Early  on  the  80th,  Barclay  with  Colloredo  in  support  ad- 
vanced on  Yandamme  with  seventy  thousand  men  — nearly 
two  to  one.  With  the  French  in  force  the  allies  would  have 
been  in  a critical  position : as  it  was,  their  superiority  to  this 
one  corps  saved  them  harmless  and  compromised  Yandamme. 
Still  expecting  reinforcements,  the  marshal  defended  himself 
several  hours  with  obstinacy,  to  hold  his  advanced  position 
until  his  colleagues  could  come  up  and  crown  the  work ; and 
towards  noon,  when  he  found  himself  attacked  on  all  sides, 
and  in  danger  of  being  pushed  up  towards  the  mountains,  he 
perceived  a body  in  his  rear  debouching  from  the  defile  at 
Tellnitz,  and,  naturally  concluding  that  it  was  Mortier  with 
the  Guard,  attacked  afresh.  This  hope  was  short-lived ; the 
corps  proved  to  be  the  van  of  the  Prussian  corps  of  Kleist, 
who,  escaping  from  St.  Cyr,  had  thrown  himself  into  the 


DISASTER  TO  VANDAMME. 


169 


mountains,  and  gained  the  Peterswalde  road,  which  was  at 
the  moment  empty,  Vandamme  having  already  crossed,  and 
the  reinforcements  being  withdrawn.  His  own  line  of  retreat 
thus  cut,  Vandamme,  under  cover  of  heavy  artillery  fire,  with 
fine  gallantry  attempted  to  break  through;  but  as  the  Prus- 
sians were  in  force,  his  effort  failed.  Part  of  Corbineau’s  cav- 


alry rode  down  the  Prussian  infantry  and  escaped,  and  some 
large  bodies  of  foot  managed  to  follow  through  the  woods, 
and  in  broken  parties  reached  Saxony ; but  part  of  the  squad- 
rons were  driven  back  and  increased  the  confusion,  and  the 
corps  as  a corps  was  doomed.  From  the  front  the  Austrians 
and  Russians  fell  vigorously  on  the  French  divisions,  which 
yet  proudly  held  their  own,  and  the  Prussians  pressed  them 
in  the  rear.  There  was  no  escaping  disaster.  What  remained 


170 


REINFORCEMENTS  WITHHELD. 


of  the  corps,  after  desperate  resistance,  was  compelled  to  sur- 
render, including  Vandamme  and  Haxo.  Over  fifteen  thou- 
sand men,  killed  and  wounded  and  prisoners,  and  fifty  guns 
fell  to  the  allies,  whose  loss  was  about  four  thousand. 

On  this  day  St.  Cyr  was  at  Liebenau  and  Lauenstein, 
Marmont  at  Altenburg  with  van  at  Zinnwald,  and  Murat  at 
Sayda.  Mortier  advanced  as  far  as  Gieshiibel ; on  hearing  of 
the  disaster  to  Vandamme  he  returned  to  Pirna,  but  again 
advanced  to  Hellendorf. 

The  emperor  wrote,  September  1,  to  Murat  : “ The  misfortune  to  the  1st 
Corps  is  one  that  we  could  not  expect.  Vandamme,  who  it  seems  has 
killed  himself,  had  not  left  a sentinel  on  the  mountains,  nor  a reserve  any- 
where. He  had  engulfed  himself  in  a bottom  without  reconnoitring  in 
any  way.  Nevertheless,  many  men  of  his  corps  have  returned.  Nearly  all 
the  generals  have  arrived  and  fifteen  thousand  men  have  already  come  in, 
so  that  I do  not  think  my  loss  will  be  more  than  four  or  five  thousand 
men.” 

There  was  no  excuse  for  this  disaster.  The  manoeuvre  was 
a good  one,  which,  well  supported,  might  have  almost  destroyed 
the  Army  of  the  Sovereigns,  to  effect  which  everything  should 
have  yielded.  It  is  clear  that  Vandamme  received  the  order 
to  advance  on  Kulm  and  Toplitz ; it  is  equally  clear  that  he 
received  no  counter-orders,  when  Najjoleon  withheld  his  rein- 
forcements. Had  troops  been  ordered  forward  from  Pirna, 
they  would  have  struck  Kleist’s  rear,  and  he  would  have  been 
the  one  caught.  Between  Napoleon  and  Bertliier  lies  the  fault, 
and  it  is  all  the  more  extraordinary  because  of  Napoleon’s 
habit  to  pursue  a defeated  enemy  to  the  end.  In  case  of  sick- 
ness the  work  could  have  been  turned  over  to  Murat  or  Ney  ; 
but  it  should  have  been  done  by  some  officer  with  orders  to  do 
it  thoroughly.  No  other  operation  would  accomplish  results 
which  would  equal  a serious  blow  to  the  Army  of  the  Sover- 
eigns. Here  lay  right  at  hand  the  means  to  close  the  cam- 


MORAL  GAIN  OF  THE  ALLIES. 


171 


paign  with  glory  ; any  other  success  or  failure  was  subsidiary. 
No  doubt  Napoleon’s  getting  the  details  of  Gross  Beeren  and 
the  Katzbach  on  August  29  had  to  do  with  his  paying  less 
heed  to  the  pursuit  of  the  Army  of  the  Sovereigns  ; but  had 
he  delayed  his  attention  to  Macdonald  and  Oudinot  for  a 
couple  of  days,  and  devoted  himself  to  the  pursuit,  he  would 
have  risked  nothing,  and  have  won  such  a decisive  victory 
over  the  allied  main  army  as  to  neutralize  the  disaster  of 
his  lieutenants.  There  being  no  pursuit,  the  allies  quickly 
recovered  their  equilibrium.  Several  authors,  including  St. 
Cyr,  assert  that  Napoleon  was  conscious  that  Vandamme’s 
disaster  was  his  own  fault.  Other  writers,  among  them  Segur, 
assert  that  he  destroyed  certain  documents  relating  to  the 
disaster.  He  had  no  reason  to  be  proud  of  it. 

The  idea  of  joining  Oudinot  for  a march  on  Berlin  was  an 
absurdity,  with  this  task  half  completed.  Napoleon  never 
committed  a more  grievous  fault.  He  allowed  the  Army  of 
the  Sovereigns  to  escape  in  good  order,  and  destroy  Van- 
damme  ; and  this,  added  to  the  defeats  of  the  Katzbach  and 
Gross  Beeren,  raised  the  hopes  of  the  allies  to  the  point  of 
further  hard  pushing ; when,  had  Napoleon  fully  neutralized 
the  Army  of  the  Sovereigns,  the  successes  of  the  other  allied 
armies  would  have  gone  for  little,  and  he  would  have  retained 
the  means  of  winning  a peace  by  reasonable  concessions.  His 
sense  of  perspective  was  at  fault. 

The  losses  of  Vandamme,  Oudinot,  Girard  and  Macdonald 
amounted  to  sixty  thousand  men,  and  this  was  little  when  com- 
pared with  the  moral  gain  of  the  allies. 

This  being  the  emperor’s  first  defensive  campaign,  he  failed 
to  conduct  it  on  lines  he  had  always  shown  to  be  correct ; he 
left  too  big  a task  to  Macdonald  ; he  organized  three  offensive 
movements  at  the  same  time  from  a defensive  position ; he  did 
not  make  sure  of  his  victory  over  the  Army  of  the  Sovereigns. 


LXII. 


THE  ELBE  ABANDONED.  AUGUST  30  TO  SEPTEMBER 

24,  1813. 

Napoleon  had  won  a victory  at  Dresden,  but  his  lieutenants  had  lost  three 
battles,  — Gross  Beeren,  the  Katzbach  and  Kulm.  The  outlook  was  doubtful ; 
but  he  still  clung  to  the  advance  on  Berlin  when  he  should  merely  have  con- 
tained Bernadotte  and  Blucher,  and  devoted  himself  to  Schwartzenberg.  He 
was  leaving  the  initiative,  his  strong  point,  to  the  enemy.  He  sent  Ney  to  take 
Oudinot’s  place  with  orders  to  advance  on  Berlin,  while  he  himself  would  move 
up  to  sustain  him ; but  when  Blucher  worsted  Macdonald,  Napoleon  hurried  to 
his  aid  and  drove  Blucher  back  by  September  6.  He  intended  to  sustain  Ney ; 
but  news  of  a fresh  advance  on  Dresden  obliged  him  to  return  thither,  to  attack 
the  enemy  in  crossing  the  mountains.  Meanwhile  Ney,  at  Dennewitz  on  Septem- 
ber 6,  was  smartly  defeated  by  Biilow  and  his  army  broken ; and  against  the 
one  defeat  at  Dresden  the  allies  could  count  four  important  victories.  For  some 
days  Napoleon  watched  the  allies  at  the  outlets  of  the  mountains,  without 
taking  definite  action.  We  scarcely  recognize  him.  During  the  whole  of  Sep- 
tember he  was  “ fumbling,”  and  meanwhile  his  central  position  at  Dresden, 
excellent  for  a strategic  offensive  against  the  several  allied  armies,  was  being 
turned  into  a tactical  defensive  position  in  which  he  was  being  surrounded  by 
superior  forces.  Supplies  were  getting  scarce,  the  young  troops  were  tired  by 
ceaseless  marching  to  and  fro.  Instead  of  manoeuvring,  which  was  his  strong 
point,  Napoleon  was  acting  on  the  defensive,  which  was  not ; and  about  Sep- 
tember 20  he  had  concluded  to  retire  behind  the  Elbe.  All  through  this  Dres- 
den campaign  he  had  had  constant  opportunities  of  putting  the  offensive  to 
good  use  by  himself  moving  against  Blucher  or  Bernadotte ; but  he  could  not 
believe  that  his  lieutenants  were  less  able  than  these  allied  generals.  No  cam- 
paign hitherto  had  shown  the  great  captain  so  weak  as  here. 

Leaving  the  all-important  pursuit  of  the  Army  of  the  Sov- 
ereigns half  accomplished,  the  emperor  had  determined  to  re- 
place Oudinot  by  Ney  for  a manoeuvre  on  Berlin,  and  himself 
to  follow  with  the  Guard,  two  army  corps  and  the  reserve 
cavalry.  Relying  on  Macdonald  to  hold  head  to  Blucher,  he 


DESTINED  TO  FAIL. 


173 


deemed  the  defeat  of  the  Army  of  the  North  and  the  capture 
of  Berlin  easy,  and  this  would  shift  back  to  his  own  side  the 
moral  influence  of  which  the  three  late  disasters  had  robbed 
him,  as  well  as  enable  him  to  reach  his  fortresses  on  the  lower 
Oder,  move  up  river  and  take  the  Army  of  Silesia  in  the  rear. 
The  assembly  was  to  be  made  in  Liickau.  All  this  was  excel- 
lently planned,  but  nothing  should  have  been  undertaken 
until  after  the  total  defeat  of  the  Army  of  the  Sovereigns ; 
and  as  in  Wellington’s  front  in  the  Peninsula,  it  was  des- 
tined to  fail,  because  a new  and  active  leader,  Blucher,  had 
come  upon  the  scene ; and  yet  more  because  the  allies  felt 
that  the  balance  of  victory  was  on  their  side,  and  the  Army 
of  the  Sovereigns  was  soon  made  ready  for  another  essay 
of  arms,  as  it  would  not  have  been  had  Napoleon  personally 
driven  his  pursuit  home. 

The  emperor’s  problems  had  been  growing  harder  of  solu- 
tion every  week.  The  commanders  of  his  left  and  centre  had 
suffered  reverses;  on  his  right  a worse  disaster  had  occurred. 
Nor  was  this  all : the  defensive  situation  he  had  created  was 
changing.  He  had  hoped  from  his  central  position  to  debouch 
on  one  or  other  of  the  allied  corps  in  succession  ; he  had  done 
so,  but  never  to  push  the  enemy  to  the  end,  essential  as  this 
is  in  any  movement ; and  now  the  proximity  of  the  allied 
armies  threatened  to  change  his  strategic  interior  lines  to  a 
central  position  tactically  surrounded  by  superior  armies. 
How  would  the  great  soldier  meet  this  danger? 

In  a “ Note  on  the  General  Situation  of  My  Affairs,”  which 
Napoleon  dictated  August  30  in  Dresden,  he  reviews  the  mili- 
tary outlook.  Part  of  this  is  given  in  substance  only ; part  in  the 
emperor’s  own  words.  It  must  be  read  from  his  standpoint. 

“ I suppose  the  Army  of  Silesia  rallied  behind  the  Bober  ; there  would 
be  no  inconvenience  if  it  should  place  itself  behind  the  Queisse.”  If  I 
order  Poniatowski  to  the  Berlin  army,  the  debouch  of  Zittau  would  not 


174 


MILITARY  OUTLOOK  REVIEWED. 


be  held,  but  he  could  reach  Kalau  in  four  days,  whereupon  the  Army  of 
Silesia  would  have  to  lean  on  Gorlitz,  or  in  fact  in  front  of  Bautzen;  and 
with  a corps  at  Hoyerswerda,  my  operation  would  not  be  compromised. 
By  giving  up  the  Bohemian  expedition  so  as  to  take  Berlin  and  revictual 
Stettin  and  Custrin,  St.  Cyr  and  Vandamme  would  take  position,  the  left 
on  the  Elbe,  Marmont  in  the  centre,  Victor  on  the  right,  all  under  Murat, 
with  headquarters  in  Dresden.  “ This  will  be  a fine  army  . . . which 
would  be  threatening,  would  run  no  danger  and  might  fall  back  on  Dres- 
den at  the  time  I should  reach  there  from  Liickau.  The  Army  of  Silesia 
could  . . . occupy  Bautzen  and  Hoyerswerda.”  These  two  armies  would 
be  on  the  defensive  while  I was  operating  against  Berlin  and  the  lower 
Oder.  “ The  Russians  cannot  be  indifferent  to  an  army  of  sixty  thousand 
men  at  Stettin.  ...  It  would  be  a pretext  to  abandon  Bohemia,  and  I 
should  have  the  initiative  of  all  the  movements.” 

I have  two  plans  of  operation  to  adopt : First  to  go  to  Prague,  which, 
however,  I could  not  take,  and  the  enemy  would  attack  my  army  in  Sile- 
sia, which  would  leave  me  with  a delicate  position  at  Prague,  and  would 
leave  Oudinot  and  Davout  on  the  defensive.  The  line  from  Prague  to 
the  sea  along  the  Elbe  is  too  long  ; broken  at  one  point  it  would  open 
access  to  the  32d  division  (lower  Elbe).  Thus  the  Prague  movement  has 
weak  points  : there  is  not  enough  chance  of  getting  Prague.  My  principal 
forces  would  be  in  another  system,  and  I myself  at  the  extremity  of  my 
line,  where  I could  not  move  on  certain  points.  Foolish  things  would  get 
done,  which  would  transfer  the  war  to  between  the  Elbe  and  the  Rhine, 
which  the  enemy  desires.  And  I should  lose  my  places  on  the  Oder,  and 
not  be  marching  on  Danzig. 

On  the  contrary,  in  marching  on  Berlin,  I should  have  a great  result. 
I should  protect  my  lines  from  Hamburg  to  Dresden,  I should  be  in  the 
centre,  where  in  five  days  I could  reach  the  extremities  of  my  lines.  I 
should  disengage  Stettin  and  Custrin,  I might  separate  the  Russians  and 
Austrians.  I should  not  be  embarrassed  for  victual.  I should  have  to 
leave  one  hundred  and  twenty  thousand  men  on  the  defensive  between 
Dresden  and  Hof.  I should  be  menacing  Prague  without  going  there. 
The  Prussians  would  not  want  to  stay  in  Bohemia  with  their  capital 
taken,  and  the  Russians  would  be  disquieted  for  Poland.  Then  the  Rus- 
sians and  Prussians  would  force  Austria  to  come  back  to  Dresden,  which 
they  could  not  do  in  less  than  fifteen  days.  I should  have  taken  Berlin, 
revictualed  Stettin,  disorganized  the  Prussian  landwehr,  and  “then  if 
Austria  recommenced  her  foolishness,  I should  be  back  in  Dresden  with 


NOT  A JUDICIOUS  OPERATION. 


175 


an  assembled  army  ; great  events,  a great  battle,  would  terminate  the 
campaign  and  the  war.”  “ Thus  any  plan  where  personally  I am  not  in 
the  centre  is  inadmissible.”  The  emperor  then  recapitulates:  “First.  The 
Prague  project : I must  go  there  personally,  place  there  the  2d,  6th,  14th 
and  1st  Corps,  and  Latour-Maubourg’s  cavalry,  Davout  in  front  of  Ham- 
burg, Oudinot  with  three  corps  at  Wittenberg  and  Magdeburg,  the  Army 
of  Silesia  below  Bautzen.  In  this  situation  I am  on  the  defensive,  the 
offensive  is  the  enemy’s.  I am  threatening  nothing.  It  would  be  absurd 
to  say  that  I am  threatening  Vienna.  The  enemy  can  mask  the  Army  of 
Silesia,  debouch  some  corps  via  Zittau,  attack  me  at  Prague,  or  else, 
masking  the  Army  of  Silesia,  he  would  send  a force  to  the  lower  Elbe, 
advance  on  the  Weser,  while  I should  be  in  Prague.  There  would  only 
remain  to  me  to  regain  the  Rhine  in  all  haste.  The  general  at  Bautzen 
would  not  believe  that  the  enemy  was  weaker  in  his  front,  and  my  army 
at  Hamburg  and  Magdeburg  would  be  quite  out  of  hand.  Second.  Hypo- 
thesis : Now  the  1st,  14th,  2d  and  6th  Corps  and  Latour-Maubourg  will 
remain  quiet  around  Dresden  without  fearing  the  Cossacks.  Augereau 
will  approach  Bamberg  and  Hof.  The  Army  of  Silesia  on  the  Queisse,  or 
the  Bober  and  Bautzen.  No  disquiet  there,  for  my  communications,  my 
two  armies,  of  Hamburg  and  Oudinot’s,  will  be  in  Berlin  and  Stettin.” 
Whereupon  the  emperor  figures  out  the  various  forces,  and  the  cipher 
letters  to  be  written  to  the  various  generals,  and  continues:  “If  I carried 
my  headquarters  to  Liickau,  I should  be  two  days  from  Torgau,  three 
from  Dresden,  four  from  Gorlitz.  I should  then  be  in  a central  position 
abreast  of  choosing  my  course,  either  to  throw  all  that  I desire  on  Berlin, 
or  to  go  there  personally.  In  leaving  Liickau  I should  have  to  be  assured 
for  my  rear.” 


To  summarize  the  above,  the  emperor  concludes  that  the 
long  contemplated  advance  on  Prague  was  not  a judicious 
operation ; that  his  line  from  there  to  Hamburg  would  have 
too  much  front,  and  be  liable  to  be  disrupted  by  an  allied 
operation  through  the  Zittau  pass ; that  an  advance  on  Berlin 
was  to  be  preferred  as  a safer  strategic  manoeuvre.  It  is  true 
that  this  Note  may  in  a sense  explain  or  justify  an  operation 
on  Berlin  ; but  it  in  nowise  justifies  leaving  the  pursuit  after 
Dresden  half  accomplished. 


176 


A WRONG  CONCLUSION. 


The  Note  also  opens  up  a fresh  question.  While  hitherto  we 
have  seen  Napoleon  at  times  shun  the  physical  effort  of  larger 
operations  and  exhibit  mental  weariness  as  a result  of  his 
bodily  condition,  from  which,  however,  ho  would  spring  up 
again  in  all  his  fervor  when  the  occasion  demanded,  yet  he 
had  invariably  been  strategically  sound ; his  intellectual  pro- 
cesses were  intact.  One  of  the  unvarying  rules  of  his  wonder- 
ful art  had  been  to  direct  his  thrust  straight  at  the  main  army 
of  the  enemy;  but  here  we  see  his  mind  avoiding  the  key- 
point,  the  Army  of  the  Sovereigns,  in  favor  of  an  operation 
which  might  be  almost  characterized  as  a raid,  because  it  was 
safer.  He  assumed  that  in  Prague  he  would  not  threaten 
Vienna.  True,  but  even  there  he  would  be  threatening  the 
Army  of  the  Sovereigns,  at  this  moment  vastly  more  important 
than  Vienna.  His  usual  crisp  line  cf  thought  appears  warped, 
and  he  refers  to  geographical  points  rather  than  armies.  He 
had  just  defeated  the  army  on  whose  success  or  failure  the  en- 
tire campaign  depended ; it  was  in  a condition  where  it  could 
be  followed  up  or  outflanked,  and  again  attacked  to  manifest 
advantage.  And  yet  Napoleon  pushed  aside  this,  the  strongest 
demand  of  the  moment,  and  argued  himself  into  the  belief 
that  a thrust  at  Berlin  would  be  better.  This  Note  is  of  ex- 
ceptional value  as  showing  for  the  first  time  a wrong  conclu- 
sion drawn  by  the  great  soldier  from  the  facts  he  properly 
arrays.  He  had  got  into  the  habit  of  misinterpreting  facts,  so 
as  to  make  these  tell  a story  flattering  to  his  vanity  or  favor- 
able to  the  scheme  in  hand  ; but  whenever  from  facts  he  argued 
out  a strategic  plan,  he  had  been  correct.  Here  he  was  wrongo 
The  Berlin  scheme  was  not  only  subsidiary,  it  was  not  prac- 
tical, for  to  carry  it  through  presupposed  that  Macdonald 
could,  hold  himself  at  Gorlitz,  and  that  Murat  at  Dresden 
could  fend  off  Schwartzenberg  for  two  weeks  ; while  no  sooner 
had  the  emperor  undertaken  the  operation  than  both  these 


NEY  SENT  TO  WITTENBERG. 


177 


factors  were  proved  unsound — for  Macdonald  fell  back,  and 
the  enemy  again  demonstrated  towards  Dresden.  Any  plan 
which  disregarded  the  Army  of  the  Sovereigns  was  a weak  one. 
He  might  attack  it  in  Prague,  or  by  following  it  up ; but  he 
should  not  leave  it  un pur- 
sued. To  check  that  army 
meant  checking  the  others  ; 
to  afford  that  army  time 
meant  that  the  others 
would  manoeuvre. 

It  is  clear  that  the  em- 
peror understood  this,  for 
on  September  1 he  wrote 
to  Murat : “ Macdonald  is 
to-day  at  Gorlitz,  and  if 
he  continues  his  retreat,  I 
shall  have  to  march  to  re- 
establish matters.  I must 
not  let  him  fall  back  be- 
hind Bautzen.  He  might 
be  at  Bautzen  the  3d,  and 
the  cuirassiers  of  Latour-Maubourg  must  come  to  Freiburg 
so  as  to  be,  the  2d  in  the  evening,  at  Dresden,  ready  to  cross 
the  Elbe  at  three  o’clock  in  the  morning.”  To  prevent  this 
retreat  endangering  Dresden,  he  determined  to  draw  in  Mar- 
mont,  Mortier  and  Latour-Maubourg  nearer  the  city,  and  to 
place  St.  Cyr  and  Victor  at  Pirna  and  Freiburg  — a mere  defen- 
sive measure.  Yet  he  planned  to  go  on  with  his  raid ; and  Ney 
was  sent  to  Wittenberg  to  take  command  of  Oudinot’s  forces, 
with  instructions  to  make  a determined  advance  on  Berlin. 


Kettledrummer  of  Chasseurs. 


On  September  2 Berthier  was  to  write  him  that  “ it  is  really  diffi- 
cult to  have  less  head  than  Oudinot  ; ” that  the  emperor  had  moved  on 
Hoyerswerda,  and  that  Ney  was  to  start  so  as  to  be  at  Baruth  the  6th. 


VOL.  IV. 


178 


MACDONALD’S  SITUATION  SERIOUS. 


“ From  Baruth  you  would  be  but  three  days’  march  from  Berlin.  The 
communications  with  the  emperor  will  be  established,  and  the  attack  on 
Berlin  could  take  place  the  9th  or  10th.  . . . Manoeuvre  quickly,  to  profit 
from  the  disarray  of  the  Grand  Army  of  Bohemia,  which  will  make  move- 
ments so  soon  as  it  perceives  those  of  the  emperor.  Oudinot  never  struck 
the  enemy.  He  had  the  art  of  putting  in  one  of  his  corps  separately.  If 
he  had  attacked  frankly,  he  would  everywhere  have  overturned  ” the  foe. 
Berthier  was  to  write  to  Oudinot,  “ that  I learn  with  extreme  discontent 
that  with  the  three  corps,  of  which  he  made  no  use,  he  retired  under  the 
cannon  of  Wittenberg;  that  he  rendered  useless  this  portion  of  our  forces 
and  compromised  at  the  same  time  the  corps  on  the  Neisse.  That  already 
perceiving  the  uncertainty  of  his  movements,  I have  sent  Ney  to  take 
command  of  his  army.” 

Napoleon  was  making  ready  to  transfer  liis  headquarters 
to  Hoyerswerda  on  September  4,  so  as  to  advance  via  Liickau 
to  cooperate  with  Ney.  On  this  day  Mortier  was  at  Pirna, 
Marmont  at  Dippoldiswalde  and  St.  Cyr  at  Dittersdorf,  watch- 
ing the  mountain  outlets ; Victor  at  Freiburg,  and  the  relics 
of  Vandamme’s  corps  were  being  consolidated  with  Teste’s 
division,  so  as  to  reconstitute  a new  1st  Corps,  which  with 
a fresh  cavalry  corps,  that  had  just  come  up  under  l’Heritier, 
was  to  be  under  Mouton,  Count  Lobau.  Murat  was  to  com- 
mand the  Dresden  country.  But  Macdonald’s  situation  be- 
came serious;  he  had  successively  abandoned  the  Bober  and 
Neisse  and  got  back  to  the  Spree  ; and  no  sooner  formed  than 
Napoleon  felt  compelled  to  alter  his  plans  and  send  the  Guard 
and  Latour-Maubourg  on  to  Bautzen  to  arrest  his  backward 
movement.  Marmont  moved  to  Konigsbruck  to  connect  Ney 
with  Macdonald,  but  Ney  does  not  seem  to  have  been  notified 
to  suspend  his  advance  until  the  emperor  was  ready  to  sustain 
him.  On  September  8 Berthier  was  instructed  to  notify  Ney : 
“I  shall  be  to-morrow  morning  at  Bautzen,  where  Macdonald 
has  arrived  with  the  army,  that  the  enemy  follows  lively  and 
seems  much  encouraged ; that  I will  attack  during  the  day 


BROAD  DEFENSIVE  SCHEME. 


179 


and  strive  to  push  him  back  on  Reichenbach,  and  that  after 
the  battle  I will  march  in  great  haste  on  Berlin.”  He  was 
also  to  write  this  news  to  Davout.  This  scarcely  altered  the 
orders  of  the  day  before.  He  might  have  told  Ney  to  pause. 

Leaving  Dresden  the  evening  of  September  3,  the  emperor 
wrote  Macdonald  to  keep  his  forces  concentrated,  as  he  hoped 
to  turn  the  tables  on  Blucher:  “I  shall  be,  if  necessary,  at  the 
point  of  day  at  Bautzen  to  make  my  morning  reconnoissance. 
. . . Have  your  whole  army  in  hand,  whatever  position  you 
occupy,  and  let  it  be  assembled.  I will  make  my  dispositions 
on  the  battlefield.  I wish  to  be  able  in  half  an  hour  to  ride 
the  front  of  the  whole  army.”  And  again  the  same  day : 
“ If  the  enemy  follows  you  lively,  my  intention  is  to  attack 
him  at  once,  that  is,  to-morrow,  or  the  day  after  at  latest.” 

Although  the  Berlin  project  had  been  set  in  motion,  Napo- 
leon was  still  working  on  his  broad  defensive  scheme.  Should 
the  Army  of  the  Sovereigns  again  advance  on  Dresden  by  the 
left  bank,  the  late  battle  would  be  repeated  ; should  it  advance 
on  the  right  bank,  as  by  way  of  Zittau,  he  would  bring  up  the 
Dresden  forces  to  join  the  forces  at  Bautzen.  Should  it 
advance  via  Neustadt  on  Weissig  (between  Dresden  and  Bisch- 
ofswerda),  to  cut  the  Bautzen  road,  St.  Cyr  would  occupy 
Lilienstein  and  Hohenstein,  Lobau  and  Victor  the  heights  of 
Weissig,  “where  there  are  very  fine  positions;”  and  when  he 
should  have  beaten  the  Army  of  Silesia,  he  could  return  and 
beat  the  Army  of  the  Sovereigns  again.  But  all  this  was  not 
the  old-time  manoeuvring  that  compromised  the  enemy : it  savors 
little  of  the  ancient  offensive  vigor  that  resulted  decisively. 

When,  early  September  4,  riding  towards  Bautzen,  Napo- 
leon ran  across  the  demoralized  forces  of  Macdonald,  his  ire 
was  roused,  and  he  showed  it  distinctly  to  this  marshal  and 
Sebastiani.  At  Hochkirch  the  van  of  the  allies  was  met,  but 
the  superior  French  forces  drove  it  back  towards  nightfall. 


180 


A DISHEARTENING  STUDY. 


Next  morning,  the  5th,  from  Hochkirch,  the  French  army 
again  advanced.  Blucher  recognized  that  Napoleon  was  at 
hand,  and  this  wily  marshal,  according  to  the  Trachenberg 
agreement,  refusing  the  gage  of  battle,  retired  behind  the 
Neisse,  and  the  French  reached  Gorlitz.  The  emperor  now 
divined  that  Blucher  was  acting  with  a set  purpose,  and, 
unwilling  to  follow  him  to  Silesia,  returned  with  the  Guard 
and  Marmont  to  Bautzen.  On  September  6,  2 A.  M.,  he  wrote 
Maret : “ I have  arrived  at  Bautzen.  I have  followed  the 
enemy  beyond  the  Neisse.  As  soon  as  the  enemy  learned  that 
I was  with  the  army,  he  fled  as  fast  as  he  could  leg  it,  and  in 
every  direction.  There  was  no  means  of  reaching  him.”  The 
thrust  on  Berlin  again  coming  to  the  fore,  early  on  the  6th  he 
ordered  Marmont  and  Latour-Maubourg  on  Hoyerswerda; 
but  he  soon  countermanded  the  order,  on  account  of  bad  news 
from  Dresden.  Blucher,  pushed  back  of  the  Queisse,  was,  he 
thought,  apt  to  keep  quiet  for  a while ; Marmont  was  ordered 
to  Kamenz,  and  Macdonald  again  sent  on  after  the  Army  of 
Silesia.  Then,  confident  that  Ney  would  hold  his  own  against 
Bernadotte,  although  deprived  of  the  promised  aid  of  the 
emperor  in  person,  supporting  Macdonald’s  flank  by  Ponia- 
towski  and  Kellermann  from  Zittau,  and  speeding  Latour- 
Maubourg  towards  Dresden,  the  emperor  hurried  thither  in 
person,  to  find  that  the  allies  were  again  crossing  the  moun- 
tains, and  were  threatening  Dresden  by  way  of  Pirna. 

This  to  and  fro  manoeuvring  without  an  attack  in  force  is 
a disheartening  study.  Whether  the  difficulty  was  due  to  the 
emperor’s  defensive  attitude  or  to  his  instability,  it  would 
seem  that  he  could  have  done  better  by  taking  an  extra  day 
or  two  before  succoring  St.  Cyr,  and  instead  of  moving  on 
Blucher  from  the  front,  to  fall  upon  his  right  flank ; to  let 
Macdonald  lure  him  on  by  feigned  retreat,  while  Napoleon 
placed  himself  so  as  to  strike  after  a fashion  that  he  must 


NO  SINGLE  POINT  SECURE. 


181 


fight  aufond.  He  might  have  sustained  Macdonald  with  part 
of  the  troops  and  himself  led  a flank  attack  on  Blucher  with 
the  rest.  By  dispositions  half  as  cunning  as  most  of  those 
with  which  he  has  made  us  familiar,  Napoleon  could  have 
assuredly  overwhelmed  Blucher,  a most  essential  thing  to  do. 
But  Napoleon  was  no  longer  as  rapid  as  of  yore.  If  he  would 
not  try  a flank  manoeuvre  on  him,  why  could  he  not  have  pur- 
sued him  a outrance  when  he  withdrew  from  his  direct  attack? 
He  does  not  seem  to  have  used  his  forces  on  the  right  hank 
as  well  as  he  might.  To  deliver  half  an  attack  is  to  fumble, 
“ tatonner,”  as  he  called  it ; it  was  what  he  always  condemned 
in  his  lieutenants,  and  he  was  now  fumbling  himself. 

Napoleon  was  learning,  to  his  sorrow,  that  his  theory  of  the 
equality  of  thousands  was  true,  and  with  their  overwhelming 
numbers,  the  allies,  patient  under  defeat,  and  believing  in 
eventual  success,  were  surrounding  him  on  all  sides.  The 
Dresden  campaign  had  begun  by  his  being  secure  at  two 
points,  while  he  attacked  the  enemy  at  the  third.  Now  no 
single  point  was  secure.  A raid  of  Cossacks  had  driven  the 
King  of  Westphalia  out  of  Cassel,  and  the  theatre  of  opera- 
tions was  growing  narrower,  and  victualing  harder.  Napoleon 
would  have  been  glad  to  risk  all  on  a battle  which  he  might 
win,  and  then  again  have  a chance  to  make  peace,  but  the 
allies  were  too  cautious  to  afford  him  this  opportunity,  until 
all  the  chances  were  in  their  favor. 

After  his  comforting  success  against  Vandamme,  Scliwart- 
zenberg  had  remained  in  the  Toplitz  valley,  uncertain  what 
Napoleon  would  do,  but  sending  a detachment  on  the  5th 
forward  to  Hellendorf  to  reconnoitre.  When,  on  the  6th,  he 
learned  that  Napoleon  had  marched  against  Blucher,  he  left 
the  command  to  Barclay,  and  put  sixty  thousand  Austrians 
across  the  Elbe,  to  march  over  the  mountains  on  Rumburg 
and  fall  on  the  French  right  flank ; but  he  did  not  go  farther 


182 


TOO  POSITIVE  INSTRUCTIONS. 


than  Aussig,  for  next  day  he  ascertained  Napoleon’s  return  to 
Dresden.  While  Klenau  remained  at  Commottau,  Barclay 
pushed  Wittgenstein- and  Kleist,  September  T,  across  the 
mountains  towards  Pirna,  following  along  with  the  main  body  ; 
and  when  on  the  8th  Napoleon,  who  had  brought  back  the 
Guard,  marched  to  meet  this  second  oncoming,  he  found  their 
van  on  the  heights  near  Dohna.  The  Guard  being  thrown 
upon  this  van,  the  allies  withdrew  some  miles.  Napoleon 
knew  practically  nothing  about  the  enemy  except  that  “ we 
are  here  in  their  presence,  that  they  crown  the  different  de- 
bouches of  Bohemia,  and  that  it  is  possible  that  soon  there 
would  be  an  affair  there,”  as  he  wrote  Berthier  this  day ; but 
as  reconnoitring  towards  Chemnitz  showed  no  threat  to  the 
communications  back  through  Leipsic,  Victor  was  drawn  in 
nearer  Dresden. 

Although  without  the  promised  support,  Napoleon  hoped 
that  Ney  had  advanced  to  some  purpose  on  Bernadotte,  but 
the  news  of  another  backset  at  Dennewitz  came  in  late  on  the 
8th.  These  failures  of  his  marshals  must  have  astonished  the 
emperor.  But  there  was  no  one  to  blame  but  himself.  The 
instructions  of  September  2 were  too  positive.  After  stating 
that  Oudinot’s  falling  back  on  Wittenberg  had  allowed  Tau- 
enzien  and  the  Cossacks  to  move  through  Liickau  on  Bautzen, 
and  thus  threaten  Macdonald’s  rear,  Napoleon  had  said  he 
himself  would  have  his  headquarters  at  Hoyerswerda  Septem- 
ber 4;  Ney  (who  would  have  a line  through  Dahme  on  Torgau) 
was  to  be  in  Baruth  the  6th,  on  which  day  the  emperor  would 
have  a corps  at  Liickau  to  connect  with  him,  and  the  Cos- 
sacks and  landwehr  would  retire  as  soon  as  Ney  approached. 
Although  generally  an  army  commander  is  held  to  construe 
his  orders  to  conform  to  the  conditions,  Napoleon’s  marshals 
had  not  been  brought  up  so  to  act ; and  the  orders  to  Ney 
were  practically  absolute  to  march  on  Berlin.  Napoleon  under- 


NEY  MOVES  ON  JUTERBOG. 


183 


rated  the  Prussian  armies  in  numbers  and  quality ; he  im- 
pressed the  feeling  on  Ney,  and  urged  this  fighting  leader 
onward,  when,  especially  after  Gross  Beeren  had  taught 


him  that  the  Army  of  the  North  had  good  leaders,  he  should 
rather  have  talked  to  him  of  caution. 

Ney  had  arrived  September  3 at  Wittenberg  with  fifty 
thousand  men,  proposing  to  head  by  Juterbog  on  Baruth  to 
the  rendezvous  with  Napoleon.  He  reached  Seyda  Septem- 
ber 5 after  beating  Tauenzien,  on  Bernadotte’s  left,  at  Zahna. 
The  6th  he  moved  on  Juterbog,  Bertrand  in  the  lead,  followed 
by  Reynier  and  then  Oudinot. 

Bernadotte,  as  Ney  should  have  known,  had  for  two  weeks 
stood  astride  the  main  road  from  Wittenberg  via  Potsdam  on 


184 


BATTLE  OF  DENNEWITZ. 


Berlin,  and  though  Ney’s  direction  exposed  the  inarching 
French  left  flank,  he  did  nothing  to  fend  off  an  attack,  but 
set  out  in  a long  column  past  this  dangerous  body  of  the 
enemy.  Towards  noon,  September  6,  Bertrand  struck  Tauen- 
zien  near  Dennewitz,  seized  the  heights  beyond,  and  won  some 
success  until  Billow  appeared  on  his  left.  Reynier  and  Oudi- 
not  were  still  in  the  rear.  Bertrand  had  fifteen  thousand  men 
to  forty  thousand,  but  he  held  on  well  until  Reynier  came  up 
and  formed  a crotchet  to  face  Billow.  Shortly  Billow  was 


sustained  by  the  Russians  and  Swedes,  but  Oudinot  also  came 
up  to  sustain  Reynier.  Both  sides  fought  well ; and  for  a 
while  it  looked  like  a French  victory;  but  finally  Bertrand 
was  overwhelmed  by  Tauenzien  and  Billow,  though  still  cling- 
ing to  Dennewitz.  To  hold  this  place,  Ney  strove  to  move 
part  of  Reynier  and  Oudinot  to  the  right,  but  in  the  move- 
ment the  Saxons  lost  their  heads,  fell  into  confusion,  and 
they  and  the  Bavarians  were  completely  routed.  By  a forced 
march  Bernadotte  came  up  near  the  battlefield  in  the  after- 
noon, but  did  not  engage.  Though  surprised,  Ney  had  ex- 
hibited due  vigor ; but  his  several  corps  did  not  act  together, 


PECULIARLY  BLAMEWORTHY. 


185 


and  owing  to  his  false  manoeuvre,  he  was  bound  to  lose  the 
day.  “ Ney  was  another  Coeur  de  Lion,  born  centuries  too 
late  : ” he  was  not  a battle  captain  for  modern  days.  Biilow 
was  the  hero  of  the  allies.  After  losing  fifteen  thousand  men, 
half  prisoners,  Ney,  cut  off  from  Wittenberg,  retreated  in  dis- 
order on  Torgau.  His  chief  had  misled  him  as  to  his  task, 
and  then  failed  to  sustain  him  as  promised.  “ I have  been 
totally  beaten,”  he  wrote  the  emperor,  “and  still  do  not  know 
whether  my  army  has  got  together  again.” 

On  September  10  Berthier  was  told  to  write  Ney  to  take 
position  in  front  of  Torgau  on  the  right  bank,  and  next  day 

“ That  if  the  enemy’s  army  from  Berlin  should  move  on  Grossenhayn,  so 
as  to  approach  Dresden  at  the  same  time  that  the  enemy’s  Army  of  Sile- 
sia did  so,  it  would  be  necessary  for  him  to  debouch  from  Torgau  to  dis- 
quiet that  army.”  And  on  September  14  Napoleon  wrote  Bertrand  : “ I 
received  your  letter  of  September  12.  I see  with  pleasure  that  your 
corps  behaved  well,  but  I have  seen  with  pain  the  bad  issue  of  the  battle, 
which  seems  to  me  to  have  been  ill  engaged.  I shall  myself  soon  take 
the  command  of  the  three  corps,  to  strive  to  procure  you  your  revenge.” 

Napoleon  was  clearly  responsible  for  Dennewitz.  He  knew 
that  Ney  was  a brilliant  fighter,  but  neither  a strategist  nor 
a grand-tactician ; he  needed  his  work  cut  out  for  him ; 
Bautzen  had  shown  his  limitations ; and  the  emperor  should 
not  have  relied  upon  him  in  so  important  a task.  His  failure 
to  sustain  him,  or  to  suspend  his  advance,  was  peculiarly 
blameworthy.  The  defeat  of  Dennewitz  not  only  prevented 
further  projects  on  Berlin,  but  opened  the  lower  Elbe  to  Ber- 
nadotte,  so  that  later  he  could  without  particular  fighting  join 
in  the  allied  march  on  Leipsic.  Despite  the  serious  nature 
of  the  defeat,  Napoleon  said  little.  Only  a letter  to  the  Min- 
ister of  War,  telling  him  to  place  the  fortresses  on  the  Rhine 
in  a state  of  defense,  and  to  fully  provision  them,  shows  how 
much  he  appreciated  the  disaster. 


186 


THE  SITUATION  DISCUSSED. 


In  the  fortnight  from  August  28  on,  Napoleon  had  won  a 
great  battle  at  Dresden  in  the  centre,  and  his  lieutenants  had 
lost  five : Gross  Beeren,  Hagelsberg,  the  Katzbach,  Kulm, 
Dennewitz  ; and  these  victories  so  far  outweighed  Dresden  — 
without  pursuit  — as  to  enable  the  allies  to  draw  their  toils 
closer  about  the  Grand  Army. 

When  Napoleon  reached  Pirna,  September  8,  he  sat  down 
with  Berthier,  Murat  and  St.  Cyr,  and  discussed  the  situation, 
both  specific  and  general,  from  a neutral  standpoint.  This 
discussion,  in  which  alone  St.  Cyr  bore  his  part, 
— the  others  not  being  as  well  equipped,  — is 
most  interestingly  narrated  in  his  Memoirs. 
It  was  at  this  time  that  Napoleon  asserted  that 
he  could  write  a treatise  by  which  anybody 
could  learn  to  carry  on  war.  The  emperor 
and  his  lieutenant  did  not  agree,  practically 
because  Napoleon,  as  appears  from  the  narra- 
tive, was  talking  of  the  science  and  St.  Cyr  of 
the  art  of  war,  Napoleon  referring  to  the  con- 
ception, St.  Cyr  to  the  practice.  This  was 
entirely  natural,  for  no  one  at  that  day  under- 
stood what  to-day  is  simple  to  us  ; indeed,  the 
phraseology  of  the  art  had  not  been  created ; 
neither  was  Napoleon  right  in  saying  he  could 
teach  all  he  knew  — for  the  human  element 
always  remains  the  unknown  quantity  in  war. 
It  being  essential  to  know  what  was  going 
on  beyond  the  Erzgebirge,  and  to  ascertain  what  the  situation 
was,  Victor,  Lobau  and  the  Guard  were  assembled  at  Dohna, 
and  on  September  9 Napoleon  led  them  against  the  enemy. 
At  all  points  the  latter  withdrew,  and  by  night  the  emperor 
and  the  Guard  were  in  Liebstadt,  Victor  at  Altenburg,  Lobau 
at  Gieshiibel,  St.  Cyr  at  Breitenau.  To  cross  into  Bohemia 


Bavarian 

Grenadier. 


ANY  OPERATION  PREVENTED. 


187 


being  no  part  of  the  plan,  Marmont  remained  on  the  right 
bank,  near  Dresden-Neustadt ; Macdonald  was  in  front  of 
Bautzen,  sustained  by  Poniatowski ; Ney  reassembling  at 
Torgau,  lTIeritier  at  Grossenhayn  ; at  Leipsic  was  a body  of 
men  under  Margaron.  44  In  this  state  of  affairs,”  Napoleon 
wrote  Maret,  September  10,  from  Liebstadt,  44 1 am  going  to- 
day up  on  the  high  hills  which  command  Toplitz,  to  get  accu- 
rate news  of  the  enemy.”  The  corps  were  advanced  to  Peters- 
walde  and  Ebersdorf,  the  enemy  still  withdrawing,  and  shortly 
before  noon  Napoleon,  reaching  the  Geyersberg,  recognized 
with  regret  that  the  Army  of  the  Sovereigns  in  force  on  the 
plain  below  prevented  any  operation  across  the  mountains 
here.  The  roads,  moreover,  were  badly  cut  up  by  constant 
recent  use.  Next  day,  September  11,  he  rode  to  Peters walde 
and  up  the  Nollendorf  heights  to  view  the  Bohemian  valley 
below,  but  with  no  greater  satisfaction.  Both  nights  he  spent 
in  the  pastor’s  house  in  Breitenau  and  Peterswalde.  St.  Cyr 
was  of  opinion  that  battle  would  be  desirable  in  the  Com- 
mottau-Toplitz  country,  and  Napoleon  agreed  with  him.  He 
could  assemble  by  the  14th  all  the  Guard,  Lobau,  Marmont, 
Victor  and  Latour-Maubourg,  which  would  give  about  one 
hundred  and  twenty  thousand  men.  But  Napoleon  did  not  be- 
lieve that  Schwartzenberg  would  accept  battle,  or  that  battle 
could  be  forced  upon  him.  On  the  12th,  with  the  Old  Guard, 
he  returned  to  Dresden  ; the  other  troops  followed  back ; and 
Marmont  and  the  cavalry  were  sent  to  Grossenhayn  to  cover 
the  arrival  of  a large  convoy  of  victual  from  the  siege-provi- 
sion of  Torgau,  a matter  of  importance,  as  victual  had  become 
difficult  to  procure. 

While  the  defeat  of  Vandamme  had  encouraged  the  enemy 
and  lost  a corps,  those  of  Oudinot,  Macdonald  and  Ney  seri- 
ously imperiled  the  campaign.  It  was  not  the  fault  of  the 
specific  plan ; it  was  rather  the  execution ; the  lack  of  good 


188 


TORGAU  THE  CENTRAL  DEPOT. 


subordinate  army  commanders,  whom  Napoleon  could  have 
trained,  but  never  did ; of  troops  with  a strong  sprinkling  of 
veterans  to  teach  the  men  how  to  camp  and  march  and  fight ; 
and  especially  the  want  of  cavalry.  The  conditions  required 
that  the  minor  armies  should  at  times  retire  rather  than  fight, 
and  for  such  retreats  cavalry  was  essential,  for  the  French  foot 
was  none  too  steady.  Interior  lines  are  of  value ; but  with 
forces  up  to  a hundred  thousand  men  they  are  more  effectively 
used  than  with  larger  numbers.  The  question  of  feeding  large 
armies  interferes  with  manoeuvring  from  a strategic  centre. 
There  are  many  generals  who  can  do  the  best  of  work  with 
thirty  thousand  men,  who  lose  their  heads  in  command  of 
an  army  twice  the  size.  Macdonald  had  too  large  a problem 
in  front  of  Blucher ; Oudinot  and  Ney  were  outweighed  by 
Bernadotte,  with  such  good  lieutenants  under  him  as  Billow 
and  Tauenzien.  Napoleon  should  have  kept  his  lieutenants 
on  the  defensive  when  he  was  not  personally  present,  a plan 
that  would  have  enabled  him  to  draw  from  them,  and  make 
his  blow  the  heavier  where  he  was  himself  directing.  After 
Kulm,  his  best  work  could  have  been  done  in  destroying 
Blucher  and  Bernadotte  and  then  coming  back  to  the  Army 
of  the  Sovereigns.  Inasmuch  as  he  controlled  all  the  pas- 
sages of  the  Elbe,  this  was  certainly  feasible,  but  he  never 
attacked  Blucher  seriously,  nor  himself  moved  against  Ber- 
nadotte : this  called  for  an  activity  of  which  he  no  longer 
seemed  capable.  During  the  whole  month  of  September  he 
was  “fumbling.”  At  no  period  did  he  act  with  the  vigor  to 
which  we  are  used.  And  not  only  did  his  lieutenants  not 
understand  the  art  of  war  in  its  broader  aspect,  but  the  lack 
of  a good  general  staff  to  attend  to  essentials  that  he  could 
not,  became  every  day  more  manifest. 

On  September  12  Torgau  was  made  the  central  depot  of 
the  army,  but  still  Dresden  was  not  given  up.  The  object  of 


A SUCCESSFUL  DEMONSTRATION. 


189 


this  seemed  to  be  to  allow  the  use  of  Torgau  as  a base  for 
a manoeuvre  on  Berlin,  or  at  least  against  Bernadotte,  on 
whom  Napoleon  still  purposed  to  march  with  Marmont  and 
Ney  and  the  Guard ; but  this  plan,  like  the  others,  came  to 
naught. 

The  Army  of  the  Sovereigns  did  not  move  until  September 
13,  when  Barclay  was  left  to  hold  the  mountain  passes  with 
the  right  wing  of  the  Army  of  the  Sovereigns, 
to  enable  Schwartzenberg  to  move  with  the 
left  towards  the  French  communications;  and 
Wittgenstein  and  Kleist,  debouching  from 
Peterswalde  on  the  14th,  pushed  St.  Cyr  and 
Lobau  back  to  Gieshiibel.  Napoleon  assumed 
that  this  column  was  part  of  a general  ad- 
vance ; and  on  September  15  he  drove  to 
Pirna,  and  had  a bridge  thrown  to  open  com- 
munications with  Macdonald,  brought  up  the 
Guard  to  Lobau’s  aid,  and  pushed  the  enemy 
back  to  beyond  Nollendorf.  Next  day  he  rode 
thither,  but  as  overcast  weather  prevented  his 
obtaining  a view,  he  determined  to  push  a 
heavy  reconnoissance  into  Bohemia  to  ascer- 
tain the  situation  ; for  he  had  rightly  guessed, 
as  he  wrote  Berthier,  that  the  allies  were  hold- 
ing the  passes  to  prevent  his  undertaking  the 
offensive  while  they  prepared  for  extended 
operations.  Moreover,  he  desired  to  impose  on  the  allies  by 
activity;  for  so  soon  as  he  had  driven  them  back  into  Bo- 
hemia, he  could  turn  against  Blucher.  This  demonstration 
succeeded.  To  forestall  a French  advance,  Schwartzenberg 
adjourned  his  movement  and  assembled  at  Kulm  to  meet  the 
French  as  they  should  debouch  from  the  passes  ; and  when 
they  began  the  attack,  early  on  the  17th,  they  found  the  allies 


Prussian 

Grenadier. 


190 


POSITIONS,  SEPTEMBER  19. 


ready ; indeed,  Sehwartzenberg  started  on  a circuit  to  cut  off 
their  van,  and  compelled  the  French  to  retire  into  the  passes 
without  serious  fighting.  “ I descended  yesterday  into  the 
plain  of  Bohemia  near  Kulm,”  Napoleon  wrote  Murat,  and 
I obliged  the  enemy  to  unmask  his  camp  and  his  force.  He 
presented  his  whole  army  in  several  lines  of  battle  and  expected 
an  attack.  I then  withdrew  the  columns.”  On  the  18th, 
from  the  heights,  Napoleon  viewed  the  allies  below  on  the 
plain,  and  a few  skirmishes  occurred  between  outlying  posts ; 
but  it  was  evident  that,  as  matters  stood,  he  could  not  debouch 
into  Bohemia  on  this  line. 

On  the  19th  the  French  were  placed  : Marmont  and  Murat 
at  Grossenliayn  ; Macdonald,  who,  so  soon  as  Napoleon  left, 
had  fallen  back  from  Blucher’s  renewed  advance,  was  at 
Harthau  and  Stolpen,  with  Poniatowski,  who  also  had  to  re- 
tire, on  the  right  at  Lohmen ; the  Guard  at  Dresden  ; Mortier 
at  Pirna;  Victor  at  Freiburg;  St.  Cyr  and  Lobau  out  near 
Gieshiibel  watching  the  passes.  Thus,  not  counting  Augereau 
and  Davout,  Napoleon  had  his  army  extended  from  Torgau  to 
Dresden,  and  from  there  to  Leipsic,  one  hundred  and  sixty 
thousand  men  about  Dresden,  thirty-five  thousand  in  the  Tor- 
gau-Wittenberg  country,  thirty  thousand  at  Grossenliayn,  ten 
thousand  at  Leipsic.  All  these  were  intersupporting,  but 
where  was  the  Napoleonic  aggressiveness  ? The  one  thing 
Napoleon  should  have  done  was  to  leave  Dresden,  assemble 
all  his  forces  and  manoeuvre  on  the  large  scale,  — there  were 
plenty  of  things  to  do,  — but  he  would  not  give  up  Dresden. 

Blucher  could  now  communicate  with  the  Army  of  the 
Sovereigns  by  way  of  Schandau. 

Looking  for  an  invasion  of  Bohemia  when  so  large  a force 
approached  the  mountains,  Sehwartzenberg  concentrated  to 
fend  it  off ; this  defensive  purpose  Napoleon  guessed,  but  he 
awaited  a better  chance  for  manoeuvring,  when  the  allies 


SCHWARTZENBERG  WINS  HIS  POINT.  191 

should  undertake  some  larger  operation.  In  other  words,  he 
left  them  the  initiative. 

This  changeableness  of  Napoleon  is  not  of  the  kind  it  once 
was.  It  is  a characteristic  of  every  great  soldier  that  his 
mind  is  constantly  evolving  new  plans,  as  fresh  situations 
are  created,  or  as  he  imagines  they  may  be  so.  It  is  only  the 
commonplace  leader  who,  having  given  birth  to  an  idea,  can- 
not give  it  up,  or  vary  it  according  to  shifting  operations  on 
the  part  of  the  enemy.  But  Napoleon’s  changes  in  this  cam- 
paign are  far  less  fruitful,  less  forcible,  than  they  used  to  be. 
First  it  is  Berlin,  then  Bohemia  he  will  attack  ; and  he  swings 
like  a pendulum  between  the  two.  He  was  gaining  nothing 
by  delay  ; the  defensive  was  sapping  his  originality  ; time  was 
working  against  him.  While  he  watched  Schwartzenberg, 
hoping  he  would  again  advance  into  Saxony,  Blucher  had 
come  dangerously  close  to  the  Elbe  ; Schwartzenberg  had  won 
his  point  in  calling  Napoleon  away  so  that  Blucher  might 
force  back  Macdonald.  Neither  side  had  made  a marked 
gain  ; but  Napoleon  had  lost  the  more.  While  delay  is  one 
object  of  the  defensive,  yet  if  delay  will  enable  one’s  opponent 
to  bring  on  a crisis  less  favorable  to  us,  then  it  ceases  to  be 
helpful.  And  so  it  was  here : time  was  working  against  the 
French  cause.  The  only  reinforcement  Napoleon  could  ex- 
pect was  Augereau’s  sixteen  thousand  men,  who  on  the  17th 
had  been  ordered  on  the  Saale  to  help  protect  the  rear,  and 
were  now  approaching  in  the  direction  of  Jena ; the  allies,  on 
the  other  hand,  had  Bennigsen  and  fifty  thousand  Russians 
coming  on  from  Breslau. 

Since  Dennewitz  the  river  transportation  had  been  uncer- 
tain, and  it  was  to  keep  it  safe  that  Marmont  and  Latour- 
Maubourg  were  established  at  Grossenhayn.  The  only  two 
roads  for  supplying  Dresden  were  along  the  river,  or  from 
Leipsic,  and  both  were  now  subject  to  attack.  Margaron  had 


192 


THE  ARMY  NOT  NOURISHED. 


a small  force  at  Leipsic,  but  not  enough  to  keep  away  the 
allied  partisans.  Platov  was  so  active  that  Lefebvre-Des- 
nouettes  had  to  be  sent  that  way  to  keep  the  country  quiet. 
Breadstuffs  were  growing  scarce  in  Saxony.  The  precau- 
tion taken  to  guard  the  Torgau  convoy  proved  this ; the  allies 
knew  it,  and  in  no  small  degree  built  their  hopes  thereon. 

The  emperor  wrote,  September  18,  to  Berthier  : “ We  have  wheat.  It 
is  only  the  grinding  which  is  embarrassing.  Nearly  all  the  villages  have 
mills.  We  should  profit  by  seizing  them  for  the  service  of  the  main  army. 
It  would  be  well  by  this  means  if  there  . . . could  be  sent  from  Dres- 
den eight  ounces  of  bread,  four  ounces  of  rice.  The  ration  would  then 
be  sixteen  ounces  of  bread  and  four  ounces  of  rice,  to  which  the  soldier 
would  add  the  potatoes  and  the  vegetables  which  he  will  find  for  a long 
time  yet  in  all  the  villages.”  And  to  Daru,  September  23  : “ The  army 
is  not  nourished.  It  would  be  an  illusion  to  look  at  it  otherwise.  Twenty- 
four  ounces  of  bread,  an  ounce  of  rice  and  eight  ounces  of  meat  are 
insufficient  for  the  soldier.  The  regulations  of  all  times  accorded  to  the 
soldier  on  campaign  twenty-eight  ounces  of  bread,  and  that  was  only 
looked  upon  as  sufficient  by  adding  the  vegetables  and  potatoes  which 
he  could  procure  in  the  country.  To-day  you  give  only  eight  ounces  of 
bread,  three  ounces  of  rice  and  eight  ounces  of  meat.  The  soldier  is* 
living  badly,  and  lives  only  by  means  of  a great  consumption  of  meat.  If 
one  continued,  then,  to  give  him  only  eight  ounces  of  bread,  it  would  result, 
first,  that  the  soldier  would  become  feeble  ; second,, that  he  would  con- 
sume an  enormous  amount  of  meat,  either  by  taking  it  in  the  country  or 
. . . in  the  parks  of  the  army.  No  discipline  and  no  surveillance  can 
prevent  the  soldier  from  killing  beeves  wherever  he  can  find  them  ; and 
yet  meat  will  become  scarce,  rather  than  bread.” 

It  was  more  and  more  evident  that  Blucher  must  be  got 
rid  of.  This  energetic  officer,  by  his  constant  thrusts  at  the 
centre  of  Napoleon’s  position,  was  threatening  its  strategic 
integrity.  Poniatowski  was  covering  Pirna,  Macdonald  from 
his  left  through  Stolpen  to  Bischofswerda,  Marmont  at  Gros- 
senliayn.  Blucher  now  stood  from  Kamenz  to  Neustadt,  and 
was  in  touch  with  Bubna,  who  was  at  Hohenstein,  and  with 


DREAD  OF  BAD  WEATHER.  193 

Bernadotte  at  Elsterwerda.  In  the  afternoon  of  the  18th  he 
moved  on  Macdonald,  who  fell  back  to  Weissig.  Next  day 
the  emperor  threw  Mortier  through  Pirna  forward  to  Lolnnen, 
to  shoulder  the  intruder  away  ; but  no  actual  operation  was 
undertaken  — this  time  on  the  score  of  the  weather. 

On  September  19,  from  Pirna,  Napoleon  wrote:  “I  should  not  be  far,  if 
the  weather  was  less  horrible  to-morrow,  from  marching  on  the  enemy 
and  pushing  him  beyond  Bautzen;”  and  next  day  to  Marmont  : “Yes- 
terday and  this  night  are  so  frightful  that  it  is  impossible  to  move.” 
And  to  Berthier:  “ Write  to  Murat,  to  Mortier,  to  Macdonald,  to  Ponia- 
towski,  that  the  frightful  weather  which  continues  to-day,  makes  every 
movement  impossible,  and  that  if  to-morrow  the  weather  betters,  prepa- 
rations are  to  be  made  for  the  day  after.”  And  on  the  22d  it  is  ordered 
that  an  important  march  by  Macdonald  “ is  not  to  be  adjourned  under 
whatever  pretext,  unless  the  weather  should  remain  as  bad  as  during  the 
20th;  but  if  the  weather  is  the  same  as  the  21st,  the  attack  is  to  take 
place.”  And  on  September  22  to  Macdonald  : “ In  making  a brisk 
attack  between  noon  and  two  o’clock,  some  prisoners  will  be  taken. 
There  will  be,  moreover,  some  news  at  Bischofswerda,  and  then  accord- 
ing to  circumstances  we  shall  be  able  to  attack  strongly  to-morrow.  I 
gave  you  notice  that  my  intention  was  to  attack  the  moment  the  weather 
should  be  less  bad.  In  a war  of  combinations  like  this,  the  days  are  of 
the  greatest  importance.  Make,  I pray  you,  your  dispositions.” 

Only  once  or  twice  before  liave  we  seen  Napoleon  arrested 
by  the  weather : the  veterans  of  the  early  years  would  have 
laughed  at  such  a cause.  Napoleon  once  called  a storm  a pre- 
sage of  victory,  and  dread  of  bad  weather  is  one  more  of  the 
by  themselves  small  factors  which  go  to  build  up  Napoleon’s 
growing  indecisiveness.  Proper  care  for  troops  — especially 
young  ones  — often  demands  that  they  shall  not  be  unduly 
exposed ; but  the  battle  of  Dresden  was  won  in  a heavy 
storm,  and  here,  despite  equinoctial  rains,  there  seems  to  have 
been  no  especial  cause  for  delay.  Indeed,  a stormy  day  is  often 
favorable  to  a sudden  advance,  because  this  is  unexpected. 


VOL.  IV. 


194  A MERE  GEOGRAPHICAL  POINT. 

On  September  21  Napoleou  thought  it  would  be  well  to 
assemble  the  whole  army  near  Dresden  and  give  the  men 

a rest ; and  he  placed  Lobau  and 
Lauriston  under  St.  Cyr  to  cover 
the  Elbe  from  Pillnitz  to  Konig- 
stein,  while  Mortier  was  brought 
back  to  Pirna,  Latour-Maubourg 
and  Marmont  sent  to  Meissen  to 
observe  the  Elbe  up  and  down, 
and  Ney  was  to  cover  the  river 
from  Torgau  to  Magdeburg.  Na- 
poleon was  hanging  on  to  Dresden 
beyond  all  reason.  Had  Dresden 
been  a strong  place  of  the  first 
importance,  one  can  understand 
his  anxiety  to  retain  it,  but  it  was 
not  this.  It  was  a mere  geogra- 
phical point.  If  Dresden  could 
aid  him  by  holding  out  a fort- 
night against  the  Army  of  the 
Sovereigns,  so  that  he  might  act 
on  the  right  bank,  it  was  useful.  If  it  could  not,  it  was  use- 
less, and  had  better  be  abandoned.  Had  St.  Cyr  received 
orders  to  defend  Dresden  as  long  as  possible  and  then  cross 
to  the  right  bank  and  destroy  the  bridges,  defending  the  river 
with  part  of  his  force,  and  joining  his  master  with  the  other 
part,  Napoleon  could  certainly  have  destroyed  both  Blucher 
and  Bernadotte  before  Schwartzenberg  could  have  done  the 
French  equal  harm.  But  only  to  this  extent  was  Dresden 
useful. 

The  news  from  Blucher  was  disquieting.  Napoleon  could 
not  divine  whether  he  purposed  manoeuvring  to  his  right  or 
his  left : so  long  as  the  French  maintained  the  offensive,  Blu- 


BLUCHER  AVOIDS  NAPOLEON. 


195 


cher  would  keep  still ; so  soon  as  they  assumed  the  defensive, 
the  old  marshal  became  active ; and  on  the  22d  the  emperor 
ordered  Macdonald  forward  to  ascertain  where  the  enemy’s 
main  force  lay,  and  he  himself,  towards  noon,  drove  out  to 
Fischbach,  and  thence  rode  beyond  Schmiedefeld.  Souham 
and  Gerard  were  advancing  through  Harthau ; Blucher’s  out- 
posts fell  back,  and  Bischofswerda  was  taken.  Lauriston 
moved  on  Neustadt.  Next  day,  on  the  French  pushing  their 
advance,  Blucher  again  retired,  consistently  avoiding  Napo- 
leon, who  though  he  would  have  been  glad  to  do  so,  adopted 
none  of  his  usual  means  to  bring  him  to  battle : as  Blucher 
had  dispatched  a corps  to  Kamenz,  which  could  readily  fall 
on  the  French  left  should  Napoleon  advance  too  far,  this  may 


have  deterred  him.  At  Harthau  he  received  a dispatch  of 
the  22d  from  Ney  — he  had  had  one  the  day  before  — that 
the  enemy  had  finished  a bridge  over  the  Elbe  at  the  mouth 
of  the  Elster.  This  began  to  look  ominous,  and  Napoleon 
was  doing  nothing  to  counteract  the  danger.  He  had  been 
ineffectively  moving  to  and  fro,  much  as  his  enemies  had  been 


196 


A NEGATIVE  ROLE. 


in  the  habit  of  doing,  while  the  allies  were  making  ready  for 
a large  manoeuvre,  only  awaiting  Bennigsen. 

Napoleon  had  long  been  contemplating  and  now  about 
concluded  to  yield  to  the  enemy  the  right  bank  of  the  Elbe, 
and  to  withdraw  Macdonald,  holding  him  ready  to  break  out 
again  across  the  river  in  case  of  necessity.  On  September  23 
lie  wrote  Rogniat,  chief  engineer  at  Dresden : — 

“ My  intention  is  to  bring  back  Macdonald’s  army  to  the  left  bank  of 
the  Elbe,  keeping  a bridge  at  Konigstein,  ...  a bridge  at  Pirna,  ...  a 
bridge  at  Pillnitz,  . . . the  three  bridges  of  Dresden,  . . . the  bridge  of 
Meissen.”  And  the  same  day  to  Murat : “ I have  pushed  the  enemy  ; he 
is  everywhere  in  retreat,  and  Macdonald  will  be  this  morning  in  Bautzen. 
The  enemy  thus  refusing  every  engagement,  my  intention  is  ...  to 
bring  the  troops  back  to  the  left  bank,  to  give  them  some  repose.  All 
the  bridges  will  be  defended  by  good  bridge-heads,  and  we  will  occupy  all 
the  debouches  of  Dresden  forest.  In  this  position  I will  keep  an  eye  on 
the  enemy,  and  if  he  drops  into  any  offensive  operation,  I will  fall  on  him 
so  that  he  cannot  evade  a battle.” 

Napoleon  had  first  undertaken  liis  Elbe  defensive  scheme 
because  it  afforded  excellent  offensive  possibilities ; but  as 
these  had  one  by  one  been  tried  and  failed,  the  strict  defen- 
sive had  become  his  reliance.  The  allies,  by  their  persist- 
ent pushing,  even  if  less  able  method,  had  forced  him  into  a 
negative  role.  He  had  not  been  acting  as  he  was  wont.  His 
offensive  had  been  weak.  The  corollary  of  the  proposition  to 
attack  only  at  one  point  at  a time  is  that  the  onset  shall  be 
pushed  home.  But  at  no  time  had  he  attacked  Blucher  with 
the  ancient  vigor  or  ability.  Whatever  the  explanation,  he 
was  weakening,  and  he  saw  it : the  French  armies  were  dwin- 
dling, not  only  by  battle  losses,  but  by  the  forced  marches  to 
and  fro  of  the  young  soldiers,  unaccustomed  to  hard  cam- 
paigning ; victual  wras  becoming  scant,  and  though  he  never 
says  as  much,  it  is  manifest  that  Napoleon  must  have  foreseen 
early  retreat. 


THE  WITHDRAWAL. 


197 


The  withdrawal  began  on  the  24th,  when-Schwartzenberg 
was  about  to  move ; Mortier  reached  Dresden,  and  Souham 
and  Lauriston  on  the  26th ; Poniatowski  retired  via  Fiscli- 
bach;  Macdonald  with  his  corps  and  Sebastiani  covered  this 
operation  at  Weissig,  and  remained  awhile  on  the  left  bank; 


Arrighi  was  to  go  to  Leipsic  to  take  command  between  the 
Mulde  and  the  Saale,  including  Margaron’s  ten  thousand 
men  ; reinforcements  were  coming  up  under  Lefol,  and  Auge- 
reau  was  due  October  10 ; Marmont  and  Latour-Maubourg 
had  moved  to  Meissen;  l’Heritier  remained  in  observation  at 
Grossenhayn.  The  emperor  rode  out  towards  Bischofswerda 
to  watch  the  operation,  and  then  returned  to  Dresden.  Dur- 
ing the.  coming  few  days,  the  Old  Guard  and  two  divisions  of 


198 


THE  ENEMY  SLOWLY  ADVANCE. 


the  Young  Guard,  Macdonald,  Sebastiani  and  Souham  assem- 
bled in  Dresden;  Marmont  and  Latour-Maubourg  moved 
back  from  Meissen  to  Wurzen  to  sustain  Ney  at  Torgau  or 
Arrighi  at  Leipsic ; Lauriston,  and  Mortier  with  his  two  divi- 
sions of  the  Young  Guard,  took  post  opposite  Pillnitz;  St. 
Cyr  at  Borna  near  Chemnitz,  Lobau  at  Gieshiibel,  and  Victor 
on  their  right,  covered  the  main  roads  from  Bohemia.  Poni- 
atowski  marched  via  Nossen  on  Waldheim,  lest  the  allies 
should  cross  by  the  western  passes  of  the  Erzgebirge,  and  to 
sustain  Victor  and  Lefebvre-Desnouettes.-  When  Ney  retired 
from  Dennewitz,  he  had  assembled  his  troops  at  Torgau,  Sep- 
tember 8,  while  holding  the  right  bank,  and  he  now  moved  to 
Diiben.  On  the  19th  Oudinot’s  corps  was  broken  up  and 
added  to  the  two  others,  and  he  was  given  command  of  two 
divisions  of  the  Young  Guard.  Dombrovski  was  added  to 
Ney’s  command.  Meanwhile  the  enemy  slowly  advanced  to 
the  Elbe  and  threw  bridges  at  Elster,  Rosslau  and  Acken  ; on 
Ney  sending  Bertrand  to  Wartenburg,  which  he  took  on  the 
24th,  the  enemy  broke  the  Elster  bridge ; but  Ney  could  not 
capture  the  Rosslau  bridge-head.  He  then  stationed  Reynier 
at  Oranienbaum  and  Worlitz,  and  Bertrand  from  Kemburg 
to  Wartenburg. 

The  campaign  of  1818  does  not  exhibit  the  great  captain 
to  advantage.  Having  undertaken  a defensive  seems  to 
have  paralyzed  his  efforts.  For  some  time  he  had  felt  that 
he  must  fight  a great  battle,  but  he  let  every  chance  of  so 
doing  slip  until  his  enemies  assembled  all  their  forces  on  his 
rear.  At  Dresden  it  was  not  he  who  brought  about  the  battle, 
but  the  allies.  His  plan  of  the  defensive  on  the  Elbe  at 
Dresden  was  excellent,  but  he  did  not  carry  it  out  effectively. 
Even  up  to  the  24th  of  September,  had  he  been  willing  to 
throw  up  Dresden  and  move  vigorously  upon  Blucher,  put 
him  to  rout  and  then  turn  upon  Bernadotte,  he  could  yet  have 


QUESTIONS  SUGGESTED. 


199 


retrieved  the  campaign,  and  Schwartzenberg’s  inarch  on  Leip- 
sic  would  have  been  quickly  shifted  into  a movement  to  the 
rear.  To  the  worshiper  of  his  genius, 
it  is  amazing  to  see  Napoleon  moving 
all  around  Dresden  without  attacking 
anybody  seriously.  “ Victory,”  he  said, 

“ belongs  to  the  armies  that  manoeu- 
vre,” and  “The  force  of  an  army  is  in 
its  mass  multiplied  by  its  speed  ;”  and 
neither  of  these  maxims  was  he  putting 
into  use.  All  this  induces  the  student 
to  bring  up  certain  questions,  which, 
however  academic,  have  their  bearing. 

Similar  ones  were  indeed  shortly  sug- 
gested by  the  emperor  himself.  It  would 
have  been  good  strategy  for  Napoleon 
to  operate  on  the  right  bank  immedi- 
ately after  Dennewitz ; it  was  abso- 
lutely essential  that  he  should  do  so 
after  his  reconnoissance  in  the  Bohe- 
mian defiles  September  15  to  17.  Hav- 
ing ascertained  that  he  could  do  nothing 
there,  his  one  chance  of  getting  out  of 
his  difficulties  without  a retreat  to  the 
Saale  was  to  move  substantially  his  whole  army  over  to  the 
right  bank  and  manoeuvre  there  against  Blucher  and  Berna- 
dotte.  We  can  well  understand  that  by  leaving  St.  Cyr  and 
Lobau  with  some  cavalry  in  Dresden,  and  quickly  assembling 
the  Guard,  Victor,  Macdonald,  Lauriston,  Marmont,  Ponia- 
towski  and  the  main  body  of  cavalry  on  the  right  bank,  Napo- 
leon might  have  driven  Blucher  well  back,  have  held  Ponia- 
towski  at  Zittau  and  Victor  at  Hoyerswerda  to  keep  open 
communication,  have  followed  Blucher  well  beyond  the  Katz- 


Prussian  Lancer. 


200 


AS  THE  APPLE  OF  HIS  EYE. 


bach,  and  then  have  sent  Macdonald  and  Lauriston  with 
some  cavalry  to  Glogau,  Ciistrin  and  Stettin  to  gather  in  the 
garrisons,  and  bring  them  back  to  the  main  army.  Where- 
upon, leaving  Marmont  to  face  Blucher,  Napoleon  would  have 
been  in  force  to  turn  on  Berlin,  or  on  the  Army  of  the  Sover- 
eigns. With  Blucher  put  to  rout, 
Berlin  captured,  and  the  French 
army  reinforced  by  the  garrisons 
named,  even  if  the  Army  of  the 
Sovereigns  took  Dresden  and 
Leipsic,  Napoleon  still  had  his 
crossings  of  the  Elbe  at  Torgau 
and  below,  and  his  line  of  retreat 
on  Magdeburg  and  Hamburg.  It 
is  not  for  the  mere  critic  to  sug- 
gest to  the  great  captain,  but 
there  are  a dozen  manoeuvres  that 
we  can  imagine  Napoleon  under- 
taking, if  he  would  only  throw  up 
Dresden.  By  assembling  all  the 
forces  possible,  including  Davout 
and  Augereau,  he  could  unquestionably  have  disposed  of 
Blucher  and  Bernadotte,  and  thereafter  defeated  the  Army 
of  the  Sovereigns.  But  Dresden  seemed  as  the  apple  of  his 
eye ; and  no  manoeuvre  that  implied  leaving  it  found  favor. 

The  following  extracts  have  their  interest.  September  19  to  Berthier: 
“ Write  to  Victor  that  it  is  not  by  four  thousand  men,  but  by  four  hun- 
dred, that  General  Bruno  was  carried  off.  He  was  quietly  sleeping  in 
the  town  with  all  his  men.  So  long  as  light  troops  serve  so  badly,  acci- 
dents will  happen.  Instead  of  bivouacking  in  a military  position  and 
changing  camp  every  day,  General  Bruno  shut  himself  up  in  the  town. 
. . . Express  to  Victor  my  discontent  that  he  did  not  give  General  Bruno 
such  instructions  as  not  to  have  shut  himself  up  in  the  town.  The  marshal 
ought  to  have  known  . . . that  he  was  living  with  the  inhabitants  instead  of 


Bavarian  Artilleryman. 


GENERAL  BRUNO  SUSPENDED. 


201 


bivouacking.  . . . The  order  must  be  repeated  to  light  troops  never  to 
pass  a night  in  a town.  They  must  bivouac,  and  change  bivouac  in  the 
evening,  so  as  to  sleep  a half  league  or  a league  from  the  place  where 
they  were  at  sunset.  This  is  the  means  of  never  being  surprised.  . . . 
Light  cavalry  should  not  take  position  like  an  infantry  corps.  Their  ob- 
ject is  to  reconnoitre,  and  not  to  fight.  ...  It  is  to  be  made  known  that 
the  death  penalty  hangs  over  commandants  of  light-troop  patrols  wrho 
pass  the  night  in  a town.”  On  September  20  Berthier  was  instructed  to 
“Write  to  Macdonald  that  it  is  regrettable  that  he  made  a movement 
without  necessity  and  moved  his  bivouacs  and  his  camps  on  such  a horri- 
ble day,  which  made  his  troops  suffer  infinitely  ; that  General  Maurin 
seems  to  carry  on  war  very  badly,  that  he  was  not  at  his  post,  that 
he  was  cantoned  in  a castle  with  his  cavalry,  and  had  but  one  battalion 
of  infantry  and  twenty  chasseurs  as  outposts.  . . . Express  to  him  my 
dissatisfaction  ; that  it  is  not  thus  that  a general  of  light  troops,  flanking 
an  army,  should  serve.”  On  September  24  to  Berthier  : “ Write  to  Ney 
to  make  him  know  the  strange  conduct  of  Colonel  Biberstein,  who  retired 
with  four  hundred  well-mounted  cavalrymen,  five  hundred  infantrymen 
and  six  guns  as  far  as  Gottingen.  Let  General  Franquemont  make  these 
men  return  and  make  an  example  of  them.” 

These  offenses  gave  rise  to  an 


ORDER. 

His  Majesty  is  discontented  with  the  manner  in  which  the  service  of 
light  troops  of  cavalry  is  made.  General  X.  was  in  position  on  the  flanks 
of  the  army  without  a grand-guard,  and  with  all  his  horses  unbridled. 
Military  law  imposes  on  such  negligence  the  pain  of  death.  His  Majesty 
surprised  a brigadier  of  the  Guard,  who,  placed  in  grand-guard  near 
Pirna,  had  his  horse  unbridled.  His  Majesty  orders  that  this  brigadier 
be  cashiered.  General  Bruno  with  one  hundred  and  fifty  horse  ...  in- 
stead of  bivouacking,  of  changing  his  position  every  day,  and  of  never 
passing  the  night  in  a place  where  one  could  have  seen  sunset,  of  never 
entering  in  the  day  into  towns  and  villages,  simply  cantoned  in  Freiburg, 
placing  his  horses  in  stables,  and  was  there  surprised  by  four  hundred 
Austrians.  His  Majesty  orders  that  General  Bruno  shall  be  suspended 
and  his  conduct  sent  before  a commission  of  inquiry. 

Every  officer  and  sub-officer,  who,  being  on  grand-guard,  shall  neglect 
the  precautions  prescribed  by  military  regulations  ; every  commander, 


202 


PUNISHMENT  FOR  NEGLIGENCE . 


whoever  he  may  he,  of  light  troops  sent  on  reconnoissance,  or  detached 
without  infantry  on  scout  duty,  who  shall  neglect  to  take  the  prescribed 
precautions  ; every  cavalry  general  who,  flanking  the  position  of  the 
army,  shall  neglect  to  place  his  grand^guard  as  required  by  military 
regulations,  and  shall  expose  the  army  to  a surprise  of  the  enemy,  shall 
be  sent  before  a military  commission  and  condemned  to  death. 


French  Staff  Officer. 


LXIII. 


LEIPSIC  MANCEUVRE.  SEPTEMBER  25  TO  OCTOBER 

16,  1813. 

Elated  by  their  victories,  the  allies  now  proposed  to  seize  Leipsie  in  Napo- 
leon’s rear,  the  sovereigns  advancing  from  the  south  and  Bernadotte  and  Blu- 
cher  from  the  north  and  east.  Napoleon  should  have  divined  this  possibility, 
and  from  his  central  position  attacked  one  after  the  other.  Blucher  had  been 
gradually  moving  down  the  Elster,  and  on  October  3 crossed  the  Elbe  and  cap- 
tured Wartenburg,  while  Bernadotte  crossed  near  Dessau.  Ney  retired,  and 
both  advanced  on  Leipsie.  Napoleon  now  had  a last  chance  to  save  himself  by 
a smart  manoeuvre  against  Blucher  and  Bernadotte,  followed  by  one  against 
Schwartzenberg ; and  he  initiated  the  first  one  well  by  a movement  on  Wurzen. 
He  devised  a number  of  clever  operations  by  which  to  outwit  the  enemy,  but 
failed  to  do  the  one  thing  needful,  — to  move  sharply  against  the  northern  armies, 
and  having  defeated  them,  to  move  against  the  sovereigns.  Moreover,  he 
insisted  on  holding  Dresden,  when  he  should  have  given  up  the  city  and  recov- 
ered the  initiative.  Bernadotte  was  timid,  but  Blucher  held  him  to  his  work, 
and  the  two  got  ahead  of  the  French  and  reached  the  Saale.  Napoleon  then 
conceived  the  idea  of  operating  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Elbe  so  as  to  call  the 
allied  armies  back  to  save  their  communications,  but  he  was  unstable.  Striv- 
ing to  contain  Schwartzenberg,  Murat  was  forced  back,  and  by  October  12  it 
became  apparent  that  all  the  allied  armies  would  concentrate  at  Leipsie  on  the 
French  communications.  There  was  still  a chance  for  Napoleon  to  reach  the 
Saale  and  adopt  a new  line,  but  he  ordered  the  army  to  Leipsie,  where  he  would 
have  to  fight  the  combined  allies  ; and  yet  he  left  two  corps  in  Dresden.  On 
October  13  he  heard  that  his  friend,  Bavaria,  had  joined  the  allies,  which  gave 
them  an  overwhelming  force.  Even  then  there  was  a chance  for  him  to  escape 
by  calling  in  Murat  and  the  Dresden  forces  and  moving  around  to  the  north  of 
Leipsie,  defeating  Blucher  and  Bernadotte  before  Schwartzenberg  arrived,  and 
taking  up  the  Saale  as  a line  of  defense  ; but  he  persisted  in  moving  on  Leipsie 
to  do  battle. 

While,  with  a view  to  some  broader  strategic  movement, 
Napoleon  was  studying  his  maps,  and  weighing  rumors  and 


204 


BLUCHER’S  VIEW  PREVAILS. 


dispatches  from  the  front,  the  Army  of  the  Sovereigns  stood  at 
Toplitz  awaiting  Bennigsen,  who  had  lately  crossed  the  Oder. 
Some  of  the  army-council  desired  Bennigsen  to  remain  in 
Silesia,  while  Blucher  via  Zittau  should  join  the  Army  of  the. 
Sovereigns,  which,  three  hundred  thousand  strong,  could  then 
manoeuvre  against  the  French  communications  ; and  indeed 
the  sovereigns  agreed  with  this  plan  and  ordered  accordingly. 
But  doughty  Marsclial  Vor warts  had  no  idea  of  serving 
under  Schwartzenberg ; he  preferred  to  manoeuvre  by  his 
right  and  join  Bernadotte,  who  he  justly  said  would  accom- 
plish nothing  alone  ; and  he  urged  that  Berlin  ought  not  to 
be  thus  disgarnished.  Blucher  was  in  fact  right ; with  their 
excess  of  forces,  two  armies  were  at  this  moment  better,  and 
Blucher’s  view  prevailed  ; the  sovereigns,  appreciating  his 
honest  ardor,  gave  way.  The  allies  might  have  proposed  to 
surround  Napoleon  in  Dresden,  but  as  they  felt  that  he 
would  cut  himself  out,  their  plan  to  march  on  Leipsic  was 
renewed,  the  conditions  being  now  essentially  in  their  favor. 
Blucher  was  to  demonstrate  in  front  of  Dresden  until  Berna- 
dotte was  ready  to  pass  the  Elbe  below  Wittenberg ; then 
to  move  rapidly  down  and  himself  cross  between  Torgau 
and  Wittenberg,  while  Schwartzenberg  with  Bennigsen  in  sup- 
port should  debouch  into  Saxony.  All  this  was  determined  on 
by  mid-September  at  allied  headquarters.  Bennigsen  reached 
Leitmeritz  September  22,  and  everything  was  then  ready  to 
move  towards  the  common  goal.  From  this  point  on,  French 
affairs  were  to  go  downhill. 

Napoleon  had  given  up  the  idea  of  further  operating  against 
Blucher  on  the  right  bank.  His  eyes  were  on  the  lower  Elbe, 
where  Bernadotte  was  threatening ; but  instead  of  giving  up 
Dresden  and  assembling  all  his  forces  for  a great  blow  from 
his  central  position,  first  on  one  and  then  on  another  of  his 
enemies,  he  persisted  in  holding  the  city,  and  permitted  the 


TO  CONCENTRATE  TO  THE  REAR . 


205 


allies  to  keep  on  with  their  initiative  and  constantly  gain  in 
morale.  He  had  long  felt  sure  that  the  Army  of  the  Sover- 
eigns would  cross  the  Erzgebirge  by  its 
western  passes,  while  masking  those  nearer 
the  Elbe,  and  take  Dresden  in  reverse. 

Though  it  opened  Bohemia  to  a French 
thrust,  it  was  the  proper  thing  for  them  to 
do;  and  the  correctness  of  his  view  was 
soon  shown  by  an  allied  attack  on  Lefebvre- 
Desnouettes,  who  at  Altenburg  was  pro- 
tecting the  French  rear  from  raids.  He 
had  driven  back  the  light  parties  of  the 
enemy  ; but  on  September  26  he  was  at- 
tacked at  Altenburg  by  Plato v from  Chem- 
nitz, sustained  by  Klenau,  and  they,  with 
the  aid  of  Thielemann  from  the  Saale, 
forced  the  French  cavalry  back  of  Weis- 
senfels. 

How  much  this  might  mean,  Napoleon 
did  not  know,  but  unless  he  was  prepared 
to  undertake  some  definite  offensive  ma- 
noeuvre, he  had  no  choice  but  to  concentrate  to  the  rear. 
Marmont  was  sent  to  Leipsic,  leaving  Latour-Maubourg  at 
Wurzen  ; Lauriston  went  to  Waldheim,  Poniatowski  to  Froh- 
burg,  out  of  which  he  drove  Platov  September  30,  Victor  to 
Chemnitz  with  l’Heritier,  Souham  to  Meissen.  As  October 
opened,  Napoleon  became  convinced  that  Schwartzenberg  was 
manoeuvring  in  full  force  by  his  left;  he  wrote  Macdonald 
that  all  news  indicated  that  the  enemy  was  moving  from  Com- 
mottau  to  Marienburg ; and  again  that  the  Army  of  Silesia 
was  moving  by  its  right  on  Elsterwerda  and  Grossenhayn, 
which  seemed  to  him  to  point  to  Blucher’s  attacking  Dresden 
from  the  north,  to  avoid  the  Dresden  Forest.  But  Blucher 


Hanseatic  Infan- 
tryman. 


206 


THE  CASE  REVERSED. 


had  a broader  aim  ; and  on  September  25,  leaving  an  Austrian 
and  a Russian  corps  opposite  Dresden,  he  started  down  and 
back  of  the  Schwarze  Elster  by  way  of  Kamenz,  Konigsbruck 
and  Elsterwerda,  to  cross  the  Elbe  somewhere  near  the  mouth 
of  this  affluent.  Bernadotte  drew  in  his  left ; and  Sacken 
demonstrated  opposite  Macdonald  and  Marmont,  while  Yorck, 
Langeron  and  St.  Priest  filed  in  his  rear.  This  was  done 
with  skill  enough  to  deceive  Napoleon ; for  until  October  4 
he  was  in  the  dark  as  to  what  Blucher  was  doing.  But  he 
then  wrote  to  Macdonald  : — 

“ I attach  a great  importance  to  know  positively  what  has  become  of 
Langeron,  Sacken  and  Yorck.  1 desire,  then,  that  to-morrow  you  should 
make  a reconnoissance  of  seven  or  eight  thousand  men  ...  on  Grossen- 
hayn  (Sacken  has  been  in  that  country),  and  that  you  should  make  recon- 
noissances  in  every  direction,  so  as  to  know  positively  what  has  become 
of  the  enemy’s  Army  of  Silesia.” 

It  is  as  interesting  for  the  military  student  to  watch  the 
growth  of  Napoleon’s  indecisiveness  as  for  the  medical  man 
to  study  the  course  of  a grave  disease.  During  the  campaign 
of  Jena,  he  used  with  regard  to  the  Prussians  the  memorable 
words:  “While  they  consult,  the  French  army  marches.” 
But  the  case  was  now  reversed.  Napoleon  sat  in  his  office  in 
Dresden,  making  plans  suited  to  many  contingencies  which 
never  were  to  happen,  and  the  allied  armies  were  slowly  but 
surely  marching  around  his  flanks.  Formerly  he  had  always 
held  the  initiative ; had  made  and  set  about  his  general  plan, 
closely  observed  the  enemy,  so  as  to  modify,  but  not  to  vary, 
what  he  had  predetermined  as  the  best  strategic  manoeuvre,  and 
had  carried  it  through  to  the  end,  obliging  his  opponents  to 
watch  him  and  fashion  their  operations  on  what  he  did.  Now 
he  seemed  to  be  waiting  for  some  manoeuvre  of  the  enemy  to 
which  he  could  apply  a merely  temporary  check  ; the  broader 
scheme  was  lost  to  view  in  the  lesser.  His  position  in  Dres- 


BLUCHER  MOVES  DOWN  THE  ELS  TER. 


207 


den  had  become  untenable  as  a strategic  centre  ; and  yet  he 
remained  there  waiting  to  pounce  on  any  invader,  forgetful 
of  his  ancient  method  of  imposing  by  sheer  audacity  on  the 
enemy.  Moreover,  he  was  ill-served  by  his  lieutenants.  On 
October  4 he  wrote  to  Marmont : “ You  send  me  officers 
who  are  children,  who  know  nothing  and  cannot  give  verbally 
any  report.  Send  me  men.”  This  was  frequently  his  com- 
plaint. 

On  October  4 there  were  in  Dresden  the  Guard,  St.  Cyr, 
Lobau,  Macdonald,  Sebastiani ; Souham  was  at  Meissen; 
Marmont  and  Latour-Maubourg  stood  at  Taucha;  Augereau, 
with  Milhaud’s  cavalry,  had  reached  Jena.  Murat,  whom 
with  the  right  wing,  on  October  2,  Napoleon  had  detached  to 
fend  off  Schwartzenberg,  had  Poniatowski 
at  Altenburg,  Victor  and  l’Heritier  in  the 
Freiburg  country  and  Lauriston  at  Mitt- 
weida.  Ney,  with  Bertrand,  Reynier  and 
Dombrovski,  was  on  the  left  between  Wit- 
tenberg and  Diiben.  This  entire  force,  now 
all  on  Saxon  soil,  numbered  two  hundred 
and  twenty  thousand  men.  There  had  been 
a slight  shifting  of  the  divisions  in  the 
army  corps  : Albert’s  division  had  gone 
from  Souham  to  Macdonald  ; and  Mar- 
chand’s  Germans  to  Reynier ; but  the  or- 
ganization remained  much  as  heretofore. 

Meanwhile  Blucher  had  been  moving 
down  the  Elster.  Having  collected  boats 
at  Elster  village,  he  threw  two  bridges,  and 
crossed  during  the  night  of  October  2-3,  Yorck  at  the  head, 
followed  by  Langeron  and  Sacken.  He  had  to  capture  War- 
tenburg,  but  Bertrand,  though  but  a quarter  his  strength,  met 
him  stoutly  — Morand  holding  himself  six  hours  — and  then 


208 


BERNADOTTE  CROSSES  THE  ELBE. 


retired  on  Kemburg  to  get  nearer  Reynier  and  Dombrovski 
on  the  Mulde.  “ The  head  of  the  Army  of  Silesia  threw  dur- 
ing the  night  a bridge  at  Wartenburg,”  Napoleon  wrote  Mac- 
donald. “ Bertrand  occupied  the  isthmus  behind  dikes  and 
marshes.  He  fought  twelve  hours.  The  enemy  advanced 
seven  times  to  the  assault  to  dislodge  him  without  being  able 
to  do  so.  Seeing  in  the  evening  that  the  ” enemy  “was  being 
reinforced  at  every  instant,  Bertrand  retreated.”  At  the 
same  time  as  Blucher,  Bernadotte  was  crossing  near  Rosslau, 
his  van  at  Dessau.  Ney,  threatened  on  both  flanks,  retired 
to  Bitterfeld,  calling  on  Marmont  for  help.  The  latter  re- 
sponded, and  on  November  5 arrived  at  Eilenburg  with  his 
corps  and  Latour-Maubourg,  Ney  falling  back  on  Delitsch. 
Between  them  they  had  about  half  the  force  of  Bernadotte 
and  Blucher. 

On  October  5 Blucher  with  sixty  thousand  men  was  head- 
ing for  Diiben  on  the  way  to  Leipsic,  Bernadotte  had  an  equal 
number  at  Acken  and  Rosslau,  partly  across.  Both  were  mov- 
ing prudently  and  building  good  bridge-heads  in  their  rear. 
Schwartzenberg,  with  one  hundred  and  seventy  thousand 
men,  had  started  down  the  Eger  September  27,  and  debouch- 
ing from  Commottau  on  Chemnitz,  and  from  Carlsbad  on 
Annaberg  and  Zwickau,  was  on  October  4 at  Marienburg, 
while  Bennigsen  had  come  up  to  Toplitz  with  fifty  thousand 
fresh  Russians,  to  replace  him  and  later  follow  on.  Napoleon 
remained  ignorant  of  all  these  movements.  He  thought  Blu- 
cher would  stay  in  front  of  Dresden  some  time  longer,  and 
the  cavalry  skirmishes  south  of  Leipsic  did  not  let  him  sus- 
pect that  Schwartzenberg  was  so  near.  Now  that  his  unwar- 
ranted pause  from  operations  had  worked  against  him  and 
in  their  favor,  in  numbers,  position  and  morale,  the  allies  were 
ready  to  march  their  two  armies,  Schwartzenberg’s,  and  Ber- 
nadotte’s  and  Blucher’s  combined,  around  his  right  and  left 


BOLSTERING  UP  THE  LIEUTENANTS.  209 

flanks  and  sit  down  on  his  line  of  communications.  There 
was  but  one  answer  — and  that  was  a perfect  one  — to  this 
manifest  strategic  challenge  : for  Napoleon  to  give  up  Dresden, 
assemble  to  the  last  man,  throw  himself  in  mass,  while  yet 
there  was  time,  between  the  two  bodies,  and  beat  each  in  de- 
tail. This  was  an  operation  which,  a half-dozen  years  before, 
he  would  have  carried  out  to  immediate  and  complete  success, 


and  he  now  addressed  himself  to  it.  But  he  opened  it  by  an 
error  he  would  not  then  have  committed  : for  less  than  suffi- 
cient reasons,  he  held  on  to  the  Saxon  capital.  Meanwhile 
he  constantly  had  to  bolster  up  his  lieutenants,  writing  to 
Berthier  October  2 : “ One  should  not  lightly  cause  an  alarm. 


VOL.  IV. 


210 


TO  MOVE  ON  TORGAU. 


One  should  not  let  one’s  self  be  frightened  by  shadows.  One 
should  have  more  firmness  and  discernment.  Write  to  Ar- 
righi  that  he  gets  alarmed  too  easily,  and  that  he  is  too  quick 
to  believe  all  the  false  rumors  spread  by  the  enemy.  It  is  not 
thus  should  act  a man  of  experience ; he  should  show  more 
character.” 

We  all  know  how  easily  forces  in  the  rear  get  demoralized. 

It  was  during  the  night  of  October  4-5  that  Napoleon 
heard  of  the  defeat  of  Bertrand,  and  of  the  advance  of 
Schwartzenberg.  As  Schwartzenberg  was  the  farther  off,  he 
determined  to  move  against  Blucher ; and  ordering  Marmont 
with  Latour-Maubourg  and  Souham  to  march  towards  and 
take  orders  from  Ney,  which  gave  this  marshal  eighty  thou- 
sand men,  he  instructed  him  to  throw  the  enemy  back  behind 
the  Elbe  and  seize  his  bridges,  while  Oudinot  replaced  Sou- 
ham  at  Meissen.  Next  day,  after  studying  his  position  from 
all  its  standpoints,  Napoleon  decided  to  turn  with  his  whole 
army,  except  Murat,  on  Blucher  and  Bernadotte,  and  by  a 
novel  manoeuvre  force  them  to  battle.  “I  propose  to  move 
on  Torgau,”  he  wrote  Marmont  October  6,  “ and  from  there 
march  by  the  right  bank  so  as  to  cut  the  enemy  off  and  take 
away  all  his  bridges,  without  being  obliged  to  fight  against 
his  bridge-heads.  In  marching  by  the  left  bank  we  have  the 
inconvenience  that  the  enemy  may  recross  the  river  and  avoid 
battle.”  The  Old  and  Young  Guard  and  Sebastiani  were 
speeded  to  Meissen ; Murat,  basing  on  Leipsic,  was  to  fend 
off  Schwartzenberg ; St.  Cyr  and  Lobau  were  to  withdraw 
from  the  Erzgebirge  to  Dresden,  and  Macdonald  to  follow 
the  Guard  when  relieved.  Napoleon  always  kept  in  mind 
the  possibility  of  being  forced  into  one  great  battle  against 
all  his  foes,  but  he  saw  safety  in  bringing  about  a first 
contest  with  Blucher  and  Bernadotte,  and  then  one  with 
Schwartzenberg. 


FOUR  MASSES  CREATED. 


211 


“ The  emperor  is  going  to  deliver  battle,”  Berthier  wrote  Daru;  “ Dres- 
den will  be  occupied  by  thirty  thousand  men.  If  His  Majesty  loses  the 
battle,  the  place  will  be  evacuated.  In  this  case,  the  artillery  will  destroy 
the  gun  carriages  and  spike  the  guns.  The  engineers  will  burn  the  block- 
houses. The  administration  will  distribute  the  clothing  to  the  thirty 
thousand  men  who  remain  here.”  The  hospitals  will  be  left  in  charge  of 
officers.  “ The  carriages  of  the  military  equipage  train  will  be  burned. 
But  as  His  Majesty  will  win  the  battle,  Dresden  will  remain  always  his 
centre  of  operations.” 

St.  Cyr  arrived  in  Dresden  in  time  to  talk  with  the  em- 
peror, who  instructed  him,  with  his  two  corps,  to  hold  the  city 
while  he  himself  should  fight  Blucher,  or  Bernadotte,  or  both. 
St.  Cyr  tells  us  that  Napoleon’s  speech  wras  quick  and  decided, 
and  his  resolve  so  positive  that  he  could  not  permit  himself  a 
word ; but  having  so  ordered,  the  emperor  turned  to  Soult’s 
defeat  in  Spain  by  Wellington,  and  discussed  the  subject  with 
great  clearness  and  point.  At  midnight  Napoleon  again  called 
St.  Cyr,  and  told  him  he  had  changed  his  plan  and  decided 
to  take  the  two  corps  with  him;  that  in  the  battle  he  would 
fight,  he  ought  to  have  all  his  forces ; that  if  he  lost,  St.  Cyr 
would  be  cut  off,  and  that  after  all  Dresden  was  of  no  further 
strategic  value,  and  later,  when  frozen,  the  Elbe  would  also  be 
of  none.  He  proposed  a better  position  for  the  winter,  with 
right  on  Erfurt  and  centre  along  the  Saale,  whose  high  left 
bank  is  easily  defended,  and  his  left  on  Magdeburg.  Dres- 
den, he  said,  was  too  near  Bohemia  to  permit  of  manoeuvring 
in  the  broadest  sense ; but  in  a more  distant  position  he  could 
form  a species  of  sack,  and  into  this  lure  the  allies.  This  was 
sensible ; he  had  clearly  grasped  the  danger  into  which  his 
long  dwelling  in  Dresden  had  placed  him. 

Thus  Napoleon  created  four  masses : Ney  with  eighty  thou- 
sand men  opposite  Blucher  and  Bernadotte,  Murat  with  forty 
thousand  and  Arrighi  in  Leipsic  with  thirty  thousand  men 
in  support,  holding  back  Schwartenzberg,  and  St.  Cyr  with 


212 


MOVEMENTS  OF  ARMY  CORPS. 


thirty  thousand  men  in  Dresden;  while  with  the  Guard, 
Macdonald  and  Sebastiani,  sixty  thousand  men,  Napoleon  was 
to  move  on  Wurzen,  so  as  to  be  able  to  sustain  either  Ney  or 
Murat.  If  Ney  and  Marmont  got  the  better  of  Blucher  and 
Bernadotte,  Napoleon  would  join  them  and  finish  the  matter ; 
if  they  were  driven  back,  he  would  call  them  in  and  move  to 
Leipsic. 

During  the  night  of  October  6-7,  the  entire  new  offensive 
plan  was  clearly  dictated  in  a 

NOTE  ON  THE  MOVEMENTS  OF  DIFFERENT  ARMY  CORPS. 

Dresden,  October  7,  1813,  1 a.  m.  1st.  Make  daring  the  7th  a strong 
march  on  Wurzen.  I can  have  my  headquarters  there  with  Sdbastiani’s 
cavalry,  with  all  the  Guard,  Oudinot’s  corps  four  leagues  from  Wurzen, 
so  as  to  be  to-morrow,  the  8th,  at  Leipsic,  if  absolutely  essential.  2d. 
The  3d  Corps  will  probably  be  at  Wurzen,  because  Mortier  has  headed 
it  for  the  Mulde.  3d.  Lauriston  can  take  position  at  Rochlitz  ; he  has 
but  three  leagues  to  march.  Victor  can  go  to  Mittweida,  beginning  his 
movement  a little  late.  They  will  find  themselves  in  communication 
with  Poniatowski,  who  is  at  Frohburg.  To-morrow  they  can  be  at  Froh- 
burg,  thus  containing  the  head  of  the  enemy’s  army.  St.  Cyr  can  to-day, 
the  7th,  direct  the  1st  and  14th  Corps  on  Dresden,  have  Meissen  occupied 
to-morrow  the  8th,  and  commence  his  movement,  evacuate  Dresden  the 
7tli,  and  move  promptly  on  Wurzen. 

By  the  result  of  this  movement  I shall  be  master  to  do  what  I will: 
from  Wurzen  I can  move  on  Torgau  and  on  the  enemy,  debouching  from 
Wittenberg,  or  else  head  my  whole  army  on  Leipsic,  and  have  a general 
battle  ; or  else  recross  the  Saale. 

Murat  would  move  on  Mittweida,  masking  his  movements  ; he  would 
not  evacuate  Flohe  until  the  night  of  the  7th.  The  enemy  would  only 
know  on  the  morning  of  the  8th  that  there  is  nobody  left  on  the  road  from 
Chemnitz  to  Dresden.  Lauriston  would  reach  Rochlitz,  and  would  not 
abandon  Mittweida  until  the  head  of  the  2d  Corps  had  arrived. 

On  the  8th,  the  2d  Corps  would  move  on  Rochlitz,  and  would  remain 
in  observation  from  Rochlitz  to  Frohburg,  occupying  Colditz,  so  as  to  get 
in  connection  with  the  army.  It  would  remain  there  until  new  orders, 


THE  MOST  CAUTIOUS  PLAN . 213 

unless  the  enemy  should  push  it.  In  this  case,  it  would  approach  Leipsic 
without  losing  touch  with  the  Mulde. 

On  the  8th,  the  army  that  I command  in  person  would  be  about 
Wurzen  ; on  the  10th,  the  corps  of  St.  Cyr  would  be  about  Wurzen. 

This  entire  Note  is  clear  and  to  the  point.  For  the  moment 
Napoleon  was  himself  again.  Satisfied  that  Dresden  had  been 
strategically  outworn,  he  had  chosen  W urzen  on  the  Mulde  as 
a position  from  which  to  fall  on  any  force  which  should  cross 
the  Elbe,  crush  it,  and 
drive  it  back  across  the 
river ; whereupon  he  could 
in  safety  join  Murat  and 
deliver  battle  to  the  Army 
of  the  Sovereigns.  The 
subsidiary  idea  in  the 
Note,  retiring  on  Leipsic, 
is  faulty,  in  that  this  would 
enable  all  the  concen- 
trically marching  allied 
armies  to  join  here  for  bat- 
tle and  overwhelm  him  by 
mere  force  of  numbers ; 
but  Napoleon  still  felt 
himself  so  able  in  battle 
that  he  weighed  this  little.  Silesian  Hussar. 

Battle  to  him,  as  to  Fred- 
erick, was  the  sword  with  which  to  cut  a knot  when  strategy 
could  not  untie  it ; and  he  felt  that,  with  equal  factors,  he 
could  defeat  any  opponent.  Why  he  had  not  sooner  offen- 
sively resorted  to  it  is  a mystery. 

In  default  of  a grand  manoeuvre,  to  retire  behind  the  Saale 
was  really  the  wisest,  because  the  most  cautious  plan.  Starting 
now,  he  could  reach  this  line  first,  and  would  be  constantly 


214 


BA  TTLE  NEEDED.  . 


gaining  while  the  oncoming  enemy  would  be  steadily  losing ; 
on  this  stream  he  could  adopt  a fresh  defensive  position  similar 
to  that  of  the  Elbe.  The  difficulty  was  that  Napoleon  could 
not  afford  to  retire  : it  was  a matter  of  reputation,  and  con- 
sequent moral  influence.  How  could  he  vacate  Saxony  with- 
out a battle  ? Giving  this  reason  due  weight,  the  Mulde  was 
a proper  substitute  for  the  Saale. 

And  yet  it  seems  as  if,  had  Napoleon  in  due  season  forced 
back  Blucher,  released  or  not  the  Oder  garrisons,  and  even 
temporarily  defeated  Bernadotte,  had  he  drawn  in  Augereau 
and  Davout  and  retired  towards  the  Rhine,  he  was  strong 
enough  to  turn  back  upon  the  sovereigns,  who  would  mean- 
while have  overrun  Saxony,  and  give  them  battle  in  one  body 
with  every  chance  of  success.  In  any  case,  what  Napoleon 
needed  was  battle,  and  if  he  was  not  to  manoeuvre  on  the  right 
bank,  he  could  have  got  it  better  by  leaving  Dresden,  and 
drawing  in  all  his  forces  to  a point  in  the  rear.  It  is  also  not 
improbable  that  had  Napoleon  assembled  all  his  forces  and 
marched  towards  the  Rhine,  the  allies,  seeing  him  willing  to 
evacuate  Germany,  might  have  made  him  a bridge  of  gold. 
Nothing  shows  the  weakening  of  his  resolution  more  than  the 
fact  that,  when  he  saw  his  strength  dwindling,  he  did  not 
strictly  concentrate  his  troops.  Both  in  1813  and  1814  he 
lost  the  campaign  by  not  giving  up  unessential  points  for  the 
sake  of  winning  at  essential  ones. 

The  French  troops,  on  October  7,  lay  as  follows:  Souham 
was  at  Torgau ; the  Old  Guard,  Oudinot,  Mortier,  Macdonald 
and  Sebastiani  at  and  near  Meissen;  Marmont  at  Taucha; 
Ney  not  far  below  Wurzen  ; St.  Cyr  and  Lobau  in  Dresden  ; 
Arrighi  in  Leipsic ; and  Murat  fending  off  the  sovereigns. 

Orders  were  issued  by  Berthier  in  accordance  with  the  Note, 
Napoleon  working  continuously  until  morning,  when  he  left 
Dresden  for  Meissen.  Arrived  near  Wurzen  the  same  even- 


AN  INEXPLICABLE  LAPSE. 


215 


ing  (October  7),  he  learned  that  Blucher  had  scarcely  passed 
Diiben,  and  that  Schwartzenberg’s  van  only  had  got  to  Alten- 
hurg.  This  gave  him  more  time  than  he  had  expected  in 
which  to  move  upon  Blucher.  Ney  and  Marmont  had  not 
acted  together,  and  Ney  had  come  back  up  the  Mulde  and 
Marmont  returned  towards  Leipsic. 

During  October  8 the  emperor’s  plan  grew  more  definite. 
As  Blucher  and  Bernadotte  were  still  separated  by  the  Mulde, 
during  the  night  of  the  8th-9th  he  gave  orders  to  concentrate 
forward,  Ney  in  the  centre  at  Eilenburg  and  thence  to  Diiben 
with  Souham,  Dombrovski  and  Reynier,  on  the  right  Bertrand 
with  Macdonald  in  support  on  Mockrehna,  on  the  left  Mar- 
mont, whom  Latour-Maubourg  was  to  join,  on  Diiben,  the 
Guard  sustaining  the  centre.  He  had  one  hundred  and  forty 
thousand  men,  and  hoped  to  drive  Blucher  across  the  Elbe, 
disengage  Wittenberg,  and  destroy  the  enemy’s  bridges,  so  as 
to  keep  them  for  some  days  from  interfering  with  the  attack 
on  Schwartzenberg  that  he  would  then  turn  about  and  make ; 
and  he  accordingly  sent  orders  to  Murat  to  hold  firm.  This 
scheme  seemed  to  be  so  certain  of  results  that  he  again  noti- 
fied St.  Cyr  not  to  leave  Dresden,  but  to  remain  there  with  his 
two  corps,  as,  if  he  crossed  to  the  right  bank,  he  might  want 
to  come  back  to  Dresden.  He  felt  that  he  had  the  enemy 
in  a false  position,  and  should  not  need  St.  Cyr’s  forces. 

Here  is  again  an  inexplicable  lapse.  Napoleon  was  aiming 
to  bring  about  the  most  important  of  all  military  events,  one 
or  more  general  engagements  ; and  yet  in  defiance  of  the  prin- 
ciple which  had  made  him  great,  the  principle  of  bringing 
together  all  his  forces  for  battle,  he  permitted  a quite  subsidi- 
ary desire,  that  of  retaining  a hold  on  Dresden  (for  the  mere 
vanity  of  possession,  it  has  been  suggested),  to  diminish  his 
forces  by  two  whole  army  corps.  If  he  won,  as  he  well  knew, 
Dresden  would  be  his  again ; if  he  lost,  he  must  also  forfeit 


216 


BOTH  ALLIED  ARMIES  ADVANCE. 


Dresden.  There  is  perhaps  no  one  maxim  on  which  Napoleon, 
in  all  he  said  and  wrote,  laid  so  much  stress  as  this  one,  to 
have  every  man  in  every  division  under  the  colors  on  the  day 
of  battle,  to  have  every  division  present,  to  beware  of  detailed 
forces,  to  bring  up  each  and  every  body,  large  and  small, 
within  reach.  Reread  the  orders  before  the  battle  of  Borodino. 
Yet  at  this  important  moment  he  himself  broke  the  rule  he 
had  dinned  into  the  ears  of  his  subordinates  for  many  years. 
His  reason  for  this  error  cannot  be  guessed.  The  remote 
chance  of  his  needing  Dresden  bridge  does  not  suffice.  Tor- 
gau  would  have  done  as  well.  Yet  error  it  was,  and  it  proved 
to  be  a bitter  one.  How  had  the  man  changed  since  the  days 
when  he  deliberately  gave  up  the  siege  of  Mantua,  to  fight  a 
battle  with  all  his  forces  and  win  Mantua  back  — and  many 
things  besides ! 

On  October  8,  while  Napoleon  was  moving  down  the  Mulde 
to  the  attack,  Bernadotte  was  at  Radegast,  Tauenzien  at 
Dessau,  and  Blucher  not  yet  across  the  Mulde,  Yorck  being 
at  Bitterfeld,  Langeron  at  Diiben,  Sacken  at  Mockrehna. 
Both  allied  armies  were  advancing  prudently,  knowing  little 
of  the  French  movements.  On  hearing  of  Napoleon’s  oncom- 
ing in  force,  Bernadotte,  timid  about  meeting  his  old  master, 
wished  to  recross  the  Elbe  ; but  all  Blucher  would  agree  to  do 
was  to  avoid  battle  until  they  could  join  the  sovereigns.  The 
day  before  they  had  intended  to  march  on  Leipsic  ; now 
Blucher’s  opinion  prevailed  to  move  towards  the  Saale  to  join 
the  sovereigns  back  of  Leipsic.  He  was  unwilling  to  give  up 
the  Leipsic  plan,  although  he  was  cutting  loose  from  his  com- 
munications with  Berlin,  and  must  rely  upon  the  country, 
which,  however,  was  friendly.  If  he  could  not  reach  Leipsic, 
he  might  join  the  sovereigns  in  the  Liitzen  country ; and  the 
gallant  old  soldier  carried  out  his  plans  with  as  much  fearless- 
ness as  he  later  did  at  Waterloo  While  it  was  doubtless 


BLUCHER  ESCAPES  NAPOLEON.  217 

Blucher’s  courage  that  was  the  heart  of  the  matter,  Gneisenau’s 
head  was  in  it  for  an  equal  amount. 

Believing  Blucher  to  be  at  Diiben,  Napoleon  broke  up  early 
on  the  9th  to  march  on  that  place,  writing  the  governor  of 
Torgau : “ I march  to-day  on  Diiben,  to-morrow  on  Witten- 
berg. Either  I shall  deliver  battle  to  the  enemy,  and  with 
the  aid  of  God  I hope  to  have  a complete  success,  or  I shall 
oblige  the  enemy  to  raise  the  siege  of  Wittenberg,  and  I will 
seize  his  two  bridges  at  Dessau  and  Wartenburg;  and  as 
he  has  immense  baggage  on  the  left  bank,  his  retreat  will  be 
difficult.”  At  the  same  time  Blucher  was  strung  out  from 
Bitterfeld  to  Mockrehna,  and  Langeron  was  to  hold  Diiben 
until  Sacken  could  come  on ; but  Ney  in  the  afternoon,  mov- 
ing down  from  Eilenburg,  chased  Langeron  out  of  Diiben, 
and  S^bastiani  and  Bertrand  attacked  Sacken,  who  only  joined 
the  other  forces  by  a northerly  night  circuit.  Macdonald  was 
near  Mockrehna,  Marmont  and  Reynier  approaching  Diiben, 
Souham  Priestablich,  Bertrand  beyond  Audenhayn,  the  em- 
peror and  the  Guard  reaching  Eilenburg.  Blucher  kept  up 
his  march  towards  the  Saale,  Langeron  and  Yorck  reached 
Jessnitz  and  Miihlbeck  during  the  day.  On  October  10  Blu- 
cher crossed  at  Bitterfeld  and  Jessnitz,  the  French  feeling  his 
rearguard.  He  had  been  smart  enough  to  escape  Napoleon, 
who,  indeed,  did  not  know  what  direction  he  had  taken,  nor 
whether  he  had  crossed  the  Mulde  the  more  easily  to  cross 
the  Elbe,  or  else  to  make  a circuit  towards  Schwartzenberg ; 
but  when,  at  Diiben,  the  emperor  heard  from  Murat  that  the 
sovereigns  were  advancing,  though  he  might  have  guessed  that 
Blucher  and  Bernadotte  were  moving  towards  their  colleagues, 
he  still  held  to  the  belief  that  they  would  recross  the  Elbe  in 
retreat,  so  soon  as  he  threatened  their  bridges. 

On  the  10th,  accordingly,  Napoleon  pushed  Macdonald  on 
Wittenberg,  Bertrand  to  Schmiedeberg,  Ney  to  Griifenhayn- 


218 


A NEW  STRATEGIC  IDEA. 


chen,  Reynier  via  Schkona  on  Kemburg,  Sebastiani  on  Tre- 
bitz ; with  the  Guard,  Marmont  and  Latour-Maubourg  he 
himself  reached  Diiben.  Until  this  day  he  had  made  a good 
effort  to  get  at  Blucher  and  defeat  him  singly,  but  now,  out 
of  all  patience  with  what  he  thought  was  another  evasion  of 
battle  by  this  wily  soldier,  he  began  working  on  a wrong  the- 
ory. He  must  have  been  conscious  that  Schwartzenberg 
was  slowly  but  inevitably  drawing  nearer  Leipsic,  and  that 
Murat  could  not  long  stave  him  off.  On  October  7,  at  1 A.  m., 
he  had  written  Berthier : “ Murat’s  principal  aim  is  to  be  to 
retard  the  march  of  the  enemy  on  Leipsic,  never  letting  him- 
self be  cut  off  from  the  Mulde,  so  that  we  can  all  approach 
Leipsic  at  the  same  time,  keeping  the  enemy  at  a distance,  or, 
if  necessary,  deliver  a general  battle.”  He  could  not  give  up 
the  idea  that  Blucher  and  Bernadotte,  unwilling  to  risk  battle, 
had  moved  farther  down  to  cross  to  the  right  bank,  and 
determined  to  follow  and  force  them  to  battle  in  case  they 
defended  the  river  crossing.  And  this  produced  a new  strate- 
gic idea : to  cross  the  Elbe  himself  and  assume  the  Dresden- 
Magdeburg  line  along  the  right  bank  as  his  line  of  operations, 
leaving  Murat,  who  had  over  sixty  thousand  men,  to  hold 
Schwartzenberg  in  Leipsic,  or,  failing  to  do  so  without  a gen- 
eral engagement,  to  march  via  Eilenburg  to  Torgau  or  Wit- 
tenberg, and  also  cross  the  Elbe.  This  would  withdraw  from 
Schwartzenberg  his  main  objective,  Murat’s  army,  and  (on  the 
assumption  always  that  Blucher  and  Bernadotte  had  passed 
to  the  right  bank)  he  would  have  placed. the  Elbe  between  the 
two  allied  armies,  he  holding  all  the  crossings,  and  be  enabled 
surely  to  deal  with  each  one  single-handed.  It  was  curious 
that  the  emperor  knew  so  little  of  the  enemy’s  movements  ; 
but  the  half-hearted  Saxons  now  were  spies  rather  than  allies. 

On  October  10,  during  the  afternoon,  he  addressed  Berthier  : “ My 
Cousin,  you  will  write  to  Murat  that  I have  . . . raised  the  blockade  of 


LETTER  TO  ST.  CYR. 


219 


Wittenberg  ; that  I have  cut  off  . . . Sacken  from  . . . Langeron  and 
. . . Yorck  ; that  I have  ordered  Arrighi  to  send  away  everything  which 
embarrasses  him  to  Eilenburg  and  Wittenberg  ; that  Augereau  is  at 
Liitzen  or  Leipsic  this  evening  ; that  Arrighi  . . . united  to  Augereau 
will  make  for  the  king  a reinforcement  of  . . . thirty  thousand  men  ; 
that  one  of  two  things  will  happen  : I shall  to-morrow  . . . defeat  the 
enemy,  or  if  he  retires,  I shall  burn  his  bridges  and  move  over  to  the 
right  bank.  Thus  Murat  should  manoeuvre  to  conserve  Leipsic  and  give 
me  time  to  beat  the  Army  of  Silesia  ; but  if  compelled  to  leave  Leipsic, 
he  is  to  direct  everything  to  the  Mulde  ; that  the  bridges  of  Eilenburg 
and  Diiben  are  guarded  ; that  my  intention,  in  this  case,  is  to  pass  to  the 
right  bank  of  the  Elbe,  and  to  manoeuvre  between  Magdeburg  and  Dres- 
den, debouching  by  one  of  my  four  places  to  surprise  the  enemy.  Murat 
should  manoeuvre  in  accordance,  etc.” 

On  October  10  Napoleon  from  Eilenburg  told  Maret  to  write  to  St. 
Cyr  “that  my  head  of  column  will  be  to-day  at  Wittenberg;  that  it  is 
possible  that  to-morrow  or  day  after  to-morrow  there  will  be  a battle  ; that 
this  event  passed,  I will  return  towards  him.  Make  him  know  that  you 
have  news  from  Murat,  who  is  at  Altenburg.  . . . That  ...  I count  on 
his  holding  Dresden.  . . . That  if  ...  he  could  not  hold  himself,  . . . 
St.  Cyr  can  retire  on  Torgau  by  one  or  the  other  bank  ; that  if  there  is  a 
battle  and  I beat  the  enemy  here,  the  Austrians  will  retire  within  their 
frontier,  and  I will  approach  Torgau  by  the  right  bank,  . . . and  there- 
upon make  a visit  to  Berlin,  but  after  having  disengaged  him.  If,  on  the 
contrary,  there  is  no  battle,  ...  I may  manoeuvre  by  the  right  bank  of  the 
Elbe,  because  all  the  projects  of  the  enemy  having  been  founded  on 
movements  by  the  left  bank,  I also  wish  to  fall  on  their  line  of  operation  ; 
that  the  result  ...  of  to-day  and  to-morrow  may  be  incalculable  ; that 
I count  on  his  firmness  and  his  prudence.  ...  I am  in  haste  to  receive 
information  from  Leipsic  . . . and  to  know  if  the  enemy  is  going  to  the 
rear  or  to  the  front.  . . . His  great  force  is  between  the  Mulde  and  the 
Saale.  It  is  between  the  Mulde  and  the  Elbe  I am  preparing  to  manoeu- 
vre, until  new  information  and  the  event  make  me  move  to  the  Elbe.” 
To  this  letter  is  appended  : “His  Majesty  is  just  getting  into  the  saddle, 
and  orders  me  to  sign  this  letter.  Baron  Fain.”  A number  of  letters  of 
Napoleon’s  are  signed  after  a similar  fashion. 

Again  he  wrote  Maret,  3 P.  M.,  October  10  : “ My  intention  is,  if  Murat 
is  obliged  to  evacuate  Leipsic,  to  recross  the  Elbe  with  all  my  army,  by 
throwing  the  Army  of  Silesia  and  of  Berlin  on  to  the  right  bank  and  taking 


220 


THE  MAJOR  PREMISE  WRONG. 


all  the  time  to  destroy  them,  or  if  they  prefer  to  abandon  their  bridges, 
to  leave  them  on  the  left  bank,  and  to  take  my  line  of  operation  on  the 
right  bank  from  Dresden  to  Magdeburg.  . . . Send  word  of  this  to  Paris, 
so  that  they  may  not  be  astonished  at  anything  the  enemy  may  publish, 
and  that  they  may  know  that  it  is  a combined  movement  on  my  part 
to  bring  the  enemy  to  battle,  and  to  something  decisive.  ...  It  is  un- 
necessary to  confide  this  secret  to  Murat.  You  will  only  let  him  under- 
stand that  affairs  are  going  well.  . . . But  if  combined  movements  do 
not  permit  him  at  this  moment  to  go  to  Leipsic,  that  it  is  preferable 
that  he  should  come  to  Wittenberg  or  Torgau.  It  is  Torgau  that  St.  Cyr 
is  to  have  in  view  by  one  bank  or  the  other,  and  as  soon  as  I shall  have 
overcome  the  Army  of  Silesia,  I will  manoeuvre  by  the  right  bank  to  put 
myself  in  communication  with  St.  Cyr.”  An  hour  later  he  wrote  Arrighi : 
“ I suppose  that  Murat,  joined  to  you  and  Augereau,  can  hold  Leipsic. 
If  it  is  otherwise,  my  intention  is  that  the  retreat  should  be  made  on  the 
Mulde  by  the  bridge  of  Eilenburg  and  Diiben,  and  if  it  becomes  neces- 
sary, on  the  Elbe  by  Wittenberg  and  Torgau,  my  project  being  to  entirely 
disconcert  the  enemy  (in  case  I should  not  have  time  to  beat  the  Army 
of  Berlin  before  the  enemy  can  reach  Leipsic),  to  give  up  the  entire  left 
bank,  and  thus  have  time  to  destroy  this  army,  having  magazines  and 
debouches  on  Dresden,  Torgau,  Wittenberg  and  Magdeburg.  This  de- 
mands the  greatest  secrecy.  . . . My  intention  is,  however,  and  you  will 
make  it  known  to  Murat,  that  Leipsic  is  not  to  be  abandoned,  unless  it 
should  be  necessary  so  as  not  to  engage  an  affair  with  inferior  forces. 
Choose  a good  position  so  as  to  show  it  to  Murat,  assemble  your  troops 
and  Augereau’s  to  there  receive  his  army.”  And  at  the  same  time  he 
wrote  Reynier  : “ Everything  leads  one  to  believe  that  the  Army  of  Ber- 
lin has  manoeuvred  on  the  Saale,  in  concert  with  the  movement  from 
Zwickau.  As  a means  of  upsetting  everything,  I will  go  to  the  Elbe, 
where  I have  the  advantage,  because  I have  Hamburg,  Magdeburg,  Wit- 
tenberg, Torgau  and  Dresden.” 

This  was  a handsome  conception ; but  the  emperor’s  major 
premise  was  wrong  — that  the  two  allied  commanders  would 
recross  the  Elbe  — and  his  conclusion  failed  ; for  Blucher,  by 
throwing  up  his  line  of  retreat,  marching  to  join  Schwartzen- 
berg,  and  compelling  Bernadotte  to  stand  firm,  made  it  value- 
less. On  the  11th  the  two  allied  armies  approached  the  Saale 


ANOTHER  PLAN  DEVISED. 


221 


country.  The  emperor’s  intellectual  alertness  overrode  his 
physical,  and  the  situation  led  him  to  devise  still  another  of 
his  brilliant  strategic  plans.  It  was  a corollary  of  the  propo- 
sition of  October  10.  The  Elbe  and  the  Oder  were  held  by 
his  fortresses ; the  Baltic  closed  the  third  side  of  the  quad- 
rangle : if  he  should  draw  in  Murat  and  throw  himself  bodily 
into  this  theatre,  live  on  Prussian  resources,  and  close  the 
fourth  side  on  the  south,  would  his  enemies  have  courage 
enough  to  play  so  big  a game 
as  to  advance  on  the  Rhine  ? 

He  did  not  think  they  would; 
the  Rhine  was  too  well  fortified, 
and  the  whole  business  was  too 
risky.  Would  they  not  rather 
return  to  defend  their  own  base? 

Blucher  and  perhaps  Berna- 
dotte  had  escaped  him,  and 
were  on  the  Saale,  reaching  out 
to- the  Army  of  the  Sovereigns. 

Between  these  two  masses  the 
strategic  area  was  now  not  wide 
enough  for  Napoleon  to  ma- 
noeuvre ; he  had  worked  too 
slowly  to  keep  them  apart. 

Beyond  the  Elbe  was  all  the 
space  needed ; and  while  the 
sovereigns  were  debating  at  Pomeranian  Dragoon. 

Leipsic,  Napoleon  could  seize 

Berlin  and  destroy  the  allied  detachments  which  stood  in  front 
of  Magdeburg,  Torgau,  Dresden,  Glogau,  Ciistrin  and  Stet- 
tin, and  add  the  garrisons  to  his  own  army.  Would  not  this 
compel  the  allies  to  return  to  the  right  bank  of  the  Elbe  and 
to  stay  there  ? Napoleon  would  have  two  hundred  and  fifty 


222  THE  EMPEROR  CONTINUES  UNSTABLE. 


thousand  men  ; could  he  not  beat  the  allies  in  battle  with 
the  moral  forces  in  his  favor,  better  than  near  Leipsic  with 
the  moral  forces  against  him  ? 

But,  reports  Caulaincourt,  Napoleon’s  marshals  protested. 
The  plan  seemed  wild  to  them,  and  his  staff  begged  him  to 
give  it  up.  The  troops  were  not  equal  to  such  a campaign ; 
the  cavalry  was  wanting  in  numbers  and  quality.  Could  the 
arsenals  of  Prussia  now  supply  material  enough  after  equip- 
ping so  large  an  army  ? Were  provisions  really  obtainable  ? 
It  was  true  that  by  drawing  in  all  the  garrisons  of  the  Elbe 
and  the  Rhine,  Napoleon  could  march  to  and  fro  throughout 
the  lands  of  his  foes  ; yet  what  the  Consul  Bonaparte  might 
dare,  the  Emperor  Napoleon  dared  not.  But  it  was  a bold, 
splendid  conception. 

The  emperor  continued  unstable  : he  wavered  between  Wit- 
tenberg and  Leipsic ; and  again,  on  the  11th,  though  he  believed 
the  enemy  to  be  near  Dessau,  he  could  not  help  seeing  that 
Blucher  might  have  been  aiming  for  the  Saale,  and  in  this  view 
still  pushed  on  to  Wittenberg  to  threaten  his  rear.  Reynier 
and  Dombrovski  were  there  to  cross  the  Elbe,  Souham  to  go 
to  Dessau,  Bertrand  and  Sebastiani  to  Wartenburg  to  break 
the  bridge,  Macdonald  in  support,  and  the  Guard  in  reserve 
at  Diiben.  Marmont  was  to  cross  the  Mulde  at  Diiben,  and 
guard  the  approaches  to  Leipsic.  The  troops  were  to  recon- 
noitre on  all  sides  to  get  in  touch  with  the  allies,  when  they 
should  return  to  the  Elbe.  The  French  advanced,  meeting 
only  rearguards,  and  Marmont  saw  evidence  of  the  allied 
movement  to  the  Saale.  In  the  evening  news  ran  in  from 
Murat  that  on  the  10th  he  had  fought  the  allies : he  thought 
Schwartzenberg  might  be  on  the  retreat. 

Napoleon  would  not  give  up  hope  that  his  threat  to  Dessau 
and  Rosslau  would  induce  Bernadotte  and  Blucher  to  come 
back  to  the  protection  of  Berlin ; but,  determined  to  occupy  the 


THE  OLD  VIGOR  WANTING . 


223 


line  of  the  Saale,  Blucher  had  pushed  on  to  Halle  and  Lobe- 
jun,and  Bernadotte  remained  in  the  Cothen-Rothenburg  coun- 
try. Tauenzien,  left  near  Dessau  to  protect  the  Rosslau  and 
Acken  bridges,  seeing  the  French  advance  on  Wittenberg, 
feared  to  be  cut  off  from  Berlin,  and  crossed  to  the  right  bank 
at  Rosslau.  Reynier  had  also  crossed  at  Wittenberg,  and 
drove  an  allied  detachment  observing  the  place  back  on  Cos- 
wig. Macdonald  followed  to  Wittenberg,  Bertrand  reached 
Wartenburg,  Latour-Maubourg  Kemburg. 

All  this  savors  of  hesitancy,  and  eye-witnesses  testify  to  the 
emperor’s  want  of  the  old  vigor  which  earned  him  so  many 
victories.  Odenleben  tells  us  that  he  saw  him  on  a sofa  in  his 
office  at  Diiben,  before  a table  at  which  he  was  idly  marking 
a sheet  of  paper,  while  his  geographer,  d’Albe,  and  his  assist- 
ant were  waiting  for  work  to  be  given  them.  He  was  looking 
for  reports  from  the  Elbe.  Marmont  brought  him  news  late 
on  the  evening  of  October  11,  and  the  emperor  talked  to  him 
until  his  six  o’clock  breakfast  next  morning  about  the  whole 
situation.  “ One  does  not  recognize  Napoleon  during  the  cam- 
paign,” Marmont  writes.  “ Instead  of  being  up  and  about, 
riding  from  place  to  place  in  the  saddle,”  says  Fain,  u he  re- 
mained almost  constantly  locked  in  his  room,  where  his  bed 
and  his  maps  had  been  brought.” 

These  reports  must  be  taken  with  a grain  of  allowance.  It 
is  questionable  whether  Napoleon  was  as  inactive  as  he  is 
sometimes  stated  to  have  been  during  these  days.  The  Cor- 
respondence of  the  12th  and  13th  shows  considerable  activity. 
Yet  St.  Cyr  asked:  “What  has  become  of  the  man  of  Ma- 
rengo?” And  it  is  true  that  he  no  longer  thought  out  his 
plan  and  issued  his  orders  ; he  consulted  with  his  entourage , 
he  waited  to  hear  what  the  enemy  was  doing  before  he  himself 
acted.  On  the  other  hand,  the  allies,  who  had  constantly  acted 
with  prudence  in  withdrawing  from  Napoleon  when  they  were 


224 


A TANGLED  SKEIN. 


in  danger,  now  that  they  saw  that  they  could  unite,  were  equally 
bold.  While  Napoleon  seemed  to  be  beset  with  alternate  las- 
situde and  energy,  the  allies  were  acting  sanely  and  steadily. 

The  Army  of  the  Sovereigns  had  arrived  on  the  theatre 
October  6,  the  Austrians  by  Chemnitz,  the  Russians  and  Prus- 
sians by  Zwickau,  Colloredo  and  Bennigsen  on  the  right  op- 
posite Dresden,  and  Lichtenstein  and  Thielemann’s  light  cav- 
alry on  the  left  reaching  out  to  the  Saale.  On  October  7 
Wittgenstein  was  at  Altenburg,  Klenau  at  Penig.  Next  day 
Schwartzenberg  was  at  Chemnitz,  Murat  in  observation  at 
Floha,  but  not  covering  Leipsic.  On  October  8 Murat  moved 
to  the  Mulde  at  Rochlitz  between  the  two  great  allied  col- 
umns, which  enabled  Wittgenstein  to  debouch  from  Altenburg 
on  Borna.  Murat  returned  to  Frohburg  the  9th  and  to  Borna 
the  10th,  where  he  attacked  the  Russians  and  drove  them  out. 
October  10  Augereau  at  Naumburg  had  met  Thielemann  and 
Lichtenstein  and  forced  them  back  on  Zeitz.  By  the  evening 
of  the  11th  Napoleon  heard  of  all  these  movements,  but  was 
not  clear  as  to  what  Bernadotte  would  do.  44  What  a tangled 
skein  all  this  is,”  he  said  to  Marmont:  44 1 alone  can  untangle 
it ; and  even  I shall  have  much  difficulty.”  Indeed,  he  did 
not  succeed. 

About  10  A.  M.,  October  12,  Napoleon  heard  from  Murat 
that  instead  of  retiring,  the  Army  of  the  Sovereigns  during 
the  afternoon  of  the  11th  was  moving  forward,  and  that  he 
himself  was  retiring  towards  Leipsic.  From  Ney  he  heard 
what  led  him  to  the  wrong  conclusion  that  Blucher  was  to 
join  Schwartzenberg  at  Leipsic,  and  that  Bernadotte  had 
recrossed  to  the  right  bank  of  the  Elbe  to  protect  Berlin. 
This  would  leave  him  only  Schwartzenberg  and  Blucher  to 
fight,  a task  to  which  he  felt  equal,  and  he  kept  on  with  the 
purpose  of  destroying  Bernadotte’s  bridges,  and  then  return- 
ing to  Leipsic  for  a general  battle.  Thus  having,  as  he 


ORDERS  TO  MOVE  ON  DU  BEN. 


225 


thought,  more  time,  he  ordered  Marmont,  who  had  moved  to 
Delitsch  to  watch  Blucher,  to  draw  nearer  to  Leipsic  to  assist 
Murat  if  needed.  During  the  night  of  October  11-12  the 
news  that  ran  in  developed  so  much  uncertainty  as  to  the 
movements  of  Blucher  and  Bernadotte  that  it  led  the  emperor 
to  doubt  whether  an  operation  on  the  right  bank  was  the  best 
one  to  undertake,  and  changing  his  mind,  he  gave  definite 
orders  to  concentrate  on  Leipsic,  although  he  continued  to 
believe  that  Bernadotte  had  crossed  the  Elbe.  October  12 
and  13  were  used  in  what  seemed  to  him  the  most  important 
work.  But  Bernadotte  was  with  Blucher ; it  was  only  Tauen- 
zien  the  French  forces  were  following ; the  emperor’s  clear- 
sightedness had  failed  him,  and  he  was  pursuing  a shadow. 
His  ancient  power  of  truly  gauging  the  meaning  of  the  reports 
running  in  from  the  outlying  forces  had  deserted  him. 

At  9.30  a.  M.  of  the  12th,  Napoleon  told  Berthier  to  order 
Ney  to  Diiben,  thence  to  Tauclia,  where  he  was  to  arrive  the 
14th,  uMy  intention  being  to  deliver  battle  there  with  all  my 
force  assembled;  in  consequence  he  will  leave  nothing  be- 
hind ; ” to  order  Macdonald  to  move  to  Diiben  where  he  must 
arrive  the  morning  of  the  14tli ; to  order  Reynier  and  Dom- 
brovski  to  be  in  Diiben  the  13th  and  at  Tauclia  the  14th ; to 
order  Bertrand,  Sebastian i and  Latour-Maubourg  to  move  at 
once  on  Diiben.  He  also  ordered  Marmont  to  Taucha,  so  as  to 
join  the  Guard  within  reach  of  Leipsic.  “ All  my  army  will 
start  moving  in  the  day  of  the  12th  ; it  will  all  have  arrived, 
and  I can  deliver  battle  to  the  enemy  with  two  hundred  thou- 
sand men,”  he  wrote  him  at  3.30  p.  m. 

In  the  Note  he  now  made,  be  carefully  figures  out  the 
marches  of  all  the  corps,  from  the  hour  at  which  they  would 
receive  the  order,  so  as  to  show  when  they  ought  to  reach 
Taucha.  This  Note  is  too  characteristic  of  the  great  captain 
to  omit. 


VOL.  IV. 


226 


ASSEMBLING  THE  DIFFERENT  CORPS. 


NOTE  ON  THE  ASSEMBLING  OF  THE  DIFFERENT  ARMY  CORPS 
AT  TAUCHA. 

Duben,  October  12,  1813,  10  a.  m. 

I give  order  to  Ney  to  move  on  Duben.  Ney  will  not  receive  this 
order  until  2 p.  M.  His  troops  will  move  at  3 o’clock  ; they  cannot  pass 
the  Duben  bridge  till  to-morrow,  13th  (the  Guard  will  then  have  passed 
it);  they  can  be  the  13th  in  the  evening  without  difficulty  at  Taucha. 

Latour-Maubourg  being  at  Keinburg,  there  is  also  no  difficulty  with  him. 

Macdonald  will  not  receive  the  order  till  3 P.  M.  If  he  has  crossed  the 
Elbe  bridge,  he  will  need  the  night  to  recross  ; he  will  not  be  in  Duben 
till  to-morrow,  13th,  and  during  the  14th  he  will  march  on  Taucha. 

Reynier,  who  is  marching  on  Rosslau,  cannot  be  at  Wittenberg  before 
to-night.  He  might  reach  Taucha  the  15th.  He  can  come  by  way  of 
Eilenburg. 

The  same  applies  to  S^bastiani. 

As  to  Mortier,  and  Oudinot,  and  the  Guard  reserve,  all  that  will  pass 
Diiben  bridge  to-day,  and  will  be  to-morrow  at  Taucha  at  an  early  hour. 

Murat  is  to-day,  12th,  at  Crobern  ; he  will  be  to-morrow,  13th,  at  Leip- 
sic  or  at  Taucha,  where  I shall  have  arrived  to-morrow  with  Curial,  the 
Old  and  the  Young  Guard,  and  Marmont,  which  with  Murat’s  will  make 
near  90,000  men. 

These  . . . will  be  reinforced  during  to-morrow,  13th,  on  which  of 
necessity  the  enemy  cannot  attack,  by  Ney,  Bertrand  and  Latour-Mau- 
bourg. 

The  15th  all  our  army  will  be  assembled. 

To-morrow,  13th,  the  enemy  will  arrive  at  Crobern  ; he  will  know.that 
the  Grand  Army  has  arrived.  The  day  of  the  14th  will  be  passed  in 
marshaling  for  battle.  I then  have  the  13th  and  14th  to  assemble.  I 
say  more  : even  if  the  whole  army  were  at  Diiben,  it  could  not  arrive 
before,  unless  it  had  five  or  six  debouches. 

Murat  is  at  Crobern  the  12th,  Marmont  at  Lindenhayn  ; they  can  be 
to-morrow  at  Taucha  in  good  position.  My  Guard,  to-day  at  DUben  and 
Eilenburg,  will  be  to-morrow  easily  at  Taucha.  Oudinot  and  Mortier 
will  be  to-day  at  Duben  with  Ornano,  Walther  and  Latour-Maubourg. 

To-morrow  all  that  will  be  at  Taucha. 

I will  then  have  to-morrow,  at  Taucha,  in  first  line : Murat,  . . . the 
garrison  of  Leipsic,  . . . Marmont,  . . . the  Guard,  . . . Latour-Mau- 
bourg, . . . total  nearly  120,000  men. 


THE  EMPEROR  TO  MURAT. 


227 


In  second  line,  Macdonald  this  evening  at  Kemburg,  to-morrow  at 
Diiben  ; Ney  this  evening  at  Grafenhaynchen,  to-morrow  at  Diiben  ; 
Bertrand  to-morrow  at  Diiben  ; S^bastiani  to-morrow  at  Diiben  ; Dom- 
brovski  and  Reynier,  the  13th,  to-morrow,  half-way  to  Diiben. 

The  14th  all  can  join  me:  Macdonald,  . . . Ney,  . . . Bertrand,  . . . 
S^bastiani  . . . Dombrovski  and  Reynier.  . . . 

Thus  in  first  line  nearly  120,000  men,  second  line  70,000  men,  total 
nearly  190,000  men. 

The  Note  details  the  strength  of  each  corps. 

In  order  to  be  sure  of  his  calculations,  the  emperor  wrote 
to  Murat  the  afternoon  of  October  12  : — 

“ Can  yon  without  compromising  yourself  hold  the  entire  day  of  to- 
morrow, 13th,  your  position  and  Leipsic  ? . . . You  will  be  increased  by 
eighty  thousand  men  whom  I will  bring  up,  and  the  14th  all  the  rest  of 
the  army.  We  shall  have  in  the  morning  of  the  15th  two  hundred  thou- 
sand men.  ...  I think  that  the  whole  Berlin  army  has  recrossed  to  the 
right  bank,  and  that  thus  we  can  deliver  battle  without  it.”  And  on  the 
same  day  in  the  evening  : “ I count  that  you  have  actually  sixty  thousand 
men.  Marmont  will  be  to-night  within  four  leagues  of  Leipsic.  If  I do 
not  decide  to  go  there  myself,  I will  send  him  to  you,  which  will  make 
you  eighty-five  or  ninety  thousand  men  ; with  that  you  ought  to  be  able 
to  gain  several  days.  A good  ruse  would  be  to  have  salvos  fired  as  a re- 
joicing for  victory  over  the  other  army.  You  might  also  have  a feigned 
review  passed,  as  if  I were  there,  and  have  Vive  VEmpereur!  shouted. 

. . . It  is  of  great  importance  to  hold  Leipsic.  . . . They  say  that  towards 
Schkeuditz  is  a good  position  to  take  against  an  army  coming  from  Halle  ; 
have  the  ground  reconnoitred.”  And  on  October  13,  6 A.  m.,  to  Mac- 
donald : “ Murat  with  ninety  thousand  men  is  covering  Leipsic  against 
the  Austrian  army.  . . . The  Army  of  Silesia,  according  to  all  informa- 
tion, is  apparently  rallying  on  Halle.  We  are  at  a very  important  mo- 
ment. I believe  the  battle  will  take  place  the  15th  or  16th.  If  all  the 
Army  of  Berlin  has  passed  to  the  right  bank,  as  they  assure  us,  we  should 
be  disembarrassed  of  forty  thousand  men.” 

The  orders  for  carrying  out  the  movement  do  not  appear  to 
have  been  issued  by  Berthier  until  during  the  succeeding  night. 
This  Note  shows  how  each  corps  would  march  and  when 


228 


BLUCHER  DECEIVES  THE  EMPEROR. 


it  would  reach  Leipsic.  On  the  18th  there  would  be  one  hun- 
dred and  twenty  thousand,  on  the  14th  one  hundred  and  ninety 
thousand  men  there.  On  the  13th  the  Sovereigns  would  reach 
Crobern  and  learn  that  the  Grand  Army  had  arrived.  The 
14th  would  be  consumed  in  marshaling  the  forces,  which  gave 
additional  time  to  assemble.  But  despite  his  decision  on  the 
12th  to  concentrate  on  Leipsic,  Napoleon  did  not  arrest  the 
movements  of  the  corps  on  the  Elbe.  Reynier  continued  his 
march  on  Rosslau  against  Tauenzien,  and  this  officer,  seeing 
Ney  also  advancing  on  Dessau,  broke  the  bridge  and  retired 
by  a night  march  to  Zerbst. 

Although  the  emperor’s  belief  that  Bernadotte  was  on  the 
right  bank  and  Blucher  alone  at  Halle  led  him  to  deduct 
forty  thousand  men  from  the  allied  aggregate  he  should  have 
to  meet  at  Leipsic,  yet  in  looking  over  the  theatre,  he  grew 
nervous  about  Murat  and  sent  a courier  to  ascertain  his  status. 
Meanwhile  Blucher  occupied  Halle  and  Merseburg  and  got  in 
touch  with  Schwartzenberg,  thus  fully  establishing  his  army 
on  the  French  communications  back  to  the  Rhine.  However 
nervous  Bernadotte  had  been  for  days,  when  Napoleon  started 
on  the  way  to  Leipsic,  he  was  satisfied.  The  conduct  of  Blu- 
cher during  this  week,  in  persisting  at  whatever  risk  in  rejoin- 
ing Schwartzenberg,  is  in  the  highest  degree  praiseworthy, 
and  peculiarly  so  in  that  he  deceived  Napoleon,  who  should 
have  followed  him,  but  did  not.  Bernadotte  was  less  dangerous. 
Meanwhile  the  Army  of  the  Sovereigns  had  slowly  advanced, 
Murat  retiring  before  it  in  excellent  order. 

Napoleon  seemed  to  have  concluded  that  there  was  nothing 
left  to  do  except  to  march  on  Leipsic  and  fight  there  ; and 
yet,  on  the  doctrine  of  numbers,  this  was  equally  to  invite 
destruction,  for  the  enemy  was  concentrating  his  entire  force 
there,  and  was  in  ample  season.  The  opportunities  of  the 
French  interior  lines  had  been  forfeited  ; there  was  scant  time 


NAPOLEON  OUTMANCEUVRED. 


229 


left  for  manoeuvring.  Whether  it  was  a question  of  a last 
battle  effort  or  not,  the  allies  had  outmanoeuvred  the  great 
captain,  and  stood  in  full  force  across  his  line  of  retreat  with 
their  own  open  : he  was  in  as  bad  a case  as  he  had  ever  placed 
one  of  his  enemies.  And  he  alone  was  to  blame.  Even  on 
the  11th  he  might  have  marched  on  Grrimma,  or  some  other 
point  near  by,  have  joined  Murat  and  with  him  fallen  on 
Schwartzenberg  before  Blucher  and  Berna- 
dotte,  properly  contained,  could  come  up,  or 
he  might  have  attacked  the  latter,  or  even 
drawn  in  Murat  and  marched  on  Berlin.  But 
he  had  taken  no  specific  action,  he  had  waited 
and  waited,  and  Dame  Fortune  will  not  smile 
on  those  who  stand  and  wait,  in  war  or  in 
any  other  business.  It  is  not  the  service  she 
demands.  The  emperor’s  old  power  of  acting 
by  instinct  on  a soundly  conceived  strategic 
plan,  marching  straight  on  the  most  sensitive 
part  of  the  enemy’s  position,  and  modifying 
his  plan  only  as  he  found  the  enemy’s  opera- 
tions antagonistic  to  it,  seemed  to  have  passed 
from  him.  He  was  no  longer  conducting  war 
as  he  had  taught  his  enemies  to  do  it.  The 
allied  commanders  were  putting  to  use  against 
him  — though  inexpertly  and  slowly  — his  own  methods.  He 
had  wasted  the  time  which  for  a week  past  had  been  more 
than  ever  of  the  essence. 

Napoleon’s  dispositions  in  the  early  days  of  October  had 
been  excellent,  to  move  down  the  Mulde  and  attack  Blucher 
and  Bernadotte,  while  containing  Schwartzenberg  by  Murat. 
His  purpose  to  move  to  the  right  bank  of  the  Elbe  was  less 
immediately  practical.  Instead,  however,  of  moving  down 
the  right  bank  to  the  mouth  of  the  Mulde,  knowing,  as  he  did 


Hanoverian 

Infantryman. 


230 


HALLE  A STRATEGIC  KNOT. 


at  Diiben,  October  10,  that  Blucher  was  moving  across  the 
river  to  join  Bernadotte,  it  seems  clear  that  he  could  have 
done  better  to  file  to  the  left  himself  across  the  Mulde  and 
force  Blucher  and  Bernadotte  back  into  the  angle  of  the 
Saale  and  Elbe,  where  he  could  fight  them  au  fond , and  thus 
prevent  their  moving  up  the  Saale  towards  Schwartzenberg. 
If  Bernadotte  had  recrossed  the  Elbe,  so  much  the  easier 
task.  After  learning  the  facts,  the  rest  of  the  10th  could 
have  been  employed  in  assembling  the  troops,  and  early  the 
11th  the  Mulde  could  have  been  crossed  and  the  whole  army 
have  advanced  on  this  errand.  If,  against  such  a manoeuvre, 
Blucher  and  Bernadotte  had  sought  to  cross  the  Elbe,  they 
could  have  been  all  but  destroyed  ; and  if  part  of  them  got 
across  and  moved  towards  Berlin,  Napoleon  with  his  bridge 
at  Wittenberg  could  then  follow  them  up  on  the  right  bank. 
If  they  had  striven  to  move  up  the  Saale,  Marmont,  already 
at  Delitsch,  could  have  prevented  their  reaching  Halle.  If 
they  crossed  the  Saale  below  Halle,  they  could  also  be  roughly 
handled  during  the  operation,  and  a comparatively  small  army 
could  then  contain  them,  while  Napoleon  moved  up  to  Leipsic 
to  deliver  battle  to  Schwartzenberg,  before  Bennigsen  could 
come  up.  If,  however,  Blucher  and  Bernadotte  managed  to 
reach  Halle,  it  was  then  time  enough  to  move  over  to  the 
right  bank,  avoid  a general  battle,  draw  in  Murat  and  St.  Cyr, 
and  base  on  Magdeburg  and  Hamburg. 

Halle  was  a strategic  knot,  “ and  one  must  be  astonished,” 
says  Grouard,  “that  Napoleon,  who  formerly  had  so  well 
appreciated  the  importance  of  Stradella  before  Marengo,  of 
Donauworth  before  Ulm,  and  the  defile  of  Kosen  before 
Jena,  had  not  been  struck  by  it;  for  if  he  had  been  able  to 
prevent  the  Army  of  Silesia  from  arriving  there  by  throwing 
it  back  on  the  lower  Saale,  he  would  be  almost  sure  to  be  able 
to  return  against  Schwartzenberg  before  Blucher  could  sus- 


THE  OPPORTUNITY  LOST. 


231 


tain  him.”  Had  Marmont,  early  October  11,  been  directed 
from  Delitsch  to  Landsberg,  sustained  in  force,  this  could 
have  been  accomplished.  Up  to  the  10th  Napoleon  had  the 
chance  of  beating  each  body  of  the  enemy  separately.  Had 
Blucher  been  seriously  worsted,  Schwartzenberg  would  have 
retired,  and  a vigorous  pursuit  would  have  much  unsettled 
him.  But  after  this  date  Napoleon  had  no  chance  of  fighting 
his  enemies  separately,  nor  indeed  to  advantage. 

Instead  of  going  to  Leipsic,  Napoleon  ought  to  have  avoided 
battle.  He  would  have  done  much  better,  even  on  the  14th, 
to  attack  Blucher  and  Bernadotte,  and  turn  that  flank  of  his 
enemies  so  as  to  reach  the  Rhine.  By  manoeuvring  in  that 
direction  Blucher  and  Bernadotte  would  have  either  been 
separated  from  Schwartzenberg,  or  they  would  have  joined 
him  up  river  so  as  to  open  the  road  for  the  French.  St.  Cyr 
should  have  been  ordered  out  of  Dresden  by  the  right  bank 
to  Torgau  and  to  cross  to  join  the  army,  which  he  could  have 
done  by  the  15th,  or  else  to  escape  towards  Magdeburg.  Had 
Napoleon  sharply  demonstrated  against  Blucher  and  Berna- 
dotte to  hold  them  in  place,  he  had  ample  time  to  take  up 
St.  Cyr,  to  destroy  Blucher  and  Bernadotte,  who  were  bound 
to  be  slow,  and  then  move  against  Schwartzenberg  with  all 
his  forces.  If  he  failed  in  this,  he  would  still  have  been 
able  to  draw  in  Murat,  cross  to  the  right  bank  of  the  Elbe 
and  move  on  Magdeburg.  Done  with  Napoleonic  vigor,  this 
might  have  enabled  him  to  be  rid  of  his  enemies  for  a while, 
and  one  may  even  imagine  the  allies  so  deliberate  and  puzzled 
as  to  enable  him  to  draw  in  the  garrisons  of  the  Oder.  But 
Napoleon  always  took  risks  and  acted  the  grand  part,  and  he 
was  doing  so  now.  All  this  again  is  academic,  and  these  sug- 
gested manoeuvres  required  what  Napoleon  no  longer  exhib- 
ited, the  activity  of  1805  and  1806.  Yet  nothing  suggested 
could  have  resulted  worse  than  what  he  did  do. 


232 


ALL  GERMANY  NAPOLEON’S  ENEMY. 


Interior  lines  are  not  always  available  against  a superior 
enemy,  for  he  may  surround  you.  A central  position  is  ex- 
cellent as  a strategic  place  of  assembly,  from  which  to  march 
against  an  enemy  divided  by  considerable  distance ; but  as  a 
tactical  position  for  battle,  it  may  fail.  From  his  central 
position  Napoleon  should  have  moved  against  Schwartzen- 
berg,  or  Blucher  and  Bernadotte  singly,  or  else  have  got  away, 
after  calling  in  St.  Cyr,  Murat  and  Davout.  On  the  10th  he 
committed  two  errors:  not  to  have  followed  Blucher,  and 
then  not  to  have  manoeuvred  away  from  Leip- 
sic.  On  the  15th  he  had  strategically  lost  the 
battle,  for  Blucher  and  Bernadotte  would  in 
all  probability  join  the  sovereigns.  But  despite 
this  failure,  interior  lines  have  none  the  less 
their  eminent  value,  as  Napoleon  had  demon- 
strated in  his  first  and  other  campaigns,  and 
would  again,  in  1814  and  1815. 

At  noon  on  the  13th  the  French  corps  began 
heading  for  Leipsic,  and  Napoleon  heard  that 
Bernadotte  was  at  Bernburg.  Worse  still,  he 
heard  that  his  old  and  constant  ally,  Bavaria, 
had  finally  been  compelled  to  turn  against 

him ; and  though  this  would  not  affect  the  im- 
Swiss  Guard.  # 

mediate  situation,  it  had  a direct  moral  effect 

on  the  battle  to  be  fought.  The  troops  on  the  Inn  had  joined 

the  Austrians,  and  were  to  march  towards  the  Rhine.  All 

Germany  was  now  his  enemy,  and  Jerome  had  been  chased 

from  his  Westphalian  kingdom.  His  delays  had  steadily 

worked  against  him  instead  of  in  his  favor,  and  nothing  but 

a great  victory  could  save  the  situation.  He  had  sent  the 

greater  part  of  his  forces  in  a wrong  direction,  and  as  he  was 

to  fight  at  Leipsic,  he  must  have  three  days  to  assemble  them 

there  for  battle.  Meanwhile  it  seems  as  if  he  should  have 


BAVARIA  BLAMED. 


233 


hidden  his  movement  on  Leipsic ; have  kept  Marmont  at 
Delitsch,  and  filed  the  army  behind  the  curtain  so  formed ; 
instead  of  which,  by  sending  Marmont  to  Leipsic,  he  disclosed 
it  to  Blucher.  On  the  14th  Blucher  remained  in  Halle,  hav- 
ing no  purpose  to  march  on  Leipsic  and  there  meet  the 
French  single-handed.  Had  Marmont,  duly  supported,  been 
used  to  fend  him  off  the  14th  and  15th,  Napoleon  might  then 
have  drawn  Marmont  in,  leaving  a slender  curtain  to  contain 
Blucher,  and  have  fought  Schwartzenberg  the  16th  with  a 
strong  show  of  victory.  For  Blucher  was  cautious  until  he 
was  certain  that  Schwartzenberg  was'  ready  to  join  in  the 
attack  on  the  emperor. 

In  the  Bulletin  of  the  Grand  Army,  October  15,  we  read 
that 

“ After  having  thus  seized  all  the  enemy’s  bridges,  the  emperor’s  pro- 
ject was  to  pass  the  Elbe  to  manoeuvre  on  the  right  bank  from  Hamburg 
to  Dresden,  to  menace  Potsdam  and  Berlin,  and  to  take  for  centre  of 
operations  Magdeburg,  which  with  this  view  had  been  provisioned  in  mu- 
nitions of  war  and  food.  But  on  the  13th  the  emperor  learned  at  Diiben 
that  the  Bavarian  army  had  joined  the  Austrian  army  and  menaced  the 
lower  Rhine.  This  inconceivable  defection  led  him  to  foresee  the  defec- 
tion of  other  princes,  and  made  the  emperor  adopt  the  part  of  falling 
back  to  the  Rhine,  an  annoying  change,  because  everything  had  been 
prepared  to  operate  on  Magdeburg.  But  it  would  have  necessitated 
remaining  separate  from  and  without  communication  with  France  for  a 
month.  This  had  no  difficulties  at  the  moment  when  the  emperor  had 
determined  his  project  ; it  was  no  longer  the  same  when  Austria  was 
going  to  have  disposable  two  fresh  armies  : the  Bavarian  army  and  the 
army  opposed  to  Bavaria.  The  emperor  then  changed  with  these  un- 
foreseen circumstances,  and  carried  his  headquarters  to  Leipsic.” 

But  while  this  loading  of  the  entire  blame  on  Bavaria  was 
a good  excuse  for  a Paris  audience,  it  cannot  shift  the  respon- 
sibility from  the  emperor’s  shoulders.  Whether  it  was  this 
defection  that  made  Napoleon  march  on  Leipsic,  or  the  hope 
that  he  could  keep  the  allies  apart  and  still  fight  each  army 


234 


THE  FACTS  SUMMARIZED. 


singly,  will  ever  be  debated.  It  is  probably  the  latter,  for  he 
did  not  definitely  hear  of  the  defection  till  the  13th,  whereas 
he  gave  his  orders  to  march  on  Leipsic  the  12th.  Yet  Marbot 
says  that  the  King  of  Wurtemberg  wrote  Napoleon  several 
days  before  the  13th  that  Bavaria  was  about  to  abandon  him. 
He  may  have  feared  it. 

But  the  causes  lay  deeper  than  this.  As  Hannibal  gradu- 
ally taught  his  Koman  foemen  how  to  conduct  war  on  me- 
thodical and  intelligent  lines,  so  that  men  like  Marcellus,  the 
Consul  Nero  and  Scipio  finally  learned  how  to  meet  him,  so 
had  Bonaparte  during  the  past  dozen  years  been  educating 
the  generals  of  Europe  until  they  too  fathomed  his  method ; 
and  as  he  declined  in  numbers  and  they  increased,  they  were 
able  to  lay  him  low.  He  had  fashioned  the  sword  to  smite 
himself,  and  his  procrastination  had  handed  it  to  his  antago- 
nist. 

To  crudely  summarize  the  facts,  Napoleon  started  for  Leip- 
sic in  the  belief  that  Bernadotte  was  on  the  right  bank,  and 
when  he  shortly  learned  that  he  was  not,  he  yet  moved  towards 
Leipsic,  first  because,  though  Bernadotte  was  on  the  Saale, 
he  hoped  to  get  through  with  Schwartzenberg  before  he  could 
get  up,  and  perhaps  even  before  Blucher  could  do  so.  Second, 
he  had  been  so  long  and  impatiently  awaiting  battle,  that 
having  great  faith  in  what  he  could  do,  and  perhaps  out  of 
patience  in  trying  so  long  to  secure  it,  he  cast  prudence  — the 
one  thing  he  now  needed  — to  the  winds.  He  himself  had 
not  yet  been  beaten  in  battle ; only  his  lieutenants  had  been. 
Third,  he  imagined  that  he  could  come  to  battle  when  and 
how  he  pleased.  “ I shall  not  deliver  battle  except  when  I 
desire,”  he  said  to  Marmont  in  the  night  of  October  11-12. 
“ They  will  never  dare  attack  me.”  A fatal  error ! 

At  this  moment  the  emperor  put  into  effect  a new  method 
of  drawing  up  his  troops.  To  Murat  he  wrote  October  13  : — 


MURAT  BEHIND  THE  GOSELBACH. 


235 


“ I yesterday  issued  an  Order  of  the  Day  that  all  my  infantry  should 
be  placed  in  two  ranks;  put  it  at  once  into  execution.  I do  not  wish  that 
it  shall  any  longer  stand  in  three  ranks.  The  fire  of  the  third  rank,  the 
bayonet  of  the  third  rank  are  insignificant,  and  when  it  goes  into  columns 
by  division,  each  battalion  will  find  itself  formed  in  column  of  six  ranks, 
not  counting  the  three  ranks  of  file  closers.  That  is  more  than  sufficient, 
and  it  has  the  great  advantage  that  a battalion  of  five  hundred  men  will 
appear  to  the  enemy  to  have  seven  hundred  and  fifty  men,  which  will 
have  a very  good  effect  at  this  moment,  when  the  enemy  does  not  know 
this  new  order  ; and  it  will  make  him  gauge  the  army  a third  stronger 
than  it  is.  An  hour  after  the  reception  of  this  order,  let  everything  be 
arranged  thus.” 

The  same  was  written  to  Marmont,  and  through  Berthier 
to  the  rest  of  the  army.  How  the  sudden  change  worked,  we 
do  not  know ; in  the  battle  the  troops  fought  well. 

On  the  12th  Murat  had  occupied  a strong  position  behind 
the  Goselbach,  covered  by  Pajol  and  Kellermann,  the  right 
under  Poniatowski  near  Crobern,  the  centre  under  Victor 
near  Giildengossa,  the  left  under  Lauriston  at  Stormthal  and 
beyond,  the  reserve  under  Marmont  at  Stotteritz.  Here  he 
received  Napoleon’s  notice  of  his  immediate  march  on  Leipsic, 
and,  replying  that  he  would  hold  a position  in  its  front  until 
the  14th,  proceeded  to  throw  up  some  field-works.  Marmont 
was  ready  to  lend  a hand  by  the  13th,  and  Augereau  brought 
him  two  divisions  and  some  cavalry,  giving  Murat  five  army 
corps,  with  sufficient  horse.  The  emperor  hurried  forward 
his  own  forces,  writing  on  the  14th  to  Ney  : “ It  is  probable 
that  we  shall  be  attacked  to-morrow  at  Leipsic.  If  you  hear 
the  cannon  to-morrow,  redouble  your  march.”  But  Murat, 
lest  he  should  be  drawn  into  battle  with  superior  forces,  and 
assuming  that  Napoleon  would  strike  Blucher  and  Bernadotte 
on  the  north  of  Leipsic  before  coming  up  to  reinforce  his  own 
line  on  the  Goselbach,  conceived  the  project  of  retiring  behind 
the  Partha,  while  holding  Leipsic  as  a sort  of  bridge-head ; and 


236 


A PARTIAL  ENGAGEMENT. 


when  Napoleon  ordered  Marmont  on  Schkeuditz  to  watch 
Halle,  Murat  began  its  execution  on  the  13th.  In  this  with- 
drawal, which  conflicted  with  the  general  plan,  he  was  arrested 
near  Liebertwolkowitz  by  one  of  Napoleon’s  dispatches.  But 
the  allies  at  once  took  possession  of  the  important  crossings 
along  the  Goselbach,  and  on  the  14th  advanced  upon  Murat 
in  a general  reconnoissance.  To  repair  his  error,  Murat  held 
Liebertwolkowitz,  and  went  forward  beyond  the  heights  of 
W achau,  striving  to  reach  Magdeborn  ; Barclay  put  in  his 
cavalry ; and  against  this  the  French  dragoons,  fresh  from 
Spain,  did  such  excellent  work,  that  despite  Pahlen’s  fine 
manoeuvring  and  the  heavy  charges  of  the  Russian  reserve, 
the  French  held  on,  and  Murat  was  near  to  victory;  but  at 
the  last  moment  a charge  of  Prussian  cuirassiers  decided  the 
combat  for  the  allies.  The  engagement  was  partial,  and  the 
Army  of  the  Sovereigns  took  no  advantage  of  it. 

On  the  14th,  while  Blucher  was  still  at  Halle  and  Merse- 
burg, and  Bernadotte  at  Rothenburg,  the  belated  French 
corps  were  all  in  full  march  on  Taucha.  Bertrand  reached 
Eutritzsch,  Latour-Maubourg  Radefeld,  Macdonald  got  well 
on  towards  Taucha,  Souham  passed  Diiben,  the  Young  Guard 
was  in  Widderitsch,  Marmont  at  Lindenthal.  Reynier  was 
getting  back  to  the  left  bank ; unable  to  cross  at  Rosslau  on 
Bernadotte’s  pontoon  bridge,  he  had  to  go  up  to  Wittenberg, 
which  delayed  him  two  marches.  Yet  so  soon  as  he  had  de- 
termined to  concentrate  on  Leipsic,  the  emperor  had  shown 
that  he  could  bring  along  his  troops  better  than  the  allies. 
Leaving  Diiben  early  in  the  day,  he  reached  Leipsic  at  noon, 
established  headquarters  at  Reudnitz,  and  after  riding  around 
the  city,  took  up  a position  south  of  the  Wurzen  road,  where 
he  could  watch  the  course  of  Murat’s  fight.  He  would  have 
liked  to  bring  on  a general  engagement  on  the  15th  before 
Blucher  and  Bernadotte  could  arrive,  but  his  dispersed  corps 


EILENBURG,  WURZEN  AND  TAUCHA  HELD.  237 

could  not  get  up  in  season ; the  roads  were  encumbered  with 
marching  divisions  and  their  trains.  Detachments  held  Eilen- 
burg,  Wurzen  and  Taucha.  In  the  evening  the  emperor  called 
his  corps  commanders  together,  and  exhibited  his  dissatis- 
faction with  the  status  by  serious  fault-finding  with  some  of 


his  marshals.  To  Augereau  he  said  that  he  was  not  the  old 
soldier  of  Castiglione,  to  which  Augereau  replied  that  with 
the  old  soldiers  of  Italy  he  would  still  show  him  what  he  was. 

Up  to  mid-October  the  allies  had  avoided  the  battle  which 
Napoleon  had  sought  to  thrust  upon  them ; but  when  they 


238 


THE  CORPS  PLACED. 


marched  upon  Leipsic,  it  was  evident  that  the  supreme  moment 
had  come.  Still,  for  Napoleon  battle  was  no  longer  so  desira- 
ble — strategically  or  tactically : the  circumstances  were  differ- 
ent ; Bavaria,  his  ally  of  many  years,  had  taken  sides  against 
him,  the  Confederation  of  the  Rhine  seemed  ready  for  dissolu- 
tion, and  the  position  of  the  allied  armies  threatened  to  close 
the  road  back  to  France.  It  had  become  a question  whether 
he  could  save  himself,  not  whether  he  could  defeat  his  enemies. 

Early  on  the  15th  Murat  reported  the  details  of  the  battle 
of  the  day  before.  About  ten  Napoleon  and  he  rode  to  Liebert- 
wolkowitz,  took  their  stand  on  a hill  to  its  west,  and  placed  the 
oncoming  corps  on  the  field  where  the  great  captain  had  decided 
to  fight  against  Europe  in  arms.  Lauriston  was  placed  at 
Liebertwolkowitz,  Victor  at  Wachau,  Poniatowski  at  Mark- 
kleeberg  and  Dosen,  with  his  right  flank  thrown  back  in  a 
crotchet  to  face  the  Pleisse  River  and  the  lowlands  as  far  as 
Connewitz.  Augereau’s  corps  was  placed  at  Zuckelhausen. 
Macdonald  was  to  come  up  and  take  post  on  the  left  astride 
the  Colditz  road.  The  entire  Old  and  Young  Guard  was  in 
general  reserve  nearer  Leipsic,  at  Reudnitz  and  Grottendorf. 
Back  of  Dosen  stood  the  Polish  cavalry  corps  of  Kellermann ; 
Latour-Maubourg’s  was  farther  to  the  left  at  Zweinaundorf ; 
Pajol’s  in  front  of  Holzhausen.  Northerly  of  Leipsic,  Ber- 
trand was  at  Eutritzsch,  Marmont  at  Lindenthal.  Two  of 
Souham’s  divisions  had  got  to  Mockau  ; the  third  was  still  on 
the  way  from  Diiben.  West  of  Leipsic,  at  Lindenau,  the  only 
outlet  for  retreat,  a small  force  under  Margaron  (later  re- 
inforced by  Bertrand)  held  the  road.  Macdonald  was  passing 
through  Taucha,  Sebastiani  marching  thither,  and  Reynierhad 
now  reached  Diiben.  Arrighi  was  in  command  in  Leipsic. 

Napoleon  rode  the  new  lines  during  the  afternoon,  and 
especially  examined  the  ground  in  front  of  Poniatowski  along 
the  Pleisse.  His  reports  led  him  to  believe  that  Bernadotte 


FAULTY  MILITARY  CONDUCT. 


239 


was  at  Merseburg,  and  he  looked  for  Blucher  on  the  Weis- 
senfels  road.  The  Army  of  the  Sovereigns  he  assumed  to  be 
stretched  out  between  Naundorf  and  Crobern.  Butin  reality 
Blucher  was  advancing  on  the  Halle  road  and  had  passed 
Schkeuditz,  as  indeed  Marmont  had  reported,  but  Napoleon 
refused  to  credit ; while  Bernadotte  stood  in  support  on  the 
line  Wettin-Petersburg-Zorbig,  with  van  at  Oppin.  Schwart- 
zenberg’s  right  wing  was  in  the  Pommsen-Giildengossa-Mag- 
deborn  country  ; his  left  wing  was  across  the  Pleisse  and 
Elster,  part  being  near  Liitzen  and  Markranstadt ; his  reserve 
lay  back  of  Audigast. 

On  October  15  in  the  evening  Napoleon  had  strategically 
lost  the  campaign.  He  had  started  after  the  armistice  with 
four  hundred  thousand  to  meet  five  hundred  thousand  men. 
He  was  ending  with  a battle  in  which  on  the  first  day  he 
would  be  outnumbered,  and  on  the  second  he  could  put  only 
two  hundred  thousand  against  three  hundred  and  twent}^  thou- 
sand. As  the  acceptance  of  the  armistice  was  a fatal  politi- 
cal error,  so  the  emperor’s  military  conduct  since  the  middle 
of  August  had  been  faulty.  Whence  proceeded  these  defects 
it  is  difficult  to  explain,  except  on  one  of  two  hypotheses: 
either  that  Napoleon  was  no  longer  the  same  energetic  man, 
or  that  having  for  the  first  time  adopted  the  defensive  on  a 
large  scale,  he  had  not  clearly  worked  out  in  his  mind  the 
method  of  conducting  a campaign  on  interior  lines.  He  did 
not  take  up  the  defensive  on  the  Elbe,  with  centre  at  Dresden, 
for  the  purpose  of  defending  Saxony,  but  for  the  purpose  of 
destroying  his  adversaries  or  bringing  them  to  his  terms  by 
one  or  more  decisive  victories ; and  he  had  not  adopted  the 
means  at  hand  to  bring  this  about.  As  he  had  shown  as  early 
as  1796  that  he  understood  the  offensive  value  of  interior  lines, 
the  first  hypothesis  seems  the  more  probable.  Except  Mac- 
donald’s defeat  at  the  Katzbach,  the  other  disasters  (at  Gross 


240 


TO  UTILIZE  INTERIOR  LINES. 


Beeren  and  Kulm  and  Dennewitz)  were  distinctly  the  em- 
peror’s fault,  and  it  may  be  said  that  Macdonald,  in  being 
ordered  forward  to  Jauer,  was  also  hampered  in  his  move- 
ments. All  the  advantage  won  in  the  battle  of  Dresden  was 
lost  in  the  minor  defeats,  and  these  seem  to  be  traceable  to 
Napoleon’s  failure  to  carry  out  his  own  rules.  Interior  lines 
are  advantageous  only  when  utilized.  If  you  take  up  inte- 
rior lines  and  wait  for  a superior  enemy  to  surround  you  in 
them,  they  possess  no  advantage.  To  utilize  interior  lines  cer- 
tain things  are  essential : 1st,  you  must  attack  and  not  remain 
quiet.  2d,  you  must  attack  at  one  place  at  a time,  so  as  to 
transfer  thither  the  bulk  of  your  forces  from  your  central 
position.  You  must  not  make  several  isolated  attacks.  3d, 
when  you  attack,  you  must  drive  the  attack  home,  so  as  to  dis- 
able the  enemy  at  that  point  from  usefulness  for  some  time. 
4th,  you  must  by  these  means  keep  your  enemies  at  such  a 
distance  that  your  central  strategic  offensive  position  shall  not 
be  turned  into  a tactical  surrounding  by  superior  forces. 
5th,  you  must  never  depend  on  a town  unless  it  is  a fortress 
capable  of  resisting  for  a long  period. 

Napoleon  did  not  in  1813  act  according  to  these,  his  own, 
principles,  as  we  have  seen.  By  initiating  several  attacks  at 
once  so  that  they  could  not  be  properly  carried  through,  he 
lost  the  force  of  all  of  them.  He  did  not  push  home  any  one 
of  his  attacks  where  he  commanded  in  person.  He  could  on 
at  least  three  occasions  have  destroyed  Blucher,  as  he  could 
after  Dresden  have  destroyed  Schwartzenberg.  He  was  con- 
tinually conceiving  brilliant  manoeuvres,  and  never  putting 
any  of  them  to  use.  Instead  of  keeping  the  allies  at  a dis- 
tance, he  unconcernedly  sat  down  in  worthless  Dresden  and 
waited  for  them  to  surround  him.  And  in  going  to  Leipsic 
to  fight  a battle,  he  deliberately  committed  strategic  suicide. 
Any  manoeuvre  was  better. 


AN  ABNORMAL  TACTICAL  MANOEUVRE.  241 


On  learning  of  Napoleon’s  return  to  Leipsic,  lest  he  should 
turn  on  and  crush  Blucher,  the  sovereigns  determined  to  force 
a battle  on  the  16th,  though  Bennigsen  and  Colloredo  could 
not  get  up  until  the  next  day.  They  hoped  less  for  a decisive 
victory  than  to  keep  the  French  in  place  until  all  their  forces 
could  join  for  a second  struggle,  and  for  this  they  were  ready 
to  pay  a price.  Schwartzenberg  had  conceived  the  queer  idea 
of  advancing  on  Leipsic  with  a large  part  of  the  allied  mass 
between  the  Pleisse  and  the  Elster,  via  Connewitz  over  the 
Moorfeld,  an  open  low-lying  meadow-land,  having  no  outlet 
to  the  north  except  one  bridge,  which  debouched  into  the  midst 
of  the  French  army ; while  the  right  under  Barclay  should 
advance  on  the  Pleisse  right  bank.  This  abnormal  tactical 
manoeuvre  would  have  exposed  Barclay  to  the  whole  French 
army,  and  brought  on  certain  defeat ; the  czar  saw  its  danger, 
and  forbade  the  Russians  and  Prussians  to  be  thus  placed ; 
and  as  a result,  Schwartzenberg  led  his  Austrians  into  the 
Connewitz  trap,  while  Kleist  and  Wittgenstein  in  the  centre 
and  Klenau  on  the  right  — all  under  Barclay  — remained  on 
the  east  bank.  Giulay  was  detached  by  way  of  Zwenkau  to 
seize  the  road  from  Leipsic  to  Merseburg. 

This  plan  spread  the  allies  too  much.  With  Blucher  and 
Bernadotte  at  Halle,  they  would  have  better  marched  on  Zeitz 
and  joined  hands  on  the  French  communications,  while  Ben- 
nigsen could  march  from  Colditz  on  Altenburg  to  cover  the 
road  to  Bohemia  during  the  operation.  But  the  sovereigns 
were  not  clear  as  to  what  Blucher  and  Bernadotte  were  doing, 
and  were  partly  manoeuvring  in  the  dark. 

Bennigsen  was  fast  approaching.  From  October  9 to  13  he 
had  advanced  via  Peterswalde  and  Dippoldiswalde,  thrown 
back  St.  Cyr,  and  by  way  of  Nossen  reached  Waldheim  the 
15th.  Between  Bernadotte  and  Bennigsen  were  one  hundred 
and  twenty  thousand  men,  who  could  come  into  line  October  IT. 


VOL.  IV. 


242 


THE  FRENCH  OUTNUMBERED. 


On  October  16  Napoleon  would  only  have  before  him 
Schwartzenberg  with  one  hundred  and  sixty  thousand  men  to 
his  own  one  hundred  and  twenty-five  thousand,  and  Blucher 
with  sixty  thousand  to  oppose  Marmont  with  twenty  thousand ; 
but  thirty  thousand  men  under  Bertrand,  Souham  and  Dom- 
brovski,  all  under  Ney,  were  coming  up.  The  allies  had  be- 
hind them  large  reserves,  Napoleon  had  not.  The  French 
morale  was  still  good,  the  allied  morale  had  risen  immensely 
during  the  last  six  weeks,  and  they  were  willing  to  risk  defeat 
in  view  of  the  reserves  sustaining  them. 

Meanwhile  St.  Cyr  with  his  two  corps  was  holding  use- 
less Dresden,  while  he  might  have  well  turned  the  tables  at 
Leipsic.  Some  twenty  thousand  men  of  Bennigsen’s  were 
there  containing  him. 

All  included,  the  allies  thus  largely  outnumbered  the 
French;  but  fora  battle  south  of  Leipsic  on  the  16th,  the 
forces  were  not  unequal,  especially  as  the  French  had  interior 
lines.  Only  Reynier  would  not  be  up,  and  Napoleon  would 
marshal  about  one  hundred  and  seventy-five  thousand  men, 
while  the  allies  would  put  only  two  hundred  and  twenty  thou- 
sand men  in  line ; for  neither  Bernadotte  nor  Bennigsen  could 
get  up.  Had  Napoleon  kept  St.  Cyr  and  Lobau  with  the 
army,  he  would  have  had  as  many  men  as  the  allies.  While 
this  near  equality  was  valid  for  the  16th,  the  enemy  could 
within  two  days  concentrate  an  overwhelming  superiority,  as 
Napoleon  could  not.  Unless  won  on  the  16th,  the  battle  would 
clearly  result  in  defeat. 

The  strategic  plan  of  the  allies,  to  march  straight  on  Napo- 
leon’s army  while  conserving  their  own  line  of  retreat  on 
Bohemia,  was  a good  one  : but  the  tactical  idea  of  marshaling 
forty  thousand  men  between  the  Pleisse  and  the  Elster  was  a 
lapse  hard  to  explain.  If  Napoleon  was  to  be  headed  off  from 
retreat,  Giulay  alone  at  Lindenau  could  do  this  long  enough 


NEY  NORTH  OF  LEIPSIC. 


243 


for  the  rest  to  come  up  by  filing  to  the  left ; and  it  needed 
but  a division  to  keep  touch  with  Giulay.  Not  expecting  such 
an  advance,  Napoleon  did  not  at  first  discover  it : to  his  eye 
the  high  land  at  Wacliau  was  the  point  to  which  to  devote 
his  attention.  Ney  had  been  intrusted  with  the  command 


Lobau. 


north  of  Leipsic,  having  his  own  corps  under  Souham,  and 
those  of  Bertrand  and  Marmont.  The  reports  and  all  the 
probabilities  were  that  Blucher  would  move  to  Merseburg  to 
get  in  touch  with  the  Army  of  the  Sovereigns,  and  then  attack 
from  there ; but  as  he  might  advance  in  whole  or  in  part 
straight  from  Halle  via  Schkeuditz,  Napoleon  had  to  provide 
against  both  contingencies. 

Now,  the  emperor  had  depended  on  drawing  in  two  of 
Ney’s  corps  for  his  massed  blow  on  Wacliau.  Souham,  on  the 
way  from  Diiben,  was  to  relieve  Marmont  near  Mockern, 
where  the  latter  had  intrenched  a fine  position,  and  Marmont 
and  Bertrand  were  then  to  come  down  to  the  main  line,  so  as 


244 


M ARM  ONI'  NOT  RELIEVED. 


to  give  Napoleon  over  forty  thousand  additional  men,  with 
whom  to  deliver  his  decisive  blow  towards  the  end  of  the  day. 
With  Schwartzenberg’s  error  in  placing  the  Austrians  where 
they  were  of  no  use,  this  reinforcement,  properly  arriving, 
should  have  led  to  a defeat  of  the  enemy.  But  things  no 
longer  worked  Napoleon’s  way.  As  formerly  at  Bautzen,  and 
later  at  Waterloo,  he  was  destined  to  find  Ney  wanting.  On 
Giulay’s  approach,  the  small  body  at  Lindenau  had  to  be 
reinforced,  and  Ney  sent  Bertrand  thither,  thus  diverting  him 
from  the  main  line  at  Liebertwolkowitz,  towards  which  at  ten 
o’clock  he  was  marching.  Marmont  had  not  yet  been  relieved 
by  Souham,  who  had  been  delayed  at  the  Mulde  crossing,  and 
could  not  come  up  as  early  as  expected ; nor,  when  Blucher 
put  in  an  appearance,  could  Marmont  leave  without  endan- 
gering Leipsic,  and  he  felt  bound  to  hold  himself  between 
Mockern  and  Eutritzsch.  Neither  could  Ney  spare  him,  as 
he  was  familiar  with  his  position  ; but  in  lieu  of  his  corps, 
Ney  detached  two  of  Souham’s  divisions,  so  soon  as  they 
arrived.  Thus  the  large  reinforcement  on  which  Napoleon 
had  counted  for  his  massed  blow  on  Wachau  was  not  to  reach 
him ; and  he  must  more  than  once  have  longed  for  St.  Cyr 
and  Lobau,  lost  in  the  purposeless  defense  of  Dresden. 

There  was  still  another  view  to  take.  Suppose  Ney’s  line 
were  drawn  upon  heavily,  this  marshal,  with  even  a handful, 
although  the  chances  were  against  him,  might  possibly  fend 
Blucher  off  from  Leipsic  during  the  day  ; for  Blucher  was  not 
yet  quite  ready,  and  Ney  had  done  some  wonderful  work  of 
this  kind  in  the  past ; and  even  if  Blucher  seized  the  town, 
provided  Napoleon  could  positively  beat  Schwartzenberg, 
as  would  then  be  probable,  the  harm  could  be  rectified,  for 
Blucher  would  have  smartly  decamped.  If,  however,  Napo- 
leon were  defeated,  without  Ney  to  fall  back  upon,  the  defeat 
would  become  a rout,  and  this  neglect  of  Leipsic  be  fatal.  It 


DAVOUT  PRACTICALLY  USELESS. 


245 


was  clearly  a risk.  Yet,  with  these  additional  forces,  added 
to  the  allies’  errors,  Napoleon  might  have  turned  their  right 
and  driven  them  up  against  the  Pleisse,  on  the  other  side  of 
which  Schwartzenberg  would  have  stood,  an  idle  spectator  of 
the  disaster.  This  plan  would  not  only  have  earned  a deci- 
sive victory,  but  by  throwing  the  Army  of  the  Sovereigns 
back  on  Zeitz,  would  have  opened  a new  line  of  retreat  for 
the  French  via  Naumburg;  and  Blucher  might  then  take 
Leipsic  and  welcome.  Still  (though  within  the  compass  of 
Napoleon’s  former  vigor),  all  this  was  a hypothesis  — Krieg- 
spiel  rather  than  actual  war.  Had  Napoleon  won,  it  would 
have  been  but  one  more  victory  to  add  to  Liitzen  and  Bautzen 
and  Dresden  ; for  Blucher,  Bernadotte  and  Schwartzenberg 
would  again  have  assembled  with  two  hundred  and  fifty 
thousand  men,  after  Bennigsen  and  Colloredo  had  come  up. 

As  at  Waterloo,  Napoleon’s  winning  could  only  delay  the 
event,  while  a retreat  via  Naumburg  would  have  abandoned 
the  French  train,  now  at  Eilenburg.  It  was  a big  game  to 
play,  and  a handsome  one,  this  disgarnishing  of  Leipsic  to  beat 
Schwartzenberg,  and  in  the  true  Napoleonic  style.  But  with 
Russia,  Austria,  Prussia  and  the  rest  of  the  allies  all  of  one 
mind,  could  Napoleon,  by  even  another  half-dozen  victories, 
divert  the  current  which  had  so  decidedly  set  against  him? 

Meanwhile  Davout  was  practically  as  useless  as  the  garri- 
sons on  the  Oder  and  beyond ; and  Walmoden  moved  skillfully 
around  Hamburg,  aided  by  the  anti-French  fervor  of  the 
population.  It  does  not  seem  that,  in  this  year  and  the  next 
two,  the  emperor  made  proper  use  of  this  marshal’s  excep- 
tional talent,  which  had  so  often  turned  the  tide  of  victory 
towards  the  French  eagles. 


LXIV. 


LEIPSIC  BATTLE.  OCTOBER  16-19,  1813. 

The  battle  of  Leipsie  was  a series  of  heavy  fights  around  the  city,  rather 
than  one  general  engagement  in  which  grand-tactics  was  employed.  On  Octo- 
ber 16  Blucher  defeated  Ney  northwest  of  Leipsie ; on  the  west  the  lines  of 
retreat  were  held  against  the  allied  forces ; on  the  south  Napoleon  fought 
Schwartzenberg.  The  allies  here  were  ill  handled,  being  separated  by  the 
Pleisse.  At  the  key-point  east  of  the  Pleisse,  the  emperor’s  forces  outnum- 
bered the  allies,  while  Schwartzenberg  was  to  the  west  of  it.  The  fighting  was 
obstinate  and  costly,  and  Marmont,  who  was  to  come  down  and  clinch  the  vic- 
tory, did  not  reach  the  field.  The  battle  here  was  drawn,  but  owing  to  Ney’s 
defeat,  Napoleon  had  to  narrow  his  lines.  His  only  safety  was  in  promptly 
moving  to  the  Rhine  ; and  during  the  succeeding  night  he  should  have  prepared 
to  withdraw  through  Leipsie  to  Naumburg  and  Erfurt ; but  he  determined  to 
fight  another  battle,  although  allied  reinforcements  were  placing  him  at  an  utter 
disadvantage-  On  October  17  the  allies  amended  their  position,  and  on  the  18th 
again  attacked.  The  French  withdrew  to  a position  closer  to  and  surrounding 
Leipsie.  On  this  day  the  fight  was  still  more  desperate,  and  at  a critical 
moment  the  Saxons  went  over  to  the  enemy.  The  French  held  themselves  with 
difficulty.  There  was  but  one  main  bridge  from  Leipsie  west.  Several  other 
bridges  should  have  been  built ; but  for  lack  of  proper  orders  or  a staff  which 
could  attend  to  details,  this  was  not  done.  At  evening  of  October  18  retreat 
was  imperative,  but  Napoleon’s  dispositions  lacked  vigor.  Early  the  19th  the 
French  fought  in  retreat,  corps  by  corps,  into  the  city  and  towards  the  one 
bridge,  the  allies  following.  By  ill  management  the  bridge  was  blown  up  be- 
fore all  the  troops  were  over,  and  twenty  thousand  men  were  captured.  The 
French  retreated.  Instead  of  pursuing,  the  allies  slowly  followed.  The  Bava- 
rians moved  up  to  cut  Napoleon’s  retreat  on  the  Main,  but  were  defeated  at 
Hanau,  and  then  the  French  army,  in  almost  as  pitiful  a condition  as  in  Rus- 
sia, made  its  way  across  the  Rhine,  ending  the  campaign  with  an  epidemic  of 
typhus. 

The  battle  of  Leipsie,  rather  than  one  great  engagement, 
was  a series  of  desperate  conflicts  around  the  city,  in  which 
half  a million  of  men  and  two  thousand  guns  were  engaged. 


THE  THEATRE  OF  ACTION. 


247 


The  field  was  not  favorable  to  the  French,  as  Leipsic  was  the 
lowest  part  of  the  theatre  of  action  ; and  especially  perilous 
was  the  crossing  to  Lindenau,  made  awkward  by  the  fall 
rains,  which  softened  the  meadows  and  filled  the  streams. 

The  city  of  Leipsic  lies  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Elster,  at 
the  point  where  the  Pleisse  runs  into  it.  Between  the  rivers, 
for  several  miles  above  and  below  the  city,  lies  low  meadow- 
land,  where  the  footing  is  rarely  firm,  and  marsh  land.  On 
the  north  of  the  city  comes  in  from  the  east  a smaller  stream, 
the  Partha.  The  only  outlet  from  Leipsic  to  the  west, 
towards  Merseburg  and  Weissenfels,  is  over  a long  causeway 
bridge  that  crosses  the  several  arms  of  the  two  rivers,  making 
a network  of  streams  and  marsh  that  cannot  be  passed  un- 
bridged ; and  at  the  western  end  of  this  long  bridge  is  Linde- 
nau. The  road  to  Halle  runs  across  the  Partha  and  north  of 
the  river.  All  around  the  city,  on  the  right  bank,  the  ground 
is  open  and  rolling,  with  an  occasional  high  knoll  commanding 
the  country,  with  good  roads  radiating  in  every  direction,  and 
numerous  small  farm  roads  connecting  these,  available  for  all 
arms.  Many  villages  dot  the  landscape,  mostly  of  the  long, 
straggling,  one-street  variety,  and  all  so  built  as  to  be  capable 
of  stout  defense,  as  are  also  several  sheep-farms,  with  walled 
inclosures.  Despite  small  brooks  and  ponds,  troops  can  move 
at  will  in  all  directions ; but  the  rivers  are  bridged  only  at 
some  of  the  villages,  and  cannot  be  forded.  There  were  in 
1813  a few  woods,  not  interfering  with  manoeuvres  ; but  ten 
miles  south  of  the  city  was  a large  stretch  of  woodland  known 
as  the  University  Forest.  Natural  obstacles  being  absent,  the 
villages  became  the  most  important  features  of  this  theatre, 
on  which  was  to  take  place  the  Battle  of  the  Nations. 

The  battle  of  October  16  was  fought  out  at  three  points : 
to  the  north  of  Leipsic,  where  Blucher,  coming  from  Halle, 
attacked  Marmont,  Ney  being  in  supreme  command  at  this 


248 


MARMONT  PUSHED  BACK. 


part  of  the  field ; to  the  west,  where  Giulay,  an  allied  flying 
left  wing,  strove  to  take  Lindenau,  so  as  to  control  the  one 
direct  line  of  retreat  now  left  the  French ; to  the  south,  where 
Napoleon  hoped  by  equal  numbers  and  superior  tactics  to 
break  down  the  defense  of  the  Army  of  the  Sovereigns.  Let 
us  consider  these  in  succession. 

Marmont  had  drawn  up  with  his  left  at  Mockern  and  part 
of  his  right  at  Eutritzsch,  and  about  noon  the  Polish  division 
under  Dombrovski  came  up  on  his  right  and  occupied  Gross 
and  Klein  Widderitsch,  making  a force  of  nearly  thirty  thou- 
sand men,  covering  the  road  from  Diiben.  Ney  had  seven 
divisions  north  of  the  Partha,  — an  ample  force ; but  some 
had  not  arrived  as  the  battle  opened,  and  there  was  not  time 
to  get  them  well  in  hand.  Moreover,  the  danger  that  Souham 
and  Reynier,  coming  up  from  Diiben  and  Eilenburg,  might 
be  cut  off,  made  Ney  anxious  for  his  right  flank.  As  already 
narrated,  Marmont  had  expected  to  move  south  to  the  Lie- 
bertwolkowitz  lines,  but  Blucher’s  early  attack  prevented  his 
so  doing.  In  his  advance,  Yorck,  Blucher’s  van,  ran  across 
the  French  outlying  posts  at  Radefeld,  Freyroda  and  Linden- 
thal,  and  succeeded,  about  1 p.  M.,  in  driving  them  back  on 
the  main  line.  But  as  Yorck  came  on  towards  Mockern,  he 
found  the  French  resistance  spirited.  Here  were  stationed 
the  French  marines ; their  conduct  was  exemplary,  and  it  was 
only  after  heavy  losses  that  he  managed  by  five  to  capture  the 
village,  and  push  Marmont  back  on  Gohlis  and  Eutritzsch. 
The  stubbornness  of  the  fighting  is  shown  by  the  French  loss 
of  twenty  guns  and  four  thousand  men,  while  Yorck  lost  over 
a third  of  his  twenty  thousand  men.  Late  at  night  a Cossack 
dash  carried  off  a French  artillery  park  of  thirty  pieces  more. 
Blucher  slept  on  the  field.  On  Ney’s  right,  too,  the  fighting 
had  been  severe.  The  Widderitsch  villages  were  captured  by 
Langeron;  but  Delmas’  division  of  Souham’s  corps  oppor- 


AT  THE  EXPENSE  OF  VICTORY. 


249 


tunely  came  up  from  Diiben  with  the  3d  Corps  artillery,  and 
drove  out  the  Prussians,  who  lost  the  opportunity  of  cutting 
it  off.  The  other  two  Souham  divisions,  twelve  thousand 
strong,  Ney  dispatched  to  reinforce  Napoleon’s  line,  though 
hard-pressed  Marmont  pleaded  for  them.  They  might  as 
well  have  been  kept  north  of  the  Partha,  for  they  arrived  too 
late  to  aid  Napoleon,  marching  and  countermarching  all  day 
without  getting  under  fire ; for  on  hearing  of  Marmont’s 
strait,  Napoleon  turned  these  divisions  back,  lest  he  should 
forfeit  Leipsic,  the  outlet  on  which  he  counted.  Bertrand 
had  also  started  about  ten  o’clock  to  join  Napoleon,  when 
Arrighi,  in  command  of  the  city,  fearing  for  its  safety  as  he 
saw  the  approach  of  Giulay’s  corps  from  Liitzen,  sent  him 
an  earnest  call  to  come  to  the  defense  of  Lindenau  with  his 
fifteen  thousand  men,  which  he  did.  Giulay  first  captured 
Leutsch  about  noon ; an  hour  later  he  forced  his  way  into 
Plagwitz,  and  at  two  the  southerly  part  of  Lindenau  was  lost. 
But  on  receipt  of  orders  from  Napoleon  to  hold  Lindenau  at 
all  hazards,  Bertrand  put  in  his  last  man,  and  managed  to 
push  Giulay  beyond  Plagwitz.  Thus  for  the  day  Leipsic  was 
made  secure,  but  at  the  expense  of  the  emperor’s  reinforce- 
ment for  his  main  line  — that  is,  at  the  expense  of  victory. 

At  the  critical  point,  south  of  the  city,  it  was  the  emperor’s 
intention  to  take  the  initiative  and  himself  attack  ; he  waited 
until  about  9 A.  M.  for  the  fog  to  lift,  and  then  the  allies 
anticipated  him.  They  were  growing  in  audacity  as  they 
found  that  their  numbers  told.  “ Meervelt,”  says  Sehwartzen- 
berg  in  his  report,  continued  his  advance  between  the  Elster 
and  Pleisse  u from  Pegau  through  Zwenkau,  in  the  direction 
of  Connewitz,”  and  “ Wittgenstein  advanced  with  the  corps 
of  Kleist  and  Klenau  through  Crobern  and  Giildengossa  on 
Liebertwolkowitz.”  West  of  the  Pleisse  Schwartzenberg- 
thus  had  nearly  forty  thousand  men ; east  of  it  Barclay  with 


250 


PONIATOWSKI’S  DILEMMA. 


sixty-four  thousand  occupied  a front  from  Crobern  to  Gross 
Possna  and  beyond,  with  twenty  thousand  men  in  reserve,  and 
the  allies  were  faced  by  about  one  hundred  and  fifteen  thou- 
sand French.  Counting  Schwartzenberg  as  neutralized  for 
the  day  in  the  Moorfeld,  Napoleon  possessed  a superiority,  — 
especially  if  his  reinforcements  came  up,  — and  now  was  the 
moment  to  make  it  avail. 

The  allied  fighting  was  marked  by  a furious  determination 
to  make  an  end  of  it ; the  morale  of  the  enemy  was  high,  and 
the  troops  fought  as  rarely  before  against  Napoleon  ; they 
were  met  with  equal  fervor  by  the  French  on  the  defense  ; 
indeed,  several  times  Napoleon,  who  personally  placed  the 
divisions,  had  to  retire  out  of  range.  On  the  allied  left  Kleist 
first  pushed  in  on  Markkleeberg  ; in  the  centre  Wittgenstein 
advanced  on  Wachau;  on  the  right  Klenau  debouched  from 
University  woods  on  the  Kohlberg  and  Liebertwolkowitz. 
Lauriston  held  fast  to  Liebertwolkowitz  ; Victor  could  not  be 
driven  out  of  Wachau,  but  the  Prussians  made  so  strong  a 
bid  for  Markkleeberg,  that  Poniatowski  yielded  momentary 
possession  of  it.  Napoleon  had  been  followed  from  Reudnitz 
by  the  Old  and  Young  Guard,  and  Macdonald  was  coming  up 
to  reinforce  his  left.  Perceiving  Poniatowski’s  dilemma,  he 
sent  Augereau  over  from  the  French  left  with  a division  of 
the  Old  Guard  to  sustain  him  at  Dosen;  Markkleeberg  was 
recovered,  while  Lefol  defended  Connewitz.  The  capture  of 
Dolitz  Castle,  the  village  being  held  by  Semele,  was  the  only 
gain  Schwartzenberg  made  during  the  day,  except  to  contain 
the  emperor’s  right  wing  ; on  the  other  bank,  with  the  main 
army,  he  could  have  been  of  distinct  use.  “ The  attack  on 
Connewitz  was  not  practicable  in  front,  because  the  enemy 
defended  the  bridge  and  dike  with  much  artillery  and  in- 
fantry, and  because  the  ground  made  it  impossible  to  put  in 
artillery,”  says  the  report  of  Schwartzenberg. 


A SLIGHT  GAIN  MADE.  251 

While  Mortier’s  two  divisions  of  the  Young  Guard  ma- 
noeuvred against  the  right  of  Klenau,  the  two  others  under 
Oudinot  went  to  the  succor  of  Wachau.  The  positions  held 
by  Victor  and  Lauriston  were  taken  and  retaken  again  and 
again;  the  Old  Guard  stood  ready  at  the  Galgenberg;  Mac- 
donald reached  Holzhausen.  Between  Liebertwolkowitz  and 
Wachau,  Drouot  placed  a battery  of  one  hundred  and  fifty 
guns  ; Murat’s  heavy  cavalry  was  massed  behind  the  centre, 
except  Sebastiani,  who  was  off  on  the  left  at  Klein  Possna. 
Somewhat  after  noon,  when  the  allies  had  made  no  real  gain 
and  their  onset  was  slightly  flagging,  Napoleon  saw  the  chance 
of  an  offensive  thrust.  Drouot  was  firing  to  good  effect  and 
the  allied  batteries  replying  promptly.  The  cannonade  was 
severe,  and  on  the  whole  a slight  gain  had  been  made  by  the 
French  corps.  Everything  looked  as  if  victory  were  at  hand. 
Macdonald  was  about  to  debouch  from  Holzhausen  on  the 
allied  right.  Marmont  and  either  Bertrand  or  Souham  were 
still  expected ; and  with  this  accession  of  force,  the  emperor 
felt  sure  he  could  crush  the  enemy.  His  purpose  was  to  push 
forward  the  line  of  foot  at  the  proper  instant,  launch  Murat 
on  Giildengossa  in  a massed  charge,  and  by  advancing  his 
now  strong  left  on  Seiffertshayn  and  the  University  woods,  to 
turn  the  allied  right.  Under  the  fire  of  the  Drouot  battery 
the  French  line  strode  forward:  Macdonald  on  Seiffertshayn 
with  Mortier  on  his  right ; Victor,  with  Oudinot  in  support, 
on  the  sheep-farm  buildings  of  Auenhayn  ; Augereau  through 
Markkleeberg  on  Crobern. 

It  was  not  long  after  two  that  this  advance  all  along  the 
line  was  made  ; the  weight  of  masses  was  in  its  favor,  and  at 
nearly  all  points  the  French  assault  won  its  way;  Kleist  and 
Wittgenstein  fell  back ; but  Giildengossa  held  out  against 
even  Lauriston^s  reserve.  An  hour  later  Napoleon  threw 
Murat  on  the  allied  centre  with  Latour-Maubourg  in  the  lead, 


252 


THE  CLIMAX-BLOW  FAILS. 


followed  by  Kellermann  and  part  of  Pajol.  The  charge  was 
magnificent.  Forward  went  this  great  mass  with  irresistible 
force,  onward  through  the  village  of  Giildengossa,  where  the 
Russians  held  the  field,  and  their  cuirassiers  were  driven  back 
to  Crobern.  One  effort  more  and  the  allied  right  would  be 
broken.  The  news  of  victory  reached  Leipsic.  Part  of  the 
French  regiments  rode  so  near  the  position  whence  the  Em- 
peror Alexander  was  viewing  the  battle,  that  he  was  obliged 
to  throw  in  his  Cossacks  of  the  Guard  to  stop  the  head  of 
column,  and  himself  to  retire  to  a safer  place.  But  Latour- 
Maubourg  was  wounded,  and,  met  by  the  vigorous  Cossack 
onset,  the  column  appeared  to  pause,  as  if  with  exhaustion. 
These  were  not  the  old  Eylau  squadrons  ; man  and  horse 
lacked  endurance.  Moreover,  the  Russian  batteries  opened 
on  the  tired  mass,  and  Barclay’s  fresh  cavalry  rode  up  and 
fell  upon  it.  Not  sufficiently  sustained,  the  column  halted, 
trembled,  and  began  to  drift  to  the  rear.  It  had  failed  to 
shake  the  allied  line.  For  eight  hours  the  battle  had  swayed 
to  and  fro  in  the  little  space  marked  out  by  the  Wachau  val- 
ley ; it  now  rolled  back  to  Wachau. 

Schwartzenberg’s  report  says  : “ The  enemy  had  succeeded  in  advanc- 
ing near  Crobern  with  a great  mass  of  cavalry  sustained  by  several  in- 
fantry squares.  . . . Nostitz  threw  himself  with  his  cavalry  on  the  enemy’s 
cavalry,  overturned  it,  cut  to  pieces  several  infantry  squares  and  entirely 
broke  it  up. 

“ The  enemy  undertook  this  with  astonishing  stanchness,  and  attacked 
on  the  right  wing.  His  intention  was  to  break  it  from  the  centre.  Witt- 
genstein and  Klenau  received  him  in  the  utmost  cold  blood,  and  even 
when  he  had  advanced  with  his  column  of  cavalry  up  to  near  Giilden- 
gossa,  the  Russian  grenadiers  remained  firm.” 

Napoleon  now  learned  why  his  reinforcements  were  de- 
layed : except  the  Guard,  he  had  put  in  his  last  man,  and  the 
climax-blow  had  against  all  expectations  failed.  Nor  was 
this  the  end,  for  immediately  afterwards  fresh  divisions  came 


ONSET  OF  THE  ALLIED  RESERVE. 


253 


in  to  the  enemy.  Alexander  had  perceived  that  the  last 
French  thrust  was  coming,  and  lest  it  might  prove  fatal,  at 
his  instance  Schwartzenberg  ordered  up  the  reserve  from 
Audigast,  and,  recognizing  his  error  in  operating  beyond  the 
Pleisse,  brought  back  by  way  of  Baschwitz  two  of  his  cuiras- 
sier and  Hesse-Homburg’s  grenadier  divisions.  It  was  now 
the  turn  of  the  allies.  These  joint  forces  were  put  in  through 
Crobern,  and  piercing  between  Augereau  and  Murat,  forged 
on  into  the  French  line.  It  was  not  far  from  four  o’clock. 
A lodgment  was  made  in  Markkleeberg,  Augereau  holding 
manfully  the  upper  end  ; but  Victor,  after  gallant  defense  of 
Auenhayn,  ceded  it  to  the  Imperial  Russian  Guard  shortly 
before  five  o’clock,  and  with  Oudinot  fell  back  to  Wachau. 
Macdonald  drove  Klenau  back,  but,  partly  owing  to  the 
wounding  of  Pajol,  who  had  sustained  him,  was  forced  out  of 
Seiffertsliayn.  It  was  this  onset  of  the  allied  reserve  that  held 
Napoleon  back  from  putting  in  the  Old  Guard  to  complete 
the  work  of  Latour-Maubourg.  Yet,  shortly  determining  on 
one  more  effort  to  turn  fortune  towards  the  eagles,  he  was  pre- 
paring for  a final  rush  on  Stormthal  and  Crobern,  when  Meer- 
veldt,  after  an  all  day’s  struggle,  managed  to  debouch  from 
Dolitz ; and  to  meet  this  fresh  danger  Napoleon  was  com- 
pelled to  throw  in  the  Old  Guard  under  Curial,  in  lieu  of 
pushing  it  out  to  the  front.  Poniatowski  used  his  troops  well, 
and  the  gallant  Austrian  was  surrounded,  his  corps  cut  to 
pieces,  and  he  himself  captured.  Still,  this  brilliant  feat  of 
arms  was  subsidiary:  the  French  centre  had  failed  to  deliver 
its  last  blow,  and  Napoleon  had  not  utilized  his  momentary 
superiority  to  crush  the  Army  of  the  Sovereigns.  Darkness 
stopped  the  fighting.  The  Bulletin  says  : “ Our  loss  in  this 
day  was  twenty-five  hundred  men  killed  and  wounded.  It 
would  be  no  exaggeration  to  give  that  of  the  enemy  at  twenty- 
five  thousand  men.”  The  casualties  were  probably  about  equal. 


254 


THE  VICTORY  BARREN. 


From  a certain  standpoint,  few  of  his  battles  illustrate 
Napoleon’s  military  sense  better  than  this  first  day  at  Leipsic. 
Although  the  enemy  had  an  excess  of  a hundred  thousand 
men,  by  his  singular  logistic  skill  in  bringing  his  troops  to  the 
battlefield  at  the  critical  point,  he  opposed  to  them  equal  num- 
bers. He  recognized  the  moment  for  assuming  the  offensive 
with  unerring  judgment,  while  the  enemy  lost  the  use  of  forty 
thousand  men  in  the  Moorfeld.  Full  of  faults  as  the  last 
months  had  been,  yet  here  the  old  battle  fervor  again  showed 
itself  in  full  effulgence.  Had  his  reinforcements  from  the 
Partha  not  been  delayed  by  Blucher’s  hard  onset,  his  superi- 
ority would  have  told.  On  the  other  hand,  he  had  failed  to 
make  use  of  his  one  chance  to  win  the  battle  ; and  nothing 
shows  the  better  quality  and  morale  of  the  allies  than  their 
tenacious  fighting  of  these  days.  They  had  banded  together 
to  put  an  end  to  the  dictation  of  Napoleon,  and  having  found 
out  that  numbers  told,  even  against  this  great  captain,  they 
did  their  work  in  courageous  and  patient  if  not  in  perfect 
fashion.  While  gallant,  the  French  fighting  was  not  that  of 
the  veterans  of  1807. 

It  has  been  claimed  that  on  this  first  day  of  the  Battle  of 
the  Nations,  Napoleon  had  won  a victory  against  Barclay  at 
Wachau;  but  Ney  and  Marmont  had  been  driven  back  nearer 
Leipsic  by  Blucher,  and  Bertrand  had  barely  held  his  own 
against  Giulay  at  Lindenau.  The  victory  was  barren  ; it  had 
taught  the  allies  their  error  in  moving  through  the  Moorfeld, 
and  next  day  they  would  do  better.  The  emperor  had  not 
accomplished  his  object  — the  defeat  of  the  enemy ; for  despite 
utmost  effort,  neither  side,  as  darkness  set  in,  had  won  a 
rood  of  ground.  If,  with  a force  at  the  key-point  equal  to 
the  enemy’s,  Napoleon  could  not  win  the  field,  what  hope  was 
there  for  the  morrow,  when  he  would  be  largely  outnumbered  ? 

During  the  night  the  balance  of  the  3d  Corps,  and  Reynier 


ALLIED  TROOPS  EQUAL  TO  THE  FRENCH.  255 


with  ten  thousand  men,  came  up,  all  Napoleon  could  expect, 
but  by  no  means  making  up  for  the  losses  of  the  16th,  while 
St.  Cyr  and  Lobau  had  to  be  abandoned,  like  Ney  in  Russia. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  allies  were  increased  by  Bernadotte, — 
who,  having  convinced  himself  that  Reynier’s  movements  were 
only  demonstrations,  resolved  to  join  Blucher,  and  advanced 
nearer  Halle, — Bennigsen  with  Russian,  and  Colloredo  with 
Austrian  reserves.  Their  full  force  of  three  hundred  thou- 
sand men,  less  the  losses,  would  be  on  hand,  and  with  fourteen 
hundred  guns.  The  French  would  number  not  much  over 
half  this  effective.  The  emperor  had  beaten  the  same  odds  be- 
hind the  defenses  of  Dresden ; but  since  then  the  allies  had 
gained  much. 

In  Napoleon’s  tactical  theory,  preponderance  of  thousands 
at  the  point  of  contact  always  won  the  day.  Frederick’s  rule 
disregarded  numbers.  He  made  up  for  strength  by  vigor : 
discipline,  fighting  quality,  stood  in  lieu  of  men,  and  in  all  his 
early  battles  he  showed  that  his  grenadiers,  his  line  horsemen, 
were  superior  to  those  of  the  enemy.  Not  so  here.  The  allied 
troops,  properly  led,  were  equal,  man  for  man,  to  the  French, 
if  not  better.  The  earlier  superiority  of  Napoleon’s  veterans  no 
longer  existed.  The  men  who  had  won  at  Rivoli,  Austerlitz, 
Friedland,  had  mostly  perished  in  Spain  or  on  the  steppes  of 
Russia;  and  however  marvelously  the  young  French  conscript 
held  his  own,  he  had  more  than  his  match  in  the  Russian  and 
Austrian  veterans,  and  in  the  Prussians  trained  under  the  new 
army  system.  All  the  allied  soldier  had  needed  was  to  find  out 
that  the  Frenchman  was  not  invincible ; and  he  had  now  done  so. 

Military  discretion  left  but  one  thing  for  Napoleon  to  do : 
to  retire  at  once  to  a new  base.  At  Leipsic  he  had  no  further 
chance  of  victory,  of  even  holding  himself. 

After  the  battle  of  the  16th,  he  should  have  recognized  that 
retreat  was  necessary  to  save  the  relics  of  his  army,  and  dur- 


256 


STILL  SOME  CHANCE. 


ing  the  17th  he  should  quietly  have  prepared  to  move  away 
during  the  night  of  the  17th-18th.  This  he  could  well  have 
done,  while  the  allies  were  preparing  for  a fresh  day  of  battle ; 
and  by  sending  orders  to  St.  Cyr  to  rejoin  him  by  the  right 
bank,  and  by  calling  in  Davout,  he  could  still  have  made 
a strong  and  perhaps  successful  fight  on  the  Saale.  Or  better 
still,  he  could  have  retired  to  Torgau,  crossed,  taken  up  St. 
Cyr,  have  kept  up  the  morale  of  his  troops  by  an  apparently 
successful  manoeuvre,  marched  rapidly  down  to  Magdeburg, 
called  in  Davout  and  manoeuvred  towards  the  Rhine.  But 
he  could  see  nothing  but  battle  before  him,  here  on  the  spot. 
Retreat  meant  ruin  to  the  Napoleonic  political  scheme.  The 
structure  was  fictitious ; it  depended  on  a bold  front,  and  the 
emperor’s  native  obstinacy  came  to  the  fore.  Reports  from 
St.  Cyr  led  him  to  believe  that  Bennigsen  could  not  arrive 
for  some  days ; he  knew  that  Bernadotte  would  join  Blucher. 
There  was  still  some  chance.  If  Leipsic  were  lost,  Napoleon 
must  fall  back  on  the  Rhine,  defending  every  step ; and  the 
loss  of  another  battle  could  scarcely  bring  about  a worse  result 
than  that ; it  meant  merely  another  score  of  thousands  lost. 
What  imported  men  ? The  emperor  bivouacked  near  some 
old  brick-sheds  hard  by  his  battle-stand,  where  he  passed  a 
restless  night,  calling  several  of  his  generals  to  his  side.  He 
had  resorted  to  the  outworn  bluff  of  a truce,  sending  Meer- 
veldt  back  to  the  allied  headquarters  with  a proposition  which 
included  the  evacuation  of  the  fortresses  on  the  Vistula  and  the 
Oder.  He  would  have  yielded  those  on  the  Elbe.  But  no 
heed  was  paid  to  the  message ; Schwartzenberg  referred  it  to 
Alexander,  who,  as  at  Moscow,  made  no  answer.  Napoleon  no 
longer  weighed  with  the  sovereigns  as  he  had ; his  credit  had 
waned.  As  at  Moscow,  he  waited,  on  the  chance  of  a favor- 
able reply.  All  military  prudence  was  staked  on  the  political 
gaming-table,  on  which  he  had  long  been  playing. 


THE  MOMENT  TO  RETIRE. 


257 


Now  was  the  moment  to  retire.  The  allies  were  waiting, 
and  would  give  him  ample  time  to  march  on  Torgau;  if  he 
preferred  to  march  to  the  Saale,  the  road  to  Naumburg  and 
Erfurt  was  practically  open,  for  to  replace  the  troops  sent 
from  the  Moorfeld  to  the  main  army  on  the  afternoon  of 
the  16th,  Giulay  had  been  drawn  in  to  Zwenkau.  The  allies 
should  rather  have  reinforced  him  ; but  content  to  drive  Na- 
poleon from  Leipsic,  they  dared  not  play  for  greater  stakes. 
If  the  French  were  not  to  retire  on  the  16th,  or  if  Napoleon 
was  to  wait  for  a reply  to  his  proposition,  it  behooved  him 
to  construct  several  bridges  on  the  Pleisse  and  Elster,  so  that 
Leipsic  could  be  speedily  emptied,  when  it  was  finally  deter- 
mined to  leave  it,  or  he  was  driven  out.  It  is  said  he  told 
Berthier  to  attend  to  this,  but  there  was  no  written  order 
given,  nor  anything  definite  done ; and  this  shows  how  far 
his  forgetfulness  had  gone  in  the  minor  matters  he  at  one 
time  so  scrupulously  oversaw.  To  say  that  this  was  the 
duty  of  the  general  staff  will  not  do ; for  Napoleon  was  to 
blame  for  there  being  none : what  he  had,  though  it  contained 
good  officers,  was  not  worthy  the  name. 

Next  day,  a rainy  Sunday,  Murat  and  he  spent  some  hours 
together,  walking  on  the  causeways  of  the  brick-ponds ; most 
of  the  day  he  remained  in  his  tent,  while  preparations  for  an- 
other struggle  were  made  by  his  lieutenants.  He  understood 
that  if  he  did  not  retire,  he  must  at  least  withdraw  to  narrower 
lines  about  Leipsic,  so  as  to  be  prepared  to  retreat ; and  at 
2 A.  M.  on  the  18th  the  French  troops  were  ordered  underarms. 

In  his  report  Schwartzenberg  says  that  as  Bernadotte,  Ben- 
nigsen  and  Colloredo  could  not  come  up  in  time  to  take  an 
active  part  in  a battle  on  the  17th,  the  general  field-marshal- 
in-chief  considered  it  wise  to  await  the  morrow  to  renew  the 
combat ; and  as  every  hour  improved  the  allied  situation,  the 
sovereigns  had  spent  the  Sunday  in  reorganizing  their  shat- 


VOL.  IV. 


258 


THE  RIGHT  WING  UNDER  MURAT. 


tered  ranks  and  in  preparing  for  a fresh  struggle.  They  were 
now  confident  of  the  ultimate  result.  Bernadotte  came  in  via 
Landsberg,  Bennigsen,  less  the  force  left  to  watch  Dresden, 
marched  via  Colditz  on  Leipsic  ; and  Colloredo  came  up  with 
his  two  divisions. 

The  emperor’s  explanations  of  his  manoeuvres  grow  lamer.  The 
Bulletin  of  the  Grand  Army,  October  24,  tells  us  that  “ The  battle  of 
Wachau  had  disconcerted  all  the  enemy’s  projects,  but  his  army  was  so 
numerous  that  he  still  had  reserves.  . . . After  the  retreat  of  the  16th 
. . . the  enemy  occupied  a fine  position  two  leagues  in  the  rear.  The 
day  of  the  17th  had  to  be  spent  to  reconnoitre  this  and  to  determine 
the  point  of  attack,  ...  to  bring  up  the  reserve  parks,  and  replace  the 
eighty  thousand  artillery  cartridges  consumed  in  the  battle.  . . . Having 
recognized  that  the  position  of  the  enemy  was  very  strong,  the  emperor 
resolved  to  draw  him  to  another  field.  On  the  18tli,  at  2 a.  m.,  he  drew 
nearer  Leipsic  by  two  leagues.” 

Personally,  Napoleon  drove  back  to  Reudnitz  during  tlie 
night  of  the  '17th-18th,  and  here  spent  some  hours  consulting 
with  Ney  ; about  5 a.  m.  he  drove  into  Leipsic,  inspected 
Lindenau  and  vicinity,  and  ordered  Bertrand  to  march  through 
Liitzen  on  Weissenfels,  so  as  to  scour  the  plain,  seize  the 
debouches  of  the  Saale  and  open  communications  with  Naum- 
burg  and  Erfurt.  The  emperor  then  returned  to  Stotteritz, 
where  by  eight  o’clock  the  Guard  had  arrived,  and  the  ar- 
tillery fire  began  to  be  pronounced  from  all  quarters.  The 
French  army  had  been  gradually  withdrawing  from  the  old 
battlefield,  and  began  to  take  up  a,  preliminary  position  sur- 
rounding Leipsic  from  the  Pleisse  to  the  Partha.  Poniatowski 
still  held  Dolitz  and  Connewitz,  Augereau  leaned  on  the  Loss- 
nitz  ponds,  Victor  occupied  Probsthayda,  on  his  left  Drouot 
and  his  big  battery.  Behind  Augereau  stood  Kellermann’s 
cavalry,  Oudinot  on  his  left.  Behind  Victor  was  Bordesoult, 
who  took  over  the  cavalry  of  Latour-Maubourg,  and  Pajol. 
All  this,  the  right  wing,  was  under  Murat.  Macdonald  stood 


PURELY  DEFENSIVE  SITUATION. 


259 


from  Zuckelhausen  to  Holzhausen,  to  his  left  rear  Sebastiani's 
cavalry,  and  Lauriston  in  second  line.  Marmont  held  Schbn- 
feld,  with  Dombrovski  at  Pfaffendorf,  Reynier  held  Pauns- 
dorf  with  a useless  detachment  out  at  Taucha,  Souham  was  in 


reserve  near  Leipsic,  and  Arrighi’s  cavalry  stood  in  support. 
The  Old  Guard  under  Curial,  the  Young  Guard  under  Mor- 
tier,  and  the  Guard  cavalry  were  in  general  reserve  at  Thon- 
berg  ; and  near  by  on  a hillock  beside  a tobacco  factory,  the 
emperor  took  up  his  stand.  Mortier  later  went  to  Lindenau 


260 


SMALL  DISPLAY  OF  GRAND-TACTICS. 


to  replace  Bertrand.  The  situation  was  purely  defensive, 
and  only  assumed  to  cover  a shorter  line,  with  salient  near 
Probsthayda  and  Stotteritz,  to  which  the  French  soon  retired. 

Opposite  the  French  convex  array  the  allies  formed  several 
parties  for  attack.  For  some  reason  Bluclier  had  given  a 
number  of  his  divisions  to  Bernadotte,  whose  army  was  ninety 
thousand  strong;  and  with  what  was  left,  he  and  Sacken 
started  from  Gohlis  to  attack  Leipsic  at  the  Halle  gate,  while 
Bernadotte  crossed  the  Partha  between  Schonfeld  and  Taucha 
to  join  the  right  of  the  Army  of  the  Sovereigns  in  an  advance 
on  the  city.  Scliwartzenberg  had  three  columns : one  of  fifty 
thousand  men,  led  by  himself,  pushed  in  on  Connewitz  along 
the  Pleisse — how  many  on  the  left  and  how  many  on  the 
right  bank  is  not  clear;  one  of  sixty  thousand  men  under 
Barclay  advanced  through  Wachau  and  Liebertwolkowitz  on 
Probsthayda;  and  one  of  sixty-five  thousand  men  under  Ben- 
nigsen  from  Sieffertshayn  against  Zuckelhausen  and  Holz- 
liausen.  Giulay  was  again  to  attack  at  Lindenau,  although 
part  of  his  twenty  thousand  men  had  been  drawn  in  by 
Scliwartzenberg.  In  his  report  Scliwartzenberg  states  that 
“ The  principal  attack  began  in  three  columns  at  8 A.  M., 
Bennigsen  and  Klenau  on  the  right  towards  Holzhausen,  Bar- 
clay with  Wittgenstein  and  Kleist  in  the  centre  towards 
Wachau,  with  the  Russian  and  Prussian  Guard  in  reserve, 
the  third  column  under  Hesse-Homburg  occupying  the  pla- 
teau between  Dosen  and  Losnig,  with  Colloredo  in  reserve. 
Nothing  could  resist  the  bravery  of  the  allied  troops.” 

Small  display  of  grand-tactics  is  apparent  on  the  18th, 
It  was  a battle  in  concave  against  convex  order,  with  fight- 
ing  all  along  the  line,  in  which  the  better  though  no  more 
gallant  troops  of  the  allies,  far  superior  in  numbers,  crushed 
the  fewer  divisions  of  the  French,  who  fought  with  a river  in 
their  rear  and  practically  but  one  outlet.  This  inexcusable 


YIELDING  GROUND. 


*261 


position  must  be  charged  to  Napoleon.  History  narrates  but 
one  brilliant  victory  gained  by  an  army  fighting  with  a river 
at  its  back  — Cannae ; and  choosing  this  position  for  valid 
reasons,  by  his  extraordinary  tactical  ability  Hannibal  won 
against  vast  odds.  In  his  situation  Napoleon  could  not  expect 
to  rival  the  great  Carthaginian.  There  were  three  hundred 
thousand  allies,  equally  strong  along  the  line,  with  twelve 
hundred  guns  giving  concentric  fire,  and  never 
a gap  or  a false  manoeuvre  which  afforded  him 
a chance  to  break  the  chain.  His  one  hope  that 
Blueher  and  Bernadotte  would  remain  north  of 
the  Partha  and  not  join  the  main  allied  line 
was  in  vain;  and  the  Saxon  and  Wurtemberg 
troops  in  the  French  army  proved  unreliable. 

In  his  report  Schwartzenberg  says  that  “ the 
three  allied  monarchs  were  yesterday,  the  de- 
cisive day,  upon  the  heights  between  Wachau 
and  Probsthayda,”  and  watched  the  battle  with 
keen  interest.  The  French  were  moving'  to  the 
rear  to  occupy  the  new  line,  and  Napoleon  was 
still  awaiting  an  answer  to  his  proposal,  when 
the  oncoming  of  the  allied  columns  was  an- 
nounced. The  column  along  the  Pleisse  was 
received  with  stout  hearts,  and  Dosen  and 
Dolitz  long  held  their  own ; but  finally  numbers 
told  and  both  fell  to  the  Austrian  assaults,  though  Lossnitz 
and  Connewitz  could  not  be  taken.  In  Barclay’s  front  the 
French  did  not  intend  to  hold  the  first  line,  and  Wachau  was 
evacuated  before  Kleist  and  Wittgenstein  fairly  attacked. 
Liebertwolkowitz  followed  suit;  by  ten  the  allies  had  captured 
the  sheep-farm  Meusdorf,  and  Barclay  turned  on  Probsthayda. 

This  rapid  gain  was  due  to  the  French  purpose  of  yielding 
ground  : until  noon  the  battle  was  not  fully  engaged.  Then 


Saxon 

Sharpshooter. 


262 


HEADED  FOR  PROBSTHAYDA. 


the  allies  were  well  in  hand  and  strode  forward  at  all  points. 
Augerean  and  Poniatowski  on  the  French  right  came  close 
to  losing  Lossnitz  and  Connewitz,  until  Oudinot  came  up  with 
his  two  divisions  of  the  Young  Guard,  and  here  along  the 
ponds  the  French  held  themselves  nobly.  In  the  centre  the 
enemy  made  his  main  effort  on  Probsthayda,  but  though 
Bennigsen  advanced  on  and  took  Zuckelhausen,  and  after  a 
lusty  fight,  Holzhausen,  which  success  seriously  imperiled 
Probsthayda,  yet  Victor,  with  Lauriston,  the  Old  Guard,  Mor- 
tier,  and  two  cavalry  corps  under  Murat  at  his  back,  clung 
to  the  place  with  a gallantry  above  praise,  the  emperor  rid- 
ing forward  to  Probsthayda  and  inspiring  the  French  divi- 
sions with  fresh  confidence.  By  two  the  allies  were  ready 
to  storm  the  place.  Advancing  in  deep  columns,  as  the  allies 
came  on  concentrically  their  masses  became  deeper,  and  so 
rapid  was  their  approach  that  only  a part  of  their  artillery 
could  keep  up.  Kleist  and  Wittgenstein,  sustained  by  Gor- 
chakov, headed  straight  for  Probsthayda.  As  the  leading 
battalions  got  near,  the  French  line  made  a countercharge: 
a hundred  guns,  and  sharpshooters  in  the  buildings  and  gar- 
dens, poured  in  their  fire.  This  counter  proved  only  partially 
effective  : the  allied  columns  were  checked,  but  they  remained 
in  place,  and  opened  their  artillery  fire  as  fast  as  the  guns 
could  be  got  up.  Bennigsen  strove  in  vain  to  take  Stotteritz, 
where  Macdonald  and  Sebastiani  held  the  line,  but  in  edging 
towards  Bernadotte  on  the  Wurzen  road,  he  and  Klenau  cap- 
tured Baalsdorf  and  Zweinaundorf.  Bernadotte  reached 
Taucha  at  noon,  and  unable  to  seize  it  out  of  hand,  turned  it 
by  a manoeuvre,  and  Ney  withdrew  his  right  to  a line  from 
Schonfeld  through  Sellerhausen  to  Stuntz.  So  soon  as  they 
got  in  touch,  Bernadotte  and  Bennigsen  took  Molkau  and 
Paunsdorf,  Beynier  and  the  Saxons  retiring  to  the  second 
line,  while  Marmont  defended  Schonfeld  with  vigor  against 


DEFECTION  OF  THE  SAXONS. 


263 


Blucher,  who,  leaving  Sacken  to  force  his  way  from  Gohlis 
towards  Leipsic,  himself  headed  Langeron  and  St.  Priest  in 
an  attack  on  Schonfeld.  The  fighting  here  was  desperate 
and  the  loss  in  officers  heavy.  The  village  was 
taken  and  retaken  no  less  than  seven  times. 

Reynier  at  Sellerhausen  was  holding  Bubna  and 
Biilow  in  check,  when  suddenly  the  Saxons  ad- 
vanced towards  the  enemy  with  a heartiness 
which  earned  them  praise  from  all  sides;  but 
on  reaching  the  enemy’s  line,  they  turned  and 
opened  fire  on  the  French.  This  unexpected 
defection  would  have  broken  Reynier,  had  not 
Ney  brought  up  Delmas  to  his  aid.  Encour- 
aged by  this  sudden  accession  to  their  ranks, 
the  allies,  though  Durutte  came  to  the  front, 
shortly  forced  Ney  back  out  of  Sellerhausen  on 
Reudnitz,  and  he  was  lucky  to  rally  on  Strass- 
enhausen,  by  the  aid  of  Napoleon,  who  came 
up  just  in  time  with  Nansouty  and  fell  on 
Billow’s  flank  ; but  after  a brief  moment  of  aid 
he  returned,  giving  Ney  orders  to  hold  his  line 
at  all  hazards,  as  he  could  not  send  him  a single 
regiment.  The  courage  of  the  young  soldiers,  who  at  the 
Katzbach  and  Dennewitz  had  misbehaved,  was  here  shown 
up,  under  the  eye  of  the  emperor,  as  brilliant. 

But  courage  availed  naught.  The  battle  degenerated  into 
an  artillery  duel  at  Strassenhausen  and  Probsthayda.  These 
salients  long  remained  in  the  hands  of  their  brave  defend- 
ers, but  at  most  points  the  French  were  forced  back  towards 
Leipsic.  Blucher  pushed  in  Marmont,  and  Ney  was  finally 
compelled  to  retire  before  Bernadotte  and  Bennigsen,  though 
at  the  Halle  gate  Dombrovski  and  Arrighi  staved  off  the 
assaults  of  Sacken.  The  allies  had  not  used  their  cavalry  to 


a 


Saxon 

Musketeer. 


264 


AMMUNITION  LOW . 


advantage.  The  French  corps  had  been  so  repeatedly  unset- 
tled as  to  enable  well-handled  squadrons  to  make  a marked 
impression ; without  attack  they  conserved  their  integrity. 
But  ammunition  was  running  low : the  French  had  fired  two 
hundred  and  twenty  thousand  rounds  during  the  two  days, 
and  there  were  but  sixteen  thousand  rounds  left.  This  alone 
made  it  essential  to  retire.  Napoleon  should  have  foreseen  it. 

Bertrand  was  able  to  carry  out  his  orders.  As  he  de- 
bouched from  Lindenau,  he  ran  across  Lichtenstein’s  divi- 
sion, all  Giulay  had  left  on  this  bank ; and  driving  it  back 
to  Knauthayn,  reached  Liitzen,  and  by  noon  pushed  his  van 
to  Weissenfels,  and  seized  the  Saale  bridge.  The  czar  had 
proposed  that  part  of  the  army  be  withdrawn  from  the  use- 
less slaughter  and  sent  across  the  river  to  Liitzen,  to  cut  the 
French  line  of  retreat,  but,  as  is  usual  in  divided  command, 
the  excellent  suggestion  was  not  carried  out. 

The  Bulletin  again  tells  a tale  of  victory  on  this  day. 

“At  ten  the  artillery  opened.  Poniatowski  . . . defended  Conne- 
witz  bridge,  Murat  . . . was  at  Probsthayda,  Macdonald  at  Holzhausen. 
All  the  efforts  of  the  enemy  during  the  day  against  Connewitz  and 
Probsthayda  failed.  Macdonald  was  overthrown  at  Holzhausen.  The  em- 
peror ordered  him  to  take  post  at  Stotteritz.  The  cannonade  was  terrible. 
Augereau,  who  defended  a wood  in  the  centre,  held  himself  all  day.  The 
Old  Guard  was  arranged  in  reserve  on  a height,  making  four  great  col- 
umns directed  on  the  four  principal  points  of  attack.  . . . The  success  of 
the  battle  was  in  the  village  of  Probsthayda.  The  enemy  attacked  it  four 
times  with  considerable  forces.  Four  times  he  was  repulsed  with  great 
loss.  At  5 p.  m.  the  emperor  advanced  his  artillery  reserve  and  deployed 
all  his  fire  on  the  enemy,  who  fell  back  a league  from  the  battlefield. 

“ During  this  time  the  Army  of  Silesia  attacked  the  Halle  suburb.  . . . 
Three  times  Ney  drove  it  out  and  overturned  it  with  the  bayonet.  At 
3 p.  m.  the  victory  was  ours,  on  this  side  against  the  Army  of  Silesia,  as  on 
the  emperor’s  side  against  the  main  army,  but  at  this  moment  the  Saxon 
army,  infantry,  cavalry  and  artillery,  and  all  the  Wurtemberg  cavalry, 
passed  in  a body  to  the  enemy.  . . . This  treachery  not  only  made  a gap 


NOT  A MINUTE  TO  LOSE. 


265 


in  our  lines,  but  delivered  to  the  enemy  the  important  debouch  confided 
to  the  Saxon  army.  ...  A moment  of  disorder  ensued.  The  enemy 
passed  the  Partha  and  marched  on  Reudnitz,  which  he  seized.  He  was 
now  only  half  a league  from  Leipsic.  The  emperor  sent  his  mounted 
Guard  ...  to  take  in  flank  the  troops  which  were  advancing  along  the 
Partha  to  attack  Leipsic.  He  himself  moved  with  a division  of  the  Guard 
to  Reudnitz.  The  promptness  of  these  movements  reestablished  order. 
The  villages  were  retaken  and  the  enemy  pushed  far  off.  The  battlefield 
remained  entirely  in  our  possession,  and  the  French  army  remained  victo- 
rious on  the  field  of  Leipsic,  as  it  had  been  on  the  field  of  Wachau.  At 
night  the  fire  of  our  guns  had  at  every  point  pushed  back  a league  from 
the  battlefield  the  fire  of  the  enemy.” 

As,  in  the  Bulletin,  Bavaria  had  been  responsible  for  the 
lapsed  manoeuvre  of  a week  before,  so  here  Saxony  has  to 
bear  the  brunt.  The  real  causes  lay  far  deeper. 

Nothing  could  now  save  Napoleon  from  annihilation  by 
numbers,  unless  he  succeeded  in  crossing  the  Pleisse  and 
Elster,  and  in  getting  well  ahead  of  the  allied  pursuit.  The 
men  had  been  fighting  all  day,  and  were  so  worn  with  hunger 
and  fatigue  that  he  did  not  deem  it  prudent  to  begin  the  re- 
treat that  night ; and  yet  there  was  not  a minute  to  lose,  and 
no  one  knew  better  than  he  how  much  farther  than  one  thinks 
possible  troops  can  really  march  ; how  much  longer  human 
endurance  can  be  taxed.  By  proper  precautions,  full  half  of 
his  train  might  already  have  been  on  the  road  to  Weissenfels, 
which  Bertrand  had  opened ; instead  of  this,  it  was  blocking 
all  the  avenues  into  Leipsic  needed  by  the  retiring  troops.  A 
proper  general  staff  is  never  so  much  in  demand  as  on  such 
an  occasion.  The  chief  of  engineers  had  been  without  orders, 
and  his  bridge  equipage  was  back  at  Eilenburg,  but  he  had 
under  his  command  plenty  of  sappers  and  miners,  and  there 
was  abundant  material  at  hand.  The  alleged  order  for  three 
supplementary  bridges  to  be  constructed  over  the  rivers  did 
not  find  its  way  to  the  proper  officers;  only  one  was  thrown, 


266 


SUBURBS  BARRICADED. 


and  this  speedily  broke.  Every  one  waited  on  Napoleon,  ex- 
pecting him  to  provide  for  every  detail.  No  one  was  habitu- 
ated to  act  on  his  own  motion,  and  no  one  took  the  lead, 
though  all  must  have  divined  the  inevitable  end.  Unless 
one  has  been  part  of  an  army  in  disorderly  retreat,  striving 
to  make  its  way  through  the  defiles  of  a town  and  over  an 
unfordable  river  by  a single  bridge,  he  can  scarcely  conceive 
what  a scene  of  error  and  terror  it  is.  Even  the  cool-headed 
by  nature  find  it  hard  to  preserve  their  balance ; the  break- 
down of  a single  vehicle  arrests  an  entire  corps  ; and  it  is  here 
that  the  poltroon  plays  his  fatal  part  in  his  frenzy  to  escape. 

There  had  been  some  movement  to  the  rear  on  the  18th, 
but  most  of  the  troops  had  rested  during  the  night ; and  day- 
light of  the  19th  caught  the  Grand  Army  in  the  midst  of 
a disastrous  retreat,  to  cover  which  so  as  to  conserve  even  a 
semblance  of  order,  Napoleon  must  fight  still  another  battle  at 
the  gates  of  Leipsic.  The  corps  were  beginning  to  withdraw 
towards  the  suburbs,  which  had  been  barricaded ; and  here, 
had  the  troops  been  marshaled  and  fought  as  at  Dresden, 
they  could  have  held  the  allies  at  bay  during  the  entire  day, 
while  the  train  and  then  successive  corps  filed  across,  for 
Leipsic  was  a perfect  bridge-head.  But  for  the  Grand  Army 
and  its  immense  number  of  vehicles,  there  was  need  of  at 
least  two  or  three  bridges  above  and  below  the  permanent 
causeway,  for  there  were  the  two  rivers  and  the  low-lying  allu- 
vial basin  between,  cut  by  its  network  of  small  but  unfordable 
branches  — all  of  which  invited  disaster.  But  what  with  the 
late  arrival  in  Leipsic,  the  hope  of  victory,  the  emperor’s 
delay  to  await  an  answer  to  his  proposed  truce,  and  the  lack 
of  a general  staff  which  should  of  itself  act  when  the  emperor 
did  not,  no  one  had  provided  for  the  probable  retreat. 

It  was  all  of  a piece  with  Napoleon’s  growing  unfitness  for 
excessive  labor.  At  times  he  could  work  with  the  old  flame 


A SHARP  ALLIED  ATTACK. 


267 


of  genius,  but  not,  as  in  the  past,  at  all  times,  and  no  one  else 
could  do  his  work  when  lassitude  overcame  him.  He  was  in 
the  prime  of  life ; but  he  had  lived  too  fast ; he  had  worked 
too  much  and  had  indulged  to  excess  ; and  he  was  no  longer 
a sound  man.  Jealous  lest  others  should  learn  his  methods, 
he  had  kept  all  power,  all  initiative,  in  his  own  hands  ; and 
he  was  now  failing  from  the  very  cause  which  insured  him  his 
early  success.  The  blame  for  this  particular  lapse  at  Leipsic 
cannot  fairly  be  thrown  on  the  chief  of  staff  or  on  the  chief 
of  engineers;  the  emperor,  to  be  sure,  was  busy  dictating  fet- 
ters to  suit  the  new  conditions  of  a retreat  behind  the  Rhine ; 
he  had  to  send  dispatches  to  the  strong  places  on  the  Oder 
and  the  Elbe,  — whether  they  could  be  reached  or  not,  — to 
Spain,  to  Italy,  to  the  Rhine,  to  the  Regency  in  Paris ; he 
had  to  plan  for  the  now  questionable  future ; he  had  to  see 
the  ‘King  of  Saxony  and  bid  him,  while  submitting  to  the 
allies,  not  to  forget  France.  Berthier  might  himself  have 
taken  up  the  matter  of  the  bridges ; Napoleon  may  have 
given  orders  on  the  subject ; but  somehow  the  work  was  not 
done,  and  the  fault  must  be  laid  to  the  leader,  not  the  sub- 
ordinate. 

The  first  attempt  on  the  19th  to  fall  back  provoked  a sharp 
allied  attack,  and  soon  there  was  fierce  fighting  in  retreat  from 
all  sides  into  Leipsi<5.  The  suburbs  were  still  held  by  what 
remained  of  Ney  and  Reynier,  with  Lauriston,  Poniatowski  and 
Macdonald,  but  they  were  shortly  forced,  and  the  French  with- 
drew within  the  city  walls.  Langeron  and  Sacken  fell  sharply 
on  Pfaffendorf,  which  Durutte  stubbornly  defended ; Mar- 
mont  and  Ricard  held  themselves  with  effort  at  the  eastern 
gates  of  Leipsic,  which  Woronzov  and  Billow  assailed;  the 
Poles  were  contained  by  Schwartzenberg  and  could  with  diffi- 
culty retire  ; Barclay  pressed  hard  on  the  heels  of  Macdonald 
and  Lauriston,  who  were  falling  back  through  Strassenhausen. 


268 


REGIMENTS  DISORGANIZED. 


No  tactical  manoeuvring  was  prescribed : each  division  com- 
mander must  hold  his  own  and  save  his  men  from  a panic. 
Napoleon  rode  to  the  bridge  about  nine  o’clock.  Victor  and 
Mortier  had  passed  over  ; Souham  and  Marmont  were  prepar- 
ing to  do  so  ; Lauriston  was  next  in  order.  The  French  with- 
drawal was  sharply  followed  up,  and  a portion  of  the  suburbs 
was  shortly  in  possession  of  the  enemy.  Parties  soon  gained 
the  boulevards ; the  Baden  troops  gave  up  Petrus  gate,  and 
the  allies  began  to  enter  the  town  proper.  Soon  the  last 
French  corps  weakened,  and  all  poured  back,  each  brigade 


striving  only  to  defend  itself  and  reach  the  bridge.  Forma- 
tion could  not  be  kept  in  the  streets ; regiments  became  dis- 
organized, and  the  scant  order  in  which  the  troops  had  retired 


THE  BRIDGE  BLOWN  UP. 


269 


was  quickly  lost.  Parts  of  the  train  obstructed  all  the  streets, 
each  driver  fiercely  pushing  for  a passage  towards  the  only 
exit ; to  get  through  was  difficult  for  bodies  of  troops  ; com- 
panies soon  broke  into 
squads,  squads  into 
groups  of  three  or  four. 

The  allies  were  follow- 
ing hard  upon ; they  too 
were  not  in  order,  but 
they  had  the  coherence 
of  success.  Langeron 
came  along  the  northern 
boulevard  towards  the 
river,  and  threw  parties 
of  sharpshooters  into 
the  meadows  to  harass 
the  French  column  filing 
over  the  bridge.  The 
colonel  of  engineers,  in  charge  of  mining  the  bridge  so  that 
it  could  be  blown  up  when  all  the  troops  had  passed,  had 
gone  to  Lindenau  to  find  out  from  Berthier  which  corps  was 
to  form  the  rear,  and  left  the  match  to  the  mine  in  charge  of 
a corporal  of  sappers.  A duty  of  this  kind  should  have  been 
intrusted  to  an  officer  directly  responsible  to  the  emperor ; 
but  there  was  no  head  to  anything.  Seeing  Langeron’s  men 
coming  on  in  great  numbers,  and  the  shot  and  shell  of  the 
enemy’s  guns  beginning  to  fall  nearer  and  oftener  on  the 
bridge  ; knowing,  moreover,  nothing  about  how  many  divi- 
sions had  passed  over  and  how  many  were  still  in  the  town, 
this  man  naturally  lost  his  head,  and  regardless  of  the  thou- 
sands still  on  the  right  bank,  ignited  the  fuse.  The  single 
bridge  was  blown  into  the  air.  Thus  cut  off,  the  troops  still 
on  the  right  bank  fell  into  panic  and  sought  safety  as  best 


Poniatowski. 


270  ORDER  FAIRLY  REESTABLISHED. 

they  might,  many  by  swimming  the  river.  A few  thousands 
succeeded  in  gaining  the  other  bank,  among  them  Macdonald ; 
Poniatowski  was  killed  while  swimming  his  horse  across  the 
river;  and  twenty  thousand  men  thus  abandoned  laid  down 
their  arms,  with  Lauriston,  Reynier  and  a score  of  other  gen- 
erals. A considerable  part  of  the  train  stalled  in  the  city 
was  captured.  Including  those  cut  off,  the  French  losses  at 
Leipsic  aggregated  fifty  thousand  men  and  three  hundred 
guns.  The  Grand  Army  had  no  further  safety  this  side  of  the 
Rhine. 

Neither  Napoleon  nor  any  one  representing  him  had  paid 
heed  to  the  withdrawal  of  the  troops,  or  to  the  passage  through 
Leipsic.  Odenleben  describes  him  as  riding  to  and  fro  in  the 
city,  sunk  in  thought  and  listless,  oblivious  of  what  was  going 
on  around  him,  and  finally  following  the  main  stream  out 
towards  Lindenau.  Here  he  stopped  and  stationed  officers 
to  check  the  stragglers,  or  small  isolated  parties,  and  tell  them 
where  their  several  corps  would  rally ; but  his  general  attitude 
was  one  of  complete  absorption,  and  as  in  Russia,  of  indiffer- 
ence to  his  surroundings ; and  with  lucid  intervals,  this  atti- 
tude continued  until  he  reached  Paris.  Being  at  Lindenau 
when  the  bridge  was  blown  up,  he  put  the  Guard  in  line  and 
ran  their  guns  in  battery,  to  protect  the  retreat,  and  the  Grand 
Army  moved  on  Weissenfels  to  seek  the  safety  of  the  river 
Saale.  During  the  march  order  was  fairly  reestablished,  and 
when  that  town  was  reached,  the  army  was  more  like  its  old 
self. 

In  his  Bulletin  of  October  24  the  emperor  strives  to  find 
excuses  for  the  days  of  Leipsic,  which  he  still  persists  in  claim- 
ing as  victories.  But  though  they  no  doubt  had  their  effect 
in  France,  the  excuses  grew  worse  and  worse.  The  defeat  at 
Leipsic  is  ascribed  principally  to  a poor  corporal  of  engineers. 
Was  it  not  solely  due  to  the  Little  Corporal? 


BULLETIN  OF  OCTOBER  2 4. 


271 


“ At  6 P.  M.  the  emperor  ordered  the  disposition  for  the  next  day,”  but 
at  7 p.  M.  he  learned  that  “ they  had  fired  ninety-five  thousand  ” (artillery) 
“ rounds  and  that  the  reserves  were  exhausted,  that  only  sixteen  thousand 
rounds  remained,  which  sufficed  scarcely  to  keep  up  the  fire  two  hours, 
and  that  afterwards  we  should  be  without  munitions,  for  what  might 
result ; that  the  army  in  five  days  had  fired  more  than  two  hundred  and 
twenty  thousand  rounds,  and  that  a fresh  supply  could  not  be  got  except 
at  Magdeburg  or  at  Erfurt.  This  state  of  things  made  a prompt  move- 
ment on  one  of  our  two  great  depots  necessary.  The  emperor  decided 
for  Erfurt,  for  the  same  reason  that  he  had  decided  to  come  to  Leipsic, 
so  as  to  be  at  hand  to  weigh  the  influence  of  the  defection  of  Bavaria. 
The  emperor  gave  at  once  orders  for  the  baggage,  park  and  artillery  to 
pass  the  defiles  of  Lindenau.  He  gave  the  same  order  to  the  cavalry 
and  different  army  corps,  and  came  into  the  suburbs  of  Leipsic  ...  at 
nine  o’clock. 

“ This  circumstance  obliged  the  French  army  to  renounce  the  fruit  of  two 
victories,  where  it  had  with  so  much  glory  beaten  troops  very  much  su- 
perior in  numbers,  the  armies  of  the  whole  Continent.  But  this  movement 
was  not  without  difficulty.  From  Leipsic  to  Lindenau  there  is  a defile  of 
two  leagues,  crossed  by  five  or  six  bridges.  It  was  proposed  to  put  six 
thousand  men  and  sixty  guns  in  Leipsic,  ...  to  occupy  this  town  as  head 
of  defile,  and  to  set  fire  to  its  vast  suburbs,  so  as  to  prevent  the  enemy 
from  taking  it.  . . . However  odious  the  treachery  of  the  Saxon  army,  the 
emperor  could  not  resolve  to  destroy  one  of  the  beautiful  cities  of  Ger- 
many . . . and  that  under  the  eyes  of  the  king,  who  since  Dresden  had 
wished  to  accompany  the  emperor,  and  who  was  so  greatly  afflicted  by  the 
conduct  of  his  army.  . . . Macdonald  and  Poniatowski  were  charged  with 
guarding  the  suburbs.  . . . The  enemy  learned  that  the  greater  part  of 
the  army  had  evacuated  Leipsic  . . and  sharply  attacked  Macdonald  and 

Poniatowski.  They  were  several  times  thrown  back.  . . . The  emperor 
had  ordered  the  engineers  to  build  mines  under  the  big  bridge  ...  so 
as  to  blow  it  up  at  the  last  moment,  to  retard  the  march  of  the  enemy, 
and  to  leave  time  for  the  train  to  defile.  General  Dulauloy  had  charged 
Colonel  Montfort  with  this  operation.  This  colonel,  instead  of  remaining 
on  the  spot  to  direct  and  to  give  the  signal,  ordered  a corporal  and  four 
sappers  to  blow  up  the  bridge  when  the  enemy  should  present  himself. 
When  the  corporal,  a man  without  intelligence  and  ill  understanding  his 
mission,  heard  the  shots  fired  from  the  town  ramparts,  he  lighted  the 
match  and  blew  up  the  bridge.  A part  of  the  army  was  still  on  the  other 


272 


OUDINOT  AS  REARGUARD. 


side,  with  a park  of  eighty  guns  and  several  hundred  wagons.  . . . We 
cannot  yet  gauge  the  losses  occasioned  by  this  unfortunate  event,  but  they 
are  carried  by  approximation  to  twelve  thousand  men.  . . . The  disorder 
which  this  carried  into  the  army  changed  the  situation  of  things.  The 
victorious  French  army  arrived  at  Erfurt  as  a beaten  army  would  arrive. 
. . . The  enemy,  who  had  been  in  consternation  at  the  battles  of  the 
16th  and  18th,  gained  again,  by  the  disaster  of  the  19th,  courage  and  the 
ascendant  of  victory.  The  French  army,  after  such  brilliant  success,  lost 
this  victorious  attitude. 

“We  found  in  Erfurt,  in  victual,  munitions,  clothes,  shoes,  all  that  the 
army  can  need.”  And  next  day  Napoleon  wrote  to  Cambacdr&s  : “I  am 
moving  to  Mainz,  and  I shall  concentrate  the  army  on  the  frontier.  The 
treachery  of  Bavaria,  as  inconceivable  as  unexpected,  has  deranged  all  my 
projects,  and  obliges  me  to  bring  the  war  nearer  our  frontier.” 

On  this  retreat,  the  disaster  in  Russia,  and  the  flight  from 
Waterloo  have  been  based  the  charge  that  in  reverses  Napo- 
leon lost  his  head.  But  Rivoli,  Arcole,  Marengo,  Eylau, 
Essling,  testify  to  the  contrary ; and  whoso  has  seen  defeat  in 
a great  army  knows  what  extravagancies  are  resorted  to  by 
men  who  in  times  of  success  are  admirable  soldiers.  Leipsic 
will  serve  as  well  as  Waterloo  to  point  the  moral.  In  this 
campaign,  the  emperor  was  guilty  of  many  a lapse,  among 
them  that  of  not  providing  his  bridges  ; but  he  did  not  lose 
his  head.  As  in  Russia,  when  matters  were  at  their  worst, 
he  shrugged  his  shoulders  and  let  them  take  their  course, 
aware  that  no  one  could  mend  them.  He  had  many  things 
to  occupy  his  mind ; but  whether  he  dwelt  on  the  demands  of 
the  future,  or  on  the  failure  his  ambition  had  made  of  the  past 
two  years,  we  do  not  know.  Neither  history  nor  Memoirs 
cast  light  on  this  question. 

From  Lindenau  Napoleon  rode  to  Markranstadt,  where, 
while  the  troops  filed  by,  he  heard  that  Bertrand  had  occupied 
Weissenfels.  Oudinot  still  stood  at  Lindenau  as  rearguard. 
Early  October  20,  accompanied  by  the  Old  Guard,  he  himself 


BERTRAND  OCCUPIES  NEU  KOSEN. 


273 


drove  to  Weissenfels,  and  Bertrand  — Kosen  having  been 
seized  by  Giulay — moved  to  Freiburg.  Blucher  followed  on 
to  Liitzen  ; from  Merseburg  — whither  he  had  marched  via 
Halle  — Yorck  debouched  to  the  south  to  threaten  the  French 
flank ; Scliwartzenberg  was  in  the  Naumburg-Zeitz  region. 
Napoleon  looked  keenly  at  Kosen,  and  wrote  Bertrand  at 
7 a.  M.  on  the  20th,  that  nothing  must  be  allowed  to  debouch 
from  this  defile,  until  the  army  was  well  past  the  place. 

“I  see  with  pleasure  that  you  are  in  Weissenfels  and  master  of  the 
bridge.  ...  If  you  see  no  obstacle  against  seizing  Naumburg  and  Mer- 
seburg by  detachments,  do  it.  . . . It  is  indispensable  to  send  a column 
of  infantry,  cavalry  and  artillery  on  Kosen.  The  infantry  is  to  intrench 
there  and  guard  the  bridge.  Place  posts  in  crenellated  houses,  between 
Liitzen  and  Weissenfels.  Place  a good  infantry  post  in  the  defile  where 
Bessieres  was  killed.” 

Bertrand  accordingly  occupied  the  heights  of  Neu  Kosen 
and  threw  back  a partial  attack  by  Giulay ; and  under  his 
shield  the  Grand  Army  filed  by  and  across  the  Unstrut  at 
Freiburg.  Here  Napoleon  personally  supervised  the  crossing, 
striving  to  get  the  troops  into  better  formation,  and  providing 
against  pursuit.  Blucher  built  a bridge  at  Weissenfels  and 
pushed  on  in  his  rear.  Schwartzenberg  remained  at  Kosen. 
But  as  Bertrand  left  Kosen  too  early,  Napoleon,  on  October 
22,  told  Berthier  to  write  him  “ that  his  evacuation  of  Kosen 
had  no  motive,  that  it  exposed  the  headquarters,  the  commu- 
nications with  Freiburg  and  especially  the  rearguard.” 

The  march  was  continuous.  Napoleon  saw  he  could  not 
again  face  the  enemy  until  he  had  crossed  the  Rhine,  and  the 
Grand  Army,  no  longer  such,  plodded  on  towards  this  goal, 
heartsick  and  footsore,  but  glad  to  look  forward  to  once  more 
treading  the  soil  of  La  Belle  France.  On  October  22  the 
, French  got  to  Biittelstadt,  where  some  Cossacks  put  in  an 
appearance,  and  during  the  succeeding  night  the  emperor  and 


VOL.  IV. 


274 


THE  ALLIES  MAKE  INROADS. 


the  Guard  reached  Erfurt.  In  this  city  a short  rest  was 
afforded  the  men.  No  immediate  pursuit  was  undertaken  by 
the  allies.  Their  triumph  had  been  grand  ; and  the  sover- 
eigns dwelt  in  Leipsic  three  days  to  settle  on  future  opera- 
tions. As  a beginning,  Klenau  was  ordered  on  Dresden,  and 
Bernadotte  and  Bennigsen  on  Hamburg.  After  a day  or  two 
the  allies  started  through  the  Thuringian  Forest  on  a parallel 
course  with  the  French,  throwing  out  light  horse  towards  them 
to  harass  their  march,  but  accomplishing  little,  as  Schwart- 
zenberg  did  not  reach  Erfurt  until  the  26th.  But  by  the 
insinuating  policy  of  Metternich,  the  allies  made  inroads  into 
the  domain  of  the  late  French  allies,  and  even  into  Napoleon’s 
family,  for  Murat,  poisoned  by  the  suggestion  that  he  might 
preserve  his  kingdom  by  joining  the  coalition,  left  the  army 
for  Naples.  Blucher  entered  Freiburg  October  22  and  joined 
Yorck,  but,  the  Unstrut  bridge  being  hard  to  repair,  headed 
by  way  of  Sommerda,  Langensalza  and  Eisenach  to  turn  the 
French  flank  at  Erfurt,  where  he  supposed  the  emperor  would 
stand.  Napoleon,  however,  had  no  other  idea  than  to  reach 
the  Rhine,  especially  as  the  Bavarians  were  known  to  have 
marched  on  Anspach  as  if  aiming  to  reach  Mainz  first ; and 
the  retreat  continued  by  way  of  Gotha  on  Eisenach. 

The  Bavarians  had  indeed  moved  towards  the  Main  to 
threaten  the  French  retreat.  Had  Napoleon  at  the  outset 
forced  the  king  to  join  Augereau,  he  might  have  created  an 
army  of  seventy-five  thousand  men,  which  by  a diversion  into 
Bohemia  might  have  influenced  the  Dresden  situation  ; but 
now  the  coalition  fell  heir  to  a fresh  army  of  fifty  thousand 
men  under  Wrede.  Leaving  Braunau  October  15,  Wrede 
crossed  the  Danube  at  Donauworth  on  the  19th,  on  the  24th 
was  at  Wurzburg,  and  three  days  later  at  Aschaffenburg. 
Detaching  ten  thousand  men  on  Frankfort,  he  marched  to 
Hanau  to  bar  the  Grand  Army  the  way  through  the  valley  of 


Leipsic  to  the  Rhine. 


276 


WREDE  REACHES  HAN  A U. 


the  Main.  From  Eisenach,  to  avoid  the  Thuringian  Forest, 
Napoleon  headed  by  way  of  Vach,  Fulda  and  Schluehtern 
on  Mainz,  and  Blucher  marched  via  Giesen  and  Wetzlar,  to 
anticipate  the  French  at  Coblenz  should  they  turn  away  from 
Wrede’s  column. 

But  Napoleon  had  no  idea  of  turning  from  Wrede,  who  had 
reached  Hanau  October  27  and  stood  behind  the  Lamboi  and 
Biilau  Forest,  his  van  at  Riickingen.  Late  October  29  Na- 
poleon reached  Langenselbold,  followed  by  Macdonald  with 
the  5th  and  11th  Corps  ; Victor  and  Augereau  had  got  to  Geln- 
hausen ; Marmont  to  Saalmiinster,  followed  by  Bertrand ; 
Oudinot  and  Mortier  were  back  at  Steinau  and  Flieden,  this 
and  the  other  side  of  Schliichtern.  Having  heard  of  Wrede’s 
advance  since  the  26th,  Napoleon  had  sent  his  train  by  way 
of  Coblenz,  and  was  in  light  marching  order. 

At  Schliichtern  the  French  van  announced  Wrede’s  pre- 
sence. To  fray  a passage  was  the  one  thing  to  do,  lest  Blucher 
might  approach  down  the  Nidda  from  the  Hersfeld  country 
and  fall  on  the  French  left,  or  Bubna  come  up  with  the  rear, 
or  the  Army  of  the  Sovereigns  get  abreast  with  the  right 
through  Franconia.  There  were  still  eighty  thousand  men  in 
line,  plus  twenty-five  thousand  wounded  or  stragglers;  but 
these  forces  stretched  out  all  the  way  to  Fulda,  and  Napoleon 
had  not  over  twenty-five  thousand  men  at  hand.  This  was 
but  two  thirds  of  Wrede’s  force,  and  this  general  had  placed 
himself  athwart  the  main  road,  backing  up  on  the  Kinzig. 
Early  October  30  Macdonald  met  the  Bavarian  van  and  threw 
it  back  into  the  forest,  but  on  advancing,  was  stopped  by 
the  strong  position  of  the  enemy  and  a hearty  artillery  fire. 
Drouot  suggested  that  a heavy  battery  could  be  established  so 
as  almost  to  enfilade  the  enemy’s  left.  This  was  done,  and 
fifty  guns  brought  up.  Macdonald  and  Victor  held  Wrede’s 
right  in  place,  while  Napoleon  collected  the  cavalry  on  the 


BATTLE  OF  HANAU.  277 

main  road.  About  3 p.  m.  Wrede  strove  to  drive  Drouot 
away  by  a cavalry  charge;  but  the  French  horse  proved  su- 
perior, and  Drouot  took  up  a still  nearer  position.  At  four 
Wrede  essayed  the  same  manoeuvre  and  failed  again  ; and 
when  at  five  Napoleon  advanced  upon  his  line,  the  event  was 
not  long  doubtful.  Wrede’s  left  was  thrown  back  into  Hanau, 


Battle  of  Hanau. 

and  the  right  got  across  the  Kinzig  as  best  it  might.  Many 
were  drowned.  Hanau  was  then  shelled,  and  Wrede  evacu- 
ated it  and  sought  safety  towards  his  right  on  Aschaffenburg. 
There  was  no  gain  in  following  up  the  blow,  as  Blucher  and 
Schwartzenberg  were  near  at  hand  ; and  the  French  pushed 
on  down  the  Main  by  a night  march.  As  at  Krasnoi  a year 
before,  Napoleon  had  broken  through  the  net  laid  for  him,  by 
energy  and  clever  manoeuvring.  On  October  31  Marmont 
remained  behind  with 'the  3d,  4th  and  6th  Corps  to  hold 
Wrede  in  check,  and  let  the  rear  of  column  come  up;  and 
the  Grand  Army  marched  on  towards  Frankfort  and  Mainz. 


278 


THE  RETREAT  COSTLY . 


Next  day,  the  rearguard  having  reported,  Bertrand  remained 
alone,  and,  after  a hearty  defense  at  Hanau,  retired  at  night. 

The  Bulletin  dated  Frankfort,  October  31,  says  : “ Our  army  quietly 
conducted  this  movement  on  the  Main.  Arrived  at  Gelnhausen  the 
29th,  ...  we  learned  that  the  Austrian  and  Bavarian  army  . . . coming 
from  Braunau  had  arrived  at  Hanau,  and  purposed  to  bar  the  road  to  the 
French  army.”  The  action  is  then  described  at  length.  “ The  enemy 
abandoned  precipitately  the  road  to  Frankfort,  which  he  was  barring,  . . . 
began  his  retreat  and  soon  after  fell  into  complete  rout.  . . . The  vic- 
tory was  complete.” 

The  Bavarians  in  Frankfort  marched  away  on  Napoleon’s 
approach,  and  on  November  2 Napoleon  reached  Mainz,  where 
the  Grand  Army  crossed  the  Rhine,  Guilleminot’s  division 
losing  heavily  in  covering  the  operation.  Napoleon  reached 
St.  Cloud  November  4. 

The  retreat  had  been  costly.  By  hunger,  exposure  and  trial 
thousands  had  perished,  and  a nervous  fever  now  broke  out 
among  the  troops,  with  the  result  that  the  lives  which  this 
campaign  cost  France  almost  equaled  those  she  had  seen  per- 
ish in  1812 : in  that  year  half  the  losses  fell  on  allied  coun- 
tries; here  it  was  France  which  chiefly  suffered.  The  Grand 
Army  was  in  so  pitiable  a plight  that,  had  the  allies  not  been 
fearful  of  the  line  of  frontier  fortresses,  they  might  at  once 
have  followed  Napoleon  to  Paris.  But  they  deemed  it  safer  to 
await  the  levies  of  militia  which  were  to  observe  the  fortresses, 
and  assemble  all  their  line  troops,  before  adventuring  on  the 
soil  of  France. 

St.  Cyr,  shut  up  in  Dresden,  received  none  of  Napoleon’s 
dispatches  to  move  down  river  to  Torgau  and  Magdeburg. 
He  might  have  cut  himself  out  along  the  right  bank,  have 
given  a rendezvous  to  Davout  at  Minden,  and  both  armies  been 
thus  saved.  St.  Cyr  essayed  this  feat  too  late  : when  Klenau 
came  up,  his  loss  was  inevitable.  He  capitulated,  with  the 


DAVOUT  DEFENDS  HAMBURG. 


279 


right  of  exchange  ; but  this  being  disapproved  by  the  sover- 
eigns, he  became  a prisoner  of  war  with  all  his  men. 

Biilow  and  Winzingerode  were  detailed  to  overrun  West- 
phalia. Bernadotte  and  Bennigsen  joined  Walmoden  and 
marched  on  Hamburg.  The  Danes  serving  with  Davout 
signed  a peace  ; but  the  doughty  marshal  entered 
Hamburg  to  defend  it ; and  here  he  held  head  to 
Bernadotte  and  Bennigsen  many  months,  though 
the  citizens  were  all  against  him.  Napoleon  had 
abdicated  before  Hamburg  surrendered.  The 
city  remembers  Davout  with  terror,  but  the  mar- 
shal, in  doing  his  duty,  showed  the  stuff  that  was 
in  him.  Why  had  he  not  been  earlier  used? 

Rapp  had  been  in  Danzig  a year,  and  still 
held  out  some  months,  finally  surrendering  the 
garrison  as  prisoners  of  war.  Wittenberg,  block- 
aded by  Tauenzien,  made  a long  defense  before 
capitulating.  Stettin,  Modlin,  Zamosc  and  the 
citadel  of  Erfurt  defended  themselves  honorably 
until  December.  Glogau,  Ciistrin  and  Magde- 
burg held  out  until  the  end  of  the  war ; for 
knowing  that  they  would  eventually  fall,  the 
Prussians  preferred  not  to  destroy  the  works  by  artillery  fire 
or  assault. 

Eugene’s  campaign  in  Italy  against  the  Austrians  was  not 
successful.  Early  in  the  campaign  Napoleon  thought  of  hav- 
ing Augereau,  the  Bavarians  and  Eugene  unite  for  a march 
on  Vienna.  This  would  have  been  a serious  operation  for  the 
Austrians  to  meet ; but  the  Bavarian  defection  anticipated 
the  manoeuvre.  Hiller  with  seven  strong  divisions  operated 
against  Eugene  at  Tarvis  and  Laybach.  In  October,  leaving 
a small  force  opposite  Eugene,  Hiller  marched  by  way  of 
Trent  on  Verona,  and  the  viceroy  retired  to  the  Adige.  Hiller 


Bavarian 

Artilleryman. 


280 


KLENAU  JOINS  HILLER. 


then  marched  by  the  Brenta  and  attacked  Vincenza,  an  Eng- 
lish division  aided  in  blockading  Venice  and  Ferrara,  and 
Istria,  Dalmatia,  Illyria,  the  Tyrol  and  the  States  of  Venice 
were  lost  to  France.  To  reduce  the  viceroy  to  still  sadder 
straits,  Klenau,  having  taken  Dresden,  joined  Hiller  with 
twenty-five  thousand  men. 

Although  the  campaign  in  Germany  had  been  lost,  like 
that  in  Rus3ia,  it  was  not  for  the  same  reason.  In  Russia 


the  emperor’s  calculations  had  gone  amiss,  and  the  army 
which  reached  Moscow  (or  possibly  Smolensk)  could  not 
have  accomplished  the  result  aimed  at ; in  Germany  the  calcu- 
lations were  exact,  and  the  army  was  equal  to  the  work  to  be 
done ; but  the  emperor  had  failed  by  unsteadfastness.  At 
times  he  was  himself  ; at  others  by  no  means  the  great  soldier 
of  1805.  He  had  not  properly  utilized  his  interior  lines. 
Moreover,  his  rule  of  moving  on  one  line  in  one  well-concen- 


A FORGOTTEN  RULE. 


281 


trated  mass  was  shown  by  the  allied  and  his  own  operations 
to  be  less  applicable  to  enormous  forces  than  to  the  lesser 
armies  he  had  formerly  led.  “ Ten  thousand  men  can  live 
anywhere,  even  in  the  desert,”  he  wrote  Clarke  in  1807 ; but 
armies  beyond  two  hundred  thousand  men  make  the  question 
of  victualing  so  serious  as  often  to  influence  strategy. 

“ He  who  seeks  to  hold  everything  will  end  by  losing  every- 
thing,” had  said  wise  old  Fritz.  Napoleon  had  lost  this  cam- 
paign by  forgetting  this  rule,  and  was  to  lose  the  campaign 
in  France  for  the  same  reason.  Had  he  at  an  early  enough 
date  recognized  his  danger,  and  concentrated  all  his  forces,  he 
would  not  have  been  outnumbered. 

Schwartzenberg  wrote  a Relation  of  the  Battle  of  Leipsic 
which  is  well  poised  and  accurate  from  his  standpoint,  but  the 
statements  in  it  were  exacerbating  to  Napoleon,  who  annotated 
it  for  publication  in  the  Moniteur  with  a great  many  memo- 
randa, mostly  exclamations,  such  as  “ False,  very  false,”  “Fab- 
rication,” etc.  In  one  thing  Schwartzenberg  imitated  the 
emperor,  putting  down  the  French  loss  at  forty  thousand,  and 
the  allied  loss  at  ten  thousand  men. 

Napoleon  had  now  to  fight  not  only  the  outside  enemy,  but 
the  fears  of  his  French  ministers  and  subordinates.  From 
Mainz,  November  8,  he  wrote  Cambaceres : “ My  Cousin,  say 
a word  to  the  pusillanimous  councilors  of  state  and  senators. 
I am  told  on  all  sides  that  they  show  great  fear  and  little 
character.  Be  well  persuaded  that  my  infantry,  artillery  and 
cavalry  have  such  superiority  over  those  of  the  enemy  that  there 
is  nothing  to  fear.  ...  I am  sorry  that  I am  not  in  Paris. 
They  would  see  me  more  tranquil  and  more  calm  than  in  any 
other  circumstance  of  my  life.” 


LXV. 


WELLINGTON  INVADES  FRANCE.  1813  TO  1814. 

Vittoria  had  settled  Spanish  affairs,  but  Wellington  did  not  stop.  He  laid 
siege  to  San  Sebastian  and  blockaded  Pampeluna.  Napoleon  sent  Soult  to 
Spain,  and  the  marshal’s  first  effort  was  to  relieve  Pampeluna,  and  reach  out 
to  Suchet  on  the  east  coast.  Late  in  July,  1813,  he  started  across  the  mountains 
and  drove  the  English  troops  towards  Pampeluna ; but  he  was  stopped  long 
enough  for  Wellington  by  rapid  marching  to  come  up  to  the  aid  of  his  lieuten- 
ants. Soult’s  right  under  Erlon  was  delayed  ; and  at  Sauroren,  despite  gallant 
attacks,  on  July  27-28,  he  was  checked  and  had  to  withdraw.  Wellington  fol- 
lowed him  with  unusual  promptness,  and  Soult  had  difficulty  in  getting  back 
across  the  mountains.  Suchet  might  have  accomplished  great  results  for  his 
master  by  working  with  Soult,  but  he  declined  to  do  so.  A month  later  San 
Sebastian  was  captured,  despite  an  attempt  by  Soult  to  relieve  the  place,  which 
led  to  a heavy  fight  on  the  Bidassoa  on  August  31.  Wellington  now  slowly 
pushed  forward,  and  little  by  little  crowded  Soult  hack,  and  Pampeluna  was 
captured.  There  was  a good  deal  of  manoeuvring  in  October  and  November, 
in  which  Wellington  was  constantly  but  deliberately  aggressive,  and  several 
hearty  actions  were  fought.  Soult  withdrew  to  Bayonne,  and  Wellington  in 
December  crossed  the  Nive.  Meanwhile,  on  the  east  coast  Suchet  had  been 
forced  towards  France,  and  had  left  garrisons  in  most  of  the  fortresses.  At  the 
end  of  1813  Napoleon  restored  Ferdinand  to  the  throne,  but  too  late  to  he  of 
use  in  his  Spanish  scheme. 

The  battle  of  Vittoria  in  June,  1813,  had  settled  the  fate 
of  the  Spanish  monarchy,  but  Wellington  did  not  relax  his 
efforts.  Although  the  capture  of  Pancorbo  had  opened  the 
Royal  road,  the  allies  could  no  longer  rely  on  so  distant  a base 
as  Portugal,  and  it  was  essential  to  reduce  San  Sebastian  so 
as  to  utilize  that  port.  Siege  was  accordingly  laid  to  it,  while 
Pampeluna  was  merely  blockaded.  Having  little  confidence 
in  the  stability  of  the  Continental  allies,  Wellington  hoped  to 
capture  San  Sebastian  before  the  armistice  in  Germany  should 


DISPUTING  THE  ADVANCE. 


287 


to  get  in  the  rear  of  the  allied  position,  where  he  could  draw 
in  Suchet  — as  the  emperor  had  himself  planned  — and  oper- 
ate against  Wellington  to  advantage.  A force  was  left  under 
Villatte  to  hold  the  Bidassoa,  and  Erlon  was  first  to  mask  the 
movements  going  on  behind  his  front,  and  then  to  join  in  the 
advance.  Bayonne  was  to  be  the  point  of  rally  if  Wellington 
advanced;  if  he  retired,  San  Sebastian  was  to  be  relieved. 
The  plan  was  good. 

On  July  24  Soult  stood  ready  to  force  his  way  through  the 
Roncevalles  pass,  and  farther  to  the  west  Erlon  was  to  cross 


the  Col  de  Maya;  but  mountain  warfare  is  difficult,  and 
Soult  must  have  known  that  his  calculations  were  subject  to 
many  contingencies.  Having  made  a stirring  address  to  his 
troops,  on  the  25th  he  started  the  two  French  bodies  forward, 
he  himself  only  having  the  main  ridge  to  cross,  while  Erlon 
had  the  Maya  ridge  as  well.  The  French  were  in  large  force, 
and  Soult’s  corps  won  its  way  through  to  the  southern  slope 
despite  rain  and  bad  roads,  the  allies  retiring  slowly,  and  dis- 
puting the  advance  with  a combat  at  Roncevalles.  Usually  a 
vigorous  officer,  Erlon  was  on  this  occasion  slow,  and  inter- 


288 


PICTON  FORCED  BACK. 


fered  much  with  Soult’s  purpose  by  failing  to  advance  with 
energy,  even  after  he  had  won  a partial  success  at  Maya. 

Wellington  was  quick  to  seize  the  bearings  cf  the  position, 
but  it  was  a question  as  to  whether  he  would  be  able  to  gather 
his  troops  in  season  to  parry  the  thrust  at  Pampeluna.  Hav- 
ing guessed  Soult’s  object,  and  convinced  that  Picton  would 
withdraw  beyond  the  range,  he  collected  all  the  troops  at 
hand  and  directed  them  towards  Pampeluna  by  way  of  the 
Lanz  valley,  while  the  Light  Division  should  move  to  the 
great  road  from  Tolosa  to  Pampeluna,  and  hold  the  gap  in  the 
Pyrenees  so  as  to  connect  Graham  with  the  new  position  of 
the  army ; for  Wellington  proposed,  should  he  fail  in  holding 
Pampeluna,  to  move  by  his  left  on  San  Sebastian. 

On  July  26  Picton,  who  was  in  command  of  all  the  troops 
assembled  in  the  Zubiri  valley,  had  retired  from  Soult’s  ad- 
vance, scarcely  hoping  to  be  able  to  save  Pampeluna,  and 
Reille  and  Clausel  marched  down  the  Guy.  The  Pampeluna 
garrison  made  a sally,  and  O’Donnell  was  on  the  point  of 
giving  up  the  blockade ; but  some  Spanish  reinforcements 
came  up  and  saved  him  from  disaster.  Picton  soon  arrived, 
and,  drawing  up  in  line  on  the  ridge  north  of  Pampeluna, 
called  in  all  the  troops  he  dared  take  from  the  blockade. 
Cole  was  to  occupy  some  hills  in  his  front,  and  did  in  fact 
seize  upon  a strong  height  overlooking  Zabaldica  from  the 
west,  which  Soult  in  his  advance  had  attempted  to  take. 
This  action  by  Cole  arrested  Soult’s  march  down  the  valley, 
and  in  order  to  meet  the  manoeuvre,  he  threw  Clausel  along 
a ridge  leading  towards  Sauroren  to  face  Cole,  and  a smaller 
force  towards  El  Cano  to  outflank  him. 

Wellington  was  leading  Hill’s  troops  down  the  valley  of 
Lanz,  when  he  heard  that  Picton  had  been  forced  back  from 
Linzoain.  He  at  once  saw  that  he  could  not  reach  his  lieu- 
tenants by  the  way  he  was  heading,  and  sent  back  word  for 


SHARP  COMBAT  AT  BUENZA. 


291 


safe,  for  troops  were  arriving  at  every  moment  to  sustain  the 
almost  overtaxed  allied  regiments  of  the  28th,  but  he  under- 
took nothing  like  pursuit.  Soult  was  losing  ground,  and 
though  Erlon  reached 
Ostiz  at  noon  of  the 
29th,  he  did  not  feel 
equal  to  fighting  another 
battle  in  this  position ; 

field,  he  made  disposi- 
tions to  withdraw,  by 
way  of  Lizasso  and  the 
Dona  Maria  pass,  so  as 
to  get  between  Welling- 
ton  and  the  Bastan,  and 
if  possible  anticipate  the 
allies  in  a movement 
towards  San  Sebastian. 

Wellington  was,  however,  alive  to  this  probability,  and  sent 
some  of  Hill’s  troops  to  Buenza,  where  on  July  30  was  a sharp 
combat  for  the  possession  of  the  road,  Soult  maintaining  his 
point.  On  the  same  day  Wellington  attacked  what  was  left 
of  the  French  line  of  battle.  Sauroren  was  captured,  and 
Foy  on  the  French  left  was  cut  off  from  Reille  and  Clau- 
sel.  The  loss  of  the  allies  had  been  severe,  but  Soult  had 
suffered  much  more.  Hill  was  in  his  front,  double  Hill’s 
force  was  in  his  rear,  and  the  road  in  front  of  him  was 
by  no  means  open.  Wellington  guessed  him  to  be  in  retreat 
towards  the  Bastan,  and  believed  he  would  march  through 
the  pass  of  Velatte;  but  by  the  retreat  of  Foy,  Soult  was 
cut  off  from  Lanz  and  obliged  to  force  his  way  through  the 
Dona  Maria  pass,  whence  he  could  march  via  Estevan  on  Eli- 
zondo. Even  then  Wellington  might,  from  Lanz  through  the 


but  leaving  Foy  on  the 


Erlon. 


292 


NINE  DAYS'  STRUGGLE. 


Velatte  pass,  reach  Elizondo  before  him,  and  in  fact,  after 
Soult  had  escaped,  Hill  was  ordered  by  Wellington  to  head 
that  way. 

Soult  was  unable  to  draw  in  his  divisions  and  get  through 
the  Dona  Maria  pass  without  a rearguard  fight  with  Hill, 
and  when  he  reached  Estevan,  he  found  himself  nearly  sur- 
rounded. The  allies,  who  had  moved  by  the  Velatte  pass, 
were  on  one  side,  the  Doha  Maria  pass  was  occupied  by 
them,  and  the  Light  Division  and  some  Spaniards  were  on 
the  way  to  block  the  roads  on  the  west.  But  Soult  gained  an 
exit  by  way  of  Sombillo.  From  here  he  could  have  marched 
to  Echallar  ; instead  of  which,  however,  he  marched  on  Yanzi 
through  a deep  gorge,  where  he  suffered  much  loss  from  the 
Light  Division,  which,  marching  on  heights  above  him,  was 
trying  to  intercept  his  column.  Wellington  thought  that 
Soult  might  have  been  entirely  cut  off,  but  he  did  in  effect 
reach  Echallar  in  the  worst  of  conditions ; .and  after  combats 
at  Echallar  and  Ivantelly,  he  reached  Ainhoa,  Sarre  and  St. 
Jean  de  Luz. 

In  this  nine  days’  struggle,  during  which  ten  actions  had 
been  fought,  the  allied  casualties  were  seventy-five  hundred 
men,  and  the  French  twice  the  number.  Throughout  the 
campaign  Wellington  had  led  his  troops,  not  merely  directed 
them.  Soult  had  not  been  aided  by  fortune.  The  weather 
was  against  him,  and  Erlon  failed  him  when  most  essential. 
After  he  was  beaten  at  Sauroren,  his  plan  to  march  by  his 
right  through  the  Doha  Maria  pass  and  succor  San  Sebas- 
tian, instead  of  retiring  the  way  he  came,  was  a bold  and 
well-conceived  operation ; but  Soult  and  his  men  had  met 
more  than  their  match  in  the  allied  army  and  its  splendid 
leader. 

The  condition  of  Wellington’s  army  was  fairly  good,  that 
of  Soult’s  was  bad.  Maucune,  Soult  reported,  had  only  one 


SIEGE  OF  SAN  SEBASTIAN. 


293 


thousand  men  left  in  his  division  on  August  2,  and  four  days 
later  there  were  still  one  thousand  stragglers.  The  rest  of  the 
army  was  almost  equally  ill  off. 

Suchet  might  have  proved  himself  a great  factor  in  Spain 
after  the  battle  of  Sauroren,  and  it  would  have  redounded  to 
his  credit.  After  Murray’s  fiasco,  he  might  have  marched 
to  the  field  of  action  with  a large  army,  and  have  done  much 
to  turn  the  scale. 

Soult  had  called  on  him  for  aid,  which  was  declined ; and 
upon  Soult’s  reporting  the  state  of  affairs,  the  emperor, 
already  overtaxed,  replied  that,  having  given  him  all  his  con- 
fidence, he  could  add  no  more  to  his  strength  or  his  orders. 
The  failure  of  the  marshals  to  cooperate  always  interfered 
with  the  French  operations  in  Spain. 

After  his  late  defeat  Soult  retired  to  somewhere  near  his 
old  position,  with  Erlon  behind  Ainhoa  on  the  left,  Clausel  in 
the  centre  at  Sarre,  holding  the  debouches  from  Vera  and 
Echallar,  as  well  as  the  Great  Rhune  mountain,  Reille  on  the 
right  along  the  lower  Bidassoa.  Foy’s  division  still  stood  at 
St.  Jean  Pied  de  Port,  and  some  reserves  were  behind  the 
Nive  and  Nivelle  rivers. 

Wellington  reoccupied  his  old  lines  from  Roncevalles  to  the 
mouth  of  the  Bidassoa,  with  his  troops  somewhat  changed  in 
location,  and  his  right  under  Hill  at  Roncevalles  strengthened. 
No  longer  fearing  for  Pampeluna,  he  devoted  his  main  atten- 
tion to  the  siege  of  San  Sebastian. 

At  this  fortress  the  arrival  of  the  allied  siege-train  was  the 
beginning  of  the  end.  The  island  of  Santa  Clara  had  been 
captured,  and  the  Urumea  River  was  found  at  certain  points  to 
be  fordable.  Graham  had  been  over  two  months  in  front  of 
the  place,  but  a half  of  this  period  had  elapsed  practically 
without  work.  On  August  31,  after  a heavy  bombardment, 
the  final  assault  was  delivered.  Even  this  came  close  to  fail- 


294 


ON  THE  LOWER  BID  AS  SO  A. 


ure,  but  an  explosion  of  ammunition  within  the  French  lines 
momentarily  disturbed  the  defense,  and  the  gallant  stormers 
swept  over  the  walls  and  into  the  town,  which  was  sacked  in 
the  worst  sense.  Rey  retired  to  the  castle  of  La  Mota,  where 
he  held  himself  eight  days  and  then  capitulated  September  9, 
just  after  Dennewitz,  with  all  the  honors  of  war.  San  Sebas- 
tian had  resisted  for  seventy-three  days,  and  is  said  to  have 
cost  the  allies  over  five  thousand  men.  It  had  been  a notable 
defense. 

While  this  was  going  on,  Soult,  unwilling  to  let  the  place 
fall  without  aid  on  his  side,  made  his  plans  to  cross  the  Bi- 
dassoa.  His  former  attack  on  Pampeluna  had  interrupted  the 
siege  of  San  Sebastian,  and  a new  attack  might  do  the  same. 
As  he  did  not  feel  strong  enough  to  move  again  on  Pampe- 
luna, and  as  to  attack  Wellington’s  centre  towards  Echallar 
required  the  crossing  of  mountain  ridges,  he  chose  to  move 
along  the  great  seacoast  or  Royal  road  towards  Irun.  Here 
he  could  bring  together  more  strength,  and  the  fighting,  by 
reason  of  the  mountainous  country  to  the  east,  would  be  apt 
to  be  confined  between  Vera  and  Irun.  To  this  effect,  then, 
Soult  made  his  preparations,  hoping  to  reach  Oyarsun,  from 
which  place  he  could,  he  thought,  rapidly  raise  the  siege.  On 
August  29  two  columns  were  assembled  on  the  lower  Bidassoa, 
one  under  Clausel  of  twenty  thousand  men,  and  the  other 
under  Reille  somewhat  larger,  with  a bridge  equipage  and 
thirty-six  guns  ; and  Soult  hoped  that  his  dispositions  would 
not  be  observed,  and  that  he  might  attack  by  daybreak  of 
August  30.  He  was,  however,  delayed  until  next  day  ; Well- 
ington, who  seems  to  have  kept  a close  watch  of  what  his 
enemy  was  doing,  made  his  counter-dispositions  with  skill ; 
and  as  the  whole  course  of  the  Peninsular  campaign  had 
shown,  his  defense  was  extremely  strong. 

At  daylight,  August  31,  Reille  crossed  the  river  and  made 


ALLIED  HEADQUARTERS  AT  VERA. 


297 


along  the  San  Marcial  hill,  and  cleverly  concealed  his  forces. 
At  seven  o’clock  of  October  7 the  crossing  of  the  river  began, 
in  seven  columns  along  a front  of  five  miles.  The  French 
were  not  in  force ; had  Soult  been  prepared,  he  could  have 
checked  the  allies  after  their  crossing,  and  have  had  them  at 
his  mercy  when  the  tide  rose  behind  them.  Reille  was  sur- 
prised and  fell  back.  Clausel  attempted  to  defend  the  cross- 
ings near  Vera,  but  the  allies  were  well  across,  and  finally 
the  Bayonette  and  Commissari  heights,  with  the  Yera  gap, 
were  taken,  and  the  French  were  driven  back  to  the  Great 
Rhune.  Clausel  still  held  this  height,  and  continued  to  do 
so  on  the  second  day,  although  later  it  was  lost.  Wellington 
slowly  pushed  his  advantage.  The  operation  all  told  lasted 
three  days,  costing  about  fifteen  hundred  men  on  either  side, 
the  allies  showing  commendable  valor  in  assaulting  the  French 
works.  Wellington’s  preparations  were  fully  equaled  by  his 
skillful  manoeuvring  after  crossing  the  Bidassoa,  and  he  always 
managed  to  place  at  the  point  of  assault  a larger  number  than 
the  enemy  could  dispose  of.  The  French  had  scarcely  done 
themselves  credit.  The  generals,  Soult  complained,  had  not 
been  careful  to  watch  the  enemy,  nor  had  they  fought  as 
firmly  as  on  former  occasions. 

Wellington  might  have  pushed  on,  taken  St.  Jean  de  Luz, 
and  turned  the  French  position,  but  he  contented  himself 
with  the  gain  he  had  made ; he  was  still  watching  the  war  in 
Germany,  determined  to  take  no  risks  so  long  as  matters  there 
were  undecided.  Adopting  Yera  as  headquarters,  he  reor- 
ganized the  allied  army  in  three  grand  divisions,  under  Hill, 
who  held  the  right,  from  Roncevalles  to  the  Bastan,  under 
Beresford,  who  held  the  centre  in  the  Maya-Echallar  country, 
and  under  Hope,  who  extended  to  the  sea.  Graham  returned 
home. 

Although  Soult  shortly  retook  the  works  at  Sarre,  he  had 


298 


ANNOYANCES  AND  DIFFICULTIES. 


been  driven  back  to  a much  narrower  and  less  favorable  posi- 
tion than  he  had  formerly  held ; and  here  he  maintained  the 
defensive  to  gain  time  to  reorganize  and  to  rehearten  his  men. 
Reille  on  the  right  held  the  main  road  along  the  sea,  Clau- 
sel  in  the  centre  was  intrenched  between  Ascain  and  Amotz, 
and  occupied  the  Little  Rhune,  and  the  left  was  still  at  St. 
Jean  Pied  de  Port.  The  whole  line  was  covered  with  field- 
works. 

Wellington  had  constant  difficulties  in  keeping  Portugal 
and  Spain  to  their  work.  It  is  natural  that  he  should  have 
had  many  political  enemies,  for  these  were  numbered  by  the 
men  who  wanted  and  did  not  receive  command,  or  had  friends 
who  were  not  given  preferment.  It  was  also  natural  that 
many  of  his  acts  as  well  as  the  mere  presence  of  the  army 
should  arouse  hatred  and  distrust  in  so  excitable  a race;  and 
the  political  turmoil  through  which  Spain  and  Portugal  had 
passed  during  the  French  regime  complicated  the  situation. 
This  went  so  far  that  it  was  at  one  time  suggested  in  the  Brit- 
ish Cabinet  that  the  Peninsula  should  be  left  to  its  own  re- 
sources, and  Wellington  be  transferred  to  Germany.  These 
annoyances,  coupled  to  many  arising  from  the  home  govern- 
ment, had,  in  view  of  Wellington’s  defensive  plan  of  campaign, 
a large  influence  on  what  he  did  ; but  there  has  rarely  been 
a soldier  who  has  not  had  annoyances  and  difficulties  to  over- 
come in  his  rear  commensurate  with  those  in  his  front.  At 
one  time  Wellington  resigned  his  position  as  generalissimo  of 
the  allies;  but  the  next  Cortes  replaced  him  on  his  own  terms. 
He  had  long  been  urged  from  Germany  to  invade  France,  but 
he  was  averse  to  winter  campaigns,  and  declined  to  under- 
take so  extensive  an  operation  until  it  became  evident  that 
the  emperor  had  lost  the  German  campaign,  and  that  the 
allies  would  shortly  cross  the  French  frontier.  On  the  other 
hand,  Soult  clung  to  his  project  of  again  invading  Aragon 


A FRESH  ADVANCE  ON  SOULT. 


299 


until  the  snows  of  winter  made  such  a scheme  impracticable ; 
and  without  Suchet’s  cooperation,  the  plan  could  not  succeed. 
Each  army  had  the  usual  difficulties  in  victualing,  and  suf- 
fered more  or  less.  Expecting  meanwhile  that  the  allies  might 
invade  France,  Soult  kept  on  improving  his  intrenchments ; 
and  anxious  about  Amotz  near  his  centre,  and  about  Foy  on 
his  left,  Soult  proposed  that  Foy  should  withdraw  to  Bidarry, 
and  seize  a position  in  the  mountains  so  as  to  fall  on  the 
allied  right,  as  they  debouched  from  the  Col  de  Maya. 

Before  attacking  Soult,  Wellington  had  paused  for  the  fall 
of  Pampeluna.  This  having  occurred,  after  four  months  of 
stout  defense,  he  now  projected  a fresh  advance  on  Soult. 
On  November  6 and  7 Hill  had  descended  from  Roncevalles 
to  the  Bastan,  leaving  Mina  and  his  Spaniards  to  hold  his 
position.  Sundry  delays  as  usual  took  place,  but  on  Novem- 
ber 10  ninety  thousand  men,  of  whom  less  than  twenty  thou- 
sand were  Spanish,  with  ninety-five  guns  moved  forward  on 
some  sixty  thousand  French.  As  Soult  had  guessed,  Well- 
ington designed  his  attack  for  the  French  centre  — which 
was  the  weakest  point  — and  the  left.  Hill  was  to  attack 
Erlon  at  Amotz,  and  Beresford  to  attack  Clausel  between 
Amotz  and  Ascain.  On  the  left  was  Hope  to  contain  Soult’s 
right,  which,  under  Reille,  leaned  on  the  sea.  Foy  was  at 
Bidarry. 

Hill  debouched  from  the  Maya  country  against  Erlon,  and 
Beresford  moved  on  the  works  at  Amotz  to  turn  his  right. 
While  Reille  and  Clausel  were  contained  by  feigned  attacks, 
Hill  and  Beresford  were,  above  and  below  the  bridge  of  Amotz, 
to  break  in  between  Clausel  and  Erlon.  Early  on  November 
10  the  allies  moved  forward  to  the  assault.  The  French  were 
well  intrenched,  but  the  allied  troops,  under  the  cheering  ex- 
ample of  their  leaders,  did  their  work  in  a masterful  manner. 
The  line  of  principal  fighting  in  this  battle  of  Sarre  was  some 


300 


SOULT  FORCED  BACK. 


eight  miles  wide,  but  on  either  flank  were  the  above  named 
collateral  operations  by  flying  wings.  Hill  on  the  right  from 
the  Pass  of  Maya  reached  the  French  defenses  before  noon, 
and  attacked  them  with  vigor  5 they  delayed  the  exuberant 
allies  but  a short  while : connection  between  Erlon  and  Clau- 
sel  was  cut,  and  Hill  and  Beresford  could  unite  their  forces ; 
the  French  centre  was  ruptured  and  Soult  forced  back  be- 
yond the  Nivelle  ; while  on  the  right  Reille  was  kept  busy  and 
pushed  some  distance  towards  Bayonne. 

On  November  11  the  allies  again  advanced.  Hope  forded 
the  Nivelle  above  St.  Jean  de  Luz  and  moved  towards  Bidart ; 
Beresford  marched  on  Arbonne  ; Hill  seized  Espelette  ; Soult 
retired  to  a new  position  leaning  on  the  intrenched  camp 
of  Bayonne.  The  allies  arrested  their  movements  with  Hope 
in  Bidart,  Beresford  in  the  Arbonne  country,  and  Hill  on  the 
right,  striving  to  push  in  Foy. 

In  a few  hours’  combat,  by  clever  concentration,  the  French 
army  had  been  driven  from  the  intrench ments  it  had  been 
working  on  for  many  weeks,  and  had  lost  a good  part  of  its 
artillery.  Soult  had  relied  too  much  on  his  line  of  intrench- 
ments,  never  a safe  plan,  because  precluding  grand- tactics. 
The  enemy  throws  a strong  column  against  one  point,  the 
line  is  ruptured  there,  and  defeat  ensues.  Soult  had  received 
better  lessons,  but  may  have  been  influenced  by  the  late  oper- 
ations on  the  Elbe.  The  allies  lost  nearly  three  thousand 
men  ; the  French  about  the  same. 

Bayonne  was  not  yet  fully  intrenched,  but  Soult  took  up 
his  headquarters  there,  and  sent  Erlon  to  reinforce  Foy  at 
Cambo.  Wellington  would  have  liked  to  push  into  France 
at  this  time,  but  the  clay  soil  at  the  foot  of  the  Pyrenees 
made  the  roads  much  as  were  those  we  remember  in  Virginia 
during  the  Civil  War,  and  he  saw  no  chance  of  moving  with 
success.  The  force  at  Cambo,  however,  flanked  the  allied 


HILL  CUT  OFF. 


301 


position,  which  was  confined  between  the  sea  and  the  river 
Nive,  with  the  left  at  Bidart,  the  centre  in  front  of  Arcangues, 
and  the  right  facing  Erlon  and  Foy,  from  Ustaritz  to  Itzatzu. 
There  was  some  skirmishing  between  the  outposts. 

On  December  10  Wellington  forced  a passage  of  the  Nive. 
Beresford  crossed  at  Ustaritz,  Hill  above  Cambo,  and  Hope 
moved  in  by  way  of  Biarritz;  as  a result,  Wellington’s  army 
got  separated  by  the  Nive,  and  Soult  determined  to  fall 
upon  the  allied  wing  that  was  on  the  left  bank  of  the  river. 
Wellington’s  position  was  unsound,  and  had  Soult  thrown  his 
whole  force  forward  towards  Arcangues,  so  as  to  seize  and 
hold  the  Bussussari  ridge,  he  might  have  inflicted  a heavy 
blow  upon  the  allies  ; but  for  some  reason  he  changed  his  mind. 
Reille  marched  against  Hope  by  the  Royal  road,  where  a heavy 
combat  ensued  ; and  Clausel  and  the  Light  Division  disputed 
the  Bussussari  heights,  on  which  the  allies  held  themselves 
masterfully.  Wellington  drew  three  divisions  from  the  right 
flank  over  to  the  left  and  maintained  his  ground,  at  a loss  on 
either  side  of  some  two  thousand  men. 

During  the  night  the  French  withdrew  to  a more  concen- 
trated position,  Soult  expecting  Wellington  to  make  a counter- 
attack. There  was  another  sharp  fight  between  Hope  and 
Soult’s  right,  but  it  was  mainly  accidental.  On  the  12th  a 
fresh  combat  broke  out  between  the  outposts,  and  each  side 
advanced  batteries,  but  nothing  came  of  it.  During  the  night 
of  December  12-13  the  Nive  became  swollen  by  the  rain,  and 
the  main  bridge  between  the  two  wings  of  the  allied  army  was 
broken,  cutting  Hill  completely  off  from  the  centre  and  left, 
at  a time  when  the  doubly  superior  French  were  advancing 
upon  him,  besides  a force  which  was  threatening  his  rear. 
Erlon  was  in  the  French  front,  followed  by  Foy,  with  plenty 
of  reserves ; but  the  ground  and  the  roads  were  such  that  a 
line  could  not  be  readily  formed,  nor  the  troops  put  in  to 


302 


BAYONNE  OF  HIGHEST  IMPORTANCE. 


advantage.  In  the  early  morning  fog  Soult  pushed  back 
Hill’s  centre  and  attacked  with  some  vigor,  but  Hill  main- 
tained himself  stoutly,  until  Wellington  managed  to  restore 
the  bridge.  The  fighting  was  bitter  and  at  heavy  loss,  but 
Hill  used  his  reserves  to  advantage  and  clung  to  his  position, 
while  Wellington  from  the  left  bank  brought  up  supports, 
and  the  allied  line  remained  intact.  Not  over  one  half  Soult’s 
forces  came  into  fighting  contact ; but  this  does  not  detract 
from  Hill’s  splendid  defense.  Hill  was  the  hero  of  the  battle 
of  St.  Pierre.  On  the  other  hand,  Soult  had  not  executed 
his  plan  with  as  much  force  or  cleverness  as  might  have  been 
expected  of  him.  He  labored  under  difficulties,  in  that  on 
the  11th  several  German  regiments,  whose  countries  had 
joined  the  allies,  went  over  to  the  enemy,  which  made  him  for 
the  moment  uncertain  of  his  standing,  but  as  an  army  com- 
mander, he  was  not  doing  himself  justice. 

Although  Bayonne  was  a fortress  of  no  strength  as  such, 
it  had  become  of  the  highest  importance  in  preventing  the 
allies  from  penetrating  France.  Wellington  did  not  feel  safe 
in  merely  observing  it  in  moving  into  France,  and  preferred 
operations  which  would  oblige  Soult  to  abandon  it,  or  reduce 
his  force  there  so  that  he  might  storm  it.  His  late  operations 
had  cut  Soult  off  from  the  main  road  to  St.  Jean  Pied  de 
Port,  and  opened  a means  for  him  to  play  into  the  hands  of 
many  French  malcontents.  Soult’s  task  was  to  force  Well- 
ington back  towards  the  Ebro ; and  indeed  the  deep  roads 
and  winter  weather  arrested  Wellington’s  offensive,  but  Soult 
was  obliged  to  confine  his  operations  to  what  would  defend 
France.  In  this  view  he  planned  to  retire,  if  he  must  do  so, 
along  the  Pyrenees  foothills  rather  than  into  the  heart  of  the 
land.  In  his  own  quiet,  systematic  manner  Wellington  kept 
about  his  work,  preparing  for  further  advance. 

After  the  battle  of  Vittoria,  Suchet  was  forced  to  abandon 


TREATY  OF  VALENCAY. 


303 


Valencia,  which  he  evacuated  July  5,  and  marched  to  Sara- 
gossa; whereupon  General  Paris  left  to  join  Soult.  Thence 
Suchet  retired  via  Tortosa  to  Tarragona,  where  he  remained 
four  months.  Bentinck  crossed  the  Ebro,  seized  the  Bala- 
guer  mountains,  and  invested  Tarragona,  being  joined  by 
Delparque.  At  Barcelona  Suchet  drew  in  Decaen  with  the 
Army  of  Catalonia,  and  advancing  in  August  on  the  allies, 
forced  them  back  to  the  mountains,  while  Delparque  invested 
Tortosa.  Suchet  blew  up  the  walls  of  Tarragona  and  retired 
to  Barcelona.  On  hearing  that  Suchet  had  sent  troops  to 
Soult,  Bentinck  ordered  Delparque’s  forces  to  Wellington, 
and  shortly  returned  to  Sicily.  He  was  succeeded  by  Clinton, 
between  whom  and  Suchet  there  were  various  exchanges. 
When  Napoleon  began  to  withdraw  his  troops,  Suchet  rein- 
forced the  garrison  of  Barcelona,  which  was  invested  by 
Clinton,  and  withdrew  to  Gerona. 

Under  orders  from  Napoleon,  Suchet  kept  garrisons  in 
Tortoza,  Tarragona,  Maquinenza,  Lerida,  Gerona,  Figueras 
and  other  places.  With  Wellington  between  the  Ebro  and 
the  Pyrenees,  Suchet  could  have  collected  over  thirty  thou- 
sand men,  which  force,  operating  on  Soult’s  left,  would  have 
compromised  the  Anglo-Portuguese.  Soult  constantly  begged 
his  aid,  but  Suchet  did  as  he  chose.  In  December  he  sent 
ten 'thousand  men  to  Napoleon. 

At  the  end  of  1813,  but  altogether  too  late  to  accomplish 
the  good  that  speedier  action  might  have  brought,  Ferdinand, 
who  had  been  a political  prisoner  in  Napoleon’s  hands,  was, 
under  the  treaty  of  Valengay  of  December  11,  sent  back  to 
Spain,  and  Suchet  surrendered  the  towns  he  still  held  on  the 
Ebro  to  the  new  king.  This  treaty  was  one  drawn  up  by 
Napoleon  and  accepted  by  Ferdinand,  who,  though  recognized 
as  king,  was  to  compel  the  English  to  leave  Spain,  the  French 
doing  so  at  the  same  time,  and  all  acts  of  the  French  gov- 


304 


FERDINAND  NO  LONGER  A FACTOR. 


ernment  under  Joseph  were  to  stand.  The  Cortes  refused  to 
confirm  this  treaty.  Ferdinand  could  no  longer  be  a factor 
in  any  plans  which  Napoleon  might  make,  although  he  re- 
turned to  Madrid,  and  once  again  became  King  of  Spain 
March  24,  1814. 


Sword  of  the  Period. 


LXYI. 


THE  ALLIES  INVADE  FRANCE.  NOVEMBER,  1813, 
TO  JANUARY,  1814. 

After  1812  France  still  supported  Napoleon  ; after  1813  she  was  lukewarm. 
The  considerable  forces  Napoleon  raised  were  largely  consumed  by  sickness. 
The  old  rules  by  which  he  had  succeeded  — rigid  concentration  and  speed,  the 
yielding  up  of  unessential  to  win  at  essential  points  — seemed  to  be  lost.  Napo- 
leon should  have  drawn  in  his  forces  from  Italy,  Spain  and  many  garrisons,  and 
assembled  them  in  one  body  to  meet  the  allies  at  the  Rhine ; but  though  they 
proposed  to  give  him  no  time,  he  would  not  believe  they  would  advance  during 
the  winter.  The  defense  of  France,  and  not  conquest,  was  to  be  looked  to ; yet 
he  occupied  the  Rhine  from  Switzerland  down  to  its  mouth,  a political  dissemi- 
nation of  forces  rather  than  military  sense.  He  believed  that  the  first  allied 
blow  would  come  through  the  Netherlands.  The  Confederation  of  the  Rhine 
deserted,  and  the  allies  in  overwhelming  forces  came  on,  Bernadotte  to  block- 
ade Hamburg  and  move  into  Holland,  Blucher  to  cross  the  Rhine  near  Mainz, 
and  the  sovereigns  between  Mainz  and  Switzerland.  Napoleon  calculated  that 
they  would  have  to  leave  so  many  troops  to  observe  the  fortresses  that  they 
would  advance  on  Paris  with  few.  The  allies  were  still  ready  to  treat  on  a 
reasonable  basis,  but  Napoleon  continued  to  demand  the  basis  of  Frankfort : 
though  this  year  he  showed  military  skill  of  the  highest  order,  his  political 
scheming  was  weak.  From  December  20  to  30  the  several  allied  armies  crossed 
the  Rhine  and  slowly  moved  forward  to  a concentration  near  Langres  and 
Troyes,  a force  being  detailed  to  meet  Augereau  at  Lyons.  Little  by  little  Ney, 
Victor,  Marmont  and  Mortier  were  pushed  back  of  the  Meuse,  and  Macdonald 
was  called  in  from  Belgium.  Napoleon  was  unprepared.  Instead  of  having 
an  equal  force,  which  by  measures  early  taken  he  could  have  had,  he  now 
opposed  the  allies  with  less  than  half  their  forces ; and  when  he  made  his  first 
assembly  at  Chalons,  the  French  army  was  already  compromised.  Blucher 
moved  towards  Brienne  to  join  Schwartzenberg.  Here  on  January  29  Napoleon 
defeated  part  of  his  force.  Blucher  retired,  and  Napoleon  followed.  He  would 
have  done  better  to  withdraw. 

The  enormous  drafts  Napoleon  had  made  on  France  for 
men  during  the  past  decade  had  almost  destroyed  her  power 


VOL.  IV. 


306 


BREEDING  TROUBLE. 


to  contribute  to  fresh  levies.  The  last  two  years  had  literally 
robbed  the  cradle  and  the  grave.  Yet  there  were  a hundred 
fortresses  to  garrison,  and  field  armies  which  must  be  raised 
and  equipped.  The  relics  of  the  Grand  Army  which  had 
sought  refuge  behind  the  Rhine  in  November,  1813,  were 
wasting  with  a fatal  epidemic  of  typhus,  and  this  had  been 
communicated  to  the  inhabitants  of  Mainz  and  Strasburg. 
Public  spirit  was  lukewarm.  After  the  Russian  campaign  all 
France  had  arisen  to  save  the  honor  of  her  eagles ; now  the 
French  people  had  lapsed  into  indifference.  The  emperor’s 
words  at  the  opening  of  the  legislature,  “ I had  conceived 
and  executed  great  designs  for  the  prosperity  and  happiness 
of  the  world : monarch  and  father,  I feel  that  peace  adds  to 
the  security  of  thrones  and  families,”  fell  dully  on  the  nation 
— it  no  longer  had  the  true  ring  for  even  Gallic  ears.  Fol- 
lowing Yittoria,  the  disaster  at  Leipsic  had  drawn  the  spirit 
out  of  ever-patient  France.  Bulletin  victories  no  longer 
cheered  her.  Intriguers  of  all  sorts  and  the  old  aristocracy 
were  breeding  trouble ; Talleyrand  headed  the  malcontents ; 
royalist  committees  were  formed  in  the  west  and  at  Bordeaux  ; 
Paris  salons  breathed  treason  to  the  empire ; Murat  was  soon 
to  yield  to  the  corrupt  approaches  of  the  allies.  During 
November  even  Eugene  was  sounded  through  the  King  of 
Bavaria,  with  a suggestion  that  he  might  be  made  King  of 
Italy ; but  unlike  Murat,  he  refused  all  advances,  answering 
that  “he  was  sure  that  the  king  would  always  prefer  to  find 
his  son-in-law  a private  citizen  but  an  honest  man,  rather  than 
a king  and  a traitor.”  As  Rome’  saw  Hannibal,  so  the  Paris 
officials  saw  the  enemy  already  at  the  gates,  and  to  cheer 
them  up,  the  emperor  wrote,  November  3,  to  Savary : “ Your 
alarms  and  your  fear  in  Paris  make  me  laugh.  I thought 
you  worthy  to  hear  truths.  ...  I fear  nothing.  I will  beat 
the  enemy  more  quickly  than  you  think.”  But  the  great 


THE  FRENCH  FORTRESSES. 


307 


man’s  influence  was  no  longer  what  it  had  been.  He  strove 
to  make  head  against  the  many  evils  by  convoking  the  legis- 
lative body,  dismissing  Maret,  and  making  Caulaincourt  Min- 
ister of  Foreign  Relations.  But  the  legislative  body  was 
intractable.  It  began  by  demanding  guaranties  for  future 
liberty,  and  was  shortly  dissolved  by  a coup  d'etat,  Napoleon 
choosing  to  rely  on  the  Senate  alone  to  legalize  his  proceed- 
ings. Yet  even  he,  for  form’s  sake,  had  to  take  notice  of 
the  altered  face  of  European  affairs.  In  his  Allocution  to 
the  Senate,  November  14,  he  said : “ Senators,  I accept  the 
sentiments  that  you  express  to  me.  All  Europe  was  march- 
ing with  us  a year  ago.  All  Europe  is  marching  against 
us  to-day.  This  is  because  the  opinion  of  the  world  is 
made  by  France  or  by  England.  We  should  then  liave 
everything  to  fear  without  the  energy  and  the  power  of  the 
nation.  Posterity  will  say  that,  if  great  and  critical  circum- 
stances presented  themselves,  they  were  not  above  France 
and  myself.” 

The  French  fortresses,  for  twenty  years  beyond  danger, 
had  not  been  properly  kept  up,  and  to  the  principal  ones 
Napoleon  first  devoted  his  efforts.  Those  of  secondary  impor- 
tance had  to  wait : it  would  have  required  vastly  more  men 
and  money  than  France  could  now  raise  to  place  them  all  on 
even  a respectable  footing.  As  a fact,  although  they  were 
largely  garrisoned  by  men  needed  for  the  field,  they  did  not 
long  retard  the  allied  invasion,  nor  consume  great  forces  to 
observe  them,  for  the  fear  of  fortresses  had  been  gradually 
lost  by  the  study  of  Napoleonic  methods.  But  Paris  was  put 
in  as  good  a state  of  defense  as  possible.  On  January  11 
Napoleon  wrote  Clarke  : “ My  intention  is  to  make  Paris  a 
strong  place.  If  the  enemy  carries  out  the  project  he  announces 
of  coming  there,  I will  await  him,  and  in  no  case  quit  Paris.” 
Huge  numbers  of  palisades  were  got  ready,  with  chevaux-de • 


308 


A MEASURE  OF  MILITARY  CAUTION. 


frise  and  other  entanglements  to  close  the  barriers  and  the 
unfinished  parts  of  the  city  enceinte ; but  not  to  alarm  the 
populace,  this  was  done  secretly ; and  when  the  time  came  to 
put  them  to  use,  they  proved  of  no  avail. 

As  to  the  army,  Napoleon  had  to  do  what  he  could.  After 
1812  the  nation  was  still  ready  to  recreate  it ; now  the  em- 
peror had  to  encounter  lukewarmness  or  opposition  on  every 
hand.  He  would  have  been  wise  during  the  past  campaign 
to  organize  the  national  guard  of  the  provinces,  which  would 
now  have  furnished  garrison  troops  and  left  all  others  to  be 
drafted  for  the  field  armies.  This  Provincial  Guard  had  been 
created  in  1805  ; but  as  all  French  wars  had  been  waged  out- 
side the  limits  of  France,  there,  had  been  no  cause  for  calling 
it  into  service ; and  its  real  utility  had  never  yet  been  tested. 
As  the  trend  of  affairs  was  no  longer  in  his  favor,  it  might 
possibly  not  have  been  a reliable  force  to  mobilize. 

It  must  have  become  evident  to  Napoleon  what  an  error 
he  had  committed  in  delaying  to  send  Ferdinand  back  to 
Spain,  when  he  could  have  made  of  him  a friend  and  ally, 
and  perhaps  rid  himself  of  the  English.  An  equal  lapse  was 
not  to  have  drawn  in  Suchet’s  forces  to  a point  where  he  could 
put  them  to  use : the  Peninsula  had  long  been  lost,  and  by 
recognizing  the  fact  Napoleon  might  have  added  to  his  forces 
on  the  Rhine  fully  fifty  thousand  veterans,  — perhaps  enough 
to  turn  the  tables  and  help  him  to  a satisfactory  peace.  Until 
the  battle  of  Yittoria,  Napoleon  had  feared  to  show  weakness, 
lest  its  political  effect  should  be  bad  at  home  and  abroad  ; 
and  he  had  overrated  his  own  strength.  After  the  Prague 
negotiations  of  1813  had  failed,  the  knot  of  the  difficulty 
should  have  been  at  once  cut,  as  a measure  of  military  caution ; 
but  Napoleon  the  statesman  had  got  the  upper  hand  of  Napo- 
leon the  soldier;  he  relied  on  unreal  political  factors,  and  for- 
got the  essential  military  factors.  He  no  longer  brought  the 


OANZ. 


iurope.ni  Theatre  of  War  in  1814. 


310 


LETTER  TO  EUGENE. 


political  situation  up  to  aid  the  military  problem,  certain  that 
to  solve  the  latter  would  enable  him  to  mould  the  former ; 
but  he  strove  to  shape  the  military  scheme  so  as  not  to  dis- 
turb the  shaky  political  structure.  Some  of  his  big  garrisons 
were  too  far  away  to  be  drawn  in  except  by  manoeuvres  he 
would  not  adopt ; but  when  Napoleon  saw  things  going  against 
him  in  1813,  had  he  but  put  to  use  his  old  rule  of  rigid  con- 
centration, had  he  drawn  in  Eugene,  Suchet,  Davout,  St.  Cyr, 
and  for  the  moment  abandoned  their  holdings,  and  others, 
to  add  to  his  field  army,  there  is  no  question  whatever  that 
he  could  have  kept  the  allies  beyond  the  Rhine,  and  have 
conquered  for  himself  a France  with  a liberal  frontier.  But 
before  he  was  willing  to  acknowledge  the  superiority  of  the 
allies,  the  time  had  passed.  He  got  nothing  from  his  garri- 
sons, nothing  from  Italy  ; all  he  got  from  Spain  was  two  weak 
divisions  from  Soult  and  ten  thousand  men  from  Suchet, 
whereas  these  two  marshals  with  half  their  force  could  have 
staved  off  the  enemy  in  Spain  long  enough  to  give  the  addi- 
tional veterans  a chance  to  accomplish  something  helpful  on 
the  Rhine,  especially  as  Wellington  would  not  have  invaded 
France  while  the  campaign  was  doubtful,  and  as  pronounced 
success  in  France  would  yield  fruit  in  other  lands. 

Italy  could  have  been  made  most  useful,  if  matters  had  been 
taken  in  time.  At  first  Napoleon  proposed  to  fight  for  this 
kingdom,  and  wrote,  November  3,  to  Eugene : — 

“ The  King  of  Naples  sends  me  word  that  he  will  soon  be  in  Bologna 
with  thirty  thousand  men.  This  news  will  permit  you  to  remain  in  com- 
munication with  Venice,  and  will  give  the  time  to  await  all  the  army  that 
I am  forming  to  retake  the  country  of  Venice.  Work  with  the  king  the 
best  way  possible.”  And  on  November  20  : “ The  viceroy  is  not  to  quit 
the  Adige  without  a battle.  He  is  to  have  confidence.  He  has  forty 
thousand  men,  he  may  have  one  hundred  and  twenty  guns.  He  is  sure 
of  success.  To  quit  the  Adige  without  fighting  is  dishonor.  It  would 
be  better  to  be  beaten.” 


TO  NO  END. 


311 


Later  he  had  planned  to  have  Eugene  enter  into  an  armis- 
tice with  the  allied  commander  Bellegarde  at  any  fair  sacri- 
fice, and  quickly  to  fall  back  across  the  Alps  on  Geneva ; and 
as  a rallying-point  for  this  force,  Augereau  was  to  assemble 
twenty-five  thousand  men  at  Lyons,  of  which  Suchet’s  ten 
thousand  were  to  be  the  nucleus,  — all  of  whom  would  furnish 
an  army  of  sixty  thousand  men  with  which  to  fall  on  the 
allied  rear  when  they  invaded  France.  But  Eugene’s  soldiers 
were  mostly  Romans,  Tuscans  or  Piedmontese,  who  would  not 
willingly  leave  their  own  soil,  and  might  prove  unreliable  in 
France ; and  the  viceroy  eventually  remained  in  Italy,  where 
he  conducted  a loyal  and  able  campaign  on  the  Adige,  but  to 
no  end. 

Although  Napoleon  was  grossly  deceiving  himself,  yet  tak- 
ing his  views  from  a certain  standpoint,  his  calculations  were 
not  lacking  in  astuteness.  It  was  true  that  the  allies  would 
have  to  observe  or  blockade  all  the  fortresses  on  the  Oder 
and  the  Elbe ; that  so  soon  as  they  passed  the  Rhine,  they 
would  have  to  invest  not  only  Mainz  and  Strasburg,  but  a 
number  of  minor  strong  places ; and  subtracting  what  men 
would  be  thus  consumed,  Napoleon  was  in  a way  justified 
in  estimating  as  small  the  force  they  could  bring  as  far  as 
the  Aube  or  the  Seine.  And  to  meet  this,  he  had  reason  to 
believe  that  he  could  have  ready  an  equal  number,  to  whose 
momentum  his  own  ability,  and  the  fact  that  the  French 
would  be  fighting  for  their  hearthstones,  would  add  the 
winning  element.  What  Napoleon  had  forgotten  was  that  he 
had  taught  Europe  how  to  sacrifice  lesser  things  to  accomplish 
greater ; he  had  taught  her  how  to  raise  troops,  how  to  utilize 
militia ; he  had  taught  her  the  equality  of  thousands.  And 
moreover,  the  Confederation  of  the  Rhine  turned  against  him, 
and,  including  the  Bavarians  and  Wurtembergers,  furnished 
one  hundred  and  fifty  thousand  men ; and  the  allied  land- 


312 


INVASION  OF  FRANCE  PROCEEDS. 


wehr  was  equal  in  number.  The  latter  easily  blockaded  the 
fortresses  held  by  the  French  in  Germany,  and  left  the  whole 
allied  field  army  free  to  invade  France.  Napoleon  had  lost 
sight  of  many  of  the  changed  factors  ; and  his  method  of  cal- 
culation proved  false  at  a critical  season. 

Suggestions  for  peace  had  again  been  made  when  Napoleon 
was  at  Frankfort,  on  terms  which  would  give  to  France  the 
Rhine,  the  Alps  and  the  Pyrenees  as  boundaries,  and  he  would 
have  been  wise  to  follow  up  and  quickly  close  with  such  a 
proposal ; Leipsic  should  have  taught  him  that  he  could  not 
conquer  better  terms  against  Europe  in  arms  ; but  he  desired 
to  know  what  was  to  become  of  Italy  and  Holland,  and  while 
this  new  element  retarded  the  negotiations,  it  in  no  wise  held 
back  the  allied  advance.  As  a fact,  Austria  wanted  Italy 
again,  England  desired  the  Low  Countries  freed  from  French 
influence,  Russia  was  determined  to  have  Warsaw.  There 
was  scant  time  to  discuss  these  questions,  and  meanwhile  the 
invasion  of  France  proceeded. 

With  an  idea  of  adding  to  his  available  forces  (from  the 
beginning  .Napoleon  foresaw  the  want  of  men,  a fact  which 
accentuates  all  the  more  his  failure  to  draw  in  his  outside 
armies),  on  November  18  he  told  Berthier  to 

“Write  to  Marmont  to  send  an  intelligent  officer  to  the  Prince  of 
Schwartzenberg  to  offer  to  treat  for  the  surrender  of  Danzig,  Modlin, 
Zamosc,  Stettin,  Ciistrin  and  Glogau.  The  conditions  of  the  surrender 
of  these  places  would  be,  that  the  garrisons  should  reenter  France,  with 
arms  and  baggage,  without  being  prisoners  of  war.  That  all  the  field 
artillery  with  the  French  arms  ” (meaning  to  exclude  captured  guns), 
“as  well  as  the  magazines  of  clothing,  which  are  found  in  the  places, 
should  be  left  to  us.  That  means  of  transportation  for  bringing  them 
back  should  be  furnished  us,  and  that  the  sick  should  be  sent  back  when 
they  are  well.  Let  him  make  it  known  that  Danzig  can  hold  out  a year; 
that  Glogau  and  Ciistrin  can  also  hold  out  a year  ; that  if  they  try  to  get 
these  places  by  a siege,  they  will  spoil  the  towns.  That  these  conditions, 


OLD  DIVISION  AGAIN  ADOPTED. 


313 


then,  are  advantageous  to  the  allies.  ...  If  they  speak  of  the  surren- 
der of  Hamburg,  Magdeburg,  Erfurt,  Torgau  and  Wittenberg,  answer  is 
to  be  made  that  my  orders  will  be  taken  on  the  subject,  but  that  there 
are  no  instructions.  . . . These  communications  will  also  serve  to  procure 
us  news.  You  will  say  nothing  to  Marmout  relative  to  the  citadel  of 
Wurzburg.” 

While  all  this  was  well  enough,  it  was  only  sparring  for 
time  and  gained  nothing : it  did  not  go  to  the  root  of  the 
matter. 

It  had  been  evident  to  Napoleon,  ever  since  the  indecisive 
result  of  the  first  day’s  battle  at  Leipsic,  that  the  right  bank 
of  the  Rhine  would  soon  have  to  be  vacated  by  the  French ; 
and  when,  on  the  retreat  from  Germany,  he  reached  Mainz, 
he  began  arrangements  for  dividing  the  course  of  the  river 
into  military  departments.  The  old  division  which  had  long 
existed  in  the  strategic  manoeuvring  of  the  past  was  again 
adopted  by  order  of  November  3 : the  Upper  Rhine,  from 
H iiningen  to  Landau ; the  Middle  Rhine  from  Landau  to 
Coblenz;  the  Lower  Rhine  from  Coblenz  down.  Berthier  was 
left  in  full  control.  On  November  7 Napoleon  wrote  him: 
“ I leave  to-night  for  Paris.  My  intention  is  that  you  should 
go  to-morrow  to  Bingen,  and  that  you  should  successively  pass 
in  review  all  the  corps,  to  fill  all  the  vacant  places  and  do  all 
that  is  necessary  to  put  order  in  these  corps.”  Of  the  Upper 
Rhine  the  command  was  given  to  Victor,  under  whom  only 
the  existing  garrisons  and  such  new  levies  as  were  locally  made 
there,  some  sixteen  thousand  men,  were  placed.  The  Lower 
Rhine,  with  headquarters  at  Cologne,  was  assigned  to  Mac- 
donald, who  here  assembled  his  own  two  divisions  of  foot  and 
Sebastiani’s  three  divisions  of  horse,  say  twenty  thousand  men. 
The  more  important  Middle  Rhine  was  turned  over  to  Mar- 
mont,  who  with  eighteen  thousand  men  was  to  establish  him- 
self firmly  in  Mainz.  Here  the  wreck  of  his  own  corps,  to 


314 


OLD  CORDON-THEORY  REVAMPED. 


which  that  of  the  3d  Corps  was  added,  made  up  two  divi- 
sions, which  were  complemented  by  three  cavalry  divisions 
under  Milhaud ; in  Coblenz  he  had  the  5th  Corps,  now  con- 
solidated into  only  one  division,  and  three  divisions  of  Arri- 
ghi’s  cavalry  ; at  Worms  he  stationed  the  2d  Corps  with 
its  one  division;  at  Kreuznach  the  four  divisions  of  the  1st 
Cavalry  Corps ; and  opposite  Mainz,  at  Castel,  Bertrand’s 
Corps,  strengthened  up  to  four  divisions.  Ney  had  a reserve 
in  Nancy  of  ten  thousand  men  ; and  there  were  troops  col- 
lecting in  Namur  temporarily  under  Mortier,  and  in  Lyons 
under  Augereau. 

This  was  a wide  separation  of  the  much  dwindled  French 
forces,  and  in  a high  degree  unwise.  Though  essential  in  a 
way  to  protect  the  various  stretches  of  French  territory  in 
which  fresh  levies  were  to  be  made,  it  was  but  the  old  cordon- 
theory  revamped,  and  the  scheme  reflected  rather  the  political 
desirability  of  covering  the  entire  French  frontier  than  the 
military  essence  of  concentration  for  defense.  Napoleon’s 
old  maxim,  and  Frederick’s  before  him,  to  yield  up  unessential 
points  in  order  to  mass  and  win  at  essential  points  had  gone 
lost.  We  shall  see  Napoleon  now,  for  mere  political  expe- 
diency, seek  to  keep  his  hold  of  Italy,  the  Pyrenees,  Bel- 
gium, when  the  momentary  loss  of  some  of  the  territory  he 
had  added  to  France  might  enable  him  to  concentrate,  beat 
the  several  allied  armies  in  detail,  drive  them  in  disorder 
from  French  soil,  and  recover  prestige  and  land  at  one  blow. 
If  there  ever  was  a moment  in  the  career  of  this  great  cap- 
tain when  military  prudence  demanded  the  denudation  of  all 
outlying  territory  for  the  sake  of  rigid  concentration,  it  was 
now.  The  single  question  of  the  defense  of  Paris  demanded 
it.  But  Napoleon  did  nothing  of  the  kind,  and  this  throw- 
ing of  his  first  principles  to  the  winds  is  amazing.  It  was 
evident  that  the  soldier  had  been  sunk  in  the  monarch,  striv- 


TIME  REQUIRED. 


315 


ing  to  hold  what  he  had  patched  together  by  his  wars.  It 
was  like  a miser  hugging  his  piles  of  gold  instead  of  seizing 
a pistol.  We  no  longer  recognize  the  man  whose  uniform 
practice  had  been  to  mass  every  soldier  and  every  gun  for 
battle. 

The  next  essential  matter  was  the  raising  of  fresh  levies, 
to  sustain  the  cordon  on  the  Rhine.  The  pending  conscription 
would  produce  one  hundred  and  fifty  thousand  men  ; those 
running  back  to  1804-07,  and  not  yet  called  into  service, 
could  be  counted  on  for  one  hundred  and  twenty-five  thousand 
more.  It  had  been  thought  that  forty  thousand  men  could 
be  drawn  from  Italy,  and  twenty-five  thousand  from  the 
Spanish  forces.  This  was  perhaps  true ; but  time  was  required, 
and  the  allies  gave  the  emperor  no  time  — which  again  showed 
faulty  calculation,  for  he  knew  that  their  big  armies  must 
be  kept  employed  to  remain  useful.  With  the  first  arrivals 
of  the  levy,  Napoleon  proposed  to  strengthen  the  forces  along 
the  Rhine,  so  as  to  raise  the  2d  Corps  to  three  divisions, 
the  5th  Corps  to  two  divisions,  the  6th  Corps  to  four  divisions, 
and  to  recreate  a 1st  Corps  with  three  divisions ; the  next 
arrivals  would  form  active  reserves  in  the  rear.  In  addition 
to  this,  he  proposed  to  anticipate  the  levy  of  1815  so  as  to 
raise  two  hundred  thousand  men  for  depot-reserves,  to  be 
posted  in  large  bodies,  one  of  thirty  thousand  men  in  Turin, 
a like  number  in  Bordeaux,  eighty  thousand  at  Metz,  forty 
thousand  at  Antwerp.  All  this  was  feasible,  but  again 
required  time  : it  should  have  been  done  months  before.  As 
to  the  probable  direction  in  which  he  would  be  called  on  to 
use  his  new  armies,  Napoleon  believed  that  the  enemy  had 
designs  on  Holland ; and  that  if  they  crossed  the  Rhine,  it 
would  be  on  its  lower  course,  as  a shorter  and  easier  line  of 
operations.  The  fortresses  there  were  universally  known  to 
be  in  lamentable  condition,  and  this  would  be  an  additional 


816  IMMENSE  NUMBERS  TO  BE  MET. 

basis  of  such  an  invasion.  Blucher  indeed  had  harbored  this 
intention  ; but  the  sovereigns  decided  otherwise. 

Now  if  the  emperor  had  convinced  himself  that  the  next 
allied  blow  would  come  from  the  Low  Countries,  it  is  all  the 
more  extraordinary  that  he  should  have  left  those  armies 
which  lay  beyond  the  Alps  and  along  the  Pyrenees  where 
they  were,  instead  of  drawing  the  main  part  of  them  in  to  the 
vicinity  of  the  capital.  He  must  have  recognized  that  he  was 
on  the  eve  of  a last  contest  for  the  conservation  of  his  empire ; 
and  that  the  troops  he  left  in  Italy,  Spain,  and  the  south  of 
France  were  lost  to  use  in  defending  Paris.  Unless  he  pur- 
posed, if  he  lost  Paris,  to  move  to  the  south  and  begin  a fresh 
struggle,  — as  the  balance  of  evidence  shows  he  then  did  not, 
— there  is  small  excuse  for  this  division  of  forces.  Had  the 
emperor  for  one  campaign  enacted  the  role  of  the  captain  of 
1796,  and  massed  his  full  strength  for  operations  against  the 
several  allied  armies  in  turn,  he  might  still  have  conquered  a 
proper  peace  on  the  soil  of  France.  His  chance  of  doing  so 
was  almost  as  good  as  during  the  armistice  of  1818 ; but  it 
could  be  accomplished  only  by  adopting  timely  means  to  meet 
the  danger.  There  had  been  abundant  time,  and  any  harm 
that  the  allies  might  have  done  from  Italy,  or  Wellington 
from  Spain,  would  be  more  than  counterbalanced  by  the  de- 
cisive victory  over  the  Army  of  the  Sovereigns. 

Neither  did  the  emperor  seem  to  measure  the  immense 
numbers  he  would  have  to  meet.  The  allies,  including  the 
contingent  of  those  countries  which  had  forsaken  the  Napo- 
leonic regime,  had  a force  which,  with  reinforcements,  good 
authorities  estimate  as  high  as  nine  hundred  thousand  men ; 
to  wit : Austrians  and  Russians  over  a quarter  million  each, 
Prussians  one  hundred  and  sixty  thousand,  Swedes  twenty 
thousand,  German  troops  two  hundred  thousand ; and  of  this 
one  sixth  was  horse.  These  figures  were  on  paper ; but  if 


STRENGTH  OF  THE  ALLIES . 


317 


we  count  the  militia,  nearly  this  number  was  actually  raised. 
Of  these,  in  first  line,  stood  — 1st.  The  Army  of  the  North 
under  Bernadotte,  one  hundred  and  seventy-five  thousand 
men,  Biilow  in  the  van,  with  the  duty  of  blockading  Hamburg, 
occupying  Holland,  and  moving  into  Belgium  by  way  of 
Utrecht  and  Diisseldorf,  to  debouch  through  Brussels.  2d. 
Blucher’s  Army  of  Silesia,  one  hundred  and  forty  thousand 


strong,  posted  in  the  Mainz  and  Mannheim  country,  and  con- 
nected with  Bernadotte  by  the  corps  of  St.  Priest.  This  was 
to  drive  the  French  out  of  Westphalia,  cross  the  Middle  Rhine 
and  penetrate  into  France  through  Metz.  3d.  The  Army 
of  the  Sovereigns  under  Schwartzenberg,  two  hundred  and 
fifty  thousand  strong,  accompanied  by  the  monarchs,  was,  in 
order  to  protect  the  Danube  line  back  to  Austria,  cantoned 
between  the  Main  and  Switzerland,  after  securing  which,  so 


318 


ALLIED  PLAN  OF  OPERATION. 


as  to  isolate  Italy,  it  was  to  move  forward  into  France  and 
seize  the  plateau  of  Laugres.  4th.  The  Italian  Army  under 
Bellegarde,  eighty  thousand  strong.  5th.  Behind  all  this 
were  reserves  numbering  two  hundred  and  thirty  thousand 
men. 

It  must  not,  however,  be  imagined  that  any  such  huge  forces 
swept  into  France.  Schwartzenberg  had  in  hand  but  two 
hundred  thousand  men  and  Blucher  but  sixty-five  thousand, 
with  which  to  open  the  campaign.  There  were,  under  the 
former,  two  light  divisions,  Bubna  and  Maurice  Lichtenstein, 
the  Austrian  corps  of  Colloredo,  Lichtenstein  and  Giulay,  the 
German  corps  of  Wrede  and  Wurtemberg,  the  Russian  corps 
of  Wittgenstein,  the  Austrian  reserve  under  Hesse-Homburg 
and  the  Russo-Prussian  reserve  under  Barclay ; and  under 
Blucher  three  corps,  Sacken,  Langeron  and  Yorck. 

The  plan  of  operation  of  the  allies,  which  they  had  learned 
from  the  lessons  of  the  past  two  years,  was  simplicity  itself. 
It  consisted  in  marching  on  Paris  in  as  many  columns  as 
would  afford  most  easy  means  of  victualing,  and  would  be, 
as  they  concentrically  approached  one  another,  mutually  sus- 
taining. By  mid-January  both  main  armies  would  reach  their 
objectives,  — Langres  and  Metz,  — and  by  the  end  of  the 
month  be  able  to  concentrate  at  Troyes,  this  being  the  place 
set  by  the  allies,  if  they  could  keep  the  initiative,  for  the 
great  battle  which  was  to  put  an  end  to  the  French  empire. 

The  shortest  road  from  Leipsic  to  Paris  is  through  Mainz, 
Metz  and  Chalons,  and  later  Napoleon  expected  the  allies  that 
way.  While  a quarter  million  men  could  not  march  on  one 
road,  neither  was  it  necessary  to  move  too  far  apart.  Between 
Coblenz  and  Mannheim  were  three  routes : through  Treves  on 
Luxemburg,  through  Kaiserslautern  on  Metz,  through  Phals- 
burg  on  Nancy.  Three  columns  on  these  routes  would  have 
sufficed.  The  French  fortresses  to  consider  were  Erfurt, 


A CONGRESS  TO  ASSEMBLE. 


319 


Wurzburg’,  all  those  in  Alsace,  Strasburg,  Mainz,  Landau, 
Saarlouis,  Thionville,  Metz,  Luxemburg,  Longwy  and  Ver- 
dun. France  once  invaded,  the  Netherlands  could  be  neg- 
lected as  of  no  strategic  value. 

Napoleon  had  hoped,  by  peace  propositions,  to  win  time  to 
put  his  new  army  into  the  field,  but  when  it  shortly  became 
evident  that  the  plan  of  the  allies  was  promptly  to  enter 
France,  and  not  mainly  from  Holland,  but  from  Switzerland 
and  across  the  Middle  Rhine,  he  altered  his  distribution  of 
troops,  temporarily  sending  Marmont  to  Colmar  and  Victor 
to  Strasburg;  while  Mortier  at  Langres,  Ney  at  Epinal  and 
Augereau  at  Lyons  were  each  to  assemble  an  army  ; but 
Macdonald  was  still  left  on  the  Lower  Rhine,  though  the 
upper  Marne  was  the  point  of  danger. 

The  allies  had  won  much  confidence  from  the  last  two  cam- 
paigns ; but  although  they  were  far  from  preferring  war  to 
peace,  knew  their  redoubtable  adversary  and  dreaded  his 
methods,  they  yet  had  determined  to  fight  to  a finish,  unless 
a satisfactory  basis  could  be  arrived  at  by  negotiation.  To 
this  the  door  was  constantly  kept  open,  and  a Congress  was 
to  assemble  at  Chatillon-sur-Seine  to  discuss  the  pregnant 
subject.  Here  again  lay  Napoleon’s  chance.  On  January  4 
he  wrote  to  Caulaincourt,  who  was  to  be  his  representative  : — 

“I  think  it  is  doubtful  whether  the  allies  are  acting  in  good  faith 
and  that  England  wishes  peace.  I myself  wish  it,  but  solid,  honorable. 
France  without  its  natural  limits,  without  Ostend,  without  Antwerp, 
would  no  longer  be  on  a level  writh  the  other  states  of  Europe.  . . . You 
must  listen  to  everything,  observe  everything.  It  is  not  certain  that  they 
will  receive  you  at  headquarters;  the  Russians  and  the  English  will  wish 
to  keep  away  all  means  of  conciliation  and  explanation  with  the  Austrian 
emperor.  You  must  try  to  guess  the  views  of  the  allies  and  let  me  know 
day  by  day  what  you  learn.  . . . Do  they  wish  to  reduce  France  to  its 
ancient  limits  ? That  is  to  degrade  it.  . . . Italy  is  intact.  The  viceroy 
lias  a fine  army.  Before  a week  has  passed,  I shall  have  assembled  means 


320 


NOTE  ON  THE  ACTUAL  SITUATION. 


of  delivering  several  battles,  even  before  the  arrival  of  my  Spanish  troops. 
The  devastation  of  the  Cossacks  will  arm  the  inhabitants  and  doable  our 
forces.  If  the  nation  seconds  me,  the  enemy  is  marching  to  his  destruc- 
tion. If  fortune  betrays  me,  I have  taken  my  stand  : I care  no  longer 
for  the  throne.  I will  not  degrade  the  nation  nor  myself  in  subscribing 
shameful  conditions.  . . . You  must  ascertain  what  Metternich  wants. 
It  is  not  for  the  interest  of  Austria  to  push  things  to  the  end.  One  step 
more  and  the  first  role  will  escape  her.  In  this  state  of  things  I can  give 
you  no  instructions.  Limit  yourself  to  hearing  everything  and  reporting 
to  me.” 

The  above  were  secret  instructions ; Caulaincourt’s  open 
ones  of  the  same  day  are  more  in  detail,  with  regard  to  all 
the  countries  under  French  dominion. 

With  his  usual  habit  the  emperor  made  on  January  12  a 
Note  on  the  Actual  Situation  of  France.  In  this  he  carefully 
goes  over  the  condition  of  the  allied  armies,  and  figures  them 
down  to  one  hundred  and  eighty  thousand  men.  As  a part 
of  our  study  of  the  emperor’s  present  capacity,  this  is  largely 
quoted.  Concerning  certain  estimates,  he  says : — 

“ This  calculation  must  be  very  exaggerated,  for  the  enemy  himself, 
in  his  greatest  emphasis,  does  not  carry  them  beyond  two  hundred  thou- 
sand men.  . . . We  believe,  then,  that  in  estimating  Billow’s  army  at 
twenty  thousand  men,  Blucher’s  at  sixty  thousand,  Schwartzenberg’s  at 
one  hundred  thousand,  one  has  got  near  the  reality.”  He  then  figures 
out  of  these  totals  that  Biilow  must  leave  eight  thousand  men  at  Gorkum, 
Bergen  op  Zoom  and  Breda  ; and  will  have  only  twelve  thousand  men 
left.  “ If  the  army  of  Blucher  is  sixty  thousand  men,  a number  probably 
exaggerated,  he  cannot  have  left  less  than  twenty  thousand  men  in  front 
of  Mainz  ; Luxemburg,  Saarlouis,  Thionville  will  occupy  some  ten  thou- 
sand. The  army  of  Schwartzenberg  must  leave  at  least  ten  thousand 
men  in  Switzerland,  . . . fifteen  thousand  men  at  Besangon  and  twenty 
thousand  in  front  of  the  places  from  Hiiningen  to  Landau,  a corps  in  front 
of  Belfort  and  Auxonne.  Thus  he  cannot  march  on  Langres  and  on 
Nancy  with  more  than  fifty  thousand  men. 

“ Let  ns  suppose,  then,  that  the  twenty-five  or  thirty  thousand  dis- 
posable men  of  Blucher  are  joined  to  the  fifty  or  sixty  thousand  of 


RESUME. 


321 


Schwartzenberg.  But  this  does  not  say  that  they  can  march  on  Paris 
with  more  than  eighty  thousand  men.  This  operation,  then,  would  be 
insane,  but  we  must  assume  it.” 

Then  follows  a review  of  the  means  possessed  by  France,  and  he  goes 
on:  “Macdonald  can  move  on  Liege  and  Charleroi,  menace  the  right 
flank  of  Blucher  by  holding  the  Meuse.  This  marshal  and  Sdbastiani 
can  assemble  ten  thousand  men  and  forty  guns,  . . . and  if  the  enemy 
marched  on  Paris,  he  would  be  able  to  arrive  before  him.”  Marmont,  he 
says,  must  have  fifteen  thousand  men,  Victor  twelve  thousand  men,  Mor- 
tier  twelve  thousand  men.  “ These  four  corps,  after  having  retarded  the 
enemy  and  disputed  the  ground,  if  he  should  actually  march  on  Paris, 
could  arrive  before  him  . . . and  be  joined  by  sixty  thousand  men.  . . . 
One  could  then  have  by  mid-February,  in  front  of  Paris,  an  army  of 
one  hundred  and  twenty  thousand  men,  after  leaving  a garrison  of  thirty 
thousand  men  in  the  city.  . . . In  every  state  of  the  case  we  should 
take  proper  measures,  and  in  no  case  admit  the  abandonment  of  Paris.” 

Rdsumd.  “ 1st.  Make  no  preparations  to  abandon  Paris,  and-  bury 
ourselves  in  its  ruins  if  necessary.”  2.  Collect  all  the  guns  possible. 
3.  Collect  all  the  cadres  and  bring  them  to  Paris,  so  as  to  form  new  bat- 
talions. 4.  Collect  all  the  conscription  men  in  Paris  and  establish  clothing 
and  equipment  factories  there.  5.  Victual  Paris  for  four  or  five  months. 
6.  Assemble  in  Paris  a thousand  guns  and  two  or  three  hundred  thousand 
rounds,  and  eight  or  ten  million  cartridges.  7.  Bring  the  park  from 
Metz  to  Paris,  as  well  as  from  other  places.  8.  Construct  gun  carriages 
for  sixteen  and  twenty-four  pounders  for  the  heights  of  Paris.  9.  Pre- 
pare palisades  to  close  the  walls  where  unfinished.  10.  Also  collect  a 
large  number  of  palisades  to  make  defenses  for  the  gates.  11.  Bring 
from  every  quarter  forty  to  fifty  thousand  implements,  and  a number  of 
road  workers,  to  make  Paris  a strong  place.  12.  The  same  thing  in  less 
measure  should  be  done  in  Lyons.  13.  A Board  to  carry  this  out  should 
be  formed. 

The  interest  attaching  to  the  utterances  of  the  great  soldier 
at  the  moment  of  opening  this  vital  campaign  will  explain 
the  long  quotations  from  the  Correspondence ; the  St.  Helena 
writings  are  to  a certain  extent  theoretical,  the  former  were 
part  of  the  personality  of  the  emperor. 

In  his  General  Instructions  of  January  13  for  Antwerp, 

VOL.  IV. 


322 


GENERAL  INSTRUCTIONS. 


Macdonald,  Marmont,  who  was  back  on  the  Saar,  Victor, 
Ney  and  Mortier,  the  emperor  recapitulates  much  of  the  above 
Note  so  far  as  numbers  are  concerned. 

If  Blucher  “ passes  the  Saar  and  moves  on  the  Moselle,  he  will  have  to 
mask  Luxemburg,  Thionville,  Marsal  and  Metz.  His  corps  will  scarcely 
suffice  for  all  these  operations.  Marmont  must  observe  him,  contain  him, 
manoeuvre  between  the  places,  and  if,  by  a chance  which  is  not  presum- 
able, this  marshal  were  obliged  to  repass  the  Moselle,  he  would  throw 
Durutte’s  division  into  Metz  and  still  anticipate  the  enemy  on  the  great 
road  to  Paris.  In  this  supposition  Macdonald,  who  is  assembling  his 
corps  on  the  Meuse,  would  observe  the  right  flank  of  the  enemy,  would 
defend  Liege  and  the  Meuse,  and  always  follow  the  right  flank  of  the 
enemy,  so  as  not  to  cease  to  cover  the  debouches  of  Paris.  If,  on  the  con- 
trary, Blucher,  having  felt  of  the  Saar,  moves  on  the  lower  Meuse  to 
menace  Belgium,  Macdonald  will  defend  the  Meuse,  and  Marmont  will 
follow  the  left  flank  of  the  enemy  to  observe  his  movements,  contain  him, 
retard  him  and  do  him  the  utmost  harm  possible. 

“ Schwartzenberg’s  army  . . . is  to  be  contained  by  Mortier  at  Langres, 
by  Ney  at  Nancy  and  Epinal,  and  by  Victor  in  the  Vosges.”  The  em- 
peror then  orders  Mortier,  Ney  and  Victor  to  work  together  “to  seize 
the  gorges  of  the  Vosges,  barricade  them,  assemble  there  the  National 
Guards,  the  Field  Guards,  the  Forest  Guards  and  volunteers,  and  should 
the  enemy  penetrate  into  the  interior  in  force,  these  three  corps  are  to 
close  the  road  to  him,  always  cover  the  route  to  the  capital,  in  front  of 
which  the  emperor  is  assembling  an  army  of  one  hundred  thousand  men. 
. . . The  marshals  may  make  proclamations  to  offset  the  invectives  of 
the  generals  of  the  enemy.  They  are  to  make  it  known  that  two  hundred 
thousand  men  of  National  Guards  have  been  formed  in  Britanny,  in  Nor- 
mandy, in  Picardy  and  about  Paris,  and  that  they  are  advancing  on 
Chalons,  independently  of  an  army  of  reserve  of  the  line  of  more  than  one 
hundred  thousand  men;  that  peace  being  made  with  King  Ferdinand  and 
the  Spanish  insurrectionists,  our  troops  of  Aragon  and  Catalonia  are  in  full 
march  on  Lyons,  and  those  of  Bayonne  on  Paris.  Finally,  to  foretell  to 
the  enemy  that  sacred  territory  he  has  violated  will  consume  him.” 

The  above  was  an  intelligent  strategic  scheme,  provided  the 
marshals  had  numbers  and  ability  equal  to  the  enemy’s  ; but 


DECREASE  OF  MENTAL  BALANCE 


323 


with  the  forces  on  either  side,  the  instructions  were  well-nigh 
worthless.  We  are  unfortunately  not  permitted  to  know 
whether  Napoleon  issued  these  instructions  to  bolster  up  the 
enterprise  of  his  marshals,  or  because  he  believed  they  could 
be  executed.  Much  or  all  of  it  sounds  like  whistling  to  keep 
up  one’s  courage ; and  yet,  although  the  masterly  conduct  of 
the  succeeding  campaign  leaves  one  in  doubt,  we  can  but  feel 
that  this  was  no  longer  the  man  to  whom  facts  once  were 
solely  hard  facts. 

Not  only  did  the  emperor  exhibit  a marked  decrease  of 
mental  balance  in  his  estimates  of  his  own  force  and  that  of  the 
enemy,  but  he  essayed  means  of  negotiation  which  must  have 
proved  his  weakness  to  the  enemy.  On  January  16  he  wrote 
to  Metternich  a letter  couched  in  terms  very  different  from 
those  of  his  last  interview.  He  states  the  case  from  his  own 
standpoint,  with  his  old  force,  but  more  courtesy;  yet  it  is 
evident  in  the  letter,  as  it  must  have  been  to  Metternich, 
that  the  emperor  was  not  what  he  had  been. 

“ Finally,”  says  he,  “ Austria  protests  that  she  wants  peace,  but  is  not 
to  continue  hostilities  to  put  herself  in  a situation  of  not  being  able  to 
reach,  or  else  of  getting  beyond  this  aim,  when  on  both  sides  it  is  desired 
to  come  to  an  end  ? All  these  considerations  have  led  me  to  think  that 
in  the  actual  position  of  our  respective  armies,  and  in  this  rigorous  season, 
a suspension  of  arms  should  be  reciprocally  advantageous  to  both  parties. 
. . . You  have  shown  me  so  much  personal  confidence,  and  I have  myself 
so  great  an  one  in  the  honesty  of  your  views,  and  in  the  noble  sentiments 
which  under  all  circumstances  you  have  expressed,  that  I dare  hope  that 
a letter  which  this  confidence  has  dictated,  if  it  cannot  reach  this  object, 
will  remain  between  Your  Excellency  and  myself.”  This  lacked  the  old 
self-poise. 

And  next  day  he  ordered  Eugene  to  do  what  could  no 
longer  be  accomplished  in  season. 

“ My  Son,  you  will  have  learned,  by  the  different  matters  that  have 
been  published,  of  the  efforts  that  1 have  made  to  have  peace.  I have  since 


324 


CURIOUSLY  FALSE  ASSUMPTIONS. 


sent  my  Minister  of  Exterior  Relations  to  their  ” (the  enemy’s)  “ outposts. 
They  put  off  receiving  him,  and  yet  have  kept  on  marching  forward. 
Suchet  will  have  told  you  that  Murat  is  placing  himself  with  our  enemies. 
As  soon  as  you  shall  have  received  the  final  news  of  this,  it  seems  to  me 
important  that  you  should  reach  the  Alps  with  your  whole  army.  In  case 
you  do  this,  you  would  leave  Italians  as  garrison  of  Mantua  and  other 
places,  having  a care  to  bring  the  silver  and  precious  property  of  my 
household,  and  the  army  chests.” 

To  summarize  the  emperor’s  figures  given  above,  Billow 
was  coming  on  into  the  Low  Countries  with  twenty  thousand 
men,  which  the  necessary  detachments  would  reduce  by  a 
quarter  or  a third,  and  the  balance  could  easily  be  held  in 


would  be  held  in  check  by  Mortier,  Victor  and  Ney.  Accord- 
ing to  this  arithmetic,  Blucher  and  Schwartzenberg  would 
not  have  a force  of  over  eighty  thousand  men  with  which 
to  advance  on  Paris.  These  curiously  false  assumptions  are 
further  illustrated  in  a letter  to  Maison  of  J anuary  20  : — 


French  Fusiliers. 


check  by  Antwerp.  Blu- 
cher with  sixty  thousand 
men  would  advance  on 
Metz ; but  half  of  this 
force  would  have  to  be 
left  to  observe  for- 
tresses, and  could  be 
contained  by  Macdon- 
ald and  Marmont. 
Schwartzenberg,  de- 
bouching from  Basle 
with  a hundred  thou- 
sand men,  must  leave 
half  of  his  effective  in 
Switzerland  and  in  front 
of  the  strong  places,  and 


DISREGARD  OF  ACTUALITIES. 


325 


“ You  have,  then,  no  other  step  to  take  to  defend  Antwerp  and  Belgium 
than  to  assemble  all  your  troops  in  Antwerp  . . . with  strong  outposts. 
...  In  this  situation  Belgium  runs  no  danger  and  your  troops  are  all 
assembled.  The  enemy  will  never  throw  himself  on  Belgium,  so  long 
as  you  can  place  yourself  between  him  and  Breda  and  can  march  on 
Gorkum.  . . . You  are  to  choose,  at  one  or  two  leagues  from  Antwerp,  a 
good  position  on  which  you  can  withdraw  your  vanguard  and  your  iso- 
lated corps  and  deliver  battle.” 

It  was  in  accordance  with  a scheme  based  on  these  utterly 
inexact  estimates  that  Napoleon  issued  orders  to  his  mar- 
shals. 

The  wrong-headedness  of  the  entire  plan  is  obvious.  Even 
had  the  effectives  of  the  several  oncoming  armies  been  accu- 
rate, as  they  were  far  from  being,  the  number  of  detachments 
which  the  allies  would  have  to  make  might  be  so  markedly 
cut  down  as  to  make  their  manoeuvre  against  Paris  by  no 
means  the  “insane  operation”  he  terms  it.  Napoleon’s  habit 
of  deceiving  himself  had  grown  to  fatal  proportions,  and 
his  judgment  had  deteriorated  every  year.  In  1812,  the 
means  he  possessed  could  not  possibly  accomplish  the  end 
he  was  aiming  at.  In  1813,  the  disregard  of  actualities 
became  yet  more  marked ; he  had  means  enough,  but  he 
failed  to  employ  them  in  a correct  or  decisive  manner.  And 
for  the  campaign  of  1814,  his  plans  were  founded  on  esti- 
mates and  assumptions  the  like  of  which  scarce  one  of  the 
generals  he  had  beaten  in  the  past  was  capable  of  equaling 
in  absurdity.  The  most  mediocre  leader  could  scarcely  have 
made  worse  military  blunders.  Whether  these  were  worse 
than  his  political  blunders,  it  is  hard  to  say.  And  yet,  when 
it  came  to  action,  Napoleon  was  never  more  like  himself  than 
in  this  memorable  campaign.  It  is  all  like  a strange  case  of 
mental  aberration. 

As  the  allied  operations  developed,  the  emperor  recognized 
how  vain  his  calculations  had  been.  To  begin  with,  the  sov- 


326 


ALLIES  CROSS  THE  RHINE . 


ereigns  had  determined  on  a winter  campaign  rather  than 
allow  the  French  time  to  recover  from  the  blow  received  at 
Leipsic;  and  the  crossing  of  the  Rhine  took  place  so  much 
earlier  than  Napoleon  had  anticipated  as  almost  to  nullify 
his  preparations.  Before  the  plan  had  been  well  settled, 
the  corps  of  Biilow  and  Winzingerode  entered  Holland  with 
thirty  thousand  men,  and,  despite  Maison  at  Antwerp,  easily 
reduced  all  the  country  to  the  Waal,  while  Nimwegen  and 
Graves  voluntarily  opened  their  gates.  This  for  the  moment 
was  not  a dangerous  element;  but  greater  dangers  were  at 
hand. 

According  to  the  well-devised  plan,  in  the  early  days  of 
December  Schwartzenberg  had  assembled  his  army  in  the 
angle  of  the  Rhine  between  Basle  and  Schaffhausen,  and  in 
the  night  of  December  20-21,  in  five  columns  he  crossed  and 
concentrated  in  Solothurn.  The  left  column  under  Bubna 
marched  towards  Geneva,  and  sent  a body  to  seize  the  moun- 
tain passes  of  the  St.  Bernard  and  Simplon,  while  the  rest 
headed  on  Lyons.  The  other  four  columns  debouched  upon 
Besan^on,  Auxonne,  Dijon  and  Vesoul,  leaving  bodies  to  mask 
these  places.  There  was  little  opposition.  Wrede  had  been 
sent  over  ten  days  before  to  protect  the  flank  of  the  cross- 
ing forces  by  besieging  Hiiningen  and  Belfort,  Breisach  and 
Schlettstadt,  and  then  to  move  on  Colmar  ; while  Deroy  seized 
the  small  fortresses  of  Blamont  and  Landskron.  Wittgenstein 
later  crossed  and  invested  Strasburg.  Wurtemberg  passed 
below  Hiiningen  on  a pontoon  bridge;  he  and  Barclay  were 
to  sustain  these  operations. 

Schwartzenberg  was  thus  extended  over  a front  of  nearly 
two  hundred  miles.  Had  the  French  been  ready,  he  might 
have  regretted  his  dispersion  of  troops,  but  they  were  still  far 
in  the  rear.  He  had  started  with  two  hundred  and  twenty 
thousand  men  ; but  seventy  thousand  were  left  before  the 


THE  WORST  HORRORS  OF  WAR. 


327 


fortresses,  Bubna  had  twelve  thousand,  Homburg  and  Lich- 
tenstein were  off  to  the  left  with  thirty  thousand,  Wrede  and 
Wurtemberg  towards  the  right  with  forty  thousand,  Barclay’s 
reserves  were  in  the  rear,  and  Schwartzenberg  with  Giulay 
and  Colloredo,  forty  thousand  strong,  was  the  headquarters 
body  that  advanced  on  the  enemy.  Bubna’s  detachment  may 
be  justified,  but  scarcely  the  absence  of  the  others  from  the 
fighting  line.  During  the  bulk  of 
the  campaign  Schwartzenberg  was 
constantly  reaching  out  towards 
Lyons,  as  if  fearful  for  his  left.  He 
overestimated  what  Augereau  could 
accomplish.  But  before  he  had  ad- 
vanced far  towards  Langres,  he  saw 
how  exposed  he  was,  and  drew  in 
Wurtemberg,  Wrede  and  Wittgen- 
stein, leaving  but  small  detachments 
opposite  the  fortresses. 

On  the  last  two  days  of  Decem- 
ber, Blucher  crossed  at  Coblenz, 

Bacharach  and  Mainz,  Sacken  on 
the  left,  Lange ron  and  Yorck  in 
the  centre,  and  the  right  under  St. 

Priest.  Langeron  was  left  with 
twenty-five  thousand  men  to  observe 

Mainz.  Both  allied  armies  were  met  by  hordes  of  armed 
peasants  defending  their  homes,  despite  that  many  were 
caught  and  shot  as  guerrillas.  It  was  natural  that  the  soldiers 
of  countries  which  for  a dozen  years  had  been  overrun  and 
depredated  by  the  French  should  now  retaliate  in  kind  ; La 
Belle  France  felt  all  the  worst  horrors  of  war ; but  no  burn- 
ing of  villages  or  execution  of  armed  peasants  deterred  these 
franc-tireurs. 


Russian  Grenadiers. 


328 


DIFFICULTY  IN  COLLECTING  ARMS . 


The  actual  force  Napoleon  liad  so  far  been  able  to  get 
together  to  meet  this  flood  of  invasion  by  little  exceeded  a 
hundred  thousand  men,  all  told,  for  field  service,  while  in  the 
Dutch  fortresses  were  twenty  thousand,  and  in  those  along  the 
Rhine  frontier  thirty-five  thousand  men.  Beside  the  huge 
masses  of  one  and  two  years  before,  this  seems  a sorry  ex- 
hibit. In  1812  Napoleon  had  opened  the  campaign  with  a 
half  million  men,  of  whom  three  quarters  perished.  In 
1813  he  had  opened  the  German  campaign  with  four  hundred 
thousand  men  ; of  these  not  much  over  fifty  thousand  had 
returned  across  the  Rhine ; in  December  he  again  had  col- 
lected over  one  hundred  thousand,  but  typhus  is  claimed  to 
have  invalided  sixty  thousand  men.  Thus,  although  he  had 
managed  to  raise  a large  force  of  new  men  by  January,  1814, 
he  was  able,  when  the  allies  invaded  France,  to  place  on  the 
first  fighting  line,  or  approaching  it,  only  the  above  small 
tale.  How  was  he  to  hold  head  against  the  quarter  of  a 
million  allied  troops  which  were  pressing  on  towards  Paris? 

There  was  much  difficulty  in  collecting  arms.  Constant 
mention  of  it  occurs.  On  January  1 we  find  in  the  orders  to 
Berthier  : — 

“ The  great  trouble  will  be  muskets.  You  must  be  careful  to  give 
moulds  for  balls  for  sporting-guus,  or  even  have  cast  a great  quantity  of 
little  balls  for  the  insurrectionists.”  And  next  day,  and  several  times 
thereafter,  the  same  thing  is  repeated  in  orders.  On  January  9 he  wrote 
Clarke  : “ Is  it  true  that  in  St.  Etienne  there  are  twelve  thousand  mus- 
kets which  are  not  perfect  but  might  serve  ? ” “ The  great  difficulty  for 
the  National  Guard  is  arms  ; we  have  none,”  to  Joseph  on  January  24. 
To  Clarke,  February  6 : “ You  have  told  me  that  the  artillery  had  a great 
number  of  pikes.  Some  should  be  given  to  the  National  Guards,  who  are 
assembling  in  the  environs  of  Paris.  They  will  do  for  the  third  rank. 
Print  instructions  how  to  use  them.  Also  send  pikes  into  the  departments, 
they  are  preferable  to  scythes,  and  moreover  in  the  towns  even  scythes 
are  wanting.”  Later,  many  arms  were  captured.  Napoleon  wrote  to 


A LEVY  IN  MASS  DECREED. 


329 


Joseph,  February  15  : “ The  peasants  picked  up  on  the  Montinirail  battle- 
field more  than  forty  thousand  muskets,  which  the  rapidity  of  the  move- 
ment has  not  allowed  us  to  gather.  Perhaps  the  National  Guard  at  Paris, 
by  sending  agents  to  the  peasants,  could  get  many  of  them.” 

All  available  means  were  put  to  use  to  raise  men.  On 
January  4 a levy  in  mass  was  decreed,  and  the  generals  of 
territorial  divisions  were  appointed. 

“ Article  3.  The  generals  commanding  the  levy  will  organize  them  in 
the  villages  and  communes.  They  will  organize  free  corps,  they  will 
give  commissions  as  partisans  to  move  on  the  flanks  and  the  rear  of  the 
enemy.  Finally,  they  will  take  all  measures  suitable  to  harm  the  enemy.” 

On  January  10  to  Macdonald  : “ You  must  feel  how  important  it  is  to 
arrest  or  at  least  retard  the  march  of  the  enemy,  and  to  present  him  all 
possible  traps.  Employ  the  Forest  Guard,  the  Field  Guards,  the  National 
Guards,  to  do  the  utmost  possible  harm  to  the  enemy.” 

The  want  of  sub-officers  was  marked.  The  emperor  wrote,  January  10, 
to  Clarke  : “ They  assure  me  that  there  could  be  found  in  the  Invalides 
seven  or  eight  hundred  individuals  whose  wounds  are  healed,  and  who 
would  gladly  serve.  If  that  is  true,  it  would  be  a precious  body  from 
which  to  take  sub-officers.” 

Blucher  and  Schwartzenberg  took  their  time,  but  shortly 
the  Army  of  the  Sovereigns  stood  on  the  front  Dijon-Gray- 
Vesoul;  and  on  January  6 Giulay  and  Colloredo  were  at  Lan- 
gres,  from  which  Mortier  retired,  while  Wurtemberg  and 
Wrede  were  moving  down  the  Rhine,  and  Barclay  was  on  the 
Saone  in  reserve.  Mortier  did  his  best  to  arrest  the  onward 
movement ; and  in  combats  at  Chaumont,  Colombes  les  deux 
Eglises  and  Bar-sur-Aube,  January  18  and  24,  the  Imperial 
Guard  fought  at  the  outposts.  Mortier  fell  back  to  Troyes, 
followed  by  Colloredo.  Giulay  remained  at  Bar-sur-Aube. 
Victor,  after  a sharp  action  at  Colmar,  and  threatened  on 
the  right  from  Remiremont  by  Wurtemberg,  and  on  the  left 
from  Luneville  by  Wittgenstein,  summarily  retired,  followed 
sharply  by  Wrede,  towards  Chaumont.  Wurtemberg  headed 


330 


THE  KEY-POINT  SEIZED . 


for  Ney  at  Epinal,  and  on  January  11  threw  back  his  van 
in  a sharp  action.  He  then  joined  Giulay  at  Bar-sur-Aube. 
Wittgenstein  fell  into  line  with  Blucher.  Pahlen  was  con- 
stantly in  the  van. 

Meanwhile  the  Army  of  Silesia  pushed  Marmont  beyond 
the  Vosges  and  the  Saar  on  Metz  ; and  leaving  Yorck  to 
observe  this  fortress  as  well  as  Luxemburg,  Thionville  and 
Saarlouis,  Blucher  followed  on  with  Sacken  to  seek  a junc- 
tion with  Schwartzenberg. 

Thus  Victor  and  Marmont  retired  towards  Ney  in  the  valley 
of  the  Moselle,  the  artillery  park  was  withdrawn  from  Metz, 
Mortier  manoeuvred  in  the  Chaumont  country,  Macdonald 
remained  on  the  Lower  Rhine  until  Winzingerode  crossed  at 
Diisseldorf  January  12,  when  he  was  ordered  on  Chalons. 
Alsatia  was  evacuated,  and  the  valley  of  the  Moselle  opened, 
which  as  yet  there  was  no  army  to  defend.  Despite  Napoleon’s 
orders  to  cover  at  Langres  the  road  to  Paris,  it  was  too  late, 
and  there  could  scarcely  be  a semblance  of  a stand  made 
against  the  overwhelming  allied  forces.  The  emperor’s  first 
line  of  defense  had  been  broken  through  like  a cobweb. 

Although  he  saw  that  the  general  initiative  of  the  European 
war  had  quite  fallen  from  his  hands,  and  that  he  had  left  only 
the  minor  initiative  of  the  theatre  at  the  upper  Seine  and 
Marne,  yet  with  a sure  eye  Napoleon  seized  the  key-point 
and  began  to  concentrate  his  columns  on  Clialons-sur-Marne. 
Lefebvre-Desnouettes,  with  some  cavalry  and  an  infantry 
division,  was  sent  to  occupy  Chalons,  while  Mortier  held  on 
to  Troyes.  Battalions  of  the  National  Guard  were  set  in  move- 
ment on  Troyes,  Provins,  Montargis,  Meaux  and  Soissons  to 
be  armed  and  clothed  and  put  into  line.  The  reserve  divi- 
sions of  Bordeaux,  Toulouse,  Nimes  and  Montpellier  were 
increased.  The  cavalry-remount  depot  was  transferred  to 
Versailles. 


THE  LIBRARY 
OF  THE 

UIWERS1TY  OF  ILLINOIS 


THEATRE  OF  NAPO] 


)N’S  MANOEUVRES  IN  1814 


THt 
Of  M 

HSlVEflSSTY  OF  ILLINOIS 


FALLING  BACK  ON  THE  MARNE. 


331 


By  suitable  concentration  Napoleon  might  have  stood  at 
Dijon  January  1 with  one  hundred  and  fifty  thousand  men, 
and  the  allies  would  not  have  dared  to  march  on  Paris.  But 
Napoleon  with  seventy  thousand  men  at  Chalons  opened  the 
Seine  to  Sehwartzenberg.  He  announced  to  his  marshals  that 
he  would  be  at  Chalons  January  25.  All  were  falling  back 
on  the  Marne  to  this  point  of  assembly,  Victor  and  Ney  to- 
gether, Marmont  from  Metz,  Macdonald  up  the  Meuse,  start- 
ing from  Maestricht  January  14.  Thus  would  be  completed 
a concentration  Napoleon  with  his  small  forces  should  have 
ordered  at  the  beginning,  as  a point  from  which  to  move 
forward  to  the  Langres  plateau.  The  emperor  apparently 
watched  these  operations  quietly,  as  if  it  were  a natural  se- 
quence of  events,  not  one  telling  fatally  against  him  ; and 
Blucher  was  able  to  head  towards  the  Marne  to  a junction 
with  Sehwartzenberg,  while  his  cavalry  followed  the  French 
to  St.  Dizier. 

This  falling  back  had  not  been  accomplished  without 
much  fault-finding,  Berthier  writing  Victor,  January  17,  “ the 
emperor  disapproves  your  having  abandoned  Nancy.  His 
Majesty  orders  you  not  to  leave  the  Moselle  without  fighting.” 
And  two  days  later  Napoleon  wrote  Berthier : “ My  Cousin, 
one  can  understand  nothing  in  the  conduct  of  Victor.  Reach 
the  outposts  before  to-morrow  morning,  20th.  Make  secure 
the  defense  of  the  Meuse.  Give  the  command  to  the  best 
general.  Join  to  it  the  divisions  of  the  Young  Guard.  Send 
off  Victor.  Give  the  command  of  everything  to  Marmont, 
and  stay  there  until  Marmont  has  taken  all  measures  for  the 
defense  of  the  Meuse  and  to  fight.”  This  is  a sample  of  a 
number  of  such  letters  at  this  period,  the  directions  in  which 
were  not  always  carried  out. 

By  mid-January  the  two  main  allied  armies  had  thus  got 
into  central  France,  had  practically  made  the  proposed  junc- 


332 


LIMITED  PLAN  ADOPTED. 


tion,  and  reached  the  point  whence  they  could  give  battle 
or  move  down  the  Seine  and  Marne  valleys  on  Paris,  while 
Napoleon  had  as  yet  been  unable  to  accomplish  what  was 
essential  to  meet  them.  Bluclier  with  fifty  thousand  men  was 
advancing  towards  the  Marne  at  Joinville  and  St.  Dizier;  the 
sovereigns  with  one  hundred  and  twenty  thousand  men  were 
slowly  moving  down  river  on  Chaumont,  whence  Troyes  was 
the  objective : Napoleon  had  but  seventy  thousand  men,  and 
these  were  on  far  too  wide  a front.  Mortier,  reinforced  up  to 
fifteen  thousand  men,  had  retired  to  Troyes  on  the  right  to 
protect  the  Seine  ; in  the  centre,  between  Yitry  and  Chalons, 
Ney,  Victor  and  Marmont  had  forty-five  thousand  men  ; on 
the  left  Macdonald  with  nine  thousand  men  had  got  up  as  far 
as  Rethel. 

Napoleon  had  determined  to  assume  the  offensive,  but  he 
was  far  from  ready  to  do  efficient  manoeuvring.  On  January 
23  he  wrote  Aide-de-Camp  Lamezan,  whom  he  sent  to  the 
front  to  announce  his  speedy  arrival : “ I wish  on  the  26th 
to  fall  on  all  the  places  where  there  is  some  infantry  of  the 
enemy,  to  crush  some  corps.  . . . My  intention  being  to 
assemble  my  troops  so  as  to  march  on  the  enemy.  . . . My 
object  is  to  fall  well  assembled  on  some  corps  of  the  enemy 
and  to  destroy  it.”  This  limited  plan  is  apparently  adopted 
as  a means  of  surprising  and  for  a few  days  checking  the 
enemy,  so  as  to  give  time  for  further  combinations,  and  the 
concentration  of  troops.  Though  his  numbers  were  few,  he 
believed  he  could  supplement  them  with  enough  energy  and 
ability  to  fend  off,  at  least  for  the  moment,  the  further  allied 
advance.  “ I suppose  that  Victor  will  have  held  himself  at 
Ligny  or  St.  Dizier ; that  Ney  with  the  . . . Young  Guard 
will  be  near  by ; that  Gerard  is  at  Brienne ; and  Mortier  at 
Bar-sur-Aube.  I will  assemble  all  these  forces,  and  fall  on 
the  first  corps  of  the  enemy  which  shall  be  at  hand,”  he  wrote 


A DAY  OR  TWO  LATE. 


333 


his  aide,  Belliard,  January  23;  “keep  secret  the  news  of  my 
arrival.”  This  all  does  not  sound  like  the  old  ring  of  battle 
when  Napoleon  headed  a successful  army  in  1805  or  1806, 
but  rather  like  partial  work  to  gain  time. 

Next  day,  in  reviewing  the  military  situation,  he  says : — 

“The  army  is  assumed  to  be  at  Chalons,  Vitry  and  Bar-sur-Aube.  The 
enemy  does  not  appear  to  be  threatening  from  the  side  of  Soissons  and 
the  Ardennes.  From  the  side  of  the  northern  fortresses  he  has  not  yet 
got  Belgium.  The  whole  movement  of  the  enemy  is  towards  Langres, 
St.  Dizier  and  Dijon.  The  movement  of  the  enemy  by  way  of  St.  Dizier 
and  Langres  is  held  in  check  by  the  army  ; that  by  way  of  Dijon  is  not 
held  in  check.  From  Dijon  to  Paris  there  is  one  road  via  Troyes  and  one 
road  via  Sens.  ...  It  is  probable  that  the  effect  of  the  movement  I am 
going  to  make  will  cause  all  the  enemy’s  parties  to  fall  back.”  And  he 
adds  : “ I do  not  suppose  that  on  this  ” (the  Dijon)  “ road  there  can  come 
more  than  a few  cavalry  parties.” 

Before  daylight  of  January  25  Napoleon  left  Paris,  after 
having  sworn  the  National  Guard  to  loyal  protection  of  the 
capital  and  of  the  imperial  family  ; and  having  appointed 
the  empress  regent,  and  Joseph  to  the  command  of  Paris 
and  the  troops  there,  he  reached  Chalons  early  next  morning. 
His  general  plan  had  been  to  move  forward  so  as  to  strike 
Blucher’s  head  of  column  and  throw  this  army  back  upon  the 
Moselle;  and  had  he  been  able  to  accomplish  this  smartly,  it 
might,  added  to  Augereau’s  threat  to  Schwartzenberg’s  flank, 
have  indeed  had  the  effect  of  pushing  the  sovereigns  back 
to  the  Rhine ; but  Napoleon  was  a day  or  two  late.  When 
he  reached  Chalons,  both  Blucher  and  Schwartzenberg  had 
already  started  on  their  concentric  march  towards  the  Aube 
and  the  Marne,  and  this  brought  the  emperor  in  contact  with 
larger  bodies  than  he  expected.  He  had  not  in  season  assem- 
bled out  of  reach  of  contact  with  the  enemy. 

On  January  26  the  French  stood  thus:  Detachments  under 


334 


POSITIONS  ON  JANUARY  26. 


Allix  in  Auxerre,  and  Montbrun  in  Pont-sur-Yonne,  and  a 
division  of  National  Guards  under  Pacthod  forming  in  Mon- 
tereau,  made  a small  division  in  the  valley  of  the  Yonne.  The 
upper  Seine  was  held  by  Mortier’s  men  at  Troyes,  and  a de- 
tachment under  Dufour  at  Arcis.  Ney,  Marmont  and  Victor 
had  assembled  and  were  protecting  the  Marne  valley,  holding 
the  centre  of  the  army  in  Vitry.  The  emperor  had  hoped  to 
find  them  in  St.  Dizier,  and  wrote,  January  26,  to  Bertliier: 
“ It  is  annoying  that  Victor  has  evacuated  St.  Dizier.  Had 
he  been  personally  with  his  assembled  army  corps,  he  would 
have  kept  for  us  this  important  point.”  Originally  intended 
to  hold  the  Ardennes,  Macdonald  had  been  called  in  to  the 
Marne,  leaving  some  troops  in  the  strong  places  in  his  rear; 
and  while  his  withdrawal  uncovered  the  French  left  on  the 
Oise,  Bernadotte  was  too  far  away  to  make  this  a present 
danger. 

In  Schwartzenberg’s  first  line,  on  the  same  day,  were  Giulay 
and  Wurtemberg  at  Bar-sur-Aube  and  Colombes  les  deux 
Eglises ; in  second  line  Wrede  near  Joinville ; behind  him 
Wittgenstein  moving  up  on  the  road  from  Nancy;  Colloredo 
was  marching  on  Troyes,  and  the  Guards  and  reserves  were 
coming  on  from  Langres.  Blucher  had  in  first  line  Sacken 
and  Olsuviev  and  an  abundance  of  cavalry,  near  Vassy  and 
Montierender ; in  second  line  Yorck,  who,  relieved  on  the 
Moselle  by  landwehr,  was  marching  towards  Bar-le-Duc 
and  St.  Dizier,  at  which  last  place  Landskoi  with  a Russian 
division  was  keeping  up  connection  for  him  with  Sacken. 

Though  the  emperor  had  only  partial  knowledge  of  the 
whereabouts  and  strength  of  the  allied  armies,  yet  his  general 
idea  still  was  that  he  could  push  on  up  the  Marne  and  in 
between  Blucher  and  Schwartzenberg  by  way  of  Joinville 
and  Chaumont,  so  as  to  attack  either  in  turn  before  they  could 
join  hands,  — the  same  manoeuvre  he  had  planned  before 


THE  EMPEROR  AT  VI TRY. 


835 


the  battle  of  Leipsic ; and  liis  preference  was  to  fall  on  the 
Army  of  the  Sovereigns,  whose  corps  he  presumed  were  the 
more  spread,  owing  to  the  heavy  roads  of  the  winter  season, 
and  by  detachments  of  which  he  had  heard.  Proposing  to 
move  on  the  enemy  next  day,  orders  from  Chalons  were  issued 
on  January  26  for  Victor  to  take  position  astride  the  road 
from  Vitry  to  St.  Dizier  as  near  as  possible  to  St.  Dizier,  and 
for  Marmont,  Ney  and  Lefebvre  to  take  similar  positions 
each  a league  in  rear  of  the  other,  headquarters  to  be  behind 
Victor.  44  It  will  be  announced  to  the  army  that  the  intention 
of  the  emperor  is  to  attack  the  enemy  to-morrow.”  On  the 
same  day,  at  4 p.  M.,  he  wrote  to  Victor : 44 1 have  reached 
Vitry.  I will  be  at  your  headquarters  before  daylight.  The 
major-general  will  have  sent  you  the  order  to  the  army. 
Everything  is  in  column  between  Vitry  and  your  vanguard. 
It  is  necessary  that  to-morrow  at  the  point  of  day  you  should 
be  in  line  of  battle.  I do  not  suppose  that  the  enemy  is 
marching  on  Vitry.  The  general  plan  of  his  operations  appears 
to  be  to  move  on  the  road  to  Troyes.” 

Napoleon  then  drove  to  Vitry.  He  assumed,  as  he  wrote 
Mortier  January  27,  that  Bluclier  stood  at  St.  Dizier,  and 
that  Scliwartzenberg  was  beyond  Bar-sur-Aube,  coming  up. 
The  latter  assumption  was  nearly  correct ; but  Blucher  was 
actually  at  Dommartin,  having  started  for  Brienne  on  the 
way  to  Troyes,  with  only  Landskoi  left  in  St.  Dizier,  who, 
when  on  the  27th  the  French  reached  the  place,  was  quickly 
disposed  of. 

Thus  Napoleon’s  movements  on  St.  Dizier  and  Blucher’s 
on  Brienne  had  cut  both  the  Army  of  Silesia  and  the  French 
army  into  two  parts.  This  would  enable  Napoleon’s  St. 
Dizier  column  to  fall  upon  Yorck,  but  a success  against 
this  officer  was  not  sufficient  to  impose  upon  the  masses  of  the 
enemy,  which  were  already  On  the  Aube.  Mortier  meanwhile 


336  THE  SITUATION  BLIND. 

was  cut  off  from  the  main  army ; the  emperor  was  obliged  to 
give  up  his  general  plan,  and  sent  orders  to  Macdonald  to 
speed  on  to  Chalons  and  hold  back  Yorck,  so  as  to  protect 
the  retreat  of  the  great  artillery  park  from  Metz;  Marmont 
from  St.  Dizier  was  to  watch  the  country  from  Joinville  to 
Bar-le-Duc  to  mask  the  movements  of  the  main  body ; Napo- 
leon himself,  with  Victor,  Ney  and  Oudinot,  marched  across 
country,  January  28,  on  Montierender,  so  as  to  gain  the  road 
to  Brienne  and  fall  upon  the  flank  of  Blucher,  reach  Mortier 
by  way  of  Lesmont  and  Piney,  and  hold  head  at  Troyes  to 
the  main  allied  army.  It  was  of  the  essence  to  reach  Blucher 
before  the  latter  could  join  the  Arm)''  of  the  Sovereigns. 

As  it  happened,  when  Blucher  reached 
Brienne,  he  remained  there,  deeming  it  prac- 
tically a junction  with  the  sovereigns;  and 
meanwhile  Schwartzenberg  had  kept  his  col- 
umns moving  slowly  in  the  general  direction 
of  Troyes,  Mortier  falling  back  before  him. 
Napoleon’s  letters  at  this  time  show  how 
blind  the  situation  was  to  him,  even  in 
France,  within  a hundred  miles  of  his  capi- 
tal. He  wrote  Marmont,  early  January  29  : 
“ I am  going  to  Maizieres,  where  I shall 
probably  be  at  ten  o’clock.  From  there  I 
shall  see  what  will  have  passed.  The  whole 
column  of  the  enemy  which  has  already 
passed  St.  Dizier  has  filed  towards  the  Aube. 
Has  it  been  at  Arcis?  Has  it  crossed  the 
Aube?  This  is  what  I do  not  know.”  He 
had,  however,  learned  that  Blucher’s  main  force  had  crossed 
the  Marne  and  was  moving  in  the  direction  of  Arcis,  with 
Sacken  and  Olsuviev  heading  for  Brienne  and  threatening 
the  all-important  Lesmont  bridge  ; that  Mortier  had  fallen 


Russian  Hussar. 


BLUCHER  IN  BRIENNE  CASTLE.  337 

back  from  Schwartzenberg  and  occupied  Troyes;  and  that 
Macdonald  was  marching  on  Vitry. 

Ignorant  of  the  numbers  which  had  marched  towards  the 
Aube,  on  the  29th  Napoleon  pushed  Victor  on  Maizieres,  and 
drew  in  Marmont  on  Vassy,  hoping  that  his  own  appearance 
at  Bar-sur-Aube  would  hold  back  any  forces  which  were  head- 
ing on  Troyes ; and  so  as  to  complete  the  French  concentra- 
tion, Mortier  was  ordered  to  Arcis-sur-Aube,  but  the  dispatch 
was  captured.  At  Montierender  there  was  a small  affair  be- 
tween the  flanking  parties.  The  roads  were  very  deep,  and 
none  of  the  armies  could  move  with  much  speed.  “ The  thaw 
continues  strongly.  We  will  pull  along  to-day,  but  to-night 
we  cannot  hope  to  do  anything  more  across  country,”  he 
wrote  Joseph. 

Driven  out  of  St.  Dizier,  Landskoi  had  moved  by  way  of 
Joinville  to  Doulevant  and  reported  to  Blucher,  who,  deem- 
ing the  affair  only  a French  reconnoissance  in  force,  and  hav- 
ing sent  Sacken  towards  Lesmont  to  push  parties  on  Arcis 
and  Troyes,  so  as  to  be  at  the  latter  place  to  meet  Schwart- 
zenberg, determined  to  advance  farther.  Blucher  himself 
was  in  Brienne  castle,  when  a French  officer  captured  by  the 
Cossacks  was  brought  before  him,  with  dispatches  to  Mortier, 
ordering  the  latter  to  keep  on  moving  forward  as  the  right 
wing  of  the  main  French  army;  and  thus  made  aware  of  the 
dangerous  situation  he  was  in,  he  hurried  orders  to  Sacken 
to  destroy  the  bridge  at  Lesmont,  and  to  retire  at  once,  he 
himself  intending  to  move  back  to  Trannes,  so  as  to  lean  on 
Schwartzenberg.  At  the  same  time  Pahlen,  who  with  his 
cavalry  had  been  moving  from  Dienville  on  Piney  and  Troyes, 
was  withdrawn  and  ordered  to  protect  Sacken’s  retreat 
from  the  forces  coming  across  country  from  Vitry.  These 
orders  concentrated  Blucher’s  very  superior  cavalry,  and  not 
only  protected  Sacken,  but  also  happened  to  interfere  with 


VOL.  IV. 


338 


THE  BATTLE  OF  BRIENNE. 


a projected  movement  of  Napoleon  towards  Bar-sur-Aube 
(Ar^onval)  on  Blucher’s  communications. 

While  Blucher  was  waiting  for  Sacken,  in  Brienne  le 
Chateau,  Napoleon,  about  2 P.  m.,  January  29,  reached  Mai- 
zieres  with  only  his  vanguard,  and  struck  Pahlen,  who  had  just 
arrived.  For  a moment  Napoleon  was  in  extreme  danger 
of  capture  by  Pahlen’s  cavalry,  was  in  fact  almost  surrounded, 
when  one  of  Meunier’s  brigades  came  up  and  cut  him  out. 
Meanwhile  Sacken  retired  through  old  Brienne,  drew  up  in 
battle  order  and  opened  upon  the  French;  Pahlen,  after  a 
lively  fight,  fell  back  slowly,  leaving  the  artillery  to  carry  for- 
ward the  fight.  Napoleon  followed  on  with  his  foot,  and  in- 
closing the  town,  about  four  o’clock,  attacked  Blucher’s  much 
superior  force.  The  French  took  Brienne  le  Chateau,  but  old 
Brienne,  in  which  stood  Olsuviev,  long  held  firm,  though  the 
French  artillery  was  well  served  and  set  the  town  afire.  The 
fighting,  which  was  quite  severe,  lasted  in  a desultory  way 
until  near  midnight,  when  Blucher  withdrew  towards  Trannes 
in  the  direction  of  the  Army  of  the  Sovereigns  approaching 
Bar ; and  the  loss  on  each  side  was  not  far  from  three  thou- 
sand men.  This  action  was  really  the  battle  of  Brienne,  and 
the  one  fought  three  days  later  the  battle  of  La  Rothiere. 
The  names  are  often  changed. 

As  an  offset  to  the  danger  run  by  Napoleon,  Blucher  also 
had  had  a narrow  escape.  When  the  first  fire  near  Maizieres 
died  down,  he  retired  to  the  castle  of  Brienne,  which,  situated 
on  a height,  affords  an  excellent  view.  WThile  eating  his  sup- 
per, he  was  watching  from  a window  the  lines  of  the  French 
camp-fires.  Staff  officers  were  going  in  and  out  and  looking 
for  a place  to  pass  the  night.  Suddenly  shots  fell  in  the  castle 
square,  and  a swarm  of  French  skirmishers  made  their  way 
into  it,  despite  hearty  resistance  by  Blucher’s  Guard.  The 
marshal  had  scarcely  time  to  rush  downstairs  and  mount 


BLUCHER  BEATEN. 


339 


liis  horse.  He  and  Gneisenau  rode  out  of  the  trap  together. 
Napoleon  well  knew  this  country,  as  he  had  been  brought  up 
in  the  military  school  here,  and,  desiring  to  seize  the  castle, 
had  sent  two  battalions  of  grenadiers  to  capture  it,  — not, 
however,  expecting  to  net  the  Prussian  marshal. 

With  reference  to  this  battle,  the  emperor  wrote,  January  31,  to  Clarke  : 
“ I had  a very  hot  affair  the  29th  at  Brienne.  I attacked  the  whole  army 
of  Blucher  and  Sacken,  thirty  thousand  strong  in  foot,  and  with  much 
cavalry.  I attacked  them  with  ten  thousand  men,  at  the  moment  when 
I had  just  made  a heavy  march.  I had  the  luck  to  seize,  from  the  com- 
mencement of  the  affair,  the  chateau,  which  dominates  everything.  As 
the  attack  did  not  commence  till  an  hour  before  nightfall,  the  fight  went 
on  all  night.  Blucher  was  beaten.  We  took  five  or  six  hundred  prison- 
ers, killed  or  wounded  three  or  four  thousand  men,  and  he  has  been 
obliged  to  recall  all  his  parties  which  were  advancing  in  the  direction  of 
Paris,  to  fall  back  on  Bar-sur-Aube.  Yesterday  I followed  him  up  in  this 
direction  for  two  leagues,  accompanying  him  by  salvos  from  forty  guns. 
Our  loss  is  estimated  at  two  thousand  men.  ...  If  Brienne  could  have 
been  occupied  earlier,  everything  would  be  in  our  power,  but  in  the  actual 
circumstances,  and  with  the  kind  of  troops  that  one  must  spare,  we  must 
consider  ourselves  happy  with  what  has  happened. 

“ We  have  taken  position  two  leagues  in  front  of  Brienne,  the  right  on 
the  Aube,  the  left  at  the  forest,  holding  ourselves  between  the  Aube  and 
the  Marne.  Mortier  is  at  Troyes  and  Macdonald  on  the  Marne.  I take 
for  pivot  Arcis-sur-Aube.  My  headquarters  will' continue  for  the  moment 
at  Brienne.” 

On  the  same  day  he  wrote  Joseph  : “ The  affair  of  Brienne  was  very 
hot.  I lost  three  thousand  men  there.  The  enemy  lost  four  or  five  thou- 
sand men.  I pursued  the  enemy  half-way  to  Bar-sur-Aube.  I have  had 
repaired  the  bridges  on  the  Aube  which  had  been  burned.  A moment 
more  and  General  Blucher  and  all  his  staff  would  have  been  taken.  . . . 
They  were  afoot,  and  did  not  know  that  I was  with  the  army.  Since  this 
combat  of  Brienne  our  armies  are  in  great  reputation  with  the  allies. 
They  no  longer  believed  in  their  existence.”  And  “ I have  reason  to 
believe,  though  I am  not  certain,”  he  also  wrote  Joseph,  “that  Caulain- 
court  has  arrived  at  the  headquarters  of  the  emperors  at  Chaumont. 
This  affair  of  Brienne,  the  position  of  our  armies,  and  the  opinion  that 


340 


LOGISTIC  STATUS  ALTERED. 


they  have  of  them,  might  accelerate  the  conclusion  of  peace.  It  is 
proper  that  the  journals  should  exhibit  Paris  as  having  the  intention  to 
defend  itself,  and  that  many  troops  are  arriving  from  all  sides.” 

The  probable  change  in  the  strategic  situation  now  led  the 
emperor  to  alter  his  logistic  status.  Early  on  February  1 he 
wrote  to  the  Intendant-General  of  the  army : — 

“ My  intention  is  that  the  centre  of  administration  shall  be  established 
at  Sezanne.  The  route  of  the  army  is  to  be  from  Brienne  and  Arcis-sur- 
Aube  along  the  right  bank  by  way  of  Dommartin,  Ramerupt  and  Sezanne, 
La  Fertd  sous  Jouarre,  Meaux  and  Paris.  . . . The  line  of  magazines  is 
to  be  henceforward  thus  established  : Sezanne  the  central  magazine,  La 
Fert£  sous  Jouarre  and  Meaux  the  magazines  in  the  rear,  Arcis-sur-Aube 
the  magazine  in  the  front.  . . . All  the  administrations  are  to  remain  at 
Sezanne.  The  magazines  of  clothing  which  might  come  for  the  army  are 
to  be  sent  to  Sezanne,  as  also  the  depots  of  military  equipage  and  every- 
thing that  belongs  to  the  army.”  He  had  no  doubt  he  could  maintain  his 
general  position,  and  drive  the  enemy  back  to  the  Rhine. 

When  Schwartzenberg  in  Chaumont  heard  of  Napoleon’s 
offensive,  he  recognized  Blucher’s  danger  and,  spurred  thereto 
by  Alexander,  who  was  really  the  clearest-headed  man  in  the 
allied  camp,  sent  couriers  in  every  direction  to  order  the  sev- 
eral corps  to  head  for  Bar-sur-Aube ; and  soon  the  columns  of 
W urtemberg  and  Giulay,  the  reserves  of  Barclay,  and  Collo- 
redo’s  corps  were  nearing  that  point.  As  Schwartzenberg  did 
not  know  what  Napoleon’s  objective  might  be,  Wrede  and 
Wittgenstein  were  ordered  towards  Joinville  and  Vassy  to 
hold  the  road  to  Chaumont.  Yorck,  for  fear  of  meeting- 
troops  on  the  Ornain,  had  already  moved  up  the  Meuse,  so 
as  by  a circuit  to  reach  St.  Dizier,  whence  he  had  driven  out 
Marmont’s  rearguard,  and  was  placed  where  he  might  operate 
on  the  French  communications.  For  fear  of  this,  Napoleon 
ordered  Vitry  to  be  fortified  as  speedily  as  possible. 

Early  the  30th  Napoleon  followed  Blucher  towards  Trannes, 


LETTER  TO  M OR  TIER. 


341 


where  the  enemy  had  taken  up  a strong  position  on  the 
heights,  covered  by  woods  and  leaning  on  the  Aube.  Artil- 
lery fire  was  opened ; but 
as  it  was  late,  though 
Gerard  had  come  up, 

Napoleon  did  not  at- 
tack, but  deployed  on 
the  line  from  Chaumes- 
nil  through  La  Rothi- 
ere  to  Dienville,  holding 
the  Lesmont  bridge. 

He  had  Ney,  Victor 
and  Gerard,  while  Mar- 
mont  was  at  Montie- 
render,  and  Mortier  was 
again  ordered  to  come 
on.  Schwartzenberg 
reached  Bar-sur-Aube  with  the  allied  head  of  column.  From 
Brienne,  January  30,  at  9.30  p.  M.,  Berthier  was  ordered 
to  send  during  the  night  to  Troyes  “ a postilion  who  has  the 
Legion  of  Honor 5’  with  a letter  to  Mortier  to  this  effect : — 

“Headquarters  is  at  Brienne.  We  are  occupying  the  bridge  of  Dien- 
ville, old  Brienne  and  Lesmont.  Yesterday,  the  29th,  we  beat  the  enemy. 
We  took  some  prisoners.  We  chased  him  out  of  Brienne  and  are  pur- 
suing him  on  Bar-sur-Aube.  Give  us  some  news  of  yourself.  We  have 
none  since  the  28th.  Push  parties  out  to  communicate  with  us,  so  as  to 
be  able  to  act  together  and  in  concert.  Send  us  a morning  report  of  the 
troops,  and  of  the  National  Guards  which  have  arrived  in  Troyes.” 

The  postilion  was  told  “ that  it  is  necessary  that  he  should  be  back  at 
the  earliest  possible  to-morrow,  31st,  to  bring  us  news  of  what  has  passed 
and  is  passing  at  Troyes.” 

According  to  reports  coming  in,  Napoleon  had  some  reason  to 
believe  Schwartzenberg  to  be  marching  on  Auxerre,  which  gave 


Gerard. 


342 


RISKING  ALL. 


him  hope  of  fighting  Blucher  here  alone  ; and  yet,  not  know- 
ing but  what  he  had  the  bulk  of  both  allied  armies  in  his 
front,  he  was  in  doubt  whether  to  manoeuvre  for  battle  or  not. 
Lest  he  should  give  a bad  turn  to  the  political  situation,  he 
did  not  want  to  retreat ; and  yet  he  was  really  in  an  ultra- 
dangerous  position,  in  a way  inseparable  from  the  offensive 
which  he  had  undertaken  too  late  with  slender  forces ; at  any 
moment  he  might  push  on  into  the  midst  of  an  overwhelming 
force.  But  as  emperor  he  could  not  well  play  the  safe  military 
game  of  a retreat  on  Paris,  so  as  to  have  in  hand  his  entire 
force  present,  and  if  pressed  from  thence  make  a march  to  the 
south,  where  he  could  pick  up  Augereau  and  his  Spanish  and 
Italian  forces,  and  with  a substantial  army  resume  a bold 
front.  He  must  defend  his  capital  to  the  last,  and  he  did  it 
ably ; but  it  was  a gambler’s  rather  than  a strategist’s  bold- 
ness ; he  was  risking  his  all.  Marmont  tells  us  that  when  he 
reached  Vitry  and  was  asked  what  reinforcements  he  had 
brought,  he  replied,  “None;  there  was  not  a man  in  Chalons;” 
and  when  asked  what  he  proposed  to  fight  with,  he  replied, 
“We  will  seek  fortune  with  what  we  have  got;  perhaps  it  will 
be  favorable  to  us.”  His  subordinates  thought  they  were 
dreaming  when  he  uttered  these  words. 

What  Napoleon  really  wanted  to  do  was  to  delay  a battle 
until  he  could  draw  in  both  Mortier  and  Macdonald.  This 
was  well,  but  the  gain  in  strength  would  be  more  than  offset 
by  the  junction  of  the  allies.  Sacken  had  broken  the  Lesmont 
bridge ; there  is  no  direct  road  between  Arcis  and  Lesmont  on 
the  right  bank,  and  Mortier  was  cut  off  until  the  Lesmont 
bridge  could  be  repaired.  Napoleon  hoped  to  win  a day  or 
two,  march  to  Troyes,  pick  up  Mortier,  draw  in  Macdonald, 
and  then  manoeuvre  for  the  protection  of  Paris.  Everything 
looked  like  a heavy  force  in  his  front,  and  he  was  loth  to 
attack  Blucher  in  earnest  lest  he  should  run  into  Schwartzen- 


NO  BREATHING-SPELL. 


343 


berg.  But  his  action  was  indecisive,  and  every  day  lost  put 
him  in  worse  case,  for  the  sovereigns  had  determined  to 
concentrate  and  deliver  battle  as  soon  as  they  could,  their  pur- 
pose being  to  allow  Napoleon  no  breathing-spell.  He  should 
months  ago  have  divined  their  plans,  and  have  stood  two 
weeks  sooner,  — as  he  well  might  have  done,  — with  double 
his  present  force,  where  he  could  alternately  fall  on  Blucher 
and  Schwartzenberg,  while  they  were  still  far  apart. 


Coat  worn  by  Napoleon. 


LXVII. 


LA  ROTHIERE  AND  MONTMIRAIL.  FEBRUARY,  1814. 

Napoleon  should  have  guessed  that  after  Brienne  Blucher  would  retire  on 
the  main  force  : his  desire  was  to  fight,  and  he  slowly  followed  on.  On  Febru- 
ary 1 he  saw  that  Blucher  was  too  strong,  and  set  out  to  retire  towards  Mortier 
at  Troyes,  but  as  Blucher  attacked,  he  could  not  avoid  the  battle.  This  was 
stoutly  contended  for  many  hours,  but  Blucher  was  in  greater  force,  and  at 
9 P.  M.  Napoleon  retired  with  his  army  much  broken.  Had  Schwartzenberg  sup- 
ported Blucher  and  pursuit  been  made,  the  French  could  have  been  definitely 
crushed.  Marmont  gallantly  protected  the  retreat.  Strategically  and  politi- 
cally things  looked  badly  : Murat  had  joined  the  allies,  Holland  was  overrun, 
heavy  forces  were  collecting  in  Belgium,  the  Congress  of  Chatillon  would  not 
listen  to  the  Frankfort  basis.  Blucher  now  moved  down  the  Marne,  while 
Schwartzenberg  advanced  through  Troyes.  Napoleon  had  devised  a manoeuvre 
on  the  enemy’s  rear,  but  on  learning  Blucher’s  operation,  he  changed  it  to  one 
against  Blucher.  While  Schwartzenberg  entered  Troyes,  Napoleon  left  a suit- 
able force  at  Nogent  and  himself  marched  to  head  off  Blucher,  who  had  been 
loosely  advancing  towards  Meaux,  or  to  attack  him  in  flank.  On  February  10 
Napoleon  struck  Olsuviev  and  destroyed  his  division.  From  there  he  turned 
towards  Montmirail,  and  while  Blucher  was  making  a thrust  in  the  wrong 
direction,  on  February  11  he  badly  defeated  Sacken,  whom  Yorck  came  up  too 
late  to  save.  On  February  12  he  followed  Yorck  and  Sacken  towards  Chateau 
Thierry,  while  Macdonald  was  sent  to  aid  the  forces  opposite  Schwartzenberg. 
Blucher  advanced  upon  Marmont,  who  was  containing  him,  and  drove  him  in  ; 
Napoleon  turned  from  his  pursuit,  and  on  February  24  defeated  Blucher  at 
Vauxchamps  and  forced  him  back  on  Chalons,  with  a total  loss,  on  the  several 
days,  of  twenty  thousand  men.  This  entire  manoeuvre  is  like  Napoleon  in  the 
old  days.  Meanwhile  Schwartzenberg  slowly  advanced,  but  as  soon  as  he  heard 
of  Blucher’s  defeat,  determined  on  retreat.  Between  the  political  and  strate- 
gic possibilities,  uncertainty  reigned  at  the  allied  headquarters ; and  of  this 
Napoleon  should  have  taken  advantage  to  secure  peace. 

The  victory  of  Brienne  on  January  29  had  not  produced 
as  good  an  effect  as  Napoleon  desired  or  asserted,  for  Blu- 
cher’s  retiring  on  the  Army  of  the  Sovereigns  was  merely  a 


BL U CHER'S  RETREAT. 


345 


concentration;  and  had  the  marshal  been  reinforced  and 
attacked  next  day,  the  French,  with  the  broken  bridge  of  Les- 
mont  in  their  rear  and  heavy  country  roads  behind  them, 
would  have  been  in  parlous  case ; but  surprised  to  find  that 
Blucher  had  retired,  the  emperor  had  for  this  reason  deemed 
him  weak,  and  decided  to  follow  him.  In  the  forenoon  of 
January  30  Grouchy  and  Victor  left  Brienne  in  a thick  fog ; 
and  when  this  broke  up  about  noon,  there  were  some  exchanges 
with  the  Russian  cavalry,  which  was  protecting  Blucher’s 
retreat.  This  day  and  the  next  were  consumed  by  minor 
operations  savoring  of  indecision.  The  situation  was  blind. 
If  Napoleon  was  to  fight  at  all,  he  should  have  pressed  on 
and  fought  with  the  men  he  had,  in  which  case  Blucher  would 
have  retired  on  Schwartzenberg,  and  in  any  event  have  given 
the  French  a chance  to  claim  victory,  or  gain  time  for  fresh 
manoeuvring ; but  at  Trannes  Blucher  found  out  that  he  was 
sustained  by  practically  Schwartzenberg’s  entire  army,  and 
received  orders  from  the  sovereigns  to  deliver  battle  in  front 
of  Trannes,  where  the  ground  was  good. 

On  the  whole  field  there  was  no  change  on  January  31, 
except  that  Marmont  reached  Morvilliers,  and  prolonged 
Napoleon’s  left ; that  Mortier  was  ordered  to  reoccupy  Troyes, 
and  Macdonald  came  on  to  Chalons.  As  Schwartzenberg 
was  approaching  every  hour,  Blucher  did  nothing  to  provoke 
battle:  he  was  not  only  courageous,  but  discreet.  Giulay  and 
Wurtemberg,  Wrede  and  Wittgenstein,  were  all  coming  on  in 
concentric  order,  while  Schwartzenberg’s  main  body  was  near 
Bar-sur-Aube.  Next  day,  February  1,  Napoleon  got  his  forces 
together : Gerard  was  at  Dienville,  Victor  at  La  Rothiere, 
Ney  and  Oudinot  in  reserve  in  front  of  Brienne  ; at  Vassy, 
Marmont,  coming  up  from  St.  Dizier,  had  met  the  Bavarians, 
with  whom  he  had  a fight,  and  then  moving  by  way  of  Mon- 
tierender  on  Soulaines,  met  Wittgenstein’s  van  cavalry,  and 


346 


MANCEUVRING  FOR  BATTLE. 


filing  to  the  right  away  from  it,  finally  reached  Morvilliers 
and  Chaumesnil.  Blucher  was  also  in  force,  and,  now  that 
the  main  army  was  at  hand,  glad  to  attack.  Napoleon  gradu- 
ally recognized  that  he  had  more  than  Blucher’s  army  in  his 
front,  and  debated  retiring  to  another  battle-ground ; but  he 
remained  where  he  was  to  learn  enough  as  to  the  enemy’s 
purpose  to  move  in  the  proper  direction.  What  he  did  to 
solve  the  question  does  not  appear ; but  as  Blucher  remained 
sturdily  in  place,  Napoleon  was  confirmed  in  his  view  that 
Schwartzenberg  was  moving  on  Troyes,  while  Blucher  held 
the  French  in  place;  and  finally  concluding  to  fall  back  across 
the  Aube  by  the  now  repaired  Lesmont  bridge,  and  move 
towards  Mortier,  he  set  Ney  in  motion  thither. 

In  pursuance  of  his  fighting  orders,  Blucher  sent  his  cavalry 
forward  in  the  plain  of  La  Rothiere,  and  drew  up  his  infantry 
between  Trannes  and  Eclance,  Schwartzenberg  being  ready 
to  sustain  him.  One  hundred  guns  stood  on  the  heights  of 
Trannes ; Wurtemberg  inarched  towards  the  heights  of  Maisons 
and  occupied  Fresnay  ; Giulay  moved  up  on  the  Bar-sur-Aube 
road  to  sustain  Blucher ; Wittgenstein  was  still  between 
Joinville  and  Mussey,  Wrede  at  Joinville,  and  the  reserve 
near  Colombes.  About  noon  Grouchy  reported  that  Blucher 
was  apparently  manoeuvring  for  battle,  and  Napoleon  rode  to 
the  outposts.  It  was  a damp,  chilly  winter  day,  interrupted 
by  sharp  bursts  of  snow,  driven  by  a cold  wind.  Little  could 
be  seen.  The  French  troops  had  already  begun  to  evacuate 
their  positions  so  as  to  move  to  the  rear.  As  the  Russian 
Guard  came  up  into  line,  Blucher  opened  the  attack.  Napo- 
leon then  neither  would,  nor  could  he  well,  avoid  the  conflict 
thus  forced  upon  him  ; the  troops  were  again  sent  into  line  ; 
but  contrary  to  his  usage,  the  emperor  fought  on  the  defensive, 
leaving  the  momentum  of  the  onset  to  Blucher.  The  divine 
fury  of  the  days  of  Montenotte  was  no  longer  present. 


T at  UBWf 
OF  JHE 

ommmr  of  Illinois 


-AUBE  COUNTRY 


m IIBMKV 

of  m 

WtVEfIStlY  Of  IU '""'S 


CANNONADE  OF  LA  ROTHIERE. 


347 


Gerard  was  on  the  right,  with  orders  to  hold  the  bridge  at 
Unienville  as  well  as  that  at  Dienville  and  the  town  of  La 
Rothiere ; Victor  was  in  the  centre  from  La  Rothiere  to 
Chaumesnil,  with  an  outpost  in  La  Giberie  ; Marmont  on  the 
left  was  in  Morvilliers  with  outposts  in  La  Chaise;  Ney  and 
Oudinot  were  still  in  reserve  in  front  of  Brienne,  holding  the 
farm  buildings  of  Beugne.  The  French 
position  was  well  covered  by  the  Aube  on 
the  right  and  a series  of  ponds  on  the  left. 

Napoleon  was  still  in  doubt  whether  he 
had  Blucher  alone  in  front  of  him ; but 
within  a couple  of  hours,  as  more  and  more 
troops  came  up  into  line,  he  saw  that  he  was 
vastly  outnumbered,  and  as  on  the  second 
day  at  Essling,  fought  only  to  hold  himself 
until  nightfall,  when  he  might  retire. 

The  battle  opened  with  a cannonade  of 
La  Rothiere  by  the  allies,  to  which,  when  it 
became  unbearable,  Victor  replied  by  throw- 
ing his  horse  upon  the  batteries,  a charge 
which  was  a fit  precursor  of  the  bold  ride  of 
the  Six  Hundred.  The  cavalry  was  thrown 
back,  decimated  by  the  fire  at  close  range, 
but  not  disordered ; and  as  the  allied  foot 
under  Sacken  advanced,  the  squadrons  again  turned  upon 
this,  but  were  themselves  met  and  hurled  back  by  a timely 
charge  of  the  Russian  horse,  bodies  of  which,  with  the  guns, 
appear  to  have  been  placed  in  the  intervals  between  the  allied 
columns.  The  ground  was  so  deep  that  artillery  could  not  be 
easily  handled,  and  at  least  half  of  the  pieces  were  left  in 
the  rear,  so  as  to  double  teams.  The  allied  foot  kept  bravely 
on  its  way  to  La  Rothiere,  and  here  ensued  a lusty  struggle 
with  Duhesme  and  the  Young  Guard  for  possession  of  the 


Prussian  Mounted 
Artilleryman. 


348 


MARMONT  OBLIGED  TO  RETIRE. 


village.  The  French  cavalry  under  Colbert,  Pire  and  Guyot 
again  made  some  handsome  charges  on  the  Russian  foot,  but 
these  were  met  and  checked  by  the  Russian  horse  under 
Wasilchikov,  though  Nansouty  and  Grouchy  attacked  the 
latter  in  flank.  The  Russian  infantry  kept  on  with  its  usual 
dogged  persistence,  and  La  Rothiere  fell,  with  twenty-four 
of  the  Young  Guard  guns.  Nor  was  this  the  only  allied  line 
of  advance.  On  the  left  bank  of  the  Aube  a heavy  column 
under  Giulay  pushed  forward  on  Dienville  bridge,  where 
leaned  the  French  right;  and  that  part  of  the  village  which 
lay  on  that  bank  went  lost.  If  the  allies  could  force  the  river, 
Brienne  would  be  in  danger,  and  the  French  fought  hard  to 
defend  the  bridge.  With  their  far  greater  forces  at  disposal, 
the  enemy  also  pushed  a column  through  the  Beaulieu  woods 
on  La  Giberie,  which  lay  in  front  of  the  French  left  wing, 
and  after  some  hearty  exchanges,  captured  the  hamlet,  and 
Marmont’s  outpost  was  forced  back  on  Chaumesnil.  Mean- 
while Wrede’s  Bavarians  were  approaching  from  Doulevant, 
and,  debouching  from  the  Soulaines  wood,  formed  line  at 
La  Chaise  opposite  the  French  left  flank;  this  was  the  most 
dangerous  blow  of  the  day,  directed  against  the  weakest  part 
of  the  French  line  ; and  it  was  not  long  before  Marmont’s 
too  extended  front  between  Morvilliers  and  Chaumesnil  waa 
ruptured  by  superior  numbers  and  the  rapid  Bavarian  onset ; 
and  lacking  time  to  concentrate,  although  he  threw  his  in- 
fantry into  squares  to  protect  his  batteries,  he  was  soon 
obliged  to  retire  to  the  protection  of  the  Ajou  wood. 

But  it  was  not  to  go  all  one  way.  These  allied  successes 
were  for  a while  balanced  by  Victor’s  gallant  advance  towards 
the  left  of  his  own  front,  recapturing  La  Giberie  by  a rapid 
rush  with  Grouchy  in  support,  to  hold  it  for  a while ; but  he 
was  not  in  force  to  keep  it,  and  shortly  before  flve  it  went 
lost  again  to  Wurtemberg,  reinforced  by  two  Russian  divi- 


FATE  OF  CHA  UMESNIL  SEALED. 


349 


sions.  This  enabled  Wurtemberg  to  join  hands  with  Wrede 
by  edging  to  the  right  towards  the  Soulaines  road.  Thus 
flanked,  the  fate  of  Chaumesnil  was  sealed,  though  Marmont 
strove  hard  to  hold  it  and  Napoleon  came  up  in  person  to  aid 
in  its  defense.  The  allies,  despite  the  oncoming  darkness, 
were  also  pushing  hard  on  Morvilliers,  and  Marmont  was 


350 


LA  ROT  HI  ERE  TAKEN. 


compelled  to  loosen  his  grasp  on  that  village.  Even  La 
Rothiere  could  not  be  held.  Everything  seemed  now  to  be 
going  against  the  French,  though  they  had  made  a stubborn 
fight.  Once  more,  after  dark,  Napoleon  led  forward  on  La 
Rothiere  and  Chaumesnil  a column  of  reserve  consisting  of 
a division  of  the  Young  Guard  under  Oudinot,  and  Rotlien- 
burg’s  foot,  but  nothing  could  be  gained,  though  for  half 
an  hour  the  fighting  in  La  Rothiere  was  furious  and  costly. 
Blucher  and  Sacken  were  here  in  person,  and  Rothenburg 
was  almost  surrounded  and  captured.  By  8 P.  M.  the  place 
was  definitely  yielded  to  the  enemy,  but  Napoleon  set  it  on 
fire  by  shells  so  as  to  secure  his  retreat,  and  some  fighting 
went  on  until  midnight.  Perceiving  that  the  French  were  on 
the  point  of  retiring,  the  allied  cavalry  was  hurled  upon  them; 
but  despite  many  casualties,  the  victory  was  no  more  decisive. 
At  9 p.  M.  orders  were  issued  uto  evacuate  all  the  sick” 
(wounded)  “ during  the  night.  The  caissons  and  the  military 
equipages  will  be  loaded  with  them,  all  the  empty  country 
wagons  which  have  brought  food,  and  finally,  all  the  wagons 
or  carts  that  can  be  procured  ...  to  distribute  bread  and 
brandy  for  two  days  to  every  one,  ...  to  evacuate  at  once  be- 
hind Brienne  all  caissons,  artillery,  useless  baggage,  to  keep 
only  the  artillery  necessary  to  defend  and  hold  the  positions.” 
Dienville  was  also  fought  for  until  after  midnight,  when 
Gerard  gave  up  the  town,  which  then  had  no  further  value. 
The  French  had  been  fully  pushed  back  on  old  Brienne. 
To  protect  the  retreat  across  the  Aube,  Victor  and  Marmont 
took  up  a position  between  old  Brienne  and  the  Ajou  wood. 
Beyond  the  cavalry  attack,  there  was  no  pursuit.  This  seems 
to  have  been  a grave  mistake,  as  the  allies  had  a big  corps 
on  the  left  bank,  and  the  French  were  so  badly  disorganized 
that  the  young  levies  might  have  been  seized  by  panic  had 
the  pursuit  been  sharp.  Out  of  forty  thousand  men,  the 


FRENCH  CROSS  THE  AUBE. 


351 


French  loss  had  been  four  thousand  killed  and  wounded, 
three  thousand  prisoners  and  fifty-four  guns.  Out  of  double 
the  number  put  in,  the  enemy’s  was  scarcely  less  than  six 
thousand  men. 

In  letting  Blucher  alone  fight  the  battle  of  La  Rothiere, 
Schwartzenberg  lost  his  best  chance  of  crushing  the  French. 

Napoleon  assembled  his  corps  on  the  road  to  Lesmont, 
ready  to  cross  the  Aube  and  march  on  Troyes,  and  personally 
remained  in  Brienne  until  4 A.  M.  of  February  2,  restlessly 
watching  for  signs  of  pursuit ; then  he  hurried  forward  to 
Lesmont,  and  directed  the  placing  of  batteries  to  protect 
the  bridge.  Marmont,  ordered  towards  Ramerupt  to  draw 
the  allied  attention  away  from  the  crossing,  while  the  French 
army  was  putting  the  Aube  between  itself  and  the  enemy, 
was  attacked  by  Wrede’s  Bavarians,  who  surrounded  him 
on  all  sides.  His  situation  was  critical,  but  he  gallantly 
took  the  initiative,  fell  fiercely  on  the  enemy,  and  drove  him 
back  in  utter  surprise  at  his  audacity ; after  which  he  defi- 
antly retired  behind  the  Voire  on  Rosnay,  and  made  his 
way  along  the  right-bank  country  roads  to  Arcis,  which  he 
reached  next  day.  Ney  was  the  last  to  cross  at  Lesmont, 
and  then  burned  the  repaired  bridge.  For  several  days  the 
allies  lost  sight  of  the  French  movements.  They  expected 
Napoleon  to  move  on  Arcis-sur-Aube,  instead  of  which  he 
moved  to  Troyes,  and  on  February  2 joined  Mortier,  during 
the  afternoon. 

With  reference  to  the  battle  of  La  Rothiere,  Napoleon  thus  wrote  Cau- 
laincourt,  February  4 : “The  report  of  Schwartzenberg  is  a folly.  There 
was  no  battle.  The  Old  Guard  was  not  there.  The  Young  Guard  was 
not  engaged.  There  were  a few  guns  which  were  taken  from  us  by  cav- 
alry charges.  But  the  army  was  on  the  march  to  pass  the  bridge  of  Les- 
mont when  this  event  happened,  and  two  hours  later  the  enemy  would  not 
have  found  us.  It  seems  that  the  whole  army  of  the  enemy  was  there, 
and  that  they  look  upon  that  as  a battle:  in  such  case  those  people  have 


352 


A SORRY  BACKSET. 


very  little  ability.  They  did  not  have  an  affair  with  more  than  fifteen 
thousand  of  our  people,  and  we  held  the  battlefield  the  whole  day.” 

Though  the  army  was  in  bad  shape  through  its  defeat  and 
hurried  retreat,  it  was  safer  at  Troyes  than  at  Brienne,  where 
the  danger  on  the  evening  of  February  1 had  been  extreme. 
Had  the  allies  kept  up  their  push  with  any  kind  of  vigor,  the 
French  campaign  might  have  been  ended  then  and  there,  for 
the  defeat  had  much  disheartened  the  army,  says  Marmont. 
“ I shall  be  at  Troyes  to-morrow,”  Napoleon  wrote  Clarke 
February  2.  “ It  is  possible  that  Blucher’s  army  may  move 

between  the  Marne  and  Aube,  towards  Vitry  and  Chalons. 
From  Troyes,  according  to  circumstances,  I will  operate  to 
retard  the  movement  of  the  column  which  they  assure  me 
is  advancing  by  way  of  Sens  on  Paris,  or  to  return  and 
manoeuvre  on  Blucher  and  retard  his  march.” 

This  defeat  was  a sorry  backset.  If  Napoleon  could  not 
win  a victory  over  part  of  the  enemy,  how  could  he  succeed 
against  Blucher  and  Schwartzenberg combined?  He  had  now 
nothing  to  hope  for  except  a few  troops  from  Spain,  and  per- 
haps the  belated  arrival  of  Eugene  from  Italy  to  make  a diver- 
sion in  the  allied  rear  ; and  as  these  could  scarcely  get  up  to 
join  in  the  defense  of  Paris,  he  would  have  to  abandon  his 
capital  and  join  them  in  the  south  of  France,  if  he  desired  to 
put  them  to  use. 

In  Italy  Murat  had  declared  against  Napoleon.  On  Feb- 
ruary 13  the  emperor  wrote  Fouche:  “ The  conduct  of  Murat 
is  infamous,  and  that  of  the  queen  has  no  name.  I hope  to 
live  long  enough  to  revenge  myself  and  France  for  such  out- 
rage and  so  frightful  an  ingratitude.”  Antwerp  was  about 
to  be  besieged  by  Billow,  aided  by  Graham’s  English  division  ; 
the  Duke  of  Weimar  was  approaching  Belgium  with  twenty- 
five  thousand  men,  which  would  enable  Billow  to  leave  mat- 
ters with  the  other  forces  and  to  enter  France  from  the  north. 


DISPATCH  TO  CAULAINCOURT. 


353 


Strategically,  everything  looked  at  its  worst.  At  the  Con- 
gress at  Chatillon,  to  which  Caulaincourt  had  been  sent  by 
Napoleon  on  a basis  of  the  terms  suggested  at  Frankfort,  the 
demand  of  the  allies,  as  the  result  of  the  defeat  of  Brienne, 
now  was  to  limit  the  Rhine  frontier,  so  as  to  take  from  France 
the  bulk  of  Belgium  and  Holland.  To  gain  time  Napoleon 
ordered  Caulaincourt  to  subscribe  to  almost  any  terms,  feel- 
ing justified  under  the  circumstances,  as  some  authorities 
allege,  in  playing  a fast  and  loose  game,  if  by  that  means  he 
could  increase  his  forces  to  the  point  of  coping  with  the  supe- 
rior numbers  of  the  enemy. 

“ The  letter  Metternich  wrote  you  is  quite  ridiculous,”  his  dispatch  of 
February  4 says  to  Caulaincourt,  “ but  1 recognize  what  I have  long  seen, 
that  he  thinks  he  is  leading  Europe,  and  that  all  the  world  is  leading 
him.  . . . You  are  constantly  asking  me  for  power  to  act,  and  instruc- 
tions, when  it  is  yet  doubtful  whether  the  enemy  will  negotiate.  The 
conditions  it  seems  have  been  decided  upon  among  the  allies  in  advance.” 
And  again  next  day  : “I  have  stayed  to-day  at  Troyes  expecting  news 
from  the  Congress.  ...  If  they  wish  peace  . . . they  must  make  a 
prompt  end,  and  from  the  beginning  of  the  Conference,  they  ought  to 
be  able  to  stop  things,  for  after  all,  within  a few  days  there  will  be  a 
general  battle  which  will  decide  everything.  I am  going  to  Nogent  to 
meet  twenty  thousand  men  of  the  army  of  Spain,  who  arrive  to-morrow 
and  day  after  to-morrow.  It  will  become  necessary  afterwards  to  have 
an  affair  to  cover  Paris.  Matters  should  then  be  settled  at  once.  As 
the  allies  have  already  decided  all  the  bases,  you  must  already  have  them  : 
accept  them  if  they  are  acceptable,  and  in  the  contrary  case  we  will  run 
the  chance  of  a battle,  and  even  of  the  loss  of  Paris,  and  of  all  that  would 
follow  that.” 

On  the  same  day  a second  courier  was  sent,  by  whom  Maret  wrote  : 
“ His  Majesty  gives  you  carte  blanche  to  conduct  negotiations  to  a happy 
end,  to  save  the  capital  and  avoid  a battle,  in  which  would  be  the  last 
hopes  of  the  nation.  . . . The  intention  of  the  emperor  is  that  you  should 
look  upon  yourself  as  invested  with  the  necessary  power  in  these  impor- 
tant circumstances,  to  take  the  most  proper  step,  so  as  to  arrest  the  pro- 
gress of  the  enemy  and  to  save  the  capital.” 


VOL.  IV. 


354 


UNPARDONABLE  OUTRAGES. 


On  February  2 to  Joseph,  speaking  of  the  meeting  of  the  Congress  at 
Chatillon,  the  emperor  wrote  : “ It  seems  that  the  allies  have  feared  that 
the  arrival  of  Caulaincourt  at  their  headquarters  might  give  rise  to  . . . 
a fomentation  of  the  germs  of  disunion  which  exist  between  them.”  And, 
to  influence,  if  he  might,  the  allied  discussion,  he  had  written  to  Cau- 
laincourt, February  2:  “The  enemy’s  troops  everywhere  are  behaving 
horribly.  All  the  inhabitants  are  taking  refuge  in  the  woods.  No  more 
peasants  are  found  in  the  villages.  The  enemy  eats  up  everything,  takes 
all  the  horses,  all  the  cattle,  all  the  clothing,  all  the  rags  of  the  peasants. 
They  beat  every  one,  men  and  women,  and  commit  a great  number  of 
rapes.  This  picture,  that  I have  seen  with  my  own  eyes,  must  easily 
make  you  understand  how  much  I desire  promptly  to  withdraw  my 
peoples  from  this  state  of  misery  and  suffering,  which  is  veritably  hor- 
rible. This  must  also  give  much  food  for  thought  to  the  enemy,  for  the 
Frenchman  is  not  patient.  He  is  naturally  brave,  and  I expect  to  see 
them  organize  themselves  into  bands.  You  are  to  make  a very  energetic 
picture  of  these  excesses.  Burgs  of  two  thousand  souls  like  Brienne  have 
nobody  left.” 

On  the  soil  of  La  Belle  France  these  outrages  were  unpar- 
donable : the  emperor  had  scarcely  realized  such  atrocities 
when  committed  in  other  lands  by  his  own  armies. 

But  this  was  the  political  side.  On  the  purely  military 
side,  we  shall  view,  in  the  coming  few  days,  among  the  most 
interesting  features  of  the  life  of  this  great  captain,  the  con- 
trast he  presents  between  his  keen  perception  and  his  skill 
when  aroused  by  danger  of  the  situation,  or  the  excitement 
of  battle,  and  the  indifference  of  his  attitude  in  the  late  cam- 
paign, when  military  success,  or  peace  with  honor,  were  sev- 
eral times  within  his  grasp. 

Napoleon  was  correct  in  his  guess  as  to  the  future  opera- 
tions of  the  allies.  They  had  been  reunited  in  the  Brienne- 
Bar  country ; they  now  again  divided.  It  was  a grave  mis- 
take for  them  not  to  follow  up  Napoleon  after  their  victory  at 
La  Rothiere.  “ As  a principle,  the  most  simple  and  effica- 
cious thing  is  to  pursue  an  advantage  at  the  point  where  one  has 


DIVISION  OF  ALLIED  FORCES. 


355 


obtained  it,  because  in  this  case  one  does  not  lose  time,  and 
one  beats  the  iron  while  it  is  hot,”  says  Clausewitz.  And  “he 
was  content,”  he  further  says,  with  reference  to  Schwartzen- 
berg,  “ to  have  a river  between  himself  and  Napoleon,  and  was 
afraid  to  be  face  to  face  with  him  in  open  country.  . . . He 
was  unwilling  to  pursue  the  wounded  lion,  but  wished  to  win  a 
line  of  defense  on  the  Seine.”  They  needed  to  do  nothing  but 
advance  in  one  solid  body  on  Paris,  crushing  as  they  went 
Napoleon’s  inferior  forces  in  their  front,  and  this  indeed  was 
the  purpose  of  the  Emperor  Alexander  ; but  Blucher  had  set 
his  heart  on  a separate  march  down  the  Marne,  and  he  and 
Schwartzenberg,  sustained  by  the  council,  who  remembered 
his  notable  march  to  the  Saale  in  1813,  adopted  a double 
plan.  While  the  sovereigns  should  follow  down  the  Seine, 
Blucher  was  to  move  down  the  valley  of  the  Marne ; and  each 
hoped  for  the  honor  of  first  entering  the  French  capital. 

With  the  idea,  however,  that  the  enemy  would  probably  ad- 
vance on  Troyes  to  complete  the  work  so  smartly  inaugurated, 
Napoleon  stood  there  on  February  4 ; but  Schwartzenberg 
strove  to  avoid  the  place  by  a circuit  to  either  flank,  while 
Blucher  reached  Fere  Champenoise  and  Yorck  entered  Cha- 
lons. This  division  of  forces  was  early  reported  by  Macdon- 
ald, and  Napoleon  determined  to  utilize  his  central  position  by 
turning  on  Blucher,  while  holding  the  crossing  of  the  Seine  at 
Nogent,  so  as  at  any  time  to  be  able  to  return  and  debouch 
upon  the  rear  of  the  Army  of  the  Sovereigns.  The  Prussian 
general  was  in  by  far  the  more  threatening  position  by  his 
greater  proximity  to  the  capital,  and  was  moreover  the  boldest 
and  most  persistent  of  his  enemies ; Napoleon  could  better 
risk  danger  from  slowly  thinking  Schwartzenberg.  With 
fewer  men,  Blucher  was  more  liable  to  be  beaten ; and  for 
Napoleon  to  appear  in  his  front  suddenly,  after  his  defeat  at 
La  Rothiere,  would  have  a strong  moral  effect.  Blucher’s 


356  OFFENSIVE  AND  DEFENSIVE  MANOEUVRES. 

thrust  at  Paris  compelled  Napoleon  to  give  up  another  pro- 
jected movement  on  Schwartzenberg’s  communications,  to 
constrain  at  least  his  temporary  retreat.  In  writing,  February 
6,  to  Joseph  about  the  latter's  orders  for  the  movement  of  re- 
inforcements, 44  I am  much  annoyed  by  these  dispositions,”  he 
said,  44  for  I was  about  to  attack  to-morrow  towards  Bar-sur- 
Seine,  to  beat  the  Emperor  Alexander,  who  seems  to  me  to 
have  made  false  dispositions,  but  I sacrifice  everything  to  the 
necessity  of  covering  Paris.”  We  here  again  see  at  its  best 
Napoleon’s  offensive-defensive.  Strictly  as  a defensive  mea- 
sure, he  was  about  to  put  to  use  a sharp  offensive  operation, 
when  Blucher’s  advance  on  Paris  prevented  it,  for  the  allies 
were  in  sufficient  force  to  make  it  prudent  to  divide.  But 
although  giving  up  the  Bar-sur-Seine  operation  against  the 
Army  of  the  Sovereigns,  he  yet  believed  that  the  lay  of  the 
land  west  of  Troyes  would  enable  a small  force  to  arrest  that 
army  for  some  days,  and  give  him  time  to  turn  on -the  Army 
of  Silesia. 

Offensive  and  defensive  manoeuvres  each  have  their  limita- 
tions. While  the  offensive  has  manifest  advantages,  it  can  be 
carried  too  far,  as  by  the  Austrians  in  1805  in  their  headlong 
advance  to  the  Iller,  or  by  the  Prussians  in  1806  in  their 
blindly  pushing  on  to  the  Thuringian  Forest  without  paying- 
heed  to,  or  indeed  understanding,  the  great  strategic  theatre. 
On  the  other  hand,  Napoleon’s  defense  on  the  Passarge  in 
1807,  on  the  Lech  in  1809,  and  in  this  campaign  was  limited 
by  the  operations  of  the  enemy,  and  his  offensive  thrusts  were 
well  timed  and  efficient.  His  defensive  scheme  in  1813  was 
well  conceived  but  ill  executed. 

While  Blucher  moved  towards  the  Marne,  intending  to  draw 
in  Yorck,  part  of  Langeron  and  Kleist,  and  leaning  on  the 
Army  of  the  North  overwhelm  Macdonald,  Schwartzenberg, 
having  learned  on  February  4 that  Napoleon  was  in  Troyes, 


TO  MOVE  TO  THE  MARNE. 


357 


continued  his  advance  in  that  direction.  Wittgenstein  took 
up  the  right  of  Schwartzenberg’s  army,  following  the  Aube, 
his  cavalry  van  forcing  Marmont  from  Arcis.  Giulay  reached 
Geraudot,  Wittgenstein  Charmont,  Wrede  and  Wurtemberg 
moved  through  Vendeuvre,  Colloredo  and  the  reserves  came 
up  along  the  Bar-sur-Aube  road.  Thus  the  allies  from  their 
central  position  were  now  pushing  out  their  main  force  fan- 
shaped on  the  Aube,  the  Marne  and  the  Yonne,  by  way  of 
Sens,  Troyes,  Arcis  and  Chalons.  When  the  van  got  near 
Troyes,  the  French  army  was  found  cantoned  in  that  town 
and  in  the  numerous  villages  about  it.  Schwartzenberg  was 
uncertain  whether  Napoleon  would  continue  to  operate  on  the 
Seine,  or  would  move  to  the  Marne,  and  did  not  wish  to  pro- 
voke a general  battle  with  Blucher  at  a distance.  His  idea 
was  to  move  around  Troyes  and  attack  it  from  both  banks. 

Napoleon  keenly  watched  these  operations,  but  what  inter- 
ested him  most  was  the  fact  that  Blucher  had  moved  towards 
Chalons.  He  believed  that  Schwartzenberg’s  object  was  to 
hold  him  in  Troyes  while  Blucher  should  turn  the  French  left 
and  make  a dash  for  the  capital.  Finally,  when  late  Febru- 
ary 5 he  learned  that  Macdonald,  retiring  from  overwhelming 
allied  forces,  had  broken  the  Chalons  bridge,  and  that  Yorck 
had  entered  the  city,  his  mind  was  quickly  made  up  to  move 
to  the  Marne  and  attack  Blucher.  Mortier,  left  in  Troyes, 
with  instructions  to  maintain  a show  of  activity  as  if  the  em- 
peror were  still  there,  did  his  work  well,  sending  out  cavalry 
parties  in  every  direction,  attacking  the  Austrian  outposts  and 
keeping  up  constant  movement.  Schwartzenberg  advanced 
slowly. 

Nogent  being  a central  position  from  which  Napoleon  could 
fall  on  Blucher’s  left  flank  if  he  should  advance  farther 
towards  Meaux,  while  not  losing  sight  of  the  Army  of  the 
Sovereigns,  Marmont  was  ordered  from  Arcis  on  to  the  town. 


358 


M OR  TIER  VACATES  TROYES. 


and  joined  hands  with  the  emperor  that  night  at  Mery.  The 
army  reached  Nogent  February  7 ; and  Mortier  having  been 
compelled  by  the  allied  turning  manoeuvres  to  vacate  Troyes 
the  preceding  night,  Schwartzenberg  filed  in  next  day. 

In  order  to  prevent  Schwartzenberg  from  ascertaining  his 
advance  on  the  Marne  and  starting  by  way  of  Sens  and  Fon- 
tainebleau for  Paris,  Victor  was  left  in  Nogent  with  Gerard 


Officers  of  Cossacks. 


and  Milhaud,  while  Oudinot  stood  in  Nangis  and  Provins  to 
threaten  the  flank  of  such  an  advance.  Pacthod  was  in  Mon- 
tereau,  Allix  in  Sens,  and  Pajol  was  collecting  troops  in  Melun. 
This  whole  force,  intended  to  contain  Schwartzenberg’s  one 
hundred  thousand  men,  amounted  to  less  than  thirty  thousand, 
and  the  generals  were  to  report  to  Clarke  in  Paris,  who  was 


BLU CHER’S  OBJECTIVE. 


359 


charged  with  the  protection  of  the  bridges  of  Melun,  Corbeil 
and  others  over  the  Seine.  Napoleon  was  to  take  with  him 
Marmont,  Ney,  Mortier  and  Gerard. 

Schwartzenberg  slowly  extended  his  troops : Wittgenstein 
moved  into  the  angle  of  the  Seine  and  Aube,  Wrede  followed 
the  road  to  Nogent,  Wurtemberg  headed  for  Sens.  In  second 
line  came  Giulay,  Colloredo  and  the  reserve. 

Meanwhile  Yorck  had  passed  St.  Dizier,  driven  the  French 
out  of  Vitry,  the  attempt  to  fortify  which  had  not  arrested 
him  a minute,  and  had  advanced  on  Chalons  February  3, 
Macdonald  retiring  on  Epernay  by  the  main  road.  Blucher 
advanced  by  the  southerly  road  through  Yertus,  with  cavalry 
feeling  out  towards  Meaux,  Sacken  in  support  and  Olsu- 
viev  in  reserve.  Macdonald  through  Epernay  fell  back  to 
Dormans,  and  sent  parties  to  take  possession  of  the  Marne 
crossing  at  Chateau  Thierry  and  La  Ferte  sous  Jouarre. 
Yorck  followed  to  Epernay ; Sacken  on  the  southerly  road 
reached  Etoges  ; Blucher’s  headquarters,  with  Olsuviev’s  di- 
vision, was  in  Yertus;  two  days’ march  to  the  rear  were  Kleist 
and  Kapzevich.  Blucher’s  objective  was  Meaux,  the  capture 
of  which  place  would  bring  him  fairly  to  the  gates  of  Paris. 
He  felt  that  he  had  a free  hand,  with  only  Macdonald  in  his 
front,  and  hoped  to  anticipate  him  at  La  Ferte  sous  Jouarre, 
or  at  least  capture  part  of  his  reserve  artillery,  which  was 
being  hauled  away  from  Chalons  by  country  horses.  The 
roads  were  bad,  and  although  Blucher  had  unwisely  separated 
his  marching  columns,  yet  as  his  left  was,  he  thought,  pro- 
tected by  a country  much  cut  up  with  streams  and  ponds,  and 
the  main  French  army  was  no  doubt  being  held  at  Troyes  by 
Schwartzenberg,  he  feared  little.  Moreover,  he  believed  that 
a large  body  of  Schwartzenberg’s  cavalry  was  between  him 
and  Napoleon.  It  had  been,  but  had  just  been  withdrawn. 

Exaggerated  reports  of  the  allied  advance  continually  came 


360 


ABSURD  REPORTS. 


to  Napoleon’s  ears,  but  he  treated  them  as  such,  knowing 
about  how  fast  at  this  season  the  allied  armies  could  march. 
He  was  continually  worried  by  the  absurd  reports  from  the 
capital,  where,  as  is  usual  in  war,  there  was  more  panic  than 
at  any  place  in  the  front. 

He  wrote  Joseph,  February  7 : “I  do  not  believe  that  the  enemy  has 
been  at  La  Fertd  sous  Jouarre.  I do  not  believe  any  more  that  he  has 
been  at  Meaux.  These  are  vain  alarms.”  Then,  speaking  of  the  royal 
household  and  possessions  : “ In  six  hours’  time,  everything  that  there  is 
can  be  loaded  on  fifteen  wagons  with  horses  my  stables  would  furnish, 
to  transport  them  first  to  Rambouillet,  but  I do  not  think  that  matters 
have  reached  that  point.  I do  not  fear  the  enemy.  I am  full  of  hope 
for  the  event.” 

Indeed,  the  authorities  in  the  capital  appear  to  have  acted  with  small 
discretion,  which  led  Napoleon  to  write  to  Cambacdres,  February  7 : “ I 
see  that  instead  of  sustaining  the  empress,  you  discourage  her.  Why  thus 
lose  your  head  ? What  are  these  Misereres  and  these  prayers  of  forty 
hours  in  the  chapel?  Are  people  going  crazy  in  Paris?”  And  on  the 
same  day  to  Joseph  : “ The  situation  of  affairs  is  nowhere  near  the  alarm 
made.  . . . People  lose  their  heads,  and  that  leads  to  no  good.  . . . The 
empress  had  got  the  idea  of  going  to  Ste.  Genevieve.  I fear  that  would 
have  a bad  effect,  aud  no  other  result.  Stop  those  prayers  of  forty 
hours  and  those  Misereres.  If  people  should  do  such  monkey-tricks  to 
us,  we  should  all  be  afraid  of  death.  Long  ago  it  was  said  that  priests 
and  doctors  made  death  painful.  The  moment  is  no  doubt  difficult, 
but  since  I left,  I have  had  up  to  this  hour  nothing  but  advantages. 
The  bad  spirit  of  the  Talleyrands,  and  of  the  men  who  have  wanted  to 
put  the  nation  to  sleep,  has  prevented  my  making  it  fly  to  arms,  and  this 
is  the  result.  In  this  situation  of  things  we  must  show  confidence,  and 
take  daring  measures.  . . . Keep  the  empress  gay  ; she  is  eating  her 
heart  out.” 

Still,  there  was  a serious  side  to  the  matter,  and  the  emperor 
frankly  discussed  it  with  Joseph.  On  February  8,  speaking 
of  Paris  being  taken,  he  wrote  : — 

“ That  end  applies  to  more  people  than  ourselves.  When  that  arrives, 
I shall  no  longer  exist,  consequently  it  is  not  for  myself  that  I speak.  I 


A RAPID  THRUST  SUGGESTED. 


361 


have  ordered  you,  for  the  empress,  and  the  King  of  Rome,  and  our  family 
to  do  what  the  circumstances  indicate.  ...  I repeat  to  you,  then,  in  two 
words,  that  Paris  will  never  be  occupied  while  I am  alive.  ...  If  by  cir- 
cumstances which  I cannot  foresee  I should  move  on  the  Loire,  I should 
not  leave  the  empress  and  my  son  far  from  me,  because  in  every  case  it 
would  happen  that  both  would  be  seized  and  taken  to  Vienna.  ...  If 
Talleyrand  has  to  do  with  this  opinion  of  leaving  the  empress  in  Paris  in 
case  our  forces  evacuate  it,  it  is  treason  they  are  plotting.  I repeat,  have 
a care  of  that  man.  I have  been  working  with  him  sixteen  years.  . . . 
He  is  surely  the  greatest  enemy  of  our  house.  ...  If  a battle  were  lost 
and  the  news  of  my  death  came,  you  would  learn  it  before  my  ministers. 
Have  the  empress  and  the  King  of  Rome  leave  for  Rambouillet.  Order 
the  Senate,  the  Council  of  State  and  all  the  troops  to  assemble  on  the 
Loire.  . , . If  I live,  I am  to  be  obeyed.  ...  If  I die,  my  reigning  son 
and  the  empress  as  regent,  for  the  honor  of  the  French,  are  not  to  let 
themselves  be  taken,  but  to  retire  to  the  last  village  with  their  last  sol- 
diers. ...  I should  prefer  that  my  son  should  be  murdered  rather  than 
to  see  him  brought  up  in  Vienna  as  an  Austrian  prince  ; and  I have  so 
good  an  opinion  of  the  empress  as  to  be  persuaded  that  she  also  is  of 
this  opinion,  as  much  as  a woman  and  a mother  can  be.”  Marie  Louise 
scarcely  lived  up  to  this  opinion  of  her.  He  had  also  written,  February 
6:  “Have  taken  away  from  Fontainebleau  all  precious  furniture,  and 
whatever  could  be  called  a trophy,  without,  however,  too  much  unfur- 
nishing of  the  castle  ; but  it  is  useless  to  leave  there  the  silver-ware 
and  all  that  can  be  easily  transported.” 

Informed  by  the  country  people  of  the  loose  order  in  which 
the  allied  corps  were  advancing,  Marmont  suggested  a rapid 
thrust  in  the  direction  of  the  great  road  between  Vitry  and 
Meaux ; and  this  being  quite  in  accord  with  Napoleon’s  main 
plan,  he  adopted  the  idea,  broadened  it  into  an  operation  by 
a large  force,  and  wrote  Joseph,  February  7,  from  Nogent : — 

“ I am  at  the  very  moment  sending  twenty  thousand  men  to  occupy 
Sezanne.  I will  move  there  to-night,  with  whatever  is  necessary  to  beat 
and  overwhelm  what  may  be  on  that  communication.  I will  then  turn 
rapidly  towards  the  communications  of  Meaux.  I believe  by  my  manoeu- 
vres to  have  obliged  the  Grand  Army  to  move  from  in  front  of  Troyes  to 
Bar-sur-Aube,  and  to  have  gained  at  least  three  marches  on  it.” 


362 


THE  VICINITY  OF  SEZANNE. 


He  then  ordered  Marmont  on  Sezanne,  from  whence  he  was 
to  reconnoitre  in  his  front  towards  Montmirail,  and  on  the 
Vitry-Meaux  road ; and  should  what  he  ascertained  accord 
with  the  existing  reports,  Napoleon  would  speedily  follow 
him  on  Sezanne. 

Though  keenly  intent  on  his  present  object,  the  emperor 
did  not  lose  sight  of  the  general  theatre  of  war;  he  wrote, 
February  8,  to  Clarke:  — 

“ I have  ordered  the  viceroy,  so  soon  as  Murat  shall  have  declared  war, 
to  move  to  the  Alps.  Repeat  this  order  to  him  by  telegraph,  by  a 
courier,  and  a triplicate  by  an  officer.  He  is  to  leave  no  garrison  in  the 
fortresses  in  Italy  except  Italian  troops,  and  that  all  that  he  has  which  is 
French  he  is  to  move  on  Turin  and  Lyons,  either  by  Fenestrelle  or  by 
Mont  Cenis.  That  as  soon  as  he  gets  to  Savoy,  he  is  to  be  joined  by  all 
that  we  have  in  Lyons.” 

While,  then,  the  emperor  waited  in  Nogent  with  Ney,  Vic- 
tor, Mortier  and  Gerard,  Marmont  started,  and  reaching 
the  vicinity  of  Sezanne  February  7,  he  sent  back  word,  which 
Napoleon  received  during  the  night,  that  a large  body  of 
cavalry,  but  no  foot,  had  passed  Sezanne  on  the  6th ; that 
only  a few  allied  troops  were  at  the  time  there ; and  that 
firing  could  be  heard  in  the  direction  of  Epernay.  This  set- 
tled the  matter  in  Napoleon’s  mind : Ney  was  started  out 
early  on  the  8th,  and  reached  Villenauxe,  followed  by  Gerard. 
With  the  other  corps  Napoleon  remained  in  Nogent  until  he 
could  ascertain  whether  Blucher  was  advancing  via  Sezanne, 
via  Montmirail,  or  down  the  Marne  road,  and  how  far  he  had 
got,  as  upon  these  facts  depended  the  value  of  the  direc- 
tion he  might  give  to  his  manoeuvre.  The  Montmirail  route 
was  the  one  Napoleon  believed  he  would  take ; but  soon  Mar- 
mont reported  from  Sezanne,  out  of  which  he  had  driven  a 
body  of  Cossacks,  that  Blucher  had  probably  followed  along 
the  Marne.  Both  routes  were  in  fact  utilized.  On  the  7th 


PITIABLE  CONDITION. 


363 


Sacken  was  at  Montmirail,  Olsuviev  at  Etoges,  Ivleist  and 
Kapzevich  at  Chalons,  Yorck  following  Macdonald  to  Dor- 
mans, the  latter  crossing  the  Marne  at  Chateau  Thierry  and 
destroying  the  bridge.  Pushing  out  a recon- 
noitring party  north  to  St.  Prix,  Marmont 
followed  shortly  with  his  corps,  and  later 
reported  that  Sacken  was  probably  on  the 
march  to  Montmirail,  a fact  that  determined 
Napoleon  to  advance  sharply  on  Blucher’s  ill- 
concentrated forces,  which  if  he  could  beat  in 
detail,  he  would  then  turn  back  to  Nogent 
and  operate  against  Schwartzenberg. 

Although  they  marched  cheerfully  along, 
yet  the  condition  of  the  brave  young  con- 
scripts was  really  pitiable.  The  emperor 
wrote,  February  8,  to  the  Chief  Commissary : 

“ The  army  is  dying  of  hunger.  All  the 
reports  that  you  make  that  it  is  nourished  Prussian  Rifle 
are  proved  false.  Twelve  men  have  died  of 
hunger,  although  blood  and  fire  have  been  used  on  the  road 
to  get  subsistence.  . . . Victor  has  nothing,  Gerard  has  no- 
thing, the  cavalry  of  the  Guard  is  dying  of  hunger.  This 
is  a double  evil,  but  which  becomes  without  remedy  when 
one  makes  illusions  for  himself  and  deceives  the  authorities.” 
For  all  that,  the  patient  men  marched  and  fought  like 
veterans. 

Napoleon  made  use  of  his  limited  forces  to  the  best  advan- 
tage. A respectable  body  had  been  left  to  defend  the  valley 
of  the  Seine  and  the  roads  from  Troyes  to  Paris : Oudinot  on 
the  line  Sens-Montereau  and  Victor  at  Nogent  were  to  con- 
tain Schwartzenberg  as  long  as  possible,  and  if  attacked,  or 
if  Schwartzenberg  should  show  signs  of  moving  on  Paris  via 
Sens,  they  were  to  unite  at  Montereau.  All  this,  in  Napo- 


364 


LETTER  TO  JOSEPH. 


leon’s  judgment,  would  delay  the  Army  of  the  Sovereigns 
some  days,  while  he  with  his  main  body  could  deal  Blucher 
a heavy  blow.  In  a letter  to  Joseph  of  February  9,  from 
Nogent,  he  states  the  case  more  accurately  than  usual:  — 

“ I am  leaving  for  Sezanne,  and  I hope  to-morrow  to  attack  the  Army 
of  Silesia.  ...  If  this  operation  has  a complete  success,  the  campaign 
may  be  decided.  ...  If  I succeed,  in  two  or  three  days,  in  crushing 
the  Army  of  Silesia,  I will  debouch  on  Nogent  or  on  Montereau.  With 
your  reserves  I can  have  eighty  thousand  men,  and  give  an  unexpected 
turn  to  affairs.  My  army,  then,  is  divided  into  three  corps  : ” that  under 
my  orders,  twenty  thousand  foot,  ten  thousand  horse  and  one  hundred 
and  twenty  guns.  “ Yorck,  Blucher  and  Sacken  are  estimated  at  forty 
to  forty-five  thousand  men.  But  Macdonald  ought  to  occupy  at  least  five 
thousand  men.  I shall  then  be  thirty  thousand  against  forty  thousand, 
a proportion  which  makes  me  hope  success.”  Corps  of  the  centre,  Vic- 
tor with  fourteen  thousand  men  ; corps  of  the  right,  Oudinot  with  twenty- 
five  thousand  men.  “ The  totality  of  my  force  is  thus  sixty  or  seventy 
thousand  men  of  all  arms.  ...  I count  that  I have  to  do  with  forty-five 
thousand  men  of  the  Army  of  Silesia,  and  one  hundred  and  fifty  thou- 
sand men  of  Schwartzenberg,  ...  so  that  if  I have  a success  over  the 
Army  of  Silesia,  ...  I can  return  on  Schwartzenberg  with  seventy  or 
eighty  thousand  men,  . . . and  I do  not  think  he  can  oppose  me  with 
more  than  one  hundred  and  ten  or  one  hundred  and  twenty  thousand 
men.  If  I am  not  strong  enough  to  attack  him,  at  least  I shall  be  strong 
enough  to  contain  him  perfectly  for  fifteen  or  twenty  days,  which  will 
lead  up  to  new  combinations.” 

And  he  also  wrote  Berthier,  February  9 : “ Either  Schwartzenberg  will 
move  on  Nogent,  or  he  will  move  decisively  on  Sens  to  penetrate  to  Paris 
by  passing  the  Yonne,  the  canal  de  Loing  and  the  forest  of  Fontaine- 
bleau. . . . 

“ My  intention,  if  I succeed  against  the  Army  of  Silesia,  is  to  move  back 
to  Nogent,  to  centralize  my  troops  there  and  to  debouch  on  the  enemy.” 

While  very  well  as  a minor  strategic  measure,  these  cal- 
culations were  all  limited  to  gaining  time,  and  to  waiting 
for  some  deus  ex  machina,  which  might  indeed  come  from 
the  Congress  of  Chatillon,  but  could  scarcely  result  from  the 


FAIRLY  RELIABLE  INFORMATION. 


365 


military  situation,  provided  the  allies  held  firm.  Napoleon 
was  counting  on  more  than  he  could  now  reasonably  hope  to 
accomplish. 

The  young  French  conscripts  marched  by  night  through 
the  big  forest  between  Villenauxe  and  Barbonne  with  grave 
hardship.  It  was  thawing  again,  and  all  the  horses  in  the 
vicinity  were  collected  to  drag  the  guns  through  the  heavy 
country  roads.  On  February  9 the  emperor  was  with  his 
marshals  in  Sezanne,  scarcely  knowing  whether  to  turn  to  the 
left  on  Montmirail  or  to  the  right  on  Cliampaubert,  until  spies 
brought  him  in  fairly  reliable  information.  Macdonald,  he 
learned,  followed  step  by  step  by  Yorck,  had  withdrawn  from 
Epernay  to  Chateau  Thierry,  and  here  he  ran  danger  of  hav- 
ing his  left  turned  by  Sacken,  who  had  been  making  forced 
marches  along  the  main  road  to  reach  La  Ferte  sous  Jouarre 
ahead  of  him ; and  as  a fact  was  but  a few  hours  late,  reach- 
ing the  place  only  to  see  Macdonald’s  rear  cross  the  Marne, 
break  the  bridges,  and  disappear  towards  Meaux  under  the  fire 
of  the  light  guns  accompanying  the  Russian  van.  Sacken 
was  at  Montmirail  with  his  van  at  La  Ferte  sous  Jouarre, 
and  Yorck  was  already  in  Dormans,  van  in  Chateau  Thierry; 
Olsuviev  had  been  ordered  by  Blucher  to  remain  in  Champau- 
bert  to  rest  his  troops,  and  to  serve  as  connection  between  the 
several  corps,  now  far  apart,  for  Blucher  himself,  with  Kap- 
zevich  and  Kleist,  had  not  advanced  beyond  Yertus.  The 
Prussian  general  had  tried  to  do  two  things  that  did  not  agree, 
— bring  forward  Kleist  and  Kapzevich  and  cut  off  Macdonald ; 
he  had  extended  himself  too  much,  and  could  not  have  pre- 
pared a better  situation  for  Napoleon  to  take  advantage  of. 

The  emperor  gave  his  troops  scant  rest,  using  for  his 
advance  roads  which  one  would  usually  call  impassable,  on 
which  the  guns  could  scarcely  be  got  forward.  Finally,  late 
at  night,  the  troops  reached  St.  Prix,  where  a few  hours’  rest 


366 


OLSUVIEV  CAPTURED. 


was  afforded  them.  Next  morning  at  nine,  Marmont,  who 
had  been  out  on  a reconnoissance,  reported  a Russian  detach- 
ment at  no  great  distance.  It  was  Olsuviev  cantoning  his 
men  in  and  about  Champaubert. 

Having  made  up  his  mind  on  good  strategical  reasons  to 
act,  Napoleon  was  ready  to  carry  out  his  plan  to  its  ultimate 
conclusion ; but  Marmont  conceived  the  idea  that  it  was  too 
late  to  fall  on  the  flank  of  the  Army  of  Silesia,  because  the 
enemy,  aware  of  the  French  manoeuvre,  would  concentrate  to 
meet  it,  and  that  a march  in  mass  on  Meaux  to  block  the 
enemy  in  front  was  preferable ; and  in  this  view  he  fell  back 
on  Sezanne.  Here  he  met  Ney  and  orders  to  advance  again, 
and  by  evening  of  the  9th  Napoleon  came  up  with  the  balance 
of  the  army.  On  the  10th,  Marmont  leading,  the  French 
army  moved  forward.  Napoleon  wrote  Joseph:  “I  am  just 
getting  into  the  saddle  to  move  to  Champaubert.  I am  a little 
annoyed  by  the  roads.  They  are  horrible.  There  are  six 
feet  of  mud.” 

At  Baye  Marmont  met  Olsuviev’s  van  ; Napoleon  came  up 
in  support,  and  Marmont  drove  this  force  in  on  the  main  body. 
Following  up  this  success,  the  French  moved  rapidly  on  the 
corps  and  surrounded  it.  Olsuviev,  whose  men  were  prepar- 
ing food,  was  attacked  by  9 A.  m.,  and  though  surprised  and 
outnumbered  many  times,  he  defended  himself  all  day  with 
wonderful  valor.  But  there  was  absolutely  no  chance  for 
him  : hedged  in  on  all  sides  and  crushed  by  mere  weight,  his 
division  disappeared  in  the  combat,  fifteen  hundred  men  being 
killed  and  three  thousand  captured,  with  twenty  guns.  Its 
constancy  was  above  all  praise. 

The  emperor  wrote  Joseph  : “ To-day  I attacked  the  enemy  at  Champ- 
aubert. . . . Olsuviev  was  taken  with  all  his  officers,  guns  and  bag- 
gage. . . . The  rest  were  thrown  into  a pond  or  killed  on  the  field  of 
battle.  This  corps  is  entirely  destroyed.  ...  I have  the  most  flattering 


TOWARDS  M ON  T MIR  AIL. 


867 


hopes  that  Sacken  is  lost,  and  if  fortune  seconds  us  as  it  has  to-day,  af- 
fairs will  be  changed  in  the  wink  of  an  eye.  . . . Blucher  is  cut  off  from 
Sacken.” 

That  same  evening  Nansouty  was  sent  out  towards  Mont- 
mirail,  to  be  followed  at  daylight  next  morning  by  the  whole 
army.  Napoleon’s  spirits  had  risen  to  a height  at  this  appar- 
ently small  success,  for  it  meant  that  he  had  cut  the  Army  of 
Silesia  in  two,  and  could  attack  its  parts  in  detail ; and  no 
one  could  measure  the  results  which  might  flow  from  this 
initial  gain.  Indeed,  at  an  earlier  day  these  might  have  been 
vast;  but  the  allies  had  been  learning  the  methods  of  the 
great  captain  ; and  no  partial  victory  could  now  more  than 
temporarily  arrest  the  tide  of  invasion. 

Blucher  was  not  doing  himself  the  credit  he  had  fairly 
earned  in  Silesia.  He  had  received  word  that  a French  army 
was  moving  north  from  Sezanne, land  Olsuviev  had  given  him 
similar  news  ; but  while  sharp  in  action  when  once  started, 
Blucher  was  not  easy  to  convince,  and  he  still  trusted  that 
Schwartzenberg  was  holding  the  emperor  opposite  Troyes. 
For  his  excuse  it  must  be  said  that  even  Gneisenau  consid- 
ered this  a detachment  of  partisans  of  no  great  moment ; and 
thinking  to  capture  a body  of  the  enemy,  Blucher  ordered 
Yorck  and  Sacken  to  join  at  Montmirail  so  as  to  come  in  to 
the  centre  point  at  Champaubert,  and  with  Kleist  and  Kapze- 
vich  moved  towards  Fere  Champenoise,  to  get  in  rear  of  and 
corral  the  supposed  column  at  Sezanne,  or  at  least  to  draw 
it  away  from  Montmirail.  In  moving  as  he  did,  says 
Clausewitz,  “ Blucher  tried  to  apply  a blister  where  a bleed- 
ing was  necessary.”  On  the  way  Blucher’s  van  was  met  by 
some  cavalry  of  Mortier,  and  at  the  same  time  the  fighting 
at  Champaubert  became  more  audible,  which  convinced  even 
Blucher  that  the  emperor  was  upon  him  with  an  army ; and 
he  found  himself  cut  in  two.  Sacken  and  Yorck  were  far 


368 


SAC  KEN  BADLY  COMPROMISED. 


down  the  Marne,  Olsuviev  in  his  centre  was  being  destroyed, 
and  he  had  been  moving  away  from  the  main  line  of  commu- 
nications with  all  troops  he  had  with  him.  Surprised  at  this 
unexpected  onset,  and  uncertain  how  much  farther  it  might 
develop,  failing,  in  fact,  to  grasp  the  meaning  of  it  all,  he  drew 
back,  during  the  night  of  February  10-11,  with  the  corps  of 
Kleist  and  Kapzevich  on  Vertus  and  Bergeres,  and  reiterated 
his  orders  to  Yorck  at  Chateau  Thierry  and  Sacken  opposite 
La  Ferte  to  fall  back  on  Montmirail.  Sacken  was  badly  com- 
promised, and  during  the  same  night,  hearing  of  the  trouble 
in  his  rear,  he  moved  back  in  accordance  with  orders;  but  as 
it  happened,  he  ran  against  Nansouty,  who  had  reached  Mont- 
mirail by  midnight.  When,  at  Yieux  Maisons,  he  discovered 
the  French  in  his  rear,  he  made  preparations  to  meet  them, 
though  Yorck  sent  him  word  that,  being  delayed  by  the  bad 
roads,  he  could  not  get  up  until  late  that  day.  Sacken  would 
have  been  wiser  to  file  by  his  left  towards  the  Chateau  Thierry 
road  to  join  his  comrade  ; but  he  did  not  appreciate  the  extent 
of  his  danger,  and  his  orders  were  explicit  to  move  back  to 
Montmirail. 

No  sooner  had  Napoleon  seized  the  fact  that  here  was  the 
opportunity  of  unusual  success,  than  he  sent  a courier  to  Mac- 
donald to  return  towards  him,  and  moved  on  Montmirail,  to 
drive  Sacken  and  Yorck  out  of  the  theatre  of  the  immediate 
operations,  so  that  he  might  then  turn  back  on  Blucher.  By 
daylight,  February  11,  the  emperor  headed  the  infantry  from 
Champaubert  to  the  west,  Mortier  was  to  follow,  and  Marmont 
and  Doumerc’s  cavalry  were  thrown  out  to  Etoges  to  contain 
Blucher. 

At  ten  o’clock,  February  11,  Napoleon  reached  Montmi- 
rail. Nansouty  was  already  out  in  front  striving  to  hold  back 
Sacken,  who  was  within  a mile  of  Haute  Epine,  while  with 
forced  marches  Yorck  was  coming  on  from  Chateau  Thierry. 


THE  BATTLEFIELD. 


369 


The  thing  for  the  French  to  do  was  to  hold  the  junction  of  the 
roads  from  La  Ferte  and  Chateau  Thierry,  northwest  of  Mont- 
mirail,  so  as  to  prevent  Yorck  and  Sacken  from  joining  hands, 
and  this  the  emperor  had  seen  to.  The  battlefield  was  a fine 
open  country,  with  many  farms,  plantations  and  small  woods; 
the  Petit  Morin  formed  the  southern  boundary ; Epine-au- 
Bois  was  in  the  centre  of  it.  After  reconnoitring,  Napoleon 
sent  Ricard  to  occupy  and  push  out  well  beyond  Pomessone, 
through  which  the  Russians  appeared  to  be  thrusting  a head 
of  column,  while  Ney  held  Marchaix,  Nansouty  occupied  the 


space  between  the  two  roads,  Bailly  or  Rouge  Terre  woods 
was  occupied  by  the  Guard,  and  Friant  was  echeloned  on  the 
La  Ferte  road.  When  the  Russian  officers  saw  that  the  road 
was  cut  off,  they  had  advised  at  once  to  move  by  the  left 
towards  Yorck  ; but  under  Blucher’s  orders,  Sacken  had  de- 
cided to  cut  his  way  through,  for  he  knew  not  what  straits  his 
chief  might  be  in.  To  do  this,  he  proposed  to  turn  the  French 


VOL.  IV. 


870 


MARCHAIX  TAKEN  AND  RETAKEN. 


left,  and  as  he  thought  to  push  them  where  Yorck,  when  he  got 
up,  could  attack  them  on  the  right ; and  in  this  view  he  took 
Le  Bois  J ean  and  Courmont.  This  manoeuvre  exactly  suited 
Napoleon’s  ideas,  because  he  wished  to  keep  the  two  corps 
apart,  and  he  held  back  the  fight  by  lively  artillery  work 
until  Mortier  arrived  about  2 p.  m.  The  key  of  the  position 
was  Haute  Epine,  and  Napoleon  ordered  Ricard  slowly  to  fall 
back,  so  as  to  allow  Sacken  to  imagine  that  he  was  gaining 
an  advantage,  and  meanwhile  he  threw  Nansouty  forward  so  as 
fully  to  hold  Yorck  and  Sacken  apart,  as  well  as  to  strengthen 
his  right  wing.  Sacken  thought  his  own  right,  which  finally 
reached  Marchaix,  was  winning  the  fight,  but  saw  that  his 
left  was  threatened  by  Nansouty,  and  drew  heavily  on  his 
centre  to  strengthen  both.  This  was  the  moment  Napoleon 
had  chosen  for  his  blow.  The  Guard  was  brought  in  and, 
advancing  on  Haute  Epine  with  Ney  at  its  head,  at  the 
point  of  the  bayonet  drove  the  Russians  out  of  the  place. 
During  this  success  Marchaix  had  been  taken  and  retaken 
three  times,  but  in  proper  season  Napoleon  sent  two  battalions 
of  the  Old  Guard  to  help  Ricard,  at  their  head  Lefebvre  and 
Bertrand.  The  Russians  were  thrown  out  of  the  place  for 
good  and  retired  to  Yieux  Maisons. 

Recognizing  his  error,  Sacken  now  strove  to  reach  Yorck 
across  country,  protected  by  the  cavalry  which  had  been  oppos- 
ing Nansouty,  but  in  this  attempt  he  was  not  lucky.  Napo- 
leon ordered  out  the  elite  squadrons  of  mounted  grenadiers, 
dragoons,  chasseurs  and  lancers,  which  he  had  kept  near  his 
own  person,  to  fall  upon  their  flank  ; and  this  fine  body  broke 
up  almost  the  last  of  the  Russian  squares.  Yieux  Maisons 
was  reached  in  much  disorder.  Napoleon’s  work  was  telling : 
Olsuviev  had  been  destroyed,  Sacken  had  been  for  some  time 
neutralized. 

Practically  all  was  over  when  Yorck  reached  the  spot.  He 


THE  BATTLE  ENDS. 


371 


had  left  five  thousand  men  to  guard  the  Chateau  Thierry 
bridge,  and  his  artillery  had  been  delayed  by  the  bad  roads. 
He  did  his  best  to  help  his  comrade  out,  but  Mortier  and 
Friant  had  been  ordered  out  along  the  road  to  meet  him,  and 
with  their  fresh  troops  drove  him  back  on  Fontenelles,  captur- 
ing many  guns.  Night  fell  and  the  battle  ended.  Yorck’s 
Prussians  camped  behind  Fontenelles,  Sacken’s  Russians  near 
Yieux  Maisons;  the  French  bivouacked  in  their  front. 

The  loss  was  some  three  thousand  men  on  the  French,  four 
thousand  on  the  allied  side.  On  February  11  and  12  Blucher 
with  Kapzevich  and  Kleist  remained  stationary  in  Bergeres. 

On  February  11,  at  8 p.  m.,  the  emperor  wrote  to  Joseph  : “ To-day  has 
been  a decisive  one.  The  Army  of  Silesia  no  longer  exists.  I have  com- 
pletely routed  it.  . . . These  two  days  entirely  change  the  situation  of 
affairs.  ...  I write  to  the  empress  to  have  a salute  of  sixty  guns  fired.” 
And  next  day:  “For  such  great  results,  I engaged  very  few  troops.” 
Berthier  was  ordered  to  “ have  proclamations  printed  . . . which  announce 
that  sixty  Russian  regiments  have  been  destroyed  and  one  hundred  and 
twenty  guns  taken.  . . . That  it  is  time  that  the  French  people  should  rise 
to  fall  upon  the  enemy  ; that  the  emperor  is  pursuing  them.  Let  all 
Cossacks  be  halted  and  all  the  detachments  stopped.  Let  the  bridges  be 
cut  in  front  of  them  and  the  trains  be  stopped.  Let  no  food  be  given 
them.”  And  he  wrote  Savary  : “ The  best  army  of  Russia  is  destroyed. 
My  old  foot  Guard  and  my  horse  Guard  did  miracles.  The  dragoons 
distinguished  themselves.”  And  to  Clarke  : “ I fought  the  combat  of 
Champaubert,  the  battle  of  Montmirail  and  the  combat  of  Chateau 
Thierry  by  engaging  a few  battalions  of  my  Guard  and  its  cavalry  ; the 
dragoons  covered  themselves  with  glory.  The  Old  Guard  much  sur- 
passed all  that  I could  expect  from  troops  d’ elite.” 

Early  February  12  Napoleon,  headed  by  his  cavalry,  fol- 
lowed on  towards  Chateau  Thierry  in  pursuit,  hoping  Mac- 
donald would  reach  the  Marne  crossing  there,  and  do  his  part 
in  making  the  pursuit  decisive.  In  this  he  was  disappointed, 
as  dispatches  had  been  delayed ; but  the  French  caught  up 
with  the  two  corps  half-way  to  Chateau  Thierry,  where 


372 


TO  GUARD  NOGENT. 


Yorck’s  rearguard,  ill  deployed  across  the  road,  was  broken 
by  Nansouty’s  cavalry.  The  enemy  was  still  further  pursued 
with  the  old  Bonaparte  vigor,  and  losses  of  three  thousand 
men  more  were  inflicted  on  these  corps  before  they  could  get 
across  the  river. 

On  the  13th  Napoleon  began  to  rebuild  the  bridges  the 
enemy  had  burned,  and  by  night  he  had  put  the  army  over 
to  the  right  bank,  pushing  Mortier  with  five  thousand  men 
out  to  Rocourt  to  follow  up  the  enemy  retiring  on  Soissons. 
He  was  beginning  to  think  he  would  have  to  content  himself 
with  what  he  had  already  accomplished,  and  turn  back  against 
Schwartzenberg,  though  he  did  not  give  the  latter  credit  for 
daring  to  advance  on  Paris  so  long  as  he  himself  had  beaten 
Blucher  and  might  fall  on  the  allied  rear ; or  indeed  so  long 
as  he  held  the  bridge  at  Nogent. 

In  the  “ General  Dispositions  ” of  February  13  it  was 
accordingly  ordered  that  “Victor  will  continue  to  guard 
Nogent,  and  will  place  his  troops  to  protect  the  whole  right 
bank  from  Nogent  to  Montereau.  If  he  has  left  Nogent,  or 
if  the  movement  of  the  enemy  is  much  more  marked  on  the 
Yonne,  he  will  move  to  Montereau,  will  cut  the  Nogent 
bridge,  in  leaving  on  the  right  bank  what  is  necessary  to 
oppose  the  reestablishment  of  the  bridge  of  Nogent.”  And 
he  wrote  this  day  to  Joseph:  “It  is  probable  that  the  news 
of  the  disaster  to  Sacken  and  Yorck  will  stop  the  movements 
of  the  enemy.  The  police  and  the  war  office  should  send 
agents  to  learn  the  effect  it  has  produced  on  them.” 

During  these  movements  Macdonald  had  been  neutralized 
and  useless.  He  was  now  reinforced  up  to  twelve  thousand 
men,  and,  no  longer  having  Blucher  to  fear,  received  orders 
to  march  to  Montereau,  to  lend  a hand  to  Oudinot  and  Vic- 
tor, who  were  facing  such  large  odds.  Meanwhile  Blucher 
had  been  consistently  playing  Napoleon’s  game,  by  retiring 


Montmirail-Etoges  Country. 


374 


TO  ATTACK  BL UCHER’S  VAN . 


to  Vertus  to  enable  Napoleon  to  beat  bis  two  advanced  corps, 
and  then,  by  coining  up,  to  try  his  own  chances  against  the 
captain  with  whom  he  had  never  yet  singly  measured  swords. 
At  Bergeres  and  Vertus,  on  the  11th  and  12th,  he  was  un- 
aware of  what  was  happening  to  his  lieutenants,  and  puzzled 
by  manoeuvres  he  failed  to  comprehend;  but  on  February  13, 
though  he  had  heard  from  spies  that  there  were  thirty  thousand 
men  in  his  front,  he  advanced  — as  if  to  win  his  revenge  battle 
— against  Marmont  and  forced  him  back  to  Fromentieres 
and  Vauxchamps.  This  was  just  what  Napoleon  desired:  he 
could  not  now  afford  to  run  after  Blucher,  as  he  had  done 
in  Silesia,  and  was  pleased  to  be  saved  the  trouble.  Hearing 
of  his  oncoming  at  Chateau  Thierry,  while  he  was  rebuilding 
the  bridge,  Napoleon  immediately  seized  the  chance  of  falling 
on  the  old  marshal  before  he  moved  the  French  army  back 
to  the  Seine,  writing  Joseph,  February  14:  “At  Montereau 
are  then  . . . forces  of  fifty  or  sixty  thousand  men,  with- 
out including  the  reserves  of  Paris.  If  to-day  is  happy,  as 
I hope,  and  if  I manage  to  get  rid  of  this  corps,  ...  I can 
go  at  once  personally  to  Montereau,  unless  the  enemy  shall 
have  ceased  his  offensive  movements.”  Without  delay  he 
started  out  towards  Blucher.  “ I hope  to  be  in  Montmirail 
before  seven  this  morning,  and  before  noon  to  attack  the 
enemy  and  teach  him  a good  lesson,”  he  wrote  at  3 A.  M., 
February  14,  from  Chateau  Thierry  to  Marmont,  who  had 
retired  towards  Montmirail  with  Blucher  upon  his  heels ; 
and  accordingly,  having  left  Mortier  to  follow  up  Yorck  and 
Sacken,  about  eight  Napoleon  reached  the  town,  ordered 
Marmont  to  the  right  about,  and  on  to  the  attack  on  Blucher’s 
van,  just  coming  up  at  Vauxchamps. 

The  emperor  was  full  of  the  spirit  of  1796. 

“We  shall  fight  to-day  between  Montmirail  and  Champaubert,”  he 
wrote  Kellermann  ; “ T suppose  this  column  is  Wittgenstein’s,  who  was 


CHARGE  AT  JANVILLIERS. 


375 


blockading  the  places  of  Alsatia,  and  who  is  announced  as  coming  hither 
in  support.  There  will  then  be  to-day  an  affair,  and  I am  full  of  confi- 
dence of  destroying  this  column  also.”  And  to  Mortier  : “I  hope,  then, 
to  have  to-day  a very  happy  event,  for  I shall  have  assembled  at  nine 
o’clock  this  morning  thirty  thousand  men.”  And  to  Joseph  : “ I am  just 
leaving.  I shall  be  at  Fromentieres  at  eight  o’clock  this  morning.  I 
shall  attack  the  enemy.  I hope  to  beat  him  well  during  the  day,  and  to 
destroy  that  corps,  too.” 

Napoleon’s  approach  heartened  the  troops.  “ It  is  hard,” 
says  Danielevski,  “ to  give  an  idea  to  what  a degree  Napo- 
leon’s presence  and  his  personal  orders  changed  the  battle- 
field. The  cavalry  attacks  were  fiercer,  the  fire  of  the  guns 
was  heavier.”  It  was  this  very  thing  by  which  Blucher 
divined  that  he  had  Napoleon  in  front  of  him ; he  was  aston- 
ished at  being  attacked  with  such  vigor  when  he  thought  he 
was  himself  pursuing  the  enemy,  and  he  had  not  really 
fathomed  the  scheme  on  which  Napoleon  was  acting  with  such 
brilliant  rapidity;  but  now  he  failed  not  to  recognize  his 
plight,  and  guessing  that  Sacken  and  Yorck  had  been  beaten, 
he  himself  made  up  his  mind  to  retire.  He  was  not  well  sup- 
plied with  cavalry,  most  of  which  he  had  sent  with  his  lieu- 
tenants, and  his  troops  withdrew  in  battalion  squares  on  either 
side  the  road,  checkerwise,  with  their  few  guns  in  the  inter- 
vals, a large  part  of  the  artillery  having  been  hurried  out 
of  danger  back  to  Yertus.  What  cavalry  he  had  was  kept 
actively  out  in  front,  and  the  many  woods  on  either  side  of 
the  road  were  held  by  his  skirmishers.  Thus  Blucher  retired 
bravely  and  in  good  order,  as  far  as  Janvilliers,  which  was 
reached  about  two  o’clock ; but  no  sooner  had  he  passed  the 
village  than  Grouchy,  coming  from  near  Echelle,  attacked 
him  in  flank,  and  by  a rapid  dash  broke  through  many 
squares.  Napoleon  was  following  hard  upon,  and  threw  him- 
self at  once  upon  the  disordered  enemy,  while  Drouot  brought 
up  all  the  guns  of  the  Guard  he  could  gather  and  kept  up  a 


376  A PAUSE  ON  BOTH  SIDES. 

steady  fire  on  the  retiring  squares,  which  inflicted  great  loss  on 
Blucher,  who  had  not  artillery  enough  to  answer  it  properly. 
But  this  was  not  all.  Grouchy,  after  his  charge  at  Janvil- 
liers,  had  continued  his  way  over  farm  roads  and  all  kinds  of 

bad  country,  and  threw  himself 
across  the  road  near  Champau- 
bert.  Luckily  for  the  enemy, 
Grouchy  could  not  be  followed 
by  any  guns.  After  passing 
through  Champaubert,  Blucher 
ran  across  this  unexpected  resist- 
ance ; his  force  fell  into  grave 
disorder,  and  he  himself  came 
near  serious  injury  in  the  crowd. 
It  was  wonderful  that  the  troops 
held  together.  Every  one  recog- 
nized that  to  regain  control  of 
this  road  was  the  only  salvation, 
and  the  very  momentum  of  the 
masses  of  men  pushing  on  broke 
through  the  net,  and  Grouchy 
retired.  It  was  now  dark,  the 
French  themselves  had  lost  much 
order,  and  a pause  ensued  on  both  sides.  This  was  inter- 
rupted by  a fresh  attack  from  Marmont,  which  carried  off 
Blucher’s  rearguard  of  Russians ; but  this  was  the  end  of  the 
battle. 

Napoleon  returned  to  Montmirail,  Nansouty  remained  near 
Etoges.  Blucher,  whose  personal  efforts  had  saved  his  army, 
stopped  awhile  in  Champaubert,  and  then  moved  back  on 
Bergeres.  He  was  happy  to  learn  next  day  that  Yorck  and 
Sacken  had  reached  Epernay  via  Rheims,  and  on  February  16 
the  Army  of  Silesia  was  rallied  on  Chalons. 


NOTICE  OF  THE  VICTORY . 377 

The  emperor  was  not  slow  to  give  the  world  notice  of  his 
victory.  At  9 P.  M.,  February  14,  he  wrote  to  Joseph:  — 

“ I write  you  a word  to  have  you  understand  the  happy  issue  of  the 
battle  of  Vauxchamps.  Blucher,  who  had  separated  himself  from  his 
army,  and  whose  headquarters  was  at  Vertus,  had  been  rejoined  by  Kleist 
coming  from  Germany  . . . and  by  a new  Russian  corps,  ...  in  all 
twenty  thousand  men.  On  the  13th  he  moved  on  Etoges  and  Champau- 
bert.  Marmont  . . . beat  in  retreat  without  engaging.  I left  Chateau 
Thierry  at  three  o’clock  this  morning,  and  arrived  at  Montmirail  when 
the  enemy  was  almost  at  the  gates.  I marched  on  the  enemy,  who  had 
taken  position  at  the_  village  of  Vauxchamps.  I beat  him,  made  three 
thousand  prisoners,  took  three  guns  and  ten  flags,  and  followed  him  up 
fighting  to  the  gates  of  Etoges.  His  loss  must  be  more  than  four  thou- 
sand men.  I have  not  lost  three  hundred  men  killed  or  wounded.  This 
great  result  comes  from  the  enemy’s  not  having  cavalry,  and  my  having 
six  or  eight  thousand  very  good,  with  which  I constantly  had  him  envel- 
oped and  turned.”  Qn  February  11  he  had  written  Marmont  about 
more  practical  matters  : “ All  the  guns  or  caissons  taken  from  the  enemy 
are  to  be  thrown  into  a neighboring  pond,  or  into  wells,  and  a list  kept 
of  them  by  an  artillery  officer,  so  that  they  can  be  got  out  after  a few 
days.  By  this  means  we  shall  have  this  annoyance  the  less,  and  more 
teams.”  And  to  Berthier  : “ Have  the  caissons  and  gun  carriages  of  the 
enemy  burned  and  bury  the  guns.  That  should  be  done  on  all  the  battle- 
fields these  days,  and  a note  made  of  the  places.”  And  to  Daru  in  the 
war  office,  February  15  : “1  am  told  that  the  wounded  and  the  sick  are 
wandering  about  Paris  without  an  asylum.  There  must  be  places  in  the 
civil  hospitals  where  they  should  be  put,  and  finally,  if  it  is  necessary,  you 
could  easily  organize  hospitals  for  six  or  seven  thousand  sick  in  taking  the 
beds  from  the  barracks,  and  even  the  furnishings  of  the  Guard.  By  this 
means  the  capital  will  not  have  under  its  eyes  the  spectacle  of  this  negli- 
gence towards  wounded  and  sick.” 

Looking  forward  to  still  another  diversion,  Napoleon  wrote,  February  15, 
to  Clarke  : “ Write  to  Augereau  that  he  is  now  well  armed,  that  I order 
him  in  the  existing  circumstances  to  open  the  campaign,  to  beat  Bubna 
and  disquiet  the  flank  of  the  enemy.” 

On  the  same  day  to  Berthier  : “ Notify  Marmont  that  I have  destroyed 
and  put  hors  de  combat  the  best  army  of  the  enemy,  which  I estimate  to 
have  been  nearly  eighty  thousand  men;  that  I am  going  to  undertake 


378 


ALLIED  SEPARATION  A MISTAKE . 


immediately  the  army  of  Schwartzenberg,  which  is  of  one  hundred  and 
twenty  thousand  men  ; that  had  they  not  taken  in  too  lively  a manner 
the  offensive  on  Paris,  I should  have  moved  on  Chalons  and  Vitry;  that 
just  as  soon  as  I shall  have  reassured  myself  as  to  the  latter’s  disposi- 
tions, at  the  least  movement  of  retreat  made  by  them,  my  intention  is  to 
march  at  once  to  Vitry  and  Alsatia,  and  as  it  is  possible  that  they  may 
have  decided  on  a retrograde  movement  by  the  major  events  which  have 
happened,  and  by  the  moral  effect  they  will  have  on  France  and  Paris,  as 
soon  as  I shall  have  knowledge  of  it,  I should  wish  to  find  Marmont  at 
Etoges  or  at  Montmirail  ; that  I shall  then  move  towards  him  with  rapid 
steps  to  oblige  the  enemy  to  make  big  marches  and  to  commence  his 
rout.” 

To  Joseph  : “The  Yeres  is  an  overflowed  river  which  is  not  fordable. 
It  can  cover  the  army  at  least  three  days.  On  the  17th  I shall  be  ready 
to  attack.”  And  to  Clarke  : “ It  seems  that  Billow  is  leaving  Belgium 
and  the  north  to  move  towards  Paris.  Maison  is  following  a false  direc- 
tion by  making  the  whole  army  useless,  and  shutting  it  up  in  towns.  He 
should  move  forward  and  pick  up  all  his  garrisons.  This  will  recall 
Biilow  to  the  defense  of  Holland.” 

That  the  separation  of  the  allies  had  been  a mistake  was 
shown  by  their  being  so  thoroughly  beaten.  All  told,  the 
Army  of  Silesia  had  lost  twenty  thousand  men,  but  it  now 
received  ten  thousand  reinforcements.  Had  Napoleon  been 
able  to  pursue  Blucher,  he  might  have  forced  him  still  far- 
ther back  and  completely  demoralized  his  troops ; and  rely- 
ing on  the  effect  of  the  disaster  when  it  should  be  reported 
to  Schwartzenberg,  he  might  have  been  wise  to  do  so ; but 
he  committed  the  same  error  he  had  in  the  Bautzen  country ; 
for  the  news  which  ran  in  from  the  Seine  determined  him  to 
leave  half  completed  the  operation  on  the  Marne  and  go  to 
the  succor  of  Oudinot  and  Victor,  who  were  being  pressed 
back. 

However  brilliant  Napoleon’s  success  in  this  short  series 
of  fights,  it  could  have  no  lasting  result.  It  was  not  ob- 
tained against  an  enemy  who,  like  the  Piedmontese  in  1796, 


1796  AND  18 U COMPARED. 


379 


would  at  once  make  peace,  but  against  the  stoutest  of 
his  opponents,  who  was  thereby  taught  prudence,  without 
being  in  any  sense  checked  in  his  intention  to  carry  through 
the  struggle.  Moreover,  Blucher  fell  back  upon  approaching 
reserves.  Had  the  entire  Army  of  Silesia  been  destroyed,  it 
would  have  scarcely  altered  the  eventual  result,  and  whereas 
in  1796  Napoleon  had  quite  finished  affairs  with  Piedmont 
before  he  turned  against  the  Austrians,  here  he  left  Blucher 
to  regain  new  strength,  while  he  was  obliged  to  turn  against 
Schwartzenberg,  to  save  his  capital  from  capture.  While  the 
splendid  conception  and  wonderful 
execution  with  raw  troops  in  this 
short  campaign  on  the  Marne  has 
often  been  compared  to  the  early 
days  of  1796,  yet  that  was  the  first 
effort  of  this  wonderful  military  gen- 
ius, and  was  decisive  in  the  highest 
degree,  whereas  these  days  were  al- 
most the  last  piece  of  brilliant  ma- 
noeuvring done  by  the  emperor,  and 
instead  of  being  decisive  in  his  favor, 
they  merely  caused  him  to  lose  much 
that  he  could  not  spare,  and  demon- 
strated to  the  allies  how  patiently 
and  carefully  they  must  work  to- 
gether in  order  to  accomplish  their 
end.  For  all  which  difference,  1796 
and  1814  may  well  be  compared  in 
the  marvelous  coup  d’oeil,  insight  into  Truml>eter  o£  Irn|,e,'ial  Guard' 
the  situation,  and  capacity  to  make  even  raw  troops  march  and 
fight.  History  presents  few  parallels  to  these  two  campaigns. 

In  order  further  to  provide  for  holding  Blucher  where  he 
had  left  him,  the  emperor  wrote  Joseph,  February  13 : — 


380 


BOURMONTS  GALLANT  DEFENSE. 


“ Send  a courier  to  Soissons  to  have  news  of  the  enemy,  and  let  the 
commandant  of  that  town  hold  it  until  extinction,  for  if  the  enemy  cannot 
enter  Soissons,  he  is  going  to  be  much  embarrassed. 

“ I do  not  think  that  Schwartzenberg  will  run  his  head  into  Fontaine- 
bleau as  long  as  we  are  masters  of  the  Nogent  bridge.  The  Austrians 
know  too  well  my  manner  of  working,  and  have  too  long  time  carried 
its  marks,  and  they  are  well  aware  that  if  they  leave  us  masters  of  the 
Nogent  bridge,  I will  debouch  on  their  rear  as  I have  done  here.  . . . 
I have  not  decided  on  the  plan  of  operation  that  I shall  follow  to-day,  but 
with  Victor,  Oudinot  and  the  reserve  ...  I shall  personally  move  . . . 
on  Montereau,  and  shall  have  enough  forces  to  contain  Schwartzenberg. 
I tremble  lest  those  Russian  rogues  should  set  fire  to  Fontainebleau  as 
a matter  of  reprisal.” 

During  the  three  days  Schwartzenberg  was  in  Troyes  he 
got  early  news  from  the  Army  of  Silesia,  and  at  the  same 
time  heard  that  Augereau  in  Lyons  had  collected  an  army, 
stated  to  him  as  forty  thousand  men,  which  was  to  move 
forward  against  Bubna,  whom  he  had  left  in  Geneva.  This 
circumstance  seemed  to  Schwartzenberg  highly  threatening, 
in  that  it  might  rob  the  allies  of  the  possession  of  Switzer- 
land, and  open  the  way  from  Italy  to  Eugene ; and  in  order 
to  meet  this  event,  he  made  out  of  his  abundant  spare  troops 
a detail  of  fifty  thousand  men  to  march  back  into  Switzer- 
land. 

Meanwhile  Wittgenstein  and  Wrede  were  ordered  to  follow 
Napoleon  towards  Sezanne,  but  they  were  held  back  February 
10  to  12  by  Bourmont’s  gallant  defense  of  Nogent,  which 
gained  time  enough  for  Napoleon  to  carry  through  his  opera- 
tions against  Blucher.  In  any  case,  it  would  only  have  ex- 
posed them  to  being  beaten  by  Napoleon  on  his  way  back. 
Wittgenstein  remained  in  front  of  Nogent,  and  Wrede  moved 
down  river  on  Bray,  which  the  French  National  Guard  gave 
up  without  firing  a gun,  and  thus  obliged  Bourmont  to  evac- 
uate Nogent  the  12th.  The  allies  then  crossed  the  Seine. 


A COUNCIL  OF  WAR  IN  NOGENT. 


381 


Napoleon  wrote  to  Joseph,  February  13:  “This  Bourmont  is 
the  famous  chief  of  Chouans,  with  whom  I am  extremely 
satisfied.  The  enemy  tried  to  enter  in  close  column.  They 
fusilladed  him  from  the  houses  and  the  barricades.  In  brief, 
he  was  repulsed  in  three  consecutive  assaults  and  lost  . . . 
two  or  three  thousand  men.”  Wurtemberg  had  been  sent  to 
Sens,  and  here  on  February  11,  against  a handsome  defense 
by  Allix,  his  divisions  stormed  the  town  and  captured  it  at 
a loss  of  three  hundred  men.  Allix  retired  to  Pont-sur- 
Yonne  and  from  there  on  Montereau,  while  an  allied  column 
marched  on  Auxerre,  for  what  reason  is  not  plain. 

Oudinot  and  Victor,  not  having  been  strong  enough  to 
prevent  the  allies  from  crossing  the  Seine,  withdrew  by  way 
of  Nangis  to  Guignes  and  behind  the  Yeres,  where  they  re- 
ceived a small  reinforcement  from  Spain,  and  where  Mac- 
donald came  up  to  join  them.  The  Army  of  the  Sovereigns 
was  thus  making  its  way  on  Paris  slowly,  governed  largely 
by  the  discussions  of  the  Congress  of  Chatillon.  But  when, 
on  February  15,  Schwartzenberg  heard  how  heavy  Blucher’s 
disaster  was,  a council  of  war  was  at  once  held  in  Nogent; 
and  lest  Napoleon  should  be  able,  by  the  destruction  of  the 
Army  of  Silesia,  to  reach  his  fortresses  in  the  rear  of  the 
allied  army,  and  thus  cut  their  communications,  it  was  deter- 
mined to  retire  from  the  advanced  position  which  had  been 
gained;  and  Napoleon’s  arrival  quickened  the  movement. 

This  fact  proves  how  wise  Napoleon  would  have  been  to 
continue  his  operation  against  the  Army  of  Silesia.  In  the 
early  days  he  would  surely  have  run  the  risk,  relying  upon 
the  natural  panic  of  the  allies  for  their  communications ; but 
he  was  now  more  monarch  than  captain,  and  had  received  so 
many  anxious  messages  from  Paris,  that  when  he  learned  that 
a raid  under  Bianchi  had  reached  Fontainebleau,  he  deter- 
mined to  operate  against  Schwartzenberg.  This  was  quite  a 


•382 


ALLIED  ARMIES  NOT  WELL  PLACED. 


natural  thing  to  do,  but  it  was  perhaps  the  turning-point  of 
the  campaign.  Had  he  moved  on  against  Blucher,  completed 
his  overthrow  and  forced  him  farther  back,  he  would  have  rid 
Paris  from  danger  for  some  weeks,  and  perhaps  have  brought 
the  Congress  of  Chatillon  to  offer  acceptable  terms.  But  his 
decision  not  to  pursue  Blucher  to  the  bitter  end  and  put  him 
'out  of  the  possibility  of  resistance  for  some  weeks,  left  matters 
substantially  as  they  were.  He  had  been  unable  to  resist  the 
threat  to  Paris  by  the  Army  of  the  Sovereigns.  His  dignity 
as  emperor  had  led  him  to  listen  to  the  panic  appeals  of 
the  Paris  public,  when  his  acumen  as  a soldier  should  have 
taught  him  that  the  Army  of  the  Sovereigns  would  retire 
when  they  found  the  Army  of  Silesia  destroyed. 

Having  determined  to  move  back  against  Schwartzenberg, 
and  having,  as  we  have  seen,  ordered  Macdonald  to  join 
Victor  and  Oudinot  in  the  position  they  had  taken  up  behind 
the  Yeres,  on  February  15  Napoleon  started  from  Montmirail 
by  way  of  La  Ferte  sous  Jouarre  towards  the  same  point. 
On  this  march  the  infantry  was  carried  in  wagons,  and  the 
gun  teams  were  supplemented  by  post-horses.  By  February 
16  Napoleon  stood  at  the  head  of  fifty  thousand  men  behind 
the  Yeres,  and  next  day  he  could  open  the  offensive  stroke 
against  Schwartzenberg. 

On  February  16  the  allied  armies  were  not  well  placed : 
the  Army  of  Silesia  was  out  of  condition  to  act  for  the  moment, 
but  was  repairing  its  damages  at  Chalons ; Schwartzenberg 
was  in  the  triangle  Nogent-Montereau-Sens,  with  Wittgenstein 
at  Nangis,  Wrede  at  Donnemarie,  Wurtemberg  at  Montereau, 
Barclay  in  reserve  at  Nogent ; to  his  order  for  retreat  a coun- 
ter order  was  issued  on  this  day,  yet  the  withdrawal  continued, 
and  on  February  IT  Wittgenstein’s  vanguard  under  Pahlen, 
which  had  advanced  as  far  as  Mormant,  was  attacked  by  the 
French  cavalry  van  before  daylight,  and  so  badly  beaten  that 


WHAT  TROOPS  SHOULD  BE. 


383 


several  regiments  were  almost  destroyed.  Uncertainty  reigned 
at  the  allied  headquarters. 

Napoleon  was  indeed  doing  work  which  reminds  one  of 
Montenotte  and  Dego ; but  while  the  elation  of  successful 
action  took  strong  hold  of  him  and  he  was  for  a brief  period 
himself  again,  there  is  nothing  given  us  to  show  that  he  ap- 
preciated how  futile  must  be  any  triumphs  on  this  smaller 
theatre  of  operations,  in  view  of  the  overwhelming  forces 
which  all  Europe  in  arms  was  concentrating  upon  the  larger 
theatre  of  operations  to  crush  him.  While  the  first  elements 
of  Napoleon’s  downward  career  may  be  seen  as  early  as 
1809,  yet  even  the  disaster  in  Russia  cannot  be  said  to  have 
fatally  injured  his  career  as  monarch.  It  was  not  until  the 
days  of  the  armistice  in  1813,  when  Napoleon  refused  the 
olive  branch  which  united  Europe  tendered  him,  and  drew 
his  sword  instead,  that  his  actual  downfall  began.  At  that 
moment  he  could  have  had  a great  and  powerful  France, 
with  European  guaranties  for  his  house.  Since  then  all  had 
changed.  The  offers  of  the  allies  had  become  less  and  less 
as  they  had  advanced  towards  and  into  the  bowels  of  the 
land,  and  now  the  emperor  could  expect  no  such  terms  as 
he  then  could  have  had. 

The  change  in  Napoleon’s  ideas  in  regard  to  what  troops 
should  be  is  shown  in  his  letter  of  February  5 to  Clarke, 
speaking  of  the  National  Guards. 

“These  troops  are  no  longer  National  Guards, but  veritable  line  troops, 
because  they  are  composed  of  men  who  have  already  made  two  hundred 
leagues  to  come  and  cover  the  capital.  ...  It  is  essential  that  these  Na- 
tional Guards,  whenever  they  arrive,  should  be  given  guns,  cartridges  and 
haversacks.  Charge  some  one  with  following  up  the  organization  of  these 
twenty  thousand  men,  who  left  their  homes  voluntarily,  and  who  will 
desert  if  they  find  themselves  looked  down  upon.” 

To  Joseph,  February  7,  he  wrote  : “ It  is  better  to  have  little  battalions, 
so  as  to  use  all  the  cadres.  I have  here  in  the  army  very  little  battal- 


384 


SERVICE  OF  THE  BARRIERS. 


ions,  which  render  me  every  day  service  which  bigger  battalions  would 
render  me.  Generally  it  is  enough  to  have  one  hundred  and  forty  men  in 
a company;  if  they  are  conscripts,  this  is  twice  too  many.”  And  the  next 
week:  “It  is  better  that  conscripts  should  have  battalions  of  only  three 
hundred  men  than  to  have  them  more  numerous.”  And  again,  February 
9 : “ You  must  accustom  the  National  Guard  to  make  the  service  of  the 
barriers  ” (gates)  “ alone,  because  when  the  line  troops  are  taken  from 
Paris  to  move  to  the  front,  the  National  Guard  will  deem  itself  lost. 
You  can  put  much  smaller  guards  at  the  barriers  which  are  not  men- 
aced.” 


Chair  of  Imperial  Throne. 
(Garde  Meuble.) 


LXVIII. 


CRAONNE,  LAON.  FEBRUARY  15  TO  MARCH  13,  1814. 

Napoleon  should  have  pursued  Blucher  and  put  him  beyond  use,  but  lest 
Schwartzenberg  should  march  on  Paris,  he  left  Marmont  to  contain  him  and 
made  a forced  march  to  join  his  lieutenants.  On  February  17  he  debouched 
from  the  Y&res,  defeating  the  enemy  at  several  points.  At  Montereau,  February 
18,  the  allies  were  driven  from  the  river,  and  retired  to  Troyes.  Nothing  better 
than  these  ten  days  can  be  found  in  Napoleon’s  campaigns.  With  only  two  to 
five  of  the  enemy,  he  had  upset  their  plans.  But  he  overrated  his  success,  and 
refused  to  accept  reasonable  terms  at  Chatillon,  or  even  an  armistice,  believing 
that  he  could  drive  the  enemy  back  to  the  Rhine.  By  February  19  Blucher 
had  rejoined ; Napoleon  faced  Troyes  ; Marmont  and  Mortier  defended  the 
Meaux  country.  Efforts  were  made  to  rouse  the  population  against  the  invader. 
In  Italy  Eugene  held  himself,  but  could  not  join  Augereau  at  Lyons.  Blucher 
obtained  leave  to  join  the  forces  coming  from  Belgium,  and  broke  up  February  24 
to  move  on  Paris.  Marmont  and  Mortier  retired  through  Meaux.  Napoleon 
again  followed,  leaving  Macdonald  at  Troyes.  He  would  have  done  better  to 
force  the  fighting  against  the  main  army : its  retreat  would  have  necessitated 
Blucher’ s.  Blucher  came  close  to  capturing  Meaux,  but  was  headed  off  and 
moved  back  to  Soissons,  which  place  the  allied  troops  coming  on  from  the 
north  captured.  Napoleon  thought  he  could  follow  and  defeat  Blucher  in  sea- 
son to  turn  back  on  Schwartzenberg,  who  had  retired  to  Chaumont,  but  the 
latter  began  another  slow  advance  on  Paris,  forcing  back  Macdonald.  Blucher 
took  up  position  on  the  Aisne ; Napoleon  strove  to  cut  him  off  from  La  on,  and 
at  Craonne,  March  7,  a heavy  battle  was  fought ; the  French  claimed  the  victory, 
but  Blucher  reached  Laon.  Thither  Napoleon  followed,  and  on  March  9 and  10 
desperately  strove  to  drive  double  his  numbers  out  of  the  place  ; but  instead  of 
working  in  one  body,  he  sent  Marmont  off  on  the  right,  and  was  defeated.  It 
was  only  Blucher’s  unwillingness  to  fight  Napoleon  au  fond  that  prevented  the 
French  being  overwhelmed.  Napoleon  retired,  and  on  hearing  of  Schwartzen- 
berg’s  advance,  moved  against  him,  leaving  Mortier  and  Marmont  to  contain 
Blucher,  and  capturing  Rheims  March  13. 

High  as  he  gauged  the  importance  of  pursuing  Blucher, 
when  the  Army  of  the  Sovereigns  had  gained  control  of  the 


386 


THE  EMPEROR  REACHES  MEAUX. 


Seine  valley,  Napoleon  decided  to  retire  to  the  defense  of  the 
capital,  which  overwhelming  forces  were  dangerously  near* 
Extreme  activity  alone  could  supply  the  want  of  troops.  Paris 
was  full  of  alarms,  and  Joseph  the  timorous  sent  courier  upon 
courier  to  recall  the  army  to  its  defense.  Blucher  being  thrown 
back  on  Chalons,  although  by  no  means  out  of  the  game, 
Napoleon  could  more  readily  respond  to  this  call ; but  almost 
the  only  point  which  he  might  still  reach  to  oppose  Schwart- 
zenberg’s  further  progress  he  decided  to  be  Guignes,  the  cross- 
roads of  the  Paris-Nogent  and  Melun-Meaux  post-routes.  It 
would  have  been  a shorter  route,  as  well  as  perhaps  a more 
effectual  method,  to  march  via  Sezanne  to  threaten  the  right 
flank  of  Schwartzenberg  ; but  there  might  have  been  difficulty 
in  seasonably  bringing  up  to  the  threatened  point  the  corps  of 
Victor,  Macdonald  and  Oudinot;  and  as  Napoleon  was  to  take 
with  him  only  the  Guard  under  Ney’s  orders,  he  could  not 
adopt  a line  of  operations  which  might  by  an  accident  separate 
him  from  these  marshals,  who  had  just  rallied  on  the  Yeres. 
Nor  was  he  quite  certain  of  what  Schwartzenberg  might  under- 
take. Orders  were  issued  at  dawn,  February  15,  for  Ney  to 
move  from  Montmirail  towards  La  Ferte  sous  Jouarre,  on  the 
way  to  Meaux  and  Guignes.  Napoleon  had  no  time  to  lose. 
The  cavalry  marched  all  day  and  part  of  the  night ; the  foot 
was  carried  in  wagons,  and  thus  Napoleon  and  his  small  force 
reached  Meaux  during  the  afternoon.  From  his  then  point 
of  view,  if,  on  his  appearance  at  Guignes,  Schwartzenberg 
hesitated  or  retired,  he  proposed  to  return  to  the  Vitry  or 
Chalons  road,  and  continue  his  operations  on  the  allied  com- 
munications ; and  meanwhile  Marmont,  with  Grouchy  in  sup- 
port, was  left  to  face  Blucher  at  Etoges,  with  orders,  if  possible, 
to  push  him  back  somewhat  farther ; but  if  Blucher  should 
advance  upon  him,  he  was  to  fight  for  every  inch,  and  yield 
only  from  place  to  place  along  the  Montmirail-La  Ferte  road. 


ASTRIDE  THE  NANGIS  POST-ROAD 


387 


While  on  this  15th  of  February  the  emperor  was  at  Meaux 
on  the  march  to  their  rescue,  Oudinot,  Victor  and  Macdonald 
had  taken  up  their  position  on  the  Yeres,  to  face  the  Army  of 
the  Sovereigns,  which  now  occupied  a considerable  space  on 
both  sides  of  the  Seine.  Schwartzenberg,  who  had  been  some- 
what disconcerted  by  the  repeated  defeats  of  Blucher,  had  not 
ventured  to  cross  the  river  with  the  whole  Army  of  the  Sov- 
ereigns; but  he  had  put  over  Wurtemberg,  Wrede  and  Witt- 
genstein, and  these  generals  took  post  at  Montereau,  Donne- 
marie  and  Provins,  while  Pahlen,  commanding  Wittgenstein’s 
van,  moved  onward  to  Mormant.  Next  day  by  three  Napoleon 
reached  Guignes ; the  troops  which  had  come  from  Montmi- 
rail  had  covered  some  sixty  miles  in  thirty-six  hours.  He 
now  had  in  line  the  Old  Guard  under  Ney,  Macdonald,  Oudi- 
not, Victor,  Gerard,  and  the  cavalry  of  Nansouty,  Milhaud, 
Excelmans  and  Kellermann,  some  thirty -five  thousand  men  all 
told ; though,  as  reinforcements  were  coming  up  from  day  to 
day  in  smaller  or  greater  numbers,  between  these  and  the 
natural  attrition  of  the  long  marches  and  constant  combats,  it 
is  impossible  to  approach  correctness  in  the  numbers  given  at 
this  point  or  elsewhere. 

This  force  Napoleon  drew  up  astride  the  Nangis  post-road 
at  Guignes,  purposing  to  try  on  Schwartzenberg  the  same 
methods  that  had  succeeded  so  well  against  Blucher.  Accord- 
ingly, on  the  17th,  the  emperor  debouched  from  the  line  of  the 
Yeres  and  advanced  on  Mormant.  Pahlen  was  quickly  dis- 
posed of;  but  as  the  French  moved  on  the  Army  of  the  Sov- 
ereigns, as  had  been  agreed  on  and  ordered  the  15th,  fell  back 
at  all  points  towards  the  line  of  the  Seine.  From  Nangis 
Napoleon  might  well  have  advanced  all  his  forces  on  a line 
which  should  envelop  one  of  the  enemy’s  flanks,  say  to  Pro- 
vins ; but  not  being  quite  sure  of  the  allied  enterprise,  and 
handicapped  by  the  notion  that  he  must  cover  Paris,  he  chose 


388 


THE  AFFAIR  AT  VILLENEUVE. 


to  send  his  several  corps  in  pursuit  in  eccentric  directions, 
viz. : Victor  on  Montereau,  Oudinot  on  Provins  and  Mac- 
donald on  Donnemarie.  As  a matter  of  fact,  he  needed  to 
have  small  fear  of  Schwartzenberg’s  constancy ; the  watch- 
word at  the  allied  headquarters  was  to  venture  little,  and 
rely  upon  mere  weight.  A flank  movement  by  the  French 
would  have  hastened  his  withdrawal. 

Yet  it  had  to  be  considered  that  Schwartzenberg  might 
hold  the  Seine,  and  throw  a heavy  column  around  Napoleon’s 
right  on  Fontainebleau  and  thus  reach  his  rear  and  the  road 
to  Paris,  — a simple  and  legitimate  operation;  and  in  order 
to  afford  no  time  for  such  a manoeuvre,  and  to  secure  the 
crossing  of  the  Seine  without  delay,  Napoleon  intended  that 
Victor  should  seize  Montereau  the  same  evening,  and  had 
definitely  so  ordered.  For  the  moment  he  would  undertake 
nothing  which  should  leave  the  capital  with  a big  army  at 
its  very  gates.  But  Victor,  meeting  La  Motte’s  Bavarian 
division  on  the  road  at  Villeneuve,  was  delayed  by  the  neces- 
sity of  brushing  it  aside,  which  he  did  with  a loss  to  it  of 
three  thousand  men  and  fourteen  guns ; but  this  affair 
stopped  him  short  of  Montereau.  Napoleon  was  unreasona- 
bly angry  at  this  delay,  which  was  not  so  much  Victor’s  fault 
as  it  was  that  the  tasks  were  hard,  and  that  Napoleon  no 
longer  cut  out  the  work  or  personally  pushed  his  lieutenants, 
as  years  before.  In  these  days  he  was  full  of  fault-finding 
and  punishments.  Nothing  was  done  right ; no  one  satisfied 
him  ; and  he  forgot  that  it  was  he  who  had  worn  out  all  his 
divisions  and  his  generals  by  ceaseless  labor.  He  looked 
back  longingly  to  the  time  when  his  marshals  were  young 
and  active.  He  forgot  that  they,  as  well  as  he,  had  grown 
old  and  fond  of  the  ease  they  had  fairly  earned  ; and  he  had 
never  taken  means  to  produce  their  legitimate  successors  in 
command. 


ALLIED  TROOPS  WITHDRAW. 


389 


On  February  18,  3 A.  m.,  he  wrote  to  Bertliier  : “ Convey  my  dis- 
content to  Victor  that  I receive  no  report  from  him  . . . and  my 
discontent  at  the  little  vigor  of  the  attack  of  Villeueuve,  and  that  he  did 
not  execute  my  orders,  which  prescribed  to  him  to  reach  Montereau.  . . . 
Write  him  a very  sharp  letter.  Add  that  his  troops  complain  that  they 
could  not  find  him,  and  that  they  never  had  orders  during  the  affair.” 
And  two  hours  later  : “ Send  to  Victor  one  of  your  aides  to  carry  quickly 
the  order  to  move,  at  once  to  Montereau.  . . . That  I am  extremely  dis- 
contented that  he  did  not  arrive  there  yesterday  evening,  because  I 
hoped  to  have  my  bridge  reestablished  during  the  night.  It  is,  however, 
important  that  he  should  personally  be  there  with  his  infantry  before  six 
o’clock.” 

And  yet  it  should  be  noted  that  he  was  reasonable  at  times. 
Clarke,  having  complained  that  although  Minister  of  War  he 
did  not  receive  news  as  early  as  some  others  in  Paris,  was 
most  kindly  answered  by  Napoleon  that  he  was  right  in  his 
position,  and  that  everything  should  thereafter  go  through 
his  channel. 

On  this  day,  February  17,  Oudinot  reached  Maison  Rouge, 
Macdonald  got  half-way  from  Nangis  to  Donnemarie,  Pajol 
followed  in  the  track  of  the  Wurtembergers  back  to  Valence, 
Allix  took  Fontainebleau,  and  Marmont,  to  keep  an  eye  on 
Blucher,  reached  out  to  the  right  to  the  Grand  Morin  at 
Reveillon.  At  night  the  extreme  right  of  the  Army  of  the 
Sovereigns  was  in  Sezanne,  Wittgenstein  took  Sordun,  and 
later  fell  back  to  Nogent,  Wrede  retired  to  the  bridge  at 
Bray,  Bianchi  withdrew  to  Pont-sur-Yonne,  Wurtemberg  was 
preparing  to  defend  the  salient  at  Montereau. 

The  emperor  was  in  high  spirits  at  the  prospect.  uThe 
whole  great  army  of  the  enemy,  Austrian  and  Russian,  Ba- 
varian and  Wurtemberg,”  he  wrote,  February  17,  to  Joseph, 
uare  recrossing  the  Seine  in  every  direction,  and  with  the 
greatest  precipitation.  It  is  probable  that  this  night  there 
will  not  be  a single  man  on  this  side ; but  I shall  lose  very 


390 


BATTLE  OF  MONTEREAU. 


important  time ; much  will  be  necessary  to  reestablish  the 
bridge  at  Montereau.”  Not  only  Victor  had  been  ordered 
sharply  up,  but  Pajol  was  to  gather  all  the  troops  he  could, 
so  as,  with  the  2d  Corps  and  Gerard’s  reserve,  to  move  upon 
the  town. 

Wurtemberg  had  orders  to  hold  Montereau  until  the  even- 
ing of  the  18th,  to  allow  the  allied  troops  who  were  filing  to 
the  rear  to  pass  beyond  it,  but  the  town  with  its  French  popu- 
lation lay  badly  for  his  defense.  The  faubourgs  were  con- 
nected with  the  town  by  bridges.  On  the  right  bank  of  the 
Seine  lies  a plateau,  holding  the  castle  of  Surville;  and  from 
this  plateau,  should  it  be  seized  by  the  French,  the  whole 
country  on  the  other  side  of  the  Seine  could  be  swept  by 
guns.  In  order  to  hold  Montereau,  Wurtemberg  had  no 
other  course  than  to  take  position  on  the  plateau  with  the 
defile  in  his  rear,  which  he  knew  he  would  have  to  cross 
fighting ; but  with  commendable  bravery  he  drew  up  his 
troops,  some  twelve  thousand  men  and  fifty  guns.  Snow  was 
falling  and  the  day  was  bitter.  The  French  attacked  early, 
but  Pajol,  who  first  opened  fire,  had  difficulty  in  meeting  the 
enemy’s  stubborn  resistance,  and  the  fighting  was  heartily 
kept  up.  No  gain  was  made  by  the  French  until  early  in  the 
afternoon  Gerard  came  up  and  put  his  peasant  troops  into 
line.  He  had  received  orders  from  Napoleon  to  take  com- 
mand of  all  the  troops  assembled  in  front  of  the  place,  and 
Victor  was  to  head  two  divisions  of  the  Guard  under  Ney. 
Napoleon  reached  the  place  about  three  o’clock,  and  shortly 
organized  four  columns  of  attack,  which  after  still  heavier 
pushing  managed  to  seize  the  plateau.  Wurtemberg,  with 
but  a third  of  the  French  force,  having  carried  out  his  orders 
with  great  gallantry,  fell  back  on  Marolles  with  the  loss 
of  three  thousand  men  killed,  wounded  and  prisoners,  to  a 
French  loss  of  five  hundred  less.  Macdonald  and  Oudinot 


RAPID  MARCHING. 


391 


reached  Bray  and  Nogent,  but  could  not  take  the  crossing- 
places.  The  emperor  was  annoyed  at  this  opposition.  “’It 
took  us  all  day  to  pass  that  horrible  defile  of  Montereau,” 
he  wrote  Joseph.  “But  what  is  extremely  precious  is  that  I 
had  the  fortune  to  seize  the  bridge  without  giving  them  time 
to  cut  it.” 

It  was  not  only  Victor  who  catne  in  for  fault-finding,  for  on  February 
19  the  emperor  told  Berthier  to  “ write  to  X.  . . . that  I am  extremely 
dissatisfied  with  the  manner  that  he  commands  artillery  ; that  yesterday 


at  3 p.  m.  every  piece  was  out  of  ammunition,  not  because  it  had  been 
used  up,  but  because  he  had  kept  his  park  too  far  off.  . . . Tell  him  that 
an  officer  of  artillery,  who  is  wanting  in  ammunition  in  the  middle  of  a 
battle,  deserves  death.” 

Napoleon  had  left  Montmirail  February  15;  on  the  16th 
he  was  at  Guignes,  on  the  17th  he  attacked  Wittgenstein 
and  Wrede,  and  the  18th  Wurtemberg.  With  regard  to  this 
rapidity,  Clausewitz  says:  “We  do  not  believe  that  there  is 
anything  like  this  in  history.”  The  march  has  several  par- 
allels, from  that  of  the  Consul  Nero  down,  but  no  compar- 


892 


CHARACTERIZED  BY  WEAKNESS. 


ison  need  be  instituted.  The  conduct  of  the  raw  troops  was 
admirable. 

Schwartzenberg  had  assembled  his  corps  in  rear  of  Nogent, 
but  on  hearing  that  Napoleon  had  got  possession  of  the 
Montereau  bridge,  he  made  arrangements  to  retire  back  to 
Troyes,  so  as  again  to  get  on  a level  with  Blucher,  and  start 
afresh ; the  scheme  for  a two-column  advance  on  Paris  had 
failed.  It  is  not  to  be  wondered  at  that  the  contact  of  the 
allied  commanders  with  this  great  captain,  who  for  nearly 
twenty  years  had  discounted  all  comers  at  the  game  of  war, 
should  have  been  characterized  by  weakness.  It  was  only 
by  repeated  attempts  that  they  could  learn  to  disregard  the 
rapidity  and  skill  of  his  manoeuvres,  and  go  on  with  their 
own  scheme,  relying  on  mere  weight.  They  had  nothing  to 
gain  and  all  to  lose  by  risk;  and,  moreover,  the  political  situ- 
ation and  the  Chatillon  negotiations  counted  for  much  in  the 
allied  attitude.  The  Army  of  Silesia  had  been  refreshed  at 
Chalons,  and  as  the  sovereigns  determined  to  have  the  two 
armies  again  cooperate,  it  was  now  ordered  by  its  left  on 
Arcis-sur-Aube,  and  the  Army  of  the  Sovereigns  was  prepar- 
ing to  join  it. 

Winzingerode  had  been  coming  up  the  Meuse,  and  had 
reached  Rheims,  and  Blucher  left  him  to  face  Mortier,  and 
himself  moved  towards  Schwartzenberg,  Marmont  taking  posi- 
tion at  Sezanne  to  watch  him. 

For  several  days  Napoleon,  while  still  moving  forward,  de- 
voted himself  to  reorganizing  his  troops,  for  during  the  last 
two  weeks,  full  of  operations  of  the  highest  skill  and  interest, 
the  men  had  undergone  serious  trials.  Ry  the  extraordinary 
boldness  of  his  offensive-defensive  he  had  replaced  the  mili- 
tary situation  where  it  had  been  three  weeks  before,  and  this 
in  front  of  an  enemy  who  outnumbered  him  in  the  ratio  of 
five  to  two.  But  to  what  use  was  it  all  ? The  ancient  vigor, 


ADVANCES  BRUSHED  ASIDE . 


393 


the  ancient  keen  estimate  of  the  enemy's  weak  point,  was 
there  once  more  in  full  measure,  but  Napoleon  seemed  to  have 
lost  his  power  of  gauging  the  eventual  outcome  of  all  these 
efforts.  To  what  could  they  lead  ? He  now  appeared,  in 
governing  the  details,  to  be  forgetful  of  the  general  trend  of 
events,  when  he  used  to  be  in  a way  careless  of  the  detail 
and  scrupulous  as  to  the  eventual  result.  After  Champau- 
bert  he  is  quoted  as  saying  to  those  about 
him  that  he  would  yet  again  stand  on  the 
Vistula ; and  now,  after  Schwartzenberg  had 
fallen  back  merely  to  assemble  for  a fresh 
stroke,  Napoleon  lost  all  power  of  weigh- 
ing probabilities,  and  brushed  aside  any 
advances  made  towards  an  armistice  by  the 
allies.  He  could  not  see  that  solely  by 
political  means  could  come  his  rescue  from 
downfall;  that  as  a military  problem  alone 
he  must  lose.  As  at  Smolensk,  he  failed  to 
gauge  the  conditions  aright.  France  could 
not  cope  with  all  Europe  in  arms,  especially 
now  that  she  was  denuded  of  men  and  ex- 
hausted by  her  former  efforts.  And  worse 
still,  Napoleon  did  not  recognize  that  his 
own  hold  on  the  people  was  weakening. 

Nothing  could  conserve  his  empire  except  a favorable  peace  ; 
and  he  had  rejected  each  and  every  successive  proposal  look- 
ing to  this  end;  and  so  he  continued  to  do.  His  mind  was 
obscured  by  the  one  idea,  that  his  present  successes  were 
decisive,  and  would  suffice  to  change  the  negotiations  at 
Chatillon  to  the  point  of  yielding  him  again  the  Frankfort 
basis ; and  he  staked  his  all  on  it.  He  could  not  see  that,  on 
his  own  theory  of  the  equality  of  thousands,  he  must  eventu- 
ally fail ; and  that  his  one  chance  now  lay  in  accepting  lesser 


French  Grenadier. 


394 


AN  EXAGGERATED  VIEW. 


terms,  even  if  lie  mentally  reserved  the  right  at  a future 
moment  to  fight  for  the  larger  frontiers. 

Too  much  elated  by  his  partial  successes,  and  oblivious  of 
the  true  perspective  of  the  situation,  Napoleon  wrote  Caulain- 
court,  February  17  : — 

“ I gave  you  carte  blanche  to  avoid  a battle  which  was  the  last  hope 
of  the  nation.  The  battle  has  taken  place  : Providence  has  blessed  our 
arms.  I have  made  thirty  to  forty  thousand  prisoners.  I have  taken  two 
hundred  guns,  a great  number  of  generals,  and  destroyed  several  armies 
with  scarcely  a blow.  I yesterday  defeated  the  army  of  Schwartzenberg, 
which  I hope  to  destroy  before  it  shall  have  crossed  the  frontier.  Your 
attitude  is  to  be  the  same.  You  are  to  do  everything  for  peace,  but  my 
intention  is  that  you  should  sign  nothing  without  my  order,  because  I 
alone  understand  my  position.  In  general,  I desire  nothing  but  a peace, 
solid  and  honorable,  and  it  can  be  only  such  if  made  on  the  basis  proposed 
at  Frankfort.  If  the  allies  had  accepted  your  propositions  on  the  9th, 
there  would  have  been  no  battle.  1 should  not  have  run  the  chance  of 
fortune  in  a moment  when  the  least  failure  would  lose  France.  I should 
not  have  known  the  secret  of  their  weakness.  It  is  just  that  in  return  I 
should  have  the  advantage  of  the  chances  which  have  turned  towards  me. 
I wish  peace,  but  it  would  not  be  one  which  should  impose  on  France  con- 
ditions more  humiliating  than  the  basis  of  Frankfort.  My  position  is  cer- 
tainly more  advantageous  than  at  the  time  the  allies  were  in  Frankfort. 

. . . To-day  it  is  different.  I have  gained  immense  advantages  over 
them,  such  advantages  that  a military  career  of  twenty  years  and  some 
repute  does  not  present  a parallel.  I am  ready  to  stop  hostilities  and  let 
the  enemy  quietly  return  home,  if  they  sign  preliminaries  based  on  the 
proposition  of  Frankfort.” 

How  much  the  emperor  believed  in  this  exaggerated  view, 
and  how  much  was  intended  for  bluff,  it  is  unfortunately  not 
permitted  us  to  know. 

To  Joseph  he  wrote,  February  18  : — 

“ Schwartzenberg  has  finally  given  sign  of  life.  He  has  sent  a parlia- 
mentary to  ask  for  a suspension  of  arms.  It  is  difficult  to  be  cowardly  to 
this  point.  He  had  constantly  refused  . . . every  species  of  suspension 
of  arms.  . . . These  miserable  creatures  at  the  first  check  fall  on  their 


ELATED  BY  PARTIAL  SUCCESSES. 


395 


knees.  Luckily,  Schwartzenberg’s  aide  was  not  allowed  to  enter.  I have 
only  received  his  letter.  ...  I will  accord  no  armistice  until  they  are 
out  of  my  territory.”  He  then  goes  on  to  say  that  he  learned  that  Alex- 
ander wished  again  to  open  negotiations,  but  that  he,  Napoleon,  would 
listen  to  nothing  except  the  basis  of  Frankfort  . . . as  a minimum,  that 
he  had  offered  to  accept  these  terms  if  they  at  once  stopped,  which  they 
refused  to  do,  and  now  they  asked  an  armistice  ; that  had  they  agreed  to 
an  armistice,  he  would  have  made  almost  any  terms  to  save  the  capital, 
but  as  they  refused,  he  now  deems  it  essential  to  accept  none  but  honor- 
able terms.  That  the  enemy  was  not  likely  to  retire  across  the  frontier 
with  many  men  left.  “ His  cavalry  is  excessively  fatigued  and  discour- 
aged. His  infantry  is  tired  of  these  movements  and  counter  movements. 
He  is  entirely  discouraged.” 

“I  destroyed  the  Army  of  Silesia,”  ...  he  wrote,  February  18,  to 
Eugene  ; “ I commenced  yesterday  to  beat  Schwartzenberg.  Within  four 
days  I have  made  thirty  to  forty  thousand  prisoners,  taken  twenty  gen- 
erals, five  or  six  hundred  officers,  one  hundred  and  fifty  to  two  hundred 
guns,  an  immense  quantity  of  baggage.  I have  lost  scarcely  any  men. 
...  If  fortune  continues  to  serve  us,  it  is  then  possible  that  the  enemy 
will  be  in  great  disorder  outside  our  frontier,  and  that  we  can  then 
conserve  Italy.” 

To  Savary,  now  Minister  of  Police,  he  wrote,  February  19  : “ Is  it 
suitable  at  the  present  moment  to  say  that  I had  few  troops,  that  I 
vanquished  only  because  I surprised  the  enemy,  and  that  we  were  one 
against  three  ? You  must  in  truth  have  lost  your  heads  in  Paris  to  say 
such  things,  when  I say  everywhere  that  I have  three  hundred  thousand 
men,  and  when  the  enemy  believes  it.”  And  again  to  Caulaincourt,  Feb- 
ruary 19  : “ You  are  in  a position  . . . which  prevents  your  knowing  the 
true  position  of  my  affairs.  Everything  they  tell  you  is  false.  The  Aus- 
trians have  been  beaten  in  Italy,  and  far  from  their  being  at  Meaux,  I 
shall  soon  be  in  Chatillon.  In  this  situation  I must  renew  orders  to  you 
to  do  nothing  without  reporting  to  me,  and  my  having  made  known  to 
you  my  intentions.  ...  I am  so  affected  by  the  infamous  proposition 
you  send  me  that  I believe  myself  dishonored  for  even  having  put  myself 
in  the  case  of  allowing  them  to  propose  it  to  you.  . . . You  speak  always 
of  the  Bourbons.  I should  prefer  to  see  the  Bourbons  in  France  with 
reasonable  conditions,  than  ” to  accept  “ the  infamous  proposition  that 
you  send  me.” 


396 


TO  THE  EMPEROR  FRANCIS . 


This  “ infamous  proposition  ” the  emperor  would  not  heed 
was  a frontier  of  Pyrenees,  Alps  and  Rhine,  but  excluding 
Italy  and  the  Netherlands.  Napoleon  indeed  was  playing  a 
gambler’s  game. 

Yet,  as  if  desirous  to  sow  by  all  waters,  Napoleon  wrote, 
February  21,  to  the  Emperor  Francis:  — 

“ Monsieur  my  Brother  and  very  dear  Father-in-Law,  I have  done 
everything  to  avoid  the  battle  which  has  taken  place.  Fortune  smiled 
upon  me.  I have  destroyed  the  Russian  and  Prussian  army  commanded 
by  Blucher,  and  since  then  the  Prussian  army  commanded  by  Kleist.  . . . 
My  army  is  more  numerous  . . . than  the  army  of  Your  Majesty.  . . . 
I have  no  difficulty  in  proving  this  to  any  man  of  sane  judgment.  ...  I 
propose  to  Your  Majesty  to  sign  peace  without  delay  on  the  basis  which 
you  yourself  drew  up  at  Frankfort,  and  that  I and  the  French  nation 
have  adopted  as  our  ultimatum.  . . . There  is  not  a Frenchman  who 
would  not  prefer  death  rather  than  submit  to  the  conditions  which  would 
render  us  slaves  of  England,  and  would  erase  France  from  the  list  of  the 
powers.  . . . Never  will  I cede  Antwerp  and  Belgium.  . . . The  Emperor 
Alexander’s  thirst  of  vengeance  has  no  cause.  Before  entering  Moscow 
I offered  him  peace.  At  Moscow  I did  everything  to  put  out  the  fire  his 
orders  had  lighted.  ...  I ask  of  Your  Majesty  to  avoid  the  chance  of  a 
battle,  I ask  of  you  peace,  a prompt  peace,  founded  on  . . . the  declara- 
tion of  the  allied  powers  of  December  1,  ...  a basis  that  I have  accepted 
and  accept  yet,  although  . . . the  chances  are  in  my  favor.  . . . Your 
Majesty  can  stop  the  war  by  a word.  ...  I cannot  turn  to  the  English, 
whose  policy  is  to  destroy  my  navy,  . . . nor  to  the  Emperor  Alexander, 
because  passion  and  vengeance  animate  all  his  sentiments.  I can  only 
address  Your  Majesty,  . . . the  principal  power  in  the  Coalition,  . . . for 
whatever  may  be  your  sentiments  of  the  moment,  you  have  in  your  veins 
some  French  blood.” 

This  letter  was  to  be  kept  as  a piece  secrete ; but  Bertliier 
wrote  to  Schwartzenberg,  February  22,  one  much  to  the  same 
effect,  which  was  to  be  considered  a piece  rninisterielle. 

The  emperor  was  relying  altogether  too  much  on  his  recent 
gains.  His  judgment  of  a dozen  years  before  would  have 
led  him  to  the  conclusion  that  he  had  best  make  a speedy 


TO  SPUR  UP  AUGEREAU. 


397 


peace ; we  saw  this  as  late  as  1809 ; but  he  believed  he  had 
almost  demoralized  the  allies,  and  he  placed  great  stress  on 
what  could  be  accomplished  by  the  force  at  Lyons  working  in 
concert  with  his  own  advance.  To  spur  up  his  old  lieutenant, 
he  wrote  to  Augereau,  February  21 : — 

“ My  Cousin,  the  Minister  of  War  has  put  under  my  eyes  the  letter 
you  wrote  the  16th.  This  letter  has  pained  me  much.  What  ? Six 
hours  after  having  received  the  first  troops  coming  from  Spain,  you  are 
not  already  in  campaign  ? Six  hours  of  rest  was  enough  for  them.  I 
won  the  combat  of  Nangis  with  a brigade  of  dragoons  coming  from 
Spain,  which  from  Bayonne  had  not  yet  unbridled.  The  six  battalions 
of  the  Nismes  division  are  lacking,  you  say,  in  clothing  and  equipments, 
and  are  without  instruction.  What  poor  reasons  are  you  giving  me  there, 
Augereau  ? I have  destroyed  eighty  thousand  enemies  with  battalions 
composed  of  conscripts,  having  no  cartridge-boxes  and  ill-clothed.  You 
say  the  National  Guards  are  pitiable.  I have  four  thousand  here  coming 
from  Angers  and  Brittany,  in  round  hats,  without  cartridge-boxes,  with 
sabots,  but  having  good  guns.  I have  made  them  serve  well.  There  is 
no  money,  you  continue  ; and  whence  do  you  expect  to  get  money  ? You 
cannot  have  any  until  we  shall  have  torn  our  receipts  out  of  the  hands 
of  the  enemy.  You  are  wanting  in  teams  : take  them  everywhere.  You 
have  no  magazines  : this  is  altogether  ridiculous.  I order  you,  in  twelve 
hours  after  receipt  of  the  present  letter,  to  start  in  campaign.  If  you 
are  still  the  Augereau  of  Castiglione,  keep  the  command  ; if  your  sixty 
years  weigh  upon  you,  quit  it  and  put  it  in  the  hands  of  the  most  ancient 
of  your  general  officers.  The  country  is  menaced,  and  in  danger,  it  can 
be  saved  only  by  audacity  and  good-will,  and  not  by  vain  temporizations. 
You  must  have  a kernel  of  more  than  six  thousand  men  of  troops  d* elite. 
I have  not  so  many,  and  yet  I have  destroyed  three  armies,  made  forty 
thousand  prisoners,  taken  two  hundred  guns,  and  thrice  saved  the  capital. 
The  enemy  is  flying  on  all  sides  towards  Troyes.  Be  the  first  among  the 
bullets.  It  is  not  a question  of  acting  as  in  the  last  years,  but  one  must 
again  put  on  his  boots  and  his  resolution  of  1793  ! When  the  French 
shall  see  your  plumes  at  the  outposts,  and  shall  have  seen  you  expose 
yourself  the  first  to  fire,  you  will  do  with  them  what  you  will.” 

And  again  he  ordered  Clarke,  February  22,  to  “ write  to  Augereau 
that  I see  with  pain  that  he  has  scattered  his  troops.  On  the  contrary,  he 


898 


NAPOLEON  MARCHES  ON  TROYES. 


should  assemble  them  to  march  to  the  front  and  overwhelm  that  ridicu- 
lous Bubna.”  And  on  February  26  to  “ write  to  Augereau  that  it  is 
ridiculous  for  him  to  think  that  he  cannot  count  on  the  troops  of  Nismes 
for  this  campaign.  Make  him  understand  that  I have  in  my  army  many 
soldiers  in  peasants’  dress,  and  many  line  troops  who  have  only  been  under 
the  colors  seventy-three  days;  that  however  young  the  French  infantry, 
it  is  always  braver  than  the  Wurtemberg,  Austrian  and  Bavarian  foot.” 

The  crossing  of  the  Seine  was  begun  during  the  morning 
of  February  19,  and  the  French  army  assembled  at  Nogent. 
Slowly  retiring,  Schwartzenberg  concentrated  at  Troyes,  and 
Blucher  coming  from  Chalons  via  Arcis  got  to  Mery  Febru- 
ary 21,  where  he  stood  in  direct  communication  with  the 
Army  of  the  Sovereigns.  Had  Napoleon  three  days  before 
marched  around  the  right  flank  of  Schwartzenberg,  he  would 
now  have  been  in  better  case,  as  he  could  have  prevented  this 
junction,  except  by  a retreat  to  some  point  much  farther  in 
the  rear,  — yet  he  can  hardly  be  held  to  have  foreseen  this. 
His  purpose  now  was  to  march  against  the  Army  of  the  Sov- 
ereigns while  his  own  army  was  in  good  heart ; but  as  Blu- 
cher’s  position  at  Mery  was  directly  on  his  flank  in  such  an 
advance,  he  threw  Oudinot  with  ten  thousand  men  against 
this  place  on  February  22.  Oudinot  managed  to  take  that 
small  part  of  Mery  which  lay  on  the  left  bank,  but  with  sixty 
thousand  men  on  the  other  side,  could  not  be  expected  to 
force  the  crossing.  Meanwhile  Napoleon  with  his  fifty  thou- 
sand men  marched  on  Troyes,  where  he  found  Schwartzen- 
berg in  line  with  eighty  thousand  effective  and  holding  firmly 
to  both  banks  of  the  Seine.  Against  so  great  a superiority 
and  on  such  awkward  ground  even  Napoleon  deemed  it  best 
to  decline  a battle.  He  had  come  on  determined  to  accept 
one ; and  had  the  enemy  lain  so  as  to  open  the  way  to  effec- 
tive grand-tactics,  the  emperor  was  in  a mood  to  risk  his  all 
on  a general  engagement  here  and  now.  It  was  as  well  for 
him  that  prudence  won  the  day. 


AN  ENTIRELY  SAFE  GAME. 


399 


Meanwhile  Mortier,  who  had  been  left  to  pursue  Yorck  and 
Sacken,  feeling  that  he  was  too  far  advanced,  was  now  leaving 
Soissons  to  retire  on  Chateau  Thierry,  and  Marmont  had 
orders  to  protect  Paris  from  Blu- 
cher  along  the  Chalons  and  Yitry 
roads;  but  if  Blucher  joined  the 
Army  of  the  Sovereigns,  Marmont 
was  at  the  same  time  to  move  by 
his  right  to  join  the  emperor. 

Though  it  is  not  to  be  wondered 
at  that  Napoleon’s  opponents  were 
loth  to  meet  the  French  army 
when  he  was  personally  in  com- 
mand, it  shows  no  great  enterprise 
in  Schwartzenberg  to  withdraw 
from  the  emperor’s  front  when 
he  so  vastly  outnumbered  him,  for 
he  had  called  in  Blucher  so  as  to 
deliver  a battle  with  all  forces ; 
yet  after  a battle  offered  him  at 
Troyes  under  conditions  which 
practically  made  it  impossible,  as 
Napoleon  neither  accepted  it  nor  immediately  manoeuvred  for 
a better  position,  the  Army  of  the  Sovereigns  did  continue 
its  retreat  to  behind  the  Aube.  Especially  with  news  of 
Augereau’s  probable  advance,  its  leaders  were  playing  an 
entirely  safe  game,  and  it  was  evident  to  them,  if  not  to  him, 
that  Napoleon  was  merely  thrashing  himself  to  pieces  by  his 
constant  operations  during  these  winter  months.  To  Napo- 
leon, on  the  contrary,  this  success  was  most  encouraging. 
He  hoped  that  the  entire  nation  would  now  rise  to  help  him 
force  the  enemy  from  the  soil  of  France.  Could  he  but  have 
fifty  thousand  more  men,  electrified  by  the  spirit  which  ani- 


400 


STIMULATING  THE  POPULATION. 


mated  the  French  people  in  1792,  he  felt  convinced  that  he 
could  accomplish  anything.  There  had  been  a great  deal  of 
lukewarmness  shown  of  late  in  resisting  the  enemy’s  advance, 
especially  the  raids  of  the  Cossacks ; and  the  emperor  sug- 
gested to  Joseph,  February  21,  that  the  queen  regent  should 
write  encouragement  to  the  several  provinces,  as  e.  g. : — 

“ I leara  that  the  town  of  Orleans  is  threatened  by  fifteen  hundred 
raiders  of  the  enemy’s  army.  What  ! the  town  of  Orleans,  which  con- 
tains forty  thousand  inhabitants,  can  be  afraid  of  fifteen  hundred  raiders. 
Where,  then,  is  French  energy?  Form  your  National  Guard,  organize  a 
company  of  cannoneers,  take  horses  from  your  stables  ; I have  ordered 
the  Minister  of  War  to  furnish  you  guns.  . . . The  enemy  ...  is  impla- 
cable, he  is  ravaging  our  country  and  pillaging  our  towns.  He  keeps 
none  of  his  promises.  To  arms  then,  inhabitants  of  Orleans,  and  by  your 
conduct  let  me  recognize  the  opinion  that  I have  of  you  and  the  energy 
of  the  French  nation.” 

The  emperor  suggested  other  means  of  stimulating  the 
population  against  the  invader.  He  wrote,  February  21,  to 
Savary,  ordering  him  to  glean  news  of  the  ill-conduct  of  the 
Cossacks  for  publication  in  the  Moniteur , to  arouse  the  in- 
dignation of  the  people,  and  bring  them  up  to  the  point  of 
defending  the  land.  To  the  Minister  of  the  Interior  he 
wrote : — 

“ It  is  hard  to  be  more  displeased  than  I am  with  your  prefects.  They 
run  away  at  will  without  need.  . . . Prescribe  to  every  prefect  to  remain 
in  the  last  village  of  his  department  which  is  occupied  by  our  troops,  and 
to  follow  the  troops  as  soon  as  they  enter  a department.”  And  on  March  5 
a decree  was  issued  that  all  public  functionaries  who,  “ instead  of  excit- 
ing the  patriotic  fervor  of  the  people,  chilled  them  or  dissuaded  citizens 
from  legitimate  defense,  should  be  considered  as  traitors  and  treated 
accordingly.” 

He  also  directed  the  minister,  February  26,  to  collect  from 
every  available  source  accounts  of  the  atrocities  of  the  war, 
and  distribute  these  to  rouse  the  population. 


NEGOTIATIONS  FOR  A TRUCE. 


401 


But  the  French  people  did  not  rise.  It  had  been  crushed 
by  its  awful  sacrifices,  and  was  no  longer  willing  to  abet  a 
continuance  of  the  never-ending  wars.  Up  to  a certain  point 
Napoleon’s  wars  had  been  justifiable ; but  of  late  years  they 
had  been  a drain  to  France  and  a menace  to  Europe.  His 
breaking  up  of  nationalities  ran  counter  to  all  the  tendencies 
of  the  age,  and  this  was  being  recognized  as  much  at  home  as 
abroad.  Still,  Napoleon  would  neither  heed  French  apathy, 
nor  could  he  believe  that  the  allies  would  hold  long  together ; 
the  alliance  did  not  appear  to  him  to  have  sufficient  cause 
for  cohesion.  He  had  no  conception  of  the  depth  of  the 
feeling  that  he  was  the  arch-disturber  of  European  peace  and 
must  be  put  an  end  to,  and  it  was  in  this  utter  blindness  to 
the  real  conditions  that  he  had  withdrawn  from  Caulaincourt 
the  authority  he  had  given  him  to  make  terms  at  Chatillon. 
While  every  soldier  wonders  at  his  audacity  and  skill,  the 
student  of  character  must  equally  wonder  at  the  emperor’s 
utter  cecity. 

On  the  morning  of  February  23  Wittgenstein  brought 
from  the  Emperor  Francis  a proposal  for  an  armistice,  to 
which  two  weeks  before  the  allies  had  not  been  willing  to 
agree,  when  Napoleon  had  asked  it.  Owing  to  news  from  the 
south,  and  the  attrition  of  the  winter  campaign,  the  peace 
party  among  the  allies,  in  a conference  at  Troyes,  had  gained 
the  upper  hand. 

Augereau  had  pushed  Bubna  back  into  Switzerland,  which 
to  the  Austrians  appeared  a most  dangerous  status ; the  allied 
forces  on  the  Rhone  were  increased  up  to  forty  thousand  men, 
and  eventually  Augereau  had  to  retire  through  Lyons  on 
Valence. 

The  negotiations  for  the  truce  were  held  in  Lusigny,  near 
Troyes,  which  latter  place  Napoleon  reached  the  24th  ; and 
here  was  one  more  chance  for  the  French  Empire,  but  Napo- 


VOL.  IV. 


402 


THE  BASIS  OF  FRANKFORT. 


leon  would  not  embrace  it.  He  wrote,  February  24,  to  General 
Flahault,  Aide-de-Camp  to  the  emperor : “ Flahault  will  go 
to  Lusigny  with  powers  from  the  major-general  to  negotiate, 
conclude  and  sign  an  armistice  between  the  two  armies.” 
But  Flahault  was  confined  to  “ treat  for  peace  on  the  basis 
proposed  at  Frankfort,”  and  he  was  to  say  that  “ without  this 
article  there  is  nothing  to  be  done ; ” and  he  “ will  enter  into 
no  discussion  until  this  article  is  first  agreed  on,”  and  “ will 
not  even  open  his  mouth  until  this  is  done.”  He  was  to 
“ speak  frankly  but  firmly,  and  say  that  we  know  the  forces 
of  the  enemy,  but  he  does  not  know  ours.  Every  day  we 
receive  from  Paris  ten  thousand  men  clothed  and  armed,  of 
whom  two  thousand  cavalry.  Our  army  is  three  hundred 
thousand  strong.  . . . The  Guard  has  been  increased  to  thirty 
thousand  men.  . . . Finally,  the  horrors  committed  by  the 
Cossacks,  for  which  there  is  no  name,  have  excited  to  the  last 
degree  the  whole  population  of  France,  and  the  whole  country 
is  under  arms.”  In  a letter  to  Caulaincourt,  February  26, 
tendering  every  safe  conduct  to  Lord  Castelreagh,  and  offer- 
ing to  respect  Chatillon,  the  emperor  tells  him  that  the  “ basis 
of  Frankfort,  that  is  what  I have  accepted,  and  what  the 
nation  has  approved.  In  speaking  to  Lord  Aberdeen,  say 
that  in  no  case  will  we  cede  Antwerp  or  Belgium.” 

Yet  he  appeared  , to  want  to  know  how  his  purpose  was 
regarded  in  Paris ; and  he  wrote,  March  2,  to  Joseph,  order- 
ing him  to  assemble,  under  the  presidency  of  the  regent,  the 
grand  dignitaries,  ministers  and  president  of  the  council,  to 
submit  to  them  his  note  sent  to  Caulaincourt,  insisting  upon 
the  basis  of  Frankfort,  and  to  ask  their  opinion.  “ I do  not 
ask  formal  advice,  but  I am  glad  to  understand  the  different 
ideas  of  the  individuals.” 

On  February  24  he  wrote  Joseph  : “ My  Brother,  I have  entered  Troyes. 
The  enemy’s  army  is  besieging  me  with  parliamentaries  to  demand  a 


BLAME  PLACED  ON  OTHERS . 


403 


suspension  of  arms.  Perhaps  one  will  be  negotiated  this  morning,  but 
it  can  be  so  only  if  the  negotiations  of  Chatillon  are  followed  on  the 
basis  of  Frankfort.”  Meanwhile  he  strove  to  bring  back  some  of  his  old 
adherents,  writing,  February  25,  to  Joseph  : “They  say  that  Bernadotte 
is  in  Cologne.  Could  you  not  send  some  one  to  him  who  would  make 
him  feel  the  folly  of  his  conduct,  and  lead  him  to  change  ? Try  it,  but 
without  my  appearing  for  anything  in  it.” 

And  next  day  he  wrote  Joseph  to  send  some  one  to  Murat  to  strive  to 
bring  him  back  to  duty  : “ He  yet  has  the  chance  to  save  Italy,  and  to 
replace  the  viceroy  on  the  Adige.” 

There  is  no  apparent  change  in  the  accuracy  or  directness 
of  the  orders  issued  by  the  emperor  at  this  time,  when  com- 
pared with  those  in  other  campaigns : as  a rule,  the  Corre- 
spondence is  full  of  matter,  and  shows  that  the  emperor  held 
everything  well  in  hand.  At  intervals  during  1813,  the 
reins  seemed  to  drop  from  his  grasp  for  a day  or  two,  as  from 
lassitude,  but  during  the  campaign  of  this  year,  until  the 
very  close,  the  Correspondence  shows  the  same  activity  and 
incisiveness  as  of  old.  The  mistake  he  made  this  year  was  in 
ill-gauging  the  actual  situation  and  what  he  could  accom- 
plish. 

That  the  emperor  should  complain  of  his  lieutenants  is 
natural,  — to  place  the  blame  on  others  had  become  a habit ; 
failure  was  always  traceable  to  the  carelessness  of  servants. 
Thus  to  Clarke,  February  26,  he  wrote:  “If  I had  had  a 
bridge  equipage  of  ten  pontoons,  the  war  would  be  finished, 
and  Schwartzenberg’s  army  would  no  longer  exist.  I should 
have  . . . taken  his  army  in  detail ; but  wanting  boats  I could 
not  cross  the  Seine,  when  I ought  to  have  been  able  to  cross 
at  will.  It  is  ridiculous  to  tell  me  that  Paris  did  not  contain 
the  necessary  boats.  . . . They  might  have  left  the  day  after 
my  letter  was  received.  All  this  is  foolishness.”  And  after 
a similar  fashion  to  others. 

To  turn  for  a moment  to  Italy,  although  Murat’s  defection 


404 


EUGENE  HOLDS  HIMSELF  IN  ITALY. 


had  raised  the  hopes  of  Austria  with  regard  to  her  war  there, 
the  king  of  Naples  was  slow  in  coming  to  the  aid  of  Belle- 
garde  on  the  Po  : he  appeared  to  be  waiting  to  see  who  should 
prove  victorious  in  France,  so  as  to  embrace  the  cause  of 
the  victors.  From  Geneva  the  Austrians  had  pushed  forward 
towards  the  Simplon,  and  the  English  were  preparing  to 
make  a descent  on  Leghorn  to  aid  Murat.  But  surrounded 
on  all  sides,  Eugene  did  not  lose  heart ; he  withdrew  from  the 
Adige  to  the  Mincio,  and  leaned  his  right  on  Mantua.  Early 
in  February  Bellegarde  made  preparations  to  cross  the  Min- 
cio at  Pozzolo ; but  on  turning  his  left  by  debouching  from 
Mantua,  Eugene  threw  the  Austrians  back  on  Valeggio,  a 
defeat  that  held  Bellegarde  in  check,  even  though  Eugene 
was  compelled  to  detach  a large  force  to  Parma  to  meet 
Murat.  As  we  have  seen,  it  was  a part  of  Napoleon’s  early 
plan  that  Augereau,  at  Lyons,  should  march  on  Geneva,  open 
the  Simplon  route,  draw  in  a number  of  Eugene’s  divisions 
from  Italy,  and  operate  in  the  upper  Jura  mountain  country, 
in  concert  with  the  main  French  army  in  Champagne.  But 
Augereau  was  slow.  The  Austrians  had  detached  a force 
against  him  under  Bubna;  this  had  j^ractically  held  him  in 
check,  and  no  good  came  of  the  general  operation  because 
Eugene  could  not  send  Augereau  reinforcements,  and  at  the 
same  time  hold  Italy  against  Bellegarde  and  Murat. 

Blucher  had  never  been  an  admirer  of  Schwartzenberg’s 
management,  and  galled  at  being  called  back  from  Chalons 
to  witness  a retreat  less  compulsory  than  his  own,  when  he 
expected  battle,  he  turned  to  Alexander,  who  himself  was 
somewhat  of  the  same  mind,  and  asked  that  Winzingerode 
and  Biilow,  coming  up  from  Belgium,  might  be  allowed  to 
join  him  in  a renewed  march  on  Paris.  At  the  czar’s  in- 
stance this  was  granted,  although  the  allied  monarchs  at 
Bar-sur-Aube  had  decided  that  the  main  army  should  move 


NAPOLEON  ENTERS  TROYES. 


405 


back  to  Langres  upon  the  Austrian  reserves.  Blucher  thus 
once  more  gained  a free  hand,  with  one  hundred  thousand 
men,  including  his  own,  to  work  with.  He  was  the  only  gen- 
eral in  the  allied  ranks  who  seemed  to  be  willing  to  face  the 
emperor,  but  he  could  do  so  only  in  a simple  operation  of 
which  he  could  understand  the  details;  and  now,  with  orders 
to  work  on  his  own  plan,  but  not  to  forget  discretion,  Blucher 
broke  up  February  24,  and  crossed  the  Aube  at  Anglure,  and 
Baudemont  and  Granges,  near  by,  intent  on  another  thrust  at 
the  man  who  had  so  cruelly  oppressed  his  Fatherland.  That 
the  first  separation  of  Blucher  and  Schwartzenberg  was  a 
mistake  in  front  of  Napoleon  was  shown  by  both  being  beaten, 
and  having  to  reunite.  On  the  second  separation  Blucher 
was  more  nearly  right,  because  he  could  expect  to  assemble 
on  the  Marne  or  Aisne  a hundred  thousand  men. 

On  the  same  day  Schwartzenberg  moved  with  his  right 
from  Troyes  to  Bar-sur-Aube,  with  his  left  from  Bar-sur- 
Seine  to  Ferte-sur-Aube,  and  sent  his  reserves  to  Langres, 
while  Napoleon  entered  Troyes.  When  the  enemy  showed 
a manifest  purpose  of  continuing  his  retreat  to  Langres,  and 
Napoleon  learned  of  Bluclier’s  absence,  he  saw  that  he  could 
not  follow  up  Schwartzenberg,  lest  he  move  too  far  away 
from  Paris,  and  conceived  the  idea  of  a secret  march  to  the 
north  to  fall  on  the  Prussian  general’s  rear,  in  the  belief 
that  he  could  again  outmanoeuvre  him.  With  this  intention 
he  set  apart  Ney  and  Victor  to  keep  touch  with  Blucher, 
while  Macdonald,  Oudinot  and  Gerard,  Milhaud  and  Keller- 
mann,  thirty-five  thousand  strong,  should  essay  to  push  back 
Schwartzenberg  still  farther.  He  himself  with  the  Old 
Guard,  the  Guard  cavalry  and  Excelmans,  remained  in  Troyes, 
ready  to  throw  this  reserve  force  in  either  direction  where 
it  might  prove  to  be  most  needed.  On  February  25  there 
was  only  an  allied  rearguard  left  in  Bar ; and  next  day  the 


406 


TO  STRIKE  BLUCHER’S  REAR . 


entire  allied  army  was  behind  the  Aube.  Oudinot  and  Ge- 
rard in  pursuit  followed  the  direct  road  to  Bar,  while  Mac- 
donald marched  via  Bar-sur-Seine  on  La  Ferte-sur-Aube,  as 
a threat  to  the  allied  flank.  A new  conference  at  Vendeuvre, 
February  25,  decided  that  the  main  army  should  retire  to  Lan- 
gres  and  remain  on  the  defensive,  while  the  two  armies  of 
the  wings,  that  is  Blucher  and  Hesse-Homburg,  should  keep 
up  the  offensive  against  Marmont  and  Mortier,  and  against 
Augereau,  the  line  of  Blucher  running  back  to  the  Netherlands 
and  Hesse-Homburg’s  to  Switzerland. 

Having  crossed  the  Aube,  and  aiming  for  Soissons,  Blucher 
had  advanced  against  Marmont,  who  stood  at  Sezanne,  had 
forced  him  back  on  February  25,  and  on  the  26th  was  march- 
ing on  La  Ferte  Gaucher,  whither  Marmont  had  retired  ; 
Mortier,  who  had  been  actively  manoeuvring  between  Soissons 
and  Chateau  Thierry  to  hold  back  the  new  corps  which,  with 
orders  to  join  Blucher,  was  invading  France  from  the  north, 
of  which  corps  Winzingerode  was  at  Rheims  and  Billow  at 
Laon,  also  fell  back  from  Chateau  Thierry  on  La  Ferte 
sous  Jouarre,  leaving  a good  garrison  in  Soissons.  The  two 
French  marshals  had  only  about  twelve  thousand  men  left, 
while  a body  from  Erfurt,  and  St.  Priest,  whom  Coburg  had 
relieved  at  Mainz,  were  also  coming  along  to  swell  the  enemy’s 
ranks.  It  was  February  26  that  Napoleon  definitely  learned 
Blucher’s  manoeuvre,  and  he  at  once  pushed  Ney  forward  with 
Victor  and  Arrighi  to  strike  Blucher’s  rear.  Ney  was  to  cross 
the  Aube  at  Arcis,  Victor  at  Anglure,  while  Arrighi  should 
cross  the  Seine  at  Nogent  and  march  to  join  the  foot  column. 
Ney’s  instructions  were  by  no  means  to  permit  Blucher  to 
set  foot  in  Sezanne. 

But  during  the  night  of  February  26-27  fresh  tidings  came 
in  showing  that  Blucher  had  made  more  progress  than  Napo- 
leon had  imagined,  and  that  Marmont  was  at  La  Fert^  Gaucher. 


MARCH  ON  LA  FERTE  GAUCHER. 


407 


The  Prussian  general  was  justified  in  expecting  to  pin  Mar- 
mont  up  against  the  Marne  and  to  advance  on  Paris  by  its 
right  bank ; and  by  the  morning  of  February  27  Napoleon 
had  determined  to  undertake  Ney’s  task  himself.  He  had 
been  staying  in  Troyes,  hoping  that  an  armistice  would  come 
about,  — but  the  allies  would  none  of  his  terms.  Ney  was 
spurred  on,  Marmont  and  Mortier  were  to  join  hands  and 
stave  off  Blucher  until  Napoleon  could  come  up ; but  these 
marshals  had  already  joined  forces  at  La  Ferte  sous  Jouarre, 
and  had  retired  on  Meaux  during  the  night  of  February  26- 
27,  to  counteract  the  very  intelligent  manoeuvre  of  the  Prus- 
sian commander,  who  in  the  effort  to  seize  the  Soissons-Meaux 
road  had  pushed  on  La  Ferte  sous  Jouarre  the  corps  of  Yorck 
and  Kleist  to  hold  them  in  this  town,  while  the  Russian  corps 
were  to  march  around  the  French  left  on  Meaux  and  cut 
them  off  from  Paris. 

Napoleon  left  Troyes  at  noon,  February  27,  and  started 
in  Blucher’s  tracks  over  country  roads  and  in  bad  weather,  to 
march  by  way  of  Herbisse  and  Sezanne  on  La  Ferte  Gaucher. 
At  places  the  artillery  stuck  fast  in  the  mud  and  delayed 
him  much,  and  many  broken  bridges  added  to  the  difficulty. 
Macdonald  was  ordered  so  to  operate  as  to  lead  Schwartzen- 
berg  to  believe  the  emperor  still  in  his  front,  giving  out  that 
he  was  at  Bar-sur-Aube  and  Yendeuvre,  for  Napoleon  hoped 
to  get  through  with  Blucher  before  his  absence  was  guessed. 
By  afternoon,  with  the  Old  Guard  and  the  Guard  Cavalry, 
he  reached  Arcis-sur-Aube,  writing  Joseph  : “ I shall  sleep  in 
Herbisse.  To-morrow,  at  9 A.  M.,  I shall  be  at  Fere  Champe- 
noise ; from  there,  according  to  events,  I shall  march  on  Se- 
zanne and  La  Ferte  Gaucher.  Thus  I shall  be  in  the  rear  of 
the  entire  enemy’s  army.”  Ney  on  February  27  had  reached 
Sezanne,  Marmont  and  Mortier  remained  in  Meaux,  and  Kleist 
had  crossed  the  Marne  at  La  Ferte  sous  Jouarre,  and  moving 


408 


BL U CHER'S  PLAN  FAILS. 


up  to  Lizy,  also  passed  the  Ourcq ; the  van  of  Saeken  and 
Langeron  had  reached  Trilport  along  the  left  bank,  and  had 
already  seized  the  faubourg  of  Meaux  on  this  bank,  when 
Marmont  and  Mortier  crossed  over  and  drove  it  off. 

On  the  28th  Napoleon  hurried  Ney’s  column,  followed  by 
his  own,  along  from  Sezanne  towards  La  Ferte  Gaucher. 
When  Bluclier  found  that  the  French  marshals  had  seized 
Meaux,  he  withdrew  Saeken  and  Langeron  back  to  La  Ferte 
sous  Jouarre,  there  crossed  to  the  right  bank,  and  put  a larger 
force  across  the  Ourcq  at  Lizy  so  as  to  turn  Meaux  by  the 
north,  leaving  Yorck  on  the  left  bank.  But  getting  wind  of 
the  manoeuvre,  Marmont  and  Mortier  debouched  from  Meaux 
in  season  to  fall  on  his  van  under  Kleist  as  it  reached  the 
Therouanne,  and  as  it  was  not  supported,  forced  it  back  on 
the  Ourcq,  which  it  crossed,  destroying  the  Lizy  bridge.  The 
Prussian  general  now  got  over  all  his  forces  to  the  right 
bank  of  the  Marne,  and  broke  the  La  Ferte  sous  Jouarre 
bridge.  Napoleon  reached  the  place  in  the  afternoon  of 
March  1,  but  it  took  all  night  for  the  column  to  close  up,  and 
curiously  he  had  no  news  of  Marmont  and  Mortier,  although 
these  marshals  had  managed  to  hold  themselves  on  the  Ourcq. 
On  the  same  day  Blucher  made  a renewed  attempt  to  attack 
them,  ordering  Saeken  to  demonstrate  at  Lizy,  while  Yorck 
and  Kapzevich  could  pass  at  Crouy  to  turn  the  French  left ; 
but  as  the  French  had  destroyed  the  Crouy  bridge,  the  plan 
failed,  though  the  Russians  tried  to  force  the  passage  at 
Gevres.  A reinforcement  of  six  thousand  men  now  came 
from  Paris  for  Marmont,  which  enabled  him  somewhat  better 
to  hold  his  own.  It  took  all  day  of  March  2 to  mend  the  La 
Ferte  bridge,  but  Victor  and  Arrighi  marched  up  to  Chateau 
Thierry  to  get  in  Blucher ’s  rear  ; and  Blucher,  hearing  of 
Napoleon’s  advent,  hurried  off  to  Oulchy  le  Chateau.  As 
Napoleon  was  now  so  placed  as  to  threaten  the  roads  to  Cha- 


INNER  POSITION  AGAIN  WON. 


409 


Ions  and  Rheims,  Blucher  had  no  choice  but  to  retire  on 
Soissons,  though  it  was  held  by  a French  garrison,  and  hither 
Blucher  also  ordered  Biilow,  and  Winzingerode,  who  had  been 
reinforced  by  Voronzov,  while  St.  Priest  was  likewise  coming 
up  from  the  lower  Rhine  through  the  Ardennes.  Marmont 
and  Mortier  followed  up  Blucher’s  march  and  took  post  at 
Mareuil,  where  they  struck  the  enemy’s  rearguard. 

From  the  inner  position  he  had  by  such  an  able  operation 
again  won,  Napoleon  had  the  triple  choice  of  turning  on  the 
left  flank  of  Blucher,  and  cooping  him  up  between  Marne  and 
Aisne,  or  of  retiring  to  strike  the  right  flank  of  Schwartzen- 
berg,  from  whom  Macdonald  had  been  unable  to  conceal  his 
absence,  or  of  marching  over  the  road  he  had  now  opened  via 
Chateau  Thierry  on  Chalons,  to  draw  in  reinforcements  from 
the  fortresses  of  Lorraine,  as  he  had  all  along  had  the  idea 
of  doing.  Oudinot  was  ordered  back  to  Arcis-sur-Aube,  and 
Macdonald  was  held  ready  to  march. 

It  seems  that  it  would  have  been  Napoleon’s  better  policy 
to  force  operations  against  the  Army  of  the  Sovereigns,  rather 
than  tire  out  his  men  following  Blucher,  beyond  the  point 
of  heading  him  off  from  Paris  and  forcing  him  back  upon 
the  Aisne.  Schwartzeriberg  was  reduced  in  numbers  by  the 
detachments  he  had  made,  and  was  not  far  from  demoral- 
ized. Napoleon  might  have  driven  him  back  to  Switzerland. 
Though  Blucher  was  allowed  much  scope  of  action,  yet  he 
was  under  command  of  the  council  sitting  at  the  headquarters 
of  the  Army  of  the  Sovereigns ; and  should  this  army  be  kept 
on  the  qui  vive , it  would  almost  certainly  result  in  Blucher’s 
being  again  called  back,  as  he  had  been  on  a former  occasion, 
or  ordered  to  and  up  the  Rhine  to  an  assembly.  The  mere 
retreat  of  the  main  army  from  Napoleon’s  front,  especially  if 
caused  by  a thrust  towards  Chalons,  entailed  Blucher’s  falling 
back,  whereas  by  dividing  his  army  and  moving  against  Blu- 


410  NAPOLEON  THE  EMPEROR  RESPONSIBLE. 


cher,  with  less  than  half  his  forces  he  could  not  possibly  win  a 
battle.  Moreover,  the  Army  of  the  Sovereigns  was  at  hand  and 
could  be  rapidly  attacked,  while  to  reach  Blucher’s  required 
much  manoeuvring.  There  was  risk  in  both  things,  but  there 
was  less  risk  in  attacking  Schwartzenberg.  Of  course  this  did 
not  mean  that  Napoleon  could  still  save  the  empire.  That 
was  doomed,  unless  he  made  friends  of  his  adversary  quickly 
while  in  the  way  with  him.  But  if  he  was  really  waiting  for 
a machine  god,  he  could  gain  more  time  for  the  mechanism  to 
work  by  attending  strictly  to  the  Army  of  the  Sovereigns. 

The  existing  false  military  situation  had  been  brought 
about  by  Napoleon  the  emperor,  not  by  Napoleon  the  captain. 
It  was  the  emperor  who  had  insisted  on  holding  Italy  and  the 
Spanish  frontier,  Hamburg,  Danzig  and  dozens  of  other  for- 
tresses, in  spite  of  the  captain’s  knowledge  that  he  would 
need  in  the  field  all  the  forces  France  controlled.  It  was  the 
emperor  who  would  not  accept  a reasonable  basis  of  peace. 
Had  the  emperor,  at  an  early  enough  moment,  forgotten  his 
desire  to  remain  King  of  Italy,  and  ordered  up  Eugene,  had 
he  waived  all  his  claims  on  Spain,  made  Ferdinand  his  friend, 
and  drawn  in  the  veterans  who  were  now  trapped  in  Spanish 
fortresses,  had  he  not  left  Davout  and  St.  Cyr  in  the  lurch, 
he  would  not  at  present  have  found  himself  at  the  gates  of 
Paris,  facing  over  two  hundred  thousand  allies  with  less  than 
ninety  thousand  men.  With  the  Italian  and  Spanish  divi- 
sions which  he  could  just  as  well  have  had,  with  the  two  able 
marshals  abandoned  on  the  Elbe,  and  with  the  activity  he 
so  pronouncedly  exhibited  in  this  memorable  campaign,  the 
allies  would,  so  far  as  one  can  judge,  have  been  violently 
thrown  back  across  the  Rhine,  and  France  could  surely  have 
closed  the  war  with  the  Rhine-Alps-Pyrenees  frontier,  the 
Frankfort  basis,  to  which  Napoleon  held  so  firmly.  His 
obstinate  effort  to  hold  everything  resulted  in  his  keeping 


GARRISONS  TO  GET  INTO  THE  FIELD. 


411 


nothing.  From  1809  his  old  sense  of  perspective,  of  the  rela- 
tive values  of  things  on  a grand  scale,  had  begun  to  weaken ; 
it  was  now  still  less  sound  ; and  the  loss  of  this  power  of 
rightly  gauging  the  values  in  a problem,  — perhaps  the  great- 
est of  all  intellectual  powers  given  to  man,  — cost  him  his 
empire,  and  France  her  millions  of  money  and  holocausts  of 
men.  Were  not  this  change  in  the  master  mind  so  marked, 
were  it  not  so  positive  a factor  in  his  downward  career,  it 
would  not  be  so  constantly  dwelt  upon. 

It  is  manifest  that  the  emperor  was  beginning  to  recognize 
his  error  in  confining  so  many  men  in  strong  places ; for  on 
March  2 he  told  Clarke  to  write  to  Maisons  to  assemble  the 
garrisons  of  the  towns,  and  to  get  into  the  field  ; to  write  by 
every  means  to  Mainz  for  Morand  to  move  out,  “ beat  the 
poor  stuff  in  front  of  him,  join  the  garrison  of  Landau,  and 
keep  the  field  on  the  rear  of  the  enemy ; ” to  give  the  same 
order  to  the  general  at  Strasburg ; to  order  in  the  same 
fashion  the  governor  of  Metz  to  take  two  thirds  of  the  garri- 
sons of  Metz,  Verdun,  Thionville,  Longwy,  “to  fall  success- 
ively on  the  blockading  forces  and  thus  threaten  the  commu- 
nications of  the  enemy.”  And  on  the  same  day  he  ordered 
him  to  send  agents  by  several  routes  to  Davout,  “ to  make 
him  understand  how  unfortunate  it  is  that  with  an  army  like 
his  own  he  lets  himself  be  blockaded  by  inferior  forces,  and 
does  nothing  for  the  country.”  This  really  goes  to  the  root 
of  the  matter : Napoleon’s  leaving  these  huge  armies  and  the 
various  garrisons  all  over  Europe,  instead  of  collecting  them 
to  fight  in  the  field,  was  the  cause  of  his  eventual  failure. 
Had  he  but  soon  enough  foreseen  events,  had  he  but  correctly 
gauged  his  own  weakness  against  all  Europe  in  arms,  and 
done  this,  the  basis  of  Frankfort,  or  even  a better  one,  would 
have  been  easily  maintained. 

But  it  was  too  late.  The  emperor  was  now  doing  what  he 


412 


BLU CHER’S  DILEMMA. 


should  have  done  three  months  before ; and  there  was  no 
present  means  of  making  these  huge  forces  available,  however 
essential  to  the  struggle  on  hand. 

When,  after  manoeuvring  on  the  Ourcq  against  Marmont 
and  Mortier,  Blucher  learned  that  Napoleon  had  reached  La 
Ferte  sous  Jouarre  March  1,  he  felt  that  his  discreetest  plan 
was  to  join  Billow  and  Winzingerode,  who  were  striving  to 
capture  Soissons,  cross  the  Aube  and  meet  him  in  Oulchy ; 
and  when,  on  March  2,  he  retired  from  in  front  of  the  French 
army  via  Ancienville  and  Neuilly  in  the  direction  of  Fismes, 
it  was  to  take  up  the  line  of  the  Aisne,  and  await  these  rein- 
forcements. He  was  tempted  to  turn  back  in  Oulchy  to 
receive  battle,  but  as  Biilow  and  Winzingerode  had  not  got 
over  the  Aisne,  he  could  not  count  on  their  aid.  He  appar- 
ently failed  to  notice  that  he  was  giving  Napoleon  an  excellent 
chance  of  driving  him  down  river  into  a cul-de-sac,  and  inflict- 
ing a bad  defeat  on  him,  for  although  the  Aisne  can  be  crossed 
on  pontoons,  he  had,  until  Soissons  was  captured,  no  certain 
bridge  over  the  river. 

Napoleon  had  repaired  the  bridge  at  La  Ferte  during 
the  afternoon  of  March  3,  and  the  troops  filed  over  towards 
Chateau  Thierry  and  Fismes.  He  had  recognized  Blucher’s 
dilemma,  and  his  object  was  to  reach  an  Aisne  crossing  before 
the  Army  of  Silesia  and  cut  off  its  connection  with  Rheims. 
Had  he  been  able  to  do  this,  Blucher,  with  Marmont  and 
Mortier  to  the  south  of  him,  Napoleon  to  the  east  of  him,  and 
Soissons  holding  the  only  crossing  of  the  Aisne,  would  have 
had  to  fight  a battle  under  poor  conditions.  Indeed,  Napoleon 
felt  confident  he  had  surrounded  his  enemy,  and  had  him  on 
more  of  a numerical  equality  than  he  could  have  hoped,  added 
to  his  being  in  a bad  strategic  position. 

Luckily  for  the  Prussian  general,  the  fresh  allied  corps  had 
actually  come  up,  and  attacked  Soissons.  Old  and  weak 


BRIDGE  EQUIPMENT  NEEDED. 


413 


General  Moreau,  in  command,  did  not  defend  the  place  with 
the  required  vigor,  and  capitulated  on  March  3,  when  he  had 
been  ordered  to  hold  on  “ to  extinction,”  and  should  have 
held  on  with  more  tenacity,  especially  as  he  could  hear  the 
sound  of  distant  guns,  and  might  have  guessed  that  it  was 
approaching  succor ; and  when  Blucher  heard  that  his  col- 
leagues had  captured  Soissons,  and  the  truth  began  to  dawn 
upon  him,  he  changed  his  direction  for  that  place  and  here- 
crossed  the  Aisne.  Mortier  and  Marmont  followed  him  up 
the  Ourcq  via  Oulchy  on  Hartennes ; the  van  of  the  main 
French  army  reached  Rocourt. 

Without  a pontoon  bridge  it  was  hard  to  manoeuvre,  and 
the  emperor,  March  2,  wrote  to  Joseph:  “ I have  asked  them 
to  send  me  by  day  and  night  marches  the  bridge  equipment 
that  they  announce  to  me  as  having  left  Paris  to-day.  It 
is  my  greatest  need,  for  the  army  of  Schwartzenberg  would 
have  been  destroyed  if  I had  had  the  bridge  equipage  at 
Mery ; and  this  morning  I should  have  destroyed  Blucher  if 
I had  had  one.  I am  preparing  to  carry  the  war  into  Lor- 
raine, where  I will  rally  all  the  troops  that  are  in  my  places 
on  the  Meuse  and  the  Rhine.” 

Next  day  Napoleon  headed  his  forces  on  a parallel  line 
through  Fere  en  Tardenois  towards  Fismes  and  Braine  on  the 
Yesle.  By  March  4 Blucher,  now  at  the  head  of  one  hun- 
dred thousand  men,  had  taken  position  on  the  right  bank  of 
the  Aisne  ready  to  receive  the  French,  who  must  cross  above 
Soissons,  which  Mortier  and  Marmont  were  approaching. 
Napoleon  reached  Fismes. 

It  seems  curious  that  in  his  own  land,  within,  indeed,  a 
couple  of  marches  of  his  own  capital,  Napoleon  should  not 
have  been  able  to  ascertain  what  his  lieutenants  were  doing; 
but  from  Fismes,  March  4,  Berthier  was  instructed  to  write 
to  Soissons  for  news  of  Mortier  and  Marmont,  who  were  to 


414 


MOREAU  TRIED  BY  COURT-MARTIAL. 


push  in  that  direction.  The  Cossacks  held  every  road,  and 
kept  the  enemy  better  informed  than  were  the  French. 

When  the  emperor  learned  of  the  fall  of  Soissons,  he  was 
bitterly  angered  by  its  slight  resistance.  Instead  of  being 
able,  with  his  whole  force,  to  fight  Blucher,  cut  off  from  his 
colleagues  by  an  impassable  river,  he  would  now,  in  order  to 
reach  him,  be  obliged  to  fight  for  his  own  passage  against 
a,  force  threefold  his  own.  He  had  struggled  with  his  brave 
little  soldiers  for  weeks  through  every  kind  of  winter  misery, 
to  find  his  plans  upset  by  the  weakness  of  one  man.  Moreau 
was  tried  by  court-martial,  and  “he  is  to  be  shot  in  the  middle 
of  the  square  of  Greve;  and  let  them  give  much  ceremony  in 
this  execution.  . . . Have  a care  that  finally  an  example  shall 
be  made,”  wrote  the  emperor.  As  a fact,  however,  Moreau 
was  not  shot : whirling  events  stood  him  in  good  stead. 

Although,  on  March  5,  Napoleon  wrote  Joseph  to  announce 
in  the  Moniteur  that  “ the  enemy’s  army,  of  Blucher,  Sacken, 
Yorck,  Winzingerode  and  Billow,  was  in  retreat,  and  without 
the  treason  of  the  commander  at  Soissons,  who  gave  up  its 
gates,  it  had  been  lost,”  his  plans  were  quite  deranged.  To 
go  back  to  the  Seine  would  leave  the  road  to  Paris  open  to 
Blucher,  and  yet  he  feared  that  Schwartzenberg,  plucking  up 
heart  of  hope,  would  again  advance  to  a point  too  near  the 
capital.  But  he  determined  to  keep  on  operating  against  the 
left  of  the  Army  of  Silesia,  for  yet  there  might  be  time  to  turn  it, 
and  force  it  back  into  the  angle  of  the  Aisne  and  Oise;  and  he 
selected  Bery  au  Bac,  where  there  was  a strong  bridge,  as  the 
main  place  to  cross  the  Aisne.  By  this  operation,  if  he  could 
not  accomplish  his  full  aim,  he  would  at  least  crowd  the  Army 
of  Silesia  towards  the  north  and  away  from  Kheims,  which 
was  the  key-point  of  connection  between  the  two  allied  armies. 
On  March  5 the  French  started,  a detachment  was  sent  to 
occupy  Rheims,  and  Marmont  and  Mortier  made  a strong 


BAD  NEWS  FROM  THE  SEINE. 


415 


demonstration  against  Soissons,  now  defended  by  eight  thou- 
sand Russians,  to  call  Blucher’s  attention  away  from  his  left 
flank. 

When  he  should  have  disposed  of  Blucher,  Napoleon  pro- 
posed to  fall  back  via  Chalons  on  Arcis.  He  wrote,  March 
4,  to  Clarke  : “ Blucher  appears  extremely  embarrassed,  and 
changes  direction  every  instant.  I am  hoping  that  that  will 
lead  us  to  a result.  My  intention  then  is  to  carry  the  war 
towards  my  strong  places,  in  manoeuvring  on  the  rear  of 
Schwartzenberg,  who  will  be  obliged  to  come  to  the  right 
about  when  he  sees  his  hospitals,  his  magazines,  his  parks 
and  his  lines  of  operation  menaced  by  me  and  by  Augereau.” 
Had  he  but  concentrated  his  available  forces  two  months 
before,  to  meet  what  then  scarce  seemed  a possibility,  but  had 
become  so  fatal  an  actuality,  had  he  made  it  possible  to  leave 
Paris  well  equipped  for  its  own  defense ; and  had  he  then 
manoeuvred  against  the  allies  as  he  was  now  doing,  the  inva- 
sion of  France  would  have  been  short-lived.  To  say  that  he 
did  not  foresee  a winter  campaign  is  no  answer ; a Napoleon 
should  have  reckoned  on  this  possibility.  The  soldier  who 
admires  the  wonderful  work  in  1814  cannot  always  look  at 
the  case  with  the  impartial  eye  of  the  student  of  history,  who 
alone  aspires  to  the  good  of  the  nations ; and  he  could  wish 
to  see  this  splendid  strategy,  this  alert  and  gallant  tactics, 
carried  out  to  its  legitimate  conclusion. 

The  emperor  heard  bad  news  from  the  Seine.  After  va- 
cating Troyes,  Schwartzenberg  had  retired  to  Chaumont  with 
his  headquarters  and  reserve,  the  rest  of  the  Army  of  the 
Sovereigns  remaining  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Aube,  facing 
Macdonald  at  La  Ferte  and  Oudinot  at  Bar.  But  the  allied 
Guard  and  reserves  had  barely  reached  the  Langres  plateau, 
and  Napoleon  turned  his  back,  when,  learning  February  26 
of  the  fact,  Schwartzenberg  faced  about,  and  Macdonald  and 


416 


BETWEEN  THE  SEINE  AND  YONNE. 


Oudinot  were  in  no  wise  able  to  impose  on  the  allied  com- 
mander. On  February  27  Wittgenstein  and  Wrede  took 
Bar-sur-Aube  ; next  day  Wurtemberg  and  Giulay  captured 
La  Ferte,  and  Schwartzenberg  began  another  slow  advance  ; 
Macdonald  retired  March  2 with  a combat  at  Bar-sur-Seine, 
and  Oudinot  March  8 with  another  on  the  Barse,  and  crossed 
the  Seine  at  Troyes.  Having  vacated  Troyes,  the  allies  took 
possession  of  the  town  on  March  4 ; Macdonald  saw  fit  to  fall 
back  towards  Nogent  and  Bray  March  5,  and  next  day  to 
Meriot  and  Montereau,  sending  the  train  to  Brovins.  A large 
allied  detachment  crossed  the  Seine  on  the  6th  at  Mery  and 
Nogent,  and  Macdonald  still  retiring,  took  up  a position  oppo- 
site Provins,  which  Macdonald  held.  Schwartzenberg  and 
headquarters  remained  ten  days  at  Troyes.  During  these 
manoeuvres  there  had  been  constant  interchanges  between  van 
and  rear  of  the  armies,  and  the  losses  had  run  up  to  nearly 
three  thousand  men  on  each  side.  Wittgenstein  was  wounded 
and  Rajevski  took  his  place  ; Schwartzenberg  was  also  slightly 
wounded. 

Although  the  allies  had  ceased  their  retreat,  Schwartzen- 
berg none  the  less  felt  the  need  of  caution,  for  rumors  were 
afloat  that  Napoleon  would  move  towards  Dijon  to  cut  the 
communications  of  the  allies ; and  having  reached  the  favor- 
able ground  between  the  Seine  and  Yonne,  none  too  inclined 
to  over  speed,  and  still  hoping  for  an  armistice,  he  put  his 
troops  into  cantonments  and  so  remained  from  March  6 until 
March  13.  This  renewed  although  hesitating  threat  to  the 
capital  demanded  immediate  attention  ; but  Napoleon  was 
playing  a bluffing  game,  and  watching  how  far  Schwartzen- 
berg would  adventure  himself,  under  pain  of  having  the  French 
return  and  fall  upon  his  rear. 

Meanwhile  the  emperor  encouraged  his  lieutenants  on  the 
Seine  to  renewed  efforts. 


ON  THE  REAR  OF  THE  ENEMY. 


417 


“ Send  one  of  your  officers  to  Troyes  to  Macdonald  and  Oudinot,”  he 
wrote,  March  4,  to  Joseph,  “ to  let  them  understand  that  I shall  manoeuvre 
by  way  of  Vitry,  St.  Dizier  and  Joinville  on  the  rear  of  the  enemy,  which 
will  make  him  disappear,  and  will  oblige  him  to  leave  the  Seine,  and  go 
diligently  to  guard  his  rear.  This  movement  will  have  the  advantage  of 
raising  the  blockade  of  my  places,  from  which  I shall  withdraw  numerous 
garrisons  and  large  reinforcements.”  Two  days  later  he  instructed  Ber- 
thier  to  notify  Macdonald  of  the  success  obtained,  “ that  I hope  he  will 


VOL.  IV. 


418 


RHEIMS  TAKEN. 


hold  on  at  Troyes,  which  is  a good  position  ; that  in  no  case  is  he  to  quit 
the  Seine,  where  he  is  to  hold  himself  at  least  until  the  12th  ; that  I am 
going  to-day  to  Laon  to  drive  out  the  corps  of  Bernadotte  and  Blucher, 
to  whom  we  are  doing  much  harm  every  day  ; that  I am  having  two 
strong  divisions  of  troops  leave  my  places  in  the  Ardennes  and  Moselle; 
that  the  enemy  is  not  blockading  them,  and  that  I count  on  throwing 
myself  on  the  right  flank  of  their  big  army  by  way  of  St.  Dizier  and 
Joinville,  at  the  time  that  Augereau  will  fall  on  their  left  flank  by  way  of 
Bourg,  Lons  and  Besangon  ; . . . that  the  enemy  is  nowhere  as  strong  as 
he  says  ; . . . that  it  was  a coup  de  main  on  Paris  that  he  attempted  and 
failed.” 

All  this  of  course  came  too  late,  for  Macdonald  and  Oudi- 
not  had  forfeited  the  line  of  the  Seine,  as  indeed  he  might 
have  anticipated. 

Having  garrisoned  Soissons,  Blucher  with  his  six  corps 
chose  a position  between  the  Aisne  and  the  Lette,  on  a high 
plateau  lying  between  the  roads  from  Soissons  and  Bery-au- 
Bac  to  Laon,  to  see  what  the  French  would  undertake ; and 
to  await  operations,  Sacken  and  Winzingerode  stood  from 
Vailly  to  Bery-au-Bac  with  an  outpost  at  Braine;  the  rest  of 
the  army  stood  in  second  line  in  the  Crouy-Chavignon  coun- 
try. Meanwhile  Napoleon  had  to  feel  his  way.  Corbineau 
was  sent  to  Rheims,  which  he  took  with  its  small  allied  gar- 
rison ; Grouchy  was  sent  forward  towards  Braine ; Marmont 
and  Mortier  were  ordered  to  recapture  Soissons,  but  in  this 
they  quite  failed,  despite  a stout  attack  March  5. 

In  taking  Rheims,  Napoleon  had  the  double  purpose  of 
standing  on  Schwartzenberg’s  right  flank,  should  he  advance 
towards  Paris ; or  if  he  stayed  in  place,  he  could  manoeuvre 
around  Blucher’s  left  wing,  and  go  on  with  his  plan  of  throw- 
ing him  into  the  angle  of  the  Aisne  and  Oise.  In  order  to  do 
the  latter  he  must,  however,  seize  the  cross-roads  at  Laon  ; and 
this  was  a far  from  easy  task  from  Fismes,  where  the  army 
now  largely  lay.  There  was  but  one  permanent  bridge  over 


BERY-AU-BAC  BRIDGE  SEIZED. 


419 


the  Aisne  that  he  could  use,  at  Bery-au-Bac,  although  he  pur- 
posed to  throw  truss  bridges  at  Mazy  and  Pont  Arcis  ; and  it 
was  almost  impossible  to  march  over  the  country  roads:  only 
desperate  operations  could  be  conducted  along  any  but  the 
chaussees.  Yet  Napoleon  must  beat  Blucher  before  Sell  wart- 
zenberg  became  dangerous  ; and  in  the  belief  that  he  might 
trust  to  a weak  conduct  of  the  Army  of  the  Sovereigns,  he 
ordered  Nansouty  forward  to  Bery-au-Bac  to  seize  the  bridge, 
which  he  was  fortunate  enough  to  do  by  a surprise,  and 
Friant  and  Meunier  moved  thither  during  the  night  of  March 
5-6.  Marmont  and  Mortier  had  been  ordered  to  follow  Blu- 
cher, if  they  could  capture  Soissons  and  pass  there ; otherwise 
they  were  to  follow  via  Bery. 

Despite  the  superficial  appearance  of  success,  it  is  evident 
that  the  emperor  felt  that  matters  were  not  moving  his  way. 
He  wrote,  March  6,  to  Joseph  that  he  had  just  heard  that 
Troyes  has  been  evacuated.  “ One  cannot  be  worse  seconded 
than  I am.  I left  in  Troyes  a fine  army,  fine  cavalry,  but  it 
wanted  soul.”  And  again,  referring  to  the  superfluity  of  troops 
in  the  fortresses,  he  wrote,  March  6,  to  Clarke : “ For  God’s 
sake,  recommend  Maison  to  get  into  the  field.  Have  reiter- 
ated orders  also  reach  Durutte  at  Metz,  Morand  at  Mainz  and 
the  different  generals,”  to  do  the  same  thing. 

The  capture  of  Braine  had  led  Blucher  to  believe  that  Na- 
poleon was  heading  for  Vailly  : he  did  not  know  that,  despite 
many  orders,  the  French  pontoons  had  not  joined  the  army, 
and  indeed  it  is  doubtful  whether  even  the  light  bridge  equip- 
ment could  have  made  the  marches  which  the  emperor  had 
forced  upon  his  young  soldiers.  To  defend  Vailly,  then,  Blu- 
cher posted  his  left  in  battle  order  at  Ostel,  Bray  and  Cerny, 
and  his  right  from  Filain  to  Ange  Gardien,  and  it  was  this 
error  that  enabled  the  French  to  seize  Bery-au-Bac  and  its 
permanent  bridge.  But  this  was  not  enough:  Napoleon  must 


420  BULOW  AND  YORCK  SENT  TO  LAON. 

hold  Laon,  so  as  to  become  master  of  Blucher’s  line  of  retreat 
from  Soissons  towards  Belgium;  and  to  accomplish  this,  all 
arms  were  hurried  forward ; but  Blucher,  who  stood  ready  to 
fight  between  the  Aisne  and  Lette,  saw  through  the  manoeuvre 
shortly  after  the  French  head  of  column  crossed  the  Aisne, 
and  started  his  train  to  Laon,  while  to  cover  it  he  threw  for- 
ward a force  along  the  plateau  towards  Craonne,  so  as  to 
threaten  the  left  of  the  French  column.  Napoleon  also  had 
foreseen  Blucher’s  possible  operation,  and  before  the  allied 
van  reached  Craonne,  they  found  the  French  in  possession  of 
Bouconville  and  Craonnelle,  and  of  all  the  outlets  from  the 
woods. 

The  plateau  not  being  wide  enough  for  Blucher  to  ma- 
noeuvre with  his  whole  army,  he  chose  rather  to  retire  on 
Laon ; and  to  safely  carry  out  this  operation,  he  sent  Billow 
and  Yorck  to  that  town,  threw  out  Winzingerode’s  infantry 
under  Voronzov  with  Sacken  in  support  to  hold  back  the 
French  from  the  plateau,  while  Winzingerode  himself  with 
ten  thousand  men  and  sixty  guns  was  to  move  across  the 
Lette,  and  during  the  night  of  March  6-7  push  on  Fetieux, 
so  as  to  fall  on  the  flank  and  rear  of  the  French  should  they 
attack  the  plateau.  Kleist  and  Langeron  followed  Winzin- 
gerode. 

Noticing  a considerable  allied  force  on  the  plateau,  Napo- 
leon sent  forward  detachments  to  ascertain  its  size,  and  slight 
combats  ensued  the  evening  of  March  6.  The  Russians  on 
the  plateau  offered  a smart  defense,  and  the  emperor  at  first 
deemed  the  whole  army  of  the  enemy  to  be  present.  The 
position  on  the  plateau  was  strong:  on  the  left  the  Lette  with 
steep  banks,  on  the  right  deep  ravines,  the  plain  below  the  pla- 
teau cut  up  by  numberless  small  ditches,  while  the  slope  was 
excellent  for  artillery  and  had  a good  road  in  the  rear  for 
retreat.  Voronzov  stood  in  front  in  three  lines,  with  artil- 


ALLIES  ATTACKED  TOO  EARLY. 


421 


lery  protecting  the  possible  approaches  from  Craonne,  and 
cavalry  on  the  right  and  left ; Sacken  was  in  the  rear.  Early 
March  7 Napoleon  reconnoitred  the  allied  position  from  an 
adjoining  height : to  attack  the  position  in  front  seemed  im- 
possible, and  he  determined  to  assault  it  from  the  valley  of 
the  Lette.  Ney  was  selected  for  this  purpose,  and  when  Vic- 
tor and  Mortier,  who  were  still  distant,  with  Grouchy  and 


Nansouty,  should  arrive,  they  were  to  move  up  from  the  Fou- 
lon  valley  on  the  other  side.  Meanwhile,  to  gain  time,  the 
emperor  would  cannonade  the  allied  position  from  the  end  of 
the  plateau  near  Craonne.  It  was  understood  that  Ney  was 
to  wait  for  Victor  and  Mortier ; but  again,  as  at  Bautzen, 
there  was  some  misunderstanding  of  orders,  and  Ney  attacked 
Ailles  too  early.  Although  the  ground  covered  Ney’s  ad- 
vance, when  he  arrived  in  touch  with  the  Russians,  he  was 


422 


VICTOR  AND  GROUCHY  WOUNDED. 


far  too  weak.  Luckily,  Victor’s  van  came  up  in  time  to  save 
Ney  from  failure ; he  was  thrown  in  by  way  of  Heurlebise, 
and  went  forward  in  good  style ; but  his  being  shortly 
wounded  upset  the  emperor’s  calculations. 

Blucher  had  harbored  the  idea  of  personally  commanding 
a general  battle  at  this  point,  and  was  waiting  for  Winzinge- 
rode  to  reach  Fetieux ; but  this  officer  got  into  difficulties 
during  the  night  over  the  country  roads,  and  was  far  from  his 
objective.  Kleist  was  then  during  the  forenoon  hurried  up 
towards  Fetieux,  Sacken  was  given  command  of  the  fighting 
on  the  plateau,  and  Blucher  started  out  personally  to  conduct 
the  operation  around  the  French  right. 

Despite  his  wound,  Victor’s  attack  had  attracted  the  atten- 
tion of  Voronzov  to  such  a degree  as  to  enable  Ney,  in  the 
cover  of  the  wooded  slopes,  to  reassemble  his  two  divisions  of 
the  Young  Guard,  which  had  failed  in  their  first  assault,  and 
once  more  to  attack  the  flank  of  the  Russians.  Nansouty 
also  ascended  the  plateau  from  Vassogne  to  occupy  the  right 
of  the  Russians,  but  he  was  without  artillery  and  suffered 
considerable  losses.  Anxious  because  no  real  progress  was 
made,  Napoleon  put  Grouchy  with  all  his  cavalry  in  to  help 
Ney,  but  Grouchy  too  was  wounded  and  his  forces  neutral- 
ized. Ney  sent  many  messages  back  to  the  emperor  that  he 
could  not  hold  himself  unless  supported,  and  Mortier  and 
Charpentier  were  sent  in  through  Heurlebise;  but  Voronzov 
at  this  moment  himself  undertook  the  offensive,  drove  back 
the  columns  which  were  attacking  his  left,  and  the  French 
were  thrown  down  the  slope.  It  looked  like  a Russian  vic- 
tory, but  having  ascertained  that  his  columns,  which  were  to 
turn  the  French  right,  could  not  be  got  up  in  time,  Blucher 
sent  Sacken  word  to  withdraw  from  the  plateau  and  move 
back  on  Laon,  which  he  shortly  proceeded  to  do. 

Napoleon’s  eye  was  quick,  and  perceiving  that  the  enemy 


THE  FRENCH  WIN  THE  BAY. 


423 


was  retiring,  he  sent  forward  all  available  troops  to  again 
seize  the  initiative.  The  advance  was  received  by  a murder- 
ous fire  of  the  Russian  artiller}',  but  night  was  falling,  Sacken 
had  given  Yoronzov  orders  to  retire,  and  the  French  shortly 
drove  what  was  left  of  the  allies  back  from  the  plateau. 

For  their  numbers  the  Russians  had  suffered  severely,  there 
being  over  three  thousand  killed  and  wounded,  including 
almost  all  their  general  officers ; the  French  lost  probably 
more,  with  several  generals,  men  whom  the  emperor  sadly 
needed. 

The  Russians  retired  towards  the  Soissons-Laon  road,  fol- 
lowed by  Napoleon  to  the  line  Filain-Ostel,  in  their  front,  and 
Blucher  slowly  fell  back  to  Laon.  The  French  had  won  the 
day,  but  the  army  was  suffering  terribly  by  its  constant  move- 
ments. The  emperor  wrote,  March  8,  to  Joseph:  “Yesterday, 
the  7th,  I beat  Winzingerode,  Langeron,  Yoronzov,  assembled 
with  the  debris  of  Sacken.  I took  two  thousand  prisoners 
from  them,  some  *guns,  and  pushed  them  from  Craonne  to 
Ange  Gardien.  This  battle  was  glorious.  Yictor  and  Grou- 
chy were  wounded.  I had  seven  or  eight  hundred  men  killed 
or  wounded ; the  loss  of  the  enemy  was  five  or  six  thousand 
men.” 

Blucher  had  gained  his  quiet  retreat  to  Laon.  “ The  battle 
of  Craonne,”  says  Clause witz,  “ was  a successful  and  brilliant 
rearguard  fight.” 

During  this  battle  Napoleon  heard  of  the  ill  issue  of  the 
negotiations  of  Chatillon,  the  allied  ultimatum  being  rejected 
by  his  orders  to  Caulaincourt.  He  could  not  see  that  these 
Pyrrhic  victories  of  his  really  counted  for  nothing ; that  the 
event  must  go  against  him ; and  he  looked  upon  the  offer  of 
the  allies  as  trifling  with  a situation  of  which  he  still  believed 
he  held  the  key.  Ever  since  the  Dresden  days,  Napoleon 
had  been  playing  at  the  game  of  war  with  the  true  gambler’s 


424 


THE  FRENCH  OCCUPY  SOISSONS. 


instinct ; and  he  was  now  risking  all  on  the  Frankfort  basis  of 
peace.  He  was  no  longer  conducting  his  operations  on  scien- 
tific principles.  He  was  struggling  with  approaching  certain 
overthrow,  and  he  would  not  recognize  that  what  he  could 
now  accomplish  was  merely  a delay  of  the  end  which  was  sure 


to  come.  All  that  he  now  did,  in  fact,  was  from  restless 
activity,  rather  than  from  sound  military  policy  which  could 
have  a lasting  effect.  Like  the  man  at  the  gaming-table,  he 
continued  to  bluff  a stronger  hand  than  his  own,  and  mean- 
while strove  for  some  temporary  advantage  which  should  lead 
the  opponent  to  throw  up  his  hand. 

During  the  night  of  March  7-8  Blucher’s  columns  were  on 
the  march  to  Laon.  The  garrison  of  Soissons  evacuated  the 
town,  the  French  occupied  it,  and  Ney,  with  Mortier  and 
Charpentier,  broke  up  during  the  forenoon  of  March  8 along 
the  Soissons  road,  while  Marmont  and  Arrighi  moved  along 
the  road  from  Bery  north.  When  Blucher  assembled  his 
forces  at  Laon,  he  had  nearly  one  hundred  thousand  men,  and 


NEY  THROWN  BACK. 


425 


on  March  8 made  ready  to  receive  battle.  Napoleon  did  not 
believe  that  the  entire  Army  of  Silesia  with  its  reinforcements 
was  there,  and  marched  boldly  forward  with  his  thirty-five 
thousand  men,  as  he  never  would  have  undertaken  to  do  in 
his  better  days.  He  no  longer  counted  the  numbers  of  the 
enemy ; prudence,  even  the  instinct  of  self-preservation,  had 
been  quite  discarded.  If  he  did  not  attack  Blucher,  Blucher 
would  probably  attack  him,  and  for  the  moment  the  victory 
of  Craonne  lent  the  army  its  old  fervor. 

Napoleon  had  failed  to  take  the  army  of  Silesia  unawares : 
he  must  now,  he  thought,  attack  it  in  front  of  Laon,  and  un- 
less he  could  accomplish  something  of  marked  value,  his  whole 
operation  would  be  fruitless.  Ney  was 
hurried  forward  with  all  the  cavalry  to 
reach  the  place  before  Blucher  should 
be  ready,  and  if  possible  to  throw  the 
moving  troops  into  confusion ; but  at 
Etouvelle  he  ran  across  some  Russian 
temporary  defenses  held  by  Chernishev 
across  a defile  between  two  villages  and 
small  marshes.  This  position  Ney  at- 
tacked, but  was  repeatedly  thrown  back, 
and  the  hope  of  getting  possession  of 
Laon  without  a battle  was  wrecked. 

Still,  Napoleon  would  not  change  his 
plan.  Some  of  the  local  authorities 
offered  to  lead  troops  by  night  over 
by-paths  so  as  to  take  the  enemy  in 
flank,  and  believing  in  night  attacks  when  the  population 
was  in  his  favor,  a detachment  of  the  Old  Guard  broke  up  at 
ten  o’clock  to  reach  Chivi  in  rear  of  the  defile  by  a detour. 
At  one  o’clock  this  detachment  fell  upon  the  slumbering 
Russian  right,  and  at  the  same  moment  Ney  rushed  the  defile 


Prussian  Train  Officer. 


426 


THE  SUBURB  OF  VAUX. 


at  the  point  of  the  bayonet ; the  position  was  captured  and 
the  enemy  fled  towards  Laon.  The  surprise  of  Chernishev’s 
troops  was  complete,  and  their  rapid  flight  led  the  French  to 
believe  that  they  might  seize  the  heights  of  Laon  out  of  hand. 
This  they  essayed,  but  batteries  had  been  set  up  across  the 
road  at  the  foot  of  the  hill,  and  the  darkness  prevented  any 
community  of  action.  The  French  fell  back,  and  by  daylight 
Blucher’ s entire  force  was  in  line  about  Laon,  ready  for  bat- 
tle. Biilow’s  corps  was  in  the  town  and  along  the  slopes, 
and  at  their  foot  plenty  of  artillery  ; Langeron,  Sacken  and 
Winzingerode  formed  the  right  flank  of  the  army  between 
Thierret  and  Neuville,  the  reserve  in  the  rear ; Kleist  and 
Yorck  were  the  left  wing  in  two  lines  between  Athies  and 
Yaux.  In  front  of  the  army  strong  outposts  occupied  Clacy, 
Semilly,  Ardon  and  Athies,  which  four  villages  were  like 
bastioned  outworks. 

On  reconnoitring,  Napoleon’s  attention  was  first  attracted 
by  the  suburb  of  Yaux,  at  the  northwesterly  end  of  the 
Laon  hill  and  at  its  foot,  for  through  it  ran  the  road  from 
Rheims  to  Belgium.  To  Marmont  was  committed  the  task 
to  make  Blucher  feel  uncertain  about  this  place  and  his  com- 
munications by  advancing  smartly  from  Corbeny  ; and  under 
cover  of  this  diversion  Napoleon  would  assault  Laon.  But 
Marmont  was  much  belated.  Blucher  was  ready,  and  occa- 
sional guns  showed  that  he  only  awaited  the  lifting  of  the 
fog  to  open  the  battle.  The  emperor  could  not  allow  him 
the  offensive,  and  the  fog  kept  his  movements  covered.  Im- 
patient at  the  delay,  and  hoping  every  moment  that  Marmont 
would  appear,  Boyer  was  sent  forward  to  take  Semilly,  and 
part  of  Mortier  to  attack  Ardon,  while  the  main  French  force 
drew  up  between  Leully  and  Clacy,  Mortier  on  the  right,  Ney 
on  the  left,  Nansouty  in  reserve.  After  a sharp  struggle  these 
villages  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  French,  the  allies  only 


VILLAGES  TAKEN  AND  LOST. 


427 


answering  by  heavy  artillery  fire.  This  lasted  until  10  A.  M., 
when  the  fog  began  to  rise,  and  Blucher,  being  able  to  see 
in  front  of  him,  undertook  the  offensive.  Winzingerode  was 
sent  against  Clacy,  a convenient  place  from  which  to  threaten 
the  French  left,  and  Cossacks  were  sent  out  towards  Mons 
beyond  it.  In  this  vicinity  the  battle  wavered  to  and  fro  for 
some  time,  the  villages  being  taken  and  lost  again  and  again, 
neither  leader  being  willing  to  attempt  anything  decisive. 
Blucher  had  an  idea  that  the  attack  on  his  right  was  only 
a demonstration,  and  that  the  main  attack  would  come  along 
the  road  from  Bery  ; Napoleon,  on  the  contrary,  was  holding 
back  his  forces  until  Marmont  should  impress  just  this  idea 
of  great  strength  upon  his  opponent.  The  emperor  had  sent 
towards  Marmont  several  staff  officers  and  couriers,  all  of 
whom  were  captured  or  lost  their  way,  the  Cossacks  roving- 
over  the  whole  country ; but  one  of  the  messages  which  reached 
Blucher  showed  him  what  the  French  leader’s  intention  really 
was,  and  to  meet  this  he  prepared  to  attack  Marmont  before 
his  arrival,  and  neutralize  him  for  the  day.  Napoleon  held 
off  till  nearly  4 P.  M. ; he  could  then  wait  no  longer,  as  he 
heard  nothing  from  Marmont,  not  even  a gun ; his  last  troops 
in  the  left  wing  were  coming  up,  and  he  ordered  a general 
attack,  so  as  to  secure  the  villages  for  the  night.  Charpen- 
tier,  Boyer,  Curial  and  Friant  pressed  in  on  Clacy  and  took 
it.  Mons  was  also  taken,  but  Ardon  could  not  be  captured, 
Poret’s  division  being  almost  destroyed  by  Billow.  Night 
came  on  and  the  battle  ended. 

From  soon  after  midday  until  four  or  five  o’clock  Mar- 
mont, who  had  been  cleverly  held  back  by  the  allied  cavalry 
outposts,  had  fought  his  way  forward  to  near  Athies,  taking 
position  across  the  road  upon  a slight  height.  His  troops 
were  so  tired  that  little  could  be  attempted  during  the  evening 
hours  ; yet  although  held  back  by  the  superior  allied  artillery, 


428 


PLAN  AGAINST  MARMONT. 


Athies  was  attacked  and  the  town  set  afire,  the  Prussians 
withdrew,  the  French  marched  in,  and  Marmont  deemed  his 
day’s  work  finished.  As  he  had  had  no  word  from  the  em- 
peror, he  sent  a cavalry  party  with  some  guns  off  to  the  left 
to  seek  his  chief  and  get  orders.  The  fighting  ended,  and 
the  French  troops  bivouacked  in  the  neighboring  villages. 

This  was  the  moment  which  energetic  Blucher  had  chosen 
for  executing  his  plan  against  Marmont.  Langeron  and 
Sacken,  with  all  the  Russian  mounted  artillery  and  a good 
deal  of  horse,  were  drawn  from  the  allied  right  to  reinforce 
Yorck  and  Kleist,  and  these  forces,  in  close  column  and  with- 
out firing  a shot,  were  to  move  forward  upon  Marmont,  while 
his  right  was  turned  by  Prussian  cavalry. 

With  little  idea  of  what  was  in  store  for  them,  Marmont’s 
men  were  quietly  resting  from  their  unusual  exertions,  when 
out  of  the  dark  the  attack  fell  upon  them.  Prince  William 
captured  Athies,  the  cavalry  under  Ziethen  turned  their 
right.  The  French  raw  troops  fell  into  panic ; the  officers 
did  what  they  could,  but  a sauve  qui  pent  was  started,  and 
the  corps  retired  in  considerable  confusion.  Marmont  made 
every  effort  to  arrest  the  flight,  but  nothing  could  really  be 
accomplished  until  Fetieux  was  reached.  Not  only  his  field 
artillery  but  his  reserve  park  was  taken;  few  guns  escaped. 
Three  thousand  French  were  captured,  the  enemy’s  losses 
being  barely  three  hundred  men. 

Still  in  doubt  as  to  Marmont’s  position  or  state,  the  em- 
peror, although  he  must  have  heard  the  firing,  about  midnight 
issued  orders  for  next  day.  Charpentier  and  Boyer,  sus- 
tained by  Ney,  Friant,  some  cavalry  and  the  reserve,  were 
to  break  up  at  six  o’clock  from  Clacy  and  push  the  allied  right 
back  to  Neuville  ; Marmont  was  to  keep  the  Silesian  army  off 
the  road  from  Laon  to  Mery ; Mortier  in  the  centre  was  to 
take  place  behind  Ardon  and  when  necessary  sustain  the 


THE  BATTLE  BEGUN  ANEW. 


429 


general  attack,  which  in  effect  was  to  turn  Laon,  by  both 
right  and  left,  and  to  contain  it  along  the  road  to  Sois- 
sons.  This  was  a desperate  matter  to  undertake  with  an 
army  of  thirty  thousand  men  against  thrice  the  number  of 
good  troops  well  posted  in  their  front.  But  Napoleon  was 
desperate. 

The  disaster  of  Marmont  on  the  evening  before,  which  it 
adds  much  to  the  credit  of  the  Cossacks  that  Napoleon  did 
not,  though  in  his  own  country,  yet  know,  rendered  his  orders 
futile ; and  after  issuing  them,  he  got  the  news  from  some  of 
the  fleeing  troops,  who,  as  runaways  will  do,  had  dispersed  in 
all  directions.  Seemingly  impossible,  the  disaster  soon  proved 
true,  and  he  now  saw  that  in  order  to  accomplish  what  he  had, 
Blucher  must  have  disgarnished  his  centre  and  right ; and 
from  this  he  drew  the  conclusion  that  he  had  much  less  in  his 
front  than  was  actually  the  case. 

Upon  this  slender  assumption  the  emperor  began  the  battle 
anew  March  9.  Blucher  had  felt  certain  that,  after  the  dis- 
aster to  Marmont,  Napoleon  would  withdraw  to  Soissons;  and 
in  this  view  he  had  ordered  Yorck  and  Kleist  to  follow  Mar- 
mont to  Bery-au-Bac,  and  St.  Priest,  who,  coming  up  from  the 
Meuse  had  surprised  Bheims,  was  to  take  him  in  rear.  Lan- 
geron  and  Sacken  were  to  move  down  by  way  of  Bruyeres  to 
the  Lette,  so  as  from  there  to  act  as  opportunity  offered  on 
the  French  flank  or  rear.  Winzingerode  and  Biilow  mean- 
while, in  front  of  and  in  Laon,  were  to  watch  the  emperor’s 
movements,  and  so  soon  as  he  withdrew,  to  follow  hard  upon. 
The  projected  pursuit  along  the  Bheims  road  had  already  been 
arrested  during  the  night  by  a diversion  by  Fabvier,  who  had 
been  moving  on  Ardon,  and,  hearing  a tremendous  firing  on 
the  Bheims  road,  moved  back  and  threw  himself  on  the  flank 
of  the  pursuing  Prussians.  He  was  joined  by  some  of  the 
Marmont  runaways,  and  this  movement,  aided  by  the  dark- 


480 


FRENCH  LINES  WELL  ARRANGED. 


ness,  stopped  the  Prussians  at  a position  not  far  from  Aippes. 
At  daylight,  however,  they  continued  their  forward  movement 
in  pursuit. 

Blucher  was  astonished  that  Napoleon  did  not  show  signs 
of  moving  to  the  rear.  He  could  see  from  the  walls  of  the 
town  a small  body,  not  exceeding  twenty  thousand  men,  sur- 
rounded by  a swamp,  with  a defile  in  the  rear,  with  sixty  thou- 
sand Prussians  off  on  their  right,  starting  in  to  attack  a strong 
place  defended  by  forty  thousand  men.  This  singular  sight, 
which  he  could  understand  only  to  mean  something  hidden, 
made  the  old  marshal  pause,  and  he  sent  orders  to  Langeron, 
Sacken,  Yorck  and  Kleist  to  stop  wherever  they  were,  and 
to  leave  pursuing  Marmont  to  the  cavalry.  Winzingerode 
at  Clacy  was  ordered  not  to  open  the  fight,  but  he  had 
already  done  so  before  the  order  reached  him. 

The  French  during  the  night  had  arranged  their  lines 
well.  Charpentier  at  Clacy  held  back  his  fire  until  the  Rus- 
sian battalions  were  at  point-blank  range,  when  he  opened 
on  them,  and  drove  them  back  into  the  woods.  By  accident, 
Ney  at  Mons,  supposing  that  the  Russians  were  in  Clacy, 
opened  fire  on  the  French  troops  which  held  the  town,  with 
regrettable  loss.  Blucher  withdrew  Sacken  and  Langeron  to 
Neuville,  and  called  the  other  corps  back  to  the  position  of 
the  day  before.  The  whole  morning  was  taken  up  by  more 
or  less  severe  fighting  between  Mons,  Clacy  and  Semilly : 
the  Russians  were  thrown  back  five  times  by  Charpentier,  yet 
nothing  decisive  was  accomplished.  About  2 p.  M.  Napoleon 
thought  he  perceived  a movement  of  the  Prussians  on  the 
heights  of  Laon,  indicating  that  Blucher  was  evacuating  the 
town,  and  he  threw  upon  it  Curial  and  Meunier ; but  these 
divisions,  though  they  reached  the  first  slopes  of  the  hill, 
were  met  by  such  heavy  artillery  fire,  followed  by  a bayonet 
attack,  that  they  were  fain  to  retire. 


THE  WAITING  GAME. 


431 


Still,  Napoleon  would  not  withdraw  from  Blucher’s  front. 
Indeed,  he  believed  he  might  draw  down  upon  him  the  whole 
Army  of  Silesia  if  he  showed  weakness.  He  sent  Drouot  and 
Belliard  to  see  whether  an  attack  could  be  made  upon  the 
enemy’s  left  between  Cerny  and  Neuville  ; but  these  officers 
brought  back  word  that  it  was  impossible,  and  Napoleon 
determined  to  retire  to  Soissons.  Drawing  up  his  artillery 
skillfully  and  opening  with  it,  the  army  passed  the  defile  at 
Etouvelle,  and  by  midnight  was  well  on  the  way  to  Soissons. 
Blucher  undertook  nothing.  This  looks  like  lack  of  enter- 
prise ; but  there  was  no  general  of  the  day  who  willingly 
met  this  great  soldier  on  the  battlefield.  Every  one  bore 
marks  of  his  wonderful  grand-tactics.  Both  Blucher  and 
Schwartzenberg  were  wise  in  playing  the  waiting  game  : what 
they  may  have  lost  in  access  of  reputation  as  fighting  gen- 
erals, they  more  than  won  in  solid  results. 

Not  counting  Marmont,  the  French  losses  were  nearly  four 
thousand  men  in  the  battle  of  Laon  ; Blucher  lost  less.  The 
movement  from  Troyes  to  Laon  with  its  battles  had  cost 
Napoleon  twelve  thousand  men,  whom  he  could  ill  spare. 

In  the  march  on  Laon  there  was  no  necessity  for  Napoleon 
to  attack  the  Russians  at  Craonne,  suggests  Clausewitz,  when 
he  could  have  sent  troops  across  the  river  to  take  them  in 
reverse.  This  was,  he  thinks,  a mistake,  but  it  was  a slight 
one ; an  undeniable  error  was  in  calculating  to  fight  the  battle 
of  Laon  in  two  separate  bodies,  and  of  this  Napoleon  ought 
not  to  have  been  guilty. 

That  Blucher  did  not  pursue  may  have  been  due  to  the 
fact  that  under  his  seventy-two  years  the  old  commander  was 
almost  broken  down  by  his  winter  campaign,  had  been  sick 
for  two  or  three  days,  and  on  the  second  day’s  fight  at  Laon 
was  not  able  to  keep  in  the  saddle.  His  chief  of  staff,  Gnei- 
senau,  carried  forward  his  orders ; but  he  did  not  yet  feel 


432 


MARMONT  SCORED. 


warranted  in  undertaking  a work  which  the  leader’s  eye  had 
not  seen  ; and  principally  for  this  reason  also  the  Army  of 
Silesia  remained  nine  days  in  place. 

The  Correspondence  contains  little  about  the  battle  of 
Laon. 

The  emperor  wrote,  March  10,  to  Joseph  : “ The  position  of  Laon  being 
extremely  favorable  ” (for  the  enemy),  “ I was  content  yesterday  to  ob- 
serve and  reconnoitre  him.  This  army  is  more  dangerous  than  Schwart- 
zenberg’s.  Nevertheless,  I shall  draw  near  Soissons  so  as  to  be  nearer 
Paris.  . . . Marmont,  who  was  marching  from  Bery-au-Bac  on  Laon,  ar- 
rived near  the  town.  He  had  constantly  pushed  back  the  enemy,  but  at 
night,  as  he  was  taking  position,  there  was  a sudden  rush  of  the  enemy, 
which  put  his  infantry  into  disorder.  The  soldiers  lost  their  heads,  and 
he  was  obliged  to  fall  back  several  leagues.  . . . This  is  only  an  accident 
of  war,  but  very  annoying  at  a moment  when  I need  good  luck.  This  has 
determined  me  not  to  attack  to-day,  for  I had  already  made  my  disposi- 
tions vigorously  to  engage  the  enemy  whatever  his  superiority  in  num- 
bers.” He  then  orders  thirty  thousand  men  to  be  raised  “ in  all  that 
population  which  has  taken  refuge  in  Paris,  and  among  all  the  workmen 
who  are  without  work.  This  levy  should  be  made  under  the  title  of  Levy 
in  Mass  of  the  National  Guards.  Seeing  that  you  have  muskets,  this 
ought  to  be  easy.”  Next  day  he  wrote  to  Joseph  : “I  reconnoitred  the 
position  of  the  enemy  at  Laon.  It  was  too  strong  to  be  attacked  without 
great  losses.  I then  decided  to  return  to  Soissons.  It  is  probable  that 
the  enemy  would  have  evacuated  Laon,  for  fear  of  being  attacked  there, 
but  for  the  unfortunate  disaster  of  Marmont,  who  behaved  like  a sub- 
lieutenant. . . . The  Young  Guard  melts  like  snow,  the  Old  Guard  holds 
together.  My  horse  Guard  also  melts.  It  is  indispensable  that  Ornano 
should  take  all  measures  to  remount  all  the  dragoons  and  chasseurs,  and 
first  of  all  the  old  soldiers.” 

Poor  Marmont  had  previously  come  in  for  a scoring  in  a letter  to 
Clarke,  March  4 : “ You  send  me  letters  of  Marmont  which  tell  nothing. 
The  excessive  vanity  of  this  marshal  is  to  be  seen  in  all  his  letters.  He 
is  always  misunderstood  by  everybody.  It  is  he  who  has  done  every- 
thing, counseled  everything.  It  is  annoying  that,  with  some  talent,  he  is 
unable  to  disembarrass  himself  of  this  folly,  or  at  least  so  to  maintain 
himself  that  it  should  rarely  escape  him.” 


RHEIMS  RECAPTURED. 


433 


There  was  no  change  of  position  at  Soissons  on  March  12 ; 
bat  hearing  at  eventide  that  St.  Priest  had  surprised  and 
taken  Rheims,  Napoleon,  who  here  received  some  reinforce- 
ments, determined  to  recapture  this  place,  the  point  of  com- 
munication between  the  two  allied  armies.  Some  small  suc- 
cess was  demanded  to  counteract  the  failure  at  Laon.  Mortier 
was  left  to  hold  Soissons,  Ney  was  started  for  Fismes  that 
evening,  the  emperor  following  with  the  Old  Guard  soon  after 
midnight,  and  Marmont  was  ordered  to  head  for  Rheirns  early 
the  13th,  while  a detachment  held  the  Bery  bridge.  Rheims 
was  reached  about  four  o’clock.  St.  Priest  and  Jagov  stood 
in  front  of  the  town  on  the  Fismes  road.  Attacking  them 
smartly,  Napoleon  drove  their  forces  across  the  Vesle;  St. 
Priest  was  mortally  wounded,  and  the  army  fell  into  disorder. 
Napoleon  forced  the  Yesle.  The  resistance  of  the  allied  rear- 
guard was  spirited  enough  to  hold  the  place  till  midnight ; 
but  the  French  superiority  told,  the  enemy  vacated  the  city, 
and  retired  in  disorder.  The  rearguard  dispersed.  The 
enemy  lost  eleven  guns,  twenty-five  hundred  prisoners  and 
over  two  thousand  killed  and  wounded.  The  French  lost  one 
thousand  in  all.  This  operation  was  full  of  the  old  Bona- 
parte elan  ; but  in  view  of  all  the  circumstances,  it  was  but 
one  more  bout  in  the  duel,  in  which  the  weaker  was  deter- 
mined to  die  game.  In  Rheims  Napoleon  received  news  of 
Schwartzenberg’s  probable  advance  towards  Paris. 

To  those  who  know  the  Frenchman’s  national  dress,  it  will 
be  interesting  to  learn  that  on  March  5 it  was  ordered  that 
the  National  Guard  should  be  uniformed  in  the  Gallic  blue 
blouses,  with  helmets  and  cartridge-boxes  in  black  leather. 

“By  this  means  every  workman,  every  bourgeois,  puts  on  his  blouse 
and  is  at  once  in  uniform.  . . . This  dress  seems  to  me  so  convenient 
that  perhaps  some  day  I shall  adopt  it  for  the  troops  of  the  line.”  This 
was  simpler  than  khaki. 


VOL.  IV. 


434  SCANT  GRACE  TO  WAR  CORRESPONDENTS. 


On  March  14  Napoleon  wrote  Clarke  : “ The  bridge  equipage  that  you 
have  sent  me  is  very  precious,  but  it  is  heavy,  and  for  little  rivers  like 
the  Aisne,  the  Oise  and  the  Marne,  it  is  necessary  to  make  one  as  light 
as  possible.  Little  boats  are  needed,  made  partly  with  heavy  water-tight 
canvas.” 

The  emperor  gave  scant  grace  to  war  correspondents.  On  February 
26  he  wrote  Berthier  : “ An  individual  has  been  sent  by  the  minister  of 
police  to  write  up  the  campaign.  Send  him  back  to  Paris.  Write  to  the 
minister  that  I am  surprised  that  he  should  send  out  agents  without  my 
permission,  that  I have  need  of  other  things  than  men  to  write  up  the 
events  of  the  campaign,  and  that  he  could  better  employ  his  money  than 
in  follies  such  as  this.” 

On  March  12  he  wrote  Joseph,  reproaching  him  for  sug- 
gesting to  the  empress  to  solicit  her  father’s  protection : “ I 
do  not  want  to  be  protected  by  my  wife  ; that  idea  would  spoil 
her  and  make  us  quarrel.  . . . The  Emperor  of  Austria  can 
do  nothing  because  he  is  feeble,  and  led  by  Metternich,  who 
is  bought  by  England.  That  is  the  secret  of  everything.” 


French  Grenadier. 


LXIX. 


ARCIS-SUR-AUBE.  MARCH  14  TO  APRIL  11,  1814. 

During  the  Laon  campaign  Macdonald  had  been  gradually  forced  back,  and 
on  Napoleon’s  marching  south,  made  ready  to  join  him.  Napoleon  reached 
Epernay  the  17th  and  headed  for  Arcis.  Alexander  had  determined  to  stop 
the  weak  manoeuvring  and  advance  in  one  body  on  Paris,  and  Blucher  was 
ordered  in  to  the  main  army,  while  Schwartzenberg  was  to  fight  if  attacked. 
Napoleon  did  not  believe  the  allies  would  stand,  but  that  his  appearance  would 
drive  them  back.  Instead  of  waiting  for  Macdonald  and  Oudinot  to  join  him  at 
Arcis,  on  March  20  he  fought  the  enemy  in  front  of  the  town  in  the  belief  that 
Schwartzenberg  was  protecting  his  retreat.  Next  day,  after  careless  recon- 
noitring, he  made  ready  to  attack  afresh,  and  suddenly  found  that  with  a 
mere  handful  of  men  he  was  running  against  the  whole  allied  army.  The  situa- 
tion was  desperate,  but  he  cleverly  withdrew  across  the  Aube.  Thereupon  he 
opened  a manoeuvre  towards  his  fortresses,  to  draw  in  the  garrisons  and  move 
upon  the  enemy’s  communications,  and  ordered  in  Mortier  and  Marmont,  be- 
lieving that  the  allies  would  retire  to  the  Rhine.  But  this  was  not  to  be.  In 
moving  down  towards  Schwartzenberg,  Blucher  cut  Marmont  and  Mortier  off 
from  Napoleon ; and  both  allied  armies  marched  towards  Paris,  defeating  these 
marshals  in  several  minor  engagements,  and,  as  they  had  a line  of  retreat 
through  Belgium,  entirely  disregarding  Napoleon’s  manoeuvre.  Napoleon  awoke 
to  the  situation  only  March  27,  when  he  found  that  Marmont  and  Mortier  alone 
were  between  the  allies  and  Paris,  while  the  enemy  was  three  marches  ahead  of 
him.  He  at  once  followed.  Marmont  and  Mortier  did  their  best  to  protect  the 
capital,  upon  which  the  allied  armies  deliberately  marched ; but  when  Napo- 
leon reached  Fontainebleau,  he  found  that  Paris  had  capitulated  March  30. 
Had  the  marshals  of  the  army  stood  by  him,  he  would  still  have  endeavored  to 
fight  the  enemy,  but  his  credit  was  gone,  no  one  now  listened  to  him,  and  on 
April  4,  and  later  April  11,  he  abdicated. 

During  March  14  Napoleon  remained  in  Rheims.  Mar- 
mont on  the  11th  and  12th  was  at  Fismes,  and  on  the  18th 
moved  towards  the  emperor.  Along  the  Seine  and  Aube 
things  remained  quiet.  Schwartzenberg,  still  in  the  Troyes- 


436 


UNDERTAKING  TOO  MUCH . 


Mery  country,  with  Barclay  in  Chaumont,  his  right  at  Pont- 
sur-Seine,  his  left  at  Sens,  and  detachments  out  beyond  the 
Seine,  which  were  faced  by  Macdonald  and  Oudinot  in  front 
of  Provins,  between  Nogent  and  Montereau,  having  heard  on 
the  13th  the  result  of  the  battle  of  Laon,  collected  his  forces 
to  advance  on  his  opponent;  but  the  news  of  Napoleon’s 
being  in  Rheims  again  held  him  back ; he  called  in  Barclay 
and  merely  put  over  Wrede  and  Wittgenstein  at  Pont-sur- 
Seine,  and  until  March  17  there  was  small  change.  Napoleon 
kept  in  mind  his  purpose  of  operating  towards  his  fortresses 
and  on  the  rear  of  the  allies,  writing  from  Rheims,  March  16, 
to  Berthier : “ Order  Ney  to  make  a proclamation  to  the 
inhabitants  of  Lorraine,  Alsatia  and  the  Vosges.  Let  him 
speak  of  our  successes,  that  the  moment  will  soon  arrive  when 
I shall  move  towards  them.  Let  them  hold  themselves  in 
readiness.  Let  them  ring  the  tocsin  as  soon  as  the  guns 
tell  them  of  our  approach.  Let  them  fall  on  the  rear  of 
the  enemy,  and  show  themselves  worthy  of  what  they  have 
always  been.”  The  emperor  was  not  only  laboring  under 
the  delusion  that  he  had  got  the  allies  on  the  run,  but  he 
was  undertaking  too  much.  He  not  only  seriously  needed 
to  rest  his  young  soldiers,  wearied  by  poor  food  and  cross- 
country marches,  before  again  advancing  on  the  Army  of  the 
Sovereigns,  though  this  seemed  about  to  renew  operations ; 
but  he  also  needed  reinforcements.  Troops  had  to  be  got 
from  whatever  source,  for  the  several  levies  furnished  too 
few,  and  the  daily  losses  were  great.  On  March  15  he  wrote 
to  Clarke : “ I am  told  that  there  are  still  man}7'  troops  dis- 
seminated. They  assure  me  there  are  six  hundred  men  of 
the  line  at  Moulins.  What  are  they  doing  there  ? The  Bu- 
reau of  Movement  should  note  all  these  detachments  and 
pick  them  up.”  And  on  March  15  to  Marmont : “ Try  to 
recruit  some  men  in  the  villages.  . . . Many  peasants  who 


THE  POLITICAL  SITUATION.  437 

have  been  ruined  ask  nothing  better  to-day  than  to  serve.  . . . 
Anyhow,  try.” 

On  March  17  Macdonald,  whose  left  was  attacked  by  Witt- 
genstein, fell  back  to  Maison  Rouge,  half-way  to  Nangis,  and 
Schwartzenberg  spread  out  his  forces  so  as  to  hold  Troyes, 
Mery  and  Nogent  on  the  Seine,  and  Arcis  and  Lesmont  on 
the  Aube,  in  the  effort  both  to  reach  out  towards  Paris,  and 
to  protect  himself  from  a turning  operation  by  the  emperor. 
Viewed  critically,  this  delay  on  the  part  of  Schwartzenberg 
looks,  as  did  Blucher’s  conduct,  wanting  in  true  military 
spirit ; but  notwithstanding  its  weak  appearance,  it  was 
founded  on  political  and  strategic  wisdom.  The  allied  troops 
were  kept  in  good  condition,  while  Napoleon’s  army  was 
wasting  its  strength  like  a wild  animal  dashing  itself  against 
the  bars  of  its  cage ; and  not  only,  despite  Napoleon’s  insist- 
ence on  the  Frankfort  basis,  was  there  still  some  chance  left 
of  peace  at  Chatillon,  but  other  aspects  of  the  political  situa- 
tion dominated  the  allied  headquarters ; for  although  all  were 
acting  together  against  him  they  deemed  the  arch  disturber 
of  the  peace  of  Europe,  there  were  many  points  of  difference 
between  the  allied  monarchs  themselves  yet  to  be  settled  with 
regard  to  the  future.  It  was  not  merely  a question  of  curbing 
France  and  of  taking  away  what  they  looked  on  as  her  ill- 
gotten  gains,  but  the  more  serious  one  of  how  to  divide  the 
spoils.  And  the  latter  was  not  only  hard  to  settle,  but  the 
question  bred  a tendency  towards  delay  and  consequent  shift- 
less conduct  of  the  campaign,  which  had  not  been  so  apparent 
in  the  earlier  stages  of  allied  work  at  Dresden  and  at  Leipsic. 
Moreover,  the  Emperor  of  Austria  had  at  times  held  back  out 
of  interest  for  his  daughter. 

After  the  battle  of  Laon,  although  matters  had  not  gone 
his  way,  Napoleon  rightly  gauged  the  probability  of  Blucher’s 
remaining  quiet  for  some  days  ; and  much  as  he  needed  rein- 


438 


TO  STOP  BLUCHER. 


forcements,  he  deemed  the  time  auspicious  to  try  once  more 
on  Schwartzenberg  the  scheme  which  had  succeeded  so  well 
before.  He  believed  the  enemy  would  spread  over  much  ter- 
ritory and  could  be  attacked  in  detail,  and  wrote,  March  17, 
to  Berthier  to  instruct  Marmont  “ that  he  is  to  make  all  the 
movements  possible  with  his  cavalry  to  impose  on  Blucher 
and  gain  time.  That  if  Blucher  passes  the  Aisne,  he  is  to 
dispute  the  ground  and  cover  the  road  to  Paris.  That  it  is 
probable  that  my  movements  will  oblige  the  enemy  to  recross 
the  Seine,  which  will  stop  Blucher,  and  permit  me  to  dispose 
of  Macdonald,  whom  I will  then  send  him.  . . . Let  him  pre- 
pare everything  needed  to  destroy  the  bridge  at  Bery-au-Bac 
in  case  anything  happens.”  Then  calling  Mortier  in  to 
Rheims,  and  heading  Ney  on  Chalons,  he  left  for  the  Seine. 

In  a Note  dictated  at  Rheims  March  17,  Napoleon  has  left 
a clear  and  detailed  resume  of  the  several  operations  he  could 
undertake,  worked  out  with  the  hours’  march  each  would  re- 
quire. The  first  was  to  move  to  Arcis,  cross  the  Aube  and  be  on 
the  march  towards  Mery  or  Troyes  on  the  20th.  Learning  Na- 
poleon’s presence  in  Fere  Champenoise  the  night  of  the  19th, 
the  enemy  would  speedily  fall  back.  Ney  would  reach  Arcis 
at  the  same  time ; having  got  his  pontoon  bridge,  Napoleon 
would  cross  where  he  pleased,  and  it  was  probable  that  this, 
the  boldest  of  the  plans,  would  much  disconcert  the  enemy. 
The  second  plan  would  be  to  march  via  Sezanne  to  Provins. 
But  by  this  route  the  roads  were  bad,  though  from  Sezanne 
Meaux  could  be  reached  if  desired,  in  lieu  of  Provins.  The 
third  plan  would  be  to  march  directly  on  Meaux  by  the  post- 
road. One  could  reach  that  place  the  20th,  and,  should  he 
have  advanced  so  far,  attack  the  enemy  the  21st.  The  first 
plan  carried  with  it  a strong  moral  effect,  but  its  results  could 
not  be  foretold.  The  second  would  cut  the  enemy  off  from 
Paris  by  the  right  bank  of  the  Seine ; but  the  march  on  the 


THREE  COURSES  TO  TAKE. 


439 


country  cross-roads  would  unnecessarily  fatigue  the  troops. 
The  third  was  the  safest  because  it  most  directly  protected 
Paris ; but  in  case  it  led  to  battle,  it  would  have  been  pre- 
ceded by  no  moral  gain.  Of  these  three  plans  the  emperor 
chose  the  most  enterprising,  as  liable  to  produce  a decided 
effect  on  the  Army  of  the  Sovereigns. 

It  is  interesting  to  gauge  the  manner  of  this  great  man, 
now  fighting  for  existence  against  all  Europe,  by  reading  his 
own  words : — 

“ Rheims,  March  17,  Note  dictated  by  Napoleon  : ‘There  are  three 
courses  to  take.  The  first  is  to  go  to  Arcis-sur-Aube,  thirteen  leagues. 
One  would  be  there  to-morrow,  18th.  One  can  cross  the  Aube  the  19th, 
and  be  in  the  night  of  19th-20th  at  M£ry  or  at  Troyes.  It  is  probable 
that  the  enemy  will  know,  day  after  to-morrow,  that  I pass  the  night  to- 
morrow at  Fere  Champenoise.  From  this  moment  this  diversion  will 
have  been  made  ...  in  the  day  of  the  19th.  Ney  will  be  at  Arcis-sur- 
Aube  at  the  same  time  as  I shall  ; we  will  pass  the  Aube,  and  the  20th 
we  will  be  at  Troyes.  ...  I believe  the  headquarters  ” (of  the  enemy) 
“ are  at  Troyes.  This  project  is  the  most  daring,  the  results  are  incalcu- 
lable.” 

“ Second.  To  move  on  Sezanne,  and  from  Sezanne  to  Provins.  To  begin 
with,  these  are  the  worst  roads.  From  here  to  Sezanne  are  nine  leagues, 
from  Sezanne  to  Provins  nine  leagues.  . . . The  cavalry  could  be  to-mor- 
row, 18th,  at  Sezanne,  if  there  is  no  cavalry  of  the  enemy.  It  would  be 
obliged  to  wait  for  the  artillery.  On  the  19th  Ney  could  not  be  there, 
and  would  be  obliged  to  come  through  this  place.  From  Sezanne  to 
Meaux,  by  way  of  Coulommiers  and  La  Fertd  Gaucher,  fifteen  leagues. 
Once  at  Sezanne,  one  could  go  to  Meaux,  one  could  reach  it  in  two  good 
marching  days.  There  are,  therefore,  from  here  to  Meaux,  by  way  of 
Sezanne,  twenty-four  leagues.  One  would  be  master  also  to  go  there 
from  here,  through  Fere  Champenoise,  seven  leagues,  from  Fere  Cham- 
penoise to  Sezanne,  four  leagues,  from  Sezanne  to  Meaux,  fifteen  leagues. 
There  would  be  from  here  to  Meaux,  passing  through  Fere  Champenoise, 
twenty-seven  leagues  instead  of  twenty-four,  that  is,  three  leagues  more. 

“ Third.  Finally,  the  third  project  would  be  to  go  straight  on  Meaux 
by  the  high  road.  From  here  to  Meaux  there  are  twenty-one  leagues  ; 
we  could  be  there  early  the  20th  . . . and  attack  the  enemy  the  21st. 


440 


AN  UNSOUND  BELIEF. 


“ Each  of  these  three  projects  has  its  character  ; the  first  is  the  most 
daring,  gives  great  fright  to  the  enemy  and  yields  unexpected  results. 
The  second  is  an  inconvenient  move  over  cross-roads,  but  after  all  it 
cuts  the  enemy  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Seine.  The  third  is  the  surest 
because  it  leads  by  an  air  line  on  Paris;  but  it  is  also  the  one  which,  having 
no  moral  influence,  leaves  everything  open  to  the  chances  of  a great  battle. 
Now,  if  the  enemy  has  sixty  thousand  or  seventy  thousand  men,  this  battle 
would  be  a furious  chance,  instead  of  which,  by  marching  on  Troyes,  and 
reaching  the  enemy’s  rear  while  Macdonald,  marching  in  retreat,  should 
dispute  all  the  positions,  there  may  be  very  great  chances.  Napoleon.” 

In  accordance  with  his  choice,  Napoleon  reached  Epernay 
March  17,  purposing  to  start  early  next  day  and  get  to  Arcis 
at  noon  the  19th,  thence  turning  on  Mdry  or  Troyes,  as  might 
seem  most  expedient,  and  fall  on  the  allied  rear.  He  wrote, 
March  17,  to  Clarke:  “Marmont  is  at  Bery-au-Bac,  Mortier 
at  Bheims  and  Charpentier  at  Soissons.  . . . Blucher,  who 
has  suffered  much,  cannot  probably  put  himself  in  march 
for  two  days,  and  as  then  he  will  have  the  Aisne  to  cross, 
Marmont  and  Mortier  will  be  there  to  dispute  the  ground. 
The  movement  that  I am  going  to  make  ought  to  occasion 
great  embarrassment  in  the  rear  of  the  enemy,  and  disquiet  the 
headquarters,  if  it  has  remained  in  Troyes.”  And  to  Joseph 
he  wrote  : “From  to-morrow  at  ten  in  the  evening  the  effect 
of  my  dispositions  will  be  felt.  For  the  enemy  will  know  my 
movement,  and  from  that  moment  it  will  influence  all  his 
operations.” 

The  manoeuvre  was  a beautiful  one ; but  it  was  founded  on 
the  belief  that  the  allies  must  retire  if  their  communications 
were  threatened  — and  this  belief  proved  unsound. 

After  thus  leaving  nearly  twenty  thousand  men  to  hold 
head  against  a renewed  march  of  Blucher  on  Paris,  Napoleon 
started,  even  after  a slight  reinforcement  had  reached  him, 
with  what,  considering  the  task,  was  a mere  handful.  Some 
five  thousand  foot  and  one  thousand  horse  under  Ney,  the 


READY  TO  RETIRE  OR  TO  FIGHT. 


441 


cavalry  of  the  Guard  with  but  thirty-five  hundred  sabres 
under  Sebastiani,  Friant’s  division,  and  an  extra  division 
of  cavalry,  with  some  sappers  and  pontoons,  made  up  what 
has  been  stated  at  ten  thousand  foot  and  six  thousand  horse. 
It  did  not  exceed  twenty  thousand  men.  This  seems  a 
small  command  for  a leader  who 
had  entered  Russia  with  half 
a million  men ; but  he  was 
going  towards  Macdonald,  and 
no  one  can  doubt  the  boldness 
with  which  the  force  would  be 
handled. 

From  Fere  Champenoise,  on 
the  18th,  Napoleon  drove  a small 
party  of  Cossacks,  and  pushed  a 
reconnoissance  of  light  horse  out 
towards  Plancy,  while  Ney  got 
to  Sommesous.  On  hearing  of 
Napoleon’s  oncoming,  Schwart- 
zenberg,  fearing  to  be  attacked 
in  flank  by  the  French,  and 
unaware  of  how  small  a force 
Napoleon  really  had,  drew  in  his  left-wing  corps  from  their 
cantonments  and  headed  them  back  to  Troyes,  leaving  those 
of  the  right  wing  on  the  Aube,  in  the  Arcis-Lesmont  coun- 
try. The  sovereigns  were  ready  to  retire,  if  need  be,  to  pro- 
tect their  communications,  or  to  fight  for  them  if  forced.  On 
March  18  Wurtemberg,  Wittgenstein  and  Giulay  were  at 
Troyes,  Barclay  at  Brienne,  Wrede  at  Pougy.  Schwartzen- 
berg  set  out  to  occupy  Arcis-sur-Aube ; but  Napoleon  antici- 
pated him.  When  the  latter  reached  Plancy,  there  were  none 
but  Cossacks  in  the  place ; Ney  reconnoitred  out  towards 
Arcis  but  found  no  enemy,  and  then  kept  on  to  Plancy.  From 


Austrian  Infantryman. 


442 


WEARY  OF  THE  NEGATIVE  ROLE. 


here  to  Mery  nothing  was  met,  and  Napoleon  hurried  forward 
from  Mery  to  reach  the  road  to  Nogent,  hoping  to  cut  off  some 
allied  troops ; but  Schwartzenberg  having  got  everything  out 
of  the  way,  only  a belated  pontoon  equipment  was  captured. 
Macdonald  echeloned  his  corps  forward  to  join  his  master 
near  Villenauxe,  but  finding  his  effort  fruitless,  and  without 
waiting  to  join  hands,  the  emperor  moved  back  to  and  up  the 
Aube  on  the  right  bank,  hoping  still  to  be  able  to  attack  the 
allies  in  flank,  and  take  advantage  of  the  disorder  this  might 
produce. 

The  Emperor  Alexander  had  become  weary  of  the  negative 
role  which  the  huge  army,  in  which  he  was  so  large  a factor, 
had  been  playing,  partly  from  political  reasons  which  he  could 
understand,  but  largely  also  from  strategic  irresolution  which 
he  could  not  approve.  It  seemed  to  him  humiliating  that  the 
allied  sovereigns  should  so  constantly  retire  before  a handful 
of  French  raw  levies,  when  a bold  push  ought  quickly  to  win 
the  capital ; and  accordingly,  when  the  Chatillon  terms  were 
refused,  Alexander  demanded  of  the  army  council  that  a junc- 
tion be  made  with  Blucher,  and  that  both  armies  march  on 
Paris  and  there  dictate  peace.  It  was  this  vigorous  method 
of  thought  on  the  part  of  the  czar  which  brought  the  Army 
of  the  Sovereigns  to  the  point  of  fighting. 

Schwartzenberg  guarded  his  flank  well.  Wrede  had  been 
in  Arcis-sur-Aube,  being  later  withdrawn  to  Pougy ; and  as 
the  allied  commander  was  now  ordered  to  fight  for  his  position, 
he  stopped  the  retreat  of  his  several  corps,  and  watched  what 
the  emperor  might  do.  His  army  stood  between  Troyes  and 
Lesmont,  facing  towards  Arcis  and  Plancy,  and  under  fresh 
instructions  Wrede  on  the  right  moved  down  the  Aube,  the 
left  wing,  Wurtemberg  and  Giulay,  advanced  on  the  road  to 
Premierfait,  with  Rajevski  with  the  Guard  and  reserve  in  the 
centre  marching  over  country  roads,  in  the  same  direction. 


NAPOLEON’S  WORST  ENEMIES. 


443 


Joseph  represented  the  emperor  in  Paris  ; and  to  him 
Napoleon,  who,  though  busy  with  his  preparations  to  attack 
the  Army  of  the  Sovereigns,  still  kept  half  his  thoughts  on 
the  capital,  and  never  forgot  the  possible  danger  of  its  capture, 
wrote,  March  16  : — 

“ My  Brother,  . . . you  are  in  no  case  to  permit  the  empress  and  the 
King  of  Rome  to  fall  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy.  I am  going  to  ma- 
noeuvre so  that  possibly  you  might  be  several  days  without  news  from  me. 
If  the  enemy  should  advance  on  Paris  with  such  forces  that  all  resistance 
becomes  impossible,  send  in  the  direction  of  the  Loire  the  regent,  my  son, 
the  grand  dignitaries,  the  ministers,  the  officers  of  the  Senate,  the  presi- 
dent of  the  Council  of  State,  the  grand  officers  of  the  crown  . . . and  the 
treasury.  Do  not  leave  my  son,  and  remember  that  I should  prefer  to 
know  him  in  the  Seine  than  in  the  hands  of  the  enemies  of  France.  The 
lot  of  Astyanax,  prisoner  of  the  Greeks,  has  always  seemed  to  me  the 
most  unfortunate  in  history.” 

The  Senate  and  the  high  functionaries  were  the  men  most 
apt  to  be  dangerous  to  the  empire;  it  was  they  who  proved 
to  be  Napoleon’s  worst  enemies,  and  they  would  have  been 
safer  away  from  Paris.  Remaining  there,  they  kept  up  the 
semblance  of  a government  with  which  the  enemy  could 
treat. 

In  addition  to  the  reinforcements  he  had  received  atRheims, 
six  thousand  men  were  coming  on  under  Lefebvre-Desnouettes, 
and  with  these  and  Macdonald’s  forces  Napoleon  was  ready 
to  march  through  Brienne  and  towards  his  Lorraine  fortresses. 
He  believed,  from  his  standpoint  with  some  justice  and 
yet  erroneously,  that  the  Army  of  the  Sovereigns  was  falling 
back  before  him.  From  Plancy,  March  20,  he  wrote  to 
J oseph : — 

“ The  Emperor  Alexander  had  come  the  18th  to  Arcis,  but  stayed  there 
only  an  hour.  We  were  almost  face  to  face.  . . . The  enemy’s  army, 
which  had  passed  the  Seine  at  Pont  and  Nogent,  having  learned  that  the 
emperor,  master  of  Rheims  and  Chalons,  was  marching  on  its  rear,  com- 


444 


NOT  AN  UNFAIR  ASSUMPTION 


menced  its  retreat  the  17th,  and  the  19th  had  taken  up  the  bridges  thrown 
at  Pont,  Nogent  and  Arcis-sur-Aube.  The  Emperor  of  Russia  and  the 
King  of  Prussia  were  with  the  column,  which  from  Arcis  was  marching 
on  Villenauxe.  Little  was  wanting  that  that  column  had  been  cut  off.” 
And  to  Clarke  : “ My  movement  had  succeeded  perfectly.  As  soon  as 
the  enemy  knew  that  I was  in  Chalons,  he  started  his  retreat.  He  beat 
in  retreat  the  whole  day  of  the  17th  and  the  day  of  the  18th.  ...  I have 
ordered  Marmont  and  Mortier,  whom  I have  left  at  Rheims  and  in  front 
of  it,  to  fall  back  on  Chalons  or  on  Pipernay,  if  Blucher  takes  the  offensive 
again,  which  to-day  would  seem  absurd  to  me.” 

From  the  emperor’s  standpoint  of  having  seen  the  enemy y 
in  victory  and  defeat  alike,  retire  from  in  front  of  his  lesser 
but  more  active  army,  the  above  assumption  — although  in 
part  set  down  for  effect  on  Paris  — was  not  an  unfair  one  to 
make.  It  accorded  with  the  true  soldier’s  instinct ; but  so  far 
from  accurate  was  it  all,  that  Schwartzenberg,  under  the  spur 
of  Alexander,  was  making  preparations  to  attack  the  French 
army  if  it  crossed  the  Aube. 

Had  Napoleon  suspected  that  his  opponent  would  fight  him, 
he  would  have  waited  for  Macdonald  and  the  other  reinforce- 
ments ; as  it  was,  he  forged  ahead,  so  as  to  keep  the  allies  on 
the  run.  He  got  back  to  Plancy  the  evening  of  March  19, 
and  early  next  morning  sent  Sebastiani  and  the  cavalry  of 
the  Guard  on  Arcis,  along  the  left  bank,  and  along  the  right 
bank  Ney  ; by  ten  the  place  was  reached  by  the  van,  Napoleon 
and  the  Old  Guard  in  the  rear. 

Sebastiani  and  Ney  at  once  occupied  Arcis,  put  it  in  posi- 
tion of  defense,  and  began  to  repair  the  bridge  which  the 
Bavarians  had  partly  destroyed.  The  inhabitants  reported 
that  the  allies  were  scarce  three  hours  distant,  and  this  news 
was  sent  to  the  emperor.  Ney  with  Janssen’s  division  stood 
astride  the  road  from  Brienne,  with  Boyer  in  reserve,  Sebas- 
tiani across  the  Troyes  road ; part  of  the  troops  at  Mery  had 
been  left  behind,  and  Letort  alone  came  along  with  his  dra- 


ATTACK  OF  KAISEROV’S  CAVALRY. 


445 


goons.  When  Napoleon  reached  Arcis  at  one  o’clock,  both 
marshals  insisted  that  the  enemy  was  near  at  hand,  but  the 
emperor  could  not  believe  that  deliberate  Schwartzenberg  had 
really  assumed  the  offensive : he  looked  on  Arcis  as  a posi- 
tion from  which  to  observe  the  enemy  and  probably  pursue 
him. 

Instead  of  riding  out  himself  to  see,  if  he  would  not  trust 
his  oldest  lieutenants,  Napoleon  sent  a staff  officer,  whose 
examination  and  report  were  crude  and  partial.  As  soon  as 
the  staff  officer  had  made  his  report,  Sebastiani,  though 
unconvinced,  rejoined  his  command  ; but  no  sooner  had  he 
reached  it  than  he  came  back  on  the  gallop  with  the  news  that 
the  enemy  was  already  drawn  up  in  columns  of  attack. 

This  was  true.  Wrede  had  informed  Schwartzenberg  that 
only  cavalry  was  at  Arcis,  and  the  latter  had  concluded  that 
Napoleon  was  about  to  move  back  up  the  Seine  on  Troyes, 
and  had  therefore  sent  Wurtemberg  forward  on  Plancy  to 
attack  whatever  he  found  in  his  way,  and  Wrede  to  Arcis. 
The  former  was  moving  in  two  columns  along  the  two  roads 
from  Troyes  to  Plancy  and  to  Arcis,  with  cavalry  connecting 
him  with  Wrede,  who  was  advancing  downstream  on  Arcis. 

About  two  o’clock,  as  the  French  infantry  was  gradually 
coming  up,  Wrede  began  his  movement  against  Arcis.  The 
fight  opened  by  an  attack  of  Kaiserov’s  cavalry,  connecting 
the  two  armies,  on  Colbert,  whom  he  drove  back,  and  even 
threw  Excelmans,  in  his  rear,  into  confusion.  Kaiserov  was 
supported  by  Wrede,  who  pushed  a column  forward  to  take 
the  village  of  Torcy,  and  attempted  to  seize  the  Arcis  bridge, 
so  as  to  cut  off  the  troops  on  the  south  of  the  river  from  the 
troops  arriving  on  the  other  side.  This  plan  nearly  succeeded. 
The  young  French  horsemen  began  to  retire,  sundry  runaways 
made  for  the  bridge,  and  these  were  pursued  by  the  enemy’s 
horse.  Had  the  latter  been  able  to  seize  the  bridge,  that  part 


446 


NEY  AT  TORCY. 


of  the  French  army  which  was  on  the  left  bank  would  have 
been  destroyed.  In  this  critical  moment  Napoleon  himself 
drew  sword,  stood  across  the  entrance  of  the  bridge,  and  by 
his  presence  stopped  the  panic  and  held  the  men  to  their  work 


long  enough  for  Friant  to  come  up,  cross  and  restore  order. 
Meanwhile  Ney  at  Torcy  had  fought  hard  to  fend  off  the  allied 
advance  ; Wrede  was  determined  to  have  the  town,  and  many 
assaults  were  made  upon  it,  with  great  loss  on  both  sides,  but 
Ney  was  not  to  be  driven  permanently  out.  Here  Napoleon 
is  said  to  have  also  taken  a personal  part,  and  to  have  been 
thought  for  a moment  killed  by  an  exploding  shell.  Finally, 
the  fight  at  Torcy  degenerated  into  a cannonade,  which  lasted 
until  late  at  night,  both  this  village  and  Arcis  being  set  afire. 
Wrede  retired  to  Chaudrey. 


RESULTS  OF  THE  DAY  UNFAVORABLE. 


447 


Meanwhile  the  cavalry  fighting,  in  the  plain  south  of 
Arcis,  was  undetermined  even  late  at  night ; but  Sebastiani, 
with  the  Young  Guard,  held  head  to  the  fierce  attacks  of  the 
Austrian,  Russian  and  Bavarian  cavalry  ; the  combat  ceased 
from  sheer  exhaustion,  and  both  sides  bivouacked  on  either 
bank  of  the  Barbuisse  brook. 

During  the  day  Wurtemberg  had  nearly  reached  Plancy, 
advancing  over  the  flat  country  with  a broad  front.  The 
first  troops  he  struck,  about  five  o’clock,  were  those  which 
had  been  left  behind  in  Mery,  and  were  now  marching  on 
Arcis;  they  were  thrown  into  confusion  and  largely  captured, 
with  the  pontoon  train  taken  the  day  before.  Wurtemberg 
bivouacked  in  the  vicinity  of  Premierfait. 

On  the  whole,  although  Napoleon  had  held  his  own,  the 
results  of  the  day  were  unfavorable,  for  his  troops  had  been 
cut  down  to  not  much  over  twenty  thousand  men  all  told ; 
Macdonald  with  sixteen  thousand  men  was  still  a full  day’s 
march  away,  and  Napoleon  could  scarcely  expect  anything 
but  utter  defeat  without  him.  Although  immensely  superior 
to  the  emperor,  Schwartzenberg  was  anxious  to  bring  up  all 
his  other  troops  for  the  battle  of  the  morrow ; and  he  ordered 
Wurtemberg  to  file  to  the  right  so  as  to  be  by  5 A.  m.  of  the 
21st  near  St.  Remy  ; and  leaving  some  cavalry  to  hold  the 
Barbuisse  brook  on  the  Arcis-Mery  road,  all  other  available 
troops  were  also  hurried  up. 

Napoleon  continued  to  misconceive  the  results  of  the  fight 
just  concluded.  He  believed  that  Schwartzenberg  had  merely 
fought  to  protect  his  retreat  ; he  expected  next  day  to  pursue 
the  allies ; and  this  view  was  confirmed  by  the  movement  of 
Wurtemberg,  which  he  had  learned.  What  troops  had  come 
up  during  the  night  from  Plancy,  part  of  Oudinot  and  Le- 
febvre-Desnouettes,  he  threw  over  the  bridge  and  into  Arcis, 
so  as  to  form  a fresh  line  from  Torcy  to  Moulin  Neuf,  and 


448 


CARELESS  RECONNOITRING . 


Macdonald  was  approaching  via  Marcilly  and  Anglure,  his 
van  reaching  the  army  early  the  21st. 

As  soon  as  daylight  broke,  Napoleon  was  in  the  saddle, 
and  reconnoitred  out  through  Torcy  on  the  road  to  Brienne. 
As  Wrede  had  momentarily  fallen  back,  he  could  see  only 
cavalry  parties  in  his  immediate  vicinity,  and  he  was  the 


more  confirmed  in  his  judgment ; he  does  not  appear  to  have 
gone  or  sent  towards  Voue  or  Mesnil ; and  yet  nearly  all 
Schwartzenberg’s  available  forces  were  assembling  in  his 
front.  This  careless  reconnoitring  is  almost  incredible.  It 
was  the  forerunner  of  that  succeeding  the  battle  of  Ligny. 
By  eight  o’clock  guns  were  opened  from  Nozay,  where 
Pahlen  was  moving  across  the  Barbuisse  brook;  the  French 
fell  back  to  Moulin  Neuf,  and  Rajevski  came  up  and  occupied 


OVERWHELMING  ODDS. 


449 


the  line  of  the  brook,  forming  the  left  flank  of  the  allied  army. 
Wurtemberg  moved  over  to  Mesnil  so  as  to  occupy  the  centre, 
and  his  cavalry  took  position  in  the  plains  of  St.  Remy.  The 
Guards  and  reserves  were  in  the  rear  along  the  road  to 
Ramerupt.  The  right  leaned  on  the  Aube  at  Chaudrey. 

The  King  of  Prussia  and  the  czar  were  both  with  the 
army,  and  Schwartzenberg,  though  suffering  from  his  slight 
wound,  was  able  to  remain  in  command.  Convinced  that 
Napoleon  did  not  believe  that  he  had  the  whole  allied  force 
in  his  front,  and  as  his  army  was  covered  by  the  hills,  he 
determined  to  await  the  attack  the  French  would  be  apt  to 
deliver.  With  his  right  on  the  Aube,  “ it  is  therefore  neces- 
sary that  in  all  movements  the  touch  should  be  kept  to  the 
right,  so  as  to  allow  no  gap  to  be  produced,”  he  said  in  his 
morning  orders ; and  masses  of  cavalry  were  to  hold  them- 
selves ready  under  cover  so  as,  should  the  French  advance  on 
the  Mesnil  height,  to  debouch  on  their  flank. 

After  his  amazingly  superficial  reconnoissance,  Napoleon 
about  ten  o’clock  ordered  Sebastiani  to  move  forward  with 
the  entire  cavalry  and  fall  on  the  enemy  wherever  he  found 
him,  Ney  with  the  infantry  to  follow  in  support.  In  pur- 
suance of  these  orders  the  marshals  moved  forward  with 
rapidity  towards  Mesnil,  and  arriving  at  the  top  of  the  hill 
were  astounded  to  see,  in  the  plain  beyond,  the  entire  army 
of  the  allies.  Here  stood  a handful  of  men,  on  an  open 
battlefield,  making  ready  to  attack  four  times  their  number 
of  better  troops.  Still,  the  marshals  opened  a scattering  fire, 
sending  aides  back  to  the  emperor  to  inform  him  of  the  facts. 
When  Napoleon  came  up,  he  finally  saw  that  his  operation  on 
the  Aube  was  an  absolute  failure,  and  that  by  unpardonably 
bad  judgment  and  slack  work  he  had  placed  himself  in  the 
most  dangerous  situation  he  had  ever  yet  faced.  With  less 
than  an  army  corps,  he  was  surrounded  by  the  whole  allied 


VOL.  IV. 


450 


AN  EXTRAORDINARY  PAUSE. 


force,  and  with  no  outlet  except  one  bridge  over  a river  in  his 
rear,  and  beyond  the  river  a defile  and  embankment  between 
marshes.  Yet  at  the  view  of  this  absolutely  fatal  situation, 
he  lost  not  for  a moment  his  presence  of  mind.  He  recog- 
nized his  strategic  error  and  saw  that  he  was  outmanoeuvred ; 
he  saw  how  ill  he  had  reconnoitred ; he  understood  his  peril ; 
and  just  because  it  was  against  all  the  principles  of  the  art 
to  retire  in  face  of  such  overwhelming  odds,  he  at  once  gave 
orders  to  stop  firing  and  to  do  so,  believing,  on  the  “ theory 
of  the  impossible,”  that  the  enemy  would  not  consider  him 
capable  of  undertaking  such  a manoeuvre.  His  judgment 
proved  correct. 

Clause witz  places  Schwartzenberg  at  eighty  thousand  men, 
Napoleon  at  twenty  thousand,  with  Macdonald  coming  up 
with  thirty  thousand,  and  thinks  that,  if  the  emperor  had 
waited  for  his  lieutenant,  there  was  still  a fighting  chance. 
So  there  was  for  a Frederick,  with  his  wonderful  fighting 
tactics,  but  not  for  a Napoleon  on  the  theory  of  the  equality 
of  thousands. 

Luckily,  Schwartzenberg  held  to  his  intention  to  await  the 
French  attack,  and  there  ensued  a pause  rarely  seen  in  war. 
An  army  of  twenty  thousand  men,  ready  to  attack  its  oppo- 
nent numbering  eighty  thousand,  batteries  drawn  up  prepared 
to  fire,  and  absolute  silence  resting  upon  the  field.  This  ex- 
traordinary pause  lasted  nearly  two  hours.  Schwartzenberg 
had  marshaled  his  troops  to  receive  a shock,  not  to  deliver 
one ; it  took  some  time  for  him  to  change  his  mind,  and  then 
still  longer  to  issue  his  orders.  Finally,  he  brought  together 
the  commanders  of  his  several  army  corps  on  the  Mesnil 
heights,  held  a short  council  of  war  and  decided  to  move 
forward.  A signal  was  to  be  given  by  three  guns  from 
Mesnil,  and  the  attack  was  to  be  in  three  columns : one  upon 
Torcy,  the  second  to  the  left  of  Mesnil  straight  on  Arcis,  the 


THE  ALLIES  ATTACK  ARCIS. 


451 


third  on  Arcis  from  the  Barbuisse  brook ; cavalry  to  advance 
between  the  columns  so  as  to  prevent  gaps  and  keep  up  con- 
nection, and  the  reserves  to  hold  the  heights  of  Mesnil. 

Napoleon’s  preparations  were  as  rapid  as  the  enemy’s  were 
slow : Ney’s  infantry  and  the  Guard  quickly  started  over  the 
bridge,  so  as  to  occupy  the  heights  beyond,  while  Sebastiani 
masked  this  movement ; and  a large  part  of  this  manoeuvre 
was  executed  while  the  allies  were  waiting,  in  a manner 
beyond  praise.  Oudinot,  who  had  arrived  the  evening  of  the 
20th,  and  three  brigades  of  old  troops  were  detailed  to  hold 
the  debouches  of  Arcis  as  long  as  possible,  and  these  he 
barricaded'  with  wagons.  He  was  supported  by  a reserve 
brigade  in  the  town,  and  a division  on  the  other  side  of  the 
river  was  standing  to  receive  him  when  he  should  retire. 

At  two  o’clock  the  allied  columns  were  formed,  the  three 
shots  were  fired,  and  the  concentric  columns  moved  towards 
Arcis.  Pahlen  first  struck  the  French  at  Vilette,  and  strove  to 
reach  the  bridge  of  boats  Napoleon  had  ordered  to  be  there 
thrown  ; the  French  were  unable  to  stand  the  shock,  fell  back 
over  the  bridge  and  destroyed  it.  A strong  line  of  skirmish- 
ers preceded  each  allied  column,  and  the  guns  soon  fired  into 
the  town  of  Arcis.  There  could  be  no  doubt  of  the  result : 
it  was  a mere  question  as  to  how  much  of  his  army  Napoleon 
could  save. 

When,  from  the  heights  of  Mesnil,  Schwartzenberg  saw 
the  French  troops  beyond  the  Aube  take  the  road  towards 
Chalons  and  Vitry,  he  determined  to  throw  Wrede  across  to 
strike  the  retiring  French  in  flank  ; and  at  four  o’clock  he 
ordered  him  through  Ramerupt,  the  train  to  follow  by  way 
of  Pougy.  Wurtemberg  was  left  to  attack  Arcis,  which  he 
vigorously  did.  Oudinot  had  great  difficulty  in  holding  him- 
self, but  he  saved  the  bulk  of  his  force ; at  the  last  moment 
Wurtemberg  attacked  the  town  with  the  bayonet,  the  few 


452 


FRENCH  WORSTED  AT  ARC  IS. 


French  left  scrambled  across,  and  the  bridge  already  mined 
was  blown  up. 

The  French  had  lost  five  thousand  men  from  the  concen- 
tric fire  of  many  batteries:  the  allies  lost  but  three  hundred 
men.  Oudinot  drew  up  at  Chesne  to  defend  the  cross-roads, 
and  falling  night  saved  him  from  further  attack.  Macdonald 
came  up  late  in  the  evening  with  his  troops  fagged  out  by 
their  long  march. 

Napoleon  and  the  Guard  reached  Sommesous  at  night,  part 
of  the  army  got  to  Mailly,  Wurtemberg  slept  on  the  field 
opposite  Arcis,  Wrede  seems  to  have  crossed  at  Lesmont  and 
marched  to  Chalette,  the  allied  cavalry  reached  Luistre. 

The  Correspondence  contains  no  mention  of  the  battle  of 
Arcis,  save  a word  from  Sezanne,  March  22,  to  Clarke:  “ The 
whole  army  of  the  enemy  is  at  Arcis ; it  is  probable  that  it 
will  march  by  way  of  Brienne.” 

At  the  opening  of  this  battle  the  emperor  had  been  con- 
vinced that  he  was  fighting  the  rearguard  of  the  Army  of  the 
Sovereigns,  which  he  had  driven  into  retreat  by  his  threat  to 
its  communications ; on  the  second  day  he  was  still  far  from 
believing  that  the  orders  for  an  allied  advance  on  Paris  had 
been  issued,  and  he  clung  to  his  idea  that,  despite  his  check,  a 
stout  operation  towards  the  Rhine  would  still  lure  the  allies 
away  from  the  capital ; and  although  worsted  at  Arcis,  he 
continued  his  general  scheme  to  draw  near  his  strong  places 
for  reinforcements  and  support,  and  as  the  best  means  of  pre- 
venting the  enemy  from  moving  on  the  capital. 

At  the  allied  headquarters  in  Pougy  there  was  much  doubt 
for  two  or  three  days  as  to  what  Napoleon  would  do,  and 
there  was  a pause  until  March  23. 

Although  Napoleon  now  stood  between  the  Army  of  Silesia 
on  the  Aisne  and  the  Army  of  the  Sovereigns  on  the  Aube, 
in  the  most  favorable  of  positions,  matters  were  day  by  day 


THE  RHINE  SCHEME. 


453 


growing  worse.  His  enemies  in  the  capital  were  more  numer- 
ous and  outspoken,  and  Wellington  had  invaded  Gasconyr 
forcing  Soult  toward  Toulouse.  None  but  extraordinary 
measures  would  avail  to  change  the  situation  in  his  favor. 
If  what  he  called  victory  and  successful  manoeuvres  in  Cham- 
pagne would  not  affect  the  enemy’s  purpose,  was  it  not  a safer 
policy  to  transfer  the  theatre  of  campaign 
to  the  Rhine  ? Hi3  own  communications 
to  be  sure  would  go  lost,  but  would  not 
the  allies  be  more  frightened  as  to  theirs  ? 

He  might  arouse  Alsace  and  Lorraine  to 
rise  en  masse  on  the  enemy’s  rear.  The 
terrain  there  was  more  favorable  to  Napo- 
leon’s lesser  numbers  and  strategic  opera- 
tions, and  he  had  his  fortresses  to  retire  to 
in  case  of  a check.  He  had  failed  at  the 
opening  of  the  campaign  to  assemble  all  his 
available  troops,  and  unless  he  was  to  aban- 
don Paris,  there  were  now  only  three  things 
left  from  which  to  choose  : to  back  up 
against  the  capital  with  his  whole  disposable 
force  and  risk  his  all  on  the  turn  of  a battle; 
or  to  call  in  Mortier  and  Marmont  and  all 

, . . , , . , Westphalian  Cui- 

the  troops  he  could  gather,  and  once  more  rassier  0fficer 

attack  the  sovereigns ; or  to  manoeuvre  as 

proposed.  At  an  earlier  date  the  Rhine  scheme  would  have 

been  good  strategy.  Was  it  too  late  now? 

This  remains  an  open  question.  Had  Napoleon  succeeded 
in  drawing  the  allies  away  from  the  capital  by  this  manoeuvre 
(as  he  might  have  done  had  not  his  dispatches  been  captured), 
it  would  have  been  lauded  to  the  skies.  But  this  is  the  way 
in  war.  Dame  Fortune  always  has  a hand  in  it.  The  margin 
between  brilliant  success  and  lamentable  failure  is  often  a 


454 


SITUATION  ON  MARCH  23. 


narrow  one,  and  the  emperor  turned  his  face  towards  the 
Rhine  with  the  purpose  of  cutting  the  enemy’s  line  running 
hack  through  Chaumont  and  Langres. 

With  the  object  he  had  in  view,  Vitry  appeared  to  be  a 
good  first  point  to  capture  out  of  hand ; it  would  indeed  have 
been  a strong  threat  to  Blucher,  should  he  advance  far ; and 
while  Napoleon  and  the  Guard  marched  to  Sommepuis,  with 
the  rest  of  the  army  echeloned  behind  him,  Ney  was  sent  out 
March  22  to  essay  the  feat ; but  Yitry  was  stoutly  held  ; and 
when  this  proved  a failure,  Napoleon  determined  to  march 
on  the  enemy’s  communications  at  St.  Dizier.  Whether  it 
was  that  he  was  convinced  that  he  had  neutralized  Blucher 
and  that  Schwartzenberg  would  retire  if  his  rear  was  threat- 
ened, or  that  he  had  got  to  the  point  of  risking  his  all  on  the 
turn-up  of  a card,  cannot  be  known  ; but  so  as  to  operate  in 
force,  he  now  ordered  Marmont  and  Mortier,  whom  he  had 
left  in  the  Rheims-Soissons-Mery  country,  with  the  duty  of 
fending  Blucher  off  from  Paris,  down  via  Chalons  to  join 
him,  thus  leaving  nothing  between  the  Army  of  Silesia  and 
the  capital.  On  the  22d  he  crossed  the  Marne  at  the  ford  of 
Frignicourt,  and  marched  on  to  Faremont.  Oudinot  remained 
opposite  Arcis,  Macdonald  and  Gerard  were  at  Dosnon,  and 
as  Napoleon  marched,  on  the  28d,  towards  St.  Dizier,  these 
three  officers  came  on  behind. 

On  March  23,  following  was  the  situation : Napoleon  at 
St.  Dizier,  his  cavalry  at  Joinville  and  Doulevant ; Ney  leav- 
ing and  Macdonald  and  Oudinot  reaching  Yitry ; Marmont 
and  Mortier  at  Bergeres  ; Pacthod,  Armey  and  a convoy  at 
Sezanne ; a cavalry  regiment  from  Paris,  Simon  with  five 
hundred  men  at  Coulommiers ; another  small  body  at  La 
Ferte  Gaucher,  Ledru  at  Meaux,  Souham  with  five  hundred 
men  at  Nogent. 

Langeron  and  Sacken  at  Rheims,  Yoronzov  with  Winzin- 


SEVERAL  PLANS  TO  ADOPT. 


455 


gerode’s  foot  at  Chalons,  Winzingerode  with  cavalry  and 
Wrede  at  Vitry;  Yorck  and  Kleist  near  Chateau  Thierry; 
Wurtemberg  and  Rajevski  near  Sommepuis,  Barclay  between 
Lesmont  and  Vitry,  Giulay  at  Arcis. 

Again,  on  March  23,  at  St.  Dizier,  Napoleon  dictated  a 
Note,  giving  a summary  of  the  general  strategic  situation, 
and  the  several  plans  to  adopt.  First,  to 
start  early  March  24  for  Vitry  and  attack 
the  town.  Second,  to  march  via  Bar-le-Duc 
on  St.  Mihiel,  seize  the  bridge,  cross  the 
Meuse,  and  base  on  Verdun  ; thence  to 
Pont-a-Mousson,  so  as  to  base  on  Metz, 
draw  in  twelve  thousand  men  from  the  for- 
tresses, drive  the  allied  corps  at  Nancy 
behind  the  Vosges  mountains,  and  advance 
against  the  allied  rear,  to  deliver  battle  with 
the  line  of  operations  running  back  on  Metz. 

Third,  to  march  on  Joinville  and  Chau- 
mont,  and  thence  back  on  Bar-sur-Aube  and 
Troyes.  Fourth,  to  march  on  Brienne,  or 
on  Bar-sur-Aube  via  Vassy.  It  seemed  to 
the  emperor  that  the  most  sensible  of  these 
plans  was  the  one  which  based  on  Metz  and 
the  French  fortresses,  and  which  would  bring  the  theatre  of 
operations  nearer  the  border.  The  emperor’s  words  are  again 
quoted : — 

Note,  St.  Dizier,  March  23  : “ There  are  four  courses  to  choose  from  : 
First,  move  from  here  at  2 A.  M.,  be  at  Yitry  at  8 A.  M.,  and  attack  the 
enemy. 

“2.  Leave  to-morrow  early  and  move  by  way  of  Bar-sur-Ornain  on  St. 
Mihiel,  so  as  to  gain  to-morrow  the  bridge  there.  From  this  moment  my 
communication  will  be  assured  on  Verdun,  and  I shall  have  passed  the 
Meuse.  I would  go  from  there  to  Pont-h-Mousson,  which  would  give  me 
my  communication  with  Metz.  I should  be  reinforced  with  twelve  thou- 


456 


CALCULATIONS  SHATTERED. 


sand  men  that  I can  draw  from  the  fortresses.  I should  have  driven 
beyond  the  Vosges  the  corps  at  Nancy,  and  I would  deliver  a battle  hav- 
ing Metz  as  a line  of  operation. 

“3.  Move  to-morrow  on  Joinville  and  Chaumont,  from  whence  I would 
take  my  line  on  Bar-sur-Aube  and  Troyes. 

“4.  Go  to  Brienne  from  Bar-sur-Aube.  We  should  move  by  way  of 
Vassy  and  be  to-morrow  very  near  Bar-sur-Aube. 

“ The  most  reasonable  of  these  projects  appears  to  be  the  one  which 
leans  on  Metz  and  my  fortresses,  and  which  makes  the  war  approach  the 
frontiers.  In  effect,  from  St.  Dizier  to  Metz  via  Bar-sur-Ornain  and 
Pont-k-Mousson  there  are  twenty-nine  post  leagues.  From  Nancy  by  the 
same  road  there  are  thirty  leagues.  By  the  direct  road  from  St.  Dizier 
to  Nancy  via  Toul  and  Void  there  are  only  twenty-two  leagues.” 

But  after  laying  down  these  several  plans  and  indicat- 
ing the  best  one,  for  some  unknown  reason  Napoleon  changed 
his  mind  (as  he  had  done  after  the  battle  of  Maloyaroslavez) 
and  started  March  24,  by  way  of  Vassy,  to  Doulevant,  and 
to  Joinville,  while  Macdonald  and  Oudinot  came  up  to  St. 
Dizier,  and  Gerard  to  Perthes.  On  the  25th  Napoleon,  with 
Ney  and  the  Guard,  remained  in  Doulevant,  Macdonald  and 
Oudinot  reached  Vassy,  Gerard,  St.  Dizier.  And  so  as  to 
concentrate  for  one  more  blow  in  mass,  Marmont  and  Mortier 
were  again  ordered  to  join  the  army  via  Vitry. 

As  the  allies  had  been  pretty  constantly  doing  the  wrong 
thing,  perhaps  Napoleon  was  justified  in  crediting  them  with 
further  doing  so.  But  now  he  had  gauged  them  ill : all  his 
calculations  as  to  what  his  blow  at  the  enemy’s  communica- 
tions would  accomplish  were  shattered.  Paying  small  heed 
to  what  the  French  were  doing,  instead  of  again  retiring 
on  Chaumont,  as  Napoleon  expected  him  to  do,  Schwartzen- 
berg,  who  had  made  no  especial  change  in  location  since  the 
battle  of  Arcis,  except  to  send  some  troops  across  the  Aube 
on  the  22d  to  Ramerupt  and  Lesmont,  merely  accentuated 
this  movement,  and  thus  drew  nearer  to  Blucher,  who,  after 


COURIERS  CAPTURED. 


457 


remaining  ten  days  behind  the  Aisne,  was  also  approaching, 
with  the  purpose  of  joining  forces,  cutting  Napoleon  off  from 
the  Seine  and  marching  straight  on  Paris.  The  allied  head- 
quarters March  23  was  at  Dampierre.  After  once  or  twice 
watching  the  effect  of  Napoleon’s  manoeuvres,  the  allies  had 
grown  to  recognize  that  the  knot  of  the  difficulty  could  be  cut 
only  in  the  capital. 

Indeed,  when  Napoleon  moved  upon  the  allied  communica- 
tions with  the  Rhine,  there  was  no  alternative  left:  Schwart- 
zenberg  was  compelled  to  join  Blucher  and  manoeuvre  between 
Napoleon  and  Paris,  leaving  the  emperor  to  do  his  worst. 
On  March  23  Schwartzenberg  reached  Sommepuis  and  met 
Blucher ; on  the  24th  Alexander  insisted  on  moving  on  Paris. 

But  there  was  a still  more  important  reason  for  this  sud- 
den allied  enterprise.  Things  had  gone  wrong  for  the  French 
cause  at  more  than  one  point,  and  couriers  carrying  dis- 
patches had  been  captured  by  Chernishev’s  roving  Cossacks 
March  22.  One  dispatch  was  from  Savary  to  the  emperor  to 
the  effect  that  France  was  quite  unable  longer  to  carry  for- 
ward the  war;  another  was  a letter  of  Napoleon’s  to  the 
empress,  saying  that,  to  lead  the  enemy  away  from  Paris,  he 
had  determined  to  move  to  the  Marne  and  approach  the  for- 
tresses. The  allied  sovereigns  thus  learned  Napoleon’s  plans, 
as  Bennigsen  had  in  1807,  and  became  acquainted  with  the 
state  of  feeling  in  Paris  ; and  Alexander  put  the  question 
plainly  to  those  of  his  generals  in  whom  he  had  most  confi- 
dence, whether  it  were  better  to  march  straight  on  the  capital, 
or  to  retire  to  the  Rhine  to  check  Napoleon’s  operations. 
He  himself  urged  strongly  the  former  plan  ; all  his  officers 
agreed  with  him,  and  the  Austrian  Cabinet  being  no  longer 
present  with  the  army,  Schwartzenberg  felt  much  more  inde- 
pendent. 

The  advance  of  the  allies  on  Paris  had  heretofore  been 


458 


THE  ALLIES’  PLAN. 


governed  by  mixed  political  and  military  reasons,  and  it  was 
in  part  to  this  circumstance,  though  more  largely  to  his  ex- 
traordinary activity  and  skill,  that  Napoleon  had  owed  his 
success  against  such  superior  numbers.  When,  after  Arcis, 
the  Army  of  the  Sovereigns  saw  him  move  towards  Chalons, 
they  had  at  first  believed  he  was  marching  against  Blucher, 
and  they  girded  themselves  to  follow ; but  when  they  learned 
that  he  was  moving  to  the  Rhine  as  a diversion,  it  was  plain 
that  while  he  might  possibly  cut  their  line  of  communications 
with  the  upper  Rhine,  they  could  none  the  less  join  Blucher 
and  take  up  a fresh  one  through  the  Netherlands.  As  to  fol- 
low Napoleon  would  lead  to  nothing,  it  was  decided  to  march 
on  Paris,  the  Army  of  the  Sovereigns  on  the  road  from  Vitry 
by  way  of  Sezanne  and  Coulommiers,  the  Army  of  Silesia  on 
the  road  from  Chalons  by  way  of  Montmirail  and  La  Ferte 
sous  Jouarre,  both  to  unite  in  Meaux  March  28,  so  as  to 
reach  Paris  together.  And  in  order  that  the  emperor  should 
not  too  early  divine  this  intention,  orders  were  given  to  Win- 
zingerode,  with  eight  thousand  cavalry  and  forty  guns,  to 
follow  Napoleon  to  St.  Dizier,  and  to  spread  the  rumor  that 
this  force  was  but  the  van  of  the  main  army. 

The  allies’  plan  led  to  still  another  result  — to  them  unex- 
pected. Let  us  turn  back  to  the  Aisne,  and  see  what  had 
been  happening  there. 

The  day  before  the  battle  of  Arcis,  Blucher,  ordering  Biilow 
on  Soissons,  and  Yorck  and  Kleist  towards  Chateau  Thierry, 
had  started  from  Laon  with  Langeron,  Sacken  and  Winzin- 
gerode  to  march  by  way  of  Rheims  on  Chalons.  In  an  effort 
to  surround  Marmont,  he  sent  Chernishev  to  cross  at  Neuf- 
chatel,  and  move  around  his  flank  ; but  Marmont,  unaware  of 
the  emperor’s  new  project,  blew  up  the  Bery  bridge,  already 
mined  by  orders,  and  moved  on  Fismes,  where  from  Rheims 
Mortier  joined  him.  The  French  marshals  strove  to  hold 


A CURIOUS  SITUATION. 


459 


Fismes,  which  covered  Chateau  Thierry,  as  Rheims  covered 
Chalons  and  Epernay,  but  they  were  not  strong  enough  to  do 
so,  and  fell  back.  Thus  disembarrassed  of  Marmont  and 
Mortier,  Blucher  threw  bridges  over  the  Aisne  to  secure  his 
retreat,  hurried  Kleist  and  Yorck  on  after  Marmont,  and 
himself  headed  for  Chalons,  which  he  reached  March  23,  and 
next  day  was  not  far  from  the  sovereigns.  In  this  way,  by 
accident  as  it  were,  the  two  allied  armies  were  joining  as  the 
two  French  armies  were  separating,  for  when  they  retired 
westerly,  the  marshals  had  no  orders  but  the  general  ones  to 
protect  the  capital. 

It  was  at  this  puzzling  moment,  late  March  21,  that  Mar- 
mont received  the  orders  for  himself  and  Mortier  to  join  the 
emperor  by  way  of  Chalons  or  Epernay  to  Vitry  ; and  as  they 
had  just  lost  Rheims,  which  was  the  cross-roads  by  which 
they  must  pass,  they  decided  to  march  over  the  country  roads 
to  Chateau  Thierry,  where  they  learned  that  Epernay  had 
gone  lost.  This  led  Marmont  to  believe  that  tire  main  road 
to  Chalons  was  in  the  hands  of  Blucher,  and  he  chose  to  force 
his  way  through  to  Yitry  by  the  Montmirail  road. 

Here  was  a curious  situation.  From  a position  that  sepa- 
rated Blucher  and  Schwartzenberg,  Napoleon  had  marched 
to  the  east,  and  allowed  the  two  allied  commanders  to  join 
hands,  so  to  speak,  between  himself  and  his  Aisne  forces, 
which  he  needed  so  much ; and  the  latter  divisions  were  now 
heading  straight  into  the  enveloping  wings  of  the  two  allied 
armies,  while  Napoleon  was  quite  cut  off  from  Paris.  With 
their  smaller  forces,  this  was  indeed  perilous  for  the  French. 
Had  the  allies  brought  about  this  result  by  their  own  manoeu- 
vring, it  would  have  been  a distinguished  piece  of  strategy ; 
as  it  was,  they  had  merely  blundered  into  it  by  Napoleon’s  act. 

Having  marched  east  from  Montmirail,  Marmont  had 
reached  Sommesous  March  24,  at  eventide,  and  there  found 


460 


IN  EVIL  CASE. 


that  he  could  no  longer  rejoin  Napoleon,  as  between  Chalons 
and  Vitry  his  scouts  announced  the  presence  of  a great  army, 
on  the  march  towards  him.  Indeed,  Blucher  had  already 
reached  Chalons,  and  his  van  was  in  motion  westward. 
Mortier  had  marched  a little  farther  north  by  way  of  Chain- 
trey.  Thus  surprised,  Marmont  retired  on  Fere  Champe- 
noise  to  await  Mortier,  whom  in  all  haste  he  called  in,  and 
on  March  25  the  two  allied  armies,  practically  in  one  body, 
advanced  on  the  small  French  force.  In  this  advance 
Mortier’s  last  brigade  was  caught  by  the  allied  cavalry,  and 
though  it  gallantly  held  itself  in  squares  some  hours,  it  was 
forced,  after  great  loss,  to  surrender.  Nor  was  this  all : Mac- 
donald’s two  divisions,  Pachtod  and  Armey,  that  had  been 
farthest  off,  four  thousand  men,  marching  via  Etoges,  had 
learned  that  the  road  to  Vitry  was  cut  off  and  had  filed  on 
Sezanne,  March  24,  to  join  Marmont  and  Mortier ; and  six 
thousand  men  of  the  National  Guard  and  provisional  regi- 
ments that  Compans  was  directing  towards  Napoleon’s  army 
along  the  Montmirail  chaussee,  with  a convoy  of  artillery, 
and  that  had  reached  the  Sonde,  also  found  their  advance 
intercepted,  and,  heading  on  Fere  Champenoise  in  the  hope 
of  joining  Marmont  and  Mortier,  were  caught  by  Grand  Duke 
Constantine,  and  after  a lively  fight  were  cut  down  or  cap- 
tured. Pachtod  and  Armey  were  cut  off  by  Blucher’s  cavalry, 
and  Schwartzenberg  captured  the  whole  body.  The  French 
lost  ten  thousand  killed,  wounded  and  taken,  among  them 
nine  generals,  eighty  guns,  two  hundred  wagons,  and  the 
entire  park.  The  allies  lost  about  one  thousand  men. 

Advancing  on  the  two  highways,  Marmont  and  Mortier 
barely  escaped.  They  were  in  evil  case.  They  could  no 
longer  join  the  emperor.  The  allies  had  unwittingly  stumbled 
into  playing  the  emperor’s  pet  game,  and  had  interposed  be- 
tween his  own  two  armies.  The  two  marshals  had  no  choice 


FATE  OF  THE  CAPITAL  SEALED. 


461 


except  to  retire  on  Paris,  to  help  make  head  against  the 
advancing  enemy,  and  as  matters  then  looked,  it  was  as  well 
they  did  so.  They  fell  back  at  night  as  best  they  might,  and 
luckily  Kleist  and  Yorck,  who  had  been  ordered  down  from 
Montmirail  March  26,  were  too  slow  to  cut  them  off,  though 
on  the  same  road.  In  Sezanne  they  expected  to  find  Corn- 
pans,  instead  of  whom  they  found  Ziethen,  who  had  driven 
Compans  out ; but  they  managed  to  open  a way,  bayonet  in 
hand.  Reaching  La  Ferte  Gaucher  in  bad  shape,  they  found 
that  a Prussian  detachment  had  also  taken  this  town,  and 
striving  to  force  their  way  through,  Pahlen  came  up  in  their 
rear,  and  they  had  to  file  off  to  the  left  towards  Provins. 
Compans  and  Vincent  were  now  alone  guarding  the  main 
road;  but  they  skillfully  retired,  broke  the  bridges,  and 
defended  the  defiles  in  such  fashion  as  to  afford  time  to 
Marmont  and  Mortier,  who  marched  to  Nangis  and  reached 
Guignes  the  27th,  to  get  to  Paris  ahead  of  the  enemy.  The 
allies,  who  kept  on  in  good  order,  in  better  weather  and  over 
better  footing,  the  artillery  on  the  road,  the  troops  on  either 
side,  on  this  day  entered  Meaux,  with  van  at  Villeparisis. 
The  fate  of  the  capital  was  sealed. 

Winzingerode,  who  had  been  sent  out  by  the  allies  to  keep 
in  touch  with  Napoleon’s  army,  reached  Vi  try  March  25 ; 
and  on  the  same  day  pushed  on  to  St.  Dizier  and  occupied  it, 
spreading  the  rumor  that  the  allied  army  was  following  on. 
His  van  was  sent  out  to  Eclaron,  on  the  road  to  Montieren- 
der.  Napoleon  was  meanwhile  blinded  by  his  belief  that 
the  allies  were  following  him  up  and  lay  opposite  him  at 
Vitry,  curtained  by  this  cavalry  corps.  He  is  stated  to  have 
said  to  one  of  the  officers  who  accompanied  him  to  Elba,  that 
he  marched  on  St.  Dizier  44  because  from  twenty  years’  expe- 
rience I had  learned  that  you  always  got  into  the  greatest 
disorder  if  I only  sent  a few  hussars  to  threaten  your  com- 


462 


NAPOLEON  LEARNS  THE  TRUTH. 


munications.  This  time  I moved  upon  them  with  my  entire 
army,  and  you  took  no  notice  of  me;  c’est  que  vous  aviez 
le  diable  au  corps.”  It  was  really  because  they  knew  his 
plans. 

With  this  idea  overriding  all  others,  he  turned  in  his  tracks, 
and  from  Doulevant  came  back,  March  26,  to  St.  Dizier, 
driving  out  the  allied  horse  which  had  followed  thus  far. 
Headquarters  remained  at  Doulevant,  but  Napoleon  person- 
ally accompanied  the  army ; and  ignorant  of  what  the  allies 
had  been  doing,  he  was  anxiously  awaiting  the  arrival  of 
Marmont  and  Mortier.  Meanwhile  he  dispatched  Oudinot 
to  Bar-le-Duc,  because  Lorraine  was  this  general’s  birth- 
place, and  he,  better  than  any  one,  could  rouse  the  popu- 
lation ; and  some  French  light  horse  moved  via  Joinville 
towards  Chaumont  and  Bar-sur-Aube.  At  St.  Dizier,  March 
26,  Napoleon  summarily  attacked  the  enemy,  thinking  thus  to 
open  a path  for  Marmont  and  Mortier  to  join  him,  and  Sebas- 
tiani  and  Milhaud  drove  back  Winzingerode.  When  the 
prisoners  captured  reported  this  to  be  part  of  Blucher’s  army, 
the  scales  fell  from  the  emperor’s  eyes ; he  could  no  longer 
blind  himself  to  the  truth,  for  he  also  learned  that  the  two 
allied  armies  were  on  the  march  to  Paris.  Yet  persisting  in 
his  determination,  he  next  day  made  a reconnoissance  in 
force  on  Vitry,  hoping  that  the  capture  of  a town  on  the 
direct  allied  line  of  operations  would  change  their  plans,  and 
with  a view  also  of  having  a strong  place  to  base  upon  for  a 
march  towards  Chalons  on  their  rear.  But  on  arrival  he 
found  that  Yitry  could  not  be  seized  out  of  hand ; and  here 
two  peasants  came  in  who  had  been  witnesses  of  Marmont’s 
and  Mortier’s  defeat  at  Fere  Champenoise,  and  of  the  march 
of  the  allied  army.  “Only  a stroke  of  lightning  can  save 
us  ! ” said  the  emperor. 

This  blow,  we  are  told,  appeared  to  rob  Napoleon  of  his 


DEJEAN  DISPATCHED  TO  PARIS. 


463 


self-possession,  and  of  that  power  of  sharp  decision  which 
during  this  campaign,  though  perhaps  in  a feverish,  unnatural 
form,  had  been  constantly  uppermost.  His  nervous  system 
had  been  overtaxed  for  two  years,  and  now  succumbed.  He 
should  have  turned  over  the  command  to  a lieutenant,  and 
have  himself  gone  post-haste  to  Paris  to  direct  its  defense, 
leaving  the  army  to  follow.  “ It  almost  seems,”  says  Clause- 
witz,  “ that  he  had  no  desire  to  expose  his  person  to  the  shame 
of  a defeat  under  the  walls  of  the  capital.”  He  turned  for 
counsel  to  his  military  family,  and  Ney  and  Berthier  urged 
with  all  their  power  of  persuasion  an  immediate  forced  march 
on  Paris,  if  perchance  they  might  yet  reach  the  capital  before 
the  less  rapid  allies.  To  this  advice  Napoleon  listened,  espe- 
cially as  without  Marmont  and  Mortier  he  was  scarcely  strong 
enough  in  the  better  elements  of  the  army  to  go  on  with  his 
operations  in  Lorraine.  He  returned  that  night  to  St. 
Dizier. 

The  dispersed  French  army  had  to  be  collected.  The  main 
part  was  near  Vitry ; Oudinot  had  been  sent  towards  Bar-le- 
Duc ; some  of  the  cavalry  was  at  Chaumont.  Troyes  was 
assigned  as  a rendezvous,  and  next  day,  the  28th,  a forced 
march  was  begun  by  way  of  that  town.  Napoleon  personally 
reached  Montierender,  and  here  received  dispatches  that  the 
royalists  were  beginning  to  show  signs  of  disquiet  in  Paris. 
On  the  29th,  from  Dolancourt  on  the  Aube,  on  learning  from 
Joseph  that  the  allies  had  reached  Meaux,  he  dispatched  to 
Paris  his  aide,  Dejean,  to  announce  his  arrival,  and  to  instruct 
Marmont  and  Mortier  to  hold  back  the  allies  at  any  cost ; 
and,  in  order  to  aid  the  matter,  to  inform  Schwartzenberg 
that  Napoleon  had  sent  to  the  sovereigns  proposals  for  peace 
which  would  be  entirely  acceptable,  and  asking  him  to  cease 
operations,  as  the  war  was  concluded.  This  stratagem  failed 
of  success. 


464 


SLIGHT  COMBATS  EVERYWHERE. 


There  was  but  scant  hope  that  Paris  would  hold  out  long 
enough  to  enable  Napoleon  to  come  to  its  aid,  though  had  the 
city  chosen  to  resist,  there  were  men  and  arms  enough.  In 
addition  to  Marmont  and  Mortier,  twenty  thousand  National 
Guards  and  two  hundred  guns  were  available  ; and  the  posi- 
tions on  the  right  bank  of  the  Seine  are  excellent.  With  a 
defense  properly  organized,  the  city  could  easily  hold  out  a day 
or  two  ; but  everybody  in  France  seemed  tired  of  the  present 
conditions ; all  but  the  army  were  in  a state  of  discontent, 
active  or  neutral  ; and  even  among  Napoleon’s  intimates, 
everlasting  war  was  sapping  the  foundations  of  fealty. 

The  allies  moved  on  in  good  order,  and  confident  now  of 
reaching  Paris.  Sacken  and  Wrede  remained  at  Meaux  to 
guard  the  communications  towards  Belgium.  There  were 
slight  combats  everywhere,  but  practically  the  small  bodies 
of  French  were  brushed  aside  with  little  trouble.  The  Marne 
was  crossed  March  28,  the  last  attack  before  reaching  Paris 
was  at  the  forest  of  Bondy,  and  from  Clichy  the  capital  was 
seen  on  the  evening  of  the  29th.  On  this  day  Marmont  and 
Mortier  reached  Charenton,  and  early  March  30  occupied  the 
heights  north  of  the  city,  while  one  hundred  and  twenty  thou- 
sand allies  stood  in  their  front.  The  day  before,  the  empress 
and  the  little  King  of  Rome  had  started  for  Tours,  followed 
by  the  archives,  the  treasure  and  valuables,  and  accompanied 
by  many  of  the  ministers  and  dignitaries  of  the  empire.  The 
government  was  to  go  to  the  Loire.  Joseph  stayed  behind  to 
defend  Paris. 

Late  at  night  on  the  29th  Napoleon  personally  reached 
Troyes,  rested  a few  hours,  and  then  set  out  again,  accom- 
panied as  far  as  Villeneuve  l’Archeveque  by  the  Guard,  which 
then  could  no  longer  keep  up  with  him  ; and  he  proceeded 
with  only  the  headquarters  escort.  This  escort  he  left  ex- 
hausted at  Villeneuve  la  Guiyard,  and  with  fresh  relays  drove 


DEFENSE  OF  MARMONT  AND  MORTIER.  465 

with  Berthier,  Caulaincourt,  Gourgaud,  Flaliault,  Drouot,  and 
a few  other  officers  to  Fontainebleau. 

Marmont  and  Mortier  meanwhile  strove  so  to  place  them- 
selves as  to  hold  the  heights  which  should  prevent  the 
approach  of  the  enemy  to  the  gates  of  Paris.  Mortier,  with 
about  ten  thousand  men,  took  up  position  on  the  left  from  St. 
Ouen  to  Pantin,  Marmont  with  some  twelve  thousand  men 
stretched  from  Pantin 
to  Montreuil.  On  the 
right  was  the  little  fort 
of  Vincennes,  which  was 
left  to  the  scholars  of 
the  Polytechnic  School 
with  twenty-eight  guns 
to  defend,  and  the  ill- 
fortified  bridge  of  Cha- 
renton  was  held  by  the 
scholars  of  the  Veter- 
inary School,  with  one 
company  of  veterans. 

Skirmishers  were  out  in 
front  in  suitable  bodies, 
and  Moncey  had  a force 
of  sundry  troops  in  front 
of  the  gate  of  Clicliy. 

The  allies  drew  a circular  line  from  the  Seine  in  front  of  St. 
Denis  to  the  Marne  at  the  forest  of  Vincennes,  and,  occupy- 
ing all  the  heights  in  the  centre,  opened  the  attack  March  30 
at  daylight,  Blucher  moving  towards  Montmartre  and  the 
Army  of  the  Sovereigns  on  Belleville.  The  two  French 
marshals  defended  themselves  better  than  could  have  been 
expected,  and,  backed  by  Moncey,  staved  off  the  adversary 
with  honorable  courage.  Though  this  defense  was  not  up  to 


Moncey. 


VOL.  IV. 


466 


TO  ARRANGE  A CAPITULATION . 


Napoleon’s  ideas  of  what  should  have  been  done,  it  was  far 
superior  to  the  defense  either  of  Vienna  in  1805  or  of  Berlin 
in  1806.  Joseph  had  taken  up  position  on  the  height  of 
Montmartre,  and  until  nearly  noon  continued  to  give  orders ; 
but  as  the  allied  left  crept  nearer  and  nearer,  and  one  posi- 
tion after  another  was  seized,  he  was  forced  to  the  conclusion 
that  the  whole  allied  army  stood  in  his  front.  This  being  the 
case,  he  left  the  command  with  Marmont  and  Mortier,  gave 
the  two  marshals  power  if  necessary  to  sign  a capitulation, 
and  himself  started  to  join  the  government  towards  Orleans. 

The  allied  line  was  tightening  its  grasp,  and  guns  were 
being  put  in  position  to  bombard  the  city,  when  Marmont 


sent  a parliamentary  to  Alexander  to  ask  for  a truce  to  ar- 
range a capitulation,  the  marshals  agreeing  to  give  up  the 
city  next  day  against  the  right  to  move  towards  Fontainebleau 
with  all  their  forces. 


SURRENDER  OF  PARIS. 


467 


Wliat  might  have  happened  had  Napoleon  been  able  to 
reach  Paris  so  as  to  have  fifty  thousand  line  troops  there,  it 
is  hard  to  say.  His  marching  orders  when  he  left  the  army 
at  Troyes  were  such  as  to  bring  them  to  Paris  by  April  2, 
but  this  was  three  days  late. 

From  Fontainebleau  on  the  30th,  with  Berthier  and  Cau- 
laincourt,  Napoleon  drove  towards  Paris,  reaching  Iniwisy  at 
10  p.  m.,  where  he  met  Mortier’s  cavalry,  under  Belliard,  retir- 
ing via  Villejuif  on  Fontainebleau,  followed  by  the  infantry 
of  the  corps.  Paris  had  surrendered 

Napoleon  would  have  insisted  on  personally  going  to  Paris, 
but  his  entourage  convinced  him  that  this  was  courting  cer- 
tain imprisonment.  He  spent  the  night  at  the  post-house 
of  Iniwisy,  La  Cour  de  France,  and  by  4 a.  m.  on  the  31st, 
learning  that  the  formal  surrender  of  the  capital  had  been 
signed  two  hours  before,  he  drove  back  to  Fontainebleau. 

Marmont  says  that  from  this  moment  on  Napoleon  seemed 
robbed  of  his  clearness  of  vision  and  power  to  decide.  In 
the  following  few  days  he  assembled  his  oncoming  army  at 
Fontainebleau,  including  Marmont  and  Mortier,  some  fifty 
thousand  strong,  and  with  these  he  determined  once  more  to 
march  on  Paris  and  drive  out  the  allies.  He  did  not  give  up 
his  cause  for  lost.  There  were  still  many  things  he  could  do 
by  collecting  all  his  forces  in  the  centre  and  south  of  France. 
From  Fontainebleau,  March  31,  he  wrote  Berthier:  — 

“ My  Cousin,  Marmont  will  form  the  vanguard  and  assemble  all  the 
troops  at  Essonne.  Instruct  him  to  direct  all  powder  by  way  of  Orleans, 
and  to  send  to  Fontainebleau  all  the  victual  which  is  in  the  magazines 
at  Corbeil.  . . . The  pivot  point  of  the  army  will  be  Orleans.”  Every- 
thing “ will  move  towards  that  point.  The  ministry  and  government  will 
assemble  at  Orleans.  . . . Instruct  the  Minister  of  War  that  the  whole 
court  is  to  move  on  Orleans  ...  to  escort  the  empress.  . . . Write  to 
the  prefect  of  Orleans  to  announce  the  unfortunate  news  of  the  enemy’s 
occupation  of  Paris,  which  my  arrival  would  have  prevented,  if  they  had 


468 


ALLOCUTION  TO  THE  OLD  GUARD. 


retarded  it  three  hours.  Instruct  him  of  the  assembly  that  is  to  take 
place  at  Orleans  ; recommend  him  to  gather  and  prepare  victual  for  the 
troops.  . . . Send  a courier  this  evening  to  Tours  to  announce  these  dif- 
ferent dispositions  to  King  Joseph  and  the  ministers,  who  will  communi- 
cate them  in  circulars  to  all  the  departments.” 

To  keep  touch  with  the  allied  sovereigns,  from  La  Cour  de  France, 
March  31,  Napoleon  wrote  Caulaincourt  : “ We  order  the  Duke  of  Vi- 
cenza, our  Grand  Master  of  the  Horse  and  our  Minister  of  Foreign  Rela- 
tions, to  visit  the  allied  sovereigns  and  the  general-in-chief  of  their  armies, 
to  recommend  to  them  our  faithful  subjects  of  the  capital.  We  invest 
him  by  these  presents  with  all  power  to  negotiate  and  conclude  peace, 
promising  to  ratify  all  that  he  will  do  for  the  good  of  our  service.  If 
need  be,  we  invest  him  also  with  military  power  to  be  the  administrator 
and  the  commissary  of  that  good  city  near  the  general-in-chief  of  the 
allies.  We  order  in  consequence  all  authorities  to  recognize  the  Duke  of 
Vicenza  in  the  said  quality,  to  second  him  in  everything  that  he  shall  do, 
for  the  good  of  our  service  and  of  our  people.” 

On  April  1 Napoleon  issued  orders  to  Berthier  to  prepare 
for  a review  of  all  the  troops  ; and  on  the  3d,  with  the  object 
of  marching  on  Paris,  he  issued  an  Allocution  to  the  Old 
Guard : — 

“ Officers,  sub-officers  and  soldiers  of  the  Old  Guard  : The  enemy 
stole  three  marches  on  us.  He  has  entered  Paris.  I have  offered  the 
Emperor  Alexander  peace  bought  by  great  sacrifice  : France  with  its  old 
limits,  renouncing  our  conquests,  losing  everything  that  we  have  won 
since  the  Revolution.  Not  only  has  he  refused,  but  he  has  done  more. 
By  the  perfidious  suggestions  of  those  emigres  to  whom  I accorded  life 
and  whom  I have  showered  with  kindnesses,  he  authorizes  them  to  wear 
the  white  cockade,  and  by  and  by  will  substitute  it  for  our  national 
cockade.  In  a few  days  I shall  go  to  attack  him  at  Paris.  I count  on 
you.  . . . Am  I right  ? ” (This  was  followed  by  a thunder  of  cries  of  “ Vice 
VEmpereur!  On  to  Paris!”)  “We  will  go  to  prove  to  them  that  the 
French  nation  knows  how  to  be  mistress  at  home  ; that  if  we  have  long 
been  so  abroad  among  others,  we  will  always  be  so  at  home.  And  that 
finally  we  are  capable  of  defending  our  cockade,  our  independence  and 
the  integrity  of  our  territory.” 


DECLARATION  OF  APRIL  4,  1814- 


469 


But  all  his  old  subordinates,  led  by  Berthier  and  Ney,  and 
including  Oudinot,  Macdonald,  Caulaincourt,  Maret  and  Ber* 
trand,  entreated  him  to  make  an  end  of  this  insensate  pro- 
ceeding. News  from  the  south  was  bad  ; the  English  were  in 
Bordeaux,  and  the  Austrians  in  Lyons ; Bentinck,  released  in 
Catalonia,  had  sailed  to  attack  Genoa;  Wellington  was  near 
Toulouse.  Worse  still,  Napoleon  had  lost  the  confidence  of 
the  Parisians : the  citizens  were  apathetic,  the  salons  breathed 
treason,  the  journalists  and  cheap  orators  joined  in  abuse  of 
the  empire.  Once  the  defense  was  over,  the  population  re- 
ceived the  allied  troops  with  acclaim ; only  the  army  remained 
faithful.  Be  it  said  to  his  credit,  the  Emperor  Alexander 
behaved  with  calmness  and  generosity,  when  the  recollection 
of  the  fate  of  the  Kremlin  might  well  have  aroused  a desire 
to  retaliate.  A large  part  of  any  population  is  always  ready 
for  a change  : particularly  is  this  true  of  the  French,  and  Na- 
poleon had  enemies  in  abundance.  On  April  2 the  Senate, 
under  the  lead  of  Talleyrand,  declared  that  Napoleon  had 
forfeited  the  crown,  and  created  a provisional  government. 
Napoleon’s  troops  would  still  have  stood  by  him,  but  espe- 
cially as  Wellington  had  driven  Soult  towards  Toulouse,  his 
marshals  were  not  so  ready  to  attempt  the  impossible.  They 
determined  to  ask  from  Napoleon  his  cession  of  the  throne, 
and  Ney,  the  spokesman  of  the  others,  put  the  case  with 
perfect  plainness.  These  entreaties  of  Napoleon’s  faithful 
comrades  drew  from  him  his  memorable  Declaration  of 
April  4,  which  was  sent  to  the  allied  sovereigns : — 

“ The  allied  powers  having  proclaimed  that  the  Emperor  Napoleon  is 
the  only  obstacle  to  the  reestablishment  of  peace  in  Europe,  the  Emperor 
Napoleon,  faithful  to  his  oaths,  declares  that  he  is  ready  to  descend  from 
the  throne,  to  give  up  France  and  even  life  for  the  good  of  the  country, 
inseparable  from  the  rights  of  his  son,  of  those  of  the  regency,  of  the 
empress,  and  of  the  maintenance  of  the  laws  of  the  empire. 

“ Done  in  our  palace  of  Fontainebleau  April  4,  1814.” 


470  CONDITIONAL  ABDICATION  REJECTED. 


Meanwhile  Marmont  and  Schwartzenberg  had  entered  into 
independent  negotiations,  and  thus  Napoleon’s  last  support, 
part  if  not  all  of  his  fifty  thousand  men,  fell  from  him.  It 
was  this  which  led  this  wonderful  egoist  to  exclaim : “ If  the 
emperor  has  despised  men,  as  he  has  been  reproached  with 
doing,  the  world  would  to-day  acknowledge  that  he  had 
grounds  on  which  to  found  this  sentiment.” 

From  Fontainebleau,  April  5,  the  emperor  issued  a 

PROCLAMATION  TO  THE  ARMY. 

The  emperor  thanks  the  army  for  the  attachment  it  has  shown  him, 
and  principally  because  it  recognizes  that  France  is  in  him,  and  not  in 
the  people  of  the  capital.  The  soldier  follows  the  fortune  and  misfortune 
of  his  general.  Honor  is  his  religion.  Marmont  has  not  inspired  this 
sentiment  to  his  companions  in  arms  ; he  has  passed  over  to  the  allies. 
The  emperor  cannot  approve  the  condition  under  which  he  did  this  act, 
he  cannot  accept  life  and  liberty  at  the  mercy  of  a subject.  The  Senate 
has  permitted  itself  to  dispose  of  the  French  government.  It  has  for- 
gotten that  it  owes  to  the  emperor  the  power  it  now  abuses.  ...  It  does 
not  blush  to  make  reproaches  to  the  emperor.  . . . To-day,  when  fortune 
has  decided  against  me,  the  wish  of  the  nation  alone  could  persuade  me 
to  remain  longer  on  the  throne.  . . . The  army  may  be  certain  that  the 
honor  of  the  emperor  will  never  be  in  contradiction  with  the  happiness 
of  France. 

The  conditional  abdication  was  rejected  by  the  sover- 
eigns, and  Napoleon  again  considered  the  plan  of  withdraw- 
ing behind  the  Loire,  even  abandoning  France  and  going 
personally  to  the  rescue  of  Italy.  But  his  strength  was 
not  only  unequal  to  such  a strain,  his  subordinates  would 
not  join  him  ; the  project  never  got  beyond  discussion. 
And  when  the  Senate  in  Paris  called  back  the  old  royal 
family,  Napoleon  gave  his  assent  to  all,  in  his  full  Act  of 
Abdication. 


FULL  ACT  OF  ABDICATION . 


471 


" The  allied  powers  having  declared  that  the  Emperor  Napoleon  is  the 
only  obstacle  to  the  reestablishment  of  peace  in  Europe,  the  Emperor 
Napoleon,  faithful  to  his  oath,  declares  that  he  renounces  for  himself  and 
his  heirs  the  thrones  of  France  and  Italy,  and  that  there  is  no  personal 
sacrifice,  even  that  of  life,  which  he  is  not  ready  to  make  for  the  interest 
of  France. 

“ Done  at  the  palace  of  Fontainebleau,  April  11,  1814.  — Napoleon.” 


Bavarian  Cannoneer. 


LXX. 


TOULOUSE.  JANUARY  TO  APRIL  10,  1814. 

While  the  allies  were  marching  on  Paris,  Wellington  was  pushing  Soult’s 
force  back  in  southern  France.  Why  Napoleon  had  not  ordered  Suchet  to  join 
Soult  is  hard  to  explain.  Wellington’s  manoeuvring  constantly  improved,  and 
after  a series  of  clever  operations  he  crossed  the  Adour  February  22,  and  thus 
turned  the  position  of  Bayonne,  meanwhile  forcing  the  French  left  across  the 
Gave  d’Oleron.  Soult  assembled  his  forces  at  Orthez,  and  on  February  27  stub- 
bornly fought  to  maintain  his  position,  but  Wellington  won  the  day,  and  Soult 
retired  up  the  Adour  early  in  March.  Wellington  was  well  received  in  France, 
as  he  conciliated  the  population  and  paid  promptly  for  supplies.  He  seized 
Bordeaux  March  12.  On  March  20  and  21  there  was  some  fighting  near  Tarhes, 
whence  Soult  retired  to  Toulouse,  followed  by  Wellington  at  the  end  of  March. 
Soult  determined  to  fight  within  the  city  works,  and  Wellington  tried  to  cross 
the  Garonne,  so  as  to  have  him  at  a disadvantage,  but  failed.  On  April  10, 
however,  he  did  cross,  and  attacked  the  city.  It  was  an  almost  desperate  chance, 
hut  the  English  troops  did  good  work,  and  against  stout  opposition,  and  great 
difficulties,  he  drove  Soult  into  the  city  proper.  On  April  11  he  prepared  for  a 
fresh  assault ; but  Soult,  on  hearing  of  Napoleon’s  abdication,  deemed  it  wise  to 
withdraw.  In  the  Peninsula  Wellington  showed  himself  to  be  a sound  rather 
than  a brilliant  general.  He  was  always  reliable  if  over-deliberate,  and  while 
not  great  as  a strategist,  was  able  in  battle  tactics,  not,  however,  following  up 
victories  by  pursuit.  It  took  many  years  to  advance  from  Lisbon  to  Toulouse, 
and  yet  at  no  time  could  he  have  been  replaced  by  any  one  who  would  have 
done  his  work  with  more  patience  and  skill.  In  Italy  Eugene  was  finally  over- 
come. The  campaign  of  1814  is  one  of  the  most  brilliant  that  Napoleon  ever 
conducted,  although  he  combined  with  wronderful  military  capacity  utter  blind- 
ness as  to  eventual  possibilities.  A Convention  was  entered  into  April  11  under 
which  Napoleon  retained  the  island  of  Elba. 

We  must  now  return  to  Wellington,  who,  during  the  allied 
march  on  Paris,  was  facing  Soult  and  contributing  his  full 
share  to  the  demolition  of  the  Napoleonic  structure.  In  the 
effort  not  to  abandon  Bayonne,  as  well  as  to  extend  far  enough 


SOULT  OVERMATCHED . 


473 


up  the  Adour  to  prevent  the  allies  from  cutting  him  off  from 
the  Toulouse  region,  Soult  was  puzzled  how  to  dispose  his 
forces  ; for  a line  from  Bayonne  to  St.  Jean  Pied  de  Port  was 
unduly  long.  Although  he  had  established  his  big  magazines 
at  Dax  and  Peyrehorade  and  fortified  these  towns,  when  the 
allies  reached  the  left  bank  of  the  lower  Adour,  they  inter- 
fered with  his  water  transportation.  A bridge  was  built  and 
a considerable  force  stationed  at  Port  de  Lande,  and  on  the 
main-road  crossings  bridge-heads  were  erected.  Clausel  stood 
on  the  Bidouze,  striving  not  to  lose  hold  of  St.  Jean  Pied  de 
Port,  from  whence  the  line  ran  to  Bayonne.  Communication 
being  insecure  along  this  extended  front,  Soult  occupied 
Helette  as  an  outpost,  so  that  Paris,  who  had  come  on  from 
Saragossa  with  a flying  corps,  might  connect  with  Clausel. 
Meanwhile,  as  if  Bayonne  were  his  sole  objective,  Well- 
ington continued  to  hold  the  angle  between  the  Nive  and  the 
ocean,  with  Hill  on  the  right  bank  extending  to  Urt. 

While  Soult’s  forces  were  reduced  by  drafts,  desertion  and 
invalidism,  Wellington’s  were  kept  in  condition,  the  English 
marshal  being  always  a good  provider.  Still,  the  difficulties 
in  Portugal  continued ; and  those  in  Spain  increased  to  such 
an  extent  that  Wellington  advised  the  British  government 
that  it  might  anticipate  a war  with  that  country,  and  sug- 
gested that  San  Sebastian  be  seized,  so  that  in  case  of  such 
an  event  a nearby  port  would  be  available  as  a base,  to  protect 
or  embark  the  troops.  Yet  the  Cortes  continued  Wellington 
in  command,  and  it  is  probable  that  Soult’s  difficulties  were 
the  greater.  With  equal  skill  in  the  commanding  officers, 
there  was  no  question  that  the  allies  would  eventually  win, 
and  it  can  scarcely  be  denied  that  Soult  was  overmatched  in 
all-round  ability. 

Friendly  habits  had  been  established  between  the  rival 
lines  at  the  outposts. 


474 


AMICABLE  ASSOCIATION. 


“ The  value  of  such  a generous  intercourse  old  soldiers  well  under- 
stand, and  some  illustrations  of  it  at  this  period  may  be  quoted,”  says 
Napier.  “ On  the  9th  of  December,  the  Forty-third  was  assembled  on 
an  open  space  within  twenty  yards  of  the  enemy’s  out-sentry;  yet  the 
latter  continued  to  walk  his  beat  for  an  hour,  relying  so  confidently  on 
the  customary  system  that  he  placed  his  knapsack  on  the  ground  to  ease 
his  shoulders.  When  the  order  to  advance  was  given,  one  of  the  soldiers, 
having  told  him  to  go  away,  helped  him  to  replace  his  pack,  and  then 
firing  commenced.  Next  morning,  the  French  in  like  manner  warned  a 
Forty -third  sentry  to  retire.  A more  remarkable  instance  happened,  how- 
ever, when  Wellington,  desirous  of  getting  to  the  top  of  a hill  occupied 
by  the  enemy  near  Bayonne,  ordered  some  riflemen  to  drive  the  French 
away  ; seeing  them  stealing  up  too  close,  as  he  thought,  he  called  out  to 
fire  ; but  with  a loud  voice  one  of  those  old  soldiers  replied,  “No  firing  ! ” 
and  holding  up  the  butt  of  his  rifle,  tapped  it  in  a peculiar  way.  At 
the  well-understood  signal,  which  meant  “We  must  have  the  hill  for  a 
short  time,”  the  French,  who,  though  they  could  not  maintain,  would  not 
have  relinquished  the  post  without  a fight  if  they  had  been  fired  upon, 
quietly  retired.  And  this  signal  would  never  have  been  made,  if  the  post 
had  been  one  capable  of  a permanent  defense,  so  well  do  veterans  under- 
stand war  and  its  proprieties.” 

The  frequent  amicable  association  of  Federals  and  Confed- 
erates at  the  outposts,  which  many  old  American  soldiers  so 
pleasantly  remember,  has  had  its  prototype  not  only  in  the 
Peninsular,  but  in  many  previous  wars. 

Owing  to  the  necessities  of  the  campaign  on  the  Seine  and 
Marne,  Napoleon  now  began  to  withdraw  troops  from  the 
armies  at  both  ends  of  the  Pyrenees.  It  is  hard  to  conceive 
how  the  great  soldier  could  have  been  so  blind  as  not  to  con- 
solidate the  forces  in  Spain  and  thus  oblige  his  lieutenants  to 
work  together,  on  the  constant  theory  that,  when  you  have 
beaten  the  main  force  of  the  enemy,  other  things  will  take 
care  of  themselves.  This  had  through  life  been  his  strongest 
principle,  and  yet  in  Spain  he  “ saw  too  many  things  at  once,” 
and  “ striving  to  keep  everything,  he  thereby  lost  everything,” 


SOULT’S  SUGGESTION. 


475 


as  Frederick  says.  Nothing,  perhaps,  more  fully  exhibits  the 
emperor’s  growing  unwillingness  to  face  the  inevitable  than 
this.  Had  he  himself  been  in  Spain,  he  would  have  left 
nothing  but  a containing  force  on  the  eastern  coast,  and 
have  united  all  his  forces  to  march  on  and  defeat  Wellington 
on  the  Ebro.  Soult  could  not  have  done  as  much,  but  with 
Suchet’s  army  added  to  his  own,  he  would  have  gone  farther 
towards  defending  the  frontiers  of  France  than  he  did.  Napo- 
leon also  expected  marked  results  from  sending  Ferdinand 
back  to  Spain,  but  like  many  of  his  calculations  at  this  time 
of  his  failing  fortunes,  he  was  misled.  The  new  king  availed 
the  French  naught. 

The  emperor  notified  Soult  in  January  that  he  must  draw 
troops  from  him  to  the  extent  of  at  least  two  divisions,  and 
that  he  must  do  the  best  he  could  with  what  remained  to  him. 
Soult  strove  to  do  his  task  justice,  but  in  addition  to  the  loss 
of  forces,  he  was  troubled  by  the  disaffection  of  the  anti- 
imperialists in  France,  who,  under  the  leadership  of  the 
Bourbons,  so  heartily  played  into  the  hands  of  the  allies  that 
Wellington  was  led  to  believe  that  the  whole  of  France  was 
anti-Napoleon. 

In  answer  to  Napoleon’s  drafts  of  men,  Soult  suggested 
that  he  would  be  too  weak  both  to  hold  Bayonne  and  face 
the  heavy  forces  of  the  allies,  and  that  perhaps  the  better 
plan  to  forestall  invasion  would  be  not  to  conserve  a base 
upon  the  ocean,  but  to  strengthen  the  army  so  as  to  enable  it 
to  move  along  the  north  foot-hills  of  the  Pyrenees,  base  on 
the  Mediterranean,  and  fall  upon  the  rear  of  the  allies  in  case 
they  advanced  into  the  interior.  He  suggested  that  Clausel, 
born  in  and  familiar  with  that  country,  would  do  the  work  as 
well  as  he  ; and  he  himself  asked  for  service  near  the  emperor. 
From  whatever  motive,  Napoleon  neglected  this  suggestion, 
and  Soult  was  left  with  not  over  forty  thousand  old  troops. 


476 


ST.  JEAN  INVESTED. 


There  were  additional  conscripts  of  poor  quality,  but  scarcely 
enough  muskets  to  arm  them. 

Wellington’s  present  question  was  how  to  compass  the  cap- 
ture of  Bayonne.  He  could  not  well  cross  above  the  city, 
because  that  meant  first  driving  Soult  from  his  holdings  on 
the  Nive.  Below,  the  stream  was  wide,  the  ebb-tide  ran  seven 
miles  an  hour,  and  the  French  had  a small  river  flotilla  which 
might  interrupt  the  passage ; but  just  because  Wellington 
guessed  that  the  French  would  not  expect  him  to  cross  in  this 
difficult  place,  he  resolved  to  do  so ; and  he  planned  to  de- 
monstrate stoutly  against  the  French  left,  and  under  cover  of 
this  to  force  the  passage.  He  collected  his  material  in  the 
Bidart  country,  and  gave  the  work  to  Hope,  while  Beresford 
was  to  contain  the  French  centre  and  Hill  should  turn  its 
left.  In  this  view,  on  February  14,  with  twenty  thousand 
men,  Hill  started  to  cross  the  Nive,  dislodged  Harispe,  who 
was  at  Helette,  cut  Soult’s  communications  with  St.  Jean  Pied 
de  Port  and  marched  on  Garris.  Beresford,  on  Hill’s  left, 
advanced  to  Bastide  Clerence. 

Soult  naturally  imagined  that  his  left  was  to  be  turned, 
while  Bayonne  was  attacked ; Paris  was  recalled  from  an 
expedition  to  Jacca,  and  Harispe  strove  to  keep  open  the  line 
from  St.  Jean  Pied  de  Port  to  St.  Palais  on  the  Bidouze.  On 
the  Garris  heights  Hill  attacked  Paris,  while  Wellington 
sent  some  Spanish  troops  around  his  left ; the  hill  was  taken 
by  a sharp  assault  in  which  five  hundred  men  were  lost, 
the  French  withdrew  behind  the  Bidouze,  and  St.  Jean  was 
invested.  Meanwhile  Picton,  on  Hill’s  left,  threatened  Vil- 
latte  at  Oregue.  At  one  moment  these  operations  promised 
to  bring  on  a general  engagement. 

Not  having  enough  men  properly  to  hold  the  line  from 
Bayonne  along  the  Bidouze  to  Mauleon,  Soult  determined  to 
withdraw  back  of  the  Gave  d’Oleron.  Erlon  was  ordered  to 


THE  DAY  DEFINITELY  LOST.  4bl 

Reille’s  troops  fell  into  disorder,  and  Beresford’s  division 
broke  into  St.  Boez.  Meanwhile  the  3d  and  6th  divisions  had 
seized  a position  from  which  they  could  enfilade  the  French 
left,  and  between  these  simultaneous  attacks,  Soult  began  to 
fear  for  his  victory.  This  indeed  was  shortly  settled,  when 
Hill,  who  had  been  threatening  Orthez,  finding  that  he  could 
not  force  the  bridge,  moved  by  his  right  to  Souars,  there 
forded  the  river,  and  advanced  along  a ridge  towards  the 
French  line  of  retreat,  through  Salespice.  Clausel  threw  for- 
ward some  troops  to  arrest  this  dangerous  manoeuvre,  but  Hill 
pushed  on,  and  Soult  saw  that  the  day  was  definitely  lost. 
He  was  in  considerable  danger,  having  four  streams  to  pass 
before  he  could  reach  the  Adour, 
but  he  cleverly  managed  his  re- 
treat ; and  he  was  aided  by  Well- 
ington’s failure  to  pursue,  owing 
in  part  to  a slight  wound  the 
latter  had  received.  Soult  lost 
four  thousand  killed,  wounded 
and  missing ; the  conscripts  in 
great  part  dispersed  and  threw 
away  their  weapons.  The  Eng- 
lish loss  was  less. 

In  the  battle  of  Orthez  the 
forces  were  not  far  from  equal,  _ . . „ ... 

1 Spanish  Pusiher. 

for  while  Soult’s  total  was  less, 

he  had  been  able  to  put  nearly  forty  thousand  men  into 
action,  while  Wellington,  by  detachments,  had  scarcely  more 
at  hand.  Soult’s  battle  was  a defensive  one,  and  his  troops 
had  not  shown  themselves  the  equals  of  the  allied.  Well- 
ington’s double  attack  without  connection  between  his  wings 
was  scarcely  justifiable  except  by  his  marked  success.  Next 
day  he  followed  up  the  retreating  French,  who  were  obliged 


482 


SOULT’S  POSITION  DISHEARTENING. 


to  abandon  their  magazines  at  Dax,  Aire  and  St.  Marsan, 
Soult  having  elected  to  move  towards  Toulouse.  Wellington 
would  have  been  glad  to  drive  him  towards  Bordeaux,  and 
definitely  cut  him  off  from  Suchet,  who  he  fancied  would  join 
Soult  by  the  Mediterranean  roads.  Hill  marched  to  Aire 
on  the  Adour  to  seize  the  magazines  there,  and  a heavy 
combat  ensued  with  Reille  and  Villatte.  Wellington  crossed 
March  1 at  St.  Sever.  Soult  retired  by  the  Adour  right 
bank. 

Wellington  paused.  From  February  14  to  March  2,  he 
had  swung  his  right  wing  over  eighty  miles  of  distance,  crossed 
five  rivers  and  several  streams,  had  captured  a number  of 
bridge-heads  and  small  works,  and  had  gained  one  battle 
and  two  combats  in  addition  to  seizing  the  French  magazines. 
His  work  had  been  handsomely  done,  and  against  an  able 
soldier. 

In  his  defensive  campaign,  Soult  did  not  sufficiently  use 
the  offensive,  for  on  more  than  one  occasion  there  was  an 
opening  which  he  might  well  have  utilized. 

Soult’s  position  was  getting  more  and  more  disheartening. 
Reduced  by  losses,  and  by  desertion,  not  only  of  conscripts, 
but  of  straggling  veterans  tired  of  war,  his  magazines  cap- 
tured, his  lieutenants  cast  down,  and  the  civil  authorities  in 
his  own  country  far  from  helpful,  he  had  to  face  almost 
certain  failure ; yet  he  bore  up  well  under  the  circumstances, 
and  to  the  very  end  did  his  best,  although  with  so  strong  a 
captain  and  so  good  a force  in  his  front,  he  knew  that  the 
end  could  not  be  far  off.  On  March  3 the  French  army 
retired  up  the  Adour,  Soult  having  selected  Toulouse  as  a 
last  stand,  but  proposing  to  march  by  way  of  Tarbes,  and 
thence  by  the  foot-hills  road,  rather  than  by  the  more  direct 
road  via  Audi.  At  Maubourget  he  stopped.  Here  he  re- 
ceived a note  from  the  emperor  telling  him,  as  to  Bayonne, 


MONT  MAISAN 


The  March  on  Toulouse. 


484 


BORDEAUX  SEIZED . 


that  fortresses  were  nothing  if  the  enemy  could  collect  suffi- 
cient guns  and  ammunition,  and  that  his  proper  course  was 
to  assume  the  offensive ; but  Soult  had  already  left  a large 
garrison  in  Bayonne,  and  was  now  cut  off  from  it.  Soult 
replied  that  he  would  take  the  offensive  when  possible,  but 
that  ever  since  mid-February  he  had  been  constantly  attacked 
by  superior  numbers ; and  that  he  had  elected  to  march  by 
way  of  Tarbes  because  the  Pyrenees  afforded  him  a safe 
place  to  lean  on,  and  a better  chance  to  attack  the  enemy, 
especially  if  they  should  march  by  way  of  Auch. 

Soult  now  reorganized  the  army  in  six  divisions  under 
Harispe,  Taupin,  Villatte,  Daricau,  Maransin  and  Armagnae, 
though  Beille,  Erlon  and  Clausel  were  left 
in  general  command  of  the  right,  centre  and 
left.  He  issued  a proclamation  to  the  people 
and  the  army  which,  while  it  would  have 
been  useless  for  English-speaking  peoples, 
was  of  the  sort  which  is  apt  to  arouse  the 
French. 

We  have  seen  that  bad  weather  had  pre- 
vented Wellington  from  pushing  his  late 
victory,  and  the  French  line  of  retreat  was 
not  now  easy  to  follow.  His  desire  to  estab- 
lish an  allied  party  in  Bordeaux  required 
troops ; but  although  he  had  orders  from 
home  not  to  play  too  far  into  the  hands  of 
the  Bourbons,  lest  his  action  should  check 
negotiations  for  peace,  Bordeaux  was  seized 
Engll®k  Dragoon  March  12  with  their  aid  by  a column  under 
Beresford.  Wellington  believed  that  a de- 
tachment of  ten  thousand  men,  known  to  have  left  Suchet, 
had  joined  Soult,  and  the  twenty  thousand  men  he  had  ex 
pected  England  and  Portugal  to  send  him  were  detained  ; yet 


HOPE  TAKEN  PRISONER.  485 

drawing  in  Freyre  with  two  Galician  divisions,  he  slowly 
pushed  his  outposts  towards  Vic  Bigorre  and  Tarbes. 

With  his  several  detachments,  Wellington  had  not  had 
many  more  men  than  Soult,  there  being  something  over  thirty 
thousand  for  duty  in  each  army  ; but  when  on  March  13  the 
Spaniards  and  some  cavalry  joined  him,  he  recovered  the 
superiority.  He  expected  Beresford  to  rejoin  before  battle, 
and  instructed  him  to  be  ready  to  move  up  the  Garonne  from 
Bordeaux,  so  as  to  follow  Soult  by  way  of  Auch. 

While  Wellington  was  moving  on  Toulouse,  Hope  had 
invested  Bayonne.  Shortly  after  midnight  of  March  14  the 
French  made  a sally  from  the  citadel,  surprised  the  English 
outposts  and  brought  about  a sharp  contest,  in  which  Hope 
was  wounded  and  taken  prisoner. 

Perceiving  a chance  of  striking  a blow  at  Wellington  south 
of  Aire,  on  March  13  Soult  made  a march  on  Conchez  and 
Portet,  protected  by  cavalry  on  the  left ; but  Hill  promptly 
seized  the  position  near  Aire  which  Soult  aimed  at,  and 
Wellington  brought  forward  troops  to  sustain  him  in  any 
position  he  might  take  along  the  road  to  Pau.  On  March  14 
Soult  skirmished  with  Hill’s  outposts  and  endeavored  to  draw 
Wellington  down  from  his  position  ; but  supposing  Soult 
reinforced  from  Suchet,  W ellington  refused  to  meet  him ; 
and  Soult  had  equally  exaggerated  notions  of  Wellington’s 
strength.  Unless  he  was  to  attack,  Soult’s  position  was  un- 
tenable; when  Wellington  pushed  cavalry  up  the  Adour,  his 
right  was  endangered,  and  on  finding  that  Wellington  was 
advancing,  he  left  Erlon  at  Yic  Bigorre,  and  marched  Clau- 
sel  and  Reille  to  Tarbes.  After  a lively  fight  the  English 
pushed  on,  turned  Erlon  out  of  his  position,  and  Soult  drew 
his  whole  army  up  at  Oleac,  leaving  Clausel  in  Tarbes  so  as 
to  retire  towards  Toulouse  at  will. 

Hill  and  Wellington  were  advancing  on  either  side  of  the 


486  ALLIES  CAUTIOUSLY  FOLLOW  SOULT. 

Adour.  The  commander-in-chief  on  March  20  sent  the  Light 
Division  and  some  cavalry  to  fall  on  Oleac,  and  meanwhile 
threatened  the  French  right  through  Dours.  Hill,  on  the 
left  bank,  assailed  Tarbes,  where  Clausel  held  his  own  with 
difficulty,  and  after  a lively  fight  Hill  forced  the  Adour.  In 
front  of  the  French  was  a plain  much  cut  up,  in  which  cav- 
alry could  not  act,  and  Soult  withdrew  his 
troops  in  good  order  in  two  columns,  guided 
at  night  by  beacon  fires  in  the  rear ; and 
after  a march  of  thirty  miles,  he  was  next 
day  at  St.  Gaudens  with  Erlon  and  Reille, 
Clausel  at  Monrejean.  The  allies  cau- 
tiously followed  by  slow  marches  in  three 
columns  by  way  of  Trie,  Galan  and  the 
main  road.  Marching  as  he  was  where  he 
feared  his  right  flank  might  be  attacked  by 
partisans  from  the  mountains,  and  with  his 
left  flank  in  the  air,  Wellington  felt  that  it 
was  better  to  advance  slowty,  keep  his  men 
well  in  hand,  and  rely  upon  their  courage 
on  the  battlefield,  where  he  always  felt  con- 
scious of  superiority ; but  his  fifteen  days’ 
delay  since  the  last  battle  enabled  Soult  to 
put  his  army  in  better  condition.  He  had  repeatedly  urged 
Suchet  to  come  to  his  rescue,  as  the  fighting  would  assuredly 
be  in  his  front,  and  not  on  the  east  coast  of  Spain  ; but  Suchet 
would  march  to  no  one’s  aid  unless  to  that  of  his  master,  and 
curiously  Napoleon  gave  no  orders  — barely  suggestions  — 
looking  to  cooperation.  The  emperor  had  quite  enough  in  his 
own  front  to  occupy  his  attention.  These  were  the  days  of 
his  wonderful  manoeuvring  between  Blucher  and  Schwartzen- 
berg. 

With  fifty  thousand  inhabitants  and  commanding  the  Ga- 


Spanish  Sapper. 


WELLINGTON  NEAR  TOULOUSE. 


487 


ronne,  Toulouse  was  a centre  of  all  the  roads  of  southwest 
France  along  which  the  French  could  retire  or  receive  acces- 
sions. Strategically,  it  was  also  the  last  French  stronghold, 
and  as  of  it  effective  use  could  be  made  as  a battlefield,  Soult 
withdrew  thither;  and  recognizing  that  Wellington  would 
have  to  leave  a force  opposite  St.  Cyprien  to  hold  his  com- 
munications, and  cross  the  Garonne  either  above  or  below, 
he  fortified  this  suburb,  as  well  as  the  ridge  of  Mont  Rave 
on  the  east  of  the  city.  The  hills  about  Toulouse  enabled 
Soult  to  see  everything  the  allies  would  do,  as  well  as  afforded 
him  positions  to  fall  upon  them  while  crossing  the  river.  A 
passage  above  the  town,  he  scarcely  feared;  if  Wellington 
crossed  below,  it  would  cut  him  off  from  Montauban,  in 
which  case,  should  Soult  lose  the  succeeding  battle,  he  would 
have  to  retreat  to  Carcassonne,  to  join  Suchet.  His  first 
plan,  then,  was  to  attack  the  allies,  should  they  cross  there, 
in  the  angle  of  the  Garonne  and  Tarn.  He  was  three  days 
ahead  of  Wellington,  and  used  his  time  to  make  his  situation 
strong. 

Arrived  near  Toulouse,  Wellington  first  resolved  to  cross 
the  Garonne  at  Portet,  and  attack  the  city  between  the  river 
and  the  canal  with  his  right,  while  his  centre  and  left  forced 
St.  Cyprien.  Indeed,  driving  the  enemy  from  the  Touch,  he 
commenced  to  throw  a bridge  for  this  purpose,  but  found  his 
equipment  short.  Thereupon,  March  28,  he  drew  in  Hill  to 
Pensaguel,  and  put  him  across  the  Garonne,  intending  him  to 
pass  the  Arriege  at  Cintegabelle,  and  then  to  move  to  the 
attack  of  Toulouse,  while  Wellington  pushed  in  on  St.  Cy- 
prien. From  adjoining  heights  Soult  could  observe  a part  of 
these  manoeuvres,  but  though  he  drew  wrong  conclusions  from 
them,  it  mattered  little ; for  Hill,  finding  that  he  could  not 
utilize  his  artillery  on  the  ground  he  had  occupied,  returned 
to  Pensaguel  and  recrossed  the  Garonne.  Soult  now  saw 


488 


S QUIT’S  POSITION  STRENGTHENED. 


that  Wellington  would  cross  below  Toulouse;  but  instead  of 
carrying  out  his  original  idea  of  attacking  him  during  the 
passage,  he  determined  to  fight  in  his  works  at  Toulouse,  and 
set  to  work  to  strengthen  Mont  Rave. 

The  Garonne  was  too  full  for  Wellington  to  pass  until 
April  3.  Thereupon  the  pontoons  were  sent  down  to  Gra- 
nade ; a bridge  was  thrown  there  and  Beresford  crossed ; but 
before  the  Light  Division  could  follow,  the  river  again  rose 
and  the  pontoon  bridge  was  taken  up.  Soult  knew  of  the 
crossing,  but  he  did  not  know  the  number  of  troops  that  had 
been  put  over ; and  having  heard  that  the  allies  had  entered 
Paris,  which  made  him  all  the  more  determined  to  confine 
himself  to  the  defense  of  Toulouse,  he  missed  a rare  oppor- 
tunity of  destroying  Beresford.  On  April  8 the  bridge  over 
the  Garonne  was  moved  up  to  Seilh,  the  Light  Division  was 
able  to  cross,  and  Wellington  headed  his  troops  and  marched 
up  along  both  sides  of  the  Ers.  This  small  river  could  not 
be  crossed  without  bridges,  and  the  march  was  somewhat  dan- 
gerous, until  the  bridge  at  Croix  d’Orade  was  seized  in  a 
brilliant  cavalry  combat  by  Vivian. 

In  the  fortnight  he  had  gained  by  the  allies’  cautious  ad- 
vance, Soult  had  made  his  position  strong.  His  left  was  in 
St.  Cyprien,  the  sweep  of  the  canal  on  the  north  was  held  by 
his  centre,  and  his  right  ran  along  Mont  Rave  ; his  conscripts 
manned  the  walls  of  the  city,  and  his  wings  were  united  by 
the  big  bridge  of  Toulouse,  while  Hill  was  separated  from 
Wellington  except  by  the  circuit  over  the  bridge  at  Seilh. 
Soult  certainly  had  a fair  chance  of  victory. 

Wellington  had  wished  to  attack  by  the.  south,  but  to  do 
this  he  would  have  to  march  along  the  Ers,  the  bridges  of 
which  were  all  mined  or  destroyed,  and  was  thus  limited 
to  an  attack  from  the  north  and  east.  At  St.  Cyprien  a for- 
tress confronted  him,  from  the  north  the  canal  stood  in  his 


THE  ADVANCE  AGAINST  TOULOUSE.  489 

way,  and  he  saw  no  choice  except  to  attack  the  Mont  Rave 
heights. 

This  ridge  has  two  distinct  long  summits,  the  Calvinet  in 
the  north,  and  St.  Sypiere  in  the  south.  Between,  the  two 
ran  into  Toulouse  roads  which  were  strongly  defended  by 
field-works,  as  were  also  the  summits  of  the  ridge.  It  was 
evident  that  the  extreme  right  of  the  French  line  was  the 
most  easily  assailable,  but  to  reach  it  a column  would  have 
to  cross  the  Ers,  or  else  march  between  the  stream  and  the 
heights,  liable  at  any  moment  to  be  attacked  in  flank.  Soult 
well  knew  that  this  was  Wellington’s  difficulty.  Reille  held 
St.  Cyprien,  Daricau  was  behind  the  canal,  Clausel  on  the 
right,  Harispe  in  the  works  at  Mont  Rave,  as  an  outpost  to 
which  ridge  the  smaller  Pugade  hill  was  fortified,  but  too 
slightly.  Had  its  works  been  strong,  it  might  have  prevented 
Beresford  from  moving  as  he  did.  Wellington’s  plan  for 
attack  April  10  was  that  Hill  should  threaten  St.  Cyprien, 
the  3d  and  the  Light  Division  advance  on  the  canal  under 
Picton,  Freyre  with  the  Spaniards  to  carry  Pugade  hill.  To 
Beresford  was  confided  the  task  of  marching  along  the  foot  of 
the  Mont  Rave  ridge,  to  attack  Soult’s  right.  If  the  other 
onslaughts  were  well  timed  and  successful,  he  might  accom- 
plish  his  work,  but  worse  is  not  often  cut  out  for  a corps 
commander. 

Early  on  April  10  the  allied  forces  advanced  against  Tou- 
louse under  fire  of  outposts  and  artillery.  Hill  manoeuvred 
against  St.  Cyprien,  Picton  moved  forward  towards  the  canal, 
and  Beresford  started  on  his  questionable  task.  On  the  other 
side  of  the  Ers,  Vivian’s  hussars  were  to  sustain  Beresford  if 
they  could  seize  a passage,  and  this  they  in  fact  did  by  gain- 
ing the  bridge  of  the  Montauban  road,  south  of  Mont  Rave. 
Through  excess  of  ambition,  Freyre’s  Spaniards  attacked  too 
early,  and  though  they  moved  up  the  northern  end  of  the  Cal- 


490 


INDISCREET  ADVANCES. 


vinet  hill  with  some  resolution,  they  were  met  by  a heavy  fire, 
their  right  was  enfiladed  from  Mont  Rave,  and  they  were  driven 
back  into  a hollow  road  half-way  down  the  slope,  where  they 
suffered  severely  and  largely  dispersed,  with  a loss  of  fifteen 


hundred  men.  Picton  also,  upon  whom  Wellington  counted 
as  his  reserve,  made  a real  attack,  instead  of  a feint,  on  the 
Jumeaux  bridge  ; and  he  too  was  repulsed,  with  the  loss  of  five 
hundred  men.  Thus  two  assaults  had  failed  by  indiscreet 
advances,  and  Wellington  was  called  on  to  face  the  fact  that 


THE  DEMOISELLES  BRIDGE  THREATENED.  491 


the  battle  was  lost,  unless  Beresford  should  accomplish  what 
seemed  almost  impossible  ; for  after  the  repulse  of  Picton  and 
the  Spaniards,  Soult  was  enabled  to  draw  Taupin  from  St. 
Cyprien  over  to  Mont  Rave,  and  to  give  him  orders  to  fall 
upon  Beresford  before  he  could  finish  his  march  and  form  for 
attack,  while  Vial  with  the  cavalry  should 
descend  between  the  two  summits,  and  cut 
off  Beresford’s  retreat.  This  Taupin  did ; 
but  he  was  slow  in  his  movements,  and 
being  met  by  a stout  line  of  skirmishers 
thrown  out  on  Beresford’s  right,  and  some 
well-timed  Congreve  rockets,  was  driven 
back  to  the  upper  ground,  he  himself  being 
killed.  Vial  was  held  in  check  by  a Brit- 
ish regiment  in  square.  Immediately  suc- 
ceeding this  French  failure,  Cole  advanced 
sharply  up  the  slope  ; and  so  tremendous 
was  his  rush  that  he  captured  one  of  the 
main  redoubts  and  established  himself  on 
the  summit.  So  suddenly  was  this  done 
that  Soult  feared  that  the  allies  would 
seize  the  Demoiselles  bridge  ; and  he  at  Spanish  Grenadier 
once  occupied  the  Sacarin  works,  where  he 
stopped  Cole’s  advance.  The  British  attack  had  been  a mar- 
vel of  resolution,  as  the  French  defense  had  been  wanting  in 
tenacity.  Beresford’s  divisions  were  now  marshaled  so  as  to 
sweep  the  Mont  Rave  heights,  and  the  allied  cavalry,  riding 
down  the  Montauban  road,  threatened  the  Demoiselles  bridge 
afresh.  The  French  right  having  been  quite  demolished, 
their  line  now  ran  from  the  Sacarin  works  to  the  Calvinet 
ridge  and  around  by  the  canal  to  the  river. 

But  this  was  not  victory,  Soult’s  defensive  position  was 
still  strong,  and  Clausel  was  ready  to  defend  the  French 


492 


SOULT  EVACUATES  TOULOUSE. 


right  vigorously.  It  was  nearly  three  o'clock  when  Beresford 
organized  a second  onslaught,  crossed  the  ridge,  and  threw 
a division  in  between  the  Mont  Have  summits.  A strong 
French  effort  was  made  to  meet  this  onset,  and  at  first  they 
maintained  their  position,  but  the  English  bid  for  the  Cal- 
vinet  heights  was  too  strong,  and  the  French  began  to  retire 
to  the  canal. 

While  Picton  had  so  far  failed,  and  the  Spaniards  had 
been  defeated,  yet  they  were  still  potentially  factors  in  the 
battle ; and  by  five  o’clock  Soult  had  quite 
given  up  his  holding  on  Mont  Rave.  He  had 
lost  five  generals  and  over  three  thousand 
men  killed  and  wounded,  to  the  allied  four 
generals  and  forty-six  hundred  lost.  During 
the  succeeding  night  he  made  ready  to  fight 
behind  the  canal  on  the  morrow,  and  wrote 
to  Suchet,  again  calling  upon  him  to  join 
him  here. 

As  April  11  opened,  Soult  was  ready  ; but 
preferring  to  change  his  plans  and  attack 
the  city  from  the  south,  Wellington  spent 
the  day  in  making  his  preparations  to  this 
end ; and  fearing  that  he  would  be  shut  up 
in  Toulouse,  in  the  night  of  the  llth-12th 
Soult  evacuated  the  city,  marched  twenty- 
two  miles,  cut  the  canal  and  Ers  bridges 
as  he  marched,  and  established  himself  at  Yillefranche.  On 
the  12th  Wellington  entered  Toulouse,  where  he  heard  of 
Napoleon’s  abdication.  On  the  next  day  Soult  received  the 
news.  He  had  faithfully  defended  his  emperor  to  the  last 
moment. 

At  Toulouse  Soult  probably  disposed  of  over  thirty-five 
thousand  men  and  eighty  guns ; the  allies  had  near  fifty  thou- 


English  Line 
Officer. 


WELLINGTON  MADE  A DUKE. 


493 


sand.  If  it  be  fair  to  take  from  this  number  the  troops  not 
actually  put  in,  the  fighting  was  done  by  something  like  equal 
forces;  but  as  reserves,  even  if  not  put  in,  must  be  counted 
among  those  in  line  of  battle,  the  French  may  be  said  to  have 
been  considerably  outnumbered.  Toulouse  has  been  called  a 
drawn  battle,  but  as  its  result  was  that  Soult  was  driven  into 
the  city  from  the  position  he  had  assumed  outside  of  it,  and 
evacuated  the  city  lest  he  should  be  besieged  in  it,  the  claim 
that  it  was  an  allied  victory  may  be  fairly  maintained. 

It  is  not  necessary  to  absolve  Soult  of  the  charge  of  fight- 
ing the  battle  of  Toulouse  after  he  knew  of  Napoleon’s  abdi- 
cation. He  did  know  that  the  allies  had  entered  Paris,  but 
he  did  not  know  until  after  the  battle  that  the  government 
had  passed  into  other  hands. 

The  sending  of  Beresford  on  his  difficult  task  has  been  a 
subject  of  reproach  to  Wellington,  but  this  seems  a narrow 
view  to  take  of  war.  At  all  times  risks  must  be,  and  they 
always  have  been,  run  by  great  soldiers.  A risk  is  measured 
as  well  by  the  quality  of  the  troops  engaged  as  by  any  other 
one  thing,  and  Wellington  had  reason  to  believe  that  Beres- 
ford could,  as  he  did,  carry  the  hill.  Had  he  not  done  so, 
more  importance  would  have  been  attached  to  the  accusation 
than  can  now  be  done,  but  in  any  case  Wellington  was  not 
running  undue  risk.  His  boldness  rather  redounds  to  his 
credit  as  a soldier. 

Wellington  had  already  been  made  Knight  of  the  Garter. 
He  was  now  made  a duke,  and  granted  four  hundred  thou- 
sand pounds  wherewith  to  support  his  honors, — a just  ap- 
preciation by  his  countrymen  of  his  great  services. 

In  the  Peninsula  Wellington  had  shown  himself  sound 
rather  than  brilliant : unquestionably  a great  soldier,  he  yet 
had  marked  limitations.  The  task  he  was  given  was  not  an 
easy  one,  and  he  carried  it  through  to  a successful  issue  in  a 


494  MARKED  DIPLOMACY  AND  SELF-CONTROL. 


workmanlike  manner,  if  slowly,  from  beginning  to  end.  He 
was  careful  in  his  logistics.  His  commissariat  was  always 
well  managed.  Unlike  Napoleon,  he  did  not  oblige  his  sub- 
ordinates to  live  on  the  country,  but  always  studied  the  food 
supply,  which  as  a habit  somewhat  limited  his  movements. 
The  French  had  a certain  advantage  in  relying  for  food  on 
the  land  they  were  in,  so  that  they  could  advance  or  retire 
in  any  direction,  while  the  English  needed  their  magazines, 
and  if  defeated,  could  retire  in  only  one  direction.  Hence 
W ellington  paid  great  regard  to  his  base  ; he  manoeuvred 
so  as  never  to  be  cut  off  from  the  sea ; for  what  was  a menace 
to  most  European  armies,  the  British  fleet  made  useful  to 
him.  When,  in  1812,  he  began  to  operate  towards  the  Pyre- 
nees, he  transferred  his  supply-centre  from  Oporto  and  Lis- 
bon, where  it  had  been  since  1809,  to  Santander  and  other 
ports  on  the  Bay  of  Biscay ; his  line  of  advance  was  always 
so  managed  as  to  be  short ; his  men  were  better  armed,  fed 
and  clad  than  the  French,  and  his  losses  from  exposure  were 
much  less. 

Wellington  quickly  recognized  and  ably  utilized  the  value 
of  Portugal  as  a base  from  which  to  debouch  into  Spain  upon 
the  French.  He  could  make  his  preparations  in  the  long  and 
narrow  sea-country,  establish  his  magazines,  and  be  ready 
to  concentrate  his  troops  at  any  point  much  earlier  than  the 
enemy.  He  retained  his  hold  here  with  determination.  He 
made  excellent  use  of  the  friendliness  of  the  Portuguese 
and  of  what  he  could  argue  out  of  the  Spaniards,  and  showed 
marked  diplomacy  and  self-control  in  his  dealings  with  these 
latter  allies,  whose  wrong-headed  attitude  frequently  came 
near  wrecking  their  own  cause.  This  was  all  the  more  a 
credit  to  him  in  that  he  was  by  nature  quick  in  temper.  Once 
launched  on  an  operation,  Wellington  was  tenacious  in  his 
manoeuvres  as  well  as  in  his  battles;  but  he  never  made  the 


WELLINGTON  LIMITED. 


495 


latter  decisive  by  pursuit.  He  speedily  caught  the  alarm 
when  a French  operation  was  directed  against  a weak  allied 
spot  and  promptly  retired,  rarely  meeting  manoeuvre  by 
manoeuvre.  With  an  eye  to  the  possible  lack  of  support  of 
the  home  government,  he  ran  no  avoidable  risk,  nor  advanced 
too  boldly  nor  hastily.  He  was  an  excellent  organizer  and 
disciplinarian;  his  army  was  nearly  always  better  than  the 
French.  Opposed  to  him  were  some  of  the  best  of  Napo- 
leon’s marshals,  but  not  one  of  them  was  his  equal,  for  while 
Napoleon  trained  wonderful  subordinates,  he  spoiled  them  as 
leaders.  Wellington  knew  how  to  profit  by  the  jealousies 
existing  among  them,  which  produced  openings  from  which 
he  could  derive  profit.  He  kept  his  army  well  concentrated, 
while  the  French  in  Spain  never  worked  together,  except 
when  Napoleon  was  present.  Wellington’s  strategy  and 
tactics  were  alike  sound  but  cautious ; his  combinations  were 
true  but.  rarely  bold.  His  sieges  were  never  great ; and  as 
his  siege  appliances  were  rarely  of  the  best,  he  was  wont  to 
hasten  the  event  by  costly  assaults.  He  either  limited  him- 
self, or  the  home  government  limited  him,  to  the  defense  of 
Portugal ; and  until  it  was  plain,  after  the  Russian  disaster, 
that  the  game  was  a safe  one  to  play,  he  did  not  indulge  in 
a truly  offensive  policy.  When  he  did  undertake  it,  and 
moved  on  the  Ebro,  his  work  was  deliberate  but  admirable. 

If  we  bear  in  mind  that  Wellington  was  unable  to  do  his 
best  in  the  Peninsula  lest  a single  disaster  should  ruin  his 
chances  of  support  by  the  British  Ministry,  and  that  his  cau- 
tion sprang  from  this  source,  we  can  after  a fashion  gauge 
what  he  might  have  done  had  he  been  untrammeled ; but  a 
captain  must  be  measured  by  what  he  does,  and  not  by  what 
he  might  have  done.  He  took  many  years  to  accomplish  his 
task,  but  he  accomplished  it ; and  success  always  goes  far 
towards  making  reputation.  Yet  success  alone  is  not  a stand- 


496 


PURSUIT  ESSENTIAL. 


ard , for  Hannibal  worked  many  years  and  failed,  and  per- 
haps, weighing  all  the  conditions,  he  heads  the  list  of  great 
captains. 

Wellington’s  field  was  small  compared  to  that  of  Napoleon. 
He  had  his  one  object  in  view,  to  save  Portugal  first  and  then 
rescue  Spain  from  the  French  dominion.  On  his  field,  ac- 
cording to  his  means,  he  did  succeed,  while  the  greatest  soldier 
of  modern  times,  on  his  enormous  theatre  of  action,  failed  to 
accomplish  the  end  he  had  in  view. 

All  great  soldiers  have  practically  worked  by  the  same 
means.  They  have  had  rare  intelligence,  great  bodily  endur- 
ance, strong  characteristic  powers  and  moral  courage.  In  a 
sense,  both  Wellington  and  Napoleon  are  alike  in  this,  but 
Napoleon  in  his  life-work  laid  the  basis  of  the  system  of  war 
we  follow  to-day,  and  this  is  more  than  any  of  his  contem- 
poraries did.  Napier  likens  the  qualities  of  Napoleon  and 
Wellington,  but  adds  with  truth  that  “in  following  up  a 
victory  the  English  general  fell  short  of  the  French  emperor. 
The  battle  of  W ellington  was  the  stroke  of  a battering-ram, 
down  went  the  wall  in  ruins ; the  battle  of  Napoleon  was 
the  swell  and  dash  of  a mighty  wave  before  which  the  bar- 
rier yielded,  and  the  roaring  flood  poured  onwards,  covering 
all.” 

Nearly  all  of  Wellington’s  battles  were  indecisive.  After 
a defensive  victory,  pursuit  is  less  easy  than  if  the  initiative 
has  been  assumed  at  the  beginning  of  or  during  the  battle. 
Yet  pursuit  is  essential  to  make  a victory  worth  its  cost  of 
life  and  treasure.  Without  it  all  previous  work  is  wasted. 
Campaigns  and  battles  are  not  conducted  for  the  sake  of  kill- 
ing and  wounding  a certain  number  of  the  enemy;  it  is  not 
even  a question  whether  the  enemy  shall  be  made  to  suffer 
more  casualties  than  yourself.  The  object  of  every  act  of 
war  is  to  disorganize  the  enemy  and  make  him  believe  himself 


UNGENEROUS  IN  CRITICISM. 


497 


incapable  of  continuing  the  contest.  The  organization  and 
logistics  of  an  army  should  tend  to  bring  upon  the  field  of 
battle  a better  body  of  troops  than,  or  one  superior  in  numbers 
to,  the  enemy  ; strategy  has  to  do  with  giving  these  troops 
such  a direction  as  shall  place  the  enemy  at  a disadvantage  ; 
the  object  of  tactics  is  so  to  utilize  the  accidents  of  the  battle- 
ground and  other  advantages  as  to  demoralize  the  enemy, 
drive  him  from  the  field,  and  so  to  break  up  his  organized 
army  by  pursuit  that  he  cannot  again  assemble  during  the 
campaign.  Only  thus  can  successful  peace  be  won. 

Napoleon  well  understood  and  practiced  this,  but  Welling- 
ton’s campaigns  and  battles  in  the  Peninsula  do  not  possess 
all  these  requirements.  To  rehearse  them  clearly  proves  the 
fact.  Such  detailed  examination  is,  however,  by  no  means 
a fair  test : we  must  take  into  consideration  all  the  limita- 
tions and  difficulties,  which  were  many.  While  Wellington 
never  reached  the  same  military  standard  as  Napoleon,  and 
none  of  his  contemporaries  did,  the  fact  remains  that, 
having  in  view  his  object  in  the  Peninsula,  the  great  Eng- 
lish leader  did  his  part  in  an  able  and  workmanlike  man- 
ner, one  safer  than  a more  risky  method,  and  he  wrote  him- 
self on  the  pages  of  history  as  a great  leader  and  a great 
man. 

Although  in  private  life  Wellington  had  his  kindly  side, 
yet  he  cannot  be  said  to  have  had  a sympathetic  nature  ; and 
he  was  often  ungenerous  in  criticising  his  subordinates.  He 
complained  that  his  officers  were  ignorant  of  their  duties  as 
well  as  careless  in  obeying  orders,  that  the  men  were  the 
scum  of  the  earth,  who  enlisted  for  drink.  And  yet  these 
officers  and  men  did  him  noble  service.  This  particular  fault 
has  been  pointed  out  by  Oman  after  a fashion  which,  indulged 
in  by  any  one  not  his  fellow  countryman,  would  be  apt  to 
provoke  resentment. 


VOL.  IV. 


498 


WELLINGTON  CAUTIOUS. 


“ His  notions  of  discipline,”  says  Oman,  “ were  worthy  of  one  of  the 
drill  sergeants  of  Frederick  the  Great.  ‘ I have  no  idea  of  any  great 
effect  being  produced  on  British  soldiers,’  he  once  said  before  a Royal 
Commission,  ‘ by  anything  but  the  fear  of  immediate  corporal  punish- 
ment.’ Flogging  was  the  one  remedy  for  all  evils,  and  he  declared  that 
it  was  absolutely  impossible  to  manage  the  army  without  it.  For  any 
idea  of  appealing  to  the  men’s  better  feeling,  or  moving  them  by  senti- 
ment, he  had  the  greatest  contempt.” 

But  how  these  men  fought  under  the  Iron  Duke ! 

In  this  connection  a word  more  may  be  permitted  about 
this  side  of  Wellington’s  character.  He  is  stated  to  have 
said,  in  1808,  that  the  first  means  by  which  to  beat  the  French 
was  not  to  be  afraid  of  them,  as  everybody  else  seemed  to 
be ; and  that  all  the  Continental  armies  were  more  than  half 
beaten  before  the  battle  began.  And  he  is  quoted  as  saying 
in  1811 : “I  do  not  desire  better  sport  than  to  meet  one  of 
their  columns  en  masse  with  our  line.”  If  these  utterances 
have  reached  us  correctly,  it  would  seem  that  they  were  better 
forgotten  than  repeated ; they  add  naught  to  the  reputation 
of  the  man  or  the  soldier.  No  one  could  tax  the  great  Eng- 
lish general  with  being  afraid  of  any  enemy ; no  bolstering 
up  of  British  courage  is  ever  necessary  ; Neither  do  the  hun- 
dreds of  thousands  of  brave  men  who  fell  in  battle  before 
Napoleon  testify  to  the  Continental  nations  being  afraid  of 
the  French.  The  constancy  of  the  English  was  never  taxed 
like  that  of  the  Austrians  or  Russians.  All  men  became  cau- 
tious when  meeting  Napoleon’s  wonderful  strategy  or  tactics : 
the  same  caution,  indeed,  or  greater,  was  exhibited  by  Well- 
ington throughout  the  Peninsular  war,  even  against  Napo- 
leon’s marshals,  as  well  as  markedly  so  when  he  met  the  great 
captain  in  the  manoeuvres  leading  up  to  Waterloo.  It  was 
indeed  just  this  quality  which  won,  when  the  reverse  might 
have  lost  the  game.  As  England’s  most  distinguished  soldier 
of  the  present  generation  says : “ W ellington  was  determined 


THE  SEVEN  CAMPAIGNS. 


499 


not  to  run  any  great  risk  of  disaster,  generally  to  adopt  a 
defensive  attitude,  and  only  to  fight  when  he  felt  reasonably 
sure  of  success,”  — a policy  partly  due  to  the  fact  that  he 
could  not  drain  England  to  procure  reinforcements,  but  also 
distinctly  characteristic.  Like  neither,  yet  Wellington  had 
in  his  make-up  certainly  more  of  the  Fabius  than  the  Han- 
nibal. He  was  a hard  worker  ; his  genius  was  of  this  order 
rather  than  partaking  of  the  divine  spark.  Equally  great, 
his  character  was  almost  the  reverse  of  that  of  Marlborough. 

From  the  French  standpoint,  in  the  first  campaign  Madrid 
had  been  won  at  Medina  del  Rio  Seco,  and  was  lost  at  Bay- 
len.  In  the  second  campaign  Napoleon  regained  Madrid,  but 
returned  too  soon  to  France.  In  the  third  Soult  invaded 
Portugal,  but  was  driven  out  of  Oporto  by  Wellington,  who 
then  turned  to  the  Tagus  and  defeated  Victor  at  Talavera. 
In  the  fourth  Victor  conquered  Andalusia,  but  failed  at  Cadiz, 
and  Soult  lazed  his  time  away  at  Seville.  In  the  fifth  Mas- 
sena  again  invaded  Portugal,  losing  time  at  Ciudad,  Almeida 
and  Busaco,  and  remained  inactive  five  months  before  Torres 
Vedras.  When  Soult  failed  to  furnish  aid,  Massena  retired, 
and  the  English,  after  the  battle  of  Fuentes  d’Onoro,  occu- 
pied all  Portugal.  In  the  sixth  campaign  Marmont  was 
beaten  at  Salamanca,  and  Wellington  briefly  entered  Madrid. 
Hence  he  moved  on  Burgos  ; but  the  allies  lost  all  their  gains 
again,  and  Wellington  was  wise  to  evade  battle  with  the  su- 
perior French.  In  the  seventh  the  fatal  defeat  at  Vittoria 
ruined  the  whole  of  the  emperor’s  Spanish  plan.  Yet  Spain 
was  lost  to  France,  not  by  what  occurred  in  the  Peninsula, 
but  by  Napoleon’s  failure  in  Russia,  in  Germany,  and  in  the 
French  campaign. 

Both  on  the  battlefield,  in  delivering  sieges,  and  in  defend- 
ing towns,  the  French  had  shown  as  much  courage  as  any 
troops  could  show.  As  J omini  says : “ Glory  and  recompense 


500  SOVEREIGNTY  OF  ELBA  CHOSEN. 

were  reserved  for  other  wars  from  this  followed  a certain 
discouragement  and  a certain  disfavor  thrown  upon  the  army 
of  Spain,  which  yet  surpassed  all  the  others  in  courage 
and  resignation.”  It  is  not  to  their  discredit  that  they  were 
beaten  by  the  allied  army.  It  is  rather  an  additional  credit 
mark  to  the  score  of  the  wonderful  fighting  capacity  of  the 
British  soldier,  and  to  the  broad  military  intelligence,  power 
to  use  men,  and  pertinacity  of  the  Iron  Duke. 

General  peace  succeeded  the  return  of  the  Bourbons. 
France  kept  the  line  of  the  Pyrenees  and  Alps,  but  the 
frontier  on  the  Rhine  was  shortened  by  excluding  Belgium 
from  her  sway. 

By  the  Convention  of  April  11  Napoleon  was  given  his 
choice  of  several  retreats.  When  he  chose  the  sovereignty 
of  the  island  of  Elba,  his  abdication  was  published.  During 
these  days  Napoleon  had  remained  in  Fontainebleau  in  full 
seclusion,  and  exhibiting  no  part  of  his  old  forcefulness.  In 
passing  through  the  south  of  France,  on  his  way  to  Elba, 
he  was  made  on  more  than  one  occasion  so  markedly  to 
recognize  that  he  had  become  hated  by  a large  part  of  the 
French  people,  as  to  cause  him  to  exhibit  dread.  And  yet 
these  same  people  would  have  cheered  him,  had  he  been  suc- 
cessful. Success  means  much  to  us  all ; more  to  the  Celt 
than  to  most  races. 

Though  Eugene  resisted  with  courage  the  combined  attack 
of  Bellegarde  from  the  Adige,  Murat  from  the  south,  Bubna 
from  the  Simplon,  and  the  English  from  Genoa,  and  had  to 
make  head  against  a revolution  at  Milan,  Italy  as  a kingdom 
could  not  survive  the  French  empire. 

This  1814  campaign  is  a brilliant  page  in  Napoleon’s  his- 
tory, and  is  a yet  more  splendid  tribute  to  the  French  common 
soldier.  With  seventy  thousand  men  in  the  field,  Napoleon 
stood  off  three  hundred  thousand  men  for  three  months,  and 


FAREWELL  TO  THE  GUARD. 


501 


his  men  frequently  marched  twenty-five  miles  a day,  and 
fought  almost  daily  battles.  But  the  higher  officers  cannot 
claim  to  have  sustained  their  chief  so  well.  At  Napoleon’s 
headquarters  there  had  long  been  a cry  for  peace  and  quiet, 
and  the  final  defection  of  Marmont  and  others  was  traceable 
to  this  feeling.  They  saw  no  end  to  warfare,  no  reward  for 
their  many  years  of  hardship  ; and  they  too  were  as  ready  as 
was  all  France  for  any  change  which  might  enable  them  to 
rest  upon  their  laurels. 

Before  leaving  for  Elba,  the  emperor  took  leave  of  his 
marshals,  and  in  the  following  recorded  scene  said  farewell 
to  the  Guard : — 

Fontainebleau,  April  20.  “ Soldiers  of  my  Old  Guard,  I make  you  my 
farewell.  For  twenty  years  I have  found  you  constantly  on  the  road  to 
honor  and  glory.  In  these  last  days,  as  in  those  of  our  prosperity,  you 
have  not  ceased  to  be  models  of  bravery  and  fidelity.  With  men  such  as 
you  are  my  cause  was  not  lost,  but  the  war  was  interminable.  It  would 
have  been  a civil  war,  and  France  would  have  only  become  more  unfor- 
tunate. I have  therefore  sacrificed  all  our  interests  to  those  of  the  coun- 
try. I am  leaving.  You,  my  friends,  continue  to  serve  France.  Its 
happiness  is  my  only  thought,  it  will  always  be  the  object  of  my  vows. 
Do  not  pity  my  lot.  If  I have  consented  to  survive  myself,  it  is  only 
yet  to  serve  to  your  glory.  I wish  to  write  the  great  things  that  we  have 
done  together.  Farewell,  my  children,  I could  wish  to  press  you  all  to 
my  heart.  Let  me  at  least  embrace  your  flag.”  (At  these  words  Gen- 
eral Petit,  seizing  the  eagle,  advances.  Napoleon  receives  the  general  in 
his  arms  and  kisses  the  flag.  The  silence  that  this  great  scene  inspires 
is  interrupted  only  by  the  sobs  of  the  soldiers.  Napoleon,  whose  emotion 
is  visible,  makes  an  effort  and  begins  again  with  a firm  voice:)  “Fare- 
well then,  once  more,  my  old  companions  ! Let  this  last  embrace  pass 
into  your  hearts.” 

The  following  letters  have  their  pathetic  side : — 

Fontainebleau,  April  19.  To  the  Empress  Marie  Louise:  “ My  good 
Louise,  I have  received  thy  letter.  I see  in  it  all  thy  pain,  which  in- 
creases mine.  . . . Keep  well,  preserve  thy  health  for  ” (gap)  “ and  for 


502 


TO  THE  EMPRESS. 


thy  son,  who  has  need  of  thy  care.  I am  leaving  for  the  island  of  Elba, 
from  whence  I shall  write  thee.  I will  do  everything  also  to  receive 
thee.  . . . Farewell,  my  good  Louise  Marie.” 

Fontainebleau,  Apri‘1  20.  To  the  Empress  : “ I am  leaving.  ...  I 
am  well,  and  I hope  thy  health  will  keep  up,  and  that  thou  wilt  be  able 
to  rejoin  me.  . . . Farewell,  my  good  Louise.  Thou  canst  always  count 
on  the  courage,  calm  and  love  of  thy  husband.  A kiss  to  the  little  king. 
Napoleon.” 


Silver  Washstand,  St.  Helena. 


LXXI. 


THE  LAST  STRATEGIC  THRUST.  MARCH  TO  JUNE, 

1815. 

The  Bourbons  had  not  been  wise,  and  the  people  were  dissatisfied.  Deter- 
mined to  reinstate  the  empire,  Napoleon  left  Elba  on  March  1,  1815,  with  one 
thousand  men,  and  landed  in  France,  where,  received  with  acclaim  and  joined 
by  many  garrisons,  he  reached  Paris  March  20,  Louis  XVIII.  fleeing  to  Belgium. 
France  received  him  because  tired  of  the  Bourbons  rather  than  trusting  him. 
He  approached  the  allies  with  a desire  for  peace,  but  they  voted  him  an  out- 
law, mobilized  all  their  armies,  most  of  which  had  gone  back  to  home  stations, 
and  started  them  for  the  Rhine,  or  the  French  north  frontier.  Napoleon  raised 
troops  to  meet  them.  As  the  allies  could  not  be  ready  to  invade  France  before 
July  15,  he  determined  to  attack  by  June  15  the  two  nearest  armies,  under 
Wellington  and  Blucher  in  Belgium  ; and  with  a skill  which  no  one  else  could 
approach,  he  assembled  behind  the  Sambre  an  army  of  one  hundred  and  twenty- 
five  thousand  men,  while  leaving  reasonable  forces  along  the  Rhine  and  in 
the  interior.  Wellington  was  in  front  of  Brussels  with  ninety  thousand  men, 
Blucher  near  Namur  with  one  hundred  and  twenty  thousand.  Napoleon  deter- 
mined to  break  through  between  the  two  and  fight  each  singly,  the  Prussians 
preferably  first.  The  manoeuvre  was  beautifully  planned.  Wellington  was 
looking  for  an  attack  on  his  right,  Blucher  was  more  ready.  On  June  15  Napo- 
leon drove  back  Blucher’s  leading  division  at  Charleroi  and  crossed  the  Sambre 
at  three  places.  His  first  object  was  to  seize  Quatre  Bras  and  Sombreffe,  so  as 
to  keep  the  allied  armies  apart,  but  owing  to  certain  delays,  this  was  not  done 
June  15,  although  he  had  anticipated  the  allies.  Blucher  concentrated  near 
Sombreffe,  Wellington  was  still  much  disseminated.  Ney,  in  command  of  the 
French  left  wing,  was  slow  in  assembling  it,  and  did  not  seize  Quatre  Bras. 
Still,  June  15  had  been  a successful  day. 


On  its  return  to  power  in  1814,  the  Bourbon  regime  was 
not  a wise  one.  Louis  XVIII.  fell  under  the  influence  of  the 
returned  emigres , whose  aim  was  to  recover  their  ancient 
properties  and  rights.  On  the  other  hand,  the  peasants  feared 


504 


THE  SPOILS. 


for  their  tenure  of  the  land  acquired  by  the  Revolution,  and 
the  soldier  had  lost  none  of  his  love  for  the  emperor.  Though 
to  disband  the  army  was  as  dangerous  as  to  keep  it  up,  it  was 
practically  starved  into  inefficiency.  Discontent  grew  apace, 
and  within  a short  period  the  country  simmered  with  revolu- 
tionary schemes. 

The  allies  had  reduced  France  to  her  ancient  limits,  pro- 
posing to  repay  themselves  for  their  sacrifices  out  of  the  spoils. 
Talleyrand  powerfully  represented  France  at  the  Congress 
of  Vienna,  and  counteracted  this  grasping  policy,  opposing 
Prussia’s  claim  to  Saxony  and  Russia’s  to  Poland,  and  striv- 
ing to  unite  Austria,  England  and  France  against  the  north- 
ern powers;  while  the  majority  of  Frenchmen,  who  saw  their 
country’s  late  enemies  getting  rich  at  her  expense,  deeply 
felt  the  national  humiliation.  England  expected  to  receive 
Malta,  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope  and  Mauritius ; Russia  large 
western  provinces  ; Prussia  to  regain  more  than  she  had  lost ; 
Austria  to  get  back  Lombardy  and  Venice ; and  when  finally 
her  influence  was  abolished  in  Italy,  France  fell  to  the  rank 
of  a second-rate  power,  to  which  for  years  she  had  reduced 
Austria. 

All  these  events  were  carefully  noted  by  Napoleon  in  Elba. 
He  had  restfully  begun  by  organizing  his  little  kingdom, 
but  this  could  not  long  satisfy  his  vast  conceptions.  If  Na- 
poleon broke  faith  with  the  allies,  they  equally  broke  faith 
with  him.  Moneys  promised  by  the  Bourbon  government 
were  not  paid ; his  wife  and  son  were  kept  from  him  by  trick- 
ery ; it  had  been  already  suggested  in  Vienna  to  banish  him 
to  some  place  like  St.  Helena  ; even  his  life  is  said  to  have 
been  threatened.  Early  in  1815  he  determined  to  return  to 
France  and  reinstall  the  empire.  He  had  been  allowed  to 
keep  in  Elba  a little  army,  in  which  were  many  devoted 
members  of  his  Old  Guard  ; and  with  four  hundred  of  these, 


VIVE  L’EMPEREUR ! 


505 


four  hundred  other  foot  members  of  his  Old  Guard,  and  one 
hundred  Polish  light  horse,  in  several  small  ships  he  set 
out  on  what,  in  any  other  man,  would  have  been  a quioxotic 
expedition. 

After  a five  days’  passage,  flying  the  Bourbon  lilies,  the 
brig  l’Inconstant,  followed  by  the  other  craft,  cast  anchor  in 
the  Bay  of  Jouan,  between  Cannes  and  Antibes,  where  fifteen 
years  before  Bonaparte  had  landed  from  Egypt ; and  by  the 
evening  of  March  1,  1815,  the  handful 
of  men  set  foot  on  shore,  and  assumed 
the  tricolor.  There  was  no  delay  ; the 
initial  success  of  the  march  inland  was 
marked  , everywhere  the  little  band  was 
received  with  acclaim. 

There  is  an  “ Official  Relation  of  the 
March  of  Napoleon  from  the  Island  of 
Elba  to  Paris,”  with  good  reason  attrib- 
uted to  the  emperor.  This  tells  us  that 
on  March  6 Cambronne,  commanding  the 
vanguard,  met  six  thousand  men  from 
Grenoble,  who,  refusing  to  listen  to  him, 
retired  to  Laffrey.  On  going  out  to 
meet  them,  the  emperor  found  a battalion 
of  the  5th  Line,  with  some  sappers  and 
miners,  and  sending  forward  his  orderly 
officer,  was  told  that  they  were  forbidden  to  communicate 
with  him.  “ The  emperor  dismounted  and  went  straight  to 
the  battalion,  followed  by  the  Guard  at  a secure  arms.  He 
made  himself  known,  and  said  that  the  first  soldier  who 
wished  to  kill  his  emperor  could  do  so.  The  unanimous  cry 
of  Vive  V Empereur  ! was  their  reply.  This  brave  regiment 
had  been  under  the  orders  of  the  emperor  in  the  first  cam- 
paign in  Italy.  The  Guard  and  the  soldiers  embraced  each 


Grenadie'r  of  Elba. 


506 


NAPOLEON  ENTERS  THE  TUILERIES. 


other,”  whereupon  the  emperor  addressed  them,  saying  that 
Bourbonism  meant  the  re-creation  of  feudal  rights. 

Avoiding  the  military  stations,  Napoleon  pushed  through 
the  hills  of  the  Dauphine,  where  the  traditions  of  the  Revolu- 
tion survived,  and  there  were  many  imperialists.  Before  reach- 
ing Grenoble,  the  7th  Line  came  to  join  the  column.  The 
city,  reached  by  a march  of  nearly  two  hundred  miles  in  six 
days,  one  of  the  best  on  record,  opened  its  gates  and  gave  him 
munition  and  supplies.  “ From  Grenoble  to  Lyons  the  march 
of  the  emperor  was  one  triumph.”  Here  were  the  Comte 
d’ Artois,  the  Duke  of  Orleans  and  several  marshals,  but  the 
sentiments  of  the  city  were  friendly,  and  late  March  10  the 
emperor  entered  it,  and  the  troops  as  a body  joined  the 
growing  army.  Marshal  Ney  had  hurried  from  his  country- 
seat  to  Paris,  to  head  a campaign  against  his  former  chief, 
but  he  too  caught  the  enthusiasm  of  the  troops,  and  on 
March  17,  in  Auxerre,  he  reported  to  the  emperor  for  duty. 
When,  late  March  19,  Napoleon  drew  rein  at  Fontainebleau, 
Louis  XVIII.  left  Paris  with  some  of  his  adherents,  went  to 
Ostend,  and  later  took  up  his  residence  in  Ghent.  At  9 p.  M., 
March  20,  Napoleon  entered  the  Tuileries,  over  which  the 
tricolor  was  floating.  The  small  army  had  made  nearly  six 
hundred  miles  in  twenty  days.  Excelmans  was  sent  to  push 
the  fleeing  monarch  and  his  suite  out  of  France.  “Thus  was 
finished,  without  spilling  a drop  of  blood,  without  finding 
a single  obstacle,  this  legitimate  enterprise,  which  reestab- 
lished the  nation  in  its  rights.  . . . Thus  was  verified  the 
word  of  the  emperor  to  his  soldiers,  that  the  eagle  with  the 
national  colors  would  fly  from  steeple  to  steeple  to  the  towers 
of  Notre  Dame.” 

On  March  21  the  emperor  reviewed  the  army  of  Paris  : 
“ Soldiers,”  said  he,  “ I came  with  six  hundred  men  to  France, 
because  I count  on  the  love  of  the  people  and  on  the  memory 


PROCLAMATIONS  ISSUED. 


507 


of  the  old  soldiers.  I have  not  been  deceived  in  my  expecta- 
tion.” The  battalion  from  Elba  then  presented  the  old  eagles 
of  the  Guard,  and  the  whole  army  swore  allegiance  to  the 
emperor.  Thus  far  the  Official  Relation. 

At  Golfe  Jouan,  March  1,  1815,  Napoleon  had  issued  what, 
from  his  standpoint,  was  a reasonable  if  exaggerated  procla- 
mation 

TO  THE  FRENCH  PEOPLE. 

Napoleon  by  the  Grace  of  God  and  the  Constitution  of  the  State, 
Emperor  of  the  French,  etc.  Frenchmen,  the  defection  of  Augereau 
delivered  Lyons  without  defense  to  our  enemies.  . . . The  victories  . . . 
and  the  position  that  I had  taken  on  the  rear  of  the  enemy  . . . had 
placed  him  in  a desperate  situation.  The  French  were  never  on  the 
point  of  being  more  powerful,  and  the  elite  of  the  enemy’s  army  would 
have  been  lost  without  resource  . . . when  the  treason  of  Marmont 
delivered  up  the  capital  and  disorganized  the  army.  The  unexpected 
conduct  of  these  two  generals  . . . changed  the  destiny  of  the  war.  . . . 

Raised  to  the  throne  by  your  choice,  everything  which  has  been  done 
without  you  is  illegitimate.  . . . Frenchmen,  in  my  exile  I heard  your 
complaints  and  your  vows.  You  called  for  this  government  of  your 
choice,  which  alone  is  legitimate.  ...  I have  crossed  the  seas  in  the 
midst  of  perils  of  every  kind.  Here  am  I among  you  again  to  reassume 
my  rights,  which  are  yours. 

He  had  also  issued  a proclamation 

TO  THE  ARMY. 

Soldiers,  we  have  not  been  vanquished.  Two  men  who  left  our  ranks 
betrayed  our  laurels,  their  country,  their  prince,  their  benefactor.  . . . 
Soldiers,  in  my  exile  I have  heard  your  voice.  . . . Your  general,  called 
to  the  throne  by  the  choice  of  the  people,  . . . has  returned  to  you. 
Come  and  join  him.  . . . We  must  forget  that  we  have  been  the  masters 
of  the  nations,  but  we  must  not  suffer  any  one  to  mix  in  our  own  affairs. 
. . . Seize  again  those  eagles  that  you  had  at  Ulm,  Austerlitz,  Jena, 
Eylau,  Friedland,  Tudela,  Eggmiihl,  Essling,  Wagram,  Smolensk,  Mos- 
kwa,  Liitzen,  Wurschen,  Montmirail.  . . . Soldiers,  come  and  rank  your- 
selves under  the  flags  of  your  chief.  ...  In  your  old  age  . . . you  will 


508 


TRICOLOR  GRADUALLY  ADOPTED. 


be  able  to  say  with  pride,  “ And  I also  was  a part  of  that  great  army 
which  entered  twice  into  the  gates  of  Vienna,  into  those  of  Rome,  of 
Berlin,  of  Madrid,  of  Moscow,  and  which  has  delivered  Paris  from  the 
stain  which  treason  and  the  presence  of  the  enemy  have  impressed 
upon  it.” 

These  were  later  distributed  in  great  numbers  all  over 
France.  From  Lyons,  on  March  18,  the  emperor  had  issued 
a decree  dissolving  the  Chambers,  and  convening  the  Electoral 
College  of  the  Empire  in  Paris  in  May  “ to  correct  and 
modify  our  Constitution  according  to  the  interest  and  wish 
of  the  nation.” 

Some  of  the  greater  cities  were  slow  in  adopting  the  tri- 
color, but  gradually  Bordeaux,  Toulouse  and  other  centres 
did  so,  and  in  a month  after  he  reached  the  Tuileries,  Napo- 
leon had  put  down  all  the  little  risings  against  his  authority 
without  bloodshed.  It  was  a remarkable  accomplishment,  and 
from  his  standpoint  proper. 

On  receipt,  March  17,  by  the  powers  sitting  at  the  Congress 
of  Vienna  of  the  news  of  Napoleon’s  landing  and  his  recep- 
tion by  the  army,  the  ministers  of  Great  Britain,  Austria, 
Prussia  and  Russia  with  one  voice  agreed  to  wage  war  against 
him  to  the  end.  Napoleon  would  have  been  glad  of  any  peace 
by  which  he  could  retain  the  empire,  and  addressed  to  this 
effect 


A CIRCULAR  LETTER  TO  THE  SOVEREIGNS. 

Paris,  April  4,  1815.  Monsieur  my  Brother,  you  will  have  learned  in. 
the  course  of  the  last  month  my  return  . . . and  the  departure  of  the 
family  of  the  Bourbons.  The  true  nature  of  these  events  must  now  be 
known  to  Your  Majesty.  They  are  the  work  of  an  irresistible  power,  the 
work  of  the  unanimous  will  of  a great  nation  which  knows  its  duties  and 
its  rights.  ...  Its  voice  called  a liberator.  ...  I came,  and  from  the 
place  where  I touched  the  shore,  the  love  of  my  peoples  has  carried  me 
to  the  heart  of  my  capital. 

The  first  need  of  my  heart  is  to  repay  so  much  affection  by  the  main- 


AN  OUTLA  W IN  EUROPE. 


509 


tenance  of  an  honorable  tranquillity.  The  reestablishment  of  the  impe- 
rial throne  was  necessary  to  the  happiness  of  the  French.  My  sweetest 
thought  is  to  make  it  at  the  same  time  useful  to  the  strengthening  of  the 
repose  of  Europe.  Enough  glory  has  illustrated,  turn  by  turn,  the  flags 
of  the  several  nations.  The  vicissitudes  of  fate  have  sufficiently  made 
great  reverses  succeed  great  successes.  A finer  arena  is  to-day  open  to 
the  sovereigns,  and  I am  the  first  to  enter  it.  After  having  presented 
to  the  world  the  spectacle  of  great  combats,  it  will  be  sweeter  to  know 
henceforth  no  other  rivalry  than  that  of  the  advantages  of  peace,  no 
other  struggle  than  the  holy  struggle  for  the  felicity  of  the  peoples. 
France  is  happy  to  proclaim  frankly  this  noble  aim  of  all  its  vows. 
Jealous  of  its  independence,  the  invariable  principle  of  its  policy  will  be 
the  most  absolute  respect  of  the  independence  of  other  nations. 

If  such  are,  as  I have  the  happy  confidence,  the  present  sentiments 
of  Your  Majesty,  general  calm  is  assured  for  a long  period,  and  Justice 
sitting  on  the  boundaries  of  the  several  states  will  alone  suffice  to  guard 
their  frontiers. 

I seize  with  eagerness  this  occasion  to  renew  to  you  the  sentiments  of 
the  sincere  esteem,  and  of  the  perfect  friendship  with  which  I am,  Mon- 
sieur my  Brother,  your  good  Brother,  Napoleon. 

This  letter  had  no  effect  : the  measures  taken  against 
Napoleon  at  the  Congress  of  Vienna  were  quite  unexam- 
pled. The  coalition  nations  refused  to  treat  with  his  new 
government.  Although  he  was  ready  to  accept  the  decision 
of  the  Congress  on  almost  all  points,  the  allies  would  not 
even  receive  his  messages ; his  envoys  were  sent  back  at  the 
frontier ; and  he  was  declared  to  be  what  was  a new  thing 
in  international  law,  an  outlaw  in  Europe.  This  was  due  as 
much  to  the  fear  of  the  powers  that  they  would  lose  their 
spoils,  as  it  was  to  a natural  dread  of  the  man. 

A few  days  before,  Napoleon  bad  written  the  Emperor  Francis:  “At 
the  moment  that  Providence  brings  me  back  to  the  capital  of  my  state, 
the  most  lively  of  my  vows  is  to  see  soon  again  the  object  of  my  most 
loving  affection,  my  wife  and  my  son.  ...  I know  too  well  the  princi- 
ples of  Your  Majesty,  I know  too  well  what  value  you  attach  to  the  affec- 


510 


FEELING  OF  SUSPICION  EXISTS. 


tion  of  the  family,  not  to  have  the  happy  confidence  that,  whatever  may 
otherwise  be  the  dispositions  of  your  cabinet  and  your  politics,  you 
will  be  eager  to  accelerate  the  instant  of  the  reunion  of  a wife  with 
her  husband  and  a son  with  his  father.”  But  this  appeal  was  likewise 
ignored. 

Perhaps  Napoleon  laid  too  much  stress  on  the  possibility 
of  keeping  the  peace ; yet  while  honestly  desiring  to  regain 
his  throne  without  war,  he  endeavored  to  strengthen  his  gov- 
ernment by  a resort  to  popular  suffrage,  by  enlisting  old 
opponents  to  accept  office,  and  by  creating  a ministry  con- 
taining men  of  the  Revolutionary  period.  Maret  was  made 
Secretary  of  State,  Carnot  Minister  of  the  Interior,  Fouche 
of  Police,  Davout  of  War,  Caulaincourt  of  Foreign  Affairs, 
and  Cambaceres  of  Justice;  Bertrand  was  created  Chief  of 
Staff  and  Grand  Marshal  of  the  Palace,  Deeres  Minister 
of  Marine,  Gaudin  of  Finance,  Mollien  of  the  Public  Treasury, 
Savary  Inspector-General  of  Gendarmerie,  Joseph  President 
of  the  Council  of  Ministers.  Still,  Napoleon  was  unable  to 
suppress  the  feeling  of  suspicion  that  existed  : the  majority 
feared  that  his  coming  meant  renewed  war.  The  soldier 
looked  at  him  from  one  standpoint,  the  civilian  from  another ; 
and  apart  from  his  old  legions,  Napoleon  was  accepted,  not 
because  France  trusted  him,  but  because  it  had  grown  to  hate 
and  fear  the  Bourbons.  The  capitalists  and  all  conservative 
men  were  slow  to  support  him,  and  Napoleon  found  a dis- 
united France  with  which  to  oppose  the  whole  of  Europe. 
Despite  his  warm  reception,  when  he  was  called  on  to  take 
up  arms,  it  had  already  been  brought  home  to  him  that  the 
nation  was  no  longer  his  own,  as  it  once  had  been. 

He  lost  not  a day  in  creating  an  army.  The  Bourbons  had 
reduced  the  forces  to  one  hundred  and  seventy  thousand  foot 
and  horse,  of  which  less  than  two  thirds  were  available.  The 
conscription  of  1814  and  1815  was  put  in  force.  All  sub-offi- 


AN  ARMY  CREATED. 


511 


cers  and  soldiers  who  had  left  the  army  were  called  in,  and 
the  members  of  the  Old  and  Young  Guard  were  glad  to  report 
for  duty.  In  each  infantry  regiment  the  first  two  battalions 
were  completed  by  the  third,  in  each  cavalry  regiment  the 
first  three  squadrons  by  the  fourth,  the  third  battalions  and 
fourth  squadrons  to  be  gradually  filled  up  ; and  the  excess 
of  men  went  to  make  a fourth  battalion  and  fifth  squadron. 
All  officers  not  called  were  to  be  in  readiness;  retired  officers 
and  men  were  invited  to  return  to  activity ; and  many  old 
soldiers  gladly  came  back.  The  St.  Helena  record  narrates 
in  detail  what  was  done.  “ There  was  no  need  of  coercive 
laws  to  constrain  them  to  obey.  They  rushed  in  with  songs  : 
laborers,  artisans,  manufacturers,  all  left  their  work  at  the 
end  of  the  week,  put  on  their  old  uniforms  and  rejoined  their 
old  regiments.” 

There  were  organized,  of  National  Guards,  two  hundred 
battalions  of  five  hundred  and  sixty  men  each,  of  which,  in 
the  ninety  strong  places  on  the  frontiers  were  one  hundred 
and  fifty-two,  the  rest  being  with  the  Observation  Corps,  and 
in  reserve.  The  fortresses  were  armed,  palisaded,  provisioned 
and  well  commanded.  Although  this  National  Guard  made 
good  garrisons,  “ they  were  neither  formed,  instructed,  nor 
clothed,  and  . . . would  have  only  embarrassed  the  army,” 
while  in  “ guarding  the  frontiers  they  could  finish  their  or- 
ganization, be  clothed  and  instructed,  and  on  the  loth  of  July 
they  could  have  entered  into  line.” 

“ The  most  important  matter  was  muskets,  . . . but  so 
much  zeal  and  intelligence  was  put  into  the  direction  of  the 
workshops,  that  from  the  month  of  May  they  furnished  each 
day  fifteen  hundred  muskets,  in  June  three  thousand,  and 
beginning  with  the  1st  of  July,  they  were  to  furnish  four 
thousand.”  The  artillery  and  cavalry  were  carefully  looked 
to ; “ some  ten  thousand  horses  used  to  the  saddle  . . . were 


512 


EVERY  ALLIED  ARMY  MOBILIZED. 


bought  for  cash  from  the  gendarmes,  and  these  purchased 
fresh  horses  for  themselves.'’  By  June  1 forty -six  thousand 
cavalry  horses  were  in  depots  or  in  line.  Yet  as  against  all 
Europe,  with  more  than  a million  men  under  arms,  what  was 
accomplished  did  not  suffice ; and  steps  were  taken  to  raise 
another  two  hundred  and  fifty  thousand  men. 

On  April  3 Napoleon  gave  full  direction  for  organizing 
the  frontier  populations  to  resist  the  invader.  As  the  depart- 
ments of  France  averaged  three  hundred  thousand  inhabit- 
ants, each  was  held  to  raise  thirty  thousand  National  Guards. 
. . . These  were  to  be  armed  and  equipped,  the  uniform 
being  the  simple  blue  blouse,  with  a black  cartridge-box. 

“On  the  1st  of  June  the  effective  of  the  French  troops  under  arms 
was  five  hundred  and  fifty-nine  thousand  men.”  “ On  the  1st  of  Oc- 
tober France  would  have  a military  state  of  eight  to  nine  hundred 
thousand  men,  completely  organized,  armed  and  clothed.  The  problem 
of  her  independence  consisted,  then,  in  being  able  to  keep  hostilities  dis- 
tant until  October  1.  . . .At  that  time  the  frontiers  of  the  empire  would 
have  been  frontiers  of  brass,  that  no  human  power  could  have  crossed 
unpunished.” 

Political  measures  were  not  neglected.  Early  in  April 
secret  agents  were  sent  to  Sweden,  Bavaria,  Wurtemberg, 
Baden,  Saxony,  and  other  countries,  to  strive  for  reconcilia- 
tion. But  the  most  essential  thing  was  time  for  preparation, 
and  the  allied  powers  had  no  idea  of  affording  Napoleon  time. 
With  the  Congress  of  Vienna  at  work,  their  armies  had  not 
been  sensibly  decreased,  although  after  the  Peace  of  Paris 
these  had  all  left  France  and  reached  home  stations.  They 
were  now  more  rapid  than  ever  before ; they  had  wonderfully 
profited  by  Napoleon’s  teaching.  Every  allied  army  was  at 
once  mobilized  and  headed  for  the  Rhine  and  the  Meuse,  on 
a plan  of  campaign  not  dissimilar  to  the  last  one,  to  be  opened 
by  mid-July.  Four  armies  were  to  start  towards  Paris : from 


THE  PLANS  OF  ACTION. 


513 


the  upper  Rhine  Schwartzenberg  with  the  Austrians,  Bava- 
rians and  Wurtembergers ; from  the  middle  Rhine  Barclay 
de  Tolly  with  the  Russians,  — to  accomplish  which  they 
marched  from  Poland  in  two  months  ; from  the  lower  Rhine 
and  Belgium  Blucher  with  the  Prussians  and  Saxons,  and 
Wellington  with  the  English,  German  and  Dutch  troops; 
while  from  Italy  two  Austrian  armies  under  Frimont  and 
Bianchi  were  to  threaten  southern  France.  Although  there 
was  less  force  than  was  essential  to  meet  an  immediate  opera- 
tion by  Napoleon,  this  strong  purpose  bore  fruit.  England, 
which  had  become  one  vast  arsenal,  covered  the  Channel  with 
convoys  to  carry  artillery  and  munitions  to  the  Continent, 
which  furnished  the  men  ; and  by  the  end  of  May,  France 
was  surrounded  along  its  entire  frontier  by  allied  troops  ; but 
the  pass-word  was  to  take  no  action  until  the  Russian  army 
came  up  into  line. 

There  were  two  plans  of  action  from  which  Napoleon  might 
choose.  One  plan  was  to  await  near  the  frontier  the  attack 
of  the  powers,  and  avoid  the  onus  of  again  provoking  war. 
Th  is  would  open  part  of  France  to  the  depredations  of  foreign 
armies  ; but  it  would  give  time  to  raise  the  maximum  of  forces, 
to  complete  preparations,  and  then  meet  the  allies  with  their 
numbers  lessened  by  corps  they  must  leave  opposite  the  French 
fortresses.  It  was  1814  over  again,  with  its  lessons  learned. 
The  other  plan  was  without  delay  to  move  against  the  nearest 
allied  forces  — those  standing  in  Belgium.  This  would  save 
France  from  invasion  to  begin  with  ; but  in  case  of  reverse, 
would  bring  it  on  earlier  than  it  would  naturally  occur,  and 
before  the  French  levies  were  quite  ready.  Still,  the  offensive 
better  suited  the  French  idea  ; it  lent  the  emperor  a stronger 
hold  of  the  situation ; he  remembered  the  failure  of  his  defen- 
sive on  the  Elbe,  and  a victory  over  Wellington  and  Blucher 
might  result  in  renewed  negotiations  or  in  dissolving  the  coa- 


VOL.  IV. 


514 


A NEW  LEASE  OF  SOVEREIGNTY. 


lition,  or  indeed  induce  a rising  of  the  Netherlands  and  the 
old  Confederation  of  the  Rhine,  where  the  French  sentiment 
was  still  strong. 

This  plan  “ was  conformable  to  the  genius  of  the  nation,  to  the  spirit 
and  to  the  principles  of  this  war.  . . . But  could  we,  with  one  hundred 
and  twenty-five  thousand  men,  beat  two  armies  ...  of  two  hundred  and 
forty  thousand  men  ? . . . The  allied  armies  were  composed  of  troops 
more  or  less  good ; one  Englishman  could  be  counted  for  one  Frenchman, 
two  Dutchmen,  Prussians  or  men  from  the  Confederation  for  one  French- 
man. They  were  under  different  generals  and  of  nations  diverse  in 
interests  and  sentiments,”  say  the  St.  Helena  papers.  After  1813  Na- 
poleon showed  narrow  judgment  in  underrating  the  Prussians. 

On  the  first  plan,  Napoleon  would  have  time  to  raise  a 
quarter  million  men  for  general  operations,  sixty  thousand 
for  the  Rhine,  over  one  hundred  thousand  new  levies  to  de- 
fend Paris,  and  twenty-five  thousand  for  Lyons,  and  it  would 
afford  time  to  fortify  these  two  most  important  cities  of 
France.  On  the  second  plan,  he  could  barely  reckon  a force 
of  one  hundred  and  twenty  thousand  men  with  which  to  in- 
vade Belgium,  and  twenty-five  thousand  men  to  protect  the 
outlets  from  Switzerland  and  the  upper  Rhine. 

Although  aware  that  in  the  eyes  of  Europe  he  was  legally  an 
usurper,  Napoleon  strove  to  base  a new  lease  of  sovereignty 
on  the  people  : “ Everything  for  the  nation,  and  everything 
for  France,  that  is  my  device,”  he  said  March  26,  in  a reply 
to  the  Address  of  the  Ministers ; and  in  answering  the  Coun- 
cil of  State:  “ Sovereignty  itself  is  hereditary  only  because  the 
interest  of  the  people  demands  it.”  Had  he  possessed  the 
confidence  of  the  people  as  he  had  won  the  heart  of  the  army, 
it  would  have  been  wiser  to  wait.  But  as  a military  problem, 
and  this  alone  could  he  consider,  the  sharp  offensive  was  the 
only  course  which  would  not  yield  encouragement  and  time 
for  preparation  to  the  allies.  The  emperor  had  not  forgotten 


THE  PRINCIPAL  ARMY.  515 

the  title  of  the  One  Hundred  Thousand  Man  which  had  been 
given  him  by  his  enemies,  and  he  recognized  that  his  old 
system  of  seizing  and  keeping  the  initiative  — as  he  had  sadly 
failed  to  do  in  1813  — was  by  far  the  best.  He  believed  that 
he  could  defeat  the  northern  armies,  and  then  take  the  others 
successively  in  detail.  This  second  plan  Napoleon  himself 
spoke  of  as  one  to  anticipate  the  allies,  who  could  not  be  ready 
before  July  15,  and  suddenly  to  open  operations  against 
Wellington  and  Blucher  by  June  15,  leaving  a sufficient 
curtain  along  the  frontier,  and  garrisons  in  the  fortresses. 
At  Bordeaux,  Toulouse,  on  the  Yar,  at  Chambery,  Belfort 
and  Strasburg,  little  bodies  were  left,  enough  to  retard  but 
not  cope  with  the  enemy,  while  against  the  Vendee,  where 
the  royalists  were  again  active,  fifteen  thousand  men  under 
Lamarque  were  dispatched,  and  the  field  army  by  so  much 
diminished. 

The  emperor’s  plan  had  been  early  conceived,  for  on  March 
27  — a week  after  reaching  Paris  — he  wrote  Davout  for 
the  state  of  the  1st,  2d,  3d  and  6th  Corps.  “ It  is  with  this 
army  . . . that  I shall  act ; I will  there  assemble  my  Guard, 
I will  have  in  hand  a mobile  force  of  eighty  thousand  men. 

. . . The  Army  of  the  North  will  be  the  principal  army.  It 
is  therefore  to  that  one  you  are  to  give  your  attention.”  And 
next  day  Reille  was  ordered  to  Valenciennes,  and  Erlon  to 
Lille,  but  notified  not  to  place  the  troops  in  a hostile  attitude. 
Still,  “the  emperor  deliberated  then  whether,  with  the  thirty- 
five  Thousand  men”  of  Reille  and  Erlon,  “he  should  com- 
mence hostilities  April  1,  by  marching  to  Brussels  and  rallying 
the  Belgian  army  under  his  flags.  The  English  and  Prussian 
armies  were  feeble,  disseminated,  without  orders,  without 
chiefs,  and  without  plans ; part  of  the  officers  were  on  leave ; 
Wellington  was  in  Vienna,  Blucher  in  Berlin.  The  French 
army  could  be,  April  2,  in  Brussels,”  says  the  St.  Helena 


516 


TO  PRODUCE  A MARKED  EFFECT. 


record.  On  the  other  hand,  were  the  hope  of  peace,  the  fact 
that  these  were  nearly  all  the  troops  on  hand,  and  the  unset- 
tled state  of  public  opinion.  The  emperor  decided  to  wait 
until  he  had  a substantial  army. 

The  opening  with  an  offensive  thrust  ou  June  15  was  no 
doubt  a better  policy  than  to  wait  longer.  In  their  Vienna 
negotiations  the  allied  powers  had  found  many  interests  at 
variance ; and  the  emperor  recognized  that  so  soon  as  the 
temporary  bond  of  ending  the  Napoleonic  regime  had  disap- 
peared, they  would  have  little  in  common.  Upon  this  state 
of  affairs  a first  decisive  victory  could  not  fail  to  produce 
a marked  effect,  and  to  this  end  he  bent  his  energies.  On 
April  24  he  sent  Dejean  on  an  inspection  tour  of  the  north- 
ern frontier  from  Beauvais  to  Landau,  to  report  the  strength 
of  the  fortresses  and  citadels,  the  condition  of  the  troops, 
artillery,  and  everything  relating  to  the  army.  On  April  27 
Reille  was  ordered  to  locate  his  headquarters  at  Avesnes  and 
a division  in  Maubeuge,  his  other  divisions  to  canton  behind 
the  Sambre;  Erlon  to  move  headquarters  to  Valenciennes, 
assemble  between  that  place  and  Conde,  with  a division  at 
Lille,  and  withdraw  from  the  coast  towns.  Each  soldier  was 
to  have  his  cartridges,  and  two  pairs  of  shoes  in  his  knapsack, 
and  the  horses  extra  shoes.  Vandamme  was  to  assemble  in 
second  line  between  Rocroi  and  Mezieres  ; Pire’s  cavalry,  in 
reserve,  to  occupy  Laon.  In  case  anything  happened,  Reille 
and  Erlon  were  to  take  position  behind  the  Sambre,  Van- 
damme to  move  up  in  support,  and  Pire  forward  to  Guise. 
Magazines  were  created  at  Avesnes  for  one  hundred  thousand 
men  and  twenty  thousand  horses  for  ten  days,  and  cartridges 
and  munitions  were  distributed.  And  to  show  how  early  the 
emperor  contemplated  opening  the  operation,  on  April  27 
Bertrand  was  ordered  to  send  to  Compi£gne  his  military 
establishment,  44  containing  a bed,  a little  silver  campaign  ser- 


MANY  COMMANDS  GIVEN. 


517 


vice,  two  brigades  of  saddle-horses,  a campaign  carriage,  a 
little  tent,  and  finally  everything  that  is  necessary  for  war- 
fare.” 

The  actual  division  of  the  forces  was  published  in  the 
Decree  of  April  30 ; and  the  ancient  and  familiar  organiza- 
tion was  resumed ; and  “ the  numbers  of  the  regiments, 
which  they  had  borne  since  1794,  were  restored;  they  had 
illustrated  them  in  twenty-five  campaigns  and  one  thousand 
combats.” 

As  usual  with  Napoleon,  the  commands  given  to  prepare 
for  the  coming  struggle  were  many.  His  eye  was  everywhere. 
All  things  were  ordered  with  the  ancient  accuracy  ; it  cannot 
be  said  that  instructions  were  heeded  with  the  same  zeal.  As 
a rule,  orders  were  issued  by  Davout,  upon  instructions  by 
the  emperor.  A few  examples  are  quoted,  as  showing  that, 
at  the  inception  of  this,  his  last  campaign,  his  mind  remained 
as  alert  and  searching  as  it  ever  was.  In  the  cabinet  he  was 
still  supreme  in  his  powers  ; but  we  shall  see  his  physical 
strength  fail  him  in  the  field,  with  a reflex  effect  on  his 
morale : — 

On  May  9 Davout  was  instructed  to  have  all  line  soldiers  taken  from 
the  fortresses  for  use  in  the  ranks,  the  fortresses  being  left  to  the  charge 
of  the  National  Guards.  On  May  12  to  see  that  the  lieutenant-generals 
commanding  military  divisions  were  not  to  shut  themselves  up  in  for- 
tresses, but  to  stay  outside,  so  as  to  organize  proper  resistance  to  invasion. 
“ They  are  to  remain  until  the  last  moment  to  have  a care  to  the  arma- 
ment and  clothing  of  the  National  Guards.”  On  May  13  to  see  that  of 
the  eight  companies  of  pontoons,  one  was  to  be  left  at  Strasburg,  one  at 
Metz,  and  the  six  others  to  be  sent  to  Douai,  Paris  and  Laon.  “These 
six  companies,  commanded  by  the  best  officer  of  pontoniers  that  you 
have,  will  be  attached  to  the  Army  of  the  North.” 

On  May  16  Napoleon  sent  Davout  a report  of  Dejean  on  the  service 
of  rations  in  the  north.  “ It  seems  that  this  service  is  very  badly  made, 
especially  with  regard  to  bread.  War  is  going  to  break  out,  and  the 
soldier  cannot  enter  into  campaign  with  four  days’  bread.”  On  May  28 


518 


DISCOURSE  TO  THE  DEPUTIES. 


he  called  Davout’s  attention  to  the  fact  that  fifty-four  thousand  men  for 
the  garrison  of  the  fortresses  in  first  line  were  too  many,  and  that  by 
June  5 they  should  be  limited  from  six  thousand  in  Lille,  down  to  five 
hundred  in  small  places,  making  all  together  thirty  thousand  men,  plus  the 
sedentary  National  Guards.  On  May  29  he  sent  him  complaints  about 
Bourcier  for  refusing  horses  nine  or  ten  years  old,  of  half  an  inch  under 
measure  : “ A horse  of  ten  years,  well  shaped,  is  better  for  us  than  a 
horse  of  five  years.”  Two  months  before,  he  had  written  Davout  : “ Our 
cavalry  does  not  seem  to  me  in  a satisfactory  condition  ; ” and  he  now 
wrote  : “ I do  not  wish  to  mount  this  year  any  man  who  has  not  served  in 
the  cavalry.”  The  surplus  men  thus  got  out  of  the  cavalry  were  to  be 
sent  to  the  infantry. 

On  June  1 the  Electoral  College  met  on  the  Champ  de 
Mai,  and  in  his  discourse  to  the  deputies  Napoleon  said  : — 

“ Emperor,  Consul,  Soldier,  I hold  everything  from  the  people.  In 
prosperity,  in  adversity,  on  the  battlefield,  in  council,  on  the  throne,  in 
exile,  France  has  been  the  sole  and  constant  object  of  my  thoughts  and 
my  actions.  ...  We  have  had  to  prepare  for  war.  . . . Frenchmen,  my 
will  is  that  of  the  people.  My  rights  are  its  rights,  my  honor,  my  glory, 
my  happiness,  can  be  no  other  than  the  honor,  the  glory,  and  the  happi- 
ness of  France.  . . . Soldiers  of  the  National  Guard  of  the  Empire, 
Soldiers  of  the  land  and  sea  troops,  . . . Soldiers  of  the  National  Guard 
of  Paris,  Soldiers  of  the  Imperial  Guard,  I confide  to  you  the  imperial 
eagle  with  the  national  colors.  You  swear  to  perish  if  need  be  to  defend 
it  against  the  enemies  of  the  country  and  the  throne.  . . . You,  Soldiers 
of  the  National  Guard  of  Paris,  you  swear  never  to  suffer  that  the 
stranger  shall  again  stain  the  capital  of  the  Great  Nation.  . . . And  you. 
Soldiers  of  the  Imperial  Guard,  you  swear  to  surpass  yourselves  in  the 
campaign  which  is  about  to  open,  to  die  rather  than  to  suffer  that 
strangers  should  come  to  dictate  law  to  the  fatherland.” 

On  May  30  the  Guard  had  been  ordered  to  be  ready  by 
June  5 at  latest;  on  June  3 Grouchy  was  to  be  prepared  to 
open  the  campaign  J une  10  ; and  orders  went  out  for  Gerard, 
with  his  Army  of  the  Moselle,  to  move  to  Philippeville  by  the 
12th.  On  June  7,  along  the  frontier  of  the  north,  the  Rhine 
and  the  Moselle,  communication  was  stopped ; Soult  was 


FAVORABLE  MILITARY  SITUATION . 519 

ordered  to  Lille  to  see  that  the  fortresses  in  first  line  were  in 
order,  and  to  rejoin  the  emperor  the  12th  at  Laon ; the  Guard 
was  to  reach  Laon  the  9th  or  10th. 

Complaints  were  sent  out  to  Drouot  that  “ two  regiments  the  emperor 
saw  drilling  had  only  one  pair  of  shoes  ; they  must  have  supplied  to  them 
two  in  their  knapsacks  and  one  on  foot  ; ” and  the  emperor  wrote  to  Ber- 
trand : “ If  something  is  wanting,  let  it  be  sent  down  ; as  I shall  often 
camp,  it  is  important  that  I should  have  my  iron  bedstead  and  my  tents. 
Have  an  eye  to  my  glasses  being  in  good  order.  . . . Give  orders  that  all 
my  aides  . . . shall  send  their  horses  to  Soissons.”  On  June  12  he  wrote 
Davout  : “ I attach  great  importance  to  having  the  five  hundred  Poles 
in  the  saddle  as  soon  as  possible.  ...  In  placing  them  at  the  outposts,  I 
hope  to  aid  much  the  desertion  of  the  Poles,”  meaning  from  the  allied  ranks. 

The  military  situation  was  favorable,  the  enemy  having  but 
two  immediately  threatening  armies  in  the  field.  One  was 
based  on  Brussels  and  the  British  Channel,  and  stood  under 
Wellington,  whom  in  Spain  we  have  seen  defeat  several  of 
Napoleon’s  marshals,  but  who  had  as  yet  met  no  leader  of  his 
own  rank,  who  was  methodical  to  a fault,  more  apt  to  receive 
than  to  deliver  battle,  and  had  yet  to  measure  himself  with 
a giant  in  war.  The  other  was  based  on  Liege,  Maestricht 
and  the  Rhine,  and  stood  under  Blucher,  a general  of  the 
opposite  type,  audacious  to  a degree,  who  also  had  beaten 
Napoleon’s  marshals,  and  though  always  worsted  by  Napoleon 
under  any  conditions  approaching  equality,  yet  harbored  the 
feeling  that  the  emperor  was  by  no  means  invincible.  Here 
were  two  armies  with  eccentric  bases,  either  one  of  which 
Napoleon  could  outnumber,  commanded  by  men  of  different 
temperaments,  whose  ideas  were  apt  to  clash  so  as  to  afford 
him  a good  opening ; and  all  other  armies  would  be  several 
weeks  in  arriving.  Napoleon  was  justified  in  assuming  that 
he  could  win  his  first  battle.  What  better  strategic  proposi- 
tion could  he  have  ? 


520 


THE  TWO  IMPORTANT  POINTS. 


The  campaign  of  1815  was  planned  with  as  exquisite  skill 
as  any  of  Napoleon’s  masterpieces;  neither  Ulm  nor  Jena 
was  better.  But  its  conduct,  like  that  of  the  three  previous 
campaigns,  fell  short  of  Napoleonic  perfection,  and,  better 
than  any  other,  it  illustrates  how,  from  the  days  of  Wagram, 
the  great  captain  had  fallen  from  his  high  estate. 

It  was  essential  that  not  only  Lyons  but  Paris  should  be 
placed  beyond  capture,  except  by  a regular  siege.  Davout 
was  to  remain  in  the  capital,  charged  with  all  the  duties  of 
Minister  of  War  and  with  its  defense. 

“If,”  says  the  St.  Helena  record,  “in  1805  Vienna  had  been  fortified, 
the  battle  of  Ulm  would  not  have  decided  the  issue  of  the  war.  The 
army  corps  commanded  by  Kutusov  would  have  been  able  to  wait  for  the 
other  corps  of  the  Russian  army  already  at  Olmiitz,  as  well  as  the  army 
of  Prince  Charles,  coming  on  from  Italy.  In  1809  Prince  Charles,  who 
had  been  beaten  at  Eggmiihl  and  obliged  to  retreat  by  the  left  bank  of 
the  Danube,  would  have  had  the  time  to  reach  Vienna,  and  there  unite 
with  the  corps  of  Hiller  and  the  army  of  Archduke  John.  If  Berlin  had 
been  fortified  in  1806,  the  army  beaten  at  Jena  would  have  rallied  on  it, 
and  the  Russian  army  would  have  rejoined  it.”  The  emperor  then  gives 
twelve  instances  in  which  Paris  had  owed  its  safety  to  its  fortifications. 
“ It  is  the  greatest  of  contradictions  and  of  inconsequences  to  leave  so 
important  a point  without  immediate  defense.” 

On  returning  from  the  Austerlitz  campaign  the  emperor 
frequently  entertained  the  subject,  and  made  several  projects 
to  fortify  the  heights  of  Paris,  but  “ the  fear  and  disquiet  of 
the  inhabitants,  the  events  which  succeeded  each  other  with 
an  incredible  rapidity,  prevented  him  from  taking  action  on 
this  project.  . . . Paris  and  Lyons  were  the  two  important 
points,  and  as  long  as  they  were  occupied  in  force,  the  coun- 
try would  not  be  lost,  nor  obliged  to  submit  to  the  discretion, 
of  enemies.” 

In  discussing  the  question  of  fortifying  Paris,  it  was  claimed 
that  the  garrison  would  consume  too  many  soldiers,  who  might 


NEY  JOINS  NAPOLEON . 


525 


old  marshals  were  only  in  part  present.  St.  Cyr,  Oudinot, 
Macdonald,  had  not  rejoined.  Massena  was  ill.  On  April 
10  Davout  was  ordered  to  strike  from  the  list  of  marshals 
Berthier,  Marmont,  Victor,  Perignon,  Augereau,  Kellermann, 
but  to  some  of  those  who  had  no  fortune  a pension  was  to 
be  given;  on  April  18  Napoleon  wrote  Davout  that  he  had 
cashiered  Generals  Souham,  Dupont,  Desolles,  Maison  and 
others,  without  further  pension  or  activity.  All  this  affected 
the  morale  of  the  army. 

Napoleon  erred  in  choosing  Soult  to  replace  Berthier.  Sev- 
eral officers  in  the  army  would  have  done  this  work  better,  many 
as  well,  for  a man  who  has  been  commander-in-chief  is  apt  to 
be  unfitted  for  the  duties  of  chief  of  staff.  Soult  would  have 
commanded  one  wing  of  the  army  better  than  he  performed 
his  unaccustomed  duties,  — vastly  better  than  Grouchy. 

Despite  the  suspicions  of  the  rank  and  file,  the  field  army 
possessed  excellent  corps  and  division  commanders,  among 
them  Vandamme,  Lobau,  Erlon,  Reille,  Gerard,  Grouchy  and 
Drouot,  although  these  generals  were  not  equal  to  those  Na- 
poleon had  formerly  led  ; nor  had  they  the  same  ambition. 
Napoleon’s  system  of  war  did  not  breed  up  men  as  fast  as  the 
methods  of  the  Revolution,  where  success  was  the  main  test. 
Some  of  his  ancient  lieutenants,  as  we  have  seen,  he  could  not 
get;  others  were  changed  in  command.  He  wrote,  April  18, 
to  Massena  : “ I thank  you  for  having  conserved  Toulon  and 
Antibes.  ...  I desire  much  to  see  you,  if  the  state  of  your 
health  permits;”  and  on  June  11  he  wrote  Davout:  “ Have 
Massena  come.  If  he  wishes  to  go  to  Metz,  give  him  the 
government.”  Napoleon  had  invited  Ney  to  join  him  : “ I 
will  receive  you  as  I did  the  day  after  the  battle  of  the 
Moskwa  ; ” as  we  have  seen,  Ney  reported  March  17,  and,  ten 
days  later,  was  sent  along  the  frontier  from  Lille  to  Landau 
to  report  on  its  state  and  the  character  of  the  officers  in  com- 


526 


DAVOUT  TO  DEFEND  PARIS. 


mand  ; and  as  hostilities  came  nearer,  Napoleon  wrote,  June 
11,  to  Davout:  “My  Cousin,  have  Ney  called  to  me;  if  he 
desires  to  be  present  at  the  first  battles  which  will  take  place, 
tell  him  that  he  is  to  be,  the  14th,  at  Avesnes,  where  my  head- 
quarters will  be.”  But  Ney  did  not  receive  the  command  of 
Napoleon’s  left  wing  until  too  late  to  get  to  know  the  troops  he 
was  to  lead.  From  the  reserve  cavalry,  Grouchy  was  changed 
to  the  command  of  the  right  wing.  Approaches  had  been  made 
to  Murat,  but  events  marched  too  rapidly  to  have  them  take 
effect.  Perhaps  the  strongest  man,  and  as  firm,  though  not 
as  brilliant  a fighter  as  Ney,  and  a far  broader  soldier,  was 
Davout.  Although  there  was  unending  labor  in  the  capital,  he 
had  begged  hard  for  field-work  ; but  Napoleon  insisted  on  his 
defending  Paris,  though  Davout  had  sensibly  pointed  out  to 
him  that,  victorious,  he  would  keep  Paris,  and,  defeated,  no  one 
could  hold  it  for  him.  Perhaps  the  emperor  feared  internal 
trouble  in  the  capital,  and  remembered  how  sternly  Davout 
had  mastered  Hamburg ; perhaps  he  feared  disagreement 
again,  if,  as  in  Russia,  Ney  and  Davout  should  work  together. 
Yet  he  knew  that  Soult  and  Ney  were  at  odds.  Specula- 
tions are  useless,  but  it  seems  evident  that,  had  Napoleon  in 
season  selected  Davout  and  Soult  to  play  the  largest  active 
roles  in  the  coming  campaign,  and  kept  Ney  for  action  under 
his  own  eye  in  the  centre,  he  would  have  had  a stronger  army. 

We  left  Wellington  after  the  battle  of  Toulouse,  in  April, 
1814.  When  Napoleon  abdicated,  the  Peninsular  army  was 
broken  up,  and  after  a diplomatic  mission  to  Spain,  Welling- 
ton was  appointed  ambassador  to  France ; but  his  position 
being  personally  unpleasant,  he  was  recalled.  Before  enter- 
ing upon  his  duties  in  Paris,  he  had  been  instructed  to  report 
on  the  defense  of  the  Belgian  frontier  ; and  from  its  strategic 
situation  and  tactical  values,  his  eye  fell  on  Mont  St.  Jean 


STRATEGIC  OPENING  AS  IN  1796. 


533 


way  of  Liege  and  Maestriclit  to  Cologne,  whence  came  the  sup- 
plies ; the  English  drew  their  victual  and  munition  by  way  of 
Ostend  and  Antwerp  : in  case  of  disaster,  the  lines  of  retreat 
would  diverge.  Napoleon  knew  generally  that  Wellington 
was  cantoned  south  of  Brussels  and  Blucher  around  Namur ; 
and  from  the  beginning  expected  and  hoped  that  the  Prus- 
sians would  be  the  ones  he  could  first  attack.  If  he  could 
drive  Blucher  back  to  the  Rhine  and  Wellington  back  to  the 
sea,  the  enthusiastic  French  people  would  heartily  support 
him,  and  he  would  gain  a standpoint  for  treating  with  the 
allies.  With  his  gigantic  conceptions  and  self-confidence, — 
even  after  1814,  — he  had  small  idea  that  this  campaign  was 
to  be  his  last. 

It  was  the  position  of  the  allied  armies  that  led  Napoleon 
to  undertake  the  same  form  of  strategic  opening  to  which  he 
had  resorted  in  his  first  campaign  in  1796,  to  wit,  one  line  of 
operations,  one  mass,  an  assembly  at  a safe  distance,  the  rup- 
ture of  the  enemy’s  centre,  and  the  hurling  of  his  mass  upon 
each  part  separately,  so  that  each  might  be  thrown  back  along 
its  own  line  of  communications.  Of  such  a divergent  retreat 
there  was  apparently  small  doubt : the  allied  commanders  had 
not  only  different  bases,  but  different  interests  to  subserve ; 
once  separated,  why  should  they  hold  together?  In  1794  the 
Austrians,  operating  in  this  country  on  the  same  lines  and 
beaten  at  the  battle  of  Fleurus,  retired  towards  the  Rhine, 
separating  from  York,  who  commanded  the  Anglo-Dutch. 

From  one  standpoint  Napoleon  was  justified  in  grounding 
his  operation  on  this  assumption.  It  was  the  natural  thing  to 
expect,  — as  was  the  allied  eccentric  retreat  when  he  moved 
on  their  point  of  junction  in  1796,  — and  all  that  it  required 
to  bring  it  about  was  the  same  discernment,  energy  and  ra- 
pidity that  Bonaparte  exhibited  in  that  surprising  campaign. 
From  another  standpoint  Napoleon  had  no  right  to  base  his 


534 


SOUNDEST  PLAN  ADOPTED. 


action  on  Blucher’s  standing  for  battle,  because  in  1813  he 
had  learned  that  Blucher  was  capable  of  smart  avoidance  of 
it,  nor  on  Blucher’s  moving  away  towards  his  own  base,  for 
he  had  also  seen  him  throw  up  his  communications  to  join 
Schwartzenberg.  But  war  is  a game  of  chances,  he  had  to 
choose  a risk,  and  the  fact  that  he  had  stronger  opponents 
than  then,  and  men  who  had  partly  learned  his  methods,  in 
no  wise  altered  the  value  of  the  plan.  The  theatre  on  which 
the  drama  was  to  be  enacted  was  not  much  more  extensive 
than  in  1796;  there  was  the  same  danger  he  had  then  run, 
that  the  superior  forces  of  the  enemy,  handled  with  speed  and 
common  purpose,  would  unite  to  fight,  or  would  outflank  and 
envelop  him  ; his  task  was  to  prove  that  Napoleon,  with  all 
his  experience,  was  now  as  much  superior  in  military  qualities 
to  W ellington  and  Blucher,  as  Bonaparte,  with  none,  had  been 
to  Beaulieu  and  Colli.  His  main  error  lay  in  underrating  the 
fighting  stanchness  of  Wellington  and  the  strategic  enterprise 
of  Blucher.  He  no  longer  weighed  facts  at  their  worth. 

Of  course  the  emperor  might  have  moved  down  the  Meuse 
about  the  Prussian  left,  or  down  the  Scheldt  about  the  British 
right,  which  latter  Wellington  thought  was  his  better  scheme. 
But  to  turn  the  Prussian  left  would  take  him  over  the  Ar- 
dennes country,  not  easy  to  subsist  in,  and  would  drive  the 
allies  together;  to  turn  Wellington’s  right  led  him  past  for- 
tresses he  must  either  capture  or  observe,  thus  depleting  his 
forces ; and  while  it  might  cause  the  evacuation  of  Brussels, 
it  would  permit  the  Prussians  to  concentrate  at  their  leisure, 
and  move  to  the  rear  to  join  the  English  for  battle.  In  the 
plan  adopted,  which  was  assuredly  the  soundest,  Napoleon 
felt  certain  he  could  compel  Blucher  to  fight,  and  the  risk 
he  assumed  was  warranted. 

It  was  natural  that  Wellington,  never  having  met  Napo- 
leon, should  have  misconceived  his  probable  plan.  Yet  it 


A MERE  QUESTION  OF  WORDING . 


535 


was  manifestly  of  no  use  to  turn  either  army  and  seize  its 
communications,  because  that  of  itself  would  open  fresh 
communications  with  the  other  army,  and  the  very  fact  that 
Blucher  and  Wellington  proposed  to  unite  for  battle  ought 
to  have  suggested  that  Napoleon  would  try  to  prevent  their 
so  doing.  Blucher  had  personally  seen  Napoleon’s  method  in 
1806 ; and  in  1813  and  1814  had  led  large  operations  against 
him,  and  his  ideas  were  sounder.  He  believed  he  might  him- 
self be  first  attacked,  and  he  chose  the  position  of  Sombreffe 
for  a defensive  battle,  relying  on  Wellington’s  aid. 

The  use  of  the  phrase  “breaking  through  the  centre”  is 
objected  to  by  some  critics,  as  is  also  the  statement  that  Na- 
poleon proposed  to  break  through  between  Blucher’s  and 
Wellington’s  armies.  Even  Clausewitz  says:  “ The  interval 
between  the  two  armies  cannot  be  the  objective  of  operations, 
and  it  would  be  very  unfortunate  if  a captain  like  Bonaparte 
had  had  the  idea  of  striking  in  the  empty  interval,  and  thus, 
giving  a sword-thrust  in  the  water;”  and  he  adds  that  such 
a proceeding  lays  one  open  to  being  attacked  in  the  rear  by 
one  army,  while  fighting  the  other.  It  is  manifest  that  when 
he  wrote,  Clausewitz  had  not  carefully  read  the  story  of  Monte- 
notte,  or  that  of  Abensberg,  or  that  of  Champaubert.  He  was 
not,  like  Jomini,  permeated  with  the  Napoleonic  idea.  “ It  was 
not  a question  of  throwing  one’s  self  into  an  empty  interval 
which  did  not  exist,”  says  Grouard,  “but  to  create  one  by  a 
first  success  and  to  profit  afterwards  from  the  separation  pro- 
duced to  successively  combat  the  fractions  of  the  enemy’s 
army.”  It  is  a mere  question  of  wording.  The  manoeuvre 
remains  intact.  Providing  what  is  meant  by  it  is  understood, 
the  phrase  is  as  good  as  any  other,  and  it  is  of  such  ancient 
application  (as  are  also  many  of  the  much-berated  Maxims 
of  War),  that  it  remains  a convenient  one  to  use.  What  it 
means  is  not  that  Napoleon  strove  to  advance  on  a geometric 


536 


A PHRASE  CONSTANTLY  EMPLOYED. 


line  between  the  two  armies,  so  as  merely  to  stand  between 
them  and  interrupt  their  communication,  but  that  he  proposed 
to  advance  upon  one  army  from  such  a direction  that  he  would 
prevent  cooperation  with  the  other  army,  and  be  able  to  at- 
tack and  defeat  the  first  army  before  the  other  could  come  up 
to  its  support.  This  direction  implied  a more  or  less  central 
line  between  them.  As  it  happened  in  this  case,  the  Prussians 
were  the  ones  to  be  attacked,  and  Napoleon  did  not  exactly 
interpose  between  them  and  their  allies,  but  he  did  do  the 
thing  which  for  generations  has  been  strategically  known  as 
breaking  through  the  centre  between  two  armies ; and  the 
adoption  of  a new  phrase  will  neither  change  the  facts  nor 
lead  to  their  clearer  understanding.  There  is  no  objection  to 
the  use  of  any  other  form  of  words  to  represent  the  same  act, 
neither  does  it  seem  that  this  phrase,  acceptable  to  so  many 
able  military  critics,  and  so  commonly  used  and  understood 
by  military  men  of  all  languages,  need  be  discarded.  It  is 
constantly  employed  by  foreign  military  men,  who  constitute 
the  vast  majority  of  those  interested  in  military  studies,  and 
who  are  called  on  most  frequently  to  put  military  theories 
into  practice.  Like  many  terms  of  the  Common  Law,  even 
if  old  fashioned,  it  will  serve.  It  may  savor  of  originality  to 
create  a new  term,  but  does  it  really  enrich  the  science?  To 
replace  old  Common  Law  words  by  new  Code  phrases  has  by 
no  means  always  been  successful : the  new  phrases  themselves 
have  to  be  construed.  Similarly  with  this  one. 

To  say  that  Napoleon  interposed  between  the  two  armies 
implies  his  intention  to  fight  one  after  the  other.  To  turn 
the  enemy’s  flank  and  to  stop  there  would  yield  no  result. 
Everything  depends  on  the  battle  which  must  ensue  upon 
a manoeuvre  ; and  just  as  Napoleon  proposed,  after  turning 
Mack’s  right  flank  at  Ulm,  or  that  of  the  Prussians  at  Jena, 
or  after  cutting  Charles  in  two  at  Abensberg,  to  fight  and 


AN  EARLY  BATTLE  ANTICIPATED. 


537 


destroy  the  enemy,  so  now,  in  interposing  between  the  two 
armies,  he  intended  to  fight  immediately  after  completing  his 
manoeuvre.  Whoso  limits  Napoleon’s  idea  to  pushing  be- 
tween the  two  allied  armies  and  marching  on  Brussels  without 
a battle  must  have  ill  read  the  history  of  this  great  captain, 
to  whom  strategic  marches  were  invariably  preludes  to  gen- 
eral engagements. 

The  strategic  scheme  was  perfect,  and  despite  delays,  it 
almost  succeeded : the  failure  of  the  campaign  does  not  prove 
the  others  to  be  better  manoeuvres.  The  allies  outnumbered 
the  French  in  the  ratio  of  nine  to  five ; why  should  Napoleon 
choose  an  operation  that  drove  Blucher  towards  Wellington,  or 
Wellington  towards  Blucher,  so  that  he  must  tactically  decide 
the  event  by  fighting  them  both  at  the  same  time?  Safety 
lay  in  thrusting  them  apart  so  as  to  fight  them  singly ; and 
the  Napoleon  of  any  year  from  1796  to  1808  would  have  won 
the  game.  It  was  lost  in  1815  by  but  a few  hours’  delay. 

That  Wellington  looked  upon  Napoleon’s  best  manoeuvre  as 
one  round  his  own  right  flank  was  in  a way  due  to  the  natural 
feeling  he  harbored  that  his  army  was  the  important  one  of 
the  campaign.  This  feeling  was  not  partaken  by  Napoleon, 
who  considered  Blucher  a more  dangerous  because  more  reck- 
less opponent.  From  what  he  knew  of  the  allied  positions,  he 
anticipated  an  early  battle  with  the  Prussians,  and  believed  it 
would  be  some  days  before  Wellington  would  be  ready  to  meet 
him.  Although  scarcely  appreciating  how  nervous  Wellington 
was  for  his  right  flank,  he  none  the  less  ordered  some  small 
diversions  in  the  Mons  region  by  the  National  Guards  from  the 
fortresses,  and  later  a cavalry  raid,  to  hide  his  real  operation. 

It  was  an  error  of  the  allied  commanders  to  keep  their 
troops  spread  in  cantonments  until  Napoleon  was  actually 
upon  them.  At  this  season  it  would  have  been  no  hardship 
for  the  men  to  be  in  the  open.  It  has  been  suggested  that 


538 


MEETING  AT  TIRLEMONT. 


Blucher  might  have  made  his  headquarters  at  Genappe,  can- 
toned his  army  between  Louvain  and  Gosselies,  and  occupied 
the  Sambre  with  cavalry  parties,  and  that  Wellington,  with 
headquarters  at  Brussels,  might  have  cantoned  his  army  for- 
ward from  there  to  Soignies.  Both  armies  would  then  have 
practically  been  in  one  body ; as  it  was,  each  stood  alone  and 
unready.  Although  by  June  11  Wellington  heard  rumors  of 
the  movements  of  French  masses  behind  the  frontier,  he  did 
nothing  to  get  his  troops  in  hand,  for  his  predominant  feeling 
was  that  he  ought  to  hold  Brussels,  and  Ghent,  the  refuge  of 
the  sovereigns ; and  it  was  his  way  to  be  hypercautious  as  to 
his  communications.  His  cantonments  were  chosen  rather  for 
concentration  against  a movement  from  Mons  than  against 
one  from  Charleroi ; and  the  information  he  gathered  until 
the  last  day  led  him  to  suspect  that  this  operation  was  likely. 

Wellington  and  Blucher  had  met  at  Tirlemont  May  3,  and 
had  arranged  upon  a plan  of  cooperation  in  case  they  should 
move  into  France ; but  an  invasion  was  deferred  until  the 
arrival  of  the  Russians.  No  document  has  come  to  light  pro- 
viding for  the  case  of  an  advance  by  the  French  ; but  whether, 
as  Muffling  asserts,  because  the  junction  of  the  two  armies  for 
a defensive  battle  was  so  distinctly  prescribed  by  circum- 
stances and  the  topography,  it  is  hard  to  say.  In  this  meet- 
ing, a French  advance  through  Charleroi  was  discussed,  Muf- 
fling tells  us,  and  it  was  agreed  that  in  such  case  the  Prussians 
should  concentrate  between  Sombreffe  and  Charleroi,  and  the 
English  between  Marcliienne  and  Gosselies,  where  the  two 
armies  would  be  together.  Siborne  says  that  Quatre  Bras 
and  Sombreffe  were  to  be  the  points.  And  there  was  a gen- 
eral understanding  that  whichever  army  was  attacked  should 
concentrate  out  towards  its  front,  and  the  other  should  come 
to  its  aid.  The  two  commanders  intended  and  strove  to  act 
together.  Blucher  expected  that  Wellington  would  promptly 


COOPERATION  THE  PRIME  IDEA . 539 

assemble  in  case  the  French  advanced,  and  this  Wellington 
would  have  done  more  effectively,  had  not  his  troops  been 
so  dangerously  disseminated.  Past  coalitions  had  generally 
failed  for  want  of  cooperation  on  the  larger  scale ; part  of 
their  failure  was  due  to  the  skill  of  Napoleon ; but  with 
such  leaders  as  the  Archduke  Charles  and  Suwarrov,  there  is 
small  doubt  that,  had  the  allies  held  together,  they  would 
sooner  have  mastered  the  French.  They  finally  did  this  in 
1813  and  1814  by  strict  cooperation,  backed  up  by  patient 
and  prudent,  if  not  the  ablest  conduct.  They  reached  Paris 
in  1814,  after  numberless  errors,  because  they  had  acted 
with  a common  purpose.  In  the  1815  campaign  their  first 
purpose  was  broad  cooperation  : the  sending  in  across  the 
French  frontier  of  sufficient  concentrically  moving  armies  to 
be  able  to  crush  all  possible  opposition.  Here  in  Belgium 
also,  the  prime  idea  was  cooperation  between  the  two  armies ; 
and  although  detailed  plans  in  case  Napoleon  advanced  into 
Belgium  are  not  of  record,  they  must  have  been  made ; and 
at  the  same  time  each  leader  understood  that,  while  he  must 
look  to  his  own  safety,  it  was  essential  to  work  together, 
and  moreover  each  understood  that  by  cooperation  alone 
could  they  win,  or  conserve  the  safety  of  either  army. 

The  Franco-Belgian  frontier  has  three  topographically  dif- 
ferent regions.  From  the  sea  to  the  Scheldt,  the  first  sec- 
tion, cut  up  by  canals  and  ponds,  affords  excellent  defen- 
sive country.  The  second,  including  the  upper  Scheldt  and 
the  Sambre  country,  is  a plain  which  stretches  into  France  as 
far  as  Cambray  and  St.  Quentin,  and  northerly  to  Ath  and 
Nivelles,  and  then  becomes  more  accentuated ; while  on  the 
right  bank  of  the  Sambre  the  ground  is  more  cut  up  with 
forests,  ravines  and  valleys.  The  third  stretches  from  the 
Sambre  to  the  Moselle,  and  although  the  ground  is  much 
more  rugged,  the  roads  are  numerous  and  good,  and  a line 


540 


THEATRE  OF  THE  1815  CAMPAIGN. 


of  operations  towards  Namur  or  Liege  could  be  maintained. 
Although  the  Sambre  is  a small  river,  its  banks  and  bed  are 
marshy,  and  it  is  not  always  easy  to  cross.  The  first  and 
third  sections  in  a way  prescribe  an  advance  from  France  into 
Belgium  by  way  of  Charleroi  towards  Brussels ; and  during 
the  wars  of  Louis  XIV.  and  the  early  Revolution,  the  opera- 
tions were  mostly  in  this  section,  which  affords  breadth  and 
ease  of  manoeuvring. 

The  theatre  of  the  1815  campaign  is  bounded  on  the 
south  by  the  Sambre  from  Maubeuge  to  Namur.  Nearly  mid- 
way between  these  towns  lies  Charleroi,  an  ancient  crossing. 
Twenty  miles  or  more  to  the  west  lies  Mons ; a little  less  to 
the  east  Namur.  Somewhat  over  thirty  miles  north  is  Brus- 
sels, and  from  this  city  to  Charleroi  and  to  the  towns  of  Cham- 
pagne runs  a good  chaussee,  while  the  main  route  from  Brus- 
sels to  Paris  goes  through  Hal  and  Mons.  Nine  miles  south 
of  Brussels  lies  the  village  of  Waterloo,  and  back  of  it  the 
Forest  of  Soignes,  through  which  runs  the  highway ; and  on 
either  side  of  the  road  the  woods  are  fairly  open,  so  that  if 
necessary,  foot  and  horse  in  good  order  could  march  through 
them ; but  artillery  would  have  to  keep  to  the  road,  and  the 
passage  might  be  gorged  by  disordered  troops,  or  accidents 
to  a train.  Over  ten  miles  north  of  Charleroi  the  chaussee 
to  Brussels  is  cut  by  the  paved  road  which  runs  from  Hal 
through  Nivelles  to  Namur,  and  this  cross-roads  is  known  as 
Quatre  Bras.  Ligny  lies  a mile  south  of  this  road,  northeast 
of  Charleroi.  Wavre  is  a short  ten  miles  east  of  Waterloo. 
From  Charleroi  northeast  runs  a paved  road  through  Fleurus 
to  Sombreffe,  beyond  which  place  it  crosses  the  Nivelles- 
Namur  road,  and  goes  on  through  Gembloux  to  Tirlemont. 
Two  miles  south  of  Waterloo  lie  the  village  and  height  known 
as  Mont  St.  Jean,  on  the  southern  slopes  of  which  the 
heaviest  fighting  of  the  battle  of  Waterloo  took  place.  The 


THE  KEY-POINTS. 


541 


ground  is  rolling,  mostly  open,  with  patches  of  woods  at  inter- 
vals ; there  are  no  streams  which  in  good  weather  seriously 
interfere  with  the  operations  of  any  arm,  and  an  abundance 
of  country  roads  run  in  every  direction.  Yet  the  Dyle  and 
its  affluents  at  times  are  hard  to  cross,  and  at  St.  Lambert 
and  Lasne,  form  a sort  of  defile  for  the  road  from  Wavre 
to  Planchenoit.  The  soil  is  apt  to  be  deep  in  case  of  rain. 
Within  the  irregular  triangle  whose  base  is  the  Mons-Charle- 
roi-Namur  line,  and  the  apex  Brussels,  was  conducted  the 
strategic  manoeuvring  which  began  with  the  crossing  of  the 
Sambre  by  Napoleon  June  15,  1815,  the  tactical  conflicts  of 
Ligny  and  Quatre  Bras  on  the  16th,  the  strategical  manoeu- 
vres to  a junction  by  Blucher  and  Wellington  the  17th  ; the 
following  of  the  allies  to  Waterloo  by  Napoleon  on  the  same 
day ; and  the  final  tactical  destruction  of  the  French  army 
on  the  18th,  by  the  two  allied  armies. 

Looking  at  the  field  from  Charleroi,  it  was  along  the  road 
to  Liege,  and  along  that  to  Brussels,  that  ran  the  lines  of 
advance  and  retreat  of  Napoleon’s  two  powerful  opponents. 
Wellington  and  Blucher  were  united  by  the  Nivelles-Namur 
road,  and  the  key-points  on  this  road,  the  possession  of  which 
would  cut  the  allied  generals  apart,  were  Quatre  Bras  and 
Sombreffe.  To  carry  out  his  plan  of  breaking  through  the 
allied  centre,  these  two  points  on  the  line  by  which  the  allies 
would  sustain  each  other  wrere  the  ones  which  Napoleon  must 
first  aim  to  seize ; and  this  he  could  do  only  by  speed  superior 
to  theirs. 

Early  in  June  Erlon  left  the  neighborhood  of  Lille  and 
Reille  Valenciennes,  to  move  towards  Maubeuge  and  Avesnes. 
“ The  garrisons  of  all  the  strong  places  from  Dunkirk  on 
masked  this  movement,  by  occupying  the  debouches  with 
strong  detachments,  so  that  at  the  moment  when  the  canton- 
ments on  this  frontier  were  assembling,  the  vanguards  were 


542 


POSITIONS  ON  JUNE  14. 


tripled,  and  the  enemy,  deceived,  believed  that  the  whole  army 
was  concentrating  on  its  left.  The  6th  Corps  left  Laon  and 
moved  on  Avesnes,  the  reserve  cavalry  concentrated  on  the 
Sambre,”  narrate  the  Memoirs. 

The  rendezvous  of  the  several  French  corps  for  the  open- 
ing of  the  operation  was  thus  south  of  the  Sambre  opposite 
Charleroi,  and  the  army  from  several  points  along  the  border 
assembled  on  a line  from  Maubeuge  to  Pliilippeville,  with  a 
force  at  Solre-sur-Sambre  and  the  centre  and  headquarters 
at  Beaumont.  Wellington  at  Brussels  and  Blucher  at  Namur 
were  ignorant  of  Napoleon’s  position  and  force,  although 
Muffling  says  that  on  June  13  they  knew  that  he  was  con- 
centrating at  Maubeuge  ; and  sundry  other  rumors  had  run 
in ; but  so  little  did  they  expect  the  French  advance  in  force 
at  this  moment,  that  on  June  14  Blucher  still  had  part  of 
Ziethen’s  corps  at  Charleroi,  Pirch’s  at  Namur,  Thielemann’s 
between  Huy  and  Dinant,  and  Biilow’s  at  LiSge,  while  Well- 
ington was  dangerously  spread  in  his  cantonments  back  of 
Nivelles  and  Ath. 

The  Order  of  the  Day,  Avesnes,  June  13,  gave  the  position 
of  the  French  army  the  14th : — 

Guard  infantry  in  front  of  Beaumont  in  three  lines.  The  regiment  of 
grenadiers  at  Beaumont,  Guard  cavalry  behind  Beaumont.  Reille  at 
Leers,  within  the  frontier,  his  cavalry  in  front  holding  all  the  debouches, 
with  fires  hidden  ; Erlon  at  Solre  ; Vandamme  a league  in  front  of 
Beaumont  ; Lobau  at  a quarter  league  behind  Vandamme  ; Milhaud 
between  Beaumont  and  Walcourt,  all  with  similar  orders.  Bridge  equi- 
page behind  Lobau  ; artillery  reserve  behind  Beaumont;  Gerard  iii  front 
of  Pliilippeville  ; sappers  at  the  head  of  each  division.  . . . “ All  the 
corps  will  march  in  the  greatest  order  and  closed  up.  In  the  movement 
on  Charleroi,  they  will  be  so  formed  as  to  profit  by  all  the  debouches, 
so  as  to  crush  the  enemy’s  corps  who  would  wish  to  attack  the  army  or 
manoeuvre  against  it.”  The  old  regulations  as  to  baggage  and  camp- 
followers  to  be  in  vigor.  These  orders  to  be  kept  secret  by  the  generals. 


CHARLEkOI  THE  MAIN  OBJECTIVE. 


543 


So  far  the  Order.  “ The  camps  were  established  behind  high  ground  a 
league  back  from  the  frontier,  in  such  manner  that  the  fires  were  not 
perceived  by  the  enemy,”  say  the  Memoirs. 

“ The  army  is  fine  and  the  weather  very  good.  The  coun- 
try is  perfectly  suited,”  Napoleon  wrote  Joseph  next  day ; 
and  to  Davout,  in  the  morning : “ I shall  pass  the  Sambre 
to-morrow,  the  15th.  If  the  Prussians  do  not  vacate  it,  I shall 
have  a battle.  As  a last  instruction,  Suchet  is  to  defend 
Lyons,  the  Saone  and  the  Rhone.  Rapp  is  to  defend  Alsatia 
as  long  as  possible,  then  the  Yosges,  then  the  Meurthe,  finally 
the  Meuse,  Marne,  etc.” 

On  June  14  the  emperor  issued  a proclamation 

TO  THE  ARMY. 

Soldiers,  to-day  is  the  anniversary  of  Marengo  and  Friedland,  which 
twice  decided  the  destiny  of  Europe.  Then,  as  after  Austerlitz,  as  after 
Wagram,  we  were  too  generous.  We  believed  the  protestations  and  the 
oaths  of  the  princes  we  left  upon  the  throne.  To-day,  in  coalition  against 
us,  they  threaten  the  independence  and  the  most  sacred  rights  of  France. 

. . . Soldiers,  at  Jena,  against  these  same  Prussians,  so  arrogant  to-day, 
you  were  one  against  three,  at  Montmirail  one  against  six.  . . . For  every 
Frenchman  who  has  heart,  the  moment  has  arrived  to  vanquish  or  to 
perish. 

Napoleon  could  feel  satisfied  with  his  operation : so  well 
had  he  managed  that  his  whole  army  by  June  14  had  been 
drawn  in  from  along  the  frontier  and  assembled  south  of 
Charleroi,  ready  to  cross  the  Sambre,  Reille  and  Erlon  on 
the  left,  Yandamme  and  Lobau  with  the  Guard  in  the  centre, 
and  Gerard  on  the  right.  Charleroi  was  the  main  objective, 
but  the  right  and  left  were  to  cross  above  or  below.  His 
opening  had  been  exquisite.  Four  corps  stationed  on  the 
Belgian  frontier,  and  so  masked  as  to  be  unperceived  by  the 
enemy,  were  drawn  in  from  a front  of  twenty  miles,  assem- 
bled back  of  Charleroi  on  a front  of  six,  a fifth  corps  came 


544 


TO  CATCH  Z IE  THEN  UNAWARES. 


up  from  the  Aisne,  the  Guard  moved  from  Paris ; and  under 
cover  of  a diversion  towards  Mons  and  Tournay  by  the  Na- 
tional Guard,  as  if  to  turn  the  British  right,  one  hundred 
and  twenty-five  thousand  men  gathered  in  front  of  the  allies 
without  their  having  any  but  remote  news  of  the  manoeuvre. 
The  emperor  proposed  to  catch  Ziethen  unawares,  and 
promptly  to  seize  Quatre  Bras  and  Sombreffe. 

Orders  were  accordingly  issued  on  the  14th  for  the  French 
army  to  break  up  at  3 A.  M.  on  the  15th : “ the  object  of  His 
Majesty  is  to  have  crossed  the  Sambre  before  noon  : ” — 

Beaumont,  June  14.  Order  of  March.  Vandamme’s  light  cavalry  was 
to  move  towards  Charleroi  at  2.30  A.  m.,  to  scout  the  country,  in  parties 
of  not  less  than  fifty  men  each,  Pajol  to  follow  them  up.  In  each  corps 
the  reveilld  to  sound  a half  hour  before  the  march.  Vandamme  to  march 
at  3 A.  M.  on  Charleroi.  Lobau  to  march  at  4 to  sustain  Vandamme. 
The  Young  Guard  to  march  at  5 behind  Lobau.  The  foot  chasseurs  of 
the  Guard  to  march  at  5.30  to  follow  the  Young  Guard.  The  foot  grena- 
diers of  the  Guard  to  leave  at  6.  Grouchy’s  cavalry  to  start  at  5.30,  with 
the  three  corps  an  hour  apart  on  lateral  roads.  Reille  to  march  at  3 
on  Marchienne,  so  as  to  be  there  before  9.  Erlon  to  march  at  3 o’clock 
. . . following  Reille,  sustaining  his  left,  to  place  a division  in  Thuin,  and 
repair  the  bridge  if  broken  Gdrard  to  move  from  Philippeville  to  Char- 
leroi at  3 A.  m.,  if  his  troops  had  been  assembled.  Reille,  Vandamme, 
Gerard  and  Pajol  to  keep  in  constant  communication.  The  cavalry  of 
the  Guard  to  leave  at  8 A.  m.  towards  Charleroi.  The  emperor  at  the 
vanguard.  The  pontoons  in  two  sections,  one  in  front  and  one  with  the 
reserve.  The  headquarters  train  to  move  at  10  a.  m.  The  ambulances 
to  be  at  the  head  of  the  general  train.  No  wagons  to  be  in  the  columns 
of  troops,  on  pain  of  being  burned. 

Before  daylight,  June  15,  Napoleon  wrote  to  Joseph  : “ As  the  enemy 
has  made  movements  to  attack  us,  I am  marching  to  meet  him.  Hostili- 
ties will  begin  to-day.” 

The  emperor  was  at  the  head  of  the  centre. 

Owing  to  an  accident  to  the  courier,  Vandamme’s  orders 
were  delayed  and  his  corps  did  not  start  until  7 A.M.,  — a most 


THE  PRUSSIANS  PUSHED  BACK. 


545 


regrettable  delay.  The  order  of  march  was  broken,  and  Pajol’s 
cavalry  was  followed  by  the  Young  Guard.  Still,  the  enemy 
was  pushed  back,  and  the  bridge  having  been  only  damaged 
by  Ziethen, — curiously,  he  destroyed  none  of  the  important 
ones,  — it  was  carried  by  the  marines  and  sappers  of  the 
Guard,  and  Pajol  entered  Charleroi  at  noon.  Here  a halt 
was  made  to  let  Vandamme  come  up.  This  was  the  first  loss 
of  time  in  the  campaign,  and  one  result  was  that  the  work 
of  the  15th  was  only  partly  accomplished.  Pircli  II.  retired 
towards  Gilly,  followed  by  Pajol;  here  he  stood  and  contained 
Vandamme  and  Grouchy,  who  lost  three  hours,  from  the  idea 
that  they  had  a large  force  in  their  front,  until  the  emperor 
came  up  at  5 P.  M.  and  pushed  the  Prussians  back  along  the 
Gembloux  road.  Thus  the  centre  sustained  by  the  Guard 
was  by  evening  echeloned  along  the  road  between  Charleroi 
and  Fleurus,  which  latter  place  Ziethen  occupied.  Had  the 
French  on  the  march  to  and  across  the  Sambre  bivouacked 
in  order  of  battle  rather  than  in  order  of  march,  they  would 
have  kept  better  in  hand  for  the  work  of  both  the  15th  and 
16th.  So  much  for  the  centre. 

On  the  left  Reille  started  early  from  Leers,  moved  up  the 
river,  and  occupied  all  the  bridges  to  Marchienne,  where  he 
crossed  and  obliqued  forward  to  Jumet,  Stein rnetz,  on  Zie- 
then’s  right,  retiring  from  Fontaine  l’Eveque  towards  St. 
Amand  through  Gosselies,  followed  by  Clary  and  Lefebvre. 
At  Gosselies,  at  5 p.  m.,  Ney  took  command,  and  advancing 
with  Bachelu,  preceded  by  Pire,  on  Frasnes,  drove  from  the 
place,  late  in  the  afternoon,  some  of  Prince  Bernard’s  out- 
lying posts,  which  retired  to  Quatre  Bras,  already  held  by  his 
brigade.  Ziethen’s  right  wing  Prussians  retired  on  Fleurus, 
followed  by  Girard.  Jerome  and  Foy  remained  at  Gosselies. 
Beille  had  done  good  work.  Not  so  Erlon,  who  followed  an 
hour  late.  As  in  the  Pampeluna  campaign,  he  lacked  prompt- 


VOL.  IV. 


546 


WORSE  THAN  DELAY. 


ness.  He  had  farther  to  go,  but  no  fighting  to  do,  and  at  night 
his  headquarters  was  at  Marchienne ; but  he  had  not  completed 
his  crossing,  nor  carried  out  his  orders  to  sustain  Reille. 
Gerard’s  crossing  was  changed  to  Chatelet,  and  was  made  later; 
but  at  night  most  of  his  forces  were  still  on  the  right  bank. 

The  emperor’s  purpose  to  throw  his  army  over  to  the  pla- 
teau at  Fleurus  and  to  seize  Quatre  Bras  and  Sombreffe  had 
not  been  realized.  The  advance  had  been  less  rapid  than 
of  yore ; the  several  parts  of  the  army  did  not  move  with- 
out friction,  as  they  had  used  to  do.  Soult’s  management 
was  not  Berthier’s  ; only  part  of  the  day’s  task  had  been 
accomplished. 

But  worse  than  delay  had  happened.  Late  on  June  14,  at 
the  opening  of  operations,  Bourmont,  who  knew  what  the 
emperor’s  dispositions  were  to  be  in  the  coming  few  days, 
with  two  other  superior  officers  of  the  4th  Corps,  went  over  to 
the  enemy.  Being  brought  before  Blucher,  the  latter  learned 
the  situation,  and  having  already  heard  of  a threatened 
movement  from  Dornberg,  commanding  an  English  cavalry 
brigade  near  Mons,  and  from  Ziethen,  who  had  had  parties 
across  the  river  to  observe  the  French  camp-fires,  he  was 
convinced  of  his  danger,  and  ordered  in  Billow  from  Li£ge, 
Thielemann  from  the  right  bank  of  the  Meuse,  to  assemble 
at  Namur,  and  Pirch  from  the  Namur  country  to  Sombreffe, 
hoping  to  sustain  Ziethen  in  season  to  carry  out  the  com- 
mon project  of  defense.  For  if  driven  back  from  the  right, 
Ziethen  had  orders  to  hold  Fleurus,  and  the  other  corps  to 
concentrate  at  Sombreffe  in  support.  Blucher  placed  more 
importance  on  this  point  than  Wellington  did  on  Quatre  Bras. 
Thus,  early  on  the  15th,  movements  on  the  Prussian  and 
French  side  began,  while  the  Anglo-Dutch  were  quietly  resting 
in  their  cantonments,  Wellington’s  staff  having  managed  to  get 
no  news  of  the  advance  of  the  French  sent  to  headquarters. 


NEY  IN  COMMAND  OF  THE  LEFT  WING.  547 


“ The  character  of  the  enemy’s  generals-in-chief  was  different,”  said 
Napoleon  at  St.  Helena.  “ The  hussar  habits  of  Blucher,  his  activity  and 
hazardous  character  contrast  with  the  circumspect  character  and  the 
slow  marches  of  Wellington.  If  the  Prusso-Saxon  army  was  not  first 
attacked,  it  would  put  more  activity  and  good-will  in  running  to  the  aid 
of  the  Anglo-Dutch  army  than  this  would  put  to  aiding  Blucher.” 

All  Napoleon’s  measures  which  had  for  aim  first  to  attack 
the  Prussians  were  bearing  fruit. 

Although  the  work  of  the  day  had  not  been  completed,  yet 
Napoleon  had  won  the  first  innings,  and  had,  in  the  face  of 
the  enemy,  crossed  the  Sambre.  As,  just  north  of  Charleroi, 
the  emperor  had  stood  at  the  junction  of  the  Brussels  and 
Liege  roads,  he  had  been  joined  by  Ney,  and  to  his  old  com- 
bative comrade  he  had  given  the  command  of  the  left  wing. 

As  we  are  told  by  the  Due  d’Elchingen  in  his  Documents  Inddits,  the 
emperor  said  to  Ney:  “ You  will  take  over  the  command  of  the  1st  and 
2d  infantry  corps.  Beille  is  marching  with  three  divisions  on  Gosselies  ; 
Erlon  is  to  be  by  night  at  Marchienne-au-Pont;  you  will  have  with  you 
Pirn’s  light  cavalry  division  ; I also  give  you  the  two  regiments  of  hus- 
sars and  lancers  of  my  Guard,  but  do  not  use  them.  To-morrow  the 
heavy  cavalry  reserve  of  Kellermann  will  reach  you.  Go  and  drive  the 
enemy  back.”  This  evidence  is  of  the  same  value  as  that  of  the  emperor 
at  St.  Helena.  Each  witness  had  a case  to  prove.  “ Ney  had  just  ar- 
rived on  the  battlefield,”  says  the  St.  Helena  record.  “ The  emperor  at 
once  gave  him  orders  to  go  to  Gosselies  and  take  command  of  all  the  left 
. . . and  to  fall  headlong  on  all  that  he  should  meet  on  the  road  from 
Gosselies  to  Brussels,  to  take  position  astride  this  road  beyond  Quatre 
Bras,  and  to  hold  himself  there  in  a military  manner,  having  strong  van- 
guards on  the  roads  to  Brussels,  Namur  and  Nivelles.” 

When,  as  Chesney  says,  Napoleon  in  his  Memoirs  does 
not  contradict  himself,  is  not  contradicted  by  any  other  testi- 
mony, or  has  evidently  no  reason  for  distorting  the  facts,  his 
evidence  is  of  great  weight.  Here  he  is  contradicted,  and 
there  exists  no  proof  that  any  mention  was  made  of  Quatre 
Bras  in  the  first  verbal  order  to  Ney;  and  as  it  was  already 


548 


NEY  STOPS  HIS  ADVANCE. 


late,  the  marshal  can  scarcely  be  held  responsible  for  not 
moving  beyond  Frasnes.  He  may  not  have  understood  the 
importance  of  Quatre  Bras.  Had  he  pushed  on  the  couple  of 
miles  farther  and  occupied  this  cross-roads,  Wellington  could 
not  have  reached  Blucher,  the  two  allies  would  have  been 
separated,  and  prevented  from  uniting  except  by  a movement 
to  the  rear ; but  Ney  heard  firing  in  the  direction  of  Fleurus, 
Girard  reported  large  forces  there,  he  feared  for  his  right 
flank,  and  his  young  troops  being  tired  by  their  first  march  in 
the  presence  of  the  enemy,  he  stopped  his  advance  between 
Gosselies  and  Frasnes,  where  he  bivouacked,  merely  throwing 
a few  videttes  out  towards  Quatre  Bras,  which  was  held  by 
Prince  Bernard.  The  firing  he  had  heard  came  from  Van- 
damme  and  Grouchy,  who  were  following  Ziethen  towards 
Fleurus.  At  night  Ney  rode  back  to  imperial  headquarters 
at  Charleroi  to  get  further  instructions.  The  day  of  the  15th, 
which  would  have  been  perfect  had  both  Quatre  Bras  and 
Sotnbreffe  been  taken,  ended  without  seizing  either.  It  might 
be  claimed  that  it  was  too  far  for  the  young  troops  to  march. 
But  a part  of  the  foot  did  get  within  a mile  or  two  of  Quatre 
Bras,  and  Sombreffe  was  no  farther.  Had  everything  gone 
properly,  Ziethen  could  well  have  been  pushed  back,  and  the 
troops  have  made  the  ten  miles  from  Charleroi. 

On  the  evening  of  June  15  Pire’s  cavalry  and  Bachelu  oc- 
cupied Frasnes,  Jerome  and  Foy  Gosselies,  Girard  had  moved 
up  to  the  right  and  was  at  Wangenies  near  Grouchy,  Erlon 
had  crossed  the  river.  Vandamme  and  Lobau  were  on  the 
Fleurus  road,  the  Guard  in  Charleroi  with  some  cavalry  still 
on  the  right  bank.  Gerard  had  not  yet  crossed  at  Chatelet. 

“ The  French  army  bivouacked  in  a square  of  four  leagues  each  side. 
It  was  equally  able  to  move  against  the  Prusso-Saxon  or  the  Anglo-Dutch 
army.  It  was  already  placed  between  them.  The  two  armies  were 
surprised,  their  communications  much  disturbed.  All  the  manoeuvres  of 


NIVELLES  THE  BETTER  PLACE . 


549 


the  emperor  had  succeeded  properly.  He  was  now  master  to  attack  in 
detail  the  enemy’s  armies.  There  remained  to  them,  to  avoid  this  disas- 
ter, which  was  the  greatest  of  all,  only  to  cede  the  ground  and  to  rejoin 
at  Brussels  and  beyond  it.”  This  claim  is  exaggerated,  and  fails  to  chime 
with  other  statements  in  the  Memoirs. 

What  had  the  Anglo-Dutch  been  doing?  Early  June  15 
the  Prince  of  Orange,  riding  his  outposts,  had  heard  firing  at 
Thuin,  and  with  the  information  had  returned  to  Brussels, 
where  he  was  to  attend  the  now  famous  Duchess  of  Rich- 
mond’s ball.  At  headquarters  information  had  run  in  from 
Blucher  that  a French  advance  was  more  likely  by  way  of 
Charleroi  than  Moris,  and  during  the  afternoon  Wellington 
had  prepared  orders  for  the  troops  to  be  grouped  in  their 
respective  localities  in  readiness  to  march.  These  orders  con- 
sumed much  time  for  issue  and  delivery.  About  10  p.  M., 
upon  further  news  from  Blucher  that  the  French  had  entered 
Charleroi  and  were  moving  on  a broad  front  towards  Brussels, 
Wellington  ordered  a general  movement  of  assembly  to  the 
eastward,  — on  Nivelles,  Braine  and  Enghien.  The  orders 
issued  on  the  15th  and  16tli  look  as  if  the  original  intention 
to  concentrate  at  Quatre  Bras  had  gone  lost;  Wellington 
now  seemed  to  consider  Nivelles  the  better  place,  as  Napoleon 
asserts  it  had  been  his  effort  to  impress  upon  him,  by  the 
diversions  from  the  frontier  fortresses. 

But  while,  during  the  15th,  the  British  had  remained 
quietly  in  place,  Prince  Bernard’s  brigade,  cantoned  in  the 
Genappe-Frasnes  region,  had  pushed  parties  out  towards  the 
Sambre.  So  soon  as  the  first  outpost  shot  fell,  and  before 
receiving  orders  to  that  effect,  he  judiciously  assembled  at 
Quatre  Bras;  and  when  at  Frasnes  his  outlying  party  was 
attacked  by  Reille,  the  Prince  of  Orange’s  chief  of  staff, 
Rebecque,  ordered  Perponcher  also  forward  to  Quatre  Bras. 
Wellington  had  already  instructed  Orange  to  assemble  two 


550 


BARON  FAIN  TO  JOSEPH. 


divisions  at  Nivelles,  and  a fresh  order  to  Perponcher  to  move 
there  followed  the  first ; but  aware  that  all  the  conditions 
would  not  be  known  at  British  headquarters,  Orange  took 
the  responsibility  of  keeping  this  force  at  Quatre  Bras ; and 
early  next  morning  Bylandt’s  brigade  came  up.  It  thus  hap- 
pened that  Quatre  Bras  was  occupied  during  the  night  of 
June  15-16  in  contravention  of  Wellington’s  orders,  who  kept 
his  eye  on  Nivelles,  apparently  deeming  his  own  right  more 
endangered  than  Blucher’s  army. 

When  Napoleon  returned  from  the  front,  Baron  Fain  wrote  from 
Charleroi,  at  9 p.  m.,  to  Joseph  : “ Monseigneur,  it  is  nine  in  the  evening. 
The  emperor,  who  has  been  in  the  saddle  since  three  this  morning,  has 
come  back  quite  tired  out.  He  has  thrown  himself  on  his  bed  to  repose 
a few  hours.  He  is  to  mount  again  at  midnight.  As  His  Majesty  could 
not  write  to  Your  Highness,  he  charged  me  to  send  you  word  as  follows  : 
The  army  forced  the  Sambre  near  Charleroi  and  placed  the  vanguard 
half-way  from  Charleroi  to  Namur,  and  from  Charleroi  to  Brussels.  . . . 
It  is  possible  that  to-morrow  there  will  be  a very  important  affair.” 

When  Napoleon  crossed  the  Sambre  with  his  van,  and  sat 
down  on  the  edge  of  Charleroi  to  see  the  troops  file  by,  it  is 
said  he  soon  fell  asleep.  He  was  frequently  noticed  thus  to 
doze.  He  had  not  been  used  to  being  so  long  in  the  saddle, 
and  he  had  worked  hard  all  the  15th.  It  is  perhaps  a little 
thing  to  do,  but  it  is  an  indication  that  the  emperor  was  no 
longer  physically  equal  to  the  conduct  of  a very  difficult  mili- 
tary operation.  At  Ratisbon  in  1809  he  had  failed  to  pursue  ; 
in  1812  he  had  shown  signs  of  physical  weakness ; in  1818  he 
frequently  made  other  things  yield  to  his  personal  comfort ; 
in  1814  he  had  borne  up  against  the  desperate  conditions 
with  wonderful  vigor ; but  the  life  at  Elba  had  not  increased 
his  power  of  continuous  work.  He  had  long  had  some  kidney 
trouble  ; hemorrhoids  now  annoyed  him,  and  since  his  stay 
in  Fontainebleau  after  the  French  campaign,  he  had  suffered 


LITTLE  LAPSES  IN  TIME.  551 

from  still  another  disease,  says  Charras,  making  all  physical 
exertion,  and  especially  riding,  difficult  and  painful. 

“He  no  longer  subdued,  as  formerly,  distractions,  sleep,  fatigue.  His 
power  of  application  seemed  to  have  reached  its  limit,”  says  Constant. 
As  he  himself  said  of  Ney,  he  was  not  the  same  man.  “In  the  latter 
years  the  emperor  had  grown  fat,”  we  are  told  by  Foy;  “he  ate  more, 
slept  longer,  and  rode  less  ; but  he  retained  all  the  vigor  of  his  mind, 
and  his  passions  had  lost  little  of  their  strength.” 

He  no  longer  subordinated  his  bodily  ailments  to  the  de- 
mands of  the  occasion ; many  things  had  to  yield  to  his  own 
comfort.  Unlike  Frederick,  whose  activity  during  a severe 
attack  of  the  gout  and  its  accompanying  fever,  in  October, 
1759,  was  the  same  as  ever,  Napoleon  was  now  guilty,  at  the 
very  inception  of  the  campaign,  of  little  lapses  in  time,  the 
sum  of  which  during  the  coming  four  days  made  up  a tale  of 
neglect  that  ruined  an  operation  which  in  conception  and  open- 
ing is  equal  to  any  he  ever  conducted.  While  in  speed  and 
conduct  he  was  quite  equal  to  his  opponents,  this  did  not  suf- 
fice to  win  the  campaign  against  such  overwhelming  odds. 
At  St.  Helena  he  acknowledged  that  he  could  not  see  as 
clearly  or  work  as  actively : “ It  is  certain  that  I felt  con- 
scious that  something  had  gone  from  me.”  He  was  physically 
more  able  in  1814  than  in  1815.  Sir  W.  Napier  reports 
Soult  as  saying:  44 The  emperor  seemed  at  times  to  be  changed; 
there  were  moments  when  his  genius  and  activity  seemed  as 
powerful  and  fresh  as  ever ; at  other  moments  he  seemed 
apathetic.  For  example,  he  fought  the  battle  of  Waterloo 
without  having  himself  examined  the  enemy’s  position.  He 
trusted  to  General  Haxo’s  report.  In  former  days  he  would 
have  examined  and  reexamined  it  in  person.”  Such  a method 
would  not  work  against  as  prudent  a general  as  Wellington, 
or  as  enterprising  a leader  as  Blucher,  both  noteworthy  fight- 
ers, especially  as  the  army  at  his  back  was  no  longer  the  old 


552 


TWO  NOTEWORTHY  THINGS. 


invincible  body,  but  one  that  now  had  the  sad  traditions  of 
the  Beresina,  of  Leipsic,  of  a captured  Paris. 

In  the  Bulletin  of  the  Army,  Charleroi,  June  15,  evening, 
the  positions  of  the  14th  were  recapitulated,  and  it  goes  on  : 

“ The  15th,  at  3 A.  m.,  Reille  attacked  the  enemy  and  moved  to  Mar- 
chienne.  . . . Pajol  entered  Charleroi  at  noon.  . . . At  3 p.  m.  Vandamme 
debouched  at  Gilly.  Grouchy  came  up  with  Excelmans’  cavalry.  The 
enemy  occupied  the  left  of  the  position  of  Fleurus.  At  5 p.  m.  the  em- 
peror ordered  the  attack,  the  position  was  turned  and  carried.  . . . Mean- 
while Reille  was  crossing  at  Marchienne  to  move  on  Gosselies.  ...  We 
thus  became  masters  of  the  whole  position  of  Fleurus.  . . . The  emperor 
has  given  the  command  of  the  left  to  Ney,  who  had  his  headquarters  in 
the  evening  at  Quatre  Chemius  ” (Quatre  Bras)  “ on  the  road  to  Brus- 
sels. . . . Nothing  can  paint  the  good  spirit  and  ardor  of  the  army.” 

The  two  noteworthy  things  in  the  Bulletin,  which  was 
written  before  Ney  reached  Charleroi  about  midnight,  — pre- 
sumably by  Soult,  inspired  by  Napoleon, — are  the  statement 
that  the  marshal  was  at  Quatre  Bras  — as  if  the  emperor  had 
so  ordered  and  supposed  the  order  obeyed  — and  the  fact 
that  the  emperor  was  satisfied  with  the  day’s  work,  assuming 
Quatre  Bras  to  be  in  French  hands  and  Wellington  cut  off, 
while  he  felt  quite  able  to  contain  Blucher. 


Napoleon’s  Engraving  Rack. 


LXXII. 


LIGNY  AND  QUATRE  BRAS.  JUNE  16,  1815. 

Napoleon  had  surprised  the  allies.  Speed  was  needed  to  destroy  each  army 
singly.  Wellington  and  Blucher  had  planned  to  assist  each  other,  but  could  not 
assemble  in  season  Blucher  stood  at  Sombreffe,  expecting  Wellington’s  aid,  and 
by  summary  attack  Napoleon  was  sure  to  defeat  him  decisively  ; but  instead  of 
moving  at  an  early  hour,  it  was  noon  before  he  got  near  the  Prussian  position. 
He  was  indefinite  in  his  orders  to  Ney,  who  in  consequence  did  not  capture 
Quatre  Bras.  Napoleon’s  battle  plan  was  to  break  through  Blucher’s  centre, 
while  drawing  in  Erlon  from  Ney  to  take  him  in  reverse  and  destroy  his  right 
and  centre  ; but  owing  to  belated  orders,  this  failed  in  part.  In  the  battle,  which 
began  at  2.30  P.  m.,  Blucher’s  centre  was  broken,  but  Erlon  did  not  get  put  in, 
and  the  Prussians  retired  from  the  field,  beaten  but  not  broken  up.  Napoleon 
believed  that  he  bad  thrown  Blucher  off  towards  the  Rhine,  but  failed  to  pursue, 
or  even  to  take  means  to  ascertain  the  facts  The  Prussians  retired  to  a 
junction  with  the  Anglo-Dutch.  While  Ligny  was  being  fought,  Ney  had  been 
slow  in  assembling  his  troops,  and  had  not  moved  on  Quatre  Bras  as  early  as 
Napoleon  expected.  At  2 p.  M.  he  attacked  the  allies  there,  but  Wellington 
soon  came  on  the  field,  and  managed  his  forces  so  well  that  Ney,  who  had  in 
hand  but  half  his  infantry,  was  driven  back,  and  Wellington  kept  the  important 
position. 

After  being  driven  back  from  the  Sambre  by  the  French 
advance,  which  at  Gilly  and  Fleurus  he  delayed  in  an  effec- 
tive manner,  Ziethen  was  recalled  from  the  Fleurus  plateau 
during  the  night,  and  early  June  16  stood  behind  the  “ ravine” 
in  which  flows  the  brook  of  Ligny ; and  to  this  village  gradu- 
ally came  up  the  bulk  of  Pirch’s  and  Thielemann’s  corps, 
Billow’s  from  Liege  being  still  upon  the  road. 

For  some  weeks  the  allied  commanders  had  had  occasional 
consultations,  and,  although  the  records  afford  scant  infor- 
mation, it  is  fair  to  assume,  had  considered  all  the  probable 
directions  of  a French  advance.  As  careful  leaders  they  could 


554 


TO  RENDEZVOUS  AT  SOMBREFFE . 


not  have  done  less,  and  such  records  are  apt  to  disappear.  An 
attempt  to  break  through  the  centre  must  have  been  discussed 
as  one  of  the  manoeuvres  ; and  should  it  be  resorted  to  by 
Napoleon,  Wellington  and  Blucher  had  agreed  — as  it  is 
claimed  by  most  of  the  German  authorities,  and  as,  indeed, 
unless  they  fell  back,  was  the  proper  strategic  manoeuvre  — 
to  assemble  respectively  at  Quatre  Bras  and  Sombreffe,  or 
in  front  of  these  places,  from  which  points  they  could  so  co- 
operate as  to  make  valid  their  superiority  over  the  French.  If 
the  allied  leaders  left  the  method  of  assembly  to  the  impulse 
of  the  moment,  they  can  scarcely  be  said  to  have  acted  as  pru- 
dent or  intelligent  strategists.  Wellington  deemed  the  allied 
cantonments  as  they  stood  to  be  near  enough  for  the  two 
armies  to  act  together ; and  so  they  were,  unless  assailed  by 
a master  of  war  who  should  move  with  secrecy  and  speed 
greater  than  theirs.  It  was  with  the  purpose  of  fighting  to- 
gether, and  in  accordance  with  the  understanding  had,  that 
Blucher,  on  the  advance  of  Napoleon  across  the  Sambre,  issued 
his  orders  to  rendezvous  at  Sombreffe,  and  in  front  of  this 
place  drew  up  his  forces  as  they  successively  arrived. 

It  is  no  doubt  true,  not  only  that  Blucher  and  Wellington 
would  have  done  better  to  select  a point  of  joint  assembly 
farther  back,  or  else  to  have  been  cantoned  much  nearer 
the  Nivelles-Namur  road  at  this  time,  but  also  that  Blucher, 
in  selecting  Sombreffe,  under  the  existing  dissemination  of 
forces,  as  a point  to  assemble  his  own  corps,  violated  that  es- 
sential maxim  of  Napoleon’s,  to  concentrate  for  approaching 
battle  at  a point  out  of  possible  reach  of  the  enemy.  While 
cooperation  between  the  two  armies  must  have  been  of  the 
essence  of  all  plans  discussed,  yet  Blucher  took  up  his  posi- 
tion without  any  written  assurance  which  has  been  found  that 
Wellington  would  there  sustain  him,  although  he  did  receive 
a dispatch  from  Muffling  stating  that  Wellington  would  be 


NOT  ONLY  STRATEGICAL  BUT  TACTICAL.  555 


at  Nivelles  at  ten  o’clock  with  a large  body,  as  the  English 
leader  assumed  that  he  would  be  able  to  do.  Even  if  Well- 
ington had  told  Blucher  that  he  could  not  aid  him,  it  is  not 
certain  that  the  Prussian  marshal  would  haVe  moved  to  the 
rear  instead  of  fighting  at  Ligny,  for  Blucher’ s position  in 
front  of  the  chaussee  was  taken,  not  only  that  he  might  reach 
out  his  right  to  the  Anglo-Dutch,  but  partly  that  Biilow 
might  promptly  come  up  from  Liege  to  his  aid.  Yet  this 
latter  was  not  a vital  point,  for  the  many  available  roads 
would  enable  Biilow  to  march  towards  any  place  at  which  his 
chief  might  choose  to  concentrate.  Blucher’s  action  tends  to 
prove  his  view  of  the  understanding;  and  although  Welling- 
ton’s divisions  in  the  event  did  not  come  up  in  season  to  aid 
the  Prussian  army  to  maintain  itself,  yet  to  do  this  was 
strategic  common  sense,  and  mistaken  as  he  was  as  to  what 
he  could  perform,  Wellington  expected  and  strove  to  accom- 
plish this  end.  The  helpful  intention  of  both  leaders  is  ac- 
knowledged in  more  than  one  way. 

To  be  effective,  cooperation  between  two  armies  must  be 
not  only  strategical  but  tactical.  Wellington’s  presence  at 
Nivelles,  and  Blucher’s  at  say  Gembloux,  would  have  been 
only  a strategical  cooperation  ; it  might  suffice  to  prevent  any 
but  a bold  commander’s  attacking  either,  lest  the  other  should 
meanwhile  fall  upon  his  flank  or  rear ; but  with  Napoleon’s 
well-known  audacity,  secrecy  and  speed,  neither  of  those  po- 
sitions sufficed.  Unless  they  proposed  battle  much  farther  in 
the  rear,  each  commander  should  have  been  at  the  points 
indicated  — Quatre  Bras  and  Sombreffe  — in  force,  and  in 
season  to  enable  him  to  put  his  divisions  into  the  actually 
ensuing  battle;  and  for  this  purpose,  the  English  army  was 
far  too  dispersed  to  get  up  in  season.  Wellington  had  been 
considering  his  right  flank  and  his  communications  rather 
than  the  combinations  of  the  campaign  ; the  oncoming  of  the 


556  NEITHER  ALLIED  COMMANDER  READY. 


French  was  so  rapid  that  he  could  not  assemble  more  than  a 
handful  beyond  Nivelles  ; and  this  was  a point  quite  out  of 
the  question  if  he  was  tactically  to  cooperate  with  the  Prus- 
sians ; because,  if  Blucher  were  contained,  Napoleon  by  an 
advance  in  force  on  Quatre  Bras  could  cut  the  two  asunder. 
Wellington  could  scarcely  have  better  forwarded  Napoleon’s 
plans  than  by  assembling  at  Hal  and  Nivelles. 

Although  neither  key-point  had  been  seized  by  the  French 
on  the  15th,  everything  looked  favorably  for  them.  Blucher 
stood  where,  as  he  believed,  he  had  agreed  to  stand,  and  was 
just  where  Napoleon  could  strike  him  single-handed,  — unless, 
as  the  emperor  feared,  he  should  promptly  retreat;  Well- 
ington was  so  much  spread,  and  received  his  news  so  slowly, 
that  he  had  not  time  fully  to  do  his  part.  Blucher  was  des- 
tined, as  Napoleon  had  rightly  calculated,  to  bear  the  brunt 
of  the  first  battle  alone. 

Had  the  allied  commanders  both  been  ready,  there  was 
no  better  place  to  fight  a battle  than  in  front  of  Quatre  Bras 
and  Sombreffe,  because  between  them  they  so  largely  outnum- 
bered the  French  that  each  could  easily  lend  the  other  a 
hand.  Should  Napoleon  attack  Blucher’s  right  to  cut  him 
off  from  Wellington,  the  latter  could  fall  on  the  French  left; 
should  he  attack  Blucher’s  left,  he  would  drive  the  two  allies 
together  to  fight  in  one  body;  should  he  turn  Wellington’s 
right,  Blucher  could  either  seize  his  communications  or  march 
to  Wellington’s  assistance  ; should  he  attack  Quatre  Bras,  he 
had  Blucher  upon  his  right  rear.  The  time  to  fight  the  battle 
of  the  campaign  was  before  either  of  the  allies  was  injured 
by  a single-handed  action  with  the  whole  French  army;  but 
neither  was  quite  ready,  though  the  Prussians  were  far  the 
more  so. 

To  allege  that  Wellington  remained  near  Nivelles  and  Hal 
out  of  nervousness  for  his  right  flank  is  not  to  state  the  whole 


WELLINGTON'S  MIND  SET  ON  NIVELLES.  557 


case.  He  had  kept  his  eye  out  for  an  advance  from  Mons, 
which  Napoleon  had  made  diversions  to  simulate,  and  he  was 
unquestionably  late  in  bringing  his  forces  to  Quatre  Bras ; 
but  this  was  rather  from  surprise  at  the  sudden  onset,  his 
failure  to  divine  Napoleon's  project,  and  the  dissemination  of 
his  troops,  than  from  indifference  as  to  the  amount  of  help 
he  was  to  afford  Blucher ; he  exhibited  in  every  way  a desire 
to  aid  the  Prussians,  so  far  as  he  understood  the  problem,  and 
could  see  his  way  clear  to  do  so.  Yet  it  is  puzzling  to  find 
him  order  the  first  concentration  on  Nivelles,  which  could  not 
possibly  have  aided  Blucher  in  season,  and  which  might  have 
placed  his  own  army  in  a situation  where  Blucher  could  not 
aid  him  ; and  the  English  needed  Blucher  quite  as  much  as 
he  did  them.  It  might  be  suggested  that  Wellington  chose 
Nivelles  as  a point  of  assembly  out  of  reach  of  the  enemy,  so 
as  thence  to  march  to  Quatre  Bras  ; but  he  certainly  was  not 
as  strategically  resourceful  as  Blucher  with  Gneisenau  at  his 
side.  Wellington  knew  before  midnight  of  June  15  that  Na- 
poleon was  advancing  in  front  of  the  Prussians,  and  Quatre 
Bras  was  clearly  the  spot  where  he  ought  to  assemble,  even 
without  a definite  agreement ; but  his  mind  was  set  on  Nivelles, 
and  only  Prince  Bernard’s  alert  intelligence  and  Ney’s  slow- 
ness saved  Quatre  Bras  for  the  allies. 

With  regard  to  the  broad  strategical  scheme  of  the  allies, 
it  was  Napoleon’s  opinion  that  at  this  late  moment  neither 
should  Blucher  have  assembled  at  Sombreffe,  nor  Wellington 
at  Quatre  Bras,  but  that  in  view  of  their  dangerously  spread 
cantonments,  and  of  their  knowledge  of  a French  concentra- 
tion south  of  the  Sambre,  they  should  have  selected  a point 
farther  back,  so  as  to  gain  time  to  prepare  for  his  onset. 
This  opens  another  question  and  one  of  much  interest ; but 
the  one  before  us  is  merely  what  Wellington  should  have 
done,  in  view  of  the  fact  that  Blucher,  in  accordance  with  his 


558 


WELLINGTON  TO  BLUCHER. 


view  of  the  agreement,  was  assembling  at  Sombreffe ; this 
being  so,  Quatre  Bras  was  the  only  place  for  him,  unless  he 
was  to  leave  Blucher  to  fight  alone. 

Indeed,  Wellington  himself  was  in  grave  danger  on  J une  16 ; 
for  had  Napoleon  decided  to  mask  Blucher,  and,  relying  upon 
his  waiting  for  all  his  troops  to  come  up,  turned  on  Welling- 
ton, he  would  have  caught  the  latter  in  poor  condition  for 
resisting  the  blow  of  a force  equal  to  his  own.  The  duke 
could  scarcely  have  got  sufficient  troops  assembled  to  the  rear 
to  prevent  being  disastrously  beaten  in  detail. 

It  was  early  in  the  morning  of  the  16th  that  Wellington 
finally  ordered  a concentration  forward  on  Quatre  Bras,  and 
he  himself  and  many  of  his  staff,  after  attending  the  Brus- 
sels ball,  mounted  and  rode  to  Quatre  Bras,  reaching  the 
place  about  10  a.  m.  A “ Disposition  of  the  British  Army  at 
7 A.  M.,  16th  June,”  had  been  prepared  for  him  by  his  staff, 
but  it  was  full  of  errors,  and  stated  the  position  of  troops, 
and  suggested  by  implication  their  direction  and  arrival,  in  a 
quite  mistaken  manner.  With  this  in  hand  Wellington  wrote 
Blucher : — 

On  the  Heights  behind  Frasnes  : 
June  16,  1815,  10.30  a.  m. 

My  Dear  Prince  : 

My  army  is  situated  as  follows  : — 

The  Corps  d’Armee  of  the  Prince  of  Orange  has  a division  here  and  at 
Quatre  Bras,  and  the  rest  at  Nivelles. 

The  Reserve  is  in  march  from  Waterloo  to  Genappe,  where  it  will 
arrive  at  noon. 

The  English  Cavalry  will  be  at  the  same  hour  at  Nivelles. 

The  Corps  of  Lord  Hill  is  at  Braine-le-Comte. 

I do  not  see  any  large  force  of  the  enemy  in  front  of  us,  and  I await 
news  from  Your  Highness  and  the  arrival  of  troops  in  order  to  determine 
my  operation  for  the  day. 

Nothing  has  been  seen  on  the  side  of  Binche,  nor  on  our  right. 

Your  very  obedient  servant, 


Wellington. 


BLUCHER  MISLED. 


559 


This  letter  was  evidently  founded  on  the  Disposition ; 
Wellington  had  manifestly  not  kept  in  his  mind,  as  Napoleon 
was  wont  closely  to  do,  the  location  of  his  troops.  About 
noon  he  rode  to  Brye  to  consult  with  Blucher.  The  latter 
urged  him  to  march  part  of  his  forces  towards  his  position, 
but  Wellington  was  unwilling  to  uncover  his  communications 
by  any  large  detachment ; he  proposed  a diversion  from  Quatre 
Bras  on  Frasnes  and  Gosselies,  so  as  to  take  the  French  in 
flank  and  rear  and  threaten  their  retreat  on  Charleroi,  while 
Blucher  sustained  their  attack  in  front;  and  he  apparently 
expected  many  more  of  his  troops  to  reach  Quatre  Bras  than 
could  possibly  do  so.  Hamley  asserts  that  44  the  duke  pro- 
posed to  concentrate  a sufficient  force  as  soon  as  possible  at 

Quatre  Bras,  march  it  upon  Frasnes  and  Gosselies,  and  from 

* 

thence  operate  against  the  enemy’s  flank  and  rear.  How- 
ever, on  calculating  the  time  that  must  necessarily  elapse  before 
this  sufficient  force  could  be  concentrated,  and  finding  that 
Blucher  might  be  defeated  in  the  interval,  it  was  agreed  that, 
in  order  to  save  time,  the  duke  should  move  this  supporting 
force  down  the  Namur  road  and  thus  come  directly  to  the 
aid  of  his  colleague.”  In  his  letter  and  interview  Welling- 
ton must  seriously,  if  unwittingly,  have  misled  Blucher.  If 
he  agreed  to  come  up  along  the  Namur  chaussee  to  Blucher’s 
tactical  aid,  it  was  not  long  before  he  ascertained  that  it 
would  not  be  possible  for  him  to  keep  his  promise.  The 
facts,  like  hundreds  of  others  of  these  days,  are  not  clear. 

It  should  be  pointed  out  that  not  only  was  the  British 
commander  lacking  in  his  knowledge  of  the  whereabouts  of 
his  divisions,  but  information  was  sent  to  him  far  from 
promptly.  He  had  not  been  notified  of  the  early  daylight 
attack  of  the  15th  on  the  Prussian  lines  at  Thuin  until 
3 P.  M. ; and  although  the  French  main  army  was  in  Charleroi 
at  noon,  the  duke  only  learned  at  10  p.  M.  that  the  enemy 


560 


PREPARED  TO  STAND . 


was  even  threatening  the  place.  He  should  have  had  news 
from  both  Mons  and  Charleroi  during  the  afternoon,  where- 
upon he  could  order  his  concentration  at  Quatre  Bras.  After 
Napoleon  was  known  to  be  afield,  if  Wellington  was  to  retain 
his  headquarters  at  Brussels,  with  the  purpose  of  fighting  near 
the  Namur  road,  it  would  seem  as  if  he  should  have  devised 
some  means  of  getting  information  more  quickly. 

At  the  Prussian  headquarters  there  was  but  one  purpose, 
— to  stand  and  fight  the  French.  Blucher’s  own  views  did 
not  cover  every  phase  of  the  situation,  but  he  had  Gneisenau 
at  his  elbow  ; and  no  one  ever  denied  the  fine  old  hero  the 
readiness  to  meet  his  foe  and  cross  swords  with  him,  whether 
wisely  or  not.  He  was  now  prepared  to  stand,  in  the  belief 
that  help  was  at  hand. 

From  Napoleon’s  standpoint,  the  situation  was  one  which 
could  not  last  long.  He  had  created  one  of  those  combina- 
tions which  must  be  seized  at  the  instant  and  made  the  most 
of ; and  a delay  of  a few  hours  might  enable  W ellington  to 
gather  his  forces  and  come  to  Blucher’s  support,  or  Blucher 
might  retire  to  seek  it.  In  either  case,  the  chance  would  go 
lost.  It  being  his  own  conception,  Napoleon  saw  the  problem 
with  the  utmost  clearness,  and  it  is  probable  that  neither 
Wellington  nor  Blucher  did  so.  The  15th  of  June  should 
have  seen  the  emperor  firmly  planted  at  both  Quatre  Bras 
and  Sombreffe : it  would  have  seen  the  Consul  Bonaparte 
at  both  places,  just  as  in  1796  he  had  seized  both  Dego  and 
Millesimo  in  season.  Time  was  of  the  essence,  and  yet  one 
little  thing  after  another  ate  up  the  hours  which  should  have 
been  given  to  the  immediate  strategic  operations.  At  St. 
Helena  he  reproached  Ney  with  not  having  on  the  15th  estab- 
lished himself  at  Quatre  Bras,  but  he  forgot  that  he  himself 
was  equally  bound  to  take  Sombreffe,  as  by  an  immediate 
advance  he  could  have  done.  Both  points  taken,  and  at  once, 


PRICELESS  MORNING  HOURS  LOST. 


561 


solved  the  manoeuvre ; to  delay  the  advance  was  risking  its 
success ; to  take  one  alone  and  afford  any  time  to  the  allied 
armies  enabled  them  to  seize  whatever  was  at  the  one  point 
as  in  a vise  between  them. 

All  this  is  apart  from  the  question  whether,  by  seizing 
Quatre  Bras  and  Sombreffe,  the  emperor  would  drive  Well- 
ington and  Blucher  into  retreat  to  a point  of  assembly  in  the 
rear.  This  was  one  of  the  chances  that  had  to  be  run,  but 
his  hope  was  that  Blucher  would  stand  and  fight  at  Som- 
breffe, perhaps  that  he  could  force  him  to  do  so,  if  unwilling. 
In  any  case,  the  plan  was  such  as  to  separate  the  allies,  what- 
ever might  be  the  result. 

If  both  these  key-points  were  not  taken  on  the  15th,  at 
least  all  preparations  should  have  been  completed  on  that  day, 
so  that  at  break  of  day  of  the  16  th  the  blow  might  be  given 
at  both.  There  is  no  doubt  that  by  midnight  Napoleon  knew 
enough  to  authorize  him,  if  he  were  in  his  old  condition,  to 
order  the  troops  forward  at  daylight.  He  could  have  advanced 
Reille  on  Quatre  Bras,  Erlon  beyond  Gosselies,  Gerard  and 
the  Guard  on  Fleurus,  and  Lobau  to  a centre  point,  say 
Wangenies.  He  would  then  have  been  ready  for  whatever 
happened.  Yet  the  16th  came,  and  it  was  between  eight  and 
nine  o’clock  before  Napoleon’s  orders  went  out,  giving  his 
subordinates  their  respectives  cues.  The  priceless  morning 
hours  had  gone  lost. 

The  delays  of  the  16th  were  due  largely  to  those  of  the 
15th  ; yet  although  Napoleon  had  to  get  his  army  across  the 
Sambre  and  in  hand  before  giving  battle  to  Blucher,  he  had 
troops  enough  together  to  brush  away  anything  in  his  front, 
and  seize  the  two  strategic  points  preparatory  to  battle.  He 
had  often  snatched  victory  by  moving  forward  with  part  of  his 
troops.  It  is  easy  to  excuse  him  by  saying  that  he  marched 
faster  than  either  of  his  opponents  would  do,  and  that  he 


VOL.  IV. 


562  PREPARED  FOR  EITHER  CONTINGENCY. 


was  justified  in  taking  no  action  until  all  liis  forces  were  as- 
sembled ; but  this,  as  has  been  pointed  out  in  previous  cases, 
is  to  try  Napoleon  by  the  old  fashioned  habits  of  centuries 
before,  where  armies  made  a manoeuvre  and  then  sat  down  to 
smile  upon  it,  as  if  it  were  a move  on  a chessboard,  and  would 
puzzle  the  opponent.  Napoleon  can  be  measured  only  by 
himself ; we  are  striving  to  gauge  his  present  ability  as  com- 
pared with  that  of  years  before ; and  according  to  his  own  - 
standard,  he  was  far  from  being  as  rapid  in  his  manoeuvres 
as  the  circumstances  demanded. 

From  the  orders  issued  at  the  time,  it  is  clear  that  Napoleon 
had  long  purposed  promptly  to  seize  both  Quatre  Bras  and 
Sombreffe,  — whether  on  the  15th  or  not  might  be  disputed, 
— so  as  to  throw  Blucher  back  on  Liege  and  Wellington  back 
on  Brussels ; and  for  a moment  his  idea  was  that  Blucher 
would  retire  and  he  himself  turn  on  Wellington.  These 
orders  were  not  the  conception  of  a moment.  When,  at  St. 
Helena,  he  said  that  he  was  careful  not  to  occupy  Sombreffe, 
his  recollection  was  accentuated  by  the  same  tactical  influ- 
ences that  prevailed  with  him  at  the  battle  of  Borodino. 
There  he  declined  to  push  too  strong  a column  round  the 
Russians’  left,  lest  it  should  induce  them  again  to  retreat,  when 
he  wished  them  to  stand  for  battle.  He  now  wanted  Blucher 
to  accept  battle ; but  it  was  of  higher  importance  to  separate 
him  from  Wellington,  and  he  would  have  been  satisfied  if  he 
only  drove  him  back  on  Liege,  where  a corps  could  contain 
him,  and  permit  the  main  army  to  turn  on  the  Anglo-Dutch. 
The  probabilities  were  that  a seizure  of  Sombreffe  would  ac- 
complish this,  as  it  also  might  induce  Blucher  to  do  battle  to 
keep  open  his  communications  with  his  colleague ; for  Mar- 
schall  Vorwiirts  never  feared  a fight.  Napoleon  prepared  for 
either  contingency. 

It  was  getting  towards  8 a.  m.  of  June  16,  when,  from 


THE  EMPEROR  TO  NEY.  563 

Charleroi,  the  emperor  wrote  to  Ney  by  his  aide-de-camp, 
Flahault : — 

“ You  will  receive  the  order  of  march  of  the  day,  but  I wish  to  write 
to  you  about  it  in  detail,  because  it  is  of  the  highest  importance.  I send 
Grouchy  with  the  3d  and  4th  infantry  corps  on  Sombreffe.  I move  my 
Guard  to  Fleurus,  and  shall  be  there  personally  before  midday.  I will 
attack  the  enemy  there  if  I meet  him,  and  I will  scout  the  road  as  far  as 
Gembloux.  There,  according  to  what  occurs,  I will  make  up  my  mind, 
perhaps  at  three  o’clock  this  afternoon,  perhaps  in  the  evening.  My 
intention  is  that  immediately  after  I shall  have  made  up  my  mind,  you 
shall  be  ready  to  march  on  Brussels.  I will  sustain  you  with  the  Guard, 
which  will  be  at  Fleurus  or  Sombreffe,  and  I should  like  to  arrive  in 
Brussels  to-morrow  morning.  You  would  start  on  the  march  this  even- 
ing, if  I make  up  my  mind  early  enough  so  that  you  could  be  informed 
of  it  by  daylight,  and  could  make  this  evening  three  or  four  leagues,  and 
be  to-morrow  at  seven  o’clock  in  the  morning  at  Brussels.  You  can 
therefore  dispose  your  troops  in  the  following  manner:  1st  division  two 
leagues  in  front  of  Quatre  Chemins,  if  there  is  no  difficulty;  six  infantry 
divisions  around  Quatre  Chemins  and  one  division  at  Marbais,  so  that  I 
can  draw  it  in  to  myself  at  Sombreffe  if  I need  it;  it  will,  moreover,  not 
retard  your  march ; Kellermann’s  corps  ...  at  the  intersection  of  the 
Roman  road  and  the  Brussels  road,  so  that  I can  draw  it  in  to  myself  if 
I need  it.  ...  I should  like,  to  have  with  me  the  Guard  division  under 
Lefebvre-Desnouttes,  and  I send  you  Kellermann’s  two  divisions  to  re- 
place it ; but  with  my  actual  project,  I prefer  to  place  Kellermann  so  as 
to  recall  him  if  I need  him,  and  not  to  have  Lefebvre  make  false  marches, 
because  it  is  probable  that  I shall  decide  this  evening  to  march  on  Brus- 
sels with  the  Guard.  Nevertheless,  cover  Lefebvre  with  Erlon’s  and 
Reille’s  cavalry,  so  as  to  spare  the  Guard.  If  there  were  any  skirmish- 
ing with  the  English,  it  is  preferable  that  it  should  fall  on  the  line  than 
on  the  Guard. 

“ I have  adopted  as  general  principle  during  this  campaign  to  divide 
my  army  into  two  wings  and  a reserve.  Your  wing  will  be  composed  of 
the  four  divisions  of  the  1st  Corps,  four  divisions  of  the  2d  Corps,  and 
two  divisions  of  light  cavalry  and  the  two  divisions  of  Kellermann. 
That  ought  not  to  be  far  from  forty-five  to  fifty  thousand  men. 

“Grouchy  will  have  about  the  same  force,  and  will  command  the  right 
wing. 


564 


BY  SPECIAL  AIDE  TO  GROUCHY. 


“ The  Guard  will  form  the  reserve,  and  I will  move  towards  one  or  the 
other  wing,  according  to  circumstances. 

“ The  major-general  gives  most  precise  orders,  so  that  there  shall  be 
no  difficulty  as  to  the  obedience  of  your  orders  when  you  are  detached, 
the  corps  commandants  having  to  take  my  orders  directly  when  I am 
present. 

“ According  to  circumstances  I will  weaken  one  or  the  other  wing  and 
increase  my  reserve  with  it.  You  sufficiently  feel  the  importance  attached 
to  the  taking  of  Brussels.  That  could,  moreover,  give  rise  to  incidents, 
for  a movement  so  prompt  and  brisk  will  isolate  the  English  army  from 
Mons,  Ostend,  etc. 

“ I desire  that  your  dispositions  should  be  well  made,  so  that  on  the 
first  order  your  eight  divisions  may  march  rapidly  and  without  obstacle 
on  Brussels.” 

At  the  same  time  he  wrote  by  special  aide  to  Grouchy : — 

Charleroi,  June  16:  “ As  commandant  of  the  right  wing  you  are  to  take 
command  of  Vandamine’s  corps,  Gdrard’s  corps  and  the  cavalry  corps  of 
Pajol,  Milhaud  and  Excelmans,  which  must  be  not  far  from  fifty  thousand 
men.  Move  with  this  right  wing  to  Sombreffe.  Have  march  in  conse- 
quence at  once  Pajol,  Milhaud,  Excelmans  and  Vandamme,  and  without 
stopping  continue  your  movement  on  Sombreffe.  The  4th  Corps,  which 
is  at  Chatelet,  receives  directly  the  order  to  move  to  Sombreffe  without 
passing  through  Fleurus.  This  observation  is  important,  because  I am 
moving  my  headquarters  to  Fleurus,  and  we  must  find  no  encumbrances 
Send  at  once  an  officer  to  Gerard  to  have  him  know  your  movement  and 
let  him  execute  his  at  once. 

“ My  intention  is  that  all  the  generals  should  take  your  orders  directly. 
They  will  take  mine  only  when  I am  present.  Between  ten  and  eleven 
I shall  be  at  Fleurus.  I will  move  to  Sombreffe,  leaving  my  Guard,  foot 
and  horse,  at  Fleurus.  I shall  not  leave  it  at  Sombreffe  unless  it  should 
be  necessary.  If  the  enemy  is  at  Sombreffe,  I wish  to  attack  him.  I 
wish  even  to  attack  him  at  Gembloux  and  also  seize  this  position,  my 
intention  being,  after  having  learned  these  two  positions,  to  leave  to-night 
and  to  operate  with  my  left  wing  under  Ney  against  the  English.  Do 
not,  then,  lose  a moment,  because  the  quicker  I make  up  my  mind,  the 
better  it  will  be  for  the  result  of  my  operations.  I suppose  you  are  at 
Fleurus.  Communicate  constantly  with  Gerard,  so  that  he  may  aid  you 


NO  SUDDEN  CONCEPTION. 


565 


to  attack  Sombreffe,  if  necessary.  Girard  is  within  reach  of  Fleurus;  do 
not  use  him  without  absolute  necessity,  because  he  is  to  march  all  night. 
Leave  also  my  Young  Guard  and  all  its  artillery  at  Fleurus:  Kellermann 
with  two  divisions  of  cuirassiers  is  marching  on  the  road  to  Brussels. 
He  is  connecting  himself  with  Ney,  so  as  to  contribute  to  the  operation 
of  this  evening  in  the  left  wing. 

“ As  I have  told  you,  I shall  be  at  Fleurus  between  ten  and  eleven. 
Send  me  reports  of  what  you  shall  have  learned.  Have  a care  that  the 
Fleurus  road  is  open.  All  the  facts  that  I have  are  to  the  effect  that  the 
Prussians  cannot  oppose  more  than  forty  thousand  men  to  us.” 

These  two  orders  and  Soult’s  more  formal  later  ones  — 
not  to  mention  the  statement  in  the  Bulletin  of  the  15th  — 
indicate  clearly  tlie  purpose  of  the  emperor  to  seize  both  Som- 
breffe and  Quatre  Bras.  It  was  no  sudden  conception.  All 
that  was  said  and  written  at  the  time  implies  that  this  should 
be  done  at  once ; and  what  he  said  years  later  at  St.  Helena 
cannot  change  the  manifest  purpose  of  these  specific  orders 
issued  at  the  moment,  especially  as  the  Memoirs  are  full  of 
contradictions.  His  order  to  Ney  to  be  ready  to  march  on 
Brussels  was  given  on  the  assumption  that  both  Quatre  Bras 
and  Sombreffe  would  be  taken  without  any  serious  fighting, 
and  that  he  himself  would  defeat  or  contain  Blucher  and 
immediately  turn  on  Wellington. 

Substantially,  then,  according  to  these  orders,  the  right  wing, 
under  Grouchy,  was  to  advance  by  way  of  Sombreffe  on  Gem- 
bloux,  unless  sooner  arrested  by  the  Prussian  army  ; while  the 
left  wing,  under  Ney,  was  to  push  through  Quatre  Bras  and 
take  up  a position  beyond  that  place  to  head  off  the  British 
army.  What  Napoleon  wrote  Ney  was  that  he  himself  would 
attack  the  enemy  if  he  met  him;  and  having  beaten  him, — 
or  in  case  he  retired,  contained  him, — would  then  march  in 
the  afternoon  or  evening  via  Quatre  Bras  on  Brussels.  Long 
before  that  time  Ney  was  to  have  taken  Quatre  Bras,  and  to 
be  ready  at  a word  to  march  rapidly  on  Brussels.  Napoleon 


566  NO  EFFICIENT  RECONNOISSANCE. 

with  the  Guard  and  Lobau  was  to  be  the  reserve  and  stand 
in  the  centre,  ready  to  march  to  aid  the  right  or  the  left, 
as  circumstances  should  dictate.  He  knew  little  about  the 
immediate  movements  of  the  allied  armies ; but  he  knew  their 
general  position ; and  it  was  clear  that  if  he  would  make  his 
offensive  effective,  he  must  keep  moving,  as  he  always  did  in 
his  days  of  success,  and  moving  in  the  right  direction.  The 
orders  were  subject  to  change  by  any  eventuality,  such  as  the 
finding  of  substantially  the  entire  Prussian  army  at  Ligny ; 
and  as  soon  as  this  new  factor  came  into  the  problem,  they 
were  in  fact  changed.  But  they  well  show  what  the  emperor 
meant  by  his  thrust  between  the  two  allied  armies,  his  rup- 
ture of  the  allied  centre. 

Napoleon  had  no  idea  that  Blucher  was  at  Sombreffe  with 
three  quarters  of  his  army.  He  was  convinced  that  he  had 
caught  him  too  early  for  concentration,  and  that  he  should 
beat  part  of  his  forces  at  Sombreffe,  take  the  place,  and  throw 
him  back  in  the  direction  of  Liege,  so  that  he  might  himself 
speedily  join  Ney.  But  he  could  have  learned  the  existing 
facts.  He  had  done  a big  day’s  work  on  the  15th,  but  no 
greater  than  he  did  every  day  in  1796,  than  several  he  con- 
secutively did  in  1809,  when  his  task  was  not  to  follow  up 
a good  strategical  creation,  but  to  turn  a disastrous  one  into 
success.  Had  he  been  as  able-bodied  as  of  yore,  he  would  have 
ridden  to  the  outposts  at  daylight,  have  viewed  things  with  his 
own  eyes,  have  ordered  a powerful  reconnoissance  to  develop 
the  enemy,  and  have  ascertained  that  Blucher  was  there  in 
force,  and  that,  to  prevent  Wellington’s  getting  up  to  his  aid, 
he  must  be  beaten  at  once.  But  Napoleon  remained  in  Charle- 
roi, without  any  efficient  reconnoissance ; he  had  no  faith  in 
Blucher’s  hearty  defense,  believed  that  he  could  brush  him 
away  by  a simple  advance,  and  gave  orders  to  this  effect  after 
#ight  o’clock  in  the  morning.  If  he  personally  needed  more 


NAPOLEON  REACHES  FLEUR  US. 


567 


rest,  he  should  have  used  the  eyes  of  others,  and  put  the  troops 
on  the  march.  It  was  not  so  much  the  exhaustion  of  bodily 
forces,  as  the  effect  this  exhaustion  had  on  the  mental  and 
moral  qualities  of  the  man,  which  lay  at  the  root  of  the  loss 
of  time.  It  does  not  suffice  to  say  that,  aware  that  Ney  had 
not  reached  Quatre  Bras  the  day  before,  he  was  waiting 
to  know  that  he  had  done  so  this  morning  before  moving 
on  Sombreffe.  The  old  leader  would  have  made  certain  that 
Ney  had  obeyed  his  orders.  What  was  a gallop  of  a dozen  or 
fifteen  miles  to  him  ? In  war  all  things  do  not  come  to  him 
who  waits ; and  Napoleon  was  waiting,  from  a species  of  las- 
situde ; he  was  pausing  on  the  threshold  of  the  operation. 
He  was  no  longer  the  leader  who,  in  the  days  of  Castiglione, 
rode  to  a standstill  five  of  the  best  horses  that  could  be  found 
in  Italy,  or  who  called  on  his  lieutenants  for  two  days’  work 
in  one  — and  got  it. 

It  was  indeed  after  eleven  when  Napoleon  reached  Fleurus ; 
and  while  the  troops  were  coming  up,  he  rode  out  to  recon- 
noitre. He  examined  the  Prussian  position  from  the  wind- 
mill at  Fleurus,  and  then,  as  was  not  uncommon,  he  rode  or 
walked  forward  alone  to  see  what  more  he  could  discover. 
His  trained  eye  gauged  the  factors  on  which  to  found  his 
battle  plan.  He  ascertained  that  Blucher  had  taken  up  a 
position  back  of  the  Ligny  brook,  — “ ravine,”  he  calls  it,  — 
facing  southerly  on  a line  covering  Ligny  and  St.  Amand, 
with  his  left  sweeping  back  towards  and  beyond  Sombreffe ; 
but  though  from  the  inspection  he  learned  the  position  of  the 
enemy,  he  did  not  discern  that  the  Prussian  army  was  almost 
all  present.  This  may  be  another  instance  of  the  growing 
inaccuracy  of  Napoleon’s  work.  We  remember  his  careless- 
ness preceding  the  battle  of  Arcis-sur-Aube.  It  cannot  be 
presumed  that  his  skill  in  gauging  numbers  had  left  him, 
though  mistakes  are  easily  made  in  so  difficult  a problem,  and 


568 


THE  MIDNIGHT  INTERVIEW. 


we  remember  that  he  made  a similar  error  even  on  the  morning 
of  Jena.  He  had  probably  not  devoted  as  much  attention 
to  reconnoissance  as  he  would  formerly  have  done.  Two 
facts  should  have  been,  but  were  not  noted  by  him,  — that 
Blucher  here  had  as  large  a force  as  the  French,  and  that 
his  position  indicated  that  he  was  ready  to  throw  up  his  line 
of  retreat  on  Liege,  and  if  defeated,  retire  to  the  rear  and 
towards  the  English  army.  The  impression  made  on  the 
emperor  was  apparently  that  Blucher  was  audaciously  hold- 
ing an  advanced  position  with  part  of  his  army,  “ a body  of 
troops,”  he  called  it,  to  give  time  for  the  rest  to  come  up,  and 
for  Wellington  to  assemble  his  widely  cantoned  divisions. 
As  Blucher  stood,  his  right  flank  was  already  turned  by  Ney, 
assuming,  as  the  emperor  must  do,  that  this  marshal  had  car- 
ried or  would  carry  out  his  instructions ; and  on  this  impres- 
sion he  acted. 

At  the  midnight  interview,  Napoleon  had  learned  that  Ney 
had  not  — as  he  had  supposed  and  had  stated  in  the  Bulletin 
— occupied  Quatre  Bras.  Indeed,  Houssaye  casts  doubt  upon 
there  having  been  any  midnight  meeting ; but  there  probably 
was  one.  While  there  is  no  evidence  that  the  emperor  even 
then  ordered  Ney  to  collect  his  forces  and  to  move  forward 
to  Quatre  Bras,  from  the  tenor  of  the  orders  issued  thereupon, 
and  the  previous  Bulletin,  it  can  fairly  be  assumed  ; and  at 
St.  Helena  the  emperor  asserted  as  much.  “ Marshal  Ney 
received  anew  the  order  during  the  night  to  move  on  the  16th 
at  the  point  of  day  out  beyond  Quatre  Bras,  to  occupy  a good 
position  astride  the  road  to  Brussels,  and  hold  the  chaussees 
of  Nivelles  and  Namur  by  his  flankers  of  right  and  left. 
Flahault,  general  aide-de-camp,  was  charged  to  reiterate  this 
to  him,  and  stayed  with  him  all  the  day.” 

This  latter  is  not  proof ; but  the  statement  fits  into  the 
other  facts.  About  5 A.  m.  the  first  written  orders  went  off 


ERL  ON  STILL  IN  THE  REAR . 569 

to  Ney,  asking  exactly  where  Reille  and  Erlon  were,  and  to 
this  he  duly  replied ; upon  receipt  of  which  reply  the  letter 
and  the  formal  order  to  the  left  wing  were  prepared  and  sent, 
about  8 A.  M.  Erlon  was  still  considerably  in  the  rear,  and 
Ney  had  failed  to  bring  him  up.  If  Napoleon  proposed  not  to 
advance  upon  Blucher  until  he  was  sure  W ellington  could  not 


Blucher. 

come  in  upon  his  left,  he  needed  to  make  sure  what  Ney  was 
doing,  and  he  took  no  steps  to  keep  Ney  up  to  his  work.  Even 
if  he  had  not  so  ordered  at  the  midnight  interview,  he  would 
naturally  expect  Ney,  with  substantially  all  his  forces,  to  be  at 
Quatre  Bras  and  overwhelm  whatever  was  there,  by  1 or  2 p.  M. 


570 


NAPOLEON’S  DUTY. 


at  the  latest.  He  forgot  that  at  Bautzen  Ney  had  been  dila- 
tory under  parallel  conditions.  Flahault  must  have  reached 
Ney  by  eleven,  and  Ney  thus  knew  that  Grouchy  was  march- 
ing on  Sombreffe  with  Vandamme  and  Gerard,  followed  by 
the  Guard  to  Fleurus,  hoping  to  clear  the  ground  in  front  of 
him  as  far  as  Gembloux.  He  was  told  that  he  was  expected 
to  capture  and  hold  Quatre  Bras,  so  as  from  there  to  march 
on  Brussels  as  soon  as  the  emperor  had  completed  his  plans, 
and  that  a corresponding  order  was  issued  to  Grouchy.  The 
whole  scheme  was  clear  and  specific  : to  attack  the  Prussians 
from  such  a direction  as  to  throw  them  away  from  the  Eng- 
lish, or  if  they  retired,  to  so  follow  them  up;  having  provided 
for  which,  the  emperor  would  join  Ney  for  a march  on  Brus- 
sels. Although  Napoleon  says  both  to  Grouchy  and  Ney  that 
they  apparently  will  not  meet  much  opposition,  yet  this  was 
a common  assurance  of  his,  and,  let  it  be  noted,  he  directs  each 
to  move  with  his  whole  force.  While  blaming  Ney,  we  must 
not  forget  Napoleon’s  duty.  We  cannot  fairly  assume  that, 
during  the  long  forenoon  of  June  16,  he  was  waiting  on  Ney; 
or  if  we  do  so,  we  must,  trying  him  by  his  own  standard, 
blame  him  for  allowing  Blucher  to  get  up  the  bulk  of  his 
forces,  and  Wellington  to  concentrate  at  Nivelles  and  move 
forward  on  Quatre  Bras.  That  Ney  was  lacking  in  his  usual 
push  is  true,  but  it  lay  on  Napoleon  to  see  that  he  obeyed 
orders.  Ney  was  not  responsible  for  Ellon’s  early  backward- 
ness, but  he  certainly  was  responsible  for  his  own  slackness, 
after  he  had  had  his  interview  with  Napoleon.  Though  the 
emperor  counted  on  him,  the  marshal  utterly  failed  his  mas- 
ter, as  Davout  would  not  have  done. 

Blucher  was  standing  at  the  windmill  of  Bussy,  just  back  of 
St.  Amand,  when  about  one  o’clock  he  saw  the  French  van 
approaching.  At  that  time  Napoleon  was  on  the  windmill 
tower  just  west  of  Fleurus,  and  Wellington  was  on  the  way 


BLUCHER  ACCEPTS  THE  BATTLE. 


571 


from  Quatre  Bras  to  a consultation  with  Blucher  at  Brye. 
While  this  consultation  was  going  on,  at  which  no  one  be- 
lieved that  there  was  any  considerable  force  opposite  Quatre 
Bras,  the  French  army  was  debouching  from  the  woods  south 
of  Fleurus,  and  pushing  back  the  Prussian  outposts.  Though 
he  had  but  three  corps  at  hand,  Blucher  accepted  the  battle ; 
no  doubt  he  would  have  done  so  in  any  event ; but  he  certainly 
relied  upon  his  colleague’s  cooperation,  either  by  an  effective 
diversion  on  Gosselies  or  a direct  attack,  and  Wellington  led 
him  to  believe  the  Anglo-Dutch  army  much  nearer  Quatre 
Bras  than  it  actually  was.  Gneisenau  says  he  so  strongly 
insisted  on  the  English  coming  in  on  the  Prussian  right  that 
Wellington  left  promising  to  do  so  if  he  was  not  himself 
attacked.  Blucher  counted  on  the  duke  to  be  on  the  ground, 
or  so  near  the  ground  as  to  lend  actual  or  moral  strength  to 
his  own  army,  and  to  keep  busy  a large  part  of  the  attacking 
French.  If  Wellington  told  him  at  Brye  that  he  could  not 
support  him,  it  was  then  too  late  to  avoid  the  battle. 

Some  hours  after  Ziethen  had  gone  into  line  behind  the 
brook  of  Ligny,  — perhaps  10  A.  M., — Pirch’s  corps  had 
arrived  and  placed  itself  in  support  in  the  rear.  By  noon 
Thielemann’s  corps  had  filed  into  line  with  right  on  Sombreffe. 
Billow’s  corps  could  not  get  up.  He  was  distant,  and  orders 
to  him  had  been  unnecessarily  delayed.  These  positions  were 
substantially  held  by  the  three  corps  during  the  battle,  which 
was  defensive  on  the  part  of  the  Prussians. 

From  the  Prussian  centre  at  Sombreffe,  the  right  wing  ran 
through  Ligny,  St.  Amand  and  Brye,  and  was  held  by  Zie- 
then with  Pirch  in  support,  numbering  sixty-three  thousand 
men  and  one  hundred  and  seventy-five  guns  ; but  although,  as 
Napoleon  testifies,  it  was  “ covered  by  a deep  ravine,”  mean- 
ing the  brook  of  Ligny,  “ his  right  was  in  the  air,”  and  liable 
to  be  turned.  The  left  wing  ran  from  Sombreffe  through 


572 


NAPOLEON  DETERMINES  ON  ATTACK . 


Tongrinelle  and  Balatre,  and  was  held  by  Thielemann  with 
twenty-five  thousand  men  and  fifty  guns.  These  positions 
were  substantially  maintained  throughout  the  day.  Thus 
Blucher  was  preparing  to  fight  with  eighty  thousand  foot,* 
eight  thousand  horse,  and  two  hundred  and  twenty  guns. 

Under  the  conditions  he  assumed  to  exist,  Napoleon  deter- 
mined on  attack.  The  most  important  strategical  problem 
was  to  cut  off  possible  cooperation  by  Wellington  ; and  the 
most  natural  tactical  manoeuvre,  to  turn  Blucher’s  right  and 
throw  him  off  along  his  line  of  retreat  on  Namur.  But  had 
the  Prussians  been  simply  driven  from  their  position  and 
into  retreat  on  Namur,  while  they  could  not  have  reached 
Wellington  in  time  for  a battle  on  the  18th,  Blucher  would’ 
still  have  been  intact  and  ready  to  operate  towards  concen- 
tration, or  upon  the  French  communications  when  Napoleon 
should  turn  on  Wellington  ; and  Wellington,  if  he  could  later 
count  on  Blucher’s  assistance,  might  himself  have  manoeu- 
vred for  a junction  and  not  have  accepted  battle  on  the  18th. 

Napoleon  was  never  content  to  do  things  by  halves : he 
wanted  something  more  decisive  than  merely  to  be  rid  of  the 
Prussians ; he  now  saw  his  way  open  to  it,  and  it  is  quite  in 
accordance  with  his  battle  theories  that,  as  a second  and  tacti- 
cal idea,  he  should  strive  to  destroy  the  Prussian  army  rather 
than  merely  to  force  it  back  discomfited  ; for  by  a decisive 
victory  he  would,  under  the  existing  conditions,  accomplish  far 
more  than  by  a minor  one.  He  noticed  that  the  Prussian 
left  was  protecting  the  road  to  Namur,  and  would  probably 
stand  in  place.  He  might  therefore  neglect  it,  and  by  mov- 
ing on  the  Prussian  front  instead  of  the  right,  and  attacking 
in  force  the  centre  and  right,  he  was  strong  enough  to  over- 
whelm them ; and  if  by  attacking  between  the  centre  and 
left  he  could  cut  the  centre  and  right  off  from  the  left,  he 
might  then  destroy  these,  and  win  an  ampler  result  than 


THE  FORCE  ON  THE  FIELD. 


573 


merely  to  drive  Blucher  back  on  bis  base  and  reserves.  And 
if,  as  he  had  a right  to  expect,  Ney  drove  back  Welling- 
ton, or  contained  him  and  then  turned  with  half  his  forces 
towards  Brye,  the  battle  could  be  made  absolutely  decisive  of 
matters  in  Belgium.  It  was  a beautiful  plan  and  conceived 
in  the  emperor’s  best  style,  — a corollary  to  the  proposition 
of  breaking  through  the  centre  and  fighting  the  allied  armies 
singly. 

By  one  o’clock  the  French  army  had  reached  the  battle- 
field. Gerard,  sixteen  thousand  men  with  forty  guns,  filed 
into  place  on  the  right  opposite  Ligny ; Vandamme,  twenty 
thousand  men  and  forty  guns,  supported  on  his  left  by 
Girard  with  four  thousand  men  and  eight  guns,  threatened 
St.  Amand ; Pajol  and  Excelmans,  six  thousand  cavalry  and 
twenty-five  guns,  sustained  by  Hulot’s  division,  were  sent  out 
to  observe  the  Prussian  left  near  Balatre.  The  Guard  and 
Milhaud,  twenty-two  thousand  strong,  with  one  hundred  guns, 
were  held  near  Fleurus  in  reserve,  and  Lobau  with  ten  thou- 
sand men  was  coming  up  from  Chatelet.  The  force  on  the 
field  was  less  than  seventy  thousand  men,  of  whom  thirteen 
thousand  were  cavalry. 

While  marshaling,  Soult  near  2 P.  M.  wrote  Ney  that  “ a 
body  of  troops  ” was  between  Sombreffe  and  Brye,  which 
Grouchy  would  attack  at  half-past  two.  “ The  intention  of  His 
Majesty  is  that  you  should  also  attack  what  is  before  you,, 
and  that  after  having  vigorously  pushed  it,  you  should  fall 
back  on  us  to  help  envelop  the  body.  ...  If  this  body  is 
previously  beaten,  then  His  Majesty  would  manoeuvre  in  your 
direction.  . . . Instruct  the  emperor  at  once  of  your  disposi- 
tions and  of  what  is  passing  in  your  front.”  This  looks  as  if 
at  2 p.  M.  Napoleon  did  not  fully  understand  the  situation, 
nor  was  ready  to  order  Ney  over  to  help  destroy  Blucher. 
He  could  have  ordered  Ney  to  observe  the  English  with  cav- 


574 


A CHANGE  IN  THE  CONDITIONS. 


airy,  and  fall  in  towards  Ligny ; or  he  could  have  divided 
Ney  in  two  so  as  with  one  half  to  contain  the  English  and  to 
join  the  latter  with  the  other  half ; or  he  could  have  instructed 
him  to  beat  the  English  and  then  fall  in  on  his  left.  If  the 
English  were  slow,  as  they  proved  to  be,  any  of  these  opera- 
tions could  not  fail  to  destroy  the  Prussian  army ; but  Napo- 
leon did  not  at  an  early  enough  hour  positively  order  part  of 
Ney  over  to  help  him  at  Ligny. 

The  action  opened  at  2.30,  by  Gerard  attacking  Ligny  and 
Yandamme  St.  Amand.  The  resistance  was  admirable,  and 
Napoleon  soon  found  that  he  had  substantially  the  whole 
Prussian  army  in  his  front,  and  not  a mere  “ body  of  troops.” 
This  opened  his  eyes,  but  it  only  encouraged  him  in  the 
belief  that  a victory  would  be  still  more  decisive ; and  at 
3.15  p.  m.  Soult  again  wrote  to  Ney : “ You  are  to  manoeuvre 
at  once,  so  as  to  envelop  the  right  of  the  enemy  and  fall  with 
the  utmost  vigor  on  his  rear,  as  his  army  is  lost  if  you  act 
vigorously.  The  fate  of  France  is  in  your  hands.  Therefore 
do  not  hesitate  an  instant  to  make  the  movement  that  the 
emperor  orders,  and  move  towards  the  heights  of  St.  Amand 
and  Brye.”  This  in  effect  meant  that  Ney  was  to  leave  what 
was  necessary  in  front  of  the  English,  and  come  with  the 
bulk  of  his  forces  in  to  Ligny.  To  enforce  this,  at  half-past 
three  Napoleon  ordered  that  Erlon  should  be  directed  towards 
the  Prussian  right. 

Here  was  a change  in  the  conditions,  that  had  been  indicated 
in  the  orders  to  Ney  as  possible : before  marching  on  Brussels 
the  emperor  had  been  compelled  to  attack  Blucher,  and  Ney 
was  accordingly  notified  to  so  modify  his  operation  as  to  con- 
tain Wellington  and  march  over  with  part  of  his  force  to  aid 
in  destroying  the  Prussian  army.  Although  the  officers  car- 
rying these  dispatches  could  well  have  delivered  them  in  an 
hour  and  a half,  it  was  scarcely  to  be  expected  that  Ney  could 


ERLON  TO  BE  AT  ONCE  SENT  OVER. 


575 


arrive  before  six  or  seven  o’clock;  but  the  June  evenings  in 
Belgium  continue  till  long  after  nine  o’clock,  and  the  battle 
was  actually  prolonged  until  ten.  Napoleon  never  doubted 
the  result.  “ Gerard  having  approached  the  emperor  to  ask 
for  certain  instructions  about  attacking  the  village  of  Ligny, 
this  prince  said  to  him,  4 It  is  possible  that  in  three  hours  the 
fate  of  the  war  may  be  decided.  If  Ney  executes  his  orders 
well,  there  will  not  a gun  of  the  Prussian  army  escape.  It  is 
taken  en  flagrant  dtilit'  ” 

It  was  essential  that  the  work  should  be  completed  on  this 
day  : too  much  time  had  already  been  lost.  To  give  Blucher 
until  the  morrow  would  result  in  his  joining  Wellington. 
Moreover,  it  was  important  to  keep  Blucher’s  attention  fixed 
on  his  front,  so  that  he  might  not  heed  the  danger  threaten- 
ing by  the  advance  of  Ney  ; and  to  facilitate  the  main  manoeu- 
vre, the  attack  on  Blucher’s  right  was  made  more  marked,  to 
induce  him  to  disgarnish  his  centre  to  aid  it,  and  open  the 
way  for  the  thrust  at  that  point,  which  should  not  only  rup- 
ture it,  but  make  Ney’s  work  easier  and  more  effective.  The 
Prussians  fought  nobly,  and  up  to  six  o’clock  nothing  had 
been  won  by  the  French.  In  order  to  be  sure  of  his  result, 
about  5 p.  M.  Napoleon  sent  Ney  another  order  to  the  effect 
that  what  was  passing  at  Quatre  Bras  had  small  importance 
compared  to  the  fight  going  on  at  Ligny,  and  that  Erlon  was 
to  be  at  once  sent  over.  But  Fezensac  describes  to  us  the 
way  orders  were  carried  out  or  not  carried  out  in  these  days, 
according  to  the  means.  When  orders  were  issued,  they  were 
assumed  to  have  been  in  due  time  executed,  whether  there 
was  a horse  fit  to  gallop  five  miles  or  not,  whether  officers  had 
maps  of  the  country,  and  whether  the  roads  were  possible  or 
impossible.  And  many  of  the  headquarters  dispatches  suf- 
fered accordingly. 

One  difference  between  Blucher’s  tactical  management  and 


576 


ERLON'S  INOPPORTUNE  APPEARANCE. 


Napoleon’s  was  marked  : Blucher  gradually  used  up  his  troops, 
putting  in  fresh  ones  to  take  the  place  of  tired  ones,  until  he 
had  placed  them  all  under  fire  ; Napoleon  as  usual  heeded 
little  the  cry  for  reinforcements  from  his  fighting  front,  but 
kept  the  divisions  to  their  work  with  his  singular  power  of 
enforcing  vigor  and  creating  enthusiasm,  and  held  intact  his 
reserves  at  Fleurus  for  a final  blow.  It  was  some  time  before 
six  o’clock  that  he  made  ready  to  put  in  the  Guard,  intend- 
ing to  sustain  Vandamme,  whose  flank  was  threatened,  with 
Duhesme’s  Young  Guard  and  half  Morand’s  chasseurs,  and  to 
aid  Gerard  with  the  other  half  of  Morand  ; while  Friant  and 
the  Old  Guard  with  all  its  artillery,  the  heavy  cavalry  and  the 
cuirassiers,  should  be  thrown  in  upon  Ligny  to  break  through 
the  Prussian  centre.  Everything  had  worked  to  the  emperor’s 
satisfaction. 

At  this  moment  the  head  of  a column  was  seen  by  Van- 
damme off  on  the  left  debouching  from  woodland  a couple  of 
miles  distant,  heading  for  Fleurus,  somewhat  to  the  south 
of  the  line  prescribed  for  Ney.  Being  nearest  to  the  point, 
Vandamme  should  have  at  once  sent  out  to  ascertain  what 
the  column  was,  but  he  only  reported  the  fact  to  Napoleon  as 
being  a possible  interference  with  his  work ; and  though  the 
emperor  could  scarcely  believe  that  the  enemy  had  crept  in 
between  Ney  and  himself,  he  withheld  his  centre  thrust.  “ The 
emperor  stopped  the  march  of  the  Guard,  and  sent  in  great 
speed  his  aide-de-camp,  Dejean,  a confidential  officer,  to  ascer- 
tain the  number,  force  and  intentions  of  this  column,”  which 
appeared  to  annoy  Vandamme;  and  he  did  this  lest  he  might 
need  his  reserve  to  oppose  the  enemy,  if  it  were  perchance 
part  of  Wellington’s  force.  More  than  an  hour  and  a half 
was  thus  consumed ; and  it  was  time  lost.  The  column 
turned  out  to  be  Erlon,  who,  belated  on  the  march  towards 
Quatre  Bras,  had,  back  of  Frasnes,  met  an  aide  of  the  em- 


ERLON  SHARPLY  RECALLED. 


577 


peror’s  bearing  dispatches  demanding  help,  and  had  of  his 
own  motion  turned  his  head  of  column  towards  the  right  wing, 
which  was  evidently  engaging  battle,  and  might  need  his 
corps.  There  is  much  dispute  as  to  what  the  orders  were, 
who  bore  them,  whether  addressed  to  Ney  or  Erlon,  and  as  to 
just  what  occurred.  But  Erlon  did  move  over  towards  Ligny, 
and  probably  sent  word  to  Ney  what  he  had  done.  Whether 
Napoleon  should  have  arrested  his  attack  on  seeing  the  ques- 
tionable column  debouching  from  the  woods,  is  open  to  argu- 
ment : had  he  forced  the  attack,  and  had  the  column  proved 
to  be  the  enemy’s,  he  might  have  succeeded,  or  he  might 
have  failed.  But  from  the  incident,  according  to  some,  the 
emperor  drew  the  conclusion  — somewhat  carelessly,  it  would 
seem  — that  Erlon  had  been  sent  by  Ney,  and  although  lie  had 
taken  a wrong  road,  which  led  him  towards  St.  Amand,  that 
he  was  equipped  with  orders,  and  would  file  to  his  left  towards 
Brye,  and  thereby  produce  the  desired  effect.  According  to 
others,  Napoleon  sent  Erlon  orders  to  attack.  Paying  no 
further  heed  to  this  column,  but  expecting  its  due  coopera- 
tion, as  repeatedly  demanded  of  Ney,  the  Guard  attack  was 
resumed  with  accustomed  vigor.  But  so  far  from  putting  his 
divisions  to  use,  Erlon,  sharply  recalled  by  Ney,  within  the  hour 
moved  back  towards  Quatre  Bras.  Durutte’s  division,  with  a 
hint  to  be  cautious,  was  allowed  to  remain  near  the  right  wing, 
to  tie  him  to  Napoleon.  Erlon  should  have  sought  and  obeyed 
Napoleon’s  orders,  not  Ney’s,  and  so  soon  as  he  got  within 
reach  of  the  emperor,  should  have  sent  a staff  officer  ahead 
of  his  column,  to  request  further  instructions.  His  conduct 
on  the  15th  and  16th  was  marked  by  laxness,  as  in  the  days 
of  Sauroren. 

Nothing  is  more  dangerous  than  a turning  movement  when 
the  turning  body  is  not  properly  tied  to  the  main  body.  That 
it  should  be  so  tied  is  one  of  the  maxims  of  Napoleon ; and 


VOL.  IV. 


578 


STOUT  ATTACK  OF  THE  GUARD. 


rather  than  not  use  Erlon  when  he  was  at  hand  and  ready  to 
be  used,  he  would  have  done  better  even  to  leave  the  conduct 
of  the  main  battle,  well  inaugurated,  to  Soult  and  have  him- 
self gone  to  head  Erlon ’s  troops,  and  put  them  in  where  they 
would  accomplish  the  view  he  had  in  hand.  It  was  a fault  — 
or  a misfortune  — of  Napoleon’s,  so  soon  as  he  saw  Erlon’s 
head  of  column,  not  to  guess  what  it  was,  and  not  thus  to  tie 
him  to  his  own  operation,  for  he  knew  that  Ney  could  hold 
himself  at  Quatre  Bras,  and  that  in  any  event  he  could  long 
enough  retard  Wellington,  who  was  rather  a defensive  than 
an  offensive  fighter,  to  enable  the  French  centre  and  right  to 
destroy  Blucher. 

There  is  as  much  dispute  as  to  who  carried  several  of  the 
orders  of  this  day,  as  there  is  as  to  what  occurred  with  regard 
to  the  orders  to  Erlon.  At  least  three  witnesses,  among 
them  Durutte,  testify  that  Napoleon  gave  Erlon  orders  to 
attack ; but  before  these  actually  reached  him,  he  may  have 
received  Ney’s  ordering  him  back.  It  is  clear  that  Napoleon 
got  to  Erlon  no  effective  orders  to  move  on  Brye  and  help 
destroy  the  Prussian  right  and  centre,  so  that  when  Erlon 
received  positive  orders  from  his  own  chief,  he  obeyed  them 
and  retired. 

The  attack  of  the  Guard  was  stout.  Blucher,  who,  deem- 
ing it  the  key  of  the  field,  had  mistakenly  concentrated  his 
forces  in  St.  Amand  to  break  down  Vandamme,  instead  of 
in  Ligny  to  meet  the  Guard,  came  up  at  the  head  of  some 
cavalry  and  sharply  attacked,  but  his  horse  was  shot  under 
him,  and  he  himself  severely  shaken  by  the  fall.  But  for 
the  darkness  he  would  have  been  captured  in  the  to  and  fro 
dashes  of  the  French  and  German  cavalry.  He  was  finally 
got  from  under  his  horse  and  into  safety,  but  for  some  hours 
disappeared  from  view,  during  which  Gneisenau  acted  for 
him. 


Z IE  THEN  MOVES  NORTH. 


579 


The  Guard  fought  on.  Despite  forceful  Prussian  resist- 
ance, the  heavy  column  could  not  be  stopped ; the  brook  of 
Ligny  was  crossed,  Ligny  was  occupied,  and  by  half-past 
eight  the  French  troops  debouched  on  the  heights  between 
Ligny  and  Sombreffe,  and  mounted  the  Bussy  windmill  hill. 
The  advance  of  the  Guard  had  been  a veritable  transforma- 
tion scene.  The  Prussian  centre  was  broken,  and  the  right 
and  centre  cut  off  as  intended.  The  battle  did  not  end  until 
ten  o’clock.  Had  Ney,  or  even  Erlon,  debouched  on  Brye, 
Blucher  with  a wrecked  army  would  have  been  thrown  off 
towards  the  Rhine.  As  it  was,  the  Prussians  were  able  to  file 
off  to  the  north. 

A handsome  victory  had  been  won,  but  not  a decisive  one. 
The  Prussians  lost  eighteen  thousand  men  killed  and  wounded, 
the  French  twelve  thousand  men.  Vandamme  bivouacked 
beyond  St.  Amand  and  Wagnelle,  Lobau  in  first  line  on  the 
Bussy  heights,  Gerard  on  his  right,  the  Guard  in  support. 
Ziethen  and  Pirch  bivouacked  between  Tilly,  Mellery  and 
Gentines,  with  an  outpost  at  Brye,  Thielemann  east  of  Som- 
breffe. Before  the  end  of  the  night  Ziethen  moved  by  coun- 
try roads  straight  north  through  Tilly,  Gentines  and  Mont  St. 
Guibert  towards  Wavre,  whither  Gneisenau  wisely  ordered 
a retreat,  so  as  to  keep  within  touch  of  the  English  lines. 
Thielemann  with  the  reserve  park  moved  through  Gembloux. 

Had  Erlon  not  delayed  matters  by  his  inopportune  appear- 
ance, the  battle  would  have  been  won  two  hours  earlier,  and 
Napoleon  would  have  had  time  that  night  to  pursue,  and  to 
wreck  the  Prussian  army  for  the  campaign, — as  he  might, 
or  might  not,  have  done.  Had  Erlon,  on  approaching  the 
right  wing,  sent  to  the  emperor  for  orders,  and  been  dispatched 
to  Brye,  the  Prussians  would  certainly  have  been  crippled  and 
pushed  off  to  the  eastward.  It  has  been  suggested  that  Lobau 
instead  of  Erlon  might  have  been  sent  to  Brye ; but  lest  he 


580 


LOBAU  KEPT  AS  A RESERVE. 


should  be  needed  at  Quatre  Bras,  he  had  been  kept  near  the 
river  too  long  to  reach  the  field  ; and  when  Erlon  retired, 
Napoleon  imagined  that  Ney  had  need  of  and  had  withdrawn 
him,  in  which  case  he  did  not  wish  to  risk  too  much,  but  kept 
Lobau  as  a reserve.  Durutte  took  position  near  Marbais. 
It  had  been  an  error  that  Lobau  was  not  sooner  brought  up ; 
but  he  was  not  ordered  forward  till  half-past  three;  he  did 
not  get  the  order  till  after  four,  and  he  could  not  reach  Fleu- 
rus  till  six.  He  would  have  been  better  at  Wangenies.  The 
difficulty  was  due  to  the  fact  that  Napoleon’s  first  orders  were 
not  issued  until  8 A.  M.  Had  they  been  issued  at  4 A.  M., 
everything  should  have  gone  well. 

At  the  end  of  the  battle  Napoleon  had  a fair  right  to 
suppose  that,  while  he  had  not  won  a decisive  victory  against 
the  Prussians,  he  had  in  all  probability  thrown  them  off  in  a 
badly  disabled  condition  towards  Namur,  and  that  he  might 
now  turn  on  the  Anglo-Dutch,  and  with  Ney’s  assistance  beat 
them  still  more  disastrously.  He  should  have  made  his  sup- 
position a certainty. 

Let  us  turn  back,  and  see  why  Ney  had  not  helped  out  his 
master.  After  the  midnight  conference,  Ney  had  rejoined 
his  troops  at  Gosselies.  In  view  of  all  the  circumstances 
surrounding  the  situation,  of  what  was  written  before,  and 
of  the  orders  which  were  thereupon  issued,  we  must  be  per- 
suaded that  Napoleon  at  this  interview  had  given  him  a fair 
conception  of  what  he  was  proposing  to  do,  to  wit : to  seize  both 
Quatre  Bras  and  Sombreffe,  fight  the  Prussians  first,  as  being 
the  nearest,  and  having  driven  them  back  along  their  line  of 
communications,  — or  in  case  they  retired,  having  contained 
them,  — to  move  over  to  join  the  left  wing  and  march  on  Brus- 
sels ; or  else,  if  he  stood,  to  overwhelm  Wellington.  Despite 
the  absence  of  any  record,  and  even  though  at  Bautzen  he 
had  failed  to  give  definite  orders,  it  is  reasonable,  from  Napo- 


NEY  AT  GOSSELIES  BEFORE  DAYLIGHT.  581 


leon’s  habit  and  method,  to  assume  that  Ney  was  well  informed 
of  the  general  plan.  It  is  agreed  that,  in  giving  him  com- 
mand of  the  left  wing,  the  emperor  told  him  to  go  and  drive 
the  enemy  back,  and  it  is  doing  violence  to  the  testimony  and 
existing  conditions  to  assume  that  for  all  practical  purposes 


Wellington. 


Ney  was  not  equipped  with  general  instructions  as  to  what  he 
was  to  do.  Indeed,  the  fact  comes  close  to  being  proved  by 
the  emperor’s  noting  in  the  Bulletin  that  Ney’s  headquarters 
was  at  Quatre  Bras.  How  well  Ney  assimilated  the  infor- 
mation and  instructions  can  only  be  guessed ; and  primarily, 
Napoleon  may  have  been  to  blame,  as  in  the  case  of  Grouchy, 
in  leaning  too  much  upon  him. 

Arrived  at  Gosselies  before  daylight,  one  would  expect  to 
see  Ney  taking  immediate  measures  to  assemble  his  forces  for 
the  fight  of  the  16th.  Bachelu’s  division  and  Pirn’s  cavalry 
were  in  Frasnes,  Foy  and  Jerome  were  in  Gosselies,  and 
Erlon’s  leading  division,  under  Durutte,  had  bivouacked  at 


582 


NEY  SHOWS  MARKED  SLACKNESS. 


Jumet.  The  first  thing  for  any  general  officer  under  like 
circumstances  to  do  was  to  get  his  men  in  hand ; but  they 
took  no  suitable  steps  to  this  end.  Instead  of  sending  Foy 
and  Jerome  to  Frasnes,  and  ordering  Erlon  up  to  Gosselies, 
and  seeing  to  it  that  these  things  were  done,  Ney  practically 
sat  down  and  waited,  doing  nothing  to  carryout  his  presumed 
instructions,  or  to  act  as  the  commander  of  forty  thousand 
men  should  act  in  preparing  for  expected  battle,  except  to 
order  Reille  to  put  his  divisions  in  readiness  to  move.  It  was 
eleven  o’clock  before  Foy  and  Jerome  were  ordered  up  to 
sustain  Bachelu  and  Pir6  ; nor  was  Erlon  promptly  brought 
along  to  take  their  place.  These  are  facts  shown  by  Ney’s 
own  orders.  Had  he  acted  as  a man  of  his  calibre  should,  he 
might  well  have  been  in  force  at  QuatreBras  by  noon,  in  such 
a position  as  to  be  able  to  spare  Erlon.  Ney  may  not  have 
deemed  it  wise  to  advance  on  a line  beyond  the  main  army  ; 
but  he  was  bound  to  obey  his  orders.  This  he  barely  did, 
and  in  the  assembling  of  his  forces  and  his  advance  on  Quatre 
Bras  he  showed  marked  slackness.  Even  had  there  been  no 
midnight  interview,  Ney,  judged  by  the  hour  of  receipt  of  the 
orders  of  Napoleon,  and  the  issue  of  his  own,  must  be  held 
to  blame  for  unpardonable  delays,  if  he  is  not  charged  with 
disobedience  of  orders.  If  he  thought  he  knew  better  than 
the  emperor,  it  was  easy  to  send  over  to  him  and  ask  for 
fresh  instructions  ; but  this  he  does  not  appear  to  have 
done. 

If  we  seek  to  excuse  Ney,  we  must  place  still  more  blame 
on  the  emperor.  There  was  no  soldier  alive  at  that  time  who 
would  have  pushed  things  any  more  promptly  than  Napoleon 
did ; but  this  is  not  the  proper  test.  He  had  cut  out  work 
to  anticipate  the  enemy,  seize  the  communications  between 
them  at  Quatre  Bras  and  Sombreffe,  fight  the  Prussians  first, 
and  fight  or  pursue  the  Anglo-Dutch  the  next  day;  and 


UNPARDONABLE  DELAYS . 


583 


with  his  ancient  speed,  this  could  readily  have  been  accom- 
plished. According  to  the  measure  of  his  best  years,  he  failed 
on  June  16  in  giving  the  necessary  speed  to  the  right  wing, 
and  in  seeing  to  it  that  proper  speed  was  given  to  the  left 
wing. 

Had  Ney  properly  carried  out  the  spirit  of  the  strategic 
scheme,  gathered  his  troops  and  moved  with  rapidity,  two 
things  must  have  resulted.  First,  Erlon  would  have  got  up 
to  a point  beyond  Frasnes,  and  would  not  have  been  inter- 
cepted and  sent  over  to  the  right  wing,  where,  as  events  turned 
out,  he  proved  useless ; and  second,  Ney  would  have  had  in 
hand  Reille’s  and  Erlon’s  corps  with  Kellermann’s  cavalry. 
With  this  force  he  would  doubtless  have  captured  Quatre 
Bras,  which  was  then  but  slightly  held,  and  would  have  estab- 
lished himself  there  with  one  of  his  corps,  with  the  forest  on 
one  side  and  the  upper  waters  of  the  Dyle  on  the  other,  and 
could  have  sent  the  other  corps  over  to  Brye  in  season  to  fall 
on  Bluclier’s  right  flank,  while  Napoleon  was  breaking  through 
between  bis  centre  and  left.  Had  he  done  this,  and  it  was  an 
easy  task,  Blucher’s  army  would  have  been  broken  up  for  the 
campaign,  so  that  even  Grouchy  could  have  contained  him, 
while  Napoleon,  turning  towards  Quatre  Bras  with  Ney  and 
the  reserves,  would  almost  certainly  have  overwhelmed  Well- 
ington. Ney  did  not  act  with  sufficient  promptness  to  get 
this  done.  Yet  while  he  must  be  held  responsible  for  his 
share  of  the  failure,  we  cannot  lose  sight  of  the  fact  that 
Napoleon  did  not  take  the  means  actually  within  his  power 
to  push  operations  to  an  issue.  With  his  speed  of  ten  years 
before,  and  his  habit  of  seeing  that  his  orders  were  so  given 
as  to  be  obeyed,  Quatre  Bras  would  have  been  taken  early 
in  the  forenoon,  and  the  battle  of  Ligny  been  fought  before 
Blucher  was  ready,  and  with  a decisive  result. 

This  may  be  hypercriticism,  and  after  the  event,  but  we 


584 


WELLINGTON  REACHES  THE  FIELD. 


are  not  testing  an  ordinary  soldier  : it  is  the  last  of  the  great 
captains  who  is  on  trial ; we  are  not  comparing  him  with 
others:  we  are  judging  him  by  his  own  rules.  We  are  used 
to  seeing  Napoleon  divine  things  aright,  and  he  was  not 
so  doing  ; and  there  is  too  much  evidence  to  show  that  he 
was  out  of  health  not  to  believe  that  it  was  his  bodily  con- 
dition with  its  reflex  action  on  his  moral  force,  which  was  at 
fault. 

To  return  to  the  facts,  Ney  did  not  move  forward  to  Quatre 
Bras,  but  remained  in  position  at  Frasnes.  Even  after  he 
had  received  the  emperor’s  and  Soult’s  written  orders,  he  was 
wanting  in  decision  ; his  preparation  for  battle  at  Quatre 
Bras  was  quite  haphazard. 

Despite  this  slackness,  however,  Fortune  — not  forgetful 
of  his  noble  past  — seemed  to  be  favoring  Ney.  When,  at 
2 p.  M.,  he  attempted  to  carry  out  his  orders  with  Bachelu,  Foy 
and  Pire,  he  had  in  front  of  him  only  Perponcher’s  division, 
and  this  he  could  have  readily  brushed  away.  Indeed,  Ney 
did  make  some  advance,  moving  Bachelu  forward  on  the  right, ' 
and  Foy  on  the  left ; but  Wellington,  fresh  from  the  Brye  con- 
sultation, reached  the  field  about  2.30,  and  taking  command, 
approved  the  seizure  of  Quatre  Bras  and  leaned  his  right  on 
Bossu  woods  and  his  left  at  Piraumont.  He  soon  discovered 
how  much  misled  he  had  been  by  the  Disposition;  but  with 
that  exceptionally  cool  head  which  in  all  his  battles  stood 
him  in  such  good  stead,  he  took  steps  to  maintain  himself 
until  troops  arrived.  At  3 P.  M.  Jerome  came  up  and  began 
to  force  the  wood.  At  3.30  Merlen’s  Dutch-Belgian  cavalry 
and  Picton’s  “ fighting  division  ” came  up,  followed  by  Bruns- 
wick, which  gave  Wellington  a preponderance.  At  5 P.  M. 
Halkett  and  Kielmansegge  of  Alten’s  afforded  Wellington  all 
he  needed  ; and  while  Kellermann  came  up,  when  Ney  received 
Napoleon’s  2 P.  M.  orders,  he  had  all  he  could  do  to  hold  him- 


FRENCH  FORCED  BACK  TO  FRASNES. 


585 


self.  About  5.15  p.  M.  he  learned  that  Erlon  had  left,  and 
angrily  ordered  him  back,  as  he  was  hard  pressed.  Before 
six  Wellington  had  a marked  superiority.  Ney  continued  the 
fight  in  his  old  style,  but  he  was  outnumbered,  and  the  British 
infantry  was  of  a different  class  from  the  Dutch.  The  latter 
after  a couple  of  hours  were  tired  out,  and  the  Duke  of  Bruns- 
wick was  killed,  but  the  British  and  Hanoverians  gallantly 


maintained  their  ground,  holding  the  wood  on  their  right  dur- 
ing the  entire  action.  To  withdraw  his  infantry,  Ney  threw  in 
Kellermann’s  cuirassiers  and  Pire.  This  enabled  him  to  with- 
draw, but  at  6.30  he  received  the  order  from  Napoleon  to  send 
Erlon,  and  when  Wellington  was  again  reinforced  by  Cooke, 
Ney  had  difficulty  in  holding  himself. 

After  Cooke’s  arrival  Wellington  took  the  offensive  and 
forced  the  French  back  to  Frasnes.  Ney  had  used  but  half 
of  the  troops  given  him,  and  had  not  accomplished  his  task ; 
Wellington’s  losses  out  of  over  thirty  thousand  men  succes- 


586 


IN  NAPOLEON’S  BEST  STYLE, 


sively  coming  up  were  forty-five  hundred  men,  and  the  French 
out  of  over  twenty  thousand  nearly  as  many. 

Had  Erlon  not  been  diverted,  Ney,  despite  his  slowness, 
might  still  have  won  the  battle  before  Wellington’s  reinforce- 
ments all  arrived.  Stanch  as  the  British  troops  were,  under 
the  conditions  they  could  scarcely  have  resisted  Ney’s  two 
corps ; but  it  would  have  been  at  too  late  an  hour  to  help 
Napoleon  complete  the  victory  at  Ligny. 

All  Ney  had  accomplished  was  to  contain  Wellington, — 
of  itself  an  excellent  operation,  but  only  half  what  he  might 
have  done.  Had  Wellington  suffered  a decided  backset  at 
Quatre  Bras,  Blucher,  instead  of  retiring  to  Wavre,  so  as  to 
fight  beside  him  on  the  18th,  would  probably  have  retired  on 
Namur.  In  this  much  Ney  had  failed.  On  the  other  hand, 
Wellington,  with  few  reliable  troops,  and  these  only  com- 
ing up  piecemeal,  had  held  himself  manfully,  and  in  part  re- 
deemed the  extraordinary  mistakes  of  his  staff,  as  shown  in 
the  Disposition,  and  his  own  misconception  of  the  strategical 
problem. 

Both  Ney  and  Erlon  have  found  earnest  advocates.  To 
each  laxness  may  be  charged.  But  the  main  fault  lay  with 
Napoleon,  who  did  not  make  his  orders  to  either  clear  and 
unmistakable. 

Still  from  the  broad  standpoint,  the  whole  operation,  save 
for  fatal  loss  of  time,  had  been  in  Napoleon’s  best  style.  He 
had  apparently  succeeded  in  carrying  out  the  opening  part 
of  his  programme.  While  Ney  had  not  taken  Quatre  Bras, 
contained  Wellington,  joined  the  emperor  with  a corps,  and 
made  the  battle  of  Ligny  decisive,  yet  he  had  staved  Well- 
ington off  from  succoring  Blucher.  Wellington,  after  view- 
ing Blucher’s  position  at  Ligny,  had  made  up  his  mind  and 
said  that  the  Prussians  would  get  beaten  ; and  as  Ney  kept 
him  too  busy  to  advance  to  his  colleague’s  assistance,  his  eye 


NAPOLEON’S  LAST  BULLETIN. 


587 


was  kept  more  on  his  line  of  retreat  on  Brussels,  which  a 
Prussian  defeat  might  jeopardize,  than  it  was  on  the  battle 
going  on  to  the  east  of  him. 

Thus  the  diverse  interests  and  eccentric  bases  of  the  allies 
on  which  Napoleon  was  reckoning  had  really  worked  in  his 
favor,  and  he  had  beaten  one  of  the  allied  armies  at  Som- 
breffe  ; and  even  had  Wellington  cared  to  hold  Quatre  Bras, 
he  could  not  after  Blucher’s  withdrawal  have  done  so.  The 
allies  had  apparently  been  thrust  apart  ; and  it  was  now  Na- 
poleon’s immediate  duty  so  to  manoeuvre  as  to  keep  them 
apart,  and  to  fight  each  again  singly.  All  this  was  still  within 
reach. 

Napoleon’s  last  Bulletin  possesses  its  own  interest,  despite 
the  usual  exaggerations.  This  is  what  he  says  of  the  battles 
of  Ligny  and  Quatre  Bras  : — 

Bulletin  of  the  Army,  Laon,  June  20,  1815.  “Battle  of  Ligny,  near 
Fleurus.  The  morning  of  the  16th  the  army  occupied  the  following 
positions : the  left  wing  under  Ney  with  the  1st  and  2d  infantry  corps 
and  the  2d  cavalry  corps  occupied  the  position  of  Frasnes.  The  right 
wing  under  Grouchy  with  the  3d  and  4th  infantry  corps  and  the  3d  cav- 
alry corps  occupied  the  heights  behind  Fleurus.  Imperial  headquarters 
at  Charleroi  with  the  Guard  and  the  6th  corps.  The  left  wing  had 
the  order  to  march  on  Quatre  Bras  and  the  right  on  Sombreffe.  The 
emperor  moved  to  Fleurus  with  his  reserve. 

“ After  having  passed  Fleurus,  Grouchy’s  columns  on  the  march  noticed 
the  enemy’s  army  commanded  by  Blucher  occupying  the  plateau  of  the 
mill  of  Bussy,  on  the  left  of  the  village  of  Sombreffe,  and  extending  his 
cavalry  far  in  front  of  the  Namur  road.  His  right  was  at  St.  Amand, 
and  occupied  this  big  village  with  great  forces,  having  in  front  of  it 
a ravine  that  formed  his  position.  The  emperor  had  reconnoitred  the 
forces  and  the  position  of  the  enemy,  and  resolved  to  attack  at  once.  It 
was  necessary  to  make  a change  of  front,  the  right  in  front  pivoting  on 
Fleurus. 

“Vandamme  marched  on  St.  Amand,  Gdrard  on  Ligny,  and  Grouchy 
on  Sombreffe.  Girard  marched  in  reserve  behind  Yandamme’s  corps. 


588  ON  THE  HEIGHTS  OF  BUSSY. 

The  Guard  was  ranked  on  the  level  of  Fleurus  as  well  as  the  cuirassiers 
of  Milhaud. 

“ At  3 p.  M.  these  dispositions  were  finished.  Lepol’s  division  of  Van- 
damme’s  corps  first  attacked  and  seized  St.  Amand,  driving  out  the 
enemy  with  the  bayonet.  It  held  itself,  during  the  whole  combat,  in  the 
cemeteries  and  near  the  bell  tower  of  St.  Amand.  But  this  village,  which 
is  very  much  spread,  was  the  theatre  of  many  combats  during  the  even- 
ing. All  Vandamme’s  corps  was  engaged  there,  and  the  enemy  engaged 
there  considerable  forces.  Girard,  in  reserve  to  Vandamme’s  corps,  turned 
the  village  by  his  right  and  fought  with  his  accustomed  valor.  His  re- 
spective forces  were  sustained  on  either  side  by  some  sixty  guns.  On  the 
right,  Gdrard  fought  at  the  village  of  Ligny,  which  was  taken  and  retaken 
several  times.  Grouchy,  on  the  extreme  right,  and  Pajol  fought  at  the 
village  of  Sombreffe.  The  enemy  exhibited  eighty  to  ninety  thousand 
men  and  a great  number  of  guns.  At  seven  o’clock  we  were  masters  of 
all  the  villages  situated  on  the  bank  of  the  ravine  which  covered  the  posi- 
tion of  the  enemy,  but  he  still  occupied  with  all  his  masses  the  plateau  of 
the  Bussy  mill. 

“ The  emperor  led  his  Guard  to  Ligny,  Gdrard  sent  in  what  was  left  of 
his  reserve  under  Pdcheux,  nearly  all  his  troops  having  been  engaged  in 
the  village.  Eight  battalions  of  the  Guard  debouched  with  the  bayonet, 
and  behind  them  the  four  squadrons  of  service,  of  Delort  and  Milhaud’s 
cuirassiers  and  the  horse  grenadiers  of  the  Guard.  The  Old  Guard  with 
the  bayonet  attacked  the  enemy’s  columns  on  the  heights  of  Bussy,  and 
in  an  instant  covered  the  battlefield  with  dead.  The  squadrons  of  service 
attacked  and  broke  a square,  and  the  cuirassiers  pushed  the  enemy  in 
all  directions.  At  7.30  we  had  forty  guns,  many  wagons,  flags  and  pris- 
oners, and  the  enemy  was  seeking  his  safety  in  a precipitate  retreat.  At 
ten  o’clock  the  battle  was  finished  and  we  were  masters  of  the  whole 
battlefield.  . . . The  elite  of  the  Prussian  army  has  been  destroyed  in  this 
battle.  His  loss  cannot  be  less  than  fifteen  thousand  men,  ours  is  three 
thousand  men  killed  or  wounded. 

“ On  the  left  Ney  had  marched  on  Quatre  Bras  with  a division  which 
had  overturned  the  English  division  there  placed.  But  attacked  by 
the  Prince  of  Orange  with  twenty-five  thousand  men,  part  English,  part 
Hanoverian  in  English  pay,  he  fell  back  to  his  position  of  Frasnes.  There 
multiplied  combats  were  engaged.  The  enemy  sought  to  force  him,  but 
vainly.  Ney  was  awaiting  the  1st  Corps,  which  only  arrived  at  night. 
He  contented  himself  with  holding  his  position.  . . . The  loss  of  the 


FOR  THE  PUBLIC  EYE. 


589 


English  is  estimated  at  four  or  five  thousand  men.  Ours  at  this  point 
was  quite  considerable,  being  forty-two  hundred  men  killed  or  wounded. 
This  combat  finished  at  night.  Wellington  later  evacuated  Quatre  Bras 
and  moved  on  Genappe.” 

The  reference  to  Ney  was  made  for  the  eye  of  the  public  in 
the  capital ; and  the  mention  of  the  order  to  march  on  Quatre 
Bras  and  Sombreffe  is  as  marked  as  in  the  orders. 


Napoleon’s  Library  Chair. 
(Garde  Meuble.) 


LXXIII. 


THE  CAMPAIGN  LOST.  JUNE  17  AND  18,  1815. 

On  June  16  Napoleon  had  made  a marked  gain,  although  not  all  he  had 
planned.  He  had  plenty  of  unused  troops  to  complete  Blucher’s  defeat,  or 
attack  Wellington.  An  immediate  pursuit  of  the  Prussians  would  have  quite 
broken  them  up,  but  again  Napoleon  wasted  the  forenoon.  At  8 A.  M.  he 
ordered  Ney  to  attack  Quatre  Bras,  but  himself  did  nothing  until  afternoon. 
He  then  sent  Grouchy  with  thirty  thousand  men  after  the  Prussians,  with  the 
idea  that  they  had  retired  towards  the  Rhine.  He  had  not  reconnoitred,  and 
had  mistaken  the  facts : Bluclier  had  boldly  thrown  up  his  communications,  and 
had  moved  towards  Wavre  to  join  Wellington.  Grouchy  was  scarcely  equal 
to  his  task  ; the  Prussians  kept  well  ahead  of  him.  Napoleon  marched  his 
reserves  towards  Ney,  who  had  allowed  Wellington,  on  hearing  that  Blucher 
was  moving  on  Wavre,  to  retire  in  full  daylight  of  the  17th  from  Quatre  Bras. 
The  French  followed,  and  at  night  drew  up  facing  the  allies  at  Mont  St.  Jean. 
Meanwhile  Grouchy  had  reached  Gembloux  June  17,  and  on  the  18th  had  fol- 
lowed Blucher  to  Wavre,  but  not  on  an  interior  line  which  would  keep  him  from 
joining  his  colleague.  At  midnight,  on  reconnoitring  Wellington’s  position, 
Napoleon  saw  that  he  would  stand  for  battle.  He  expected  Grouchy  to  come 
in  on  his  right,  and  had  no  fear  that  Blucher  would  reach  the  field.  Early 
June  18  Wellington  drew  up  his  sixty-seven  thousand  Anglo-Dutch  for  a defen- 
sive battle,  and  Napoleon  marshaled  his  seventy-three  thousand  French  for 
attack.  He  did  nothing  to  bring  up  Grouchy,  or  to  hold  the  roads  and  defiles 
against  Blucher’s  approach. 

While  the  operations  of  June  16  had  not  accomplished  all 
that  Napoleon’s  vast  imagination  had  planned,  yet  the  gain 
made  was  marked.  In  his  advance  from  Charleroi,  and  quite 
in  accordance  with  the  course  mapped  out,  he  had  broken 
through  the  allied  centre,  and  had  beaten  Blucher  singly. 
The  immediate  thing  for  him  to  do  was  so  sharply  to  follow 
the  shaken  Prussian  army  as  to  disable  it  for  some  days  and 
throw  it  off  in  an  eccentric  direction;  whereupon  he  might 
turn  against  the  British  army,  which  had  held  its  own  at 


CONDITIONS  PROMISING  FOR  PURSUIT.  591 


Quatre  Bras,  and  by  throwing  his  mass  upon  it,  overwhelm  it 
also.  No  one  knew  better  than  he  that  even  a routed  army 
can  be  collected  and  made  available  within  a day  or  two, 
unless  sharply  pursued ; the  conditions  were  promising  for 
pursuit,  and  while  he  was  thus  engaged  he  could  rely  on 
Wellington  undertaking  no  offensive  measures.  Busied  with 
his  defense  of  Quatre  Bras,  the  latter  had  made  no  attempt  to 
interfere  in  the  fight  at  Ligny ; it  was  his  habit  to  rest  after 
battle  as  well  as  to  fight  defensively ; and  Napoleon  could 
with  safety  detail  Ney  to  observe  him,  while  he  himself,  or  at 
least  a couple  of  corps,  harassed  the  rear  of  Blueher.  This 
smartly  accomplished,  he  could  turn  on  Wellington,  who,  in 
case  he  should  meanwhile  have  attacked  Ney,  would  run  the 
greater  danger  of  being  taken  in  reverse  the  farther  back 
he  should  have  driven  the  French  marshal. 

Napoleon  had  plenty  of  troops  not  fatigued  by  the  battle 
of  the  16th  ; the  victorious  enthusiasm  of  all  made  them  easily 
capable  of  further,  even  trying  work : and  fighting  on  suc- 
cessive days  was  no  novelty.  Lobau  had  not  been  put  in, 
the  Guard  and  the  cavalry  had  suffered  little ; over  on  the 
left  Erlon  had  done  nothing ; only  a portion  of  the  troops  had 
exhausted  their  ammunition  ; and  there  was  no  reason  why  a 
start  should  not  have  been  made  at  earty  dawn  of  the  17th  to 
finish  the  work  of  the  day  before.  Napoleon  knew  that  the 
Prussians  had  not  been  decisively  enough  defeated  to  be  out 
of  the  reckoning ; and  experience  and  knowledge  alike  dic- 
tated the  completion  of  their  overthrow.  Had  he  done  this, 
Wellington  would  have  retired  on  Waterloo,  and,  Blueher 
eliminated,  would  have  had  to  fight  there  singly ; or  else  he 
would  have  retired  on,  or  given  up  Brussels,  for  Blueher 
could  certainly  have  been  prevented  from  coming  to  his  aid. 
Such  a result  might  have  brought  on  renewed  negotiations 
for  peace.  The  operation  was  as  plain  as  that  of  Napoleon’s 


592 


WELLINGTON  GETS  A WAY. 


first  campaign,  or  as  that  of  Ratisbon ; but  unless,  as  in  1796 
or  1809,  speed  was  made  the  first  factor  in  the  problem,  the 
same  success  could  not  be  anticipated. 

A well-designed  strategic  operation  often  opens  a choice 
of  manoeuvres,  and  another  chance  for  Napoleon  has  been 
suggested.  Wellington  knew  of  the  progress  of  the  battle 
of  Ligny,  but  he  did  not  at  once  learn  of  its  full  result,  — a 
courier  sent  by  Gneisenau  had  been  wounded  on  the  road,  — 
and  he  was  still  busy  gathering  his  forces.  Only  six  miles 
away,  he  was  just  in  the  condition  to  be  successfully  attacked. 
Ney  lay  in  his  front,  and  Napoleon  could  have  brought  up 
troops  in  good  heart  to  fall  on  his  flank,  while  a compara- 
tively small  force  looked  after  the  Prussians  for  the  day. 
Starting  at  dawn,  Wellington  could  have  been  attacked  before 
eight  o’clock,  and  with  Ney  keyed  up  by  the  emperor’s  pre- 
sence, the  Anglo-Dutch  might  have  been  defeated.  But  sullen 
over  the  Erlon  incident,  Ney  had  failed  to  keep  his  chief 
posted  as  to  his  doings  of  the  16th  ; and  the  emperor  took  no 
steps  to  learn  the  situation.  Neither,  indeed,  was  he  in  a mood 
energetic  enough  to  take  advantage  of  it,  and  Wellington  got 
away  by  10  A.  M.  Yet  even  so  early  a morning  expedition 
against  Wellington  might  have  been  an  error,  for  he  had  at 
Quatre  Bras  and  Nivelles,  all  together,  more  than  sixty  thou- 
sand men. 

From  Ligny  battlefield  Napoleon  had  personally  returned 
to  Fleurus  about  Up.  m.,  — tired  out.  According  to  his 
ancient  habit,  even  in  1814,  he  would  have  taken  but  an  hour 
or  two  of  sleep,  and  then,  the  reports  of  outlying  corps  being 
all  in,  would  have  issued  orders  for  immediate  movement. 
Nothing,  however,  was  done.  When  Grouchy  came  to  head- 
quarters, he  was  told  that  he  would  receive  orders  in  the 
morning.  Soult  was  not  instructed  to  take  proper  measures. 
The  night  passed  and  no  pursuit  was  ordered.  The  morning 


FAILURE  TO  RECONNOITRE  NORTHWARD.  593 


dawned : Napoleon  still  loitered  in  Fleurus,  while  his  army 
was  bivouacked  on  the  battlefield.  He  was  really  worked  out. 
The  effort  of  June  16  would  have  been  nothing  to  him  in 
earlier  years,  but  now  it  had  not  only  robbed  him  of  his  own 
activity,  but  of  the  power  of  pushing  his  lieutenants.  No  re- 
port on  the  battle  of  Quatre  Bras  had  been  received;  and 
Flahault,  who  had  remained  with  Ney  during  the  16th,  did 
not  get  back  to  headquarters  until  early  morning  of  June  17. 
As  Ney  had  not  heard  the  details  of  the  battle  of  Ligny,  after 
Flahault’s  arrival  Soult  wrote  him  the  facts,  and  added  that 
it  would  consume  the  day  to  finish  the  business  of  the  16th, 
distribute  ammunition,  and  collect  stragglers  and  detach- 
ments. This  was  not  Napoleonic  alertness.  It  falls  far 
behind  1809  or  even  1814. 

It  is  evident  that  the  emperor  was  not  making  ready  to  do 
much  of  anything  on  the  17th.  Assuming  that  the  Prussians 
had  moved  on  Liege  at  daylight,  Pajol  had  been  sent  by 
Grouchy  out  the  Namur  road,  and  had  captured  a battery  at 
Le  Mazy ; Excelmans  followed  him  and  filed  off  towards 
Gembloux,  where  he  heard  there  were  troops  ; but  no  recon- 
noissance  was  made  towards  Tilly  and  Wavre,  although  plenty 
of  cavalry,  in  fresh  condition,  was  at  hand.  This  failure  to 
reconnoitre  northward  is  amazing.  While  Napoleon  had 
every  reason  to  believe  that  Blucher  would  retire  on  his  base, 
there  was  always  a possibility  that  he  might  have  striven  to 
join  his  allies,  and  it  was  folly  to  leave  so  important  a matter 
to  guess-work.  If  the  emperor  did  not  deem  this  action  pos- 
sible, it  accentuates  the  lapse  in  his  powers  of  estimating  mili- 
tary potentialities.  As  at  Arcis,  in  lieu  of  ascertaining  the 
facts,  he  relied  on  his  own  intuitions.  Had  he  supposed  that 
the  Prussians  had  moved  to  the  north,  and  he  could  have 
ascertained  the  fact  during  the  night,  he  would  at  once  have 
suspected  the  reason  ; but  he  was  not  abreast  of  his  work. 


VOL.  IV. 


594 


NEY  TO  TAKE  QUATRE  BRAS. 


We  remember  that  he  wrote  Soult  from  Austerlitz,  Decem- 
ber 3 : “ The  emperor  will  personally  stick  to  the  heels  of  the 
enemy.  His  opinion  is  that  in  war  nothing  has  been  done  so 
long  as  something  yet  remains  to  be  done ; no  victory  is  com- 
plete so  long  as  one  can  do  more.  ...  In  the  position  in 
which  we  find  ourselves,  there  is  only  one  thing  to  do  and  one 
general  order : to  do  as  much  damage  to  the  enemy  as  possi- 
ble, and  to  complete  the  victory.”  What  a contrast  between 
then  and  now! 

The  first  order  issued  on  this  critical  morning  was  the  one 
that  went  out  about  8 a.  m.  to  Ney,  saying  that  Pajol  was 
pursuing  towards  Namur,  that  Ney  was  to  attack  anything  in 
his  front  at  Quatre  Bras,  presumably  only  a rearguard,  and 
take  possession  of  the  place ; should  he  find  stout  opposition, 
Napoleon  would  come  over  to  take  them  in  flank.  The  em- 
peror regretted,  Soult  wrote,  that  Ney  had  not  held  his  divi- 
sions together ; that  if  Erlon  and  Reille  had  been  kept  in  one 
body,  not  an  Englishman  would  have  escaped ; or  if  Erlon 
had  gone  into  the  battle  on  the  right,  the  Prussians  would 
have  been  not  merely  beaten,  but  destroyed ; and  he  urged 
Ney  to  keep  all  his  divisions  within  a league  of  ground.  The 
emperor  seemed  more  occupied  with  Quatre  Bras  than  with 
the  pursuit  of  the  Prussians. 

Leaving  Fleurus  between  8 and  9 A.  M.,  Napoleon  drove 
towards  the  battlefield ; but  the  wheeling  being  irksome,  he 
took  to  the  saddle.  At  St.  Amand,  according  to  Grouchy, 
he  rode  to  all  the  village  outlets  where  the  heavy  fighting 
had  occurred,  and  thence  over  the  battlefield,  examining  the 
prisoners,  talking  to  the  wounded  men  and  ordering  their 
careful  treatment ; he  praised  some  regiments  that  were 
standing  in  line,  all  of  which  greeted  him  with  tumultuous 
cheers  ; and  then  he  dismounted  and  talked  long  with  Gerard 
•and  Grouchy  about  public  opinion  in  Paris,  about  the  legisla- 


ORDERS  FOR  IMMEDIATE  ATTACK. 


595 


tive  bodies,  the  Jacobins,  and  other  topics  quite  foreign  to  the 
matter  which  should  have  monopolized  his  attention.  In 
another  leader  this  slowness  might  have  been  expected,  but  in 
Napoleon,  striving  to  wrest  from  the  grasp  of  united  Europe 
the  crown  he  had  forfeited  a year  ago,  it  was  fatal.  In  such 
talk  the  precious  time  flew  by,  and  with  it  was  passing  the 
empire  which  celerity  quite  as  much  as  skill  had  built  up. 

It  was  approaching  noon.  A dispatch  came  up  from  Ney 
that  the  enemy  still  held  Quatre  Bras ; and  Napoleon  reiter- 
ated his  orders  for  immediate  attack,  which  he  would  properly 
support.  Gerard’s  division,  which  had  suffered  severely,  was 
left  on  the  battlefield ; Lobau,  the  Guard  and  Milhaud  had 
assembled  at  Marbais,  ready  to  move  along  the  chaussee 
towards  Quatre  Bras,  and  the  emperor  started  them  to  join 
Ney,  — he  himself  to  follow.  This  was  the  opening  of  the 
second  step  of  the  campaign,  on  the  plan  already  enunciated  ; 
but  there  had  been  far  too  much  pause  between  the  first  and 
second  steps.  “ Napoleon  remaining  inactive  a whole  night 
and  a whole  morning  following  a victory,”  says  Grouard, 
“ without  trying  to  reap  its  advantages,  — that  is  what  we 
have  not  seen  even  in  1813.” 

To  provide  for  containing  the  Prussians,  Napoleon  placed 
Grouchy  in  command  of  Vandamme’s  and  Gerard’s  corps, 
Teste’s  division  of  Lobau’s,  and  Excelmans’  and  Pajol’s  cav- 
alry, over  thirty  thousand  men  and  nearly  a hundred  guns, 
and  said  to  him,  as  Grouchy  subsequently  testified : “ Start 
at  once  in  pursuit  of  the  Prussians ; complete  their  overthrow 
by  attacking  them  so  soon  as  you  shall  have  got  in  touch  with 
them,  and  never  losing  sight  of  them.  I will  join  Ney’s 
corps  with  the  troops  I take  with  me,  will  march  against  the 
English,  and  fight  with  them  if  they  make  a stand  this  side  of 
the  Forest  of  Soignes.  You  will  keep  up  connection  with  me 
by  the  paved  road  which  leads  to  Quatre  Bras.”  This  last 


596 


FURTHER  ORDERS  TO  GROUCHY. 


phrase  shows  that  Napoleon  relied  on  the  Prussians  having 
retired  on  Liege.  Had  he  imagined  they  had  fallen  hack  to 
the  north,  he  would  not  have  indicated  this  route  to  Grouchy, 
as  it  was  three  sides  of  a quadrangle,  although  for  security 
a second  courier  could  have  been  wisely  so  sent. 

Grouchy  said  his  troops  needed  rest,  and  that  moving 
towards  Namur  would  isolate  him ; but  this  was  to  be  expected. 
J ust  now  was  not  the  time  to  rest  the  troops ; if  the  Prussians 
had  been  able  to  march  a distance,  so  could  the  French ; and 
Grouchy’s  turn  had  come  to  act  independently,  as  Ney  had 
done  the  day  before.  Shortly  after  talking  with  Grouchy,  a 
report  ran  in  that  some  twenty  thousand  Prussians  had  been 
seen  near  Gembloux,  and  as  this  first  led  Napoleon  to  ques- 
tion whether  they  all  had  retired  on  Namur,  he  dictated  to 
Bertrand  further  orders  to  Grouchy  to  march  to  Gembloux, 
as  well  as  explore  in  the  direction  of  Namur  and  Maestricht, 
definitely  to  ascertain  the  direction  of  their  retreat,  and  in- 
struct the  emperor,  so  that  he  might  learn  their  design  ; and 
saying,  moreover,  and  this  is  the  gist  of  the  order,  that  “ it  is 
important  to  penetrate  what  the  enemy  are  purposing  to  do, 
whether  they  are  separating  from  the  English,  or  whether  they 
are  striving  still  to  join  them,  in  order  to  fight  another  battle.” 
As  things  stood,  Napoleon  could  mean  only  that  Grouchy 
should  certainly  go  as  far  as  Gembloux,  and  as  far  beyond  as 
might  be  desirable  to  get  at  all  the  facts  ; should  keep  touch 
with,  and  never  lose  sight  of,  the  Prussians.  And  Grouchy 
was  bound  to  act  as  any  general  must  act  when  in  command 
of  what  was  in  fact  an  army,  and  not  hampered  by  hard  and 
fast  instructions.  Every  order  is  to  be  construed  by  its  pur- 
pose ; the  primary  purpose  here  was  to  ascertain  where  Blu- 
cher  was,  and  the  secondary  purpose  to  keep  him  away  from 
Wellington,  while  Napoleon  followed  the  latter.  Napoleon 
understood  the  order : was  he  justified  in  relying  on  Grouchy 


PRUSSIANS  MOVE  TO  THE  NORTH. 


597 


to  act  up  to  it  ? At  St.  Helena  he  said  that  Grouchy  “ re- 
ceived positive  orders  to  always  remain  between  the  chaussee 
from  Charleroi  to  Brussels  and  Marshal  Blucher,  so  as  to  be 
constantly  in  communication  with  the  army  and  able  to  reach 
it.”  But  this  is  not  contemporary  evidence,  any  more  than 
Grouchy’s  testimony. 

In  any  case,  Gembloux  was  in  a wrong  direction.  Grouchy 
should  have  been  sent  towards  Wavre  through  Mont  St. 
Guibert.  Napoleon  did  not  give  the  Prussians  credit  for 
having  fathomed  his  war  theory,  although  they  had  shown  in 
1813  and  1814  that  they  could  do  so.  Blucher  had  moved 
from  the  Elbe  to  the  Saale  in  1813  to  join  Schwartzenberg  ; 
he  had  moved  from  the  Marne  to  the  Seine  in  1814  to  help 
Schwartzenberg,  and  now  Napoleon  could  not  credit  his  being 
ready  to  do  the  same  thing  to  help  Wellington.  Was  the  old 
power  of  divination  passing  from  him  ? 

Perhaps  Napoleon  erred  in  giving  Grouchy  so  large  a force. 
Had  Blucher  retired  on  Liege,  much  less  would  have  sufficed, 
although  without  Blucher’s.  interference  Napoleon  would,  with 
the  rest,  have  had  enough  to  handle  the  Anglo-Dutch  prob- 
lem. Had  he  known,  as  he  ought  to  have  taken  means  to 
know,  that  the  Prussians  were  moving  to  the  north,  he  then 
would  have  made  no  mistake  in  giving  Grouchy  thirty  thou- 
sand men,  but  it  would  have  been  incumbent  on  him  to 
definitely  order  him  to  move  on  a line  interior  to  Wavre  — 
to  the  roads  the  Prussians  were  using. 

Much  obloquy  has  been  heaped  on  Grouchy  for  not  per- 
forming his  duty  with  more  energy  and  intelligence ; he  has 
had  equally  strenuous  defenders  ; but  the  emperor  could 
scarcely  have  expected  Grouchy  to  carry  out  his  orders  in 
the  manner  Davout  or  Soult  would  have  carried  them  out. 
He  could  not  tell  him  the  successive  steps  to  be  taken,  for 
he  did  not  know  what  might  happen  : he  could  and  did  give 


598  AN  EXAMPLE  OF  SLUGGISH  CONDUCT. 


only  general  — in  fact  crudely  partial  — instructions.  All  he 
could  indicate  was  the  possible  danger  of  the  Prussians  mov- 
ing again  towards  the  English,  and  Grouchy  had  to  be  left  to 
work  according  to  what  occurred.  Still,  in  view  of  Blucher’s 
retreat  to  the  north,  the  campaign  had  already  been  forfeited 
by  Napoleon’s  slowness  before  ever  Grouchy  started ; and  it 
was  Napoleon’s  fault,  if  he  expected  an  old  cavalry  general, 
who,  however  gallant,  had  never  shown  himself  equal  to  the 
command  of  an  army,  to  go  out  with  indefinite  orders  to  do 
an  indefinite  piece  of  work,  and  accomplish  it  to  perfection, 
when  he  himself  had  just  been  giving  this  general  an  ex- 
ample of  sluggish  conduct  in  a critical  situation.  Even  Ney 
had  ill  done  his  work.  Whatever  the  criticism  of  Grouchy, 
the  real  blame  lies  at  the  emperor’s  door.  He  had  ill  guessed 
the  enemy’s  operations ; he  had  failed  clearly  to  instruct  his 
lieutenants ; he  had  wasted  hour  after  hour ; he  had  not  put 
to  use  the  best  men  he  had  ; how  could  he  succeed  ? 

It  was  2 P.  M.  before  Vandamme  got  on  the  road;  and 
Gerard  was  an  hour  late.  The  weather  was  wet.  Grouchy 
did  not  get  beyond  Gembloux  that  night,  — a matter  of  five 
miles ; and  from  there  he  wrote  back  word  that  the  enemy 
appeared  to  have  moved  in  two  columns,  one  on  Wavre  and 
one  on  Perwez,  and  that  this  looked  as  if  the  left  column,  at 
least,  was  striving  to  join  the  English  ; if  he  found  the  mass 
of  the  enemy  on  the  Wavre  road,  he  should  follow  there, 
if  he  found  it  on  the  Perwez  road,  he  should  follow  there. 
From  this  report  Napoleon  drew  the  conclusion  that  Grouchy 
understood  that  his  task  was  to  keep  the  Prussian  army  busy, 
and  he  turned  to  more  immediate  work. 

While  Grouchy  was  getting  under  way,  Napoleon  had  per- 
sonally reached  Ney’s  position,  and  his  own  reserve  troops 
were  following  along  the  main  road.  He  was  too  late:  Well- 
ington had  already  retired.  Ten  good  hours  had  gone  lost ; 


BLUCHER  THROWS  UP  HIS  BASE. 


599 


Napoleon  had  dallied  while  Wellington  marched;  and  with 
these  hours,  in  view  of  the  alertness  of  old  Marschall  Vor- 
warts,  had  vanished  nearly  all  hope  of  a successful  issue  to 
the  operation  of  breaking  the  enemy’s  centre,  driving  apart 
the  two  armies,  and  maiming  each  one  singly. 

While  Blucher  may  not  at  first  have  grasped  the  broad 
military  problem  involved,  he  and  Gneisenau  had  utilized  the 
night  and  forenoon  succeeding  Ligny  battle  well.  The  vet- 
eran of  seventy-three  was  more  alert  than  Napoleon  at  forty- 
five.  Ziethen  had  been  left  to  protect  the  withdrawal  of  the 
other  two  corps,  and  to  him  at  Tilly,  Wellington  early  in  the 
morning  had  sent  an  aide,  who  ascertained  what  Blucher  had 
done  and  purposed  to  do.  Although  the  British  had  so  far 
helped  him  little,  Blucher’s  mind  remained  fixed  on  the  one 
idea  of  cooperation ; for  upon  this  present  success  alone  de- 
pended. In  order  to  work  together,  either  he  or  Wellington 
had  to  imperil  his  base  ; and  as  it  was  evident  that  the  Brit- 
ish commander  was  not  prepared  to  do  this,  Blucher,  without 
a word  of  comment,  but  instinct  with  the  desire  of  working 
for  the  general  good,  threw  up  his  own  ; and  instead  of  retiring 
from  Ligny  along  his  natural  line  of  retreat  towards  Namur 
and  Liege,  though  this  was  manifestly  his  safest  road,  espe- 
cially as  five  miles  away  was  the  Orreau,  behind  which  he 
could  draw  up  a rearguard  to  fend  off  French  pursuit,  he 
headed  from  the  battlefield,  as  already  shown,  on  a line  par- 
allel to  Wellington’s  communication  with  Brussels,  back  on 
Tilly ; and  here  the  troops  lay  on  their  arms.  Then,  at  early 
dawn,  he  started  Ziethen  and  Pirch  for  Wavre,  sending  Thiele- 
mann to  Gembloux,  so  as  to  be  nearer  his  fresh  corps  under 
Biilow,  with  whom  he  would  follow  on  other  roads ; and  by 
this  means  prepared  to  assemble  so  as  to  reach  out  towards 
the  Anglo-Dutch  army,  when  it  should  stand  for  battle  at 
Mont  St.  Jean,  as  he  had  understood  from  Wellington  was 


600 


THE  STRATEGIC  TABLES  TURNED. 


the  intention.  At  10  A.  M.,  June  17,  Ziethen  and  Pirch  were 
beyond  Mont  St.  Guibert,  and  Thielemann  was  beyond  Gem- 
bloux.  All  were  well  ahead  of  Grouchy,  who  did  not  start 
till  2 P.  M.  Although  from  Wavre  the  Prussians  might  retire 
towards  Maestricht  if  they  desired,  it  was  not  as  good  a line 
as  from  Sombreffe,  because  if  from  Wavre  they  advanced 
towards  Brussels,  their  communications  would  run  in  prolon- 
gation of  their  front,  and  put  them  in  grave  danger  of  hav- 
ing these  seized.  Yet  Blucher’s  main  object  was  clear,  — to 
join  the  English  and  force  another  battle ; and  Namur  and 
Liege  with  all  their  supplies  were  deliberately  forfeited,  de- 
spite its  being  questionable  whether  sufficient  munition  could 
be  timely  got,  if  they  moved  away  from  there.  As  to  rations, 
though  the  Prussians  used  the  magazine  system,  the  troops 
could  live,  if  need  be,  on  the  country.  Happily  for  the 
allies,  this  operation  was  not  interfered  with,  and  the  four 
corps  gradually  reached  Wavre,  and  went  into  position  there 
or  near  by ; and  still  more  fortunate,  the  ammunition  train, 
ordered  to  Wavre,  came  up  in  season.  Though  Blucher  had 
been  beaten  at  Ligny,  and  this  by  about  an  equal  force,  the 
time  afforded  him  by  Napoleon,  and  his  own  honest  purpose, 
had  enabled  him  to  turn  the  strategic  tables  on  the  French  ; 
and  as  things  now  stood,  although  they  were  still  too  far  apart, 
the  two  allied  armies  could  join  on  any  agreed  battlefield  in 
the  rear,  and  by  their  great  superiority  in  numbers  over- 
whelm the  emperor  ; or  should  Napoleon  stand  on  the  defen- 
sive, they  could  come  on  at  their  own  good  time  in  double 
his  force  to  attack  him.  Splendid  in  conception  as  was 
Napoleon’s  strategic  plan,  — and  as  a plan  it  yields  in  naught 
to  the  best  of  them  all,  — his  execution  had  been  so  dilatory 
as  to  enable  Blucher,  with  not  a tithe  of  his  ability,  by  mere 
speed,  resolution  and  clean-cut  adherence  to  the  idea  of  coop- 
eration, to  escape  from  the  trap  into  which  he  had  been  lured, 


PRAISE  TO  THE  PRUSSIANS. 


601 


and  to  prepare  the  downfall  of  the  great  master  of  the  art  of 
war.  Had  Napoleon  himself  but  moved  with  the  energy  of 
his  opponent ! 

Blucher  may  have  made  an  error  in  fighting  at  Ligny,  but 
it  was  an  error  in  the  right  direction,  that  of  cooperation 
with  Wellington ; and  when  he  was  defeated,  he  exhibited 
marvelous  courage  in  throwing  up  his  base  and  moving 
towards  Wavre  to  again  join  Wellington.  It  was  a bettering 
of  his  march  on  the  Saale  in  1813.  He  cannot  possibly  be 
held  to  have  done  more.  It  has  been  claimed  that  he  should 
at  once,  after  Ligny,  have  marched  to  join  Wellington  at 
Quatre  Bras,  Genappe,  or  Waterloo,  but  this  would  have  been 
to  make  him  more  than  a Blucher : it  would  have  made  him 
a Bonaparte.  If  Blucher  be  held  to  have  done  this,  by  how 
much  more  must  Wellington  be  found  wanting ! One  cannot, 
indeed,  too  much  praise  the  good-will  and  ability  displayed  by 
all  the  Prussians  in  this  manoeuvre,  in  which,  after  a bad 
defeat,  at  the  moment  ascribed  by  them  to  Wellington’s  fail- 
ure to  sustain  them,  they  moved  to  a junction  with  their  allies 
in  such  a manner  as  to  aid  them  to  win  a battle  on  the  second 
day,  the  manoeuvre  being  hidden  to  the  French,  though  con- 
ducted within  easy  reach.  “ No  other  general  of  that  age,  not 
Wellington  himself,  would  have  so  heroically  risen  superior 
to  defeat,  and  would  have  made  the  most  hazardous  march 
from  Wavre  to  Waterloo,”  frankly  says  O’Connor  Morris. 
However  much  we  may  admire  the  dogged  will  of  Welling- 
ton, as  he  backed  up  against  the  Forest  of  Soignes  to  fight 
the  battle  which  was  to  decide  the  fate  of  Napoleonism,  yet 
Marshal  Blucher  remains  the  hero  of  the  allied  strategy  at 
Waterloo  ; and  this  praise  to  the  Prussians  implies  corre- 
sponding blame  to  Napoleon. 

The  emperor  had  definitely  lost  the  campaign  of  1815. 

To  go  back  to  Quatre  Bras.  Before  attacking  on  the  morn- 


602 


ENGLISH  WITHDRAW  BY  DAYLIGHT . 


ing  of  the  17th,  Ney  is  said  to  have  waited  several  hours  with 
the  impression  that  a short  delay  might  induce  Wellington  to 
stand  at  Quatre  Bras,  and  enable  him  to  advance  on  his  posi- 
tion in  front,  while  Napoleon  came  on  and  took  the  English  in 
flank,  — the  pendant  of  the  manoeuvre  he  himself  had  failed 
in  the  day  before.  This  was  neither  the  spirit  of  the  old  Ney, 
nor  the  tenor  of  his  orders.  He  might  have  guessed  that  the 
British  would  not  seek  to  hold  the  right  of  the  Quatre  Bras- 
Sombreffe  line  when  the  Prussians  had  been  driven  out  of 
the  left  of  it,  although  in  excuse  for  this  lapse  it  may  be  said 
that  he  was  not  early  informed  of  the  victory  of  Ligny. 
Moreover,  N^y  erred  in  not  keeping  the  emperor  posted  as 
to  his  own  doings,  — and  this  apparently  out  of  lack  of  his 
old  frank  helpfulness.  Wellington  had  early  concluded  to 
retire  towards  Brussels,  basing  his  action  on  the  same  facts 
as  those  known  or  accessible  to  Ney,  and  had  fallen  back  at 
10  A.  M.  With  Blucher  retiring  towards  Wavre,  he  knew 
that  not  only  could  he  not  fight  at  Quatre  Bras  with  success, 
but  that  wherever  in  the  rear  he  might  stand,  the  Prussian 
army  could  debouch  upon  the  flank  of  the  French  when  they 
should  attack  him.  Early  in  the  day  there  came  an  officer 
from  Blucher,  and  by  him  Wellington  returned  word  that  he 
would  stand  at  Mont  St.  Jean  for  battle,  if  Blucher  would 
send  a corps  to  help  him.  This  news  reached  Blucher  about 
noon,  but  as  he  did  not  know  exactly  where  Thielemann 
and  Biilow  then  were,  and  his  ammunition  had  not  yet  been 
secured,  he  could  not  until  later  give  the  assurance  asked. 

Ney  did  not  penetrate  Wellington’s  design,  and  until  the 
arrival  of  Napoleon,  nothing  of  moment  was  done.  Though 
the  English  had  been  for  three  hours  in  the  delicate  position 
of  withdrawing  by  daylight  from  the  field  of  battle,  Ney  had 
not  discovered  the  fact  or  taken  any  action  to  interfere  with 
them.  South  of  Quatre  Bras  there  is  a roll  in  the  ground 


THREE  HYPOTHESES. 


603 


that  hid  the  cross-roads.  But  this  is  no  excuse,  as  recon- 
noitring would  have  disclosed  the  manoeuvre.  When,  about 
two,  Napoleon  reached  Quatre  Bras,  he  was  seriously  annoyed 
by  Ney’s  indifference ; the  attack  was  sharply  ordered  and  at 
once  delivered,  the  English  rearguard  under  Uxbridge  retired, 
and  the  French  forces  in  a heavy  thunderstorm  followed 
Wellington  along  the  Brussels  road  until  evening.  The 
emperor  had  recovered  from  his  fatigue,  and  was  active  in 
urging  on  the  men  ; but  he  could  accomplish  nothing,  and 
except  for  some  skirmishes  along  the  road,  Wellington  escaped 
unscathed.  At  eventide,  with  the  French  following  hard  upon, 
the  English  army  stopped,  and  deployed  in  a strong  position 
previously  selected  in  front  of  Mont  St.  Jean.  Wellington, 
who  had  had  prepared  a sketch  of  his  lines  in  advance,  asked 
Muffling  to  draw  up  a plan  for  the  cooperation  of  the  Prus- 
sians, which  the  latter  did  on  three  hypotheses : Should  the 
enemy  attack  Wellington’s  right,  the  Prussians  were  to  move 
on  Ohain  by  the  nearest  road,  so  that  Wellington  could  fall 
back  upon  them ; should  the  enemy  attack  the  centre  or  left  of 
Wellington,  part  of  the  Prussians  were  to  move  by  St.  Lam- 
bert and  Lasne,  and  strike  the  French  right,  and  part  move 
on  Ohain ; should  the  enemy  move  on  St.  Lambert,  which  is 
the  key  of  the  country,  to  cut  the  lines  apart,  the  Prussians 
were  to  receive  his  assault,  and  Wellington  would  attack  him 
in  the  rear. 

Deeming  it  probable  that  he  had  the  bulk  of  the  English 
army  in  his  front,  and  as  the  day  was  far  spent,  Napoleon 
made  no  effort  to  attack  that  evening,  but  halted  at  Planche- 
noit,  with  headquarters  at  Le  Caillou.  Part  of  the  army  did 
not  get  beyond  Genappe.  With  a proper  start  in  the  morn- 
ing of  the  17th,  the  French  ought  to  have  reached  Planchenoit 
by  one  or  two  o’clock,  but  they  did  not  arrive  until  seven. 
Said  the  emperor,  in  pointing  out  the  setting  sun : “ What 


604 


FRENCH  FORCES  NOT  IN  GOOD  ORDER. 


would  I not  give  to  have  to-day  the  power  of  Joshua,  and 
retard  its  movement  two  hours.”  Erlon  was  at  the  head  of 
column,  and  bivouacked  across  the  chaussee  on  the  right  of 
Planchenoit ; the  cavalry  was  in  second  line  near  Rosomme ; 
the  Guard  was  in  the  rear ; and  Lobau,  Reille  and  Keller- 
mann  lay  near  Genappe.  The  forces  were  neither  well  closed 
up,  nor  in  good  order. 

Instead  of  following  Wellington,  or  after  following  him 
some  distance  and  leaving  reasonable  forces  to  contain  him, 
Napoleon  might  have  essayed  another  manoeuvre,  have  marched 
towards  Wavre,  and  again  on  June  18  or  19  have  joined 
Grouchy  and  defeated  Blucher.  Wellington  would  probably 
have  remained  where  he  stood,  at  Mont  St.  Jean  : it  is  doubt- 
ful whether  he  would  have  left  his  position  with  speed  enough 
properly  to  sustain  Blucher.  But  Napoleon  did  not  know  the 
Prussian  whereabouts,  made  the  grave  error  of  supposing 
them  unable  and  perhaps  unwilling  to  come  to  Wellington’s 
aid,  and  acted  on  this  belief.  This  suggestion  of  a manoeuvre 
has  no  historical  value. 

After  nightfall  Napoleon  was  inclined  to  the  opinion  that 
Wellington  would  retreat  and  join  Blucher  behind  the  Forest 
of  Soignes,  whereupon  “ the  position  of  the  French  army 
would  become  very  delicate.  ...  It  was  impossible  to  hazard 
a crossing  of  the  forest,  and  to  fight  at  its  debouches  more 
than  double  its  own  forces,  formed  and  in  position ; and  yet 
in  a few  weeks  the  Russian,  Austrian  and  Bavarian  armies 
would  cross  the  Rhine  and  move  on  the  Marne.  . . . The 
emperor’s  design  was  to  follow  the  English  army  in  its  retreat 
and  strive  to  break  it  up,  despite  the  darkness  of  the  night, 
so  soon  as  it  should  be  on  the  march.”  Whatever  happened, 
to  complete  his  operation  he  must  bring  the  Anglo-Dutch 
army  to  battle  before  it  could  be  doubled  by  the  oncoming  of 
the  Prussians;  and  to  determine  whether  Wellington  would 


ON  MONT  ST.  JEAN. 


605 


stand  or  not,  at  1 A.  M.  of  the  eventful  18th  of  June,  Napo- 
leon rode  out  with  Bertrand,  and  then  walked  the  pickets  for 
over  an  hour  to  see  what  might  be  discovered.  The  watch- 
fires  on  Mont  St.  Jean  covered  so  much  ground,  and  such 
apparent  quiet  reigned  there,  that  his  opinion  was  changed  ; 
and  sundry  reports  by  peasants  came  in  to  the  same  effect : 
the  Anglo-Dutch  were  bivouacking  in  place. 

About  2 A.  M.  the  “ Wavre-Perwez  ” dispatch  ran  in  from 
Grouchy  at  Gembloux.  It  appeared  to  affect  Napoleon  little. 
He  had,  he  supposed,  already  provided  for  every  contingency, 
and  he  assumed  that  Grouchy  understood  the  importance  of 
fending  Blucher  off  the  main  French  army.  He  saw  Welling- 
ton alone  in  his  front,  and  he  was  convinced  that  he  should 
beat  him.  The  danger  of  Blucher’s  coming  up  on  his  right 
appeared  too  remote  to  consider,  and  that  the  main  reason 
why  Wellington  had  stopped  and  drawn  up  at  Mont  St.  Jean 
was  that  he  relied  on  the  Prussian  commander  to  do  this  very 
thing,  he  did  not  weigh  for  much.  On  his  part,  Wellington 
was  equally  certain  that  he  could  hold  his  own  until  his  ally 
should  arrive,  although  Wavre  was  a day’s  march  away,  and 
the  French  would  probably  be  ready  for  attack  early  next 
morning.  If  everything  should  prove  favorable  for  such  an 
attack,  it  was  clear  that  his  chances  were  not  of  the  best ; 
and  it  must  have  required  all  the  Iron  Duke’s  resolution  — 
and  in  battle  he  had  plenty  — to  draw  up  on  Mont  St.  Jean 
with  Blucher  so  far  away,  to  meet  what  he  supposed  to  be  a 
hundred  thousand  men.  Wellington  did  not  propose  to  stand 
where  he  was,  unless  part  of  the  Prussian  army  was  sure  to 
come  to  his  support,  and  this  lends  some  color  to  the  other- 
wise improbable  story  that,  during  the  early  night  of  June 
17-18,  he  rode  over  to  Blucher’s  headquarters,  to  reassure 
himself. 

It  might  indeed,  as  Napoleon  avers,  have  been  better  strat- 


606 


A FLYING  STRATEGIC  RIGHT  WING. 


egy  for  both  armies  to  retire  to  the  north  of  the  Forest  of 
Soignes,  join  there  and  await  the  French  oncoming ; but 
Wellington  preferred  his  own  plan.  It  seems,  however,  certain 
that,  if  the  weather  had  been  dry  enough  to  keep  the  ground 
solid,  and  Napoleon  had  opened  the  battle  early  in  the  morn- 
ing, in  view  of  what  did  occur  on  heavy  ground  and  late  in 
the  day,  the  Anglo-Dutch  would  have  suffered  as  marked 
a defeat  at  Waterloo  as  the  Prussians  did  at  Ligny.  Said 
Napoleon  at  St.  Helena : Wellington  “ could  do  nothing  more 
contrary  to  the  interests  of  his  party  and  his  nation,  to  the 
general  spirit  of  this  campaign,  and  even  to  the  most  simple 
rules  of  war,  than  to  remain  in  the  position  he  occupied.  He 
had  behind  him  the  defiles  of  the  Forest  of  Soignes.  If  he 
was  beaten,  all  retreat  would  be  impossible  to  him.”  Unsup- 
ported, in  face  of  Napoleon,  this  was  true. 

Wellington,  however,  at  whatever  hazard,  determined  to 
stand  his  ground  against  the  French.  From  what  he  knew 
of  Napoleon,  he  had  every  reason  to  be  cautious,  and  in  a 
defensive  battle  he  knew  he  ought  to  bring  into  line  every 
available  man : and  yet,  either  to  protect  a retreat  by  his 
right  towards  the  sea-coast  towns  and  the  English  fleet,  in 
case  he  could  not  easily  retire  through  the  forest,  or  else  from 
a dread  that  Napoleon  might  still  essay  to  turn  his  right  flank 
(no  other  good  reasons  are  apparent,  and  these  do  not  suffice), 
Wellington  had  left  Colville’s  division  at  Hal,  and  some  Neth- 
erland  troops  between  Hal  and  Engliien,  in  all  a force  of  seven- 
teen thousand  men,  as  a flying  strategic  right  wing.  We  are 
told  in  the  St.  Helena  papers  that  “ a corps  of  two  thousand 
horse  was  directed  towards  Hal,  threatening  to  turn  the  road 
of  the  Forest  of  Soignes,  and  to  move  on  Brussels.  The  Duke 
of  Wellington,  alarmed,  sent  thither  his  4th  infantry  division. 
During  the  night  the  French  cavalry  returned  to  camp.  The 
English  division  remained  in  observation,  and  was  paralyzed 


WELLINGTON  AT  FAULT. 


607 


throughout  the  battle.”  This  raid,  if  the  emperor’s  statement 
is  accurate,  added  to  the  diversions  by  the  National  Guards 
from  the  fortresses,  in  a way  accounts  for  Wellington’s  ner- 
vousness for  his  right.  Colville’s  orders  were  to  retire  from 
Braine  le  Comte  to  Hal,  by  way  of  Enghien,  or  direct, 
according  to  news  from  the  enemy ; the  Dutch  troops  were  to 
stand  between  Hal  and  Enghien,  and  hold  their  ground  as 
long  as  possible.  In  this  detail  of  seventeen  thousand  men, 
Wellington  was  clearly  at  fault:  they  might  have  been  his 
salvation  at  Mont  St.  Jean.  The  great  captain  succeeds  by 
divining  from  the  little  he  can  know  what  the  probable  action 
of  the  enemy  may  be,  and  by  acting  upon  this  divination  ac- 
cording to  certain  crisp  rules.  In  thus  guessing  the  strategic 
probabilities,  Wellington  was  far  less  expert  than  Napoleon. 

There  are  few  sources  from  which  we  can  ascertain  the 
motives  of  the  Iron  Duke  in  this,  his  greatest  campaign.  In 
1842  he  wrote  a Memorandum  on  Clausewitz’s  History,  which 
latter  was  naturally  colored  by  the  Prussian  idea;  and  in  this 
paper  he  made  statements  which  in  many  respects  do  not 
agree  with  those  in  his  dispatches,  or  indeed  with  the  facts. 
Such  variations  are  easily  referable  to  lapses  of  memory,  par- 
taken by  all  great  men  who  in  after  years  have  written  of  the 
past.  No  leader  relying  upon  his  own  memory  and  apart  from 
documents  and  consultation  with  others  has  ever  succeeded, 
many  years  afterwards,  in  compiling  quite  accurate  accounts 
of  a great  campaign.  Such  narratives  are  often  pregnant  with 
valuable  matter ; but  documents  and  the  testimony  of  others 
are  essential  to  the  reliable  narrative  of  events.  Moreover, 
in  this  case,  the  duke  was  writing  controversially.  While 
nothing  in  history  is  more  interesting  than  the  view  taken  at 
the  moment  by  a great  soldier  of  a situation,  about  the  details 
of  which  we  are  now  far  better  informed  than  he  could  then 
possibly  be,  and  his  motives  for  taking  this  or  the  other 


608 


FIRST  PROMISE  OF  AID. 


action,  yet  these  are  the  matters  most  generally  hidden  from 
us  by  time.  So  here : we  do  not  know  just  what  was  passing 
in  the  great  Englishman’s  mind  at  the  critical  moments  of 
this  absorbing  week. 

As  from  the  inception  of  the  campaign,  so  the  allied  leaders 
had  kept  up  touch  during  the  night  of  June  17-18,  and  it 
was  understood  that  the  Prussians  should  come  on  from  Wavre 
to  sustain  the  Anglo-Dutch  left.  Zietlien  and  Pirch  had 
reached  Wavre  before  noon  of  the  17th,  Ziethen  crossing  the 
Dyle;  Thielemann  through  Gembloux  had  reached  Wavre 
too  late  to  get  through  the  town.  Billow  through  Waldhain 
and  Corbaix  reached  Dion  le  Mont  in  the  evening.  Late 
at  night  the  ammunition  train  arrived  at  Wavre  ; and  on  get- 
ting news  that  Wellington  proposed  to  fight,  about  midnight 
Blucher  wrote  him  that  Billow  would  move  at  daybreak 
towards  St.  Lambert,  with  Pirch  in  support,  while  Ziethen  and 
Thielemann  would  be  held  ready  to  move.  This  first  promise 
of  aid  probably  reached  Wellington  by  breakfast  time  ; it 
must  have  buoyed  him  up  not  a little,  and  messages  passed 
during  the  whole  day.  The  Prussian  commander  did  start 
his  columns  at  an  early  hour,  via  both  Ohain  and  St.  Lambert; 
by  daylight  of  the  18th,  indeed,  the  British  saw  some  parties 
of  Ziethen’s  cavalry  van  on  the  hills  back  of  Ohain ; the 
gradual  oncoming  of  the  Prussians  was  fully  known  ; and 
though  Blucher  was  much  delayed  by  bad  roads,  he  made 
speed  enough  to  save  the  battle.  The  British  army  had  the 
satisfaction  of  holding  on  in  their  chosen  position,  with  the 
certainty  of  support  before  nightfall. 

The  Prussians  were  late  in  leaving  Wavre.  Blucher  had 
underrated  the  difficulties  of  the  march.  The  country  south 
of  WTavre- Waterloo  is  cut  up  by  little  brooks  feeding  the 
Dyle,  each  in  a valley  with  marshy  banks,  making  operations, 
especially  in  rainy  weather,  extremely  difficult.  These  brooks 


A FEELING  OF  SUSPICION. 


609 


leave  a number  of  hills  between  them,  along  which  the  roads 
are  apt  to  run,  except  when  they  cross  the  brooks.  Billow, 
who  was  well  supplied,  and,  though  he  had  marched  hard,  had 
not  been  in  action,  started  at  daybreak  from  Dion  le  Mont, 
through  Wavre  towards  St.  Lambert.  Pirch  was  to  follow, 
but  he  did  not  leave  Wavre  till  nearly  noon.  Ziethen’s  foot 
did  not  start  until  midday  by  way  of  Ohain.  Thielemann, 
unless  contained  by  Grouchy,  was  to  march  towards  Planche- 
noit  via  Couture.  Billow  had  four  miles  to  move  from  Dion 
before  he  crossed  at  Wavre,  and  in  moving  through  the  vil- 
lage, a fire  delayed  his  corps  two  hours.  Blucher  could  have 
helped  Wellington  more  quickly  by  first  starting  Ziethen  and 
Thielemann,  who  were  already  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Dyle, 
but  he  preferred  to  put  in  Billow,  who  had  not  yet  fought ; 
and  he  reckoned  on  the  troops  moving  faster  than  they  did. 
Such  delays  are  common  in  war ; late-arriving  ammunition 
and  rations  had  to  be  distributed;  and  the  troops,  coming  up 
in  sections,  were  somewhat  scattered.  The  delays  were  less, 
however,  than  Wellington’s  on  the  16th;  and  it  is  a source 
of  wonder  that  they  were  not  greater;  The  slowness  may  have 
been  due  in  part  to  a feeling  of  suspicion  at  Prussian  head- 
quarters. The  lack  of  support  at  Ligny  had  not  yet  been 
explained,  and  Blucher  and  Gneisenau  had  a right  to  feel  that 
Wellington,  even  though  unwittingly,  had  then  misinformed 
them  ; and  from  this  they  drew  the  conclusion  that  they  must 
not  now  rely  upon  him  so  far  as  to  risk  their  last  line  of 
retreat  to  the  Rhine.  However  much  Wellington  desired  to 
cooperate  with  Blucher,  we  cannot  wonder  that  the  feeling 
was  strong  in  the  mind  of  Gneisenau  that  he  was  not  certain 
to  stand,  as  he  said  he  would,  for  battle  at  Mont  St.  Jean  ; 
and  should  the  Prussians  move  thither  to  his  support  and  find 
that  he  had  retired  through  the  Forest  of  Soignes,  would  they 
not,  at  a distance  from  their  base,  and  with  their  new  line  run- 


VOL.  IV. 


610 


PRUSSIANS  PRESS  FORWARD. 


ning  back  in  prolongation  of  the  left,  be  at  the  mercy  of  Napo- 
leon and  Grouchy?  Neither  Wellington  nor  Blucher  knew 
Grouchy’s  force.  Had  Gneisenau  supposed  that  Grouchy  had 
over  thirty  thousand  men,  he  might  indeed  have  dissuaded  his 
aged  chief  from  sending  three  quarters  of  his  force  to  join  in 
the  battle  at  Mont  St.  Jean  ; but  Blucher  was  more  ready 
to  take  the  risk  than  his  chief  of  staff,  and  in  the  event  his 
opinion  prevailed.  Whether  from  one  or  the  other  cause, 
that  the  Prussian  corps  started  and  marched  deliberately  is 
not  strange  ; but  when  once  the  sound  of  the  guns  was  heard, 
every  Prussian  pressed  forward  with  eagerness.  Blucher 
urged  on  his  artillerymen  with,  “ Kinder , ihr  wollt  dodi  nicht 
class  ich  wortbruchig  werden  soli!”  “ Boys!  you  would  not 
have  me  break  my  word,  would  you?  ” 

During  the  night  of  June  17-18,  then,  Wellington  was 
standing  for  battle  at  Mont  St.  Jean ; Blucher  was  making 
ready  to  come  up  on  his  left;  Napoleon  was  preparing  to 
attack  the  Anglo-Dutch,  quite  unaware  of  the  Prussians  being 
near  at  hand.  Where  was  Grouchy,  on  whom  the  emperor 
was  relying  to  contain  the  Prussian  army  ? 

From  Gembloux,  early  June  18,  Grouchy  had  marched  to 
Sart  a Walhain.  During  the  night  he  had  made  up  his  mind 
that  the  Prussians  were  moving  on  Brussels,  and  forgetting 
that  the  main  object  of  his  manoeuvre  was  to  prevent  their 
joining  the  English,  he  still  continued  his  eccentric  direction. 
To  carry  out  the  spirit  of  his  orders,  he  should  have  filed 
towards  the  crossings  of  the  Dyle  at  Moustier  and  Ottignies, 
so  as  both  to  approach  Napoleon  and  head  off  Blucher.  He 
could  have  started  at  daybreak  June  18,  and  if  he  did  not 
reach  the  battlefield,  he  would  at  least  have  in  a fashion 
contained  the  Prussians,  who  were  marching  in  three  columns 
not  intersupporting,  and  have  given  the  emperor  a freer  hand. 

Napoleon  spent  the  night  at  Le  Caillou.  From  the  10  p.  m. 


GROUCHY  TO  CONTAIN  BLUCHER. 


611 


report  that  he  received  at  2 a.  m.  from  Grouchy,  he  might 
have  inferred,  hut  did  not,  that  the  latter  misunderstood  the 
situation.  Grouchy  had  said  that  he  might  follow  the  Prus- 
sians on  Perwez  or  on  Wavre,  and  if  he  did  the  latter,  Napo- 
leon may  have  concluded  that  he  meant  to  follow  them  on  an 
interior  line  so  as  to  head  them  off  from  joining  the  Anglo- 
Dutch.  It  would  seem  that  Napoleon  or  Soult  should  have 
written  Grouchy  at  once  to  march  to  Moustier  or  Ottignies, 
cross  there,  and  by  operating  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Dyle, 
prevent  the  Prussians  from  marching  through  the  defile  at  St. 
Lambert.  It  may  seem  unnecessary  to  tell  an  officer  intrusted 
with  thirty  thousand  men,  and  charged  with  work  like  that 
of  Grouchy,  that  his  object  was  to  contain  the  enemy,  and 
that  this  could  be  done  only  by  keeping  on  an  interior  line ; 
but  better  officers  than  Grouchy  have  failed  to  understand 
the  strategy  of  a campaign,  and  like  him  have  helped  bring 
on  disaster.  It  is  all  a part  of  the  haphazard  execution  of  a 
beautiful  plan,  the  blame  for  which  falls  on  the  emperor.  It 
is  probable  that  Soult,  and  certain  that  Davout,  would  have 
done  this  work  well,  without  further  explanation  ; the  em- 
peror assumed  that  Grouchy  would  do  so  ; and  wrapped  in 
the  belief  that  either  he  would  timely  come  in  on  his  right, 
or  else  contain  Blucher,  he  omitted  to  give  him  definite  in- 
structions, although  a body  of  horsemen  was  sent  to  Moustier 
to  meet  Grouchy’s  head  of  column.  It  is  true  that  Napoleon 
(or  Soult)  literally  acquiesced  in  Grouchy’s  suggestion  that 
he  should  follow  the  Prussians  to  Wavre  ; but  to  follow  them 
to  Wavre  meant  not  only  to  do  this  thing,  but  so  to  do  it 
as  to  prevent  their  joining  the  English,  i.  e.  on  an  interior 
line,  say  the  Dyle  left  bank.  Grouchy  had  said  he  would 
strive  to  prevent  the  Prussians  from  joining  Wellington,  and 
Napoleon  relied  too  much  on  this  assurance.  After  1 p.  m., 
June  17,  no  really  important  instructions  were  sent  to  Grouchy 


612 


ERRORS  COMMITTED. 


till  10  A.  M.,  June  18,  and  these  he  did  not  receive  until 
4 p.  M.,  when  he  had  reached  Wavre.  Ever  since  he  started, 
Grouchy  had  been  acting  on  his  own  motion  under  the 
Bertrand  order  and  the  verbal  instructions.  Napoleon  is 
censurable  for  giving  him  so  big  a piece  of  work,  and  for  not 
following  him  up  with  suitable  orders ; but  when  Grouchy 
had  it  hinted  to  him  that  the  Prussians  might  try  to  join  the 
English,  and  was  given  a free  hand  to  act  as  he  saw  fit,  it 
is  fair  to  hold  him  to  accomplish  more  than  he  did.  Had 
Grouchy  at  daylight  marched  towards  Moustier,  he  would 
have  crossed  the  Dyle  by  ten  o’clock,  at  which  time  the 
Prussians  were  still  in  their  condition  of  uncertainty,  and  his 
presence  might  have  quite  shifted  the  scenes. 

As  Napoleon  must  be  credited  with  the  splendid  plan  of 
campaign,  so  must  he  bear  the  onus  of  its  errors  of  execution. 
After  winning  a brilliant  but  half  success  at  Ligny,  he  began 
making  errors.  He  did  not  communicate  with  Ney,  or  hold 
him  in  hand  in  a manner  to  insure  his  prompt  action;  he  did 
not  pursue  the  Prussians,  but  gave  them  the  whole  morning 
of  the  17th  in  which  to  repair  their  disaster.  He  did  not 
carefully  reconnoitre,  and  therefore  did  not  send  Grouchy  on 
the  proper  route,  through  Mont  St.  Guibert,  but  on  an  eccen- 
tric route  through  Gembloux.  He  did  not  divine  that  the 
Prussians  were  moving  towards  the  English.  The  errors 
which  his  lieutenants  committed  were  trivial  as  compared  to 
his  own,  and  those  they  did  commit  were  always  traceable 
to  him.  Wellington  and  Blucher,  after  a fashion,  understood 
each  other,  Napoleon  and  Ney  and  Grouchy  did  not. 

The  campaign  of  1815  was  lost  by  Napoleon’s  laxness. 
What  Grouchy  could  have  contributed  to  success  on  June  17 
or  18,  though  it  might  have  won  Waterloo,  could  not  have 
altered  the  event  of  the  campaign. 

On  other  fields  Napoleon  had  made  mistakes,  sometimes 


WELLINGTON'S  DEFENSIVE  POSITION. 


G13 


grave  ones  ; but  as  these  had  been  covered  up  by  his  speed  or 
able  management,  or  by  the  accidents  of  the  field,  all  of  which 
had  resulted  in  success,  less  examination  is  made  into  these 
errors  and  less  weight  is  attached  to  them  than  to  those  of 
1815.  Indeed,  it  is  difficult  accurately  to  gauge  errors  that 
do  not  produce  disaster,  especially  in  that  much  evidence  with 
regard  to  them  is  apt  to  be  wanting.  But  Napoleon’s  errors 
in  1815  are  amply  testified  to,  and  are  the  more  insisted  on 
as  belonging  to  the  campaign  which  wrought  his  ruin. 

From  the  middle  of  the  straggling  village,  of  Waterloo  to 
La  Haye  Sainte,  which  was  the  centre  point  of  the  battle 
which  put  an  end  to  Napoleon’s  empire  and  career,  is  almost 
two  miles.  The  village  of  Mont  St.  Jean  lies  just  back  of 
the  battlefield.  The  hill  so  named  in  a way  dominates  the 
surrounding  country ; and  on  its  gentle  southern  slopes  was 
drawn  up  Wellington’s  army  of  allies,  numbering  sixty-seven 
thousand  men,  with  one  hundred  and  eighty  guns ; while  in 
its  front,  along  a lower  crest,  Napoleon  marshaled  the  French 
army  of  seventy-four  thousand  men,  with  two  hundred  and 
sixty  guns.  The  forces  have  been  the  subject  of  endless 
discussion,  and  the  estimates  vary  greatly.  The  above  is 
accurate  enough. 

The  English  commander’s  defensive  position,  some  three 
miles  long,  was  chosen  with  fine  tactical  judgment,  and  every 
part  of  it  had  been  long  before  studied  and  charted.  There 
were  no  field-works,  except  some  abatis  across  the  two  cliaus- 
sees,  but  the  slope  formed  a natural  glacis,  peculiarly  well 
adapted  to  artillery  fire ; and  from  the  elevated  English  po- 
sition could  be  observed  all  the  movements  of  the  French 
forces,  while  the  reverse  slope  of  the  crest  enabled  Wellington 
to  hide  his  troops  and  markedly  protect  them  from  the  French 
guns.  The  hillock  of  Mont  St.  Jean  descended  on  the  north 
to  Waterloo,  on  the  west  to  Merbe  Braine,  on  the  east  to 


Waterloo.  (Siborne’s  sketch.) 


MQtrr  si  jean 


A SERIES  OF  OUTPOSTS. 


615 


Ohain,  on  the  south  to  La  Haye  Sainte.  On  the  British 
right  the  ridge  ended  in  a valley  beyond  the  Nivelles  road,  on 
the  left  in  a high  open  space.  The  army  stood  in  two  lines, 
the  British  battalions  formed  in  two  ranks,  the  other  troops 
in  three  ranks.  In  places  each  line  was  reinforced  up  to 
much  greater  depth.  Along  the  front  of  this  line,  part  way 
down  the  slope,  ran  nearly  east  and  west  the  road  which  came 
in  through  Ohain  from  Wavre.  From  Ohain  to  the  Charleroi 
chaussee  the  road  was  lined  by  live  hedges ; farther  west  for 
nearly  half  a mile  it  was  sunken,  and  fully  six  feet  deep.  A 
second  almost  parallel  road  from  Wavre  ran  through  the  defile 
(or  difficult  crossing  of  the  Lasne)  at  St.  Lambert,  and  then 
obliqued  to  Planchenoit,  two  miles  and  a half  to  the  south. 
A third  of  a mile  in  front  of  Wellington’s  left  lay  the  three 
hamlets  of  Papelotte,  La  Haye  and  Smouhain,  whose  build- 
ings and  walls  were  occupied  and  made  available  for  defense, 
and  between  these  villages  ran  the  head  of  a small  brook, 
along  whose  banks  the  rains  had  made  the  clayey  soil  almost 
impassable.  His  centre  stood  astride  the  chaussee,  with  the 
village  of  La  Haye  Sainte,  well  held,  three  hundred  yards 
in  its  front.  His  right  turned  southwesterly  so  as,  a quarter 
mile  in  its  front,  to  lean  upon  the  old  chateau  and  farm  build- 
ings of  Hougomont,  which  lay  in  a large  grove,  and  with  its 
inclosing  walls  stood  like  a species  of  fortress.  It  was  an 
advanced  post,  one  value  of  which  was  that,  if  held,  the  Brit- 
ish line  could  be  moved  forward  so  as  to  include  it,  and 
drive  a wedge  into  the  enemy’s  line  without  danger  to  itself. 
A series  of  outposts,  difficult  to  capture,  thus  lay  in  front  of 
Wellington’s  main  line.  Though  the  ground  was  everywhere 
accentuated,  the  French  had  to  march  uphill  to  the  attack. 
From  Le  Caillou  farm,  the  chaussee  runs  up  and  over  the 
Rosomme  hill,  which  is  about  as  high  as  Mont  St.  Jean,  down 
and  up  and  over  that  of  La  Belle  Alliance,  which  is  almost  as 


616 


DEFECT  OF  BRITISH  POSITION. 


high,  and  then  down  into  the  valley  at  the  foot  of  Mont  St. 
Jean,  and  up  the  slope.  Owing  to  the  deep  ground  as  well 
as  the  position,  the  French  artillery  during  the  day  proved 
less  effective  than  the  British,  not  getting  put  to  work  at  as 
close  quarters.  Wellington  was  well  aware  in  what  a deadly 
manner  Napoleon  could  use  artillery,  and  his  screening  his 
troops  behind  the  crest  of  the  hill  showed  keen  appreciation 
of  tactical  values.  He  had  made  his  right  the  stronger  flank 
and  posted  his  reserve  near  by  it,  because  he  continued  to 
fear  an  attack  from  there  ; and  his  left  remained  the  weaker, 
because  he  expected  Blucher  to  sustain  it. 

As  Napoleon  claimed,  the  British  position  was  subject  to  the 
defect  of  having  its  line  of  retreat  along  a single  road  through 
a forest ; and  though  the  woods  were  open  enough  for  foot 
and  horse  to  march  on  either  side  of  the  road,  yet  in  case  of 
disaster,  this  was  manifestly  a peril.  Some  accounts  state 
that  the  road  was  much  clogged  up  by  the  oncoming  train 
and  by  broken-down  wagons  and  ambulances ; and  at  some 
stage  of  the  battle  this  was  altogether  probable.  In  later 
days  Wellington  said  that  the  road  was  ample,  and  that  he 
could  also  have  retired  by  his  right  towards  the  coast ; that 
the  French  could  not  have  followed  him,  as  he  could  have 
defended  the  outlet  of  the  forest,  and  this  especially  as  the 
Prussians  would  have  been  upon  the  enemy’s  heels.  But 
none  the  less,  Wellington  had  never  yet  felt  the  impact  of 
Napoleon’s  tremendous  blow,  and  as  the  18th  of  June  might 
have  opened  clear,  and  with  ground  hard  enough  for  Napo- 
leon to  move  to  the  attack  shortly  after  daylight,  the  Prus- 
sians being  eliminated,  the  position  must  be  said  to  have  had 
the  defect  mentioned.  Although  the  question  is  a pure 
hypothesis,  the  risk  did  exist.  “ The  English  general,  in  de- 
termining to  receive  battle  in  front  of  the  Forest  of  Soignes, 
counted  on  the  cooperation  of  the  Prussians ; but  this  cooper- 


NO  TWO  CHARTS  AGREE. 


617 


ation  could  not  take  place  until  afternoon.  He  therefore 
remained  exposed  alone  from  four  o’clock  in  the  morning 
until  four  o’clock  in  the  evening,  that  is  to  say,  for  twelve 
hours.  A battle  lasts  ordinarily  not  more  than  six ; this 
cooperation  was  therefore  illusory,”  say  the  Memoirs. 

The  season  had  been  wet ; the  men  slept  in  the  mud  ; 
during  the  night  of  June  17-18  it  rained  heavily,  lessening 
at  sunrise  and  clearing  about  8 a.  M.  “At  five  o’clock  the 
emperor  perceived  a few  feeble  rays  of  that  sun  which  should 
before  setting  light  up  the  destruction  of  the  English  army. 
The  Britannic  oligarchy  was  to  be  overturned.  France  was 
to  arise  again  this  day  more  glorious,  more  powerful,  and 
more  grand  than  ever,”  wrote  Napoleon  at  St.  Helena.  But 
the  fields  were  so  heavy  that  manoeuvring  until  the  sun  had 
a chance  to  dry  them  would  work  much  against  the  army 
taking  the  offensive.  To  the  troops  on  the  defensive  the 
rain  made  small  odds  : it  was  rather  a benefit. 

Among  the  hundreds  of  charts  of  this  memorable  battle, 
there  are  no  two  that  agree  as  to  the  positions  of  the  troops 
on  either  side,  at  the  opening  or  at  any  particular  moment  of 
the  day.  But  although  the  accounts  of  the  best  authorities 
vary  so  greatly  as  to  prevent  anything  like  exactness  as  to 
position  or  manoeuvre,  these  are  given  in  such  a manner  as 
not  to  mislead. 

On  the  English  left,  from  the  chauss^e  east,  were  Picton’s 
and  part  of  Cole’s  British  divisions,  and  Perponcher’s  Bel- 
gian division,  with  the  British  cavalry  of  Vivian  and  Vande- 
leur  on  the  extreme  left,  partly  deployed,  partly  in  column  ; 
one  hundred  and  twenty  guns  were  on  this  wing,  of  which 
Picton  seems  to  have  exercised  the  command.  The  villages  in 
front  of  the  left  were  held  by  Bernard,  with  over  three  thou- 
sand men.  The  infantry  was  behind  the  crest,  fairly  covered 
from  the  fire  which  would  open  the  battle,  except  Bylandt’s 


G18 


FRENCH  IN  ELEVEN  COLUMNS. 


brigade,  which  was  badly  posted  near  the  chaussee  on  the 
front  slope,  where  the  French  artillery  could  reach  it.  Be- 
hind the  left  wing  near  the  chaussee  was  Ponsonby’s  cavalry. 
The  auxiliaries  held  several  places  in  the  line.  The  centre, 
under  Orange,  was  protected  by  the  sunken  road,  and  began 
at  the  chaussee  with  Alten’s  division,  La  Haye  Sainte  being 
well  prepared  for  the  battle.  On  Alten’s  right  came  Cooke’s 
division,  a part  of  whose  troops  were  in  Hougomont.  The 
right  was  under  Hill,  and  Clinton’s  division  and  the  Bruns- 
wickers  ran  from  Merbe  Braine  westerly,  Chasse’s  Dutch- 
Belgian  division  out  as  a flying  right  wing  at  Braine  l’Alleud. 
Behind  the  centre  were  Somerset’s  heavy  cavalry  near  the 
chaussee,  mostly  in  close  column,  and  the  Dutch-Belgian  cav- 
alry on  his  right  rear.  This  made  a heavy  mass  of  cavalry 
behind  the  right.  The  artillery  was  distributed  all  along  the 
line.  The  reserve  was  of  foot,  thirteen  thousand  strong. 

From  the  positions  occupied  during  the  night,  the  French 
troops  moved  forward  in  eleven  columns,  so  as  to  deploy  into 
line  of  battle.  Four  were  to  form  the  first  line,  four  the 
second,  three  the  third.  At  nine  o’clock  the  heads  of  the 
first  four  columns  reached  their  places,  and  “ deployed  with 
great  precision  and  without  confusion.”  All  the  columns 
marched  to  the  music  of  trumpets  and  drums,  “ the  bands 
playing  the  airs  which  reminded  the  soldiers  of  the  memory 
of  a hundred  victories.  The  earth  seemed  proud  to  bear  so 
many  brave  men.  The  spectacle  was  magnificent,  and  the 
enemy,  who  was  placed  so  as  to  be  able  to  see  the  army  to 
the  last  man,  must  have  been  struck  by  it,”  say  the  Memoirs. 

The  first  French  line  was  under  Ney,  and  had  Erlon  on  the 
right,  leaning  his  left  on  the  chaussee  at  La  Belle  Alliance 
tavern,  and  with  cavalry  on  the  extreme  right  opposite  Smou- 
hain.  His  divisions  stood  from  the  right : Durutte,  Mar- 
cognet,  Donzelot,  Allix  (later  Quiot).  Reille  was  on  the 


THE  RIVAL  ARMIES. 


619 


left,  with  his  right  leaning  on  the  tavern,  and  stretched  as 
far  as  the  Nivelles  road,  the  divisions,  in  order  from  the 
right:  Bachelu,  Foy,  Jerome.  Pire’s  cavalry  stood  astride 
the  Nivelles  road.  Each  infantry  division  was  in  two  lines, 
the  second  two  hundred  feet  behind  the  first,  with  artillery 
in  front.  In  the  right  wing  the  artillery  was  in  the  brigade 
intervals.  In  second  line,  or  as  a sort  of  first  reserve,  to 
sustain  early  assaults,  stood  Lobau’s  corps  with  Domon  and 
Subervie.  Kellermann’s  cuirassiers  were  between  the  two 
roads,  off  on  his  left ; Milhaud’s  cuirassiers  were  some  dis- 
tance off  on  his  right.  In  third  line  or  reserve  stood  the  foot 
Guard,  in  front  of  Rosomme,  with  Guyot  on  the  left,  and 
Lefebvre-Desnouettes  on  the  right,  but  advanced. 

The  centres  of  the  rival  armies  were  nearly  a mile  apart. 

Though  the  best  British  regiments  were  still  in  America, 
from  whence  they  had  not  returned  since  the  peace,  the 
English  troops  and  the  German  Legion  were  excellent.  The 
Hanoverians  were  militia,  but  they  had  been  in  service  quite 
as  long  as  most  of  the  French  levies ; and  though  many 
nationalities  were  represented  in  Wellington’s  command,  it 
was  yet  composed  of  as  good  material  as  Napoleon’s,  save 
that  the  French  army  was  homogeneous.  That  the  Belgian 
and  Nassau  troops  were  nervous  at  fighting  Napoleon  did  not 
count  for  more  than  the  fact  that  the  French  recruits  knew 
that  Wellington  had  always  defeated  their  veteran  comrades 
in  Spain.  So  far  as  mere  fighting  was  concerned  on  this  day, 
both  French  and  English  can  agree  to  share  the  honors. 
Nothing  practically  was  lost  by  bad  conduct. 

The  habit  of  the  French  was  to  make  their  assaults  in  line 
of  battalion  columns,  or  with  deployed  battalions  in  the  centre 
and  battalions  in  column  at  half  distance  on  the  flanks,  so  as 
to  give  good  front  fire  and  retain  the  ability  to  form  square. 
This  formation  was  also  the  rule  with  the  Prussians,  and  with 


Waterloo.  No. 


VALUE  OF  LINE  AGAINST  COLUMN . 


621 


‘Wellington’s  German  contingents.  But  the  British  troops 
mainly  fought  in  the  two-rank  line  which  gave  such  effective 
volleys  and  had  proved  so  successful  in  the  Peninsula,  depth 
being  secured  by  one  or  more  additional  lines  or  bodies  in 
support,  in  the  rear. 

It  seems  unnecessary  to  repeat,  even  for  the  non-military 
reader,  when  the  value  of  line  against  column  is  mentioned, 
that  it  is  not  meant  that  the  British  troops  stood  only  in  one 
long  two-rank  line,  faced  everywhere  by  a deep  column;  but 
rather  that  for  the  purpose  of  best  utilizing  their  defensive 
fire,  the  British  battalions  stood  in  two  ranks,  with  small 
intervals  between  battalions  ; and  that  other  troops,  in  their 
rear,  although  ready  to  come  forward  to  support  them,  were 
not  at  the  instant  engaged,  — indeed,  often  laydown  or  were 
concealed  out  of  range  ; whereas  the  attacking  French  col- 
umns at  deploying  intervals  were  all  put  in  at  the  same  time, 
and  being  deeper,  suffered  more  from  the  fire.  Each  such 
column  was  subjected  to  direct  fire  in  front,  and  to  oblique 
fire  upon  its  flanks  by  the  troops  which  stood  opposite  the 
intervals  between  it  and  its  neighbors.  The  column  had  the 
greater  momentum,  but  much  less  effective  fire  until  it  could 
deploy.  One  must  constantly  bear  in  mind  that  the  Anglo- 
Dutch  at  Waterloo  were  at  the  outset  nearly  as  numerous 
as  the  French  opposing  them ; that  during  most  of  the  battle 
they  much  outnumbered  them  ; that  they  occupied  a similar 
space,  and  that  per  metre  of  front  as  many  allies,  or  more, 
were  in  line,  differently  distributed.  It  was  just  in  this  dis- 
tribution, and  its  proper  application,  that  Wellington  showed 
his  strong  tactical  ability. 

There  had  occurred,  in  January  of  this  year,  the  remarkable 
battle  of  New  Orleans,  which  tends  to  illustrate  what  has  here- 
tofore been  said  about  the  relative  value  of  line  and  column. 
To  defend  the  city,  after  a preliminary  manoeuvre,  General 


622  PAST  MASTER  OF  DEFENSIVE  TACTICS. 


Jackson  had  intrenched  himself  with  his  Kentucky,  Tennessee' 
and  Texas  sharpshooters,  and  some  militia,  three  thousand 
men  in  all,  behind  a cotton-bale  rampart,  clad  in  mud,  with 
a ditch  in  front.  The  British,  with  nearly  double  his  force, 
composed  largely  of  the  best  Peninsular  troops,  used  to  victory 
and  led  by  such  veterans  as  Pakenham,  Lambert  and  Gibbs, 
assaulted  the  position  with  a gallantry  rarely  equaled,  never 
surpassed.  But  in  less  than  half  an  hour  they  were  thrown 
back  with  the  amazing  loss  in  killed  and  wounded  of  twenty- 
one  hundred  men  to  only  twenty-two  of  the  defenders. 

This  battle  does  not  prove  that  Jackson’s  sharpshooters 
were  any  more  brave  than  the  British  troops.  It  was  merely 
a failure  of  an  assault  in  line.  In  the  open  country,  or  under 
equal  circumstances,  the  sharpshooters  would  no  doubt  have 
succumbed  to  the  better  British  discipline.  Nor  does  Talavera 
or  Albuera  prove  that  the  British  were  either  more  courageous 
than  the  French,  or  that  their  line  as  a tactical  formation  was 
better  than  the  French  column.  These  and  similar  instances, 
such  as  occurred  at  Bunker  Hill  and  in  the  late  Boer  War,  only 
tend  to  prove  that  a certain  type  of  man,  regular  soldier  or 
not,  placed  in  an  advantageous  position  on  the  defensive,  and 
handled  with  determined  skill,  or  actuated  by  a powerful 
motive,  can  maintain  his  position  against  the  very  best  of  regu- 
lar troops.  The  instances  of  this  are  so  numerous  throughout 
history  that  it  is  unsafe  to  draw  from  any  victory  or  victories 
a general  conclusion  of  the  value  of  one  formation  against 
another.  The  battles  in  the  Peninsula  and  the  later  battle 
of  Waterloo  merely  go  to  show  that  Wellington  was  Past 
Master  of  Defensive  Tactics,  and  that  the  French  attacks 
lacked  coherence  and  skill.  Wellington  had  a good  class  of 
troops  to  lead,  and  he  placed  them  with  consummate  ability  and 
knowledge  of  what  he  had  to  accomplish.  It  does  not  seem 
as  if  what  he  did  at  Mont  St.  Jean,  or  in  Spain  or  Portugal, 


bfl 

cS 

6 

o 

'S 


624 


NAPOLEON’S  ACTION  MODIFIED. 


proved  broadly  that  the  line  was  superior  to  the  column.  It 
merely  was  so  under  the  existing  conditions. 

After  a reconnoissance  from  the  Belle  Alliance  hill,  Napo- 
leon returned  to  the  farm  of  Rosomme  and  took  up  his  stand 
on  the  highest  ground  near  by. 

“ At  eight  o’clock  the  emperor’s  breakfast  was  brought,”  say  the 
Memoirs,  “at  which  several  general  officers  sat  down.  He  said:  ‘The 
enemy’s  army  is  superior  to  ours  by  nearly  a quarter.  We  have  none  the 
less  ninety  chances  for  us  and  not  ten  against  us.’  ‘No  doubt,’  said  Mar- 
shal Ney,  who  came  in  at  this  moment  ; ‘if  the  Duke  of  Wellington  was 
simple  enough  to  await  Your  Majesty  ; but  I have  come  to  announce  that 
his  columns  are  already  in  full  retreat.  They  are  disappearing  in  the 
forest.’  ‘ You  have  ill  looked,’  answered  this  Prince.  ‘ There  is  no  longer 
time.  . . . He  would  expose  himself  to  a certain  loss.  He  has  cast  the 
dice  and  they  are  for  us,’  ” say  the  Memoirs. 

Napoleon’s  original  idea  had  been  for  an  opening  attack  on 
Wellington’s  left,  which,  if  successful,  would  crowd  him  still 
farther  away  from  the  Prussians,  and  which  was  in  consistent 
sequence  to  the  general  plan  of  the  campaign.  In  other 
words,  he  would  attack  with  his  right  wing,  so  as  to  crush  the 
English  left  and  throw  Wellington  back  into  a bad  country. 
Durutte  was  to  attack  Papelotte  and  La  Haye,  while  Ney  led 
Erlon’s  other  divisions  on  the  east  of  the  chaussee.  Jerome 
was  to  attack  Hougomont,  Bachelu  and  Foy  were  to  operate 
on  his  right,  and  upon  Jerome  was  to  be  executed  a species 
of  echeloned  left  wheel,  sustained  by  Lobau  first  and  the 
Guard  next.  Had  this  been  promptly  done,  it  might  have 
stopped  the  Prussian  oncoming  ; but  Ney  early  discovered  that 
the  brook  which  runs  among  the  villages  opposite  the  French 
right,  though  its  banks  were  low,  yet  was  so  deep  in  mud  that 
not  even  foot  could  pass  it  in  good  order.  He  suggested  that 
the  assaulting  columns  should  cross  farther  up  the  brook;  and 
his  report  modified  Napoleon’s  action,  so  as  to  bring  the  assault 
more  upon  the  British  centre.  This  latter  was  one  of  Napo- 


READY  TO  TAKE  THE  RISK. 


625 


leon’s  favorite  operations;  he  had  used  it  at  Ligny  ; and  with 
Wellington’s  single  road  of  retreat,  a rupture  of  his  centre 
would  throw  both  wings  aside  where  they  could  not  possibly 
reunite,  and  each  might  be  badly  compromised.  That  by 
attacking  the  Anglo-Dutcli  left  he  would  have  exposed  his 
own  right  and  rear  to  the  onset  of  the  Prussians,  was  not  reck- 
oned on  by  the  emperor. 

While  the  French  army  was  still  marshaling,  Napoleon 
sent  an 

ORDER. 

To  each  Army  Corps  Commander,  June  18,  1815,  11  a.  m.  Once  the 
whole  army  shall  be  ranked  in  battle  order,  at  about  1 p.  m.,  at  the 
moment  when  the  emperor  shall  give  the  order  to  Ney,  the  attack  is 
to  commence,  so  as  to  seize  the  village  of  Mont  St.  Jean,  where  is  the 
intersection  of  the  roads.  To  this  effect  the  battery  of  twelve-pounders 
of  the  2d  and  6th  Corps  will  join  that  of  the  1st.  These  twenty-four  guns 
will  fire  on  the  troops  on  Mont  St.  Jean,  and  Erlon  will  commence  the 
attack,  moving  forward  his  division  on  the  left  and  sustaining  it  accord- 
ing to  circumstances  by  the  divisions  of  the  1st  Corps.  The  2d  Corps  will 
advance  in  such  measure  as  to  keep  on  a level  with  Erlon.  The  sapper 
companies  of  the  1st  Corps  will  be  ready  to  barricade  themselves  at  once 
at  Mont  St.  Jean. 

Napoleon’s  confidence  that  he  would  beat  the  enemy  was 
founded  on  the  expectation  that  Grouchy  would  come  in  on 
his  right,  as  Ney  was  to  have  done  at  Ligny  on  his  left;  or 
at  least  that  he  would  contain  the  Prussians,  as  Ney  had  the 
Anglo-Dutch.  Although  it  must  have  occurred  to  him  that 
Wellington  was  standing  for  battle  with  the  belief  that  the 
Prussians  would  come  up,  yet  he  was  ready  to  take  the  risk 
that  they  could  not  do  so.  Had  he  deemed  the  risk  serious, 
he  would  have  attacked  Wellington  earlier,  despite  the  ground, 
and  he  would  have  sent  out  at  daylight  to  see  that  Grouchy 
hurried  towards  him  by  the  proper  road,  — at  least  in  his  early 
days  he  would  have  done  this.  He  relied  on  Grouchy  more 


VOL.  IV. 


626 


AN  UNUSUAL  PAGEANT. 


than  he  should,  especially  with  the  country  roads  over  which 
he  had  to  march. 

At  10  A.  M.  Napoleon  received  a 6 a.  m.  dispatch  from 
Grouchy,  without  any  explicit  news  of  Blucher,  but  indicating 
his  own  march  as  on  Sart  aWalhain.  The  emperor  had 
gleaned  news  of  a heavy  force  of  the  enemy  marching  on 
Wavre,  and  he  answered  — the  first  dispatch  since  1 P.  M. 
of  the  17th  — that  Grouchy  might  also  move  towards  Wavre, 
the  natural  inference,  as  he  supposed,  being  that  the  march 
would  be  so  directed  as  to  contain  Blucher. 

The  reports  received  appeared  to  convey  to  Napoleon  no 
impression  that  Blucher  could  escape  Grouchy  and  take  part 
in  the  coming  battle ; and  as  between  eight  and  nine  the  troops 
were  being  marshaled,  with  bands  still  playing  and  the  regi- 
ments hurrahing,  “the  emperor  rode  the  ranks.  It  would 
be  difficult  to  express  the  enthusiasm  which  animated  all 
the  soldiers.  The  infantry  raised  their  shakos  at  the  ends  of 
their  bayonets,  cuirassiers,  dragoons,  light  cavalry  their  hel- 
mets and  shakos  on  the  points  of  their  swords.  Victory 
appeared  certain,”  say  the  Memoirs.  The  emperor  felt  as 
much  assurance  as  at  any  one  of  his  great  battles.  This 
unusual  pageant  was  resorted  to,  to  consume  the  time  and 
keep  the  spirit  of  the  men  at  proper  tension,  and  must  have 
been  an  interesting  sight  to  the  allied  troops  on  the  hills 
above.  But  while  Wellington  could  view  the  entire  deploy- 
ment, there  was  nothing  that  would  permit  him  to  penetrate 
Napoleon’s  design. 


Sword  of  the  Period. 


WRITINGS  WHILE  AT  ST.  HELENA.  735 

10.  Abstract  of  the  Military  Events  happening  during  the 

Year  1798.  11  pages. 

“ This  Abstract  is  reproduced  according  to  the  original  manuscript 
given  in  1841  by  General  Bertrand  to  the  Library  of  the  town  of 
Chateauroux.” 

11.  Abstract  of  the  Military  Events  happening  during  the 

First  Six  Months  of  1799.  25  pages. 

“ This  Abstract  is  reproduced  according  to  the  original  manuscript 
given  in  1841  by  General  Bertrand  to  the  Library  of  the  town  of 
Chateauroux/’ 

12.  Abstract  of  the  Military  Events  happening  during  the 

Last  Six  Months  of  1799.  31  pages. 

“ This  Abstract  is  reproduced  according  to  the  original  manuscript 
given  in  1841  by  General  Bertrand  to  the  Library  of  the  town  of 
Chateauroux.” 

13.  18  Brumaire.  21  pages. 

“ This  fragment  is  reproduced  according  to  the  Memoirs  to  serve 
for  the  History  of  France  under  the  Reign  of  Napoleon  I.  Edition  of 
1830.  We  have  not  got  the  original  manuscript.” 

14.  Provisional  Consuls.  24  pages. 

“ This  Abstract  is  reproduced  according  to  the  original  manuscript 
given  in  1841  by  General  Bertrand  to  the  Library  of  the  town  of 
Chateauroux.” 

15.  Defense  of  Genoa  by  Massena.  20  pages. 

“ This  Abstract  is  reproduced  according  to  the  original  manuscript 
given  in  1841  by  General  Bertrand  to  the  Library  of  the  town  of 
Chateauroux.” 

16.  Marengo.  25  pages. 

“ This  Abstract  is  reproduced  according  to  the  original  manuscript 
given  in  1841  by  General  Bertrand  to  the  Library  of  the  town  of 
Chateauroux.” 


736 


WRITINGS  WHILE  AT  ST.  HELENA. 


17.  Ulm  — Moreau.  21  pages. 

“ This  Abstract  is  reproduced  according  to  the  original  manuscript 
given  in  1841  by  General  Bertrand  to  the  Library  of  the  town  of 
Chateauroux.” 

18.  Diplomacy  — War.  42  pages. 

“ This  Abstract  is  reproduced  according  to  the  original  manuscript 
given  in  1841  by  General  Bertrand  to  the  Library  of  the  town  of 
Chateauroux.” 

19.  Neutrals.  33  pages. 

“ This  Abstract  is  reproduced  according  to  the  original  manuscript 
given  in  1841  by  General  Bertrand  to  the  Library  of  the  town  of 
Chateauroux.” 

20.  Notes  on  the  Abstract  of  Military  Events,  or  Histori- 
cal Essays  on  the  Campaigns  of  1799  to  1814.  35  pages. 

This  Abstract  was  a work  in  19  volumes  by  General  Mathieu 
Dumas,  Paris,  1816-1826. 

“These  Notes  are  reproduced  according  to  a copy  contributed  by 
Madame  la  Comtesse  de  Montholon.” 

21.  Four  Notes  on  the  Work  entitled  Memoirs  to  serve 
for  the  History  of  the  Revolution  of  Santo  Domingo.  12 
pages. 

This  was  a work  in  2 volumes  by  General  Yicomte  de  Lacroix. 
Paris,  1819. 

“ These  Notes  are  reproduced  according  to  the  Memoirs  to  serve 
for  the  History  of  France  under  the  Reign  of  Napoleon  I.  Edition  of 
1830.  We  have  not  got  the  original  manuscript  of  this  dictation.” 

22.  Six  Notes  on  the  Work  entitled  The  Four  Concordats. 
34  pages. 

This  was  a work  in  3 volumes  by  Monsieur  de  Pradt,  formerly 
Archbishop  of  Maliues.  Paris,  1818. 

“ These  Notes  are  reproduced  according  to  a copy  contributed  by 
Madame  la  Comtesse  de  Montholon.” 


WRITINGS  WHILE  AT  ST.  HELENA. 


737 


23.  The  Island  of  Elba  and  the  Hundred  Days.  132 
pages. 

“ This  portion  of  the  Works  of  Napoleon  entirely  unpublished, 
is  given  here  according  to  the  original  manuscript,  bearing  numerous 
corrections  and  additions  by  the  hand  of  the  emperor.  This  manu- 
script has  been  contributed  by  General  Henry  Bertrand.” 

24.  Campaign  of  1815.  81  pages. 

“ This  portion  of  the  Works  is  reproduced  according  to  the  original 
manuscript  contributed  by  Madame  la  Comtesse  de  Montholon.” 

25.  Notes  on  the  Letters  written  from  Paris  during  the 
last  Reign  of  the  Emperor  Napoleon.  Translated  from  the 
English  of  J.  Hobhouse.  12  pages. 

A work  in  2 volumes,  published  at  Ghent  and  Brussels  in  1817. 

“The  Commission  has  thought  it  interesting  to  issue  these  Notes 
heretofore  remaining  unpublished.  They  are  nearly  all  by  the  hand 
of  the  emperor.  The  original  manuscript  has  been  contributed  by 
General  Henry  Bertrand.” 

26.  Notes  on  the  Manuscript  coming  from  St.  Helena  in 
an  Unknown  Manner.  16  pages. 

The  Manuscript  was  by  Lullien  de  Chateauvieux,  first  published 
in  England  in  1827. 

“These  Notes,  of  which  the  original  text  has  not  been  found,  are 
here  reproduced  according  to  the  publication  made  by  General  Gour- 
gaud,  under  the  following  title  : The  Manuscript  of  St.  Helena , 
published  for  the  first  time  with  notes  of  Napoleon.  Paris,  1821.” 

27.  Letters  from  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope.  60  pages. 

Doctor  Warden  published  in  1817  some  Letters  written  from  St. 
Helena.  Napoleon,  discovering  errors  therein,  wrote  this  work, 
which  reached  Europe  in  1817,  and  was  published  in  English  without 
the  name  of  the  author,  and  afterwards  translated  into  French. 

“It  is  quite  probable  that  these  letters  are  by  Napoleon  himself, 
as  has  been  time  and  again  asserted  by  General  Bertrand,  General 
de  Montholon  and  Comte  Marchand  ; the  Commission,  moreover,  has 
received  from  General  Henry  Bertrand  the  contribution  of  a first 


VOL.  IV. 


738 


WRITINGS  WHILE  AT  ST.  HELENA. 


editing  which  bears  numerous  corrections  and  additions  by  the  hand 
of  the  emperor.”  Napoleon  did  not  at  first  intend  that  these  letters 
should  be  published  as  from  him,  but  the  Commission,  as  a matter 
of  historical  interest,  has  thought  well  to  include  in  the  Works  of 
Napoleon  I.  the  most  important  of  these  Letters  from  the  Cape.  What 
appears  in  the  Correspondence  is  a translation  from  the  English 
work. 

28.  Eighteen  Notes  on  the  Work  entitled  Considerations 
on  the  Art  of  War.  100  pages. 

This  was  a work  by  Lieutenant-General  Baron  Rogniat.  Paris, 
1816. 

“ These  Notes  are  reproduced  according  to  the  original  manuscript, 
bearing  numerous  corrections  by  the  hand  of  the  emperor.  This 
manuscript  has  been  contributed  by  General  Henry  Bertrand.” 

29.  Notes  on  the  Introduction  to  the  History  of  the  War 
in  Germany  in  1756,  by  General  Lloyd.  8 pages. 

This  was  a work  published  in  England  and  Brussels  in  1784. 

“ These  Notes  are  reproduced  according  to  a manuscript  con- 
tributed by  General  Henry  Bertrand.  The  work  of  Lloyd,  with  the 
marginal  annotations  of  Napoleon,  has  been  given  to  the  city  of 
Bordeaux,  which  keeps  it  in  its  Museum.” 

30.  Project  for  a New  Organization  of  the  Army.  32 
pages. 

“This  project  is  reproduced  according  to  a copy  contributed  by 
4 General  Henry  Bertrand.  There  is  reason  to  believe  that  this  copy 
is  not  complete,  and  that  the  emperor  had  given  to  his  work  a longer 
development,  but  it  has  been  impossible  to  find  what  seems  to  be 
missing.” 

31.  Essay  on  Field  Fortification.  23  pages. 

“This  Essay  is  reproduced  according  to  a copy  contributed  by 
General  Henry  Bertrand.” 

32.  Reflections  on  Suicide.  2 pages. 

“ These  Reflections  are  reproduced  according  to  the  original  manu- 
script contributed  by  Comte  Marchand.” 


WRITINGS  WHILE  AT  ST.  HELENA.  739 

33.  Observations  on  the  Tragedy  of  Mahomet.  By  Vol- 
taire. 4 pages. 

“ These  Observations  are  reproduced'  according  to  the  original 
text  contributed  by  Comte  Marchand.” 

34.  Note  on  the  second  book  of  the  Eneid  of  Virgil.  3 
pages. 

“ This  Note  is  reproduced  according  to  the  original  manuscript 
contributed  by  Comte  Marchand.” 

N.  B.  The  Commission  has  not  published  the  Notes  on  the  History 
of  the  Embassy  of  Warsaw  in  1812 , because  they  are  too  short  to  be 
understood  without  inserting  the  whole  volume  of  Abb£  de  Pradt. 
Nor  has  it  published  the  Notes  on  the  Memoirs  of  Fleury  de  Cha- 
boulon,  as  these  were  too  meagre,  and  as  everything  interesting 
therein  is  found  in  the  Island  of  Elba  and  the  Hundred  Days. 

35.  Abstract  of  the  Wars  of  Julius  Caesar.  89  pages. 

“ This  Abstract  is  reproduced  according  to  the  original  manuscript 
contributed  by  Comte  Marchand.” 

36.  Abstract  of  the  Wars  of  Marshal  Turenne.  71 
pages. 

“This  Abstract  is  reproduced  according  to  the  Memoirs  to  serve 
for  the  History  of  France  under  the  Reign  of  Napoleon  1.  Edition  of 
1830.  We  have  not  got  the  original  manuscript.” 

37.  Abstract  of  the  Wars  of  Frederick  II.  83  pages. 

“ This  Abstract  is  reproduced  according  to  the  Memoirs  to  serve 
for  the  History  of  France  under  the  Reign  of  Napoleon  1.  Edition  of 
1830.  We  have  not  got  the  original  manuscript.” 

38.  Biographical  Notes.  4 pages. 

“ These  Notes  seem  to  have  been  destined  to  anonymous  publica- 
tion. They  have  so  far  remained  unpublished.  They  are  reproduced 
in  this  collection  according  to  the  original  writing,  partly  by  the 
hand  of  the  emperor,  which  has  been  contributed  by  General  Henry 
Bertrand.” 


740 


WRITINGS  WHILE  AT  ST.  HELENA. 


39.  Extracts  from  the  Memorial  of  St.  Helena.  63  pages. 

This  was  a work  in  8 volumes,  entitled  Memorial  of  St.  Helena , or 
Journal , where  will  he  found  inserted  day  by  day  what  Napoleon  said 
and  did  during  eighteen  months.  By  Comte  de  Las  Cases.  Paris, 
1823. 

N.  B.  The  Commission  has  left  out  matter  already  treated  by 
Napoleon  in  other  portions  of  his  works.  It  has  taken  from  the 
memorialists  of  St.  Helena  only  that  which  is  given  by  each  one  of 
them  as  a dictation  of  the  Emperor  Napoleon,  or  as  literal  transcrip- 
tion of  his  words. 

40.  Extracts  from  Napoleon  in  Exile.  24  pages. 

This  was  a work  in  2 volumes,  entitled  Napoleon  in  Exile , or  A 
Voice  from  St.  Helena.  The  opinions  and  reflections  of  Napoleon  on 
the  most  important  events  of  his  life  and  government , in  his  own  words , 
by  Barry  E.  O’Meara,  Esq.,  his  late  surgeon.  London,  1822. 

N.  B.  The  Commission  has  left  out  matter  already  treated  by 
Napoleon  in  other  portions  of  his  works.  It  has  taken  from  the 
memorialists  of  St.  Helena  only  that  which  is  given  by  each  one  of 
them  as  a dictation  of  the  Emperor  Napoleon,  or  as  literal  transcrip- 
tion of  his  words. 

41.  Extracts  from  the  JZecitals  of  the  Captivity.  41 
pages. 

This  was  a work  in  2 volumes,  entitled  Recitals  of  the  Captivity  of 
the  Emperor  Napoleon  at  St.  Helena , by  General  Montholon,  compan- 
ion of  his  captivity  and  his  first  testamentary  executor.  Paris,  1847. 

N.  B.  The  Commission  has  left  out  matter  already  treated  by 
Napoleon  in  other  portions  of  his  works.  It  has  taken  from  the 
memorialists  of  St.  Helena  only  that  which  is  given  by  each  one  of 
them  as  a dictation  of  the  Emperor  Napoleon,  or  as  literal  transcrip- 
tion of  his  words. 

42.  Extracts  from  the  Memoirs  of  Doctor  Antommarchi. 
10  pages. 

This  was  a work  in  2 volumes,  entitled  Memoirs  of  Doctor  Antom- 
marchi, or  The  Last  Moments  of  Napoleon.  Paris,  1825. 


WRITINGS  WHILE  AT  ST.  HELENA. 


741 


N.  B.  The  Commission  has  left  out  matter  already  treated  by 
Napoleon  in  other  portions  of  his  works.  It  has  taken  from  the 
memorialists  of  St.  Helena  only  that  which  is  given  by  each  one  of 
them  as  a dictation  of  the  Emperor  Napoleon,  or  as  literal  transcrip- 
tion of  his  words. 

43.  The  Captivity.  86  pages. 

This  contains  sundry  letters  by  Napoleon,  preserved  by  General 
Montholon  and  General  Bertrand,  letters  by  these  two  gentlemen 
and  sundry  other  persons,  notes  of  things  said  by  Napoleon  at  St. 
Helena,  and  much  other  matter  relating  to  his  confinement  there. 

44.  Testament.  20  pages. 

“ This  testament  ” (last  will)  “ is  reproduced  according  to  the 
original  preserved  in  the  archives  of  the  Empire.” 


Meissonier’s  French  Eagle. 


APPENDIX  F 


PARTIAL  LIST  OF  SOURCES  CONSULTED  IN  WRIT- 
ING THIS  HISTORY  OF  THE  ART  OF  WAR. 

(Alexander,  Hannibal , Ccesar,  Gustavus,  Frederick  and  Napoleon.) 

The  full  titles  are  not  given.  “Alison’s  Europe,”  or  “ Rustow’s  1796-97,”  or  “ Jomini’s 
Great  Operations,”  or  “ Chesney’s  Waterloo,”  or  “ Vegetius  de  Re  Mil.”  suffices  to  identify 
the  works  in  the  index  of  any  library  which  contains  the  volumes.  Most  of  the  titles  are  given 
in  English. 

A.  G.,  Napoleon’s  Maxims.  — Abrantes,  Memoirs  — Adelung,  Pragra.  Hist’y.  — Adderfeld, 
Charles  XII.  — Affaires  Etrangeres,  Archives  des. — Albemarle,  Fifty  Years. — Alison, 
Europe  ; Castlereagh  ; Marlborough.  — Allied  Armies  and  Schwartzenberg.  — Almanachs, 
Sundry. — Alombert  et  Colin,  1805  en  Allem. — Alombert,  Diirrensteiu.  — Ammian,  Hist. 
Rome.  — Anderson,  Sir  John  Moore.  — Andrade,  Guerrilleros  1809.  — Andrews,  Mod.  Europe. 

— Angeli,  Ulm  and  Aust’z  ; Archd.  Charles.  — Anhalt,  Diary.  — Annuals,  Sundry.  — Annual 
Register.  — Antoine,  Godart.  — Antommarchi,  Napoleon. — Aosta,  Archives.  — Appian,  Hist. 
Rome.  — Archenholtz,  Gustavus  Adolphus  ; Seven  Years’  War.  — Archives  of  Berlin,  Vienna, 
Munich,  Stuttgart,  Dresden,  Paris,  many  German  towns  and  princely  houses.  — Arneth, 
Eugene;  Maria  Theresa;  Austria.  — Arrian,  Alexander. — Arteche,  Independence . — Artil- 
lerie,  Archives  del’.  — Assolant,  1812. — Aster,  Leipsic;  Dresden;  Explanation;  Kulm  ; Sun- 
dry Mil.  Wks.  —Aubrey,  Revitaillement. 

Baader,  Niirnberg.  — Bade,  Pr.  Eugene  1813.  — Bailleu,  Prus.  and  France;  Dip.  Corr. — 
Baine,  Revolution.  — Balagny,  Napoleon  in  Spain.  — Baldamus,  Sc.  of  War.  — Barbier,  Louis 
XV.;  1812;  Diet.  — Barge,  Phoenic.  Colonies.  — Barral,  Waterloo.  — Barras,  Memoirs.  — Bar- 
thold, Gustavus.  — Batty,  1815.  — Baudus,  Napoleon.  — Baumgart,  Frederick.  — Baurain, 
Gustavus.  — Bausset,  Memoirs;  Napoleon’s  Court. — Beamish,  German  Legion.  — Beaurain, 
Flanders;  Cond6  ; Luxemburg. — Beauregard,  Archives.  — Beer,  Austria  and  Russia. — 
Beitzke,  1812;  1813-15. — Beker,  Desaix.  — Belhomme,  Infantry.  — Bellang6,  Fr.  Soldiers. — 
Belliard,  Memoirs. — Bellot,  Toulouse.  — Bellune,  Memoirs.  — Belle  Isle,  Memorabilia;  Corr. 

— Belmas,  Sieges  in  Peninsula.  — Beltrami,  Napoleon,  1814.  — Beneckendorf,  Fr.  Wilhelm  I. 

— Berenhorst,  Art  of  War.  — Berndt,  Glogau.  — Bernhardi,  Mem’s;  Toll;  Frederick.  — Bernis, 
Mem’s.  — Berthezene,  Souv.  Mil.  — Berthier,  Mem’s;  Egypt  and  Syria;  Marengo;  Registre; 
1798-99.  — Berton,  Fleurus  and  Waterloo.  — Bertrand,  St.  Helena;  1798-99.  — Bessler, 
Blucher.  — Bevern,  Precis.  — Bibliotheque  Historique,  Liskenne  and  Sauvan.  — Bielfeld, 
Familiar  Letters.  — Bigelow,  Strategy.  — Bignon,  France.  — Binder,  Geist  u.  Stoff.  — Biogra- 
phies, Sundry.  — Biography,  Military,  Leipsic.  — Biornberg,  Russian  War.  — Bischoff,  Fred- 
erick’s Conversations. — Bismark,  Cavalry. — B.  K.  C.  von,  Geist  and  Stoff. — Blakeney, 
Peninsular  War.  — Bleibtreu,  1812;  1813.  — Blesson,  Sieges  1815.  — Blucher  in  his  Corr.  Con- 
chard.  — Blumen,  Day  Book  1806-19.  — Blumenthal,  Ziethen,  1813.  — Bockenheimer,  Mainz. 

— Bogdanovich,  1812;  1813;  1814.  — Boger,  Bacon.  — Boguslavski,  Vendee;  Copenhagen;  1896, 
Modes  of  Fighting.  — Bonaparte  (Louis),  Docums.  Hist.;  French  Artillery.  — Bonin,  Freder- 
ick and  Leopold.  — Bonnal,  Rossbach  and  Jena;  Masters  of  War.  — Bonnart,  Histoire,  etc.  — 
Boothby,  A Prisoner.  — Boonegue,  Bergon  op  Zoom.  — Borkowsky,  Frederick  and  England.  — 
Boulay  de  la  Meurthe,  Talleyrand.  — Bourdillon,  Journal.  — Bourgeois,  Moscow.  — Bourg  St. 


758 


APPENDIX  F. 


Pierre,  Archives.  — Bourienne,  Memoirs. — Bouvier,  Italy.  — Boyer,  Scharnhorst. — Bracken- 
bury,  Frederick.  — Brandt,  Life  of  Gen.  — Bremen,  Kesselsdorf  ; Ratisbon  ; Leipsic.  — Bren- 
del,  White  Hill.  — Brialmont,  Wellington.  — Brockhaus,  Niirnberg  ; Hist.  Pocketbook.  — Bro- 
druck,  Imp’l  Army,  1757.  — Broglie,  Memoirs;  Frederick  and  Mar.  Theresa.  — Brossier, 
1800.  — Browne  (Fd.  Ml.),  Reports. — Browne,  Wellington.  — Brunker,  Peninsula.  — Buch- 
holz,  Prussia.  — Biiddaus,  Dicty.  — Bugeaud,  Spect.  Mil. ; Maxims,  etc.  — Bulletin  Helv6- 
tique.  — Bulletins,  des  Lois  ; de  l’Arm6e.  — Bullock,  Diary.  — Billow,  Geist,  etc.  ; 1800.  — 
Bunau,  Imp’l  Hist.  — Burghesh,  Letters  of  Wellington.  — Burkersrode,  Saxons  in  1812.  — 
Burton,  Queen  Anne.  — Biisching,  Legends  ; Geography;  Contrib.  Notable  People.  — Butter- 
worth,  Waterloo. — Buturlin,  1812;  1813. 

Cabanas,  Napoleon.  — Cabany,  Baylen.  — Caesar,  Commentaries.  — Cagliani,  Gt.  St.  Ber- 
nard. — Camon,  Clausewitz  ; Napoleonic  Battle  ; Napoleonic  War.  — Campaigns  of  Fr.  Mar- 
shals in  Germany.  — Campana,  1800.  — Campredon,  Danzig. — Canitz,  Frederick’s  Cavalry.  — 
Canson,  Napoleonic  War.  — Capefigue,  Cent  Jours. — Carlyle,  Heroes;  Frederick;  French 
Revolution  ; Miscellanies.  — Carnot,  Memoirs.  — Carr,  Governments.  — Carru,  Memoirs.  — 
Casalas,  1812.  — Casse,  Memoirs.  — Castellane,  Journal.  — Catherine  II,  Memoirs.  — Caulain- 
court,  Recollections.  — Cayrol,  Scott.  — Cazalas,  1812.  — Cazenove,  Sabretache.  — Cerrini, 
Saxons  in  1813.  — Chaigneau,  Journal.  — Cliamboulon,  Memoirs.  — Chambray,  1812.  — 
Chapuis,  1812 ; 1815. — Chaptal,  Souvenirs.  — Charles  (Archd.),  1794-95;  1799;  Strat.  in  Ger. 
1796.  — Charles  XII.,  Sundry  Hist’s  of. — Charles  (Prince),  1757;  Secret  Letters  ; Reports  ; 
Reflections.  — Charras,  1813  ; 1815.  — Charv^riat,  Thirty  Years’  War.  — Chassin,  Pacifica- 
tion. — Chemnitz,  Gustavus.  — Chenier,  Davout.  — Chesnel,  Mil.  Dict’y.  — Chesney,  Waterloo 
Lectures.  — Chesney,  worked  up  by  Gt.  Ger.  Gen.  Staff.  — Chevaux  C^lebres,  par  J.  B.  N.  — 
Christen,  Austria.  — Choppiu,  Kellermann.  — Chotard,  Louis  XIV.  — Chuquet,  Valmy;  Wis- 
sembourg;  Jemappes  ; Retraite;  Mainz;  Napoleon. — Churchill,  Letters.  — Cicero,  Speeches, 
etc.  — Ciriacy,  Sieges,  1815.  — Clarendon,  Rebellion.  — Clark,  Cromwell.  — Clausewitz,  Gus- 
tavus; 1796;  1799;  1806;  1812;  1813;  1814;  1815;  Vom  Kriege.  — Clement,  1813.  — Clerc, 
Soult.  — Cleve,  Soult  in  1813-14.  — Clinton,  Waterloo.  — C.  M.,  Marlborough  and  Eugene.  — 
Cochrane,  Autobiography.  — Cogniazzo,  Aus.  Veterans;  Frederick.  — Coignet,  Cahiers.  — Col- 
borne,  Narrative.  — Colin,  1793  ; 1805,  Alsatia  and  Pal.;  Mil.  Educ’n  of  Napoleon  ; Tactics  and 
Disc. — Collingwood,  Corr. — Collini,  Voltaire. — Compton,  Caesar.  — Conchard,  1812. — 
Cond6,  by  Desormeaux.  — Confidential  Corr.  Napoleon  with  Joseph.  — Conrady,  1814.  — Con- 
stant, Memoirs;  Cent  Jours.  — Cooper,  Diary.  — Cope,  Rifle  Brig.  — Cornelius  Nepos,  Lives, 
etc.  — Cornaro,  1796-97  in  Ger. ; 1796  in  It. ; 1812.  — Corr.  (official)  of  Austria;  of  Bavaria; 
of  Napoleon.  — Costello,  Memoirs.  — Cottin,  Toulon.  — Cotton,  Waterloo.  — Couderc,  Last 
Armies.  — Coutanceau,  1794  A.  du  Nord.  — Couvreu,  Marmont.  — Coxe,  Gustavus;  Marl- 
borough; Walpole;  Courts;  Austria;  Memoirs;  Pelham.  — Craan,  Waterloo.  — Creasy,  Dec. 
Battles.  — Crillon,  Louis.  — Criss£,  Turpin  de,  Essays.  — Crists,  Archd.  Charles,  1809.  — 
Croker,  Diary.  — Cronholm,  Gustavus.  — Crossard,  Memoirs.  — Crown  Prince  to  King  of  Bav. 

— Cugnac,  1800  A.  de  Res.  — Cumberland,  Duke  of,  Life.  — Curiosity  Militaires.  — C.  v.  W. 
(Muffling),  1813.  — Czartoryski,  Memoirs.  — Czekelius,  Sil.  Wars. 

Daguerre,  St.  Pierre.  — Dalrymple,  Portugal.  — Dalton,  Waterloo  Roll  Call. — Damitz, 
1815.  — Damitz  and  Grolman,  1814.  — Danielevski,  1805;  1814.  — Danielevski  and  Miliutin,  1812. 

— Daun,  Reports,  Army  Journal. — Dautane,  Spectateur  Mil. — David,  1794-95.  — Davout  a 
Hamburg.  — Davout,  3e  corps  ; Memoirs.  — Day  Book  of  1814,  by  Eugene  of  W.  ; Sundry 
others. — Decken,  Thirty  Years’  War. — Decker,  1796;  Seven  Years’  War.  — Delanoe,  Anc. 
Fortif.  — Delbruck,  Gneisenau.  — Demiau,  5e  regiment.  — Deposito  de  la  Guerra,  Italy.  — 
De  Pradt,  Hist,  de  l’Amb.  — Derr^cagaix,  Mod.  War.  — Derode,  Friedland.  — Deroy  to  King 
of  Bav.  — Desbriere,  Projets  Debarq.,  1793-1805  ; Cavalry  ; Sundry  Works.  — Dessau  (Leop.), 
Autobiog’y.  — De  Wette,  Duke  of  Saxony.  — Desormeaux,  Gustavus ; Conde.  — Desprey, 
1793-97  ; Memoirs.  — Dessole,  Army  of  Italy.  — Desvemois,  Memoirs.  — Devrient,  Gustavus.  — 
Dewitz,  Diary.  — Dickhutli,  Rossbach.  — Dictionaire  Mil.  Paris,  94.  — Diodorus  Siculus, 
Hist’l  Liby.  — Dion  Cassius,  Rome.  — Dionysius,  Rome.  — Ditfurth,  Borodino  ; Hessians.  — 
Division  Reports,  (Sundry)  Journals  and  Day  Books.  — Documents  Etr.  1805  ; ditto  Inedits; 
ditto  on  Waterloo.  — Dohm,  Celebrities. — Dombrovski,  Poland.  — Donnersmarck,  Reliques. 

— Dumouriez,Vie  et  M^moires.  — Dresden,  State  Archives  ; War  Archives.  — Droysen,  Alex- 
ander ; Gustavus;  Pr.  Politics;  Frederick;  Wartenburg.  — Ducasse,  Vandamme;  Supple- 


APPENDIX  F. 


759 


ment ; Silesia  ; 1812.  — Dudik,  Gustavus.  — Dufour,  Strategy.  — Dubesme,  Archives  ; Light 
Inft’y. — Dulaure,  Paris.  — Duller,  Archd.  Charles.  — Dumaine,  Souvenir.  — Dumas  (A.),  Na- 
poleon. — Dumas  (M.),  Precis;  Souvenirs.  — Du  Mege,  Toulouse.  — Dumouriez,  Autobiography. 

— Dunant,  Manuscrit.  — Duncker,  1st  Sil.  War. — Dundas,  Tactics. — Duparcq,  Mil.  Art. — 
Durdent,  Moscow.  — Durutte’s  Div.  by  Rouil.  — Duval,  Napoleon,  Biilow  and  Bernadotte.  — 
Duvernet,  Voltaire.  — Duvernoy,  Frederick’s  fortif’n.  — Duvivier,  Gustavus  ; Span.  Succ. 
War. 

Eberstein,  Mems. — Eckhardt,  1812.  — Edicts,  Prussian.  — Elchingen,  Doc.  In6d.  1815. — 
Eliott,  Portugal. — Ellesmere,  Essay.  — Ense,  Biographies  ; Leopold;  Seydlitz.  — Ense,  Blu- 
cher  ; Keith;  Voltaire. — Erlon,  Life  of.  — Ernouf,  K16ber.  — Erman,  Sophie  Charlotte. — 
Espagnac,  M’l  Saxe.  — Eugene,  Memoirs ; Hist.  Vienna ; 1755 ; Reflections  on  Flanders.  — 
Eugene  and  Grammont,  Conversations.  — Eugene’s  Campaigns,  from  Impl.  Archives,  Vienna. 

— Eugene’s  Correspondence.  — Eugene  of  Wurt.,  Day  Book  of  1814.  — Eutropius,  Hist. — 
Exner,  Saxons  in  1809 ; in  1812. 

Faber  du  Faur,  Russia  — Fabricius,  Partisans.  — Fabry,  1796-77;  1812  ; 1813.  — Fain,  1812 ; 
1813  ; M.  S.  1814 ; Invasion  of  France  ; Memoirs.  — Fassmann,  Fr.  William ; August  the 
Great.  — Fastes  de  Louis  XV.  — Faure,  Napoleon.  — Fav<5,  Art’y.  — Favrat,  Poland.  — Feld- 
ziige,  Prussia,  1740-79. — Ferdinand  of  Br.,  Papers;  Reports;  Reflections;  Diary.  — Ferra- 
rius,  Eugene.  — Feuquieres,  Gustavus  ; Memoirs.  — Fezensac,  Souv.  Mil.  ; Russia.  — Finken- 
stein,  Mil.  Diet.  — Fischer,  Anspach  ; Thirty  Years’  War  ; Frederick.  — Fletcher,  Gustavus.  — 
Florus,  Rome.  — Flussan,  Dipl.  Transactions.  — Folard,  Polybius.  — Fonscolomb,  Mil.  Art.  — 
Formanek,  Inf.  Regt.  41. — Formey,  Souvenirs  ; Citizen.  — Forster,  1813;  Gustavus,  Wallen- 
stein.— Forster,  Fr.  William  I. ; Urkundenbuch  ; Prussia;  Heroes. — Fortescue,  Br.  Army. 

— Foucart,  Bautzen;  1806;  1807;  Cavalry,  1806.  — Foucli£,  M^moires. — Fournier,  Napoleon. 

— Foy;  Peninsula. — Fragments  Historiques.  — Fraser,  Sir  A.  S.,  Waterloo. — Fraser,  Sir 
Wm.,  Wellington. — Frazer,  Letters. — Frederick  the  Great’s  Wars,  by  Gt.  Ger.  Gen.  Staff. 

— Frederick,  Works ; Corr.  with  his  generals ; Letters  to  his  family.  — Freytag,  Memoirs ; 
German  People.  — Freysing’s  Div.,  Report  of.  — Friant,  Vie  du  Genl.  — Frimcaul,  Napoleon. 

— Fririon,  Mil.  Educ’n.  — Frobenius,  Mil.  Lexicon.  — Frobenius  and  Kohlhauen,  Hist,  of  the 
World. — Frontinus,  Strategy. — Fuchs,  Mollwitz. — Furse,  Marengo  and  Hohenlinden. — 
Fyffe,  Modern  Europe. 

Gachot,  Massena  ; 1799  ; Suwarrov.  — Gallitzin,  Hist.  War.  — Garden,  Treaties.  — Gardiner, 
Thirty  Years’  War.  — Gardner,  Quatre  Bras,  Ligny  and  Waterloo.  — Gardyne,  Hist.  92d  Reg’t. 

— Gamier,  C6te  d’Or.  — Garve,  Frederick  II.  — Gaudi,  Mem’s.  — Gazette,  Nat.  1812.  — 
Gawler,  Waterloo.  — Gazette,  London,  Reprints  from.  — Geijer,  Swedish  History. — Gelder, 
Memoirs.  — Genie,  Archives  du. — George,  Russia  ; English  Battles.  — Gerard,  Documents; 
Waterloo  ; Observ.  on  Grouchy.  — Gerneth,  5e  Bavarois.  — Gesammelte  Nachrichten,  Leipsic. 

— Geyler,  Frederick.  — Gforer,  Gustavus. — Gibbon,  Roman  Empire. — Gibbs,  Napoleon. — 
Giesses,  Diary.  — Gifford,  Fr.  Revolution.  — Gille,  Conscrit  de  1808.  — Gindely,  Thirty  Years’ 
War.  — Giraud,  1814-15.  — Giroard,  1814.  — Gironcourt,  19th  Century.  — Girod  de  1’ Ain,  Foy  ; 
Ebl6  ; Drouot.  — Gleig,  Wellington;  Waterloo.  — Gneisenau,  Vie  de  ; 1815.  — Gohier,  Me- 
moirs.— Goler,  Dyrrachium  and  Phar.  — Goltz,  Nation  in  Arms;  Rossbach  and  Jena;  Conduct 
of  War.  — Gomm,  Letters  and  Journals.  — Gonneville,  Memoirs.  — Gore,  Waterloo. — Gottfried, 
Chronicle.  — Gourgaud,  1815  ; St.  Helena  Journal ; Russia.  — Gouvion  St.  Cyr,  see  St.  Cyr.  — 
Gotzinger,  Saxon,  Switzerland.  — Graham,  Diary.  — Grande  Encyclopedic.  — Grauert,  Vistula. 

— Great  Ger.  Gen.  Staff,  Prussians  in  1812  ; Wars  of  Frederick  ; Pirmasens  and  Kaiserslautern  ; 
numerous  pamphlets.  — Grenier,  Eylau  and  Friedland.  — Greville,  Diaries.  — Griffiths,  Napo- 
leon..— Grimoard,  Critiques.  — Grimvard,  1792-94.  — Grisot,  Maxims  of  Napoleon  ; Pamphlets. 

— Gronow,  Reminiscences.  — Grossmann,  Mansfeld.  — Grote,  Greece.  — Grouard,  Napoleonic 
Strategy;  Maxims;  1813;  1815;  Napoleonic  Battles.  — Grouchy,  1812-14;  1815;  Observ. — 
Griinhagen,  Frederick's  1st  Sil.  War;  Sil.  under  Frederick. — Gualdo  Priorato,  Critiques. 

— Gudin,  Archives.  — Guerre,  Archives  de  la.  — Guhrauer,  Leibnitz.  — Guibert,  Tactique. 

— Guillaume,  Pays-Bas.  — Guillemard,  Memoirs.  — Guillon,  Spain.  — Guischard,  Art  of 
War.  — Guizot,  Memoirs.  — Gunther,  1800.  — Gurwood,  Dispatches  of  Wellington.  — Gustavus, 
Letters. 


760 


APPENDIX  F. 


Hallam,  Hist.  Works.  — Hamburg,  Anon.  Hist.  of. — Hamilton,  Gren.  Guards. — Hamley, 
Operations;  Wellington.  — Hardenberg,  Memoirs.  — Hardy,  Fleurus  ; French  Tactics.  — Har- 
rison, Cromwell.  — Hart,  Reflections;  Art  of  War. — Hartmann,  1799;  1808-15  in  Spain; 
1812.  — Hauterive,  1793-1805.  — Hausmann,  7e  Bavarois.  — Hawker,  Journal.  — Hay,  Penin- 
sular War.  — Hazlitt,  Napoleon.  — Heigel,  Bavaria  ; Aus.  Succ.  War.  — Heilman,  Wrede  and 
Bavs.  1813;  1800.  — Heisman,  Rus.  Gen.  Staff.  — Helbig,  Wallenstein. — Heldengeschichte  , 
Frederick  II.  — Heller,  Corr.  of  Eugene.  — Helldorf,  Wurtemberg  ; Kulm.  — Helvetian  Re- 
public, Acts  of.  — Henckel,  Frederick.  — Henderson,  Cumberland.  — Hennebert,  Gribeauval ; 
Hannibal.  — H^risson,  The  Black  Cabinet.  — Herrmann,  Marengo.  — Herodotus,  History. — 
Heyme,  Relation.  — Hildebrandt,  Anecdotes.  — Hiller,  1814.  — Hinard,  Diet.  — Hirsch  and 
Kowalski,  Repertory.  — Hirschberg-Wuttke,  1756-58.  — Histoire  (Anon.)  de  l’ex-garde  ; de  la 
peninsule;  des  camp,  de  Napoleon  en  1805-06  et  1807-09.  — Historical  Record  Life  Guards. 

— Historique,  Artillerie  6e  Corps ; of  3e  Hulan’s ; chev.  leg.  polonais  ; de  l’ambassade,  etc. 

— Hoenig,  Volks  Krieg.  — Hoffmann,  Borodino  ; 1813.  — Holier,  Tyrol  in  1809.  — Hohenlohe- 
Ingelfingen,  Letters.  — Holberg,  Denmark.  — Holies,  Baireuth.  — Holtzendorf , Saxon  Inf. ; 
Refut.  of  Funck.  — Hooper,  Waterloo;  Wellington.  — Hopfner,  1806-07.  — Hopp^,  Hanover. 

— Hornmayr,  Aus.  Plutarch;  Ger.  Hist.;  Pilgrims;  Richelieu.  — Horn,  Gt.  Elector;  Fr. 
William.  — Hordt,  Memoirs.  — Horsburgh,  Waterloo.  — Hortig,  Mantua. — Houssaye,  1814; 
1815.  — Hoyer,  Sc.  and  Hist’y  of  War ; Pontoons.  — Hubner,  Genealogy.  — Hugo,  Deux  Isles. 

— Hugo  (A.),  Mil.  France.  — Huidekoper,  Mil.  Studies ; sundry  Papers.  — Hulot,  Souvenirs ; 
Artillerie.  — Hume,  England.  — Hurter,  Gustavus.  — Hyde  Kelly,  Wavre  and  Grouchy.  — 
Hy ernes,  Napoleon.  — Hyndford,  Papers. 

Ideville,  Bugeaud.  — II  Corriere  Milanese.  — Infantry  Mem’s,  Hague  1743.  — “ Instruc- 
tions ” of  Prussian  Army. 

J.  C.  1796-97.  — Jackson,  Waterloo.  — Jalins,  Army  Org’n  ; Hist,  of  Sc.  of  War.  — James, 
Naval  History. — Janin,  Waterloo.  — Jarrys,  Thirty  Years’  War.  — Jerome  (Bonaparte), 
Memoirs.  — Johnston,  Napoleon.  — Jomini,  Napoleon  ; Great  Oper’s  ; Strategy  ; Art  of  War  ; 
Revolution;  1815.  — Jones  (G.),  Waterloo. — Jones  (J.),  1807-12  in  Spain.  — Jonquiere,  see 
La  J.  — Joseph  (Bonaparte),  Memoirs.  — Josephus,  Hist.  Jews.  — Jourdan,  Memoirs;  Sambre 
and  M.  ; 1796.  — Journal  de  l’Arm^e  de  Catalogne;  des  Operations  de  l’art’ie;  d’un  officier 
Bavarois;  d’un  officier  d’t5tat-major ; des  sciences  militaires  ; des  operations  de  la  le  arm6e; 
d’un  officier  Wurtembergois  ; pour  l’art,  la  science  et  l’histoire  ; du  le  corps  russe  ; des  oper. 
du  le  corps;  des  dix  campagnes  ; de  la  2e  brigade  ; of  a soldier  of  71st  regiment ; of  sundry 
regiments  ; of  Saxon  Army.  — Judson,  Caesar.  — Julius,  Critiques.  — Jung,  Bonaparte.  — Jus- 
tinus,  Hist.  Macedonia. 

Kausler,  Critical  Works;  Eugene;  Atlas;  Battles.  — Kennedy,  Waterloo.  — Ker,  Secret 
Transactions. — Kerchnarve,  Cav’y  at  Leipsic. — Keym,  Crit.  Works;  Eugene.  — Kheven- 
hiiller,  Observation  Points.  — King,  Br.  Army.  — Kircheisen,  Napoleon.  — Klein,  Pr.  Laws. 

— Kleist,  Dresden.  — Klinggrafen,  Dispatches.  — Klopp,  Magdeburg.  — Klopslusch,  Jena.  — 
Kloss,  Portrait. — Klotz,  Frederick  as  Engineer. — Knesebeck,  Rem.  Russia;  Ferdinand. — 
Knorr,  Bluclier.  — Knotel,  Uniforms.  — Koch,  Massena.  — Koch  u.  Schrell,  1814;  Treaties  of 
peace.  — Kochly,  Caesar.  — Kohler,  Empire;  Warfare;  Muntzbelustigungen.  — Kortzfleisch, 
D.  of  Brunswick,  1809.  — Koser,  Frederick;  Pr.  State  Papers;  Brandenburg.  — Kriegelstein, 
Ratisbon.  — Kriele,  Kunersdorf.  — Krogh,  Diary.  — Krychnow,  Mems.  — Kuhl,  1796.  — Kiis- 
ter,  Character  Sketches;  Lebensrettungen.  — Kutzen,  Kolin  ; Leuthen. 

La  Barre  Duparcq,  Art  of  War.  — Labaume,  1812.  — La  Beaumelle,  Maupertius.  — Labe- 
doyere,  Napoleon.  — Lacr^telle,  France.  — Lafaille,  Duhesme.  — Lafarelle,  Sabretache.  — 
La  Graviere,  Alexander.  — Lahure,  Souv.  Mil.  — La  Jonquiere,  Jemappes  ; Egypt.  — Lameth, 
Letters. — Lamiraux,  Soult ; St.  Sebastian. — Landwehr,  Prus.  in  1813.  — Lanresac,  Liitzen. 

— Lanfrey,  Napoleon;  Memoirs. — Langeron,  Mem’s.  — Lapene,  Ebro;  Pyrenees,  etc. — 
Laraviaux,  Soult. — Larrey,  Chirurgie  Mil. — Las  Cases,  Ste  Helene ; Lowe.  — Latour 
d’ Auvergne,  Waterloo.  — Lausanne,  Gazette  de.  — Lavalette,  Memoirs.  — Laveaux,  Frederick 
II.  — Laverne,  Suwarrov.  — Lavisse,  Napoleon.  — Lazan,  1808.  — Leach,  Sketches.  — Lecestre, 
Lettres  ingd. ; Napoleon.  — Lecomt6,  Spain  1808-14.  — Lecourbe,  Vie  Mil.  — Leeke,  Seaton  at 
Waterloo ; Supplement.  — Leipsic,  by  Rothenburg.  — Legendre,  Memoirs.  — Lehman,  Freder- 


APPENDIX  F. 


761 


ick  and  Seven  Years’  War;  Scharnliorst.  — Leibnitz,  Brunswick. — Leith-Hay.  — Lejeune, 
Memoirs.  — Lemoine,  Bonaparte. — Le  Page,  Carbineers.  — Le  Petit,  Charles  XII. — Le 
Ploge,  Torgau,  1813.  — Leslie,  Military  Journal.  — Lettow-Vorbeck,  1806-07  ; Pursuit.  — Levy, 
Napoleon  and  Peace.  — Lewal,  Jena.  — Liebert,  1812.  — Liebert,  Prop’s  of  Napoleon  in  1812. 

— Liger,  Revolution  ; Memoirs.  — Ligne,  Melanges  Mil.  ; Frederick  ; Mems.  — Lillienstern, 
Eye  Witness.  — Lindenau,  Beresina.  — Linder  et  Le  Bret,  Memoirs  ; St.  Helena.  — Liskenne 
and  Sauvan,  Mil.  Library.  — Livy,  Rome.  — Lloyd,  Seven  Years’  War.  — Lobel,  Militarwesen. 

— Lockhart,  Napoleon.  — Loen,  Minor  Works.  — Londonderry,  Peninsula.  — Lorenzen,  Thirty 
Years’ War. — Loringhoven,  1812.  — Lorraine  (Pr.  of),  Relation. — Lossau,  Ideale.  — Lottin, 
de  Billy.  — Loudon,  Life  of  ; Reports.  — Loveredo,  Spect.  Mil.  — Lowe,  Wallenstein.  — Lucien 
Bonaparte,  Memoirs.  — Ludwig,  Speed  in  Marches.  — Lumkemanu,  Turenne.  — Lutzow, 
Hohenfriedberg.  — Luynes,  Memoirs. 

Macaulay,  England.  — Maccabees,  The.  — Macdonald,  Souvenirs.  — Mack,  Memoirs  Justif. ; 
Hauptrelation,  1805  ; Punktationen.  — Madrid  Gazette.  — Maguire,  Br.  Army,  1811-13.  — 
Mahan,  Sea  Power;  Nelson. — Mailath,  Aus.  Empire.  — Maillebois,  Mem.  Justif.  — Maitland, 
Surrender  of  Bonaparte.  — Malakovski,  1796.  — Malmesbury,  Letters.  — Malo,  1815.  — Mann- 
stein,  Russia.  — Manuscrit  de  1812. — Marbot,  Memoirs. — Marcaggi,  Napoleon.  — Marcillac, 
France  and  Spain.  — Marengo,  V6rit6. — Margueron,  Russia,  1812.  — Maria  Theresa,  Wars  of, 
Impl.  Archives,  Vienna ; Letters  to  and  from  Generals  ; Sundry  Lives  of.  — Marheinicke, 
Ger.  Reformation.  — Marmont,  Memoirs  ; Esprit.  — Marston,  Gneisenau.  — Martigny,  Ar- 
chives de.  — Martinien,  Officiers  tues  et  blesses.  — Massena,  Memoirs.  — Massenbach,  1806.  — 
Masses,  Guerre  de.  — Masslowski,  Russians  in  Seven  Years’  War. — Massnet’s  History. — 
Masson,  Card.  Bernis ; l’Empereur.  — Maupertuis,  Letters.  — Maurice,  Waterloo.  — Mauvillon, 
Fr.  William  I.;  War  in  Bohemia  ; Ferdinand  of  Br.;  Cont.  Works.  — Maxims  of  Napoleon  of  St. 
Cyr.  — Maxwell,  W.  H.,  Peninsula  Sketches;  Wellington. — Maxwell,  Sir  H.,  Wellington. — 
Mayr,  Man  of  Rinn.  — McDougall,  Hannibal.  — McGregor,  Autobiography.  — Meerheimb, 
Bautzen.  — M^moires  Militaires.  — M^moires  d’ltalie.  — Memorial  du  Depot  de  la  Guerre.  — 
Memorial  de  Ste  H£l£ne.  — M^moires  de  France  en  1815.  — M&noires  sur  l’arra^e  d’ltalie.  — 
M6n6val,  Memoirs ; Nap.  and  Mar.  Louise.  — Mentzel,  Remounts ; Germans.  — Mercer,  Water- 
loo.— Merres,  Handbook. — Messager,  Boiteux. — Metternich,  Autobiog.  ; Memoirs. — Met- 
ternich  to  Stachelberg,  1811-13. — Meynert,  Warfare. — Michaeli,  Electoral  Houses.  — Mi- 
chaelovski  et  Danielevski,  Austerlitz.  — Michelet,  Histoire  du  XIX.  Siecle.  — Mignet,  Revolu- 
tion.— Mil.  Wochenblatt.  — Miloutine,  1799  en  Italie.  — Minkawitz,  Thielemann’s  Brigade.  — 
Minutuli,  1792.  — Miot,  Memoirs ; Egypt  and  Syria.  — Mirabeau,  Hist.  Secrete  ; Court  of  Ber- 
lin.— Mitchell,  Papers.  — Molard,  Mil.  Powers;  Cons.  Mil.;  100  years  French  Army. — 
Molero,  Caesar. — Mollien,  Memoirs. — Mommsen,  Rome. — Money,  Souvenirs  de  1792. — 
Moniteur,  Files  of.  — Moniteur,  Westphalian.  — Monographs,  Sundry.  — Monologue  de  Napo- 
leon. — Montagnon,  Compiegne.  — Montecuculi,  War  News  ; Comment’s.  — Montfort,  Souve- 
nirs.— Months,  1806-  — Montholon,  Souvenirs.  — Moore,  View  of  Society.  — Morner,  Bran- 
denburg. — Morris  (O’Connor),  Napoleon ; Wellington  ; Gt.  Corn’s.  — Morris  T.,  Recollec- 
tions. — Morris’  Frederick.  — Moskova,  Archives.  — Motley,  Dutch  Republic  ; United  Neth- 
erlands.— Mougenot,  Belligerents.  — Mudford,  1815.  — Muffling  (C.  v.  W.),  From  My  Life; 
Sketch  ; Armies  under  Wellington  and  Blucher ; Napoleon  Strat.  1813-14  ; 1815  ; Official 
Reports.  — Muller,  Espionage  under  Napoleon.  — Muller,  Rossbach  ; Three  Silesian  Wars. 

— Munich,  Archives  of.  — Munster,  1809.  — Muquardt,  1815.  — Murat,  en  Espagne.  — Miittel, 
Leipsic. 

Nanke,  Wanderings.  — Napier,  Peninsular  War.  — Napoleon,  Correspondance  de  ; (Euvres 
de  ; Memoires  pour  servir ; Guerres  de  Frederick  II.,  etc.  — Napoleon  III.,  Caesar. — Napo- 
leonic Dictionary.  — National  Archives.  — Natzmer,  Suwarrov.  — Naud£,  Seven  Years’  War  ; 
Brandenburg. — Neale,  1808. — Nepos,  Cornelius,  Lives. — Neukomm,  Musique  Mil. — Ney, 
Memoirs.  — Neyroutsos  Bey,  Alexander.  — Nichol,  Literary  Anecdotes.  — Nicolai,  Anecdotes  ; 
Berlin  and  Potsdam. — Nieman,  Diary.  — Noailles,  Memoirs  ; Campaigns. — Noel,  Souvenirs, 
etc.  — Norvins,  Napoleon  ; Portfeuille  de  1813.  — Nouvelliste  Vaudois. 

Obser,  Pol.  Corr.  of  Baden.  — Ochs,  Life  of  Gen.  — O’Connor  Morris,  see  Morris.  — Oden- 
leben,  Saxony,  1813. — Oestreicli  u.  Preussen  im  Befreiungskriege.  — Oestreich,  Kriege  seit 
1495.  — Oestrejchische  Mil.  Zeitschrift.  — “(Euvres”  of  Frederick.  — Okunev,  Russia,  1812. 


762 


APPENDIX  F. 


— Old  Prussian  Officer,  Letters  of.  — Oldfield,  Waterloo.  — Olivero,  Fort  of  Bard.  — Ollech, 
Reyher,  Kolin  ; Rossbach  ; Leuthen ; 1813-15  ; 1815 ; worked  up  by  Gt.  Ger.  Gen.  Staff.  — 
Oman,  Peninsular  War;  Art  War  Mid.  Ages.  — O’Meara,  Napoleon;  Napoleon  in  Exile. — 
Oncken,  Cons,  and  Empire.  — Opitz,  Breitenfeld.  — Ordres  du  Jour  in  Egypt. — Origines, 
France  Contemp.  — Orlich,  Sil.  Wars;  Maurice  of  Dessau.  — Ormsby,  Letters. — Orosius, 
Histories.  — Oscar  (King),  Charles  XII.  — Osten,  Sacken,  1813.  — Oudinot,  Memoirs.  — Ozno- 
bichine,  Cav.  Charge,  1808. 

Pajol,  Louis  XV.  — Palet,  1809.  — Parker,  Waterloo.  — Parliamentary  Returns  ; Parliamen- 
tary Papers.  — Parquin,  Vieux  Soldat  ler  Emp.  — Pascallet,  Grouchy.  — Paskievich,  Journal. 

— Pasquier,  Memoirs. — Pastenacci,  Entzheim. — Paton,  24th  Reg.  — Pattison,  Waterloo. — 
Pausanias,  Greece.  — Pauli,  Prus.  Histories  ; Heroes  of  Seven  Years’  War.  — Pelet,  1809  ; 1813  ; 
Memoirs. — Pelleport,  Souvenirs.  — Pellet,  Napoleon  in  Elba. — Pellot,  Memoirs;  Pyrenees. 

— Peninsular  War,  Spanish  Official  Report.  — Perin,  Lannes. — Perreau,  Catinat. — Pertz, 
Gneisenau  ; (Euvres  du  grand  Frederic  ; Stern.  — Petersdorf,  Thielmann.  — Petiet,  Archives 
de  l’artillerie  ; Souv.  Mil.  — Petre,  Napoleon  in  Poland. — Pezzl,  Eugene;  Loudon.  — Pfalz, 
1805.  — Pfeffel,  Germany.  — Pflug-Hartung,  Rev.  and  Emp.  ; Waterloo.  — Picard,  Cav.  at  Ma- 
rengo ; Bonaparte  and  Moreau.  — Piccolomini,  Diary.  — Picliard,  Revol.  Helvetique.  — Picton, 
Waterloo.  — Pieces  officielles  guerresde  l’emp. — Pierart  Epopee;  Waterloo.  — Pierron,  Dres- 
den to  Leipsic.  — Pils  (Gren),  Journal;  Marches.  — Pingaud,  Bernadotte  ; Agent  secret. — 
Pion  des  Loches,  Campagnes.  — Pittaluga,  Marengo.  — Platen,  Reports  and  Letters.  — Plotho, 
1813-14,  1815.  — Plumicke,  Danzig.  — Plutarch,  Lives.  — Podewil,  Court  of  Vienna.  — Pohler, 
Wars  ; Hist,  of  Fortification.  — Pollis,  Waterloo.  — Pol.  Corr.  of  Prussia.  — Pollnitz,  Memoirs. 

— Polybius,  Univ.  Hist.  — Porter,  Hist.  Royal  Engineers.  — Porter,  Russia.  — Possett’s 
Annals.  — Poten,  Mil.  Science.  — de  Pradt,  Ambassade.  — Prague  Garrison,  Retreat  of. — 
Precis  Hist,  on  Napoleon  by  Member  of  Household. — Pregitzern,  Hohenzollern. — Preuss, 
Frederick ; Brandenburg  ; Frederick  with  Relations ; Frederick’s  Youth  ; Record  Book.  — 
Pringle,  Appendix  to  Scott’s  Napoleon.  — Prussian  Cadet  School,  Seven  Years’  War. — Prus- 
sian Gen.  Staff,  1796.  — Psychology  of  War,  B.  K.  — Puffendorf,  Brandenburg ; Gt. 
Elector;  Thirty  Years’  War.  — Putlitz,  Prague.  — Putter,  Ger.  Empire.  — Puys^gur,  Art 
of  War. 

Quarterly  Review.  — Quincy,  Louis  XIV.;  Maxims.  — Quinet,  1815.  — Quintus  Curtius, 
Alexander.  — Quistorp,  1813. 

Raguse,  Memoirs.  — Rambaud,  Moscow  and  Sebastopol.  — Ramsay,  Turenne.  — Ranke,  His- 
tory ; Hardenberg  ; Wallenstein.  — Ranft,  Leopold  of  Anh.  Des.  ; Origin  of  Seven  Years’ 
War.  — Ransome,  Frederick’s  Battles.  — Ramer,  Contributions. — Rapp,  Memoirs.  — Rau, 
Principal  Powers.  — Records,  Austria;  Netherlands;  Niirnberg  ; Prussia  ; Sweden,  and  many 
others.  — Regal,  Impl.  Regt.  — Regenfuss,  Diary.  — Regimental  Histories  and  Journals. — 
Registre,  de  la  munic.  d’Aigle;  de  Norges  ; de  Nyon;  de  Lausanne  ; de  Villeneuve.  — Regu- 
lations (Prus.)  for  Recruiting;  ditto  for  Aus.  and  Prus.  Armies.  — Reibnitz,  Day  Book. — 
Reille,  Hist.  — Reinhardt,  1st  Regt.  Guards.  — Reitzenstein,  Thirty  Years’  War.  — Relation 
Beige.  — Relation  of  Pr.  of  Prussia.  — Rembrowski,  Chevaux  lagers.  — Remoortere,  1815.  — 
R^musat,  Memoirs.  — Renan,  Avenir  de  la  Science.  — Renemont,  1809.  — Rentsch,  Branden- 
burg. — Repertory  of  Mil.  Affairs,  Vienna.  — Reports  of  Aus.  and  Prus.  Officers.  — Retzow, 
Seven  Years’  War. — Revel,  Memoirs. — R£v£rie  de  Paris. — Reynier,  Egypt.  — Richardot, 
Egypt  and  Syria.  — Richelieu  (Ml.),  Memoirs.  — Riesenbeck,  Travels. — Rietz,  Stralsund. — 
Ritchie,  Memoirs.  — Ritter,  Thirty  Years’  War.  — Rivoli  a Marengo.  — Roberts,  Wellington. 

— Robinet  and  Chaplain,  Diet,  of  Rev’n.  — Robinson,  Secret  Mission  ; Picton.  — Rochechouart, 
Rev.  Emp.  and  Restor.  — Rocca,  Spain,  1808-09.  — Rodenbeck,  Journal ; Fr.  William  I.;  Fred- 
erick the  Great  ; Contributions.  — Roederer,  Works.  — Rogniat,  Answer.  — Roguet,  Memoirs. 

— Rollin,  Ancient  History.  — Romagny,  Battles;  Hist.  Nethl.  Army.  — Ropes,  Napoleon; 
Waterloo;  Caesar.  — Rose,  Napoleon.  — Rosebery,  Napoleon.  — Rossler,  Frederick’s  Attack. 

— Rouget,  Memoirs  ; Spec.  Mil.  — Rouil,  Durutte’s  Div.  — Rousset,  1813  ; Maitres  ; Louvois. 

— Rothenburg,  Leipsic.  — Routier,  Recital.  — Rovigo,  Memoirs.  — Roville,  St.  Hilaire,  1809. 

— Roy,  Turenne.  — Rumpff,  Sc.  of  War.  — Russel,  The  Hundred  Days.  — Russian  State 
Papers.  — Russian  Gen.  Staff,  1812.  — Riistow,  1796-97  ; 1805  ; Generalship  19th  Cent. ; Hist. 
Inf.  ; Mil.  Diet.  ; Caesar. 


INDEX. 


INDEX. 


Abdallah  Pasha,  1,  537,  etc. 

Abdication  of  Napoleon,  4,  470,  471. 

Abensberg,  battle  of,  3,  188-190. 

Abercrombie,  1,  609;  2,  16,  113,  114, 
116. 

Aboukir,  naval  battle  of,  1,  449,  etc.; 
land  battle  of,  557,  etc.;  massacre 
of,  561;  2,  114. 

Acre,  1,  516;  description  of,  531,  etc.; 
siege  of,  534,  etc.;  assault  on,  535, 
etc.;  545,  547, 548;  lack  of  ordnance, 
544. 

Aderklaa,  taken,  3,  309. 

Administration  of  French  army  at  the 
time  of  the  Peninsular  War,  3,  20. 

Adour,  the,  4,  477. 

Agreda,  3,  78,  79. 

Albe,  Bacler  d\  Chief  of  the  Topo- 
graphical Bureau,  4,  698. 

Albeck,  2,  198,  etc. 

Alberche,  the,  3,  352. 

Albuera,  battle  of,  3,  409,  410;  taken 
by  Godinot,  410. 

Alexander,  czar,  2, 137,  253,  260,  286; 
after  Austerlitz,  296;  after  Jena,  433: 
asks  truce,  537;  adheres  to  Tilsit 
treaty,  3,  36,  56;  a better  statesman 
than  Napoleon,  56;  his  ukase  of 
December  31,  1810,  423;  deprecates 
war,  but  will  not  yield  further  to  Na- 
poleon, 433;  concludes  the  treaty  of 
Bucharest,  434 ; complains  of  the  in- 
crease of  Polish  territory,  435 ; nega- 
tive in  utterance,  but  active  in  pre- 
paring resistance,  447;  his  policy, 
448;  plays  a waiting  game,  453,  455; 
plays  a game  of  retreat,  459;  will- 
ing to  negotiate  if  the  French  will 
recross  the  Niemen,  468;  remains 
by  his  army,  489  ; tries  to  organize 
a national  system  of  defense,  490, 
491;  his  appeal  to  the  Russian 
soldiers,  491;  retires  to  Moscow, 
519;  arouses  the  Russian  people, 
519;  retains  confidence  in  Rumant- 


zov,  565;  determined  not  to  yield 
to  Napoleon,  601;  letter  of  Napo- 
leon to,  603,604;  his  purpose,  to  de- 
liver Europe  from  the  French  yoke, 
609;  came  close  to  being  a great  man, 
610;  his  plan  to  cut  off  St.  Cyr,  624; 
arrives  at  Vilna,  692;  underrates  the 
French  before  Liitzen,  4,  29;  at 
Bautzen,  65,  67,  72;  at  Leipsic,  252- 
264 ; weary  of  the  negative  role,  de- 
mands that  the  armies  march  on 
Paris,  442;  insists  on  moving  on 
Paris,  457;  behaves  with  calmness 
and  generosity  at  the  surrender  of 
Paris,  469. 

Alexander  the  Great,  4,  680,  683,  693, 
699,  716-718. 

Alexandria,  1,  472;  blockaded,  514;  2, 
114;  battles  about,  115,  etc.;  battle 
of,  116;  siege  of,  118. 

Alkmar,  1,  610. 

Allies,  in  Spain,  3,  28  ff .,  45  ff.,  64  ff ., 
93  ff .,  340-377, 383-417, 705-747;  4, 
282-304;  concentration  of,  before 
the  battle  of  Liitzen,  29-32;  at  the 
battle  of  Liitzen,  34-39;  retreat 
of,  after  the  battle  of  Liitzen,  39; 
at  Bautzen,  and  after,  60-62,  65- 
79;  before  and  during  the  armistice, 
80-114;  meeting  of  sovereigns  of,  at 
Trachenberg  castle,  96;  army  of.  at 
the  beginning  of  the  campaign,  Au- 
gust 1813,  118-121;  hampered  by  a 
multiplicity  of  advisers,  142;  before 
Dresden,  147-162;  their  retreat  from 
Dresden,  163-171;  their  movements 
August  30-September24, 1813,  172- 
202;  during  the  Leipsic  manoeuvre, 
203-245;  at  Leipsic,  246-281;  in- 
vade France,  November,  1813,  to 
January,  1814,  305-343;  strength 
of,  317;  their  plan  of  operations, 
318;  cross  the  Rhine,  326;  at  La 
Rothiere,  344-351;  from  La  Ro- 
thiere  to  Montmirail,  351-371 ; divi- 


772 


INDEX. 


sion  of  their  forces,  355;  at  Janvil- 
liers,  375,  376;  separation  of,  a 
mistake,  378;  not  well  placed,  382; 
behind  the  Aube,  406;  take  posses- 
sion of  Troyes,  416;  at  Craonne, 
420-423;  after  Craonne,  435  ff.;  with 
headquarters  at  Dampierre,  457; 
plan  to  march  on  Paris,  457,  458; 
reach  Paris,  464;  before  Paris,  465, 
466;  cross  the  Gave  at  Berenx,  479; 
at  the  battle  of  Orthez,  479-481 ; cau- 
tiously follow  Soult,  486;  at  Tou- 
louse, 489-493;  mobilized  after  Na- 
poleon’s return  from  Elba,  512; 
their  plan  of  action,  513;  in  the 
Waterloo  campaign,  528-670. 

Allocution  to  the  Old  Guard,  4,  468. 

Almeida,  surrenders  to  the  French, 

3,  388  ; abandoned  by  the  French, 
407. 

Altenkirchen,  combat  of,  1,  330. 

Alvinzi,  in  Friuli,  1,  349;  plans,  349; 
holds  Brenta,  351;  at  Vicenza,  353; 
in  front  of  Verona,  362;  at  Arcole, 
363;  weakens,  370;  retires,  371;  ad- 
vances on  Verona,  375;  retires  to 
Brenta,  376;  again  advances,  377, 
381;  plan,  382;  moves  on  Rivoli, 
383;  marches  on  Rivoli  in  several 
columns,  388;  at  Rivoli,  390,  etc.; 
fierce  attack,  394;  defeated,  395, 
etc.;  retires,  399. 

Americans,  teach  lessons  in  war,  1,  24; 

2,  170,  173. 

Andalusian  project,  3,  381-386. 

Anglo-Dutch  Army  under  Wellington, 

4,  529-670. 

Antwerp,  attempt  on,  by  the  English, 

3,  332,  333. 

Aosta,  2,  29. 

Aranda,  occupied  by  Victor,  3,  74. 

Arapiles,  the,  3,  715. 

Arcis-sur-Aube,  occupied  by  Sebas- 
tiani  and  Ney,  4,  444;  battle  of,  445- 
452. 

Arcole,  battle  of,  1,  361,  etc.:  difficul- 
ties at,  364;  the  victory,  370;  the 
losses,  371,  376. 

Areizaga,  routed  by  Sebastiani  and 
Mortier,  3,  372;  defeated,  383. 

Argenteau,  1,  188,  195,  198. 

Argonnes,  1,  69. 

Armies,  first  revolutionary,  1,  64;  of 
1793,  82;  of  1794,  108;  of  1796, 
178.  See  Army. 

Army  Corps,  1,  31;  in  the  Austrian 
army,  3,  132;  use  of,  in  battle,  194. 


Army,  English,  history  and  organiza- 
tion of,  3,  22-25. 

Army,  French,  1,  2,  etc.;  2,  127;  di- 
vided into  corps,  138;  organization 
of,  at  the  time  of  the  Peninsular  War, 
3,  17-22;  organization  of,  at  the 
time  of  the  Austrian  campaign,  146, 
147. 

Army,  Spanish,  character  of,  3, 15-17. 

Army  of  Alps,  1,  123,  etc. 

Army  of  Andalusia,  3,  64,  119,  120, 
339,  381,  383,  721. 

Army  of  Aragon,  3,  381,  398. 

Army  of  Catalonia,  3,  381. 

Army  of  the  Centre,  3,  381,  707,  713, 
729,  732,  744. 

Army  of  Channel,  1,  142. 

Army  of  Danube,  1,  585. 

Army  of  Egypt,  its  disposition,  2,  110; 
under  Menou,  112. 

Army  of  the  Elbe,  4,  11,  12,  116;  dis- 
solved, 45. 

Army  of  Estremadura,  3,  64,  339. 

Army  of  Finland,  3,  519. 

Army  of  Galicia,  3,  63,  72. 

Army  of  Germany,  3,  146,  292,  295, 
296,  332,  434. 

Army  of  Italy,  1,  117,  124;  in  1796, 
183,  185,  etc.;  distribution  of  troops, 
187 ; suggestion  to  divide,  235 ; not  di- 
vided, 239;  near  Mantua,  258;  equip- 
ment, 288;  its  distribution,  288;  its 
position,  308;  condition  near  Man- 
tua, 345;  its  danger,  355;  in  critical 
position,  359;  position  after  Arcole, 
376;  its  marching,  385,  401;  position 
after  Rivoli,  404;  later  position,  412; 
on  Isonzo,  427;  in  Germany,  433; 
position  near  Leoben,  437;  in  1799, 
587,  etc.;  at  Magnano,  590,  etc.;  re- 
tires to  Milan,  591 ; at  Cassano,  592, 
etc.;  at  the  Trebia,  600,  etc.;  at 
Novi,  604,  etc.;  2,  9,  20,  78;  Eugene 
sent  to  re-create,  4,  44. 

Army  of  the  Main,  4,  12. 

Army  of  Moldavia,  3,  452,  519. 

Army  of  the  North,  Bernadotte’s,  3, 
134;  4,  122, 317;  Caffarelli’s,  3, 732; 
under  Napoleon,  in  1815, 4, 522-525. 

Army  of  Orient,  1,  463,  464;  how 
equipped,  465;  sets  sail,  467;  reaches 
Alexandria,  470;  its  trials,  475,  478, 
509;  marches  in  squares,  481;  or- 
ganized, 492;  horses  for,  494;  mu- 
tiny, 498;  rewards  and  punishments 
in,  506,  etc.;  winter  distribution  of, 
509,  etc.;  amusements  in,  511;  cut 


INDEX. 


773 


off  from  news,  513;  confidence  of 
soldiers,  519;  distribution,  522;  its 
forces,  554. 

Army  of  Portugal,  3,  381,  387,  390, 
722,  724. 

Army  of  Reserve,  quietly  raised,  2, 
10;  prospects  of,  11;  a secret,  18; 
its  make-up,  24;  crosses  Alps,  26; 
reaches  Italy,  33;  crosses  Po,  51;  at 
Marengo,  62,  etc. 

Army  of  the  Rhine,  3,  33,  135. 

Army  of  Silesia,  advances  to  the 
Katzbach,  4,  121;  at  Wartenburg, 
208;  to  enter  France,  317;  pushes 
Marmont  on  Metz,  330;  divided, 
335, 367;  after  Janvilliers,  rallied  on 
Chalons,  376;  reinforced,  378;  pre- 
fers to  join  the  Army  of  the  Sover- 
eigns, 392;  at  Laon,  425,  426;  before 
Paris,  454;  at  Waterloo,  528,  531. 

Army  of  the  South,  3,  119,  744. 

Army  of  the  Sovereigns,  4,  96,  97 ; its 
movements  in  August,  1813,  121— 
141;  its  movements  in  September, 
1813, 172-200, 204,  205;  in  theLeip- 
sic  campaign,  224, 228, 236-245, 248, 
253;  in  the  invasion  of  France,  317, 
329,  381,  382,  385-410,  442-465. 

Army  of  Spain,  3,  61-63;  4,  284. 

Army  of  Syria,  4,  523;  the  plague, 
530;  at  Acre,  533;  loses  siege-guns, 
536;  operations  about  Acre,  537, 
etc.;  defeated,  548;  retires,  551;  the 
retreat,  551,  etc.;  distressing  march 
of,  552,  etc.;  losses,  553;  rapid 
march  to  Cairo,  553. 

Arrighi,  at  Leipsic,  4,  249,  259,  263. 

Artificers,  1,  19. 

Artillery,  improvement  in,  4,  13;  di- 
vided into  batteries,  14;  field,  15, 
16;  hauled  by  contract,  17;  park, 
17;  Austrian  and  Prussian,  18; 
schools,  18;  regimental  schools,  18; 
of  Grand  Army,  2,  311;  314,  322; 
of  the  French  army  at  the  time  of  the 
Peninsular  War,  3,  19,  22;  English, 
25;  of  the  French  army  in  1813,  4, 
24. 

Arts  and  sciences,  1,  348. 

Asparn,  battle  of,  3,  254-278. 

Assaye,  battle  of,  3,  41,  42. 

Assembly,  Legislative,  1,  57. 

Assignats,  1,  3;  2,  130. 

Aube,  the,  4,  351. 

Auerstadt,  battle  of,  2,  385;  theatre 
of,  386;  won  by  Davout,  402,  etc.; 
losses  at,  404. 


Auffenberg,  4,  582.. 

Augereau,  1,  118,  125,  187,  196,  199, 
204,  222,  228,  234,  238,  249,  252, 
255,  261,  264,  270,  273;  at  Castigli- 
one,  276;  279,  292,  299,  302,  305, 
350,  356,  etc.;  at  Arcole,  361,  etc., 
364;  at  Rivoli,  382,  etc.,  405,  449;  2, 
138,  140;  on  march  to  Vienna,  221, 
etc.;  in  Jena  campaign,  361,  etc.;  at 
Jena,  387,  etc.;  in  pursuit,  413,  etc.; 
on  Vistula,  437,  etc.;  in  winter  quar- 
ters, 454;  in  Eylau  campaign,  472, 
etc.;  at  Eylau,  480,  etc.;  the  quality 
of  his  corps  bad  in  the  Russian 
campaign,  3,  623;  in  the  Leipsic 
manoeuvre,  4,  207-238;  at  Leipsic, 
250-276;  retires  on  Valence,  401. 

Augsburg,  3,  133  ff.,  151,  152. 

Aulic  Council,  1,  194,  261,  313,  410, 
436,  580,  618;  2,  10,  51,  82;  3,  138, 

142,  150,  161,  162,  237,  332;  336;  4, 

143. 

Austerlitz,  battle  of,  2,  266,  etc.; 
theatre  of,  267;  losses  at,  293;  its 
splendor,  300;  Napoleon’s  opinion 
of,  301. 

Austria,  a source  of  disquietude  to 
Napoleon,  3,  117,  128;  arms  against 
Napoleon,  130-133 ; her  purpose 
to  force  war,  135;  in  the  Ratisbon 
campaign,  142-181 ; concentrates 
her  forces  in  western  Bohemia,  142; 
her  plan,  142;  her  forces  divided, 
143;  her  forces  cross  the  Inn,  157 ; 
in  the  Abensberg  and  Eggmiihl 
campaign,  182-217;  in  Napoleon’s 
march  to  Vienna,  218-251;  in  the 
Essling  or  Asparn  campaign,  252- 
282;  at  the  island  of  Lobau,  283-303; 
in  the  Wagram  and  Znaim  cam- 
paign, 304-336;  attitude  of,  at  the 
beginning  of  the  Russian  war,  431- 
433;  makes  a treaty  with  France, 
432,  433;  attitude  of,  after  the  Rus- 
sian war,  699;  after  Vittoria,  4,  5; 
attitude  before  Liitzen,  26;  uncertain 
after  Liitzen,  44,  45;  Napoleon 
cedes  to  the  formal  mediation  of,  91 ; 
the  military  staff  of,  142,  143;  her 
forces  in  Italy,  404. 

Austrian  Army,  organization  of,  3, 
131-133,  144. 

Austrian  soldier,  I,  260;  2,  309. 

Babinovichi,  forest  of,  3,  529. 

Badajoz,  surrenders  to  the  French,  3, 
401;  besieged  by  the  English,  408; 


774 


INDEX. 


siege  of,  raised,  411;  again  besieged, 
415;  pillaged,  416. 

Baden,  2,  144. 

Baggage,  1,  36. 

Baggavut,  2,  448,  484;  3,  457,  544, 
546,  576-582,  615. 

Bagration,  1,  594,  599,  606;  2,  228, 
246;  at  Guntersdorf,  248;  274;  at 
Austerlitz,  289,  290;  a fighter,  3, 452; 
his  movements  during  the  Russian 
campaign,  1811  to  June,  1812,  456- 
476;  retires,  469;  in  danger,  472; 
beyond  the  Niemen,  476;  his  move- 
ments during  the  French  advance 
from  Vilna  to  Vitebsk,  482-510; 
his  movements  during  the  Smolensk 
and  Valutino  campaign,  521-546; 
at  odds  with  Barclay,  521;  starts 
for  Smolensk,  531;  prevents  the 
seizure  of  Smolensk,  535;  during  the 
Borodino  campaign,  570-588;  killed, 
588. 

Baird,  2,  118;  heads  an  expedition 
to  reach  Egypt  from  India,  3,  40; 
sent  against  the  Danish  fleet,  44;  at 
Astorga,  83,  93-102. 

Bakeries,  field,  2,  319. 

Bakum,  battle  of,  1,  610. 

Balance  of  power  under  Napoleon,  3, 
129,  130. 

Balloons,  1,  40. 

Baraguey  d’Hilliers,  1,  430,  438;  3, 
335,  602,  617,  631,  652,  655. 

Barclay  de  Tolly,  2,  448,  476,  etc.; 
his  character  as  a soldier,  3,  452; 
his  movements  during  the  Russian 
campaign,  1811  to  June,  1812,  456- 
476;  his  critical  position,  467,  468; 
retires,  469;  beyond  reach,  475;  his 
movements  during  the  French  ad- 
vance from  Vilna  to  Vitebsk,  483- 
510;  decamps  from  before  Napoleon, 
505 ; his  movements  during  the  Smo- 
lensk and  Valutino  campaign,  521- 
550;  at  odds  with  Bagration,  521; 
holds  a council  of  war,  523;  moves 
toward  Vitebsk,  524;  his  combat  at 
Inkovo,  524;  at  Smolensk,  536;  evac- 
uates Smolensk,  538,  539;  crosses 
the  Usha,  549;  delays  too  long,  550; 
during  the  Borodino  campaign,  565- 
570;  in  general  command,  570;  sur- 
prises Peyri,  4,  59;  at  Bautzen,  69- 
77;  pushes  Wittgenstein  and  Kleist 
towards  Pirna,  182;  at  Leipsic,  249- 
267;  crosses  the  Rhine  into  France. 
326,  327,  329. 


Bard,  Fort  of,  1,  29,  33,  39. 

Barras,  1,  171,  174,  457;  2,  3. 

Basle,  treaty  of,  1,  177. 

Bassano,  battle  of,  1,  300,  etc. 

Bastile,  destroyed,  2,  35. 

Battalion,  French,  at  the  time  of  the 
Peninsular  War,  3,  18,  21;  English, 
24;  column,  48,  280-282,  363;  of 
the  Grand  Army,  size  of,  444. 

Batteries,  light,  1,  15;  horse,  15;  how 
divided,  17. 

Battle,  order,  1,  22;  usual  steps  in,  22; 
lumbering,  23. 

Battles,  difference  between  Frederick’s 
and  Napoleon’s,  2,  298,  etc.;  num- 
bers killed  and  wounded  in  some 
modern,  4,  748-756. 

Bautzen,  battle  of,  4,  60-78;  Van- 
damme  ordered  to,  123. 

Bavaria,  2,  144;  Elector  of,  1,  154; 
turns  against  Napoleon,  4,  232; 
blamed,  233. 

Bayalich,  1,  269,  272,  381,  etc. 

Bavlen,  battle  of,  3,  30,  31;  moral 
effect  of  battle,  34-36. 

Bayonne,  Junta  of,  3,  8,  9;  of  highest 
importance,  4,  302. 

Beaulieu,  1,  76,  83,  178,  188;  plans, 
192,  etc.;  errors,  196,  201,  218; 
crosses  Po,  219;  at  Valencia,  220; 
227;  retires  to  Mincio,  243;  plans  to 
defend  Minc.'o,  247;  abandons  it, 
250. 

Beaumont,  3,  99:  4,  55. 

Beker,  3,  254,  256. 

Belgium,  conquered,  1,  79. 

Bellegarde,  1,  582,  5«5;  2,  62;  in  the 
Abensberg  and  Eggmiihl  cam- 
paign, 3,  183-204;  at  Essling,  257; 
at  Wagram,  302,  308,  309;  in  Italy, 
4,  404. 

Bel  hard,  evacuates  Cairo,  2,  118;  in 
Madrid,  3,  106. 

Belvider,  in  the  Peninsula,  3,  57,  64- 
70. 

Benavente,  the  race  to,  3,  114. 

Bennigsen.  2,  436;  at  Pultusk  and 
Praga,  439;  retires  to  Narew,  440; 
447;  plans  to  attack,  463;  retires, 
470;  stops  at  Eylau,  474;  enterprise, 
496:  advances,  510;  retires,  514;  at 
Heilsberg,  520;  retires  to  Friedland, 
526;  at  Friedland,  534;  errors,  536, 
etc.;  at  Moscow,  3,  614;  arrives  at 
Toplitz,  4,  204,  208;  at  Leipsic, 
255  ff. 

Bentinck,  4,  303. 


INDEX. 


775 


Berenx,  4,  479. 

Beresford,  in  the  Peninsula,  3,  343, 
345,  409;  4,  297-301;  at  Orthez, 
478-481;  captures  Bordeaux,  484; 
in  the  battle  of  Toulouse,  491,  492. 

Beresina,  the,  3,  677-684. 

Berg,  in  the  battle  of  Liitzen,  4,  35,  36. 

Bergen,  battles  at,  1,  610. 

Berlin,  entered,  2,  421;  decree  of,  426; 
harshly  treated,  429. 

Bernadotte,  beaten  at  Neumarkt,  1, 
324;  418,  426,  435,  etc.,  570,  572, 
612;  Minister  of  War,  2,  2;  138, 139; 
at  Ulm,  196,  etc.;  on  march  to  Vi- 
enna, 221,  etc.;  criticised  by  Napo- 
leon, 245;  at  Austerlitz,  269,  etc.; 
295;  in  Jena  campaign,  361,  etc.;  at 
Jena,  388,  etc. ; literal  obedience,  397 ; 
misses  battle,  403;  in  pursuit,  413; 
found  fault  with,  418;  on  Vistula, 
440,  etc.;  in  winter  quarters,  453; 
464,  469;  in  Friedland  campaign, 
508,  etc.;  511;  in  the  Hanseatic 
towns,  3,  33;  Napoleon’s  recom- 
mendation to,  134;  in  march  on 
Vienna,  225-247;  at  Raab  and  after, 
289,  296-301 ; in  the  Wagram  cam- 
paign, 305-333;  elected  prince  royal 
of  Sweden,  398;  about  Berlin  with 
the  Army  of  the  North,  4,  122;  at 
Gross  Beeren,  132-134;  in  the  Leip- 
sic  manoeuvre,  204-245;  advances 
nearer  Halle,  255;  in  the  battle  of 
Leipsic,  257-263;  ordered  on  Ham- 
burg, 274;  marches  on  Hamburg, 
279. 

Bernard,  Prince,  4,  549. 

Berne,  battle  of,  1,  454. 

Berthezene,  3,  209. 

Berthier,  1,  176;  experience,  191;  230, 
239, 249, 454, 461,  464;  in  command, 
Army  of  Reserve,  2,  10,  18,  23,  138; 
at  Ulm,  196,  etc.;  at  Austerlitz,  272, 
319;  in  Spain,  3,  59-80;  in  the  Ratis- 
bon  campaign,  137-179;  overlooks 
a phrase  of  Napoleon’s  letter,  155- 
157;  his  military  skill,  155-162;  at 
Abensberg  and  Eggmiihl,  184-216; 
in  march  on  Vienna,  225-247;  at 
Smolensk,  531 ; ordered  to  hurry  to 
Smolensk,  592;  Chief  of  Staff,  but 
real  commander,  689;  before  and  at 
Bautzen,  4,  54-68;  at  Leipsic,  257, 
267;  in  full  control  on  the  Rhine, 
313;  in  the  invasion  of  France,  341; 
at  the  head  of  the  general  staff,  697, 
698. 


Bertrand,  reconnoitres  in  Germany, 
2,  146;  at  Vienna  bridge,  238;  on 
the  retreat  from  Moscow  and  be- 
fore the  battle  of  Liitzen,  4,  16-32; 
at  the  battle  of  Liitzen,  37;  before 
and  at  Bautzen,  48-74;  at  Gross 
Beeren,  135;  at  Dennewitz,  184; 
in  the  Leipsic  manoeuvre,  207-236; 
ordered  to  march  through  Liitzen 
on  Weissenfels,  258;  carries  out  his 
orders,  and  seizes  Saale  bridge,  264; 
occupies  the  heights  of  Neu  Kosen, 
273. 

Bery-au-Bac,  bridge  of,  4,  419. 

Bessieres,  1,  191,  251;  gallantry,  297; 
465;  2,  138,  140,  440,  446;  at  Me- 
dina de  Rio  Seco,  3, 26-29;  called  in, 
after  Baylen,  32;  position  in  mid- 
September,  1808,  56 ; movements 
up  to  the  fall  of  Burgos,  60-70;  at 
Madrid,  87;  after  the  surrender  of 
Madrid,  91,  97;  pursues  the  Aus- 
trians, 199;  in  march  on  Vienna, 
222-238;  in  the  Essling  campaign, 
253-270;  marches  on  Eisenach  and 
Gotha,  4,  16;  killed,  27. 

Beurnonville,  1,  75,  330. 

Bianehi,  3,  183. 

Biberacli,  battle  of,  1,  335. 

Bidassoa,  the,  4,  293,  294,  296,  297. 

Bilbao,  occupied,  3,  59. 

Bisamberg,  the,  3,  253. 

Bischofswerda,  4,  49,  54,  195. 

Bisson,  3,  69,  142. 

Blake,  in  the  Peninsula,  3,  28,  57,  59- 
81,  374,  412. 

Bliicher,  2,  358;  at  Auerstadt,  398, etc.; 
escape,  406;  retreat,  422;  surrenders, 
423;  before  the  battle  of  Liitzen,  4, 
21-29;  at  the  battle  of  Liitzen,  34, 
42;  defeats  Maison,  83;  to  avoid 
battle  with  Napoleon,  97 ; to  harass 
Napoleon  in  front,  98;  at  Striegau, 
121;  retires  behind  the  Schnelle 
Deichsel,  127;  at  the  Katzbach,  137- 
141;  Napoleon  marches  on,  179- 
181;  moves  on  Macdonald,  193; 
avoids  Napoleon,  195;  during  the 
Leipsic  manoeuvre,  204  ff.;  his  view 
prevails  in  the  army  council,  204; 
his  aim  to  cross  the  Elbe,  205,  206; 
moves  down  the  Elster,  207 ; on  the 
way  to  Leipsic,  208;  escapes  Na- 
poleon, 217;  deceives  Napoleon,  228; 
at  the  battle  of  Leipsic,  247-260; 
in  the  invasion  of  France,  324  ft.; 
in  Brienne  castle,  337  ; beaten  at 


776 


INDEX. 


Brienne,  338,339;  retreats,  345;  at  ! 
the  battle  of  La  Rothiere,  347-350; 
to  move  down  the  Marne,  355,  356; 
at  Montmirail,  367-371 ; advances 
against  Marmont,  372-374;  at- 
tacked by  Napoleon,  375;  retires 
to  Janvilliers,  375;  moves  back  on 
Bergeres,  376;  at  Mery,  398;  asks 
and  obtains  permission  to  make  a 
renewed  march  on  Paris,  404,  405; 
follows  up  Marmont,  406;  his  plan 
fails,  408;  retires  on  Soissons,  409; 
his  dilemma,  412;  on  the  right  bank 
of  the  Aisne,  413;  between  the  Aisne 
and  the  Lette,  418;  starts  his  train 
to  Laon,  420;  at  Craonne,  422;  falls 
back  to  Laon,  423,  424;  at  Laon, 
424-431 ; after  Orcis,  458  if.;  in  1815 
with  army  based  on  Liege,  Maes- 
tricht,  and  the  Rhine,  519;  gets  the 
Army  of  Silesia  into  shape,  528;  at 
the  beginning  of  June,  1815,  532; 
at  Tirlemont  with  Wellington,  538; 
issues  orders  to  rendezvous  at 
Sombreffe,  554;  his  arrangement 
with  Wellington  before  the  battle 
of  Waterloo,  554,  555;  misled  by 
Wellington,  559;  prepared  to  stand, 
560;  accepts  the  battle,  571;  barely 
escapes  capture,  578;  his  forces  de- 
feated, 579;  throws  up  his  base  and 
moves  toward  Wellington,  599-601; 
sends  word  that  he  will  support 
Wellington,  608;  begins  the  march 
to  support  Wellington,  610;  comes 
up  from  Ohain  and  saves  the  day, 
655,  656. 

Bobr,  headquarters,  3,  675. 

Bon,  1,  485,  526,  etc.,  540,  etc.,  547. 

Bonaparte,  Abbe,  1,  257. 

Bonaparte,  1,  117;  birth,  131,  132; 
family,  132;  youth,  133;  ancestry, 
134;  parents,  135;  at  Brienne,  136; 
character,  136,  137;  studies,  138;  at 
Paris  school,  139;  certificates,  140; 
first  love  affair,  140;  absentees,  141; 
first  writings,  141,  142;  in  Corsica, 
143;  becomes  captain,  144;  first  coup 
d'etat,  in  Corsica,  145;  goes  to  Paris, 
146;  again  in  Corsica,  148;  failure  at 
Maddalena,  148;  family  expatriated, 
149;  “Supper  at  Beaucaire,”  153;  j 
at  Toulon,  154 ; plans  at  Toulon,  157 ; 
real  position,  159;  Redoubt  of  Fear-  [ 
less  Men,  160;  storms  Fort  Mul-  j 
grave,  160;  promotion  to  general, 
162;  joins  Army  of  Italy,  163;  at  I 


Saorgio,  163;  plans  for  Army  of 
Italy,  164,  etc.;  arrest,  166;  again 
in  Corsica,  167;  in  Paris,  168;  Me- 
morial on  Army  of  Italy,  168;  to 
War  Department,  169;  desires  to  go 
to  Turkey,  170;  stricken  from  army 
list,  170;  puts  down  Sections,  171, 
etc.;  reorganizes  National  Guard, 
173;  given  command  of  Army  of 
Italy,  174;  takes  command,  177; 
appearance,  183;  careful  method, 
189;  plans,  190;  seizes  works  of  art, 
193;  attacks  allies,  196;  activity, 
198,  202,  266;  at  Dego,  200;  “turns 
the  Alps,’’  202;  separates  Austrians 
and  Piedmontese,  203;  makes  truce, 
212;  strategy,  215;  use  of  numbers, 
216;  exaggeration,  217;  begs  rein- 
forcements, 218,  235,  258,  308,  345, 
358,  553;  prepares  to  cross  Po,  222; 
relies  on  enemy’s  mistakes,  222; 
crosses  Po,  224;  at  bridge  of  Lodi, 
229,  etc.;  saluted  “P’tit  Caporal,” 
231;  enters  Milan,  234;  threatens  to 
resign,  236;  force,  238;  lieutenants, 
238;  hard  work,  239;  praises  lieu- 
tenants, 239,  275;  what  he  had  ac- 
complished, 240 ; advances  on  Mincio, 
244;  despised  wealth,  244;  boasts, 
251 ; narrow  escape,  251 ; difficulties, 
254;  plans  as  to  Mantua,  255;  hesi- 
tates before  Lonato,  262;  standing 
among  his  lieutenants,  263;  problem 
at  Lonato,  271;  audacity,  278;  at 
Castiglione,  279,  etc.;  summary 
methods,  283;  theories  as  to  Mantua, 
286;  gauges  generals,  289;  ready  to 
join  Moreau,  290;  moves  up  Adige, 
292;  captures  Trent,  298;  at  Bas- 
sano,  302;  pursues  Wurmser,  304; 
attacks  Wurmser  at  Mantua,  306; 
writes  emperor,  309;  situation,  346; 
writes  Wurmser,  348;  cannot  ad- 
vance on  Alvinzi,  349;  plans  checked, 
352;  reprimands  division  Vaubois, 
352;  not  aided  by  fortune,  354;  in- 
fluenced by  Frederick,  354;  beaten 
at  Caldiero,  356,  etc.;  complains  to 
Directory,  358;  desperate  situation, 
359;  plans,  363;  at  Arcole,  363,  etc.  , 
renews  attack,  367 ; persistence,  368; 
moves  on  Davidovich,  374;  difficul- 
ties after  Arcole,  379;  complains  of 
commissaries,  380;  forces  before 
Rivoli,  382;  guesses  Alvinzi’s  de- 
sign, 385;  moves  on  Rivoli,  389; 
directs  battle,  391,  etc.;  self-con- 


INDEX. 


Ill 


fidence,  393,  etc.;  marches  back  to 
Mantua,  397;  plans,  410;  in  Rome, 
411 ; route  towards  Vienna,  412,  etc.; 
plans  march  on  Vienna,  415;  attacks 
Austrians  on  Tagliamento,  418;  or- 
ders to  Joubert,  419,  etc.;  orders  to 
generals,  421;  opinions  of  Charles, 
424;  occupies  Palmanova,  426;  cap- 
tures Austrian  train,  429;  advances 
on  Klagenfurt,  433;  writes  Charles, 
433;  recovers  communications,  436; 
situation  at  Leoben,  438,  440;  ca- 
pacity for  diplomacy,  440;  mass 
theory,  441;  generalship,  441;  per- 
sonality, 442;  a republican,  448; 
resigns,  450;  not  accepted,  450;  at 
Udine,  450;  in  Paris,  454,  etc.;  re- 
ception in  Paris,  457 ; commander  of 
English  expedition,  459;  Oriental 
dreams,  460;  prepares  expedition  to 
Egypt,  462;  jealousy  of  Directory, 
462;  General-in-Chief  of  Army  of 
Orient,  463;  Oriental  plans,  466; 
sails  for  Egypt,  467 ; at  Alexandria, 
471;  rule  of  war  in  Egypt,  475;  in 
Utopia,  479;  at  Shubra  Khet,  480, 
etc.;  at  battle  of  Pyramids,  486, 
etc.;  organizes  Egypt,  490,  etc.;  re- 
organizes army,  490;  reports  to  Di- 
rectory, 495,  522;  careful  about  ra- 
tions, 496;  moves  against  Ibrahim, 
498;  hopes  dashed  by  Aboukir,  501 ; 
plan  for  ruling  Orientals,  505;  strives 
to  communicate  with  India,  510; 
strives  to  get  news,  513;  prepares  for 
Syria,  518;  crosses  desert  to  Syria, 
521,  etc.;  captures  El  Arish,  525; 
captures  Gaza,  526;  takes  Jaffa,  528; 
shoots  prisoners,  529;  besieges  Acre. 
534,  etc.;  moves  against  army  of 
relief,  539,  etc. ; at  battle  of  Mount  j 
Tabor,  542,  etc.;  hides  defeat  at 
Acre  in  cheerful  words,  548;  opinion 
of  navy,  554;  moves  against  invad- 
ing Turks,  555;  defeats  Turks  at 
Aboukir,  557,  etc.;  decides  to  leave 
Egypt,  562;  leaves  Egypt,  564;  trip 
home,  566;  received  with  open  arms, 
2,  2;  conduct  on  Eighteenth  Bru- 
maire,  4;  First  Consul,  6;  moderate 
as  such,  8;  offers  peace  to  powers, 
8;  plans  for  campaign,  11;  strategy, 
12;  flatters  Moreau,  15;  instructions 
to  Massena,  16;  modifies  plans,  19, 
etc.,  22;  with  Army  of  Reserve,  26, 
etc.;  knew  of  Bard,  30;  plans,  33; 
successful,  34;  broadens  his  plans, 


36;  disregards  obstacles,  37;  views, 
about  Genoa,  39;  moves  on  Melas, 
43;  learns  Melas’  movements,  46; 
learns  fall  of  Genoa,  51;  divides  his 
forces,  53;  at  Stradella,  54;  wanders 
from  the  mass  theory,  54;  why,  56; 
forces  much  dispersed,  57;  conduct 
at  Marengo,  67 ; praises  his  generals, 
74;  strategy  in  1800,  76,  etc.;  writes 
the  emperor,  77;  returns  to  Paris, 
78;  tries  to  reinforce  Egypt,  119; 
criticises  evacuation  of  Egypt,  120; 
makes  treaties,  121;  new  system, 
124;  successes,  125;  what  he  did 
for  France  as  First  Consul,  130; 
made  Emperor,  132,  etc. 

Bonchamp,  1,  102,  etc. 

Bonnet,  position  in  mid-September, 
1808,  3,  56;  movements  up  to  Bur- 
gos, 63-69;  at  Santander,  72;  after 
the  surrender  of  Madrid,  99, 102;  at 
Salamanca,  715-718;  in  the  battle 
of  Liitzen,  4,  36. 

Bordeaux,  captured  by  Beresford,  4, 
484. 

Borisov,  3,  669-675,  678-683,  701. 

Borodino,  3,  566-589. 

Borstell,  position  in  March,  1813,  4, 
14. 

Boudet,  3,  150,  192,  224,  231,  255, 
266,  309. 

Bourbon  regime,  its  return  to  power, 
4,  503. 

Bourmont,  his  gallant  defense  of 
Nogent,  4,  380;  goes  over  to  the 
enemy,  546. 

Bourrienne,  2,  14. 

Braine,  4,  418,  419. 

Bray,  4,  380. 

“Breaking  through  the  centre,”  4, 
535,  536. 

Brenier,  in  the  battle  of  Liitzen,  4,  36. 

Bridge-heads,  Napoleon  on,  4,  707, 
708. 

Brienne,  castle,  Blucher  in,  4,  337; 
battle  of,  338,  339. 

Brueys,  1,  465,  499. 

Brune,  1,  569;  in  Holland,  609;  in 
command,  Army  of  Italy,  2,  78, 102, 
138,  140. 

Bruno,  suspended,  4,  201. 

Brunswick,  Duke  of,  1,  59,  64,  66,  67, 
etc.,  74,  83;  2,  338,  358;  at  Auer- 
stadt,  395;  mistakes,  398;  killed  at 
the  battle  of  Quatre  Bras,  4,  585. 

Brussels,  4,  540-549,  562-574,  591, 
597,  629. 


778 


INDEX. 


Bubna,  4,  326,  327. 

Bucharest,  treaty  of,  3,  434. 

Budweis,  Charles  at,  3,  236. 

Buenza,  4,  291. 

Bulletin,  Ulm  and  Austerlitz,  1st,  2, 
192;  2d,  195;  3d,  195;  5th,  204,  206; 
10th,  214;  4th,  215;  23d,  234,  239; 
30th,  260;  31st,  292,  296;  36th,  294; 
Jena,  1st,  367;  2d,  370;  3d,  371; 
4th,  380;  13th,  404;  5th,  406;  10th, 
407;  11th,  407;  9th,  407;  23d,  408; 
14th,  417;  17th,  420;  42d,  443;  47th, 
450;  51st,  456;  54th,  457;  52d,  460; 
of  the  Army  of  Germany j Ratisbon, 
April  24,  1809,  1st,  3,  179,  187,  191, 
193,  213;  May  19,  9th,  221,  222, 
226,  258;  7th,  242,  243;  10th,  256, 
266,  269,  276-278;  July  3,  24th, 
293;  25th,  298,  305-307,  311,  316; 
9th,  519:  13th,  538;  26th,  619,  625, 
629;  29th,  629,  700-704;  excuse 
for  almost  entire  omission  of,  in  the 
correspondence  on  the  Russian  cam- 
paign, 660;  at  Bautzen,  4,  66;  of 
Grand  Army,  October  15, 1813,  233; 
at  Leipsic,  October  24,  258,  264, 
270-272;  at  Frankfort,  October  31, 
278;  at  Charleroi,  552;  Napoleon’s 
last,  June  20,  1815,587-589,  646. 

Billow,  2,  336,  409;  covers  Berlin,  4, 
21 ; opens  the  Prussian  lines  to  Witt- 
genstein, 6;  position  in  March,  1813, 
14;  at  Gross  Beeren,  136;  at  Denne- 
witz,  184,  185;  enters  Holland,  320, 
324,  326;  sent  to  Laon,  420;  moves 
toward  St.  Lambert,  to  support 
Wellington,  609;  arrives  at- St.  Lam- 
bert, 634,  637;  moves  toward 

Planchenoit,  638;  forces  back  Lobau 
on  Planchenoit,  648;  edges  to  the 
left  towards  the  French  rear,  656 ; a 
writer  on  the  science  of  war,  721- 
726. 

Burgos,  taken  by  the  French,  3,  60-70; 
citadel  besieged  by  Wellington,  723, 
siege  abandoned,  724. 

Burrard,  at  Vimiero,  3,  45,  47. 

Busaco,  battle  of,  3,  389-392. 

Bussy,  the  heights  of,  4,  588. 

Buxhovden,  2,  256,  436,  439,  447,  449. 

Bylandt,  4,  629,  631. 

Byng,  4,  284,  289. 

Cadiz,  blockaded  by  Soult,  3,  385. 

Cadoudal,  2,  134. 

Caesar,  4,  716-718. 

Caffarelli,  1,  466,  478,  498,  509,  526. 


Caffarelli,  Junior,  2,  244,  262, 269,  etc., 
272,  289. 

Cairo,  1,  484;  occupied,  486;  revolt 
in,  516. 

Caldiero,  battle  of,  1,  365,  etc.;  2,  255. 

Calendar,  New,  1,  59;  Gregorian,  2, 
155. 

Caliano,  1,  295,  etc.,  350. 

Cambaceres,  2,  2,  359,  434. 

Campbell,  4,  284. 

Camping,  2,  318. 

Canclaux,  1,  129. 

Carnot,  1,  4,  59,  110,  118,  174,  236; 
strategy,  314,  324,  332;  plans,  341 ; 
587;  2,  124,  126. 

Carrion,  3,  110-112. 

Cassano,  battle  of,  1,  594,  etc. 

Castanos,  3,  30-32,  57-67,  72-81,  84, 
85. 

Castiglione,  battle  of,  1,  268,  etc.,  279, 
283.  _ 

Castrejon,  combat  at,  3,  713. 

Casualties,  modern,  4,  748-756. 

Catheart,  3,  43,  44,  434. 

Cathelineau,  1,  102. 

Caulaincourt,  3,  581  ; 4,  85  ff.,  319, 
320,  353,  695,  696. 

Cavalry,  Austrian,  1,  220. 

Cavalry,  tactics  of,  1,  10,  etc.,  heavy 
and  light,  12;  armament,  12;  spread 
among  divisions,  28;  reserve  created 
by  Bonaparte,  28;  in  open  order,  29; 
use  of,  2,  161 ; 250,  311,  314,  322, 
454,  500;  of  the  French  army,  at 
the  time  of  the  Peninsular  War,  3, 
18;  English,  25;  of  the  French  army, 
at  the  time  of  the  Austrian  cam- 
paign, 148;  at  Inkovo,  525;  value 
of,  4,  19,  20;  Ney’s  charge  of,  at 
Waterloo,  640-647. 

Celada,  3,  724. 

Ceva,  1,  202,  204. 

Cham  3 227. 

Championnet,  1,  113,  326,  445,  568, 
569;  collects  army  at  Grenoble,  603; 
to  assist  Army  of  Italy,  607;  com- 
mands Army  of  Alps  and  Italy,  617. 

Channel  campaign,  chances,  2,  140; 
equipment,  142. 

Charette,  1,  102,  105,  129. 

Charleroi,  1,112;  4,  540  ff.;  the  main 
objective  on  June  14,  1815,  543; 
entered  by  Pajol,  545. 

Charles,  Archduke,  1,  90,  etc.;  in 
command  on  Rhine,  178,  307,  312; 
reduced  to  defensive,  313;  generalis- 
simo, 314;  beats  Jourdan,  315;  re- 


INDEX. 


779 


tires  from  Malsch,  317;  leaves  gar- 
risons on  Rhine,  318;  at  Neresheim, 
320;  crosses  Danube,  321;  plans, 
324,  recrosses  Danube,  324;  beats 
Bernadotte,  324;  fine  plan,  326;  ad- 
vances on  Moreau’s  rear,  330;  at 
Emmindingen,  338;  at  Schliengen, 
339;  captures  Kehl  and  Huningen, 
340;  hero  of  1796  German  campaign, 
340,  etc.;  405,  409,  410;  plans  for 
defense,  414;  on  Tagliamento,  422; 
retires  on  his  reinforcements,  422; 
divides  his  forces,  423;  reaches  Pal- 
manova,  426;  goes  to  Villach,  427; 
replies  to  Bonaparte,  434;  continues 
retreat,  436;  plans  in  Germany,  573; 
crosses  Lech,  575;  beats  Lefebvre, 
577;  wins  Stockach,  580,  581;  drives 
French  to  Zurich,  586;  beats  Mas- 
sena  at  Zurich,  586;  moves  to  Mann- 
heim, 612;  moves  towards  Switzer- 
land, 616;  2,  124,  150;  opinion  of 
Napoleon,  215;  facing  Massena  on 
Adige,  252;  campaign  against  Mas- 
sena, 254,  etc.;  in  the  Ratisbon 
campaign,  3,  131-174;  his  slowness, 
169,  172;  in  the  Abensberg  and 
Eggmiihl  campaign,  182-214;  re- 
treats after  Eggmiihl,  214;  during 
Napoleon’s  march  to  Vienna,  218- 
245;  retires  toward  Cham,  222; 
at  Budweis,  236;  his  plan,  237;  in 
the  Essling  campaign,  252-275; 
at  the  Bisamberg,  253;  at  Essling, 
256;  at  Lobau,  283-303;  misled, 
298;  in  the  Wagram  and  Znaim 
campaign,  305-335;  his  life  reca- 
pitulated, 335,  336. 

Charles  IV.  of  Spain,  3,  2,  7,  9. 

Chasseloup,  Chief  of  Engineers,  4, 
698. 

Chatillon,  Congress  of,  4,  319,  353, 
381,  382,  423. 

Chaumesnil,  4,  346-350. 

Chaves,  captured,  3,  339. 

Chernishev,  3,  674;  4,  425,  426. 

Chichagov,  3,  452,  623-659,  673-697. 

Chiclana,  3,  402. 

Cintra,  Convention  of,  3,  48,  50. 

Cipher,  sample  of,  4,  79. 

Circular  to  the  Bishops  of  the  Empire, 
3,  595. 

Ciudad  Real,  3,  340. 

Ciudad  Rodrigo,  taken  by  the  French, 
3,  387;  Army  of  Portugal  retires  on, 
404;  Wellington  besieges,  412,  413; 
capitulates  to  the  English,  414. 


Civil  War,  the  American,  4,  20,  687. 

Clairfayt,  1,  64,  67,  73,  76,  90, 110, 114, 
123,  178. 

Claparede,  3,  192-212,  231-240,  264- 
266,  602. 

Clarke,  General,  1,  442;  Minister  of 
War,  3,  285. 

Clausel,  3,  715-723,  733-746;  4,  284- 
301,  479-491. 

Clausewitz,  3,  452,  453. 

Clergy,  1.  54,  etc. 

Clinton,  3,  729;  4,  303. 

Coa,  Wellington  in  front  of  the,  3, 
405. 

Coalition,  First,  1,  61;  its  armies  in 
1793,  83;  failure  of,  126;  its  mem- 
bers, 177,  457,  468;  begins  war 
afresh,  568;  ends,  618;  its  methods, 
619. 

Coalition,  Second,  1 , 568;  Russia  with- 
draws from,  2,  9;  strategy  of,  128. 

Coalition,  Third,  2,  138,  144. 

Coburg,  1,  83,  90,  etc.,  110,  112. 

Code  Napoleon,  the,  3,  420,421;  4, 
710. 

Coehorn,  3,  232-234. 

Coimbra,  3,  392-394. 

Colbert,  3,  253. 

Cole,  4,  288-290,  491. 

Colli,  1,  188,  194,  198,  202,  206,  219, 
250,  606. 

Colloredo,  at  Leipsic,  4,  255-258;  in 
the  invasion  of  France,  327-340. 

Columns  of  attack,  1,  26;  against  line, 
26;  3,  48,  363;  4,  621-623;  of  bat- 
talions, 3,  280-282. 

Command,  word  of,  2,  180. 

Commissaries,  1 . 34  ; complaints  as 
to,  235,  347,  380;  of  war,  290,  347. 

Committee  of  Public  Safety,  1,  59,  60, 
107,  110,  112,  116,  118,  127,  147, 
152,  156,  169,  171. 

Commune,  1,  61. 

Compans,  at  Borodino,  3,  573-577; 
in  the  battle  of  Liitzen,  4,  36. 

Company,  2,  171. 

Concentration,  1,  27,  293. 

Concentric  operations,  1,  293;  4,  721, 
722. 

Confederation  of  the  Rhine,  2,  305; 
3,  36. 

Congress  of  Prague,  4,  103-105. 

Congress  to  assemble  at  Chatillon- 
sur-Seine,  4,  319;  demands  of  the 
allies  at,  353;  Army  of  the  Sover- 
eigns governed  by,  381;  negotiations 
at,  423. 


780 


INDEX. 


Conscription  Act,  1,  5. 

Constantine,  2,  274,  287;  3,  523,  539. 

Consular  Guard,  1,  6. 

Continental  System,  2,  428;  3,  2,  4, 
6,  44,  129,  380,  399,  420-423,  435- 
437. 

Contractors,  1,  347. 

Contributions,  levied,  1.  244,  257. 

Convention,  1,  2,  4,  79,  85,  93,  127, 
152,  171. 

Convention  of  Cintra,  3,  48,  50. 

Convention  of  Tauroggen,  3,  694. 

Coote,  2,  118. 

Copenhagen,  battle  of,  2,  122;  bom 
barded  by  the  English,  3,  44. 

Corbineau,  3,  678,  682;  4,  418. 

Cordon  system,  1,  65,  78,  188;  4,  721; 
theory  of,  revamped,  314. 

Cordova,  sacked,  3,  30. 

Corona,  La,  1,  261,  384,  etc. 

Corps,  1,  31;  in  the  Austrian  army, 
3,  132;  use  of,  in  battle,  194. 

Corsica,  1,  134. 

Corunna,  surrender  of,  3,  119. 

Cossacks,  3,  454,  553;  under  Tet- 
tenborn  at  the  Elbe,  4,  13. 

Cosseria,  4,  199,  etc. 

Coujp  d'etat  of  Eighteenth  Fructidor, 
1,  449. 

Courtray,  1,  66,  110. 

Craddock,  3,  50,  124. 

Craonne,  battle  of,  4,  420-423. 

Cuesta,  joins  with  Blake,  3,  28;  po- 
sition in  mid-September,  1808,  57; 
defeated  by  Victor,  340;  and  Welles- 
ley, 351  ; occupies  Talavera,  354 ; 
at  Oropesa,  367. 

Curial,  4,  253,  259. 

Custine,  1,  75,  84. 

Ciistrin,  2,  425. 

Dallemagne,  4,  222,  224,  230,  274, 
454. 

Dalrymple,  at  Vimiero,  3,  44,  47; 
negotiates  Convention  of  Cintra, 
48. 

Damanhur,  1,  475. 

Damietta,  1,  523. 

Danish  fleet,  captured  by  English,  3, 
44. 

Danton,  1,  50. 

Danube,  Napoleon  prepares  to  cross, 
3,  244-247;  Napoleon  crosses  at 
Lobau,  296,  297. 

Danzig,  2,  504,  etc. 

Daru,  in  the  Ratisbon  campaign,  3, 
141;  made  custodian  of  the  em- 


peror’s private  treasury,  4,  81;  Gen- 
eral Intendant,  698. 

Dates,  list  of,  4,  764-768. 

Davidovich,  1,  261,  291,  297,  etc.,  308, 
348,  etc.,  368,  373,  375. 

Davout,  1,  460;  2,  138,  139;  at  Ulm, 
196,  etc.;  on  march  to  Vienna,  221, 
etc.;  at  Austerlitz,  269,  etc.;  checks 
allied  left,  285,  289,  291;  pursues 
enemy,  295;  in  Jena  campaign,  361, 
etc.;  at  Auerstadt,  388,  etc.,  396;  in 
pursuit,  413,  etc.;  at  Berlin,  417; 
sent  to  Posen,  436;  on  Vistula,  437, 
etc.;  at  Nasielsk,  445;  at  Golymin, 
449;  in  winter  quarters,  454,  466; 
in  Eylau  campaign,  472,  etc.;  at 
Eylau,  484,  etc.;  in  Friedland  cam- 
paign, 508,  etc.;  at  Heilsberg,  519, 
etc.;  at  Friedland,  529;  at  the  head 
of  the  Army  of  the  Rhine  at  the  be- 
ginning of  the  Peninsular  War,  3, 
33;  in  the  Ratisbon  campaign,  133- 
180;  at  Abensberg  and  Eggmiihl, 
183-215;  outnumbered,  200;  calls 
for  aid,  202;  makes  a stout  defense, 
203;  in  march  on  Vienna,  222-248; 
in  the  Essling  campaign,  253-276; 
in  the  Lobau  campaign,  289-302;  in 
the  Wagram-Znaim  campaign,  305- 
325;  surprised  by  Rosenberg,  308; 
passes  Neusiedl,  314;  reaches  Nick  - 
olsburg,  324;  to  command  in  Rus- 
sian war,  435;  ordered  into  march- 
ing shape,  445;  reaches  Vilna,  468; 
opposes  Bagration,  475,  476;  on  the 
upper  Niemen,  481;  Jerome’s  com- 
mand placed  under,  482;  at  Minsk, 
483;  blamed  for  laxness,  484;  his 
long  stay  at  Minsk,  489  ; blamed 
by  Napoleon,  496;  reaches  Mohi- 
lev,  499  ; at  the  battle  of  Mohilev, 
499  ; writes  to  Poniatowski,  500;  at 
Smolensk,  533-540;  held  back  by 
Rosen,  551;  scolded  by  Napoleon, 
563;  at  Borodino,  572-583;  at  Mos- 
cow, 591-595;  during  the  retreat 
from  Moscow,  627-645,  655,  659, 
662-684 ; at  the  battle  of  Maloyaro- 
slavez,  632;  becomes  the  rearguard, 
638;  at  the  battle  of  Viasma,  642, 
643;  at  Smolensk,  662;  reaches 
Krasnoi,  664;  quarrels  with  Ney, 
665;  blamed  (unjustly)  for  aban- 
doning Ney,  667;  his  position  in 
March,  1813,  4,  9;  abandons  Dres- 
den and  marches  on  Liineburg,  13, 
14,  16;  at  Bautzen,  78;  enters  Ham- 


INDEX. 


781 


burg,  89;  the  emperor’s  letters  to, 
102;  how  far  useful,  103;  at  Gross 
Beeren,  136;  practically  useless,  245; 
defends  Hamburg,  279;  to  remain 
at  Paris  with  duties  of  Minister  of 
War  and  with  the  defense  of  the 
city,  520,  521,  526. 

Debelle,  3,  99,  100,  111. 

Declaration  of  April  4,  1814,  the,  4, 
469. 

Dedovich,  3,  257. 

Deep  order  of  battle,  3,  279-282. 

Dego,  1,  176,  198,  199,  etc. 

Delaborde,  3,  45,  99,  102,  111. 

D’Elbee,  1,  103. 

Delmas,  at  Bautzen,  4,  70;  at  Leipsic, 
248,  263. 

Delparque,  beats  Marchand,  3,  372; 
assists  in  the  investment  of  Tarra- 
gona, 4,  303. 

Delta,  the,  1,  474. 

Demoiselles  bridge,  4,  491. 

Demont,  3,  150. 

Dennewitz,  battle  of,  4,  184. 

Departments,  created,  1,  56. 

Deroy,  3,  191,  196,  512,  554;  4,  326. 

Desaix,  seizes  Kehl,  1,  315;  at  Ra- 
stadt,  316;  moves  on  Niirnberg,  332  ; I 
at  Biberach,  335;  to  Strasburg,  338,  | 
464,  465;  vanguard  in  Egypt,  475;  | 
at  Shubra  Khet,  480,  485,  497,  502;  i 
at  Sediman,  503,  etc.;  in  Upper  I 
Egypt,  554,  562;  reaches  Army  of  i 
Reserve,  2,  57,  60,  64;  conduct  at 
Marengo,  68,  etc.;  killed,  72;  char- 
acter, 74,  110,  120. 

Desenzano,  1,  247,  266. 

Desolles,  in  the  Peninsula,  3,  56,  69, 
73,  85,  99. 

Despinoy,  1,  264,  274,  277. 

Dessaix,  3,  573-576. 

Dijon,  1,  18. 

Dillon,  1,  65. 

Diplomacy  of  the  day,  3,  650. 

Directory,  1,  173,  189,  193,  209,  235, 
239,  250,  256,  282,  284,  290,  308, 
345,  348,  353,  372,  .376,  379,  401, 
408, 409, 411, 425, 440,  448, 449, 453. 
457,  etc.,  461,  etc.,  466,  477,  515,  520, 
553,  563, 566, 567,  etc.,  570, 591, 594, 
618;  2,  2. 

Disarmament,  1,  492. 

Discipline,  French,  low,  1,  37;  for  bat- 
tle good,  38,  207,  245,  381, 421,  431, 
470,  507;  2,  127,  etc.,  320;  in  the 
Spanish  Army,  3,  16;  in  Welling- 
ton’s army  in  Spain,  728,  731. 


Divan,  native,  1,  491;  suspended,  518; 
re-created,  518. 

Division,  as  grand  tactical  unit,  1,  28, 
30;  military,  30. 

“Divisions,”  1,  171. 

Djezzar  Pasha,  1,  516,  531,  536. 

Dnieper,  the,  3,  455,  528. 

Doetorov,  2,  273,  292,  477,  etc.;  3, 
471,  472,  537,  570,  578,  579,  630- 
632. 

Doctors,  1,  49. 

Dolf,  in  the  battle  of  Liitzen,  4,  35. 

Dombrovski,  3,  669,  674;  4,  248,  259, 
263. 

Dommartin,  1,  154. 

Domon,  4,  638. 

Doumouriez,  1,  66,  68,  etc.,  76,  83, 
90,  etc.,  93. 

Draft,  1,  82. 

Drehsa,  4,  57,  58,  60,  70,  78. 

Dresden,  abandonment  of,  4,  13,  14; 
occupied  by  the  French  after  the 
battle  of  Liitzen,  41;  the  passage  at, 
48;  strengthened,  98,  99;  in  danger, 
145;  description  of,  with  surround- 
ing country,  151-153;  battle  of, 
August  26,  153,  154;  battle  of,  Au- 
gust 27,  157-161;  Napoleon  holds 
on  to,  194,  204,  206,  207,  215. 

Drissa,  3,  489,  516. 

Dromedary  regiment,  1,  492. 

Drouot,  at  Leipsic,  4,  251-277;  at 
Janvilliers,  375,  376;  advises  delay 
in  the  attack  at  Waterloo,  628. 

Dueling,  1,  39. 

Dufour,  3,  602. 

Dugommiez,  1,  154,  etc.,  159. 

Dugua,  1,  485,  523,  554. 

Duhesme,  occupies  places  in  Spain,  3, 
6;  shut  up  in  Barcelona,  10,  26,  63  ; 
opens  the  route  to  Gerona,  120. 

Dumas,  Mathieu,  3,  74,  102. 

! Dupas,  3,  224. 

Dupont,  at  Haslach  and  Juningen, 
2,  198;  at  Magdeburg,  414;  at  Me- 
dina de  Rio  Seco,  3,  26-29;  crosses 
the  Sierra  Morena  and  sacks  Cor- 
dova, 30;  capitulates,  31:  court- 
martialed,  35. 

Durette,  takes  Papelotte,  4,  631. 

Duroc,  1,  176,  465;  2,  272,  339;  killed, 
4,  81 ; Grand  Marshal  of  the  Palace, 
695. 

Durosnel,  4,  55. 

t Diirrenstein,  battle  of,  2,  233. 

I Dutch  Expedition,  1,  608,  etc. 

| Dvina,  the,  3,  455. 


782 


INDEX. 


Ebelsberg,  3,  231-234. 

Eble’s  improvements,  1,  13;  at  the 
Studianka  ford  of  the  Beresina,  3, 
678-682. 

Ebro,  campaign  of  the,  3,  58-82. 

Eccentric  operations  4,  721-723. 

Eggmiihl,  the  march  on,  3,  205;  battle 
of,  206-213. 

Egypt,  expedition  to,  1,  461,  etc.;  de- 
scription of,  476,  etc.;  organization 
of,  490,  etc.;  rewards  and  punish- 
ments in,  505,  etc.,  514,  517;  fortifi- 
cations of,  509;  Turks  invade,  555; 
fresh  invasion  by  Turks,  2,  111; 
campaign  of,  113,  etc. 

Eighteenth  Brumaire,  2,  4,  etc. 

Eilenburg,  4,  237y 

El  Arish,  siege  of,  1,  523;  captured, 
525;  convention  of,  2,  111. 

Elba,  sovereignty  of,  chosen  by  Napo- 
leon, 4,  500;  his  return  from,  504, 
505. 

Elbe,  the,  4,  11,  12,  21,  89-111,  115- 
146,  172-202. 

Elliot,  3,  729. 

Elsnitz,  2,  47,  etc.,  62. 

Elster,  Napoleon’s  retreat  across,  4, 
265,  266. 

Eltingen,  battle  of,  2,  208. 

Embabeh,  1,  484. 

Emigration,  of  nobles,  1,  55. 

Emigres,  shot  without  trial,  1,  39. 

Emmendingen,  battle  of,  1,  337. 

Emperor  of  Austria,  3,  215. 

Enghien,  Due  d’,  2,  134,  137. 

Engineers,  1, 19;  topographical,  20,32. 

England,  subsidizes  Coalition  powers, 
1,  96;  assists  Coalition,  119;  mis- 
tress of  sea,  113,  447;  forces  at 
Port  Mahon,  2,  16;  plans  to  aid  Me- 
las,  25;  invades  Egypt,  113;  activ- 
ity at  sea,  122;  makes  peace,  122; 
again  bellicose,  132;  projected  in- 
vasion of,  133;  weak  ethics,  134; 
negotiations  with,  306;  after  Tilsit, 
541;  her  forces  in  the  Peninsula,  3, 
24-26,  44-126,  337-417,  705-747; 
4,  282-303 ; and  the  Continental  Sys- 
tem, 3,  129,  130,  436,  437;  assists 
Napoleon’s  enemies,  332. 

English  army,  3,  22-25;  in  the  Water- 
loo campaign,  4,  529-670. 

English  fleets,  3,  332. 

English  goods,  seized,  2,  419. 

Enrollment,  1,  4. 

Erlon,  in  Spain,  3,  726,  736,  741;  4, 
284-300;  moves  toward  Maubeuge, 


in  the  1815  campaign,  541;  lacks 
promptness,  545,  546;  directed 
toward  the  Prussian  right,  574,575; 
his  inopportune  appearance  heading 
for  Fleurus,  576;  recalled  by  Ney, 
577,  578;  his  conduct  lax,  577;  at 
the  battle  of  Quatre  Bras,  585,  586; 
his  advance  at  Waterloo,  629-632. 

Esdraelon,  plain  of,  1,  532,  541. 

Espagne,  3,  253,  262. 

Espinosa,  3,  71. 

Essling,  battle  of,  3,  254-278. 

Eugene  Beauharnais,  1,84;  made  Vice- 
roy of  Italy,  2,  305,465;  in  Italy,  3, 
33,  218,  219;  Napoleon’s  fault-find- 
ing letters  to,  219-221 ; in  the  Lobau 
campaign,  283-300;  joins  his  chief, 
284;  Napoleon’s  instructions  to, 
286-288;  drawn  in,  299;  in  the 
Wagram  campaign,  305-323;  elected 
Grand  Duke  of  Frankfort,  398; 
joins  the  Grand  Army,  446;  holds 
Ney,  544;  takes  Borodino,  578; 
assaults  the  big  redoubt,  579-581; 
marches  on  Rusa,  591 ; at  Moscow, 
618;  on  the  retreat  from  Moscow 
and  before  the  battle  of  Liitzen, 

3,  627-630,  639-645,  659,  663-695; 

4,  6-32;  at  the  battle  of  Liitzen, 
35  ff . ; sent  to  re-create  the  army  of 
Italy,  44;  unsuccessful  in  Italy,  279; 
surrounded  on  all  sides,  he  does  not 
lose  heart,  404. 

Eylau,  battle  of,  2,  475,  etc.;  losses 
at,  487. 

Fabvier,  3,  719. 

Federsee,  1,  334. 

Feldkirch,  1,  582. 

Ferdinand,  Archduke,  2, 153, 193,  201, 
210;  3,  5-10;  4,  303,  304. 

Fere  Champenoise,  4,  460. 

Ferey,  3,  714,  715,  718. 

Ferino,  1,  316,  etc.,  334. 

Ferrol,  captured,  3,  119. 

Field-works,  1,  40,  etc. 

Finances,  1,  82,  177. 

Finkenstein,  2,  503. 

Finland,  taken  by  Russia,  3,  375,  433. 

Fiorella,  1,  279,  etc. 

Fire  of  troops,  2,  173,  180,  401. 

Fleurus,  balloon  at,  1,  40;  battle  of. 
112:  in  the  Waterloo  campaign,  4. 
540  ff . ; Erlon’s  inopportune  appear- 
ance heading  for,  576. 

Flotilla,  Nile,  1,  480;  at  Shubra  Khet, 
483;  on  Danube,  2,  228. 


INDEX. 


783 


Folard,  1,  26. 

Fombio,  combat  of,  1,  226. 

Fontainebleau,  treaty  of,  October  27, 
1807,  3,  4. 

Forest  of  Soignes,  4,  540,  606,  616, 
635. 

Formation  of  troops,  1,  22;  261;  for 
battle,  2,  165,  etc.;  lineal,  166,  etc., 
169;  3,  363;  4,  621-623;  deep,  2, 
166.  170;  3,  279-282;  under  Fred- 
erick^, 166;  Ordinance  of  1791, 168; 
battalions  in  columns,  171;  3,  280; 
battalions  in  line,  2,  172;  various, 
176,  313;  in  1806,351. 

Fort  Mulgrave,  1,  155,  etc. 

Fortification,  1,  40,  etc.;  Napoleon’s 
observations  on,  4,  702-708. 

Fortresses,  1,  61,  etc.;  Italian,  182; 
Piedmontese  surrendered,  212; 
French,  4,  307. 

Foucart,  his  estimate  of  the  French 
forces  at  Bautzen,  4,  61. 

Fouche,  2,  3,  155,  307,  506;  chief  of 
secret  service  at  Dresden,  4,  41. 

Foy,  General,  2,  182;  3,  396,  714-740; 
4,  291-301,  477,  478,  480. 

France,  condition  of,  under  the  Na- 
poleonic Code,  3,  420,  421;  her 
increase  of  territory,  421,  422;  her 
foreign  relations,  422-424;  invasion 
of,  by  the  allies,  4,  305-471;  given 
much  politically  by  Napoleon,  711. 

Franceschi,  3,  56,  99,  100;  surprised 
by  English  at  Rueda,  102;  his 
roundabout  communication  with 
the  emperor,  104. 

Francis,  Emperor,  2,  229,  294,  306; 
his  proposal  for  an  armistice,  4,  401. 

Frankfort,  the  basis  of,  4,  402. 

Frankfurt  on  Oder,  2,  425;  4,  6. 

Frederick’s  battles,  1,  23;  at  Moll- 
witz,  264;  at  Prague,  287,  292;  in  - 
fluence on  Bonaparte,  354 ; contempt 
of  numbers,  362;  4,  255;  tactical 
method,  2,  166;  3,  321;  4,  681; 
power  to  manoeuvre,  2,  167;  com- 
pared with  Napoleon,  420;  4,  682, 
683,  685,  687,  708,  715-718;  his  sys- 
tem of  war,  720. 

Frederick  William,  at  Auerstadt,  2, 
402;  asks  truce,  404,  428;  moves  to 
Konigsberg,  432;  makes  convention 
with  Russia,  433. 

French  army,  organization  of,  at  the 
time  of  the  Peninsular  War,  3,  17- 
22. 

French  officer’s  duties,  2,  314. 


French  soldier,  1,  251,  285,  300,  309, 
360,372;  2,206,  etc.,  315,  317,319. 

Friant,  2,  114,  397,  etc.;  3,  150-179, 
183-191,  207,  211,  214. 

Friedland,  battle  of,  2,  530,  etc. 

Frohlich,  1,  316. 

Frontier  departments,  4,  522. 

Frontiers  of  France,  1,  60,  62. 

Fuentes  d’Onoro,  battle  of,  3, 405-407. 

Gains,  French,  1,  127,  etc. 

Galicia,  evacuated,  3,  348. 

Galitzin,  3,  578. 

Ganteaume,  1,  565;  2,  119,  etc. 

Gaza,  1,  526,  etc.;  captured,  526,  553. 

Gazan,  3,  122. 

Geisenhausen,  the  pursuit  on,  3,  199. 

Gembloux,  4,  596-600,  610,  612. 

Genappe,  4,  601-604,  664,  665. 

Gendarme,  1,  12. 

Genoa,  seized  by  French,  1,  346,  447; 

2,  16,  etc.,  35;  heroic  defense,  37. 

Genola,  battle  of,  1,  617. 

Gerard,  in  the  battle  of  Liitzen,  4,  34, 
36;  at  the  Katzbach,  138, 139;  before 
and  in  the  battle  of  La  Rothiere,  341, 
345,  347,  350;  at  Montereau,  390. 

German  character  misunderstood,  3, 
430. 

Gerona,  captured,  3,  374. 

Girard,  at  Gross  Beeren,  4,  136. 

Giron,  4,  284. 

Giulay,  2,  213,  261,  295;  3,  291; 
strives  to  take  Lindenau,  4,  248, 
249,  254;  drawn  into  Zwenkau, 
257;  again  to  attack  Lindenau,  260; 
at  Bar-sur-Aube,  329;  at  La  Rothi- 
ere, 348. 

Gleina,  4,  70,  73. 

Glubokoi,  on  the  road  to,  3,  501. 

Gneisenau,  2, 358;  3,  453;  4,  528,  609, 
610,  656. 

Gobert,  3,  29,  30. 

Godinot,  takes  Albuera,  3,  410. 

Godoy,  Manuel,  3,  2,  3,  7,  8,  16,  17. 

Golymin,  battle  of,  2,  449. 

Goselbach,  the,  4,  235. 

Governments,  of  France,  1789  to  1815, 
1,  56. 

Graham,  in  the  Vittoria  manoeuvre, 

3,  738-744;  in  Spain,  4,  284  ff.; 
blockades  San  Sebastian,  285; 
crosses  the  Douro,  734. 

Grand  Army,  order  of  march  from 
Channel,  2,  150,  etc.;  its  constitu- 
tion, 151,  310;  value,  153;  orders  to 
cross  Rhine,  159;  route  in  Germany, 


784 


INDEX . 


160,  162,  185;  position  October  6, 
191;  crosses  Danube,  192;  good 
health,  193;  reaches  Augsburg,  195; 
at  and  around  Ulm,  198,  etc. ; crosses 
Inn,  223;  on  Traun,  226;  reaches 
Vienna,  239;  position  there,  244; 
reaches  Znaim,  249;  reaches  Briinn, 
256;  situation  at  Briinn,  258;  made 
ready  for  battle,  259;  enemy’s  plan 
to  attack,  259,  265;  in  readiness  for 
battle,  264;  manoeuvres  prior  to 
Austerlitz,  271,  etc.;  manoeuvres  at 
Austerlitz,  281 , etc. ; habit  of  victory, 
309;  tactics  of,  312;  difference  be- 
tween it  and  other  armies,  313;  its 
formation  for  battle,  313;  remains  in 
Germany,  342;  position,  348;  ad- 
vances into  north  Germany,  361; 
organization  in  Jena  campaign, 
362;  at  Schleiz  and  Saalfeld,  368, 
369;  moves  up  to  Jena,  382;  pursuit 
after  Jena,  409,  etc.;  position  on 
Vistula,  438;  crosses  Vistula,  442, 
443;  crosses  Ukra and  Bug,  444, 445 ; 
tired  out,  452;  in  winter  quarters, 
454,  462;  position  fortified,  454; 
put  in  good  condition,  458,  461 ; 
manoeuvres  near  Jonkendorf,  470, 
etc.;  at  Eylau,  475,  etc.;  follows 
Russian  army,  491 ; goes  into  winter 
quarters,  492;  reorganized,  507; 
breaks  up  winter  quarters,  508;  at 
Heilsberg,  519,  etc.;  manoeuvres 
after  Heilsberg,  524;  at  Friedland, 
530,  etc.;  543;  withdrawn  towards 
the  Confederation  of  the  Rhine,  3, 
2;  divisions  of,  in  Peninsular  War, 

21,  32;  in  Germany,  becomes  the 
Army  of  the  Rhine,  33;  dissolved 
October  12,  1808,  141;  ready  for 
the  invasion  of  Russia,  organizction 
of,  439-445;  advances  toward  the 
Vistula,  446;  position  of,  May  31, 
1812,  450;  proclamation  to,  June 

22,  462;  position  of,  June  23,  463, 
464;  crosses  the  Niemen,  467;  head 
of,  split  into  several  columns,  471; 
becoming  weary  of  long  march, 
477;  hardships  of,  478-481;  posi- 
tion of,  July  14,  1812,  488;  as- 
sembles for  a passage  of  the 
Dvina  near  Bechenkovichi,  496; 
position  of,  July  24,  497;  decreas- 
ing, 507,  511;  put  into  cantonments, 
508,  509,  512;  position  of,  August  4, 
519;  passes  the  Dnieper,  528;  at 
Smolensk,  537-540 ; entry  into  Smo- 


lensk, 540,  541;  at  the  battle  of 
Valutino,  544-547;  further  advance 
of,  552  ff.;  depletion  of,  on  the 
road,  557,  558;  rear  of,  ill  cared  for, 
561;  at  Borodino,  571-582;  at  Mos- 
cow, 590-621;  its  departure  from 
Moscow,  621;  condition  of,  on  leav- 
ing Moscow,  626;  its  retreat,  627  ff.; 
at  Maloyaroslavez,  631-633;  regular 
retreat  of,  begun,  638;  fast  dissolv- 
ing, 654;  the  rearguard  abandoned, 
664;  Ney  reaches,  667;  numbers  of, 
on  November  21,  1812,  671;  position 
of,  November  25,  680;  the  emperor 
writes  Maret  the  condition  of,  687, 
688;  reaches  Vilna,  691;  dissolved, 
693;  the  numbers  lost,  695;  average 
rate  of  marching  of,  699;  reconstruc- 
tion of,  after  Vittoria,  4,  4;  retreat 
of,  6-9;  movements  about  the  Elbe, 
9-16;  numbers  of,  17;  concentrates 
on  the  Saale,  23;  losses  atLiitzen, 
41,42;  at  Bautzen,  60-78;  continues 
its  advance,  82 ; about  Dresden, 
153-171;  in  the  Leipsic  manoeuvre, 
203  ff.;  at  Leipsic,  246-281;  re- 
treats across  the  Pleisse  and  Elster, 
266;  moves  on  Weissenfels  to  seek 
the  safety  of  the  River  Saale,  270; 
marches  toward  the  Rhine,  272-278; 
crosses  the  Rhine,  278. 

Grandjean,  3,  76,  84,  99. 

Grand-tactics,  3,  50,  279-282,  321 ; 4, 
260. 

Grenadiers,  value  of,  1,  9. 

Grenier,  his  position  in  March,  1813, 
4,  9. 

Gribeauval,  1,  13,  17;  2,  312. 

Gross  Beeren,  battle  of,  4,  134-136. 

Gross  Gorschen,  4,  34-39. 

Grouchy,  1,  607;  2,  96;  at  the  battle 
of  La  Rothiere,  4,  348;  attacks 
Blucher  at  Janvilliers.  375,  376;  sent 
toward  Braine,  418;  at  Craonne, 
421,  422;  at  Waterloo,  595  ff.|  fails 
in  containing  Blucher,  610-612; 
his  note  to  Napoleon,  626;  loses  his 
opportunity  to  head  off  Blucher,  635 ; 
receives  two  dispatches  from  Soult, 
636;  not  sufficiently  instructed  by 
Napoleon,  636,  637;  attacks  Thiele- 
mann, 657;  accomplishes  little,  658. 

Gshask,  3,  561  ff. 

I Guard,  the,  2,  151,  207,  244,  248,  289, 
299,  348,  362,  383,  388,  458,  480, 
483,  522,  531;  at  the  time  of  the 
Peninsular  War,  3,  17,  18;  in  the 


INDEX. 


785 


campaign  against  Moore,  105,  109  ; 
at  Borodino,  570  ft.;  the  one  body 
cared  for  in  the  Russian  war,  676; 
in  Mainz,  4,  16;  in  Erfurt,  23;  to 
march  towards  Bautzen,  55;  Na- 
poleon’s farewell  to,  501;  in  the 
Waterloo  campaign,  524,  649  ft.; 
stout  attack  of,  in  the  battle  of 
Ligny,  578,  579;  the  cavalry  of,  at 
Waterloo,  646. 

Gudin,  2,  397,  etc.;  in  the  Ratisbon 
campaign,  3,  150-179;  in  the  Abens- 
berg  and  Eggmiihl  campaign,  182- 
210;  killed,  546. 

Guerrillas,  in  Spain,  3,  65  66. 

Guibert,  1,  27;  2,  167. 

“Guides,”  1,  12,  251. 

Guns,  regimental,  1,  10;  decrease,  16. 

Guntersdorf,  battle  of,  2,  248. 

Giinzburg,  2,  198,  etc. 

Gustavus,  2,  468,  523;  4,  683,  694, 
699,  716-718,  720. 

Guyeux,  1,  264,  269,  274,  277,  366, 
417,  etc.,  428. 

Halle,  a strategic  knot,  4,  230. 

Hamburg,  vacated,  4,  89;  entered  by 
Davout,  89;  strengthened,  99;  de- 
fended by  Davout,  279. 

Hanau,  Wrede  reaches,  4,  274-276; 
battle  of,  277. 

Hannibal,  compared  with  Wellington, 
4,  496;  compared  with  Napoleon, 
715-718. 

Hanseatic  towns,  incorporated  with 
France,  3,  398. 

Hardenberg,  2,  327. 

Hardinge,  4,  532. 

Harispe,  4,  476,  479,  484,  489. 

Harris,  3,  40. 

Haslach,  2,  198. 

Hautpoul,  2,  483. 

Havelberg,  4,  11. 

Haxo,  General,  3,  463;  4,  170. 

Heilsberg,  battle  of,  2,  515,  etc. 

Helder,  French  cavalry  capture  fleet 
at,  1,  115,  608. 

Heliopolis,  battle  of,  2,  112. 

Herrasti,  3,  387. 

Hill,  at  Busaco,  3,  391;  breaks  the 
bridge  at  Almaraz,  417,  711;  re- 
tires, 725;  further  movements  in 
Spain,  4,  284-302;  in  the  Bayonne- 
Toulouse  movements,  476-489. 

Hiller,  in  the  Ratisbon  campaign,  3, 
142-179;  in  the  Abensberg  and  Egg- 
miihl  campaign,  183-206;  pursued 


by  Bessieres,  222;  turns  back,  224; 
in  the  march  on  Vienna,  229  ft'.;  at 
Linz,  229-231 ; at  Ebelsberg,  231- 
234;  retires  to  Mautern,  239;  in  the 
Essling  campaign,  253-263;  attacks 
Asparn,  260;  operates  against  Eu- 
gene at  Tar  vis  and  Lay  bach,  4,  279; 
attacks  Vincenza,  279,  280. 

Hoche,  1,  87,  etc.,  129,  409,  444,  445, 
448. 

Hochkirch,  4,  70,  71,  73. 

Hohenlinden,  battle  of,  2,  94,  etc.;  an 
accident,  100;  a decisive  victory,  101. 

Hohenlohe,  2,  83,  356;  at  Jena,  389, 
etc.;  aims  for  Stettin,  416,  422; 
with  his  right  on  Schirling,  3,  201; 
at  Aderklaa,  308. 

Hohenzollern,  1,  598;  2,  20;  3,  183, 
187,  207,  211,  257,  260,  262,  270. 

Holkar,  3,  40,  41. 

Holland,  overrun  by  French,  1,  115; 
brought  into  the  French  empire,  3, 
398. 

Homburg,  4,  327. 

“Honor,”  1,  39. 

Hope,  3,  87,  89,  90,  93-101;  4,  297- 
301,  477,  478,  485. 

Hospital  service,  1,  37;  of  the  French 
army,  at  the  time  of  the  Peninsular 
War,  3,  20. 

Hotze,  1,  328,  575,  581,  616. 

Houchard,  1,  94. 

Hougomont,  4,  615,  628,  629. 

Hoyerswerda,  4,  53  ft. 

Huningen,  1,  340. 

Ibrahim  Bey,  1,  479,  484;  retires 
towards  Syria,  488,  497. 

Improvements,  military,  2,  123,  etc. 

India,  Wellesley  in,  3,  38-43. 

Infantry,  1,  7,  etc.;  2,  309;  of  French 
army,  at  the  time  of  the  Peninsular 
War,  3,  17;  at  the  time  of  the  Aus- 
trian campaign,  147-149. 

Inkovo,  combat  at,  3,  524. 

Inn,  passage  of  the,  3,  157. 

Institute  of  France,  1,  458. 

Insurrection  of  Madrid,  3,  10. 

Interior  lines,  4,  188,  232,  239,  240. 

Italian  Army,  4,  318. 

Italy,  in  1796,  politically,  1,  178;  topo- 
graphically, 180,  etc.;  its  fortresses, 
182;  affairs  in,  4,  403,  404. 

Ivrea,  1,  31. 

Jaffa,  1,  523,  527,  528,  552. 

Janvilliers,  4,  375. 


786 


INDEX. 


Jellachic,  1,  583,  585;  2,  205,  etc.;  3, 
142. 

Jemappes,  2,  65;  battle  of,  76,  etc. 

Jena,  battle  of,  2,  385,  etc.;  theatre 
of,  386;  opens,  388;  opens  too  early, 
389;  won  by  French,  394;  losses  at, 
404;  battle  of  accident,  411. 

Jerome  Bonaparte,  on  Vistula,  2,  437, 
etc.;  his  task  at  the  beginning  of 
the  Russian  campaign,  3,  460;  at 
Grodno,  469;  character  of,  474; 
remiss,  482;  his  whole  command 
placed  under  the  orders  of  Da- 
vout,  482;  his  further  movements, 
483-489;  his  long  stay  at  Grodno, 
489. 

John,  Archduke,  2,  93,  107;  3,  218, 
283  ff. 

Jomini,  1,  279,  280,  502;  2,  107,  181, 
360,  409;  on  the  formation  of  bat- 
tle, 3,  280-282;  his  reasons  for  the 
failure  of  the  Russian  campaign, 
696-698;  on  the  battle  of  Bautzen, 
4,  68,  70,  71,  77;  leaves  the  French 
army  and  takes  service  with  the 
Russians,  113, 114;  on  the  charge  of 
Ney’s  cavalry  at  Waterloo,  647;  his 
summing  up  of  the  equipment  of 
a captain,  684;  on  Napoleon’s  ab- 
stractedness, 699,  700;  his  life,  726, 
727;  a writer  on  the  science  of  war, 
727-732. 

Jonkendorf,  battle  of,  2,  470,  472. 

Joseph  Bonaparte,  made  King  of 
Naples,  2,  305;  elected  King  of 
Spain,  3,  8,  9;  enters  Spain,  29; 
quits  Madrid,  31;  his  abnormal 
plan,  September  14,  1808,  54;  could 
not  understand  Napoleon’s  plans, 
55;  given  title  of  Lieutenant-Gen- 
eral of  the  Emperor,  107;  his  formal 
entry  into  Madrid  as  King  of  Spain, 
125;  at  fault,  352,  353;  his  false  re- 
port of  the  battle  of  Talavera,  364; 
as  King  of  Spain,  381;  his  Andalu- 
sian project,  381;  enters  on  the 
campaign,  382,  383;  involved  with 
the  national  Cortes,  705;  at  odds 
with  Napoleon,  706;  reaches  Blasco 
Sancho,  719;  his  instructions  to 
Soult,  721;  gives  the  supreme  com- 
mand to  Soult,  724;  reenters  Ma- 
drid, 732;  leaves  Madrid,  735;  in 
the  Vittoria  manoeuvre,  735-746; 
his  reign  over,  745;  retires  to  Paris, 
bereft  of  his  throne,  4,  284;  defends 
Paris,  464,  466. 


Josephine,  1,  175;  2,  137,  191,  214, 
544. 

Joubert,  1,  191;  sent  up  Adige,  351; 
with  Vaubois,  353;  succeeds  Vau- 
bois,  376;  at  Rivoli,  383,  387;  left 
to  face  Alvinzi,  397;  completes  vic- 
tory, 398;  406,  419,  etc.,  426;  ad- 
vances on  Laudon  and  Kerpen,  429; 
ordered  in  to  army,  436;  in  com- 
mand, Army  of  Italy,  603;  at  Novi, 
604;  killed,  606. 

Jourdan,  1,  94,  110;  at  Fleurus,  113, 
etc.,  114,  120,  etc.,  307;  on  Rhine, 
313;  pushes  back  Wartensleben, 
321 ; tries  to  work  with  Moreau,  322; 
on  Naab,  323;  retires  on  Wurzburg, 
325;  retires  through  mountains,  330; 
recrosses  Rhine,  330;  in  1796  cam- 
paign, 343,  572,  574;  plans,  577;  at 
Stockach,  578,  581;  retires,  580; 
resigns,  580;  2,  3,  138,  140;  com- 
mands, with  Joseph,  the  army  on 
the  Ebro,  3,  54;  does  not  under- 
stand Napoleon’s  plans,  55;  his 
comment  on  the  fall  of  Madrid, 
90;  as  a soldier,  125;  succeeded  by 
Soult  as  military  adviser  of  the  king, 
370;  becomes  again  the  king’s  ad- 
viser, 733. 

Juningen,  2,  198. 

Junot,  1,  156,  176,  191,  213,  275,  465, 
537;  2,  272;  his  mission,  3,  4-6;  his 
position  in  Lisbon,  37;  at  the  bat- 
tle of  Vimiero,  45-48;  movements 
after  the  surrender  of  Madrid,  90; 
replaces  Moncey,  99,  122;  besieges 
Saragossa,  122;  at  Busaco,  390; 
fails  to  cooperate  near  Dresna,  546; 
at  Borodino,  576,  581,  582. 

Juntas,  insurrectionary,  3,  10. 

Kaim,  2,  20,  62. 

Kaiserov,  at  Arc is-sur- Aube,  4,  445. 

Kaiserslautern,  battle  of,  1,  87,  etc.; 
116. 

Kaja,  4,  34-38. 

Ivalish,  treaty  at,  4,  5. 

Kalkreuth,  2,  395,  etc.,  406,  416,  504. 

Kamenski,  at  Pultusk,  2,  441;  op- 
poses French,  445;  retires,  446;  450. 

Kamenz,  4,  49,  54. 

Kantarah,  El,  1,  522. 

Katzbach,  battle  of  the,  4,  138-141. 

Kehl,  1,  315,  340. 

Keith,  2,  113. 

Kellermann,  Senior,  1.  66,  68,  etc. 

Kellermann,  Junior,  1,  95,  117,  187, 


INDEX. 


787 


236;  at  Marengo,  2,  64;  73,  150; 
at  Vimiero,  3,  47;  negotiates  Con- 
vention of  Cintra,  48;  in  command 
of  reserve  corps  on  the  Rhine,  230; 
at  Preititz,  4,  72;  in  the  Wachau 
valley,  252. 

Kerpen,  1,  430. 

Kienmayer,  2,  82,  98,  222,  274;  3,  142, 
143,  161,  173,  183,  193,  225. 

Kilmaine,  1,  248,  292,  293,  304. 

Kleber,  1,  84,  103-105,  113,  313,  etc.; 
wins  Forscheim,  322,  465,  475,  497, 
526,  etc.,  538,  540,  etc.;  at  battle 
of  Mount  Tabor,  542,  547,  558;  in 
command,  Army  of  Orient,  564;  in 
command  in  Egypt,  2,  110;  signs 
convention,  111;  wins  Heliopolis, 
112;  assassinated,  112. 

Klein  Bautzen,  4,  73  ff. 

Klein  Forstgen,  4,  59. 

Klein  Gorschen,  4,  34-37. 

Klein  Munchen,  3,  232. 

Kleist,  before  the  battle  of  Liitzen,  4, 
30,  31 ; pushes  in  on  Markkleeberg, 
250;  falls  back,  251;  heads  for 
Probsthayda,  262;  at  Craonne,  420- 
422. 

Klenau,  1,  598;  2,  93;  3,  258,  308,  309, 
317;  at  Leipsic,  4,  250-280. 

Klux,  in  the  battle  of  Liitzen,  4,  34. 

Koblos,  1,  383,  388,  etc. 

Kochanovo,  headquarters,  3,  671. 

Kollowrat,  2,  94,  etc.,  213,  273;  during 
the  Abensberg  and  Eggmiihl  cam- 
paign, 3, 183-214;  to  march  on  Linz, 
237,  253;  at  Wagram,  308-315. 

Kdnigswartha,  4,  58  ff. 

Korsakov,  1,  611;  at  Zurich,  615. 

Kossier,  1,  554. 

Kovno,  headquarters  of  Napoleon,  3, 
464;  looted,  692. 

Kozietulski,  at  the  pass  at  Somo- 
Sierra,  3,  86. 

Krasnoi,.  taken  by  Ney,  3,  530;  battle 
of,  661-663. 

Kray,  1,  328,  446;  on  Adige,  588;  at- 
tacks Scherer,  589;  wins  Magnano, 
591;  593,  605,  etc.;  versus  Moreau, 
2,  22,  etc.;  retires,  26;  on  Rhine,  81; 
falls  back,  85;  beaten  at  Moskirch, 
87,  etc.;  crosses  Danube,  88;  loses 
Biberach,  89;  holds  Ulm,  90,  etc.; 
retires  from  Ulm,  91,  etc. 

Kremlin,  injured  but  not  destroyed  by 
fire,  3,  596;  to  be  blown  up,  620; 
partly  blown  up,  630. 

Kulm,  4,  168. 


Kutusov,  retires  from  Inn,  2,  222;  re- 
treat, 223;  crosses  Enns,  228;  crosses 
Danube,  231;  at  Durrenstein,  238; 
at  Meissau,  245;  moves  on  Znaim, 
246;  joins  second  Russian  army,  251 ; 
occupies  Wischau,  262;  slow  in  move- 
ments, 269;  errors  at  Austerlitz,  271, 
etc.;  five  columns,  273,  etc.;  what 
he  should  have  done,  280;  initial 
manoeuvres,  282,  etc.;  beaten  by 
Soult  on  Pratzen,  286;  cut  in  two, 
290;  only  obeying  orders,  300;  re- 
port on  Austerlitz,  301;  chosen 
commander  of  the  Russian  forces, 
3,  550,  565;  at  Borodino,  566-582; 
marches  through  Moscow  to  Panki, 
592;  his  movements  while  the 
French  were  in  Moscow,  602-621; 
at  Podolsk,  602;  takes  Napoleon’s 
letter  to  the  czar,  604,  605;  defeats 
Murat,  615;  during  the  French  re- 
treat from  Moscow,  625-698;  at  Ma- 
loyaroslavez,  632;  adopts  a Fabian 
policy,  643,  644;  refrains  from  at- 
tack, 661,  662;  hyper-conservative, 
662;  his  scheme,  663;  at  Dobraia, 
665;  death,  4,  14. 

La  Belle  Alliance,  4,  615,  624,  643,  650. 

Labourdonnaye,  1,  76. 

La  Favorita,  battle  of,  1,  399,  etc. 

Lafayette,  1,  8,  25,  55,  64,  65,  68,  486. 

La  Ferte  Gaucher,  4,  406-408. 

La  Ferte  sous  Jouarre,  4,  406-408, 
412. 

Lagrange,  3,  74,  77,  85. 

Laharpe,  L 187,  195,  etc.,  227,  238. 

La  Haye  Sainte,  4,  613-624,  629- 
651.  ' 

La  Houssaye,  3,  97,  106. 

Lake,  3,  43. 

Lambert,  1,  184,  235. 

La  Motte,  at  Villeneuve,  4,  388. 

Landrecies,  1,  110. 

Landshut,  battle  of,  3,  196-199. 

Landskoi,  4,  337. 

Langeron,  at  the  Katzbach,  4,  138- 
MO;  at  Leipsic,  248-269;  crosses 
the  Rhine,  327. 

Lannes,  1,  191,  202,  224,  226,  230; 
gallantrv,  302;  382,  397,  465,  497, 
526,  etc.,  531,  545,  557,  etc.;  2,  24, 
27;  at  Bard,  30,  31,  43,  45,  48;  wins 
Montebello.  52;  57,  64,  138,  140;  at 
Ulm,  196,  etc.;  on  march  to  Vienna, 
221,  etc.;  at  Vienna  bridge,  238;  at 
Austerlitz,  287,  290;  pursues  enemy, 


788 


INDEX. 


295;  in  Jena  campaign,  361,  etc.; 
at  Saalfeld,  369;  at  Jena,  387,  etc.; 
in  pursuit,  413,  etc.;  on  Vistula, 
437,  etc.;  at  Pultusk,  448;  in  win- 
ter quarters,  454;  467  ; at  Heilsberg, 
519,  etc.;  at  Friedland,  530,  etc.; 
at  Tudela,  3,  73-82;  after  Tudela, 
83,  84;  besieges  Saragossa,  123; 
in  the  Saal-Arnhofen  region,  182; 
on  march  to  Vienna,  222-248;  in 
the  Essling  campaign,  253-279;  his 
death,  278,  279. 

Lanusse,  1,  202,  465,  557;  2,  114. 

Laon,  battle  of,  4, 424-431 ; rendezvous 
of  French  after  Waterloo,  665. 

La  Pena,  3,  57,  85. 

La  Pietra,  1,  296,  352. 

Lapisse,  3,  67,  69;  at  Madrid,  88; 
after  the  surrender  of  Madrid,  99;  in 
the  campaign  against  Moore,  109; 
in  Portugal,  338  ft*. 

Lapoype,  1,  155. 

Larochejaquelin,  1,  101,  105,  106. 

La  Romatia,  mutiny  of  his  troops,  3, 
36,  37;  joins  Blake,  63,  71,  72; 
after  the  surrender  of  Madrid,  110; 
blockades  Lugo,  347;  his  death,  401. 

La  Rothiere,  battle  of,  4,  346-351. 

Lasalle,  1,  395;  2,  419;  at  Torque- 
mada,  3,  26;  at  Medina  de  Rio  Seco, 
28;  position  in  mid-September, 
1808,  56;  movements  after  the  sur- 
render of  Madrid,  90,  91,  97,  99;  in 
the  Essling  campaign,  253-262. 

Latour-Maubourg,  1,  76,  188,  314, 
etc.,  330,  335,  336,  409,  444;  2,  97, 
etc.;  3,  97,  99,  106,  493;  at  Bautzen, 
4,  74-78;  aids  Lefebvre,  81 ; with 
Marmont,  83;  at  Sagan,  90;  in  the 
Leipsic  manoeuvre,  205-238;  at 
Leipsic,  251-253. 

Laudon,  1,  351,  402,  411,  438,  582, 
585;  2,  102. 

Lauriston,  at  Wagram,  3,  312;  sent  to 
Russian  headquarters  with  message, 
604,  605;  on  the  retreat  from  Mos- 
cow and  before  the  battle  of  Liitzen, 
4,  9-32;  marches  on  Meissen,  48; 
in  the  days  of  the  armistice,  1813, 
81-90;  at  the  Katzbach,  138-140;  in 
the  Leipsic  manoeuvre,  205-238;  at 
Leipsic,  250-270. 

Lecourbe.  1,  582,  586;  2,  82,  85,  92, 
94,  138. 

Lefebvre,  1,  114,  315,  326,  330, -445; 
2,  138,  140,  150,  504,  508;  defeats 
Palafox  at  Epila,  3,  27;  his  move- 


ments up  to  Burgos,  59-70;  takes 
Valmaseda,  71;  from  Burgos  to 
Tudela,  71-82;  after  Tudela,  83; 
his  movements  after  the  surrender 
of  Madrid,  90,  99;  sent  to  operate 
against  Moore,  106;  drives  back  the 
Army  of  the  South,  119;  lays  siege 
to  Saragossa,  121,  122;  in  the  Ratis- 
bon  campaign,  135-178;  defeats 
Thierry,  178;  at  Abensberg,  182; 
at  Egglofsheim,  212;  on  march  to 
Vienna,  222-247;  at  Altenburg,  4, 
205;  sent  to  occupy  Chalons,  330. 

Legion  of  Honor,  1,  5,  39. 

Legrand,  3,  150,  254-269,  309,  324. 

Leipsic,  manoeuvre,  4,  203-245;  battle 
of,  246-281. 

Leith,  at  Busaco,  3,  391. 

Le  Mans,  battle  of,  1,  105. 

Lepic,  3,  56. 

Lestocq,  2,  431,  439,  446,  459;  in 
Evlau  campaign,  472,  etc. 

Leva!,  3,  99,  106. 

Levies,  how  made,  1,  82. 

Lichtenstein,  1,  326,  329;  2,  210,  273, 
287;  3,  157,  161,  173,  183-206,  258; 
4,  327. 

Lieutenants,  list  of,  4,  744,  745. 

Light  cavalry,  increases,  1,  10. 

Light  foot,  increase  of,  1,  7,  9. 

Light  troops,  increase  of,  1,  49. 

Ligny,  4,  540  ff.;  battle  of,  570-579. 

Ligurian  Republic,  1,  447. 

Lindenau’s  tactics,  1,  30. 

Line  and  column,  3,  48-50,  363;  4, 
621-623. 

Lineal  tactics,  1,  24;  2,  65,  etc. 

Linz,  3,  229-235. 

Liptay,  1,  188,  225,  248,  269,  276,  383, 
388,  etc. 

Lisbon,  occupied  by  the  French,  3,  6; 
its  situation,  393. 

Lithuania,  3,  455,  466,  485. 

“Little  Headquarters,’’  3,  444. 

Lloyd,  the  earliest  writer  on  the  science 
of  war,  4,  720. 

Loano,  battle  of,  1,  125. 

Lobau,  island  of,  3,  273,  291  ff. 

Lobau,  in  the  battle  of  Liitzen,  4,  36; 
kept  as  a reserve  after  the  defeat  of 
the  Prussians,  566,  580, 591 ; at  Mar- 
bais,  595 ; ordered  to  sustain  Domon, 
638;  opposite  Biilow  at  Planchenoit, 
642,  645;  forced  back  on  Planche- 
noit, 648. 

Lodi,  bridge  of,  1,  229;  a mistake,  232. 

Loison,  3,  45,  344-346,  406. 


INDEX. 


789 


Lonato,  battle  of,  1,  268,  etc.;  270, 
275. 

Lorge,  3,  102. 

Loshniza,  3,  679. 

Louis  Bonaparte,  1,  465;  made  king 
of  Holland,  2,  305,  350,  352. 

Louis,  Archduke,  at  Abensberg  and 
Eggmuhl,  3,  187-206. 

Louis  Philippe,  1,  76. 

Louis,  Prince  of  Prussia,  2,  369. 

Louis  XVI.,  deprived  of  power,  1,  56; 
arrested  in  flight,  57;  tried  and  exe- 
cuted, 59. 

Lubino,  battle  of,  3,  544-546. 

Lucien  Bonaparte,  2,  4,  etc. 

Luckner,  1,  65. 

Lugo,  3,  347. 

Lusha,  the,  3,  631. 

Lusignan,  1,  383,  etc.,  388,  etc.,  417. 

Liitzen,  battle  of,  4,  32-38. 

Macdonald,  1,  570;  moves  to  join 
Moreau,  579;  at  Modena,  598;  at 
theTrebia,  599;  errors,  602;  2,  138, 
140;  at  Wagram,  3, 312-317 ; created 
marshal,  323;  with  Yorck,  com- 
mands the  Prussian  contingent  in 
Napoleon’s  army,  693;  ordered  to 
Tilsit,  reaches  Konigsberg,  693,  694  ; 
on  the  retreat  from  Moscow  and 
before  the  battle  of  Liitzen,  4,  23- 
32;  at  Dresden,  48;  in  the  days  of 
the  armistice,  1813,  81-108 ; Na- 
poleon’s instructions  for,  130;  at  the 
Katzbach,  137-141;  at  Gorlitz,  176, 
177;  his  situation  serious,  178;  sent 
after  the  Army  of  Silesia,  180;  in 
the  Leipsic  manoeuvre,  206-240;  at 
Leipsic,  250-276;  in  command  of 
the  lower  Rhine,  313,  330;  in  the 
invasion  of  France,  331  ff.;  ordered 
to  march  to  Montereau,  372;  on  the 
Yeres,  387;  combats  at  Bar-sur- 
Seine,  416;  falls  back  to  Maison 
Rouge,  437. 

Mack,  1,  568;  character,  2,  153;  se- 
lects Iller  for  defense,  154:  a the- 
orist, 187;  false  position,  188;  un- 
certainty, 189,  195;  what  he  should 
have  done,  192,  193;  chances,  201; 
does  not  understand  concentration, 
202 ; inclosed,  203,  209  ; surren- 
ders at  Ulm,  210;  criticism  on,  213; 
meets  Kutusov,  222. 

Mackenzie,  3,  729. 

Madrid,  occupied  by  Murat,  3,  7;  in- 
surrection of,  May  2, 1808, 10;  polit- 


ical rather  than  commercial  centre, 
11;  surrenders  to  the  French,  88; 
Joseph  leaves,  735. 

Magazines,  1,  34;  2,  220,  318. 

Magdeburg,  2,  414,  425;  4,  9-12. 

Magnano,  battle  of,  1,  590. 

Mahrattas,  the,  3,  40-43. 

Maida,  battle  of,  2,  305. 

Mainz,  1,  84,  116;  battle  of , 120,  etc.; 
system  of,  4,  705. 

Maison,  4,  83. 

Maitland,  3,  729  ; 4,  650  ff. 

Major,  first  created,  1,  33. 

Malet  conspiracy,  the,  3,  646. 

Maloyaroslavez,  battle  of,  3,  630-633, 
635. 

Malsch,  1,  317. 

Malta,  1,  463;  captured,  469. 

Mamelukes,  1,  473,  479;  individual 
courage  of,  482;  487. 

Manhood  service,  1,  4,  6. 

Manoeuvres,  of  Revolutionary  armies, 
2,  168,  etc. 

Mantua,  1,  247,  253;  country  between 
Trent  and,  253,  256;  besieged,  257; 
siege  abandoned,  265 ; battle  in  front 
of,  306,  310;  surrenders,  402;  2,  102. 

Maps,  1,  32;  3,  439. 

Marceau,  1,  104,  113,  330. 

Marchaix,  4,  370. 

Marchand,  3,  69,  85,  99,  370. 

Marches,  remarkable,  1,  309,  553;  2, 
242,  316,  317;  4,  747. 

Marengo,  theatre  of,  2,  58;  battle  of, 
59,  etc.;  defeat  at,  66,  etc.;  new  line 
formed,  70;  victory,  72;  losses  at, 
73;  criticisms  of,  76,  79. 

Maret,  3,  613. 

Marie  Louise,  Napoleon  weds,  3,  379. 

Marmont,  1,  178,  191,  281,  523,  562; 
2,  24,  27,  32,  138,  139;  at  Ulm,  196, 
etc.;  at  Austerlitz,  271,  etc.;  163, 
182,  350;  in  Dalmatia,  3,  33;  leaves 
Dalmatia,  289;  his  delays,  291;  in 
the  Wagram-Znaim  campaign,  312- 
326;  created  marshal,  323;  replaces 
Massena  in  Portugal,  407,  408 ; 
given  carte  blanche  in  his  own  opera- 
tions, 711;  his  activity,  711;  with- 
draws behind  the  Douro,  712;  at 
Salamanca,  713-717;  on  the  retreat 
from  Moscow  and  before  the  battle 
of  Liitzen,  4,  16-32;  in  the  battle  of 
Liitzen,  36;  at  Dresden,  48;  objects 
to  detailing  troops  for  an  operation 
on  Berlin,  108;  in  and  after  the 
battle  of  Dresden,  155-168;  in  the 


790 


INDEX. 


Leipsic  manoeuvre,  205-244 ; sent  to 
Leipsic,  205 : to  guard  the  approaches 
to  Leipsic,  222,  225;  not  relieved  by 
Souham,  244;  at  Leipsic,  247-268; 
attacked  by  Blucher,  247;  pushed 
back,  248,254;  in  command  of  the 
middle  Rhine,  313;  in  the  invasion 
of  France,  330  ff.;  at  the  battle  of 
La  Rothiere,  347-350;  drives  back 
Wrede  and  reaches  Arcis,  351;  his 
idea  of  a rapid  thrust  between  Vitry 
and  Meaux,  361;  ordered  on  Se- 
zanne, 362;  captures  Olsuviev,  366; 
ordered  to  attack  Blucher’s  van, 
374;  defeats  Pahlen,  382;  to  protect 
Paris,  399;  pressed  by  Blucher,  406, 
407;  fails  to  take  Soissons,  418;  at 
Laon,  426-430;  scored,  432;  or- 
dered to  head  for  Rheims,  433;  after 
Arcis,  458  ff.;  retires  on  Paris,  460, 
461;  his  defense  of  Paris,  464,  465. 

Marshals,  created,  2,  138;  their  skill, 
324;  their  efficiency  decreased 
(1813),  4,  25;  list  of,  743. 

Marulaz,  enters  Moosburg,  3,  198, 
199;  driven  back  to  Neumarkt, 
225;  in  the  Essling  campaign,  253, 
265. 

Mass,  attack  in,  1,  27;  502,  556. 

Massena,  1,  117,  125,  etc.,  163,  187, 
196,  etc.,  201,  204,  223,  228,  230, 
234,  238,  250,  252,  255,  261,  263, 
269,  273,  279,  292,  299,  302,  305;  at 
Bassano,  350;  356,  etc.;  at  Arcole, 
361,  etc.;  at  Rivoli,  382,  etc.;  417, 
etc.;  captures  Tarvis,  427;  at  Neu- 
markt, 435,  454,  572;  takes  over 
Jourdan’s  army,  580;  Swiss  opera- 
tions, 582;  defeated  at  Feldkirch, 
584;  plans,  585,  612;  beaten  at 
Zurich,  586;  drives  enemy  back  in 
Switzerland,  610;  given  free  hand, 
611;  attacks  all  along  the  line,  613; 
successful  campaigning,  616;  at 
Genoa,  617;  in  Genoa,  2,  16;  ver- 
sus Melas,  20;  shut  up  in  Genoa, 
21;  defends  Genoa,  37;  surrenders 
honorably,  38,  138,  140,  150;  facing 
Charles  on  Adige,  252;  at  Auster- 
litz,  271,  etc.;  501;  in  Friedland 
campaign,  508,  etc.;  in  the  Ratisbon, 
campaign,  3,  142-180;  at  Abens- 
berg  and  Eggmiihl,  182-209;  on 
the  march  to  Vienna,  222-247;  in 
the  Essling  campaign,  253-276;  in 
Lobau,  292;  at  Wagram,  306-322; 
in  Portugal,  382,  387-398,  400-407; 


in  retreat,  403-405;  replaced  by 
Marmont,  407,  408. 

Mathieu,  Maurice,  3,  76,  83,  99. 

Maucune,  3,  715-718,  724,  735-740. 

Maupetit,  3,  99. 

Mautern,  Hiller  retires  to,  3,  239. 

Maya,  4,  295. 

Meaux,  4,  386,  461. 

Medellin,  3,  340. 

Medellin  Hill,  3,  355  ff. 

Medical  treatment,  1,  37;  2,  316. 

Medina  de  Rio  Seco,  battle  of,  3,  28. 

Meerfeldt,  1,  577;  2,  238;  4,  253, 
256. 

Melas,  1,  188,  599,  606,  618;  2,  9, 
11;  advances,  20;  reaches  Nice,  21; 
plans,  25,  34;  forces,  26,  34,  43;  sur- 
prised, 35;  operations,  46;  prospects, 
49;  bottled  up,  54;  concentrates 
near  Alessandria,  57;  forces  much 
dispersed,  57;  determined  to  fight, 
61;  at  Marengo,  68;  surrenders 
northern  Italy,  75. 

Mendacity,  generally  indulged  in,  in 
time  of  war,  3,  555. 

Mendizabal,  succeeds  La  Romana,  3, 
401. 

Mengabriel,  3,  340. 

Menou,  1,  464,  475,  558;  in  command 
in  Egypt,  2,  112,  etc.;  incapacity, 
113,  115;  at  battle  of  Alexandria, 
116. 

Merle,  3,  28,  56;  attacked  by  Blake, 
59;  out  toward  Burgos,  69;  move- 
ments after  the  surrender  of  Madrid, 
90,  99,  102. 

Merlin,  3,  56. 

Mermet,  3,  90,  99,  102. 

Mesnil,  4,  448-451. 

Mesnil-Durand,  1,  27;  2,  167. 

Messes,  1,  43;  company,  2,  221. 

Metternich,  makes  treaty  with  France, 
3,  432,  433;  made  an  enemy  of,  by 
Napoleon,  4,  94;  his  meeting  with 
Napoleon,  95,  96. 

Metzko,  4,  157. 

Mezaros,  1,  129. 

Milan,  revolt  in,  1,  245;  decree  of, 

3,  5. 

Milhaud,  3,  72,  75;  movements  after 
the  surrender  of  Madrid,  90,  91, 
97,  99. 

Millesimo,  1,  199,  etc. 

Miloradovich,  2,  233,  273;  3,  662  ff.; 

4,  21-30. 

Mincio,  1,  243,  246,  etc.;  plan  to  de- 
fend, 248. 


INDEX. 


791 


Miners,  1,  19. 

Minsk,  Davout  at,  3,  483;  lost,  668. 

Mirabeau,  1,  55,  57. 

Mobility,  of  France,  1,  29. 

Modena,  Duke  of,  1,  226. 

Mohilev,  battle  of,  3,  499,  500. 

Molitor,  2,  92;  3,  150,  199,  225,  252- 
269,  309. 

Molk,  Napoleon’s  headquarters  at,  3, 
238. 

Moncey,  2,  25,  33,  42,  52,  138;  attacks 
Valencia,  3,  27;  position  in  mid- 
September,  1808,  56;  movements  up 
to  Burgos,  59-69;  from  Burgos  to 
Tudela,  73-75;  after  Tudela,  83- 
85;  after  the  surrender  of  Madrid, 
96,  99;  besieges  Saragossa,  122;  in 
front  of  Clichv,  4,  465. 

Mondovi,  1,  204,  206. 

Monnier,  2,  48. 

Mons,  1,  76,  etc.;  4,  540  if. 

Montbrun,  at  the  pass  at  Somo-Sierra, 
3,  86;  in  the  Ratisbon  campaign, 
150-178;  on  the  march  to  Vienna, 
222-241;  before  the  battle  of  Wa- 
gram,  298,  300;  killed  at  Borodino: 
581. 

Montebello,  battle  of,  2,  52. 

Monte  Legino,  1,  195. 

Montenotte,  1,  176,  195,  etc. 

Montereau,  battle  of,  4,  390. 

Montezemolo,  1,  201. 

Montmirail,  battle  of,  4,  367-372. 

Mont  St.  Jean,  4,  540,  599-615,  628- 
645. 

Moore,  Sir  John,  commanding  the 
Anglo-Portuguese  army,  3,  64,  93; 
at  Salamanca,  83,  94;  his  march 
from  Lisbon  to  Salamanca,  93,  94; 
vacillation  of,  95;  his  manoeuvre, 
96;  advances  on  Burgos,  100,  101; 
marches  to  Mayorga,  101, 102;  and 
La  Romana,  110-112;  retreats,  112- 
115;  killed,  118. 

Moosburg,  3,  198. 

Morand,  2,  397,  etc.;  in  the  Ratisbon 
campaign,  3,  150-179;  at  Abens- 
berg  and  Eggmiihl,  182-197;  at 
Borodino,  579,  581. 

Moreau,  creates  corps,  1,  31;  111,  116, 
119,  290,  307;  on  Rhine,  312;  crosses 
Rhine,  315;  anticipates  Charles, 
316;  wins  Malsch,  317;  advances 
slowly,  318;  limitations,  321;  beats 
Latour,  331;  fails  to  aid  Jourdan, 
331;  astride  Danube,  332;  forced  to 
retire,  332;  retires  through  Black 


Forest,  336;  twice  beaten  recrosses 
Rhine,  339;  in  1796  campaign, 
343;  409,444;  1797  campaign,  445 ; 
in  Army  of  Italy,  589;  succeeds 
Scherer,  594;  beaten  at  Cassano, 
594;  retires  to  Turin,  595;  regains 
Riviera,  596;  wins  two  combats,  596; 
fails  to  meet  Macdonald,  602;  suc- 
ceeds Joubert,  606;  in  command 
on  Rhine,  2,  9;  power,  12,  etc.;  dis- 
agrees with  Bonaparte,  13,  83;  al- 
lowed his  own  way,  14;  slow,  22; 
troops  detached  from,  24;  moves 
on  Kray,  26,  82;  crosses  Rhine,  84; 
wins  Moskirch,  85,  etc.;  operates 
around  Ulm,  90,  etc.;  reaches  Isar, 
92;  at  Hohenlinden,  94,  etc.;  follows 
Austrians  to  Molk,  101;  134;  killed, 
4,  160. 

Moreau,  General,  surrenders  Soissons, 
4,  413;  court-martialed,  414. 

Mornington,  Lord,  3,  38,  39. 

Morlot,  3,  76,  84,  99. 

Mortier,  2,  138,  140;  receives  new 
corps,  229;  crushed  at  Diirrenstein, 
233;  retires  across  Danube,  236; 
438, 508, 511;  at  Heilsberg,  519,  etc. ; 
at  Friedland,  530,  etc.;  ordered  to 
Burgos,  3,  90;  ordered  to  Saragossa, 
96,  99;  besieges  Saragossa,  122;  on 
the  retreat  from  Moscow,  627;  put 
at  the  head  of  the  cavalry,  4,  55; 
at  Dresden,  154  ff.;  at  Leipsic,  251- 
276;  in  the  invasion  of  France, 
329  ff.;  vacates  Troyes,  358;  retires 
on  Chateau  Thierry,  399;  falls  back 
from  Chateau  Thierry  on  La  Ferte 
sous  Jouarre,  406,  407;  fails  to  take 
Soissons,  418;  at  Craonne,  421,  422; 
after  Arcis,  458  ff.;  his  defeat  at 
Fere  Champenoise,  460;  retires  on 
Paris,  460,  461 ; his  defense  of  Paris, 
464,  465. 

Moscow,  the  French  arrive  at,  3,  592; 
every  element  of  organization  in, 
broken  up,  595;  fired,  596;  evacu- 
ated by  the  French,  621. 

Moscow  road,  3,  535  ff. 

Moskirch,  battle  of,  2,  86,  etc. 

Moskwa,  battle  of  the,  3,  583. 

Mount  Tabor,  battle  of,  1,  541,  etc. 

“Mountain,”  the,  1.  57. 

Mountain  warfare,  1,  571. 

Mouton,  position  in  mid-September, 
1808,  3,  56;  movements  up  to  the 
fall  of  Burgos,  63-69;  at  Landshut, 
198;  at  Essling,  271. 


792 


INDEX. 


Muffling,  4,  532,  538. 

Mulde,  the,  4,  213  ft'. 

Munitions,  manufactured  in  France, 

1,  14. 

Murad  Bey,  1,  479,  484,  488,  503,  555; 

2,  110. 

Murat,  1,  176,  191,  213,  465,  514,  538, 
540,  etc.,  555,  557,  etc.;  2,  24,  48, 
57,  102,  138,  139,  145,  151,  192; 
wins  Wertingen,  194;  commands 
right  wing,  197;  conduct  at  Ulm, 
199,  etc.;  follows  Werneck,  214;  on 
march  to  Vienna,  222,  etc.;  reaches 
Vienna,  238;  at  Vienna  bridge,  238; 
follows  Kutusov,  244,  etc.;  outwit- 
ted, 246,  248;  follows  Russians  to 
Wischau,  256;  at  Austerlitz,  269, 
etc.,  290;  pursues  enemy,  294,  322; 
in  pursuit,  413,  etc.;  against  Ho- 
henlohe,  422;  enters  Warsaw,  438; 
advances  to  Pultusk,  440,  446;  in 
Eylau  campaign,  472,  etc.;  in  Fried- 
land  campaign,  508,  etc.;  at  Heils- 
berg,  519,  etc.;  at  Friedland,  529; 
occupies  St.  Sebastian  and  Pampe- 
luna,  3,  6;  occupies  Madrid,  7; 
becomes  king  of  Naples,  8;  at  Os- 
trovno,  503;  reaches  Gaponava,  506; 
follows  up  Nevrovski,  529,  530; 
crosses  the  Dnieper,  544 ; fails  to  as- 
sist Ney  with  vigor,  546;  held  back 
by  Rosen,  551 ; attacks  the  Russians 
at  Kolotsi,  567 ; takes  Fomkina,  568; 
at  Borodino,  576  ft'.;  to  reconnoitre 
towards  Kolomna,  602;  detailed  to 
meet  Kutusov,  605;  defeated  by 
Kutusov,  615;  in  command  of  the 
Grand  Army,  689;  reaches  Konigs- 
berg,  693;  retires  to  Elbing,  694:  ! 
retires  to  Posen,  694;  turns  over  his  j 
command  to  Eugene  and  leaves  for 
Naples,  694;  at  Dresden,  4,  157  ft'.; 
in  the  Leipsic  manoeuvre,  207  ft'.;  : 
behind  the  Goselbach,  235;  atLeip-  I 
sic,  251-262;  declares  against  Na- 
poleon in  Italy,  352. 

Murray,  3,  729. 

Murviedro,  capitulates  to  the  French, 
3,  414. 

Musket,  2,  166,  319,  332. 

Musnier,  3,  76,  77,  85,  99. 

Mutinies,  early  French,  1,  37. 

Mysore,  reduced,  3,  40. 

Namur,  4,  540  ft. 

Nansouty,  3,  150,  151,  168,  183,  190, 
195;  at  Montmirail,  4,  367-372;  I 


takes  the  Bery-au-Bac  bridge,  419; 
at  Craonne,  421,  422. 

Nantes,  1,  102,  etc. 

Naples,  1,  256,  346,  454,  568,  569,  587; 
2,  103. 

Napoleon,  ideas  of  mountain  warfare, 
1,  571;  criticises  Charles,  581;  criti- 
cises Feldkirch,  583;  criticises  the 
Trebia,  602;  criticises  Massena,  611 ; 
criticises  Suwarrov,  618;  praises  and 
criticises  Massena,  2,  40;  praises 
and  criticises  Moreau,  100,  104; 
praises  and  criticises  Kray,  104; 
seizes  Naples  and  Hanover,  133;  at- 
tempts to  assassinate,  134;  hatred 
of  England,  134;  made  emperor, 
135;  oath,  136;  court,  136;  organizes 
expedition  against  England,  140, 
etc.;  crowned  King  of  Italy,  143; 
keeps  eye  on  Germany.  146;  sends 
aides  to  reconnoitre  Germany,  147, 
etc.;  plans  for  1805,  149;  puts  em- 
bargo on  mails,  155;  orders  roads 
repaired,  156;  method  of  making 
plans,  157;  orders,  158;  knowledge  of 
enemy,  161;  breach  of  neutral  Wur- 
temberg  and  Prussia,  186;  makes 
cavalry  demonstrations  through 
Black  Forest,  187;  reaches  Stras- 
burg,  187 ; gives  safeguard  to  Heidel- 
berg, 187;  learns  Mack’s  position, 
190;  letters  to  Josephine,  191; 
reaches  Donauworth,  194;  plans, 
196;  responsibility  for  Murat,  199; 
concentrates,  203;  closes  Mack  in, 
204,  etc.;  Prince  Charles’  opinion  of, 
215;  writes  King  of  Prussia,  219; 
makes  Augsburg  secondary  base, 
219;  uses  both  magazines  and  requi- 
sitions, 221;  in  Munich,  222;  pur- 
suit of  Kutusov,  223;  criticises 
Russians,  225;  strategy,  228;  criti- 
cises Murat,  226,  228,  232,  247;  ex- 
pects battle,  227,  230;  creates  corps 
for  Mortier,  229;  writes  Francis, 
229,  251 ; report  of  Diirrenstein,  234 ; 
new  plans,  235,  237;  criticism  of 
subordinates,  236;  acts  for  effect, 
239;  reaches  Vienna,  241;  criticises 
outpost  duty,  242;  what  he  had 
done,  242;  at  Schonbrunn,  244;  has 
to  make  detachments,  244;  battles, 
245;  was  he  a gambler?  245,  etc.; 
use  of  cavalry,  250;  concentration, 
256,  etc.;  prepares  for  battle,  259; 
writes  Alexander,  260;  ruse  before 
battle,  262;  desires  peace,  263;  plan 


INDEX. 


793 


for  Austerlitz,  260,  etc.;  studies 
battlefield,  270;  guesses  allied  pur- 
pose, 271;  draws  up  army,  272; 
certain  of  winning,  275;  orders  for 
battle,  276;  rides  the  lines,  279; 
risks,  280;  personal  movements  dur- 
ing battle,  282,  etc.;  293;  gives  or- 
ders to  pursue,  294;  opinion  about 
pursuit,  295;  plans  had  he  lost  Aus- 
terlitz, 299;  “Observations”  on  Ku- 
tusov’s  report,  302;  dominant  on  the 
Continent,  304;  hopes  for  peace, 
305;  internal  work  in  France,  306; 
tactics,  312;  method  of  using  of- 
ficers, 314;  use  of  national  charac- 
ter, 315;  attitude  after  Austerlitz, 
325;  strategy  and  tactics,  326; 
knowledge  of  Prussian  army,  339; 
foresees  war,  343;  writes  to  King  of 
Prussia,  344,  347,  374,  415,  496;  de- 
sires peace,  345;  orders  reconnois- 
sances  in  Germany,  345;  ready  for 
war,  346;  strategical  ideas,  346; 
plans  matured,  352,  353;  opinion  of 
Prussians,  354;  choice  of  plans,  355; 
awaiting  events,  357;  plans  general 
defense  of  empire,  359;  knowledge 
of  where  Prussians  were,  360;  con- 
centrates, 364;  receives  letter  from 
King  of  Prussia,  366;  reconnoitres 
field  of  Jena,  381 ; mistakes  numbers, 
382;  issues  orders  for  battle,  383, 
387;  at  Jena,  388,  etc.;  praises  Da- 
vout,  404,  405;  pursues  enemy,  409; 
strategy  at  Jena,  410;  decree  after 
Jena,  412;  aspirations,  412;  organ- 
izes pursuit,  413;  decree  taking  pos- 
session of  Prussia,  418;  at  Sans 
Souci,  419;  makes  triumphal  entry 
in  Berlin,  421;  punishes  opponents, 
423;  hard  on  Prussia,  424;  kindly 
acts,  424;  makes  no  terms  with  Prus- 
sia, 432;  hopes  for  peace,  433;  plans, 
435;  expects  battle  in  Posen,  436; 
plans  for  advance,  437;  crosses  Vis- 
tula, 442;  finds  victualing  difficult, 
442;  expects  battle,  444;  strives  to 
reach  Russians,  445 ; resorts  to  con- 
centric movement,  446;  which  fails, 
449  ; decides  on  winter  quarters,  451 ; 
issues  orders  for  same,  453;  makes 
excuses  for  campaign,  456;  mistakes 
in  campaign,  457;  reorganizes  army, 
458;  blames  Ney,  460;  habits,  461; 
meets  Bennigsen’s  advance,  466; 
able  concentration,  468;  orders  mis- 
carry, 469;  at  Eylau,  475,  etc.; 


after  Eylau,  487,  etc.;  during  cam- 
paign, 491;  transfers  headquarters 
to  Thorn,  493;  care  about  supplies, 
494;  intimate  knowledge  of  army, 
494;  activity,  498,  etc.;  and  public 
opinion,  502;  studies  Orient,  504; 
meets  fresh  advance  of  Bennigsen, 
512;  general  schemes,  517,  518; 
errors  at  Heilsberg,  519,  etc.;  reports 
after  Heilsberg,  524;  meets  Alex- 
ander, 538;  upholds  the  Continental 
System,  3,  2,  420-423;  interferes 
with  the  status  of  Spain,  2ff.;  at- 
tacks Portugal,  4-7,  124,  125;  per- 
sonal advice  of,  to  Junot,  6;  antici- 
pates little  resistance  in  Spain,  25, 
26;  incensed  at  result  of  Baylen, 
31-33,  50;  prepares  to  avenge  Bay- 
len, 32,  33;  his  Note  on  the  Present 
Situation  in  Spain,  35;  incensed  at 
Cintra,  50;  his  Notes  on  the  Penin- 
sular War,  51-53;  his  answer  to 
Joseph’s  abnormal  plan,  54;  his 
plans  not  understood  by  his  gener- 
als, 55,  66,  67 ; arrives  at  Bayonne, 
59;  his  management  of  Burgos  cam- 
paign, 59-70;  from  Burgos  to 
Tudela,  72-82;  loss  of  efficiency  due 
to  decrease  of  activity,  81,  84; 
marches  on  Madrid,  82,  85-88; 
changes  location  of  troops  after 
the  surrender  of  Madrid,  90,  91;  is- 
sues proclamation  to  Spaniards,  91; 
introduces  changes  in  Spain,  92;  his 
disposition  of  troops  to  meet  the 
English,  96-100;  sends  Ney  to  in- 
tercept Moore’s  retreat,  103,  104; 
his  plan  to  fall  on  Moore’s  rear,  104, 
105;  his  note  to  Joseph,  December 
22,  1808,  107;  crosses  the  Guada- 
rama,  108;  reaches  Tordesillas,  114; 
pursues  Moore,  114,  115;  goes  to 
Valladolid  and  learns  of  the  Austrian 
situation,  117;  leaves  Valladolid  and 
returns  to  Paris,  124,  125,  127; 
his  directions  for  further  operations 
in  the  Pennisula,  125;  views  of  the 
Spanish  campaign,  126,  128;  letters 
to  Jerome  on  Austria,  128;  new  bal- 
ance of  power  created  by,  129,  130; 
prepares  for  the  coming  storm,  133- 
135  ; issues  instructions  for  the 
Major-General,  137,  138,  140,  141; 
his  policy  that  of  initiative,  138, 139, 
151;  his  plan  of  concentrating  his 
forces,  141,  155;  complains  of  the 
I press,  145;  puts  Vandamme  in  com- 


794 


INDEX. 


mand  of  the  Wurtembergers,  145; 
organizes  the  army,  146-149;  goes 
to  the  front,  162-164;  his  conduct 
of  the  campaign,  164  ff.;  his 
divination  of  Charles’  plans,  169; 
his  proclamation  to  the  army,  169; 
marvelous  rapidity  of,  180;  at 
Abensbergand  Eggmiihl,  182 ff.; the 
gradual  development  of  his  plans, 
185;  his  sense  of  perspective,  187; 
note  of,  after  Landshut,  199;  his 
failure  to  pursue  after  Eggmiihl, 
212,  213;  his  proclamation  to  the 
army,  216;  his  capacity  to  work,  217 ; 
pushes  on  Vienna,  219  ff . ; his  fault- 
finding letters  to  Eugene,  219-221; 
divines  that  Charles  is  at  Cham, 
226,  227;  creates  reserve  corps  on 
Rhine,  230;  makes  his  headquarters 
at  Molk,  238;  in  front  of  Vienna,  241 ; 
makes  preparations  to  cross  the 
Danube,  244  ff. ; issues  proclama- 
tion to  the  Army,  248;  his  Order  of 
the  Day,  259;  his  proclamation  to 
the  Hungarians,  250;  writes  to  Jose- 
phine, 250;  writes  to  the  Imperial 
Librarian  in  Paris,  251;  at  Essling, 
252-282;  crosses  the  Danube,  254, 
255;  lapse  in  his  activity,  258,  259; 
his  Decree  on  the  Estates  of  the  Pope, 
286;  his  instructions  to  Eugene,  286- 
288;  his  orders,  288;  his  Orders  for 
the  Passage  of  the  Danube,  296; 
crosses  the  Danube,  297 ; at  Wagram, 
303  ff.;  writes  to  Cambaceres,  319; 
writes  to  General  Clarke,  320 ; writes 
to  Alexander,  320;  his  concentrated 
grand-tactics,  321,  322;  at  Znaim, 
322  ft'.;  ratifies  armistice,  326,  327; 
his  letters  on  various  departments 
of  the  army,  327,  328;  his  interest 
in  the  peasantry,  328;  displays  less 
energy  in  pursuit  than  formerly,  328, 
329;  writes  to  Emperor  Francis, 
330;  returns  to  Paris,  336;  directs 
Spanish  affairs,  347,  348,  385,  396; 
writes  to  Soult,  349;  on  the  battle  of 
Talavera,  364-366;  on  Spanish  af-  ! 
fairs,  376,  377;  weds  Marie  Louise,  | 
379;  approaches  England  with  pro- 
posals of  peace,  380;  his  impatience, 
380;  agrees  to  the  Andalusian  pro-  j 
ject,  381,  382;  on  the  eve  of  failure, 
418;  his  code  and  administration, 
420,  421 ; determines  on  a Russian 
campaign,  423-425;  to  the  King  of 
Wurtemberg,  425;  his  hard  hold  on 


fact  lost,  426;  his  faith  in  his  des- 
tiny, 427;  his  care  of  detail,  428- 
431  ; directs  the  organization  of 
the  “Army  of  Germany,”  434;  tries 
to  avoid  war,  436,  437;  goes  to 
Dresden,  437,  438;  goes  to  head- 
quarters at  Thorn,  438;  studies 
maps  of  Russia,  438,  439;  collects 
food,  446,  447,  465;  at  Posen,  450; 
conducts  a “war  of  armies,”  457;  his 
plan  at  the  beginning  of  the  cam- 
paign, 459, 460;  holds  back  the  right, 
461;  his  proclamation  to  the  army, 
462;  in  Polish  uniform,  463;  takes  up 
headquarters  at  Kovno,  464;  crosses 
the  Niemen,  467;  his  orders  impos- 
sible of  execution,  469,  481,  658; 
takes  up  headquarters  at  Vilna,  471; 
mistakes  Doctorov’s  corps  for  Ba- 
gration’s, 471,  482;  lacks  the  endur- 
ance of  former  times,  473, 474 ; prods 
Jerome,  483;  his  pause  at  Vilna,  485, 
486,  495;  winning  quality  lacking, 
486;  his  change  of  plan,  488,  489, 
492;  forbids  small  detachments, 
493;  writes  to  the  czar,  493;  scolds 
Davout,  496 ; pushes  toward  Vitebsk, 
502-504;  declines  to  pursue  a 
broken  enemy,  506;  puts  the  army 
in  cantonments,  508,  509;  keeps 
sight  of  his  army  everywhere,  511, 
512;  writes  to  Barbier  for  books, 
513;  passing  of  his  power  to  gauge 
the  value  of  events,  516;  calls  coun- 
cil of  war,  519,  520;  plans  to  cut 
Russian  left  off  from  Moscow,  520; 
ignorant  of  enemy’s  movements, 
526;  arrests  his  march  on  the  score 
of  rain,  527,  528;  leaves  Vitebsk  for 
the  front,  528;  his  operation  on  the 
Smolensk  road,  528,  529;  at  Smo- 
lensk, 531-541;  lack  of  decisiveness, 
543,  544,  547,  548;  his  orders  along 
the  road,  553;  kindly  acts  of,  554;  ac- 
cused of  mendacity,  555 ; mistaken  in 
the  belief  that  he  could  easily  conquer 
Russia,  555,  556;  his  proper  course 
would  have  been  to  remain  at  Smo- 
lensk, 558,  559;  arrives  at  Gshask, 
561;  his  staff  ill  trained,  561 ; retains 
idea  of  battle,  562;  his  Order  of  the 
Day,  563;  scolds  Davout,  563;  pre- 
pares for  battle,  564;  at  Borodino, 
567-589;  advances  from  Mozhaisk, 
592;  enters  Moscow,  593;  issues  a cir- 
cular to  the  Bishops  of  the  Empire, 
595;  still  believes  that  the  Russians 


INDEX. 


795 


will  treat,  597 ; four  operations  open 
to,  600;  writes  to  Alexander,  603; 
his  gauging  of  the  situation  on 
October  4,  607;  his  organization, 
608;  his  orders,  610;  his  Note  is- 
sued in  Moscow,  611;  his  imprac- 
ticable plan  to  threaten  St.  Peters- 
burg, 612;  his  dispatch  to  Maret, 
613;  his  cipher  letter  to  Maret,  613; 
his  preparations  for  leaving  Moscow, 
616-620;  leaves  Moscow,  621;  as- 
sumes too  much,  623;  his  explanation 
of  the  evacuation  of  Moscow,  625; 
at  Maloyaroslavez,  631-635;  his  se- 
lection of  the  worst  route,  635-637 ; 
at  Viasma,  639;  his  orders  to  Victor, 
648;  his  habit  of  exaggeration,  649; 
probably  foresaw  disaster,  650,  651; 
blamed  for  misleading  Victor,  652; 
his  lapse  from  vigorous  thought  and 
action,  653;  reaches  Smolensk,  655; 
at  Krasnoi,  662;  abandons  the  rear- 
guard, 664,  665;  his  idea  of  march- 
ing on  Minsk,  668,  669;  reduces  the 
train,  670;  at  the  Beresina,  670- 
686;  decides  to  force  the  Beresina, 
677 ; to  Maret,  on  the  condition  of 
the  Grand  Army,  687,  688;  writes  to 
the  empress,  688,  689;  arrives  in 
Paris,  690;  why  he  failed  to  subdue 
Russia,  696-698;  his  Bulletin  on 
leaving  the  army,  699-704;  on  the 
battle  of  Salamanca,  719,  720;  forms 
a new  army  after  the  Russian  cam- 
paign, 4,  1-4;  his  position  in  Europe 
at  the  beginning  of  1813,  4,  5;  cir- 
cumstances of  his  retreat  from  Mos- 
cow, 6-9;  letters  to  Eugene,  6-11, 
15,  16;  taxes  Eugene  with  falling 
back  on  Wittenberg,  9,  10;  his  plan 
to  assemble  on  the  Elbe,  11,  12;  his 
comparison  of  the  allied  and  the 
French  forces,  18,  19;  reaches  Er- 
furt, 19;  on  the  lack  of  cavalry,  20; 
his  plan  when  he  discovered  that  the 
enemy  was  marching  on  Saxony,  21, 
22;  concentrating  on  the  Saale,  23; 
dependence  on  artillery,  24;  and  his 
officers  25;  completes  the  junction, 
26;  at  Liitzen,  32-38;  comments  on 
the  battle  of  Liitzen,  42,  43;  negoti- 
ates for  peace,  45-47;  operations 
after  Liitzen,  47;  at  Dresden,  48-59; 
his  plan  to  march  on  Berlin,  49-53; 
at  Bautzen,  59-78;  monument  to, 
on  Mont  Cenis,  79;  his  plan,  84; 
accepts  an  armistice,  85-88;  his 


letter  to  Eugene,  86;  his  letter  to 
Caulaincourt,  88;  loss  of  moral 
energy  in,  91-93;  makes  an  enemy 
of  Metternich,  94;  meeting  of,  with 
Metternich,  95,96;  strengthens  the 
Elbe,  98;  plans  open  to,  100,  101; 
writes  to  Davout,  102;  accepts 
terms  of  peace,  104,  105;  his  instruc- 
tions for  Ney  and  Marmont,  106; 
asks  the  opinion  of  his  lieutenants, 
106,  107;  writes  to  Berthier,  107;  his 
written  scheme  of  August  6,  108, 
109;  selects  the  defensive,  110,  111; 
his  dispatches  to  his  lieutenants,  112, 
113;  weakening  of  his  physique  and 
resolution,  116,  117;  organization 
and  location  of  his  army  at  the  open- 
ing of  the  campaign,  August,  1813, 
117,  118;  writes  to  St.  Cyr,  124;  his 
apparent  hesitancy  due  to  his  being 
on  the  defensive,  125;  prepares  to 
attack,  126,  127;  misunderstands 
Blucher’s  retreat,  127;  annoyed  at 
lack  of  initiative  in  his  commanders, 
127;  writes  to  Maret,  128,  129;  fails 
to  divine  the  Trachenberg  plan,  129; 
his  instructions  for  Macdonald, 
130;  his  plan  for  taking  the  enemy 
doubly  in  reverse  clear-sighted,  131; 
marches  on  Dresden,  133;  arrives 
at  Dresden,  146,  149;  inactive  at 
second  battle  of  Dresden,  161,  162; 
writes  to  Kellermann,  163;  returns 
to  Dresden,  166;  at  fault  in  allow- 
ing the  Army  of  the  Sovereigns  to 
escape,  170, 171,  173,  176,  177;  his 
plan  to  capture  Berlin,  172-175; 
his  “Note  on  the  General  Situation 
of  My  Affairs,”  dictated  in  Dresden, 
173-175;  draws  wrong  conclusion 
from  facts,  176;  orders  Ney  to  ad- 
vance on  Berlin,  177,  178;  his  broad 
defensive  scheme,  179;  his  to  and 
fro  manoeuvring,  180;  with  no  single 
point  secure,  181 ; gives  too  positive 
instructions,  182;  responsible  for 
Dennewitz,  185;  discusses  the  situa- 
tion, 186;  views  the  disposition  of  the 
enemy’s  forces,  187;  his  changeable- 
ness, 191,  193;  on  the  nourishment 
of  the  army,  192;  his  dread  of  bad 
weather,  193;  holds  on  to  Dresden, 
194,  200,  204,  206,  207,  215;  writes 
to  Rogniat,  196;  withdraws  from  the 
right  bank  of  the  Elbe,  196-198;  sus- 
pends Bruno,  200-202;  in  the  Leip- 
sic  manoeuvre,  204-245 ; proposes  to 


796 


INDEX . 


move  on  Torgau,  210;  creates  four 
masses,  211;  new  offensive  plan, 
212,  213,  215;  his  Note  on  the  Move- 
ments of  Different  Army  Corps, 
212;  needs  a battle,  214;  a new 
strategic  idea,  218;  letter  to  Berthier, 
218,  219;  letter  to  St.  Cyr,  219; 
letter  to  Maret,  219;  letter  to  Ar- 
righi,  220;  his  major  premise  wrong, 
220;  still  another  plan,  221;  con- 
tinues unstable,  222;  his  old  vigor 
wanting,  223;  gives  orders  to  con- 
centrate on  Leipsic,  225;  his  Note 
on  the  Assembling  of  the  Different 
Army  Corps  at  Taucha,  226,  227 ; 
writes  to  Murat,  227;  outmanoeu- 
vred, 229;  loses  his  opportunity,  231, 
232;  all  Germany  his  enemy,  232; 
a new  method  of  drawing  up  his 
troops,  234,  235;  at  Leipsic,  246- 
281 ; retreats  across  the  Pleisse  and 
Elster,  265, 266;  finds  excuses  for 
the  days  of  Leipsic,  270-272;  re- 
treats to  the  Rhine,  273-278;  at 
Hanau,  276,277;  his  words  at  the 
opening  of  the  legislature  after  the 
Russian  campaign,  306;  his  Allo- 
cution to  the  Senate,  November 
14,  307;  should  have  used  his  rule 
of  concentration  in  1813,  308,  310; 
314,  316;  letter  to  Eugene,  1813, 
310;  his  calculations  as  to  the  pos- 
sible invasion  of  France,  311;  writes 
to  Berthier,  312,  313;  divides  the 
course  of  the  Rhine  into  military 
departments,  313;  raising  troops, 
315;  alters  his  distribution  of  forces, 
319;  writes  to  Caulaincourt,  319; 
his  Note  on  the  Actual  Situation 
of  France,  320,  321;  his  General  In- 
structions, 322;  exhibits  a marked 
decrease  of  mental  balance,  323; 
writes  to  Metternich,  323;  orders  to 
Eugene,  323;  his  false  assumptions, 
324;  writes  to  Maison,  325;  his  blun- 
ders, 325;  his  difficulty  in  collecting 
arms,  328;  letter  to  Berthier,  331; 
a limited  plan  adopted  by,  332; 
leaves  Paris  and  goes  to  Chalons, 
333;  a day  or  two  late,  333;  at  Vitry, 
335;  ignorant  of  the  situation,  336, 
337;  at  the  battle  of  Brienne,  338, 
339;  alters  his  logistic  status,  340;  ! 
defends  the  capital,  342;  at  the  battle  I 
of  La  Rothiere,  347-351 ; crosses  i 
the  Aube,  351;  and  the  Congress  of  I 
Chatillon,353;  and  the  reports  from  I 


Paris,  360;  his  letters  to  Joseph, 
360,  361,  364;  at  Nogent,  362;  at 
Montmirail,  367-372;  to  attack 
Blucher’s  van,  374;  his  notice  of 
the  victory  at  Janvilliers,  377,  378; 
writes  to  Joseph,  380,  381;  at  the 
head  of  his  army  behind  the  Yeres, 
382‘;  his  letter  to  Clarke  on  the 
National  Guards,  383,  384;  retires 
to  Meaux,  386;  astride  the  Nangis 
post-road,  387;  at  Montereau,  390; 
his  rapid  marching,  391;  refuses 
advances  for  an  armistice  393; 
writes  to  Caulaincourt,  394;  writes 
to  Joseph,  394,  395;  writes  to  Sa- 
vary,  395;  elated  by  partial  suc- 
cesses, 395 ;'  writes  to  the  Emperor 
Francis,  396;  writes  to  Augereau, 
397,  398;  throws  Oudinot  against 
Mery,  398;  marches  on  Troyes,  398; 
wishes  to  stimulate  the  population, 
400;  blind  to  the  real  conditions, 
401;  refuses  proposal  for  armistice, 
401,  402;  places  blame  on  others, 
403;  enters  Troyes,  405;  leaves 
Troyes,  407;  marches  on  La  Ferte 
Gaucher,  407,  408;  the  emperor  and 
not  the  captain  responsible  for  mis- 
takes, 410;  orders  garrisons  to  get 
into  the  field,  411;  reaches  Fismes, 
413;  hears  bad  news  from  the  Seine, 
415;  encourages  his  lieutenants  to 
renewed  efforts,  416-418;  antici- 
pates Blucher’s  movement  toward 
Craonne,  420;  at  Craonne,  420- 
423;  at  Laon,  425-432;  recaptures 
Rheims,  433;  his  purpose  of  oper- 
ating toward  the  fortresses  and  on 
the  rear  of  the  allies,  436;  his  aim  to 
stop  Blucher,  438:  his  resume  of  the 
operations  he  could  make,  438-440; 
reaches  Epernay,  440;  advances 
from  Epernay,  440;  writes  to  Joseph, 
443;  reaches  Arcis,  445;  at  Arcis, 
445-451;  his  Rhine  scheme,  452- 
454;  his  Note  dictated  at  St.  Dizier, 
455,  456;  his  dispatches  captured, 
457;  cut  off  from  Paris,  459;  learns 
that  the  allies  are  on  the  march  to 
Paris,  462;  loses  his  self-possession, 
462,  463;  goes  to  Fontainebleau, 
465;  after  the  surrender  of  Paris, 
467  ff“.;  writes  to  Berthier,  467;  his 
Allocution  to  the  Old  Guard,  468; 
his  Declaration  of  April  4,  469:  his 
Proclamation  to  the  Army,  April  5, 
470;  his  abdication,  470,  471;  drafts 


INDEX . 


797 


men  from  Soult,  475;  compared  with  | 
Wellington,  496,  497 ; chooses  sover- 
eignty of  Elba,  500;  says  farewell  to 
the  Guard,  501;  letters  to  the  em- 
press, 501,  502;  at  Elba,  504;  returns 
to  France,  504,  505;  his  march  to 
Paris,  505,  506;  enters  the  Tuileries, 
506;  proclamations  to  the  French 
people  and  to  the  army,  507,  508; 
circular  letter  to  the  Sovereigns, 
508,  509;  declared  an  outlaw  in 
Europe,  509;  to  the  Emperor  Fran- 
cis, 509,  510;  aware  of  feeling  of 
suspicion  in  France,  510;  creates 
an  army,  510-512;  two  plans  open 
to,  513-515;  decides  to  strike  a de- 
cisive blow,  516;  gives  many  com- 
mands, 517;  orders  issued  through 
Davout,  517,  518;  his  discourse  to 
the  deputies,  518;  his  division  of  his 
active  forces,  521,' 522;  his  strategic 
opening  of  the  Waterloo  campaign, 
533,  534,  536,  537;  his  Proclamation 
to  the  Army,  June  14,  1815,  543; 
proposes  to  catch  Ziethen  unawares, 
544;  crosses  the  Sambre,  544-547; 
should  have  seized  Quatre  Bras  and 
Sombreffe,  548,  560-562;  guilty  of 
lapses,  550-552;  had  purposed  to 
take  Quatre  Bras  and  Sombreffe, 
562-565;  writes  to  Ney,  June  16, 
563,  564 ; writes  to  Grouchy,  564 ; 
his  plan,  565,  566;  makes  no  effi- 
cient reconnoissance,  566,  567 ; 

reaches  Fleurus,  567;  at  the  mid- 
night interview,  568;  his  duty,  570; 
determines  to  attack,  572;  his  plan 
for  attacking  the  Prussians,  572, 
573;  defeats  the  Prussians,  570-579; 
fails  in  speed,  582,  583;  Ligny  and 
Quatre  Bras  operation  in  his  best 
style,  586, 587 ; his  last  bulletin,  587- 
589;  after  Quatre  Bras,  his  proper 
course  to  pursue  the  Prussians,  591- 
593;  returns  to  Fleurus,  592;  does 
not  reconnoitre  northward,  593;  on 
the  battlefield,  594,  595;  his  orders  to 
Grouchy,  595,  596;  arrives  at  Quatre 
Bras  and  orders  an  attack,  603;  in 
the  early  morning  of  the  18th,  605; 
his  errors  lose  the  1815  campaign, 
612,  613;  his  position  at  Waterloo, 
613;  his  action  modified  so  as  to 
bring  the  attack  more  upon  the  j 
British  centre,  624;  his  Order  to  the 
Army  Corps  Commanders,  625: 
his  dispatch  from  and  his  dispatch  I 


to  Grouchy,  626;  delays  in  the  attack 
at  Waterloo,  628;  discovers  the  ap- 
proach of  the  Prussians,  634;  fails 
to  instruct  Grouchy  sufficiently,  636, 
637;  his  orders  to  Lobau,  638;  his 
proper  course  on  learning  of  Bil- 
low’s arrival,  639,  640;  moves  nearer 
La  Belle  Alliance,  643;  orders  Ney 
to  collect  cavalry,  650;  loses  his  cool- 
ness of  calculation,  652;  his  faults 
at  Waterloo,  659, 662  ; his  criticism  of 
Wellington’s  manoeuvres,  663,  664; 
retreat  of,  664;  reaches  Paris,  665; 
sends  message  to  the  Deputies,  665 ; 
his  Declaration  to  the  French  people, 
665,  666;  his  message  to  the  army, 
666;  starts  for  America,  667;  a pris- 
oner, 667;  writes  to  the  Prince  Re- 
gent of  England,  667;  his  Protest, 
667,  668;  in  a different  class  of  cap- 
tains from  Wellington,  669;  unsur- 
passed in  any  era,  672;  his  personal 
appearance,  673,  674;  his  health, 
674,  680;  his  mental  equipment, 
674;  unscrupulous  in  accomplishing 
his  ends,  675;  impatient  at  opposi- 
tion, 675;  nervous  and  sensitive, 
676;  self-control  foreign  to  him, 
677;  his  courage,  personal  and 
moral,  678;  great  in  force  of  intellect 
and  character,  678,  679;  his  morals, 
679;  his  clearness  of  vision,  680;  his 
boldness,  680;  his  power  to  gauge 
a situation,  681;  his  capacity  for 
work,  681;  acted  on  strategic  rea- 
sons, 681;  his  imagination,  682;  his 
power  of  playing  a bluff  game,  682; 
cared  least  for  his  men  of  all  great 
captains,  683;  in  proper  equipoise, 
684;  born  to  command,  685;  his 
power  to  charm,  685;  his  genius  and 
power  to  create,  686;  his  reputation 
of  immense  value,  687;  his  early 
lapse  from  vigorous  health,  687,  688; 
his  best  traits  undermined  by  con- 
stant success,  688;  his  arrogance, 
689;  his  belief  in  his  own  destiny, 
689;  his  juggling  with  facts,  690; 
his  belief  in  the  accomplishment  of 
things,  691 ; his  hunger  for  approval, 
691;  secretive  as  to  his  operations, 
692;  trained  no  corps  of  experts, 
693;  favored  by  Fortune,  694;  never 
a disciplinarian,  694;  altered  mili- 
tary habits,  695;  his  imperial  cortege, 
695,  696:  his  general  staff,  697,  698; 
his  office,  698;  his  sleeping,  698, 


798 


INDEX. 


699;  grew  tired  of  war,  699;  grew 
careless  in  the  conduct  of  war,  700; 
his  misrepresentation  of  facts,  701: 
overstated  his  own  forces,  and  under- 
rated the  enemy’s,  701,  702;  his 
observations  on  fortification,  702- 
708;  saturated  with  selfishness,  708, 
709;  he  and  his  work  the  outcome 
of  the  French  Revolution,  709;  his 
Code,  710;  the  opposer  of  the  estab- 
lished order  of  things,  711;  gave 
much  politically  to  France,  711;  the 
weakening  of  his  character,  712, 
714;  planned  his  campaigns  prop- 
erly, 713;  his  strategy,  715;  compared 
with  other  captains,  715-718;  his 
writings,  732-741. 

Nasielsk,  combat  of,  2,  445. 

National  Assembly,  organized,  1,  54. 

National  Convention,  1,  59. 

National  Guard,  1,  2,  8,  55;  uniform 
of,  4,  433;  part  of,  destroyed,  460. 

Nations,  battle  of,  4,  246-281. 

Nauendorf,  1,  578. 

Neerwinden,  battle  of,  1,  91,  etc. 

Nelson,  1,  470,  499,  568;  2,  9,  122. 

Neresheim,  battle  of,  1,  319. 

Neu  Kosen,  occupied  by  Bertrand, 
4,  273. 

Neusiedl,  3,  314. 

Neutrality,  breach  of  Prussian,  2,  186, 
218. 

Nevrovski,  retires,  3,  530. 

New  Orleans,  battle  of,  4,  621. 

Ney,  2,  138,  140;  at  Ulm,  196,  etc.; 
under  Murat  at  Ulm,  197;  at  Eltin- 
gen,  208,  etc.;  on  march  to  Vienna, 
221,  etc.;  at  Austerlitz,  271,  etc.; 
322;  in  Jena  campaign,  361,  etc.;  at 
Jena,  338,  etc.;  at  Magdeburg,  417; 
captures  Magdeburg,  425;  on  Vis- 
tula, 440,  etc.;  in  winter  quarters, 
454;  too  enterprising,  459;  blamed 
by  Napoleon,  460,  466;  in  Eylau 
campaign,  472,  etc. ; follows  Lestocq, 
473,  etc.;  in  Friedland  campaign, 
508,  etc.;  at  Friedland,  529,  etc.; 
position  in  mid-September,  1808, 
3,  56;  movements  up  to  Burgos, 
59-69;  from  Burgos  to  Tudela, 
72-82;  unjustly  criticised,  80-82; 
after  Tudela,  83-85;  at  Madrid,  88; 
after  the  surrender  of  Madrid,  91, 
98;  sent  to  intercept  Moore’s  re- 
treat, 104;  opposed  by  the  weather, 
108;  further  movements  in  the  cam- 
paign against  Moore,  109  ff . ; at 


Tordesillas,  113;  in  Galicia,  338  ff.; 
leaves  the  Peninsula,  370;  his  char- 
acter as  a general,  382;  at  Busaco, 
390-392;  follows  up  Nevrovski,  529, 
530;  at  Smolensk,  533-540;  crosses 
the  Dnieper,  544;  held  by  Eugene, 
544;  falls  upon  Tuchkov,  545,  546; 
his  proposal  to  harass  the  enemy, 
548;  at  Borodino,  573-586;  at  Mos- 
cow, 593,  617,  618;  on  the  retreat, 
627-645,  655,  659,  662-667,  680, 
684;  in  command  of  the  rearguard, 
644;  at  Smolensk,  662;  cut  off,  665; 
quarrels  with  Davout,  665;  reaches 
the  Grand  Army,  667;  before  the 
battle  of  Ltitzen,  4,  16-32;  in  the 
battle  of  Ltitzen,  34-36;  before  and 
at  Bautzen,  48-78;  at  Weissenberg, 
82;  advances  on  Liegnitz,  83;  near 
Breslau,  88;  stays  by  the  emperor’s 
person,  129;  at  Dresden,  154-170; 
sent  to  Wittenberg,  177;  beats  Tau- 
enzien  at  Zahna,  183;  moves  on 
Juterbog,  183;  at  Dennewitz,  184, 
185;  in  the  Leipsic  manoeuvre,  207- 
217,  243,  244;  at  Leipsic,  247-267; 
at  the  invasion  of  France,  331  ff.; 
at  the  battle  of  La  Rothiere,  347; 
to  strike  Blucher’s  rear,  406, 407 ; at 
Craonne,  421,  422;  thrown  forward 
to  Laon,  425;  occupies  Arcis,  444; 
at  Torcy,  446;  moves  toward  Mes- 
nil,  449;  joins  Napoleon  on  the 
latter’s  return  from  Elba,  506,  525; 
advances  on  Frasnes,  545;  in  com- 
mand of  the  left  wing,  547 ; lax  in 
his  duty,  569,  570,  580-584;  at 
Gosselies,  580,  581;  at  the  battle 
of  Quatre  Bras,  585,  586;  to  take 
Quatre  Bras,  594,  595;  delays  before 
attacking  on  the  17th,  and  fails  to 
keep  the  emperor  posted  as  to  his 
doings,  602 ; attacks  La  Haye  Sainte, 
630  ; takes  La  Haye  Sainte,  632;  his 
proposal  to  assault  with  cavalry,  640 ; 
his  assault,  642-645 ; his  discretion 
at  fault,  647,  648;  ordered  to  collect 
cavalry,  650;  advances  to  the  left  of 
the  sunken  road,  653;  his  faults  at 
Waterloo,  659. 

Nice,  2,  78. 

Nickolsburg,  3,  324. 

Nieder  Keina,  4,  65,  69. 

Niemen,  the,  crossed,  3,  467. 

Nivelles,  4,  549  ff. 

Nobles,  1,  54,  etc. 

Nogent,  4,  362,  372,  380,  38L  398. 


INDEX. 


799 


North  German  uprising,  3,  285. 

Northern  Convention,  2,  120. 

Novi,  battle  of,  1,  614,  etc. 

Nurnberg  editors,  1,  342. 

Nyzam,  the,  of  the  Deccan,  3,  38, 
40. 

Ober  Leuchling,  taken,  3,  202. 

Oblique  attacks,  2,  175. 

Observation  corps,  the,  3,  438. 

Ocskay,  1,  272,  383. 

O’Donnell,  3,  729. 

Officers,  in  the  Spanish  army,  3,  16. 

O’Hara,  1,  159. 

Olsuviev,  4,  334,  336,  338,  366. 

Open  order,  in  America,  1,  25. 

Oporto,  sacked,  3,  339;  evacuated  by 
Soult,  345. 

Orange,  Prince  of,  1,  112;  4,  549, 
550. 

Ordinance,  of  1791,  2,  168,  etc.;  178, 
312. 

Organization,  1,  1;  of  European  ar- 
mies, 7,  etc.;  of  Prussia’s  and  Na- 
poleon’s armies,  compared,  3,  608. 

Oropesa,  3,  367. 

Orsha,  headquarters  at,  3,  669. 

Orthez,  battle  of,  4,  479-481. 

Ostermann,  2,  480,  etc.;  retards  the 
French  at  Ostrovno,  3,  503 ; at 
Borodino,  581,  582;  at  Dresden,  4, 
155,  159  ff.;  reaches  Peterswalde, 
160. 

Ostrach,  1,  577. 

Ostrolenka,  combat  of,  2,  495. 

Ott,  1,  298,  etc.;  2,  20;  at  Genoa,  35, 
etc.;  47;  loses  Montebello,  52,  54. 

Oudinot,  at  Feldkirch,  1,  583,  585, 
614;  2,  248;  at  Austerlitz,  272,  etc.; 
at  Friedland,  535;  in  the  Ratisbon 
campaign,  3,  133-150,  163-179; 
at  Abensberg  and  Eggmiihl,  183- 
195,  204,  212;  at  Essling,  264,  266, 
273;  crosses  the  Danube,  297;  in 
the  Wagram-Znaim  campaign,  305- 
326;  created  marshal,  323;  on  the 
march  to  Moscow,  516-518;  on  the 
retreat  from  Moscow  and  before 
the  battle  of  Liitzen,  675-686;  4,23- 
28;  captures  Borisov,  3,  675;  recon- 
noitres the  Studianka  ford,  679; 
crosses  the  Beresina,  682,  684,  686; 
before  and  at  Bautzen,  4,  48,  55, 
65-76;  marches  on  Liickau,  82;  at 
Hoyerswerda,  88;  to  be  sent  on 
Berlin,  105,  106,  141;  at  Gross 
Beeren,  132-137 ; at  Dennewitz,  184; 


at  Leipsic,  251-276;  as  rearguard, 
272;  at  the  battle  of  La  Rothiere, 
347;  behind  the  Yeres,  381,  387; 
thrown  against  Mery,  398;  combats 
on  the  Barse,  416;  at  Arcis,  451; 
dispatched  to  Bar-le-Duc,  462. 

Ouvarov,  3,  580. 

Pack,  3,  718. 

Paget,  3,  344. 

Pahlen,  4,  337,  338,  382,  451. 

Pajol,  at  Leipsic,  4,  252,  253,  258;  at 
Montereau,  390;  enters  Charleroi, 
545. 

Pakenham,  3,  716  ff, 

Palafox,  defends  Saragossa,  3,  27, 121— 
123;  his  plan,  57;  movements  up 
to  Burgos,  59-64;  from  Burgos  to 
Tudela,  73-81;  after  Tudela,  85. 

Pampeluna,  3,  6;  4,  284-289,  299. 

Panki,  3,  592. 

Paoli,  1,  135,  143. 

Papelotte,  4,  631. 

Paris,  put  in  a state  of  defense,  4,  307 ; 
surrenders  (1814),  467;  to  be  put  in 
a state  of  defense  by  Davout,  520, 
521;  surrenders  (1815),  667. 

Park  artillery,  1 , 17. 

Parma,  Duke  of,  1,  226. 

Partouneaux,  surrenders,  3,  683. 

Paskievich,  3,  533. 

Passau,  all-important,  3,  230. 

Pastrengo,  1,  589. 

Pavia,  revolt  in,  1,  245. 

Pay,  irregular,  1,  33;  amount,  42; 
deductions  from,  43;  tables  of,  44, 
etc.;  extra,  49,  etc.;  2,  320. 

Peace,  with  Prussia,  1795,  L 118;  with 
Spain,  126;  of  Basle,  177;  of  To- 
lentino,  404;  preliminaries  of  Leo- 
ben,  437;  Campo  Formio,  451;  of 
Luneville,  2,  103;  of  Amiens,  122; 
of  Tilsit,  539;  with  Austria,  3,  334. 

Peninsula,  resume  of  the  campaigns 
in,  4,  499. 

Peninsular  War,  3,  9,  45-126,  337- 
417,  705-747;  4,  282T304. 

People,  replacing  sovereigns,  1 , 6. 

Perignon,  2,  138. 

Perpendicular  order,  2,  165,  etc. 

Peschiera,  1,  256. 

Peterswalde,  Ostermann  enters,  4, 160. 

Peyri,  surprised  by  Barclay,  4,  59. 

Phellippeaux,  1,  536,  546. 

Phull,  3,  489. 

Pichegru,  1,  85,  90,  109,  120,  etc.;  2, 
134. 


800 


INDEX. 


Picton,  4,  288  ff.,  479,  480,  489-492, 
631. 

Pijon,  1,  272,  296,  307. 

Pillaging,  1,  207,  etc. 

Pirch,  4,  608,  609,  635,  638,  656. 

Pirmasens,  battle  of,  1,  85. 

Pirna,  occupied  by  Vandamme,  4,  159. 

Placentia,  1,  224. 

Plague,  1,  530,  548. 

Planchenoit,  4,  603,  604;  secured  by 
Napoleon,  649;  taken  by  the  Prus- 
sians, 656. 

Plasencia,  3,  366. 

Platoon,  2,  171. 

Platov,  3,  476;  at  the  battle  of  Mo- 
hilev,  499;  attacks  Lefebvre  at  Al- 
tenburg,  4,  205. 

Pleisse,  the,  Napoleon’s  retreat  across, 
4,  265,  266. 

Podolsk,  3,  602. 

Poland,  2,  433,  455;  status  of,  at  the 
beginning  of  the  Russian  war,  3, 
422,  433;  declares  herself  free,  494; 
amnesty  granted  to,  692. 

Poles,  charge  of,  at  Somo-Sierra,  3, 
86;  gallantry  of,  at  Madrid,  88. 

Polish  operation  ended,  3,  331. 

Polotsk,  3,  516-519. 

Polytechnic  schools,  1,  20. 

Pomerania,  occupied  by  Napoleon,  3, 
433,  436. 

Poniatowski,  at  Smolensk,  3,  530-538; 
at  Borodino,  572-582;  takes  Utiza, 
578;  drives  Dorkov,  629;  ordered 
towards  Gshask,  637,  638;  at  Fe- 
dorovskoi,  641;  rejoins  the  French 
army,  4,  6;  sent  to  Frohburg,  205; 
near  Crobern,  235;  along  the 
Pleisse,  238;  at  Leipsic,  250-270; 
killed,  270. 

Poniemon,  bridges  at,  3,  464. 

Pontoniers,  1,  19. 

Pontoon  train,  2,  349. 

Pope,  estates  of  the,  3,  286. 

Portugal,  Napoleon’s  attack  upon,  3, 
4-7, 124,  125;  topography  of,  13, 14; 
campaign  of  1809  in,  337-377. 

Posen,  2,  436;  3,  450. 

Prague,  Congress  of,  4,  103-105. 

Preititz,  4,  69  ff. 

Prenzlau,  2,  422. 

Primolano,  1,  299. 

Prince  of  the  Peace,  3,  2 ff. 

Prisoners,  use  made  of,  2,  212,  376. 

Probsthayda,  4,  258  ff. 

Proclamation,  to  Army  of  Italv,  1.176 
in  Piedmont,  210;  at  Milan,  241; 


before  Arcole,  356 ; at  Bassano. 
416;  to  Army  of  Orient,  469;  at  Alex- 
andria, 473;  to  Egyptians,  489;  in 
Cairo,  495;  at  Gaza,  526;  in  Syria, 
529;  at  Acre,  533,  550;  at  Milan, 

2,  49;  to  army  before  Ulm,  163;  to 
Army  of  Italy,  163;  to  the  nation, 
164;  at  Ulm,  204;  after  Ulm,  216; 
to  army  after  Austerlitz,  297 ; Octo- 
ber, 1806,  363;  at  Potsdam,  421; 
from  Posen,  440;  after  Friedland, 
537;  of  November  13,  1807,  to  the 
effect  that  “the  House  of  Braganza 
had  ceased  to  reign,”  3,  5;  to  the 
Grand  Army,  September  18,  1808, 
53;  of  December  7,  1808,  after  the 
surrender  of  Madrid,  91;  to  the 
Army,  in  the  Ratisbon  campaign, 
169;  to  the  Army,  after  Eggmiihl, 
216;  to  the  Army,  May  13,  1809, 
248;  to  the  Hungarians,  250;  to 
the  Soldiers  of  the  Army  of  Italy, 
284;  to  the  Army  at  the  beginning 
of  the  Russian  campaign,  462;  at 
Borodino,  571;  to  the  Army  after 
Liitzen,  4,  42;  to  the  Army  after 
the  surrender  of  Paris,  470;  to  the 
French  people  on  Napoleon’s  re- 
turn from  Elba  to  Paris,  507;  to  the 
Army,  507;  to  the  Army,  June  14, 
1815,  543. 

Promotions,  1,  33. 

Provera,  1,  199,  etc.,  350,  366,  381, 
etc.,  400. 

Provincial  Guard,  the,  4,  308. 

Prussia,  makes  peace,  1,  118;  makes 
treaty  with  Austria,  2,  237,  305;  re- 
fuses treaty,  306;  in  1806,  327,  etc.; 
troops,  328;  organization,  329,  335; 
artillery  and  cavalry,  330;  officers, 
331,  332,  334;  victualing,  351;  army 
discipline,  333;  working  in  wrong 
direction,  336;  attempts  reform,  337 ; 
attitude,  342;  short-sighted,  346; 
cavalry,  355;  only  chances,  357; 
plans,  364;  situation  of  her  army, 
364;  army  concentrates  on  Weimar, 
372;  army  cut  off  from  Elbe,  376; 
strives  to  regain  Elbe,  378;  position 
of  army,  379;  did  not  expect  battle, 
391;  fighting  good,  391;  army  at 
Auerstadt,  396;  fighting  at  Auer- 
stadt,  400;  army  retires  behind  Vis- 
tula, 431 ; her  attitude  after  Baylen, 

3,  36;  estranged,  399;  her  luke- 
warmness at  the  beginning  of  the 
Russian  war,  431-433;  her  treaty 


INDEX. 


801 


with  Napoleon,  432;  her  attitude 
after  the  Russian  war,  699;  4,  5. 

Prussian  organization,  3,  608. 

Prussia’s  army,  1789,  1,  7;  1806,  2, 
355;  cut  oft  from  Berlin,  413,  etc.; 
at  Magdeburg,  414;  on  April  1, 1813, 
4,  13;  at  the  battle  of  Liitzen,  35-38; 
after  Liitzen,  42;  at  Bautzen,  62  ft'.; 
after  the  reopening  of  hostilities, 
1813,  118-121;  under  Blucher,  531; 
at  Waterloo,  532  ft. ; attacked  and 
defeated,  570-579;  moves  to  the 
north,  597;  moves  to  a junction 
with  Wellington,  599-601,  608-610; 
arrives  at  St.  Lambert,  634,  637; 
advances  from  Ohain,  655,  656. 

Pultusk,  battle  of,  2,  447,  etc. 

Punishments,  1,  39,  505-514,  517;  2, 
333. 

Pursuit,  1,  234,  310;  2,  294,  409,  etc., 
452. 

Pyramids,  1,  484;  battle  of,  485,  etc.; 
losses  at,  488. 

Pyrenees,  1,  95;  opens  in,  109,  118, 
126;  description  of,  3,  13. 

Quatre  Bras,  4,  540  ft.;  battle  of,  584- 
586. 

Queen  of  Prussia,  2,  336,396,544,  545. 

Quiot,  attacks  La  Haye  Sainte,  4,  630. 

Quosdanovich,  1,  113,  260,  266,  272, 
273,  etc.,  277,  284,  291,  300,  348, 
383,  388,  etc. 

Raab,  battle  of,  3,  289. 

Race  to  Benavente,  the,  3,  114. 

Raevski,  3,  533,  534. 

Ramaniyeh,  1,  479. 

Rampon,  1,  195. 

Range  of  fire,  2,  166. 

Ranks,  in  foot  and  horse,  1.  20,  21. 

Rapp,  1,  465;  4,  279. 

Rastadt,  combat  of,  1,  316;  Congress 
of,  456;  2,  2. 

Rations,  1,  42,  etc.;  good,  246;  2,  221. 

Ratisbon,  campaign  of,  3,  138-181; 
taken  by  the  Austrians,  200. 

Reding,  3,  30,  31,  57,  120. 

Red  Sea,  1,  554. 

Regimental  flags,  3,  429. 

Reign  of  Terror,  1.  61,  107. 

Reille,  3,  735-742;  4,  284  ft.,  545,  628. 

Requisitions,  raising  food  by,  1,  34, 
35;  2,  318. 

Reserves,  unknown,  1,  24;  too  small, 
28. 

Reuss,  1,  274;  2,  92;  3,  183,  225,  307. 


Revolution,  French,  origin  of,  1,  51, 
etc.;  difficulty  of  leaders,  97,  108; 
declared  finished,  2,  6;  its  wars 
ended,  122;  what  these  taught  the 
world,  123,  etc.;  strategy  in,  126, 
etc. 

Revolutions,  France  offers  to  aid,  1, 
79. 

Rewards,  1,  39,  405;  2,  303,  307,  321, 
460,  543. 

Rey,  4,  294  296. 

Reynier,  1,  464,  475,  485;  at  El  Arisli, 
525;  545;  at  Busaco,  3,  390;  de- 
feated by  Wellington  at  Sabugal, 
404;  at  Sambrov,  469;  reaches  An- 
topol  and  retires  to  Slonim,  515; 
follows  up  Tormasov,  516;  captures 
Brest  Litovsk,  673;  before  the  battle 
of  Liitzen,  4,  6-29;  before  and  at 
Bautzen,  48-78;  follows  the  Prus- 
sians, 83;  near  Breslau,  88;  at  Den- 
newitz,  184;  sent  toward  Kemburg, 
218;  at  Leipsic,  248-270. 

Rheims,  4,  418,  429,  433. 

Rhine,  crossings  of,  1,  313;  the  course 
of,  divided  into  military  depart- 
ments, 4,  313;  Napoleon’s  scheme 
to  divert  the  war  to,  452-454. 

Ricard,  at  Montmirail,  4,  370. 

Richepanse,  2,  96,  etc.;  gallantry,  99. 

Ricochet  firing,  1,  42. 

Riesch,  2,  98. 

Rights  of  races,  3,  422. 

Rivers,  Napoleon  on  the  defense  of, 
4,  707,  708. 

Rivoli,  1,  253,  261;  battle  of,  386,  etc.; 
topography  of,  386,  etc.;  fighting 
at,  390,  etc.;  plateau,  393;  losses 
at,  396. 

Roads,  1,  63. 

Robespierre,  1,  59,  61. 

Robespierre,  Junior,  1,  153,  161,  163. 

Rochambeau,  1,  26,  64,  65,  486. 

Roder,  in  the  battle  of  Liitzen,  4,  34. 

Rogniat,  4,  133. 

Rogues,  war  against,  1,  347. 

Rome,  1,  256;  campaign  against,  403, 
etc.;  occupied,  454;  568,  587;  2,  105; 
occupied  (January,  1808),  3,  5. 

Roncevalles,  4,  287. 

Rosen,  holds  back  Murat  and  Davout, 
3,  551. 

Rosenberg,  1,  606;  in  the  Abensberg 
and  Eggmiihl  campaign,  3,  183- 
210;  in  the  Essling  campaign,  257- 
270:  surprises  Davout,  308. 

Roskilde,  defeat  of,  3,  44. 


802 


INDEX . 


Rostopchin,  3,  597. 

Roveredo,  1,  295,  etc. 

Ruchel,  at  Jena,  2,  392,  etc. 

Ruffin,  3,  69,  85;  at  Madrid,  87,  88; 
at  Toledo,  99;  at  Madrid,  106;  at 
Talavera,  357,  358. 

Ruse,  1,  294. 

Rush  tactics,  suit  French  character, 
1,  27;  combined  with  open  order, 
27. 

Russia,  friendly  to  France,  2,  121; 
protests  against  the  Continental 
System,  3,  399;  the  invasion  of, 
419  ft. ; disaffection  of,  422, 423;  takes 
Finland,  433;  makes  treaty  with 
Turkey,  434;  parties  in,  447;  makes 
treaty  with  Sweden,  515;  makes 
treaty  with  England,  515. 

Russian  army,  1,  573;  2,  422,  435; 
much  improved  by  czar,  439;  at 
Eylau,  488,  etc.,  509;  at  Friedland, 
535 ; at  the  beginning  of  the  Russian 
war,  3,  449-452;  at  Borodino,  573- 
584;  at  Liitzen,  4,  34-38,  42;  after 
Liitzen,  42;  at  Bautzen,  62  ff. 

Russian  frontiers,  3,  454, 455. 

Russian  soldier,  2,  201;  226. 

Russian  troops  character  of,  3,  453, 
454. 

Russians,  opposed  the  Turks  in  1811, 
3,  417;  the  retiring  scheme  of,  456. 

Rustan,  4,  696,  698. 

Saale,  concentration  on,  4,  23. 

Saalfeld,  combat  of,  2,  369. 

Sabugal,  3,  404. 

Sachsen-Teschen,  1,  64,  76. 

Sacken,  2,  477,  etc.;  3,  673;  at  the 
Katzbach,  4,  139;  at  Leipsic,  260, 
263,  267;  in  the  invasion  of  France, 
327  ff.;  at  the  battle  of  La  Rothiere, 
350;  at  Montmirail,  367-370;  stand- 
ing from  Vailly  to  Bery-au-Bac, 
418;  at  Craonne,  420-423. 

Sahuguet,  1,  292,  304,  307. 

St.  Amand,  4,  567-579. 

St.  Bernard,  2,  27,  etc. 

St.  Boez,  4,  480. 

St.  Cyr,  Gouvion,  1, 123,  315,  etc.,  331, 
334,  607;  2,  82,  84,  89,  150,  181; 
relieves  Duhesme  at  Barcelona,  3, 
26,  63,  99,  120;  at  Eggmuhl,  212; 
in  Catalonia,  374;  created  marshal 
518;  at  Polotsk,  518,  646,  647;  a 
sound  soldier,  4,  108;  objects  to 
detailing  troops  for  an  operation  on 
Berlin,  108;  directed  to  hold  Dres- 


den, 123;  the  emperor  writes  to, 
124;  withdraws  into  Dresden,  132, 
144;  at  Dresden,  144  ff. ; discusses 
with  Napoleon  after  Dennewitz,  186; 
in  the  Leipsic  manoeuvre,  207-244; 
talks  with  the  emperor  in  Dresden, 
211;  becomes  prisoner  of  war,  278, 
279. 

St.  Cyr,  Carra,  3,  263-265. 

St.  Hilaire,  2,  272,  etc.,  291,  480,  etc.; 
in  the  Ratisbon  campaign,  3, 150  ff. ; 
in  the  Abensberg  and  Eggmuhl 
campaign,  183  ff.;  in  the  Essling 
campaign,  264  ff.;  killed,  269. 

St.  Jean,  invested,  4,  476. 

Saint  Mars,  3,  121. 

St.  Pierre,  battle  of,  4,  301,  302. 

St.  Priest,  captures  Rheims,  4,  429. 

St.  Sulpice,  3,  183,  185,  222,  253. 

Ste.  Suzanne,  2,  82,  84,  94. 

Salamanca,  battle  of,  3,  711-720. 

Saliceti,  1,  153,  161,  235,  244. 

Salo,  1,  247,  266. 

Salza  bridges  broken,  3,  229. 

Sambre,  battles  along,  1, 110,  etc.,  116; 
in  the  Waterloo  campaign,  4,  539  ff. 

San  Bartolomeo,  stormed  and  cap- 
tured, 4,  285. 

San  Giorgio,  1,  401. 

San  Marco,  1,  294. 

San  Sebastian,  4,  285-296. 

Sanivki,  headquarters,  3,  683. 

Santa  Clara,  island  of,  taken,  4,  293. 

Santander,  3,  71  ff. 

Sappers,  1,  19. 

Saragossa,  besieged,  3,  27,  120-124; 
siege  raised,  32. 

Sardinia,  1,  78. 

Sauret,  1,  258,  264,  266. 

Sauroren,  battle  of,  4,  289,  290;  cap- 
tured, 291. 

Savants,  1,  348,  466,  478,  512. 

Savarv,  2,  146,  260,  262,  467,  495;  3, 
210. 

Savoy,  1,  78. 

Saxon  army  at  Jena,  2,  392,  etc.;  406. 

Saxons,  resume  alliance  with  French 
after  the  battle  of  Liitzen,  4,  41. 

Saxony,  taken  possession  of,  2,  419. 

Scharnhorst,  2,  335,  358. 

Scherer,  1,  125,  184,  570;  on  Min- 
cio,  587;  divides  forces,  588;  de- 
feated along  Adige,  589;  defeated  at 
Magnano,  590;  resigns,  594. 

Schleiz,  combat  at,  2,  368. 

Schlingen,  battle  of,  1,  339. 

Schmettau,  2,  395,  etc. 


INDEX . 


803 


Schwartzenberg,  2,  213;  his  move- 
ments during  the  march  to  Moscow, 
460,  464,  484,  488,  497,  502,  515, 
519,  542;  his  half-hearted  aid,  657, 
658,  673;  charged  with  acting 

treacherously,  673, 674 ; sent  as  min- 
ister to  Paris,  4,  2;  retires  to  Cra- 
cow, 6;  nominally  commander-in- 
chief,  really  chief  of  staff  to  the 
sovereigns,  121,  142,  143;  begins  to 
cross  the  Erzgebirge,  131;  deter- 
mines to  march  on  Dresden,  132; 
crosses  the  Elbe  and  marches  to 
Aussig,  181,  182;  assembles  at 
Kuhn  and  compels  the  French  to 
retire,  189,  190;  concentrates  to  fend 
off  an  invasion  of  Bohemia,  190; 
wins  his  point  in  calling  Napoleon 
away,  191;  in  the  Leipsic  manoeu- 
vre, 204  ff.;  at  Marienburg,  208; 
his  van  at  Altenburg,  215;  his  ab- 
normal tactical  manoeuvre,  241;  at 
Leipsic,  249-257,267,  273:  his  Re- 
lation of  the  Battle  of  Leipsic,  281; 
in  the  invasion  of  France,  324  ff.; 
details  men  to  go  to  Switzerland, 
380;  arranges  to  retire  back  to 
Troyes  after  the  battle  of  Monte- 
reau,  392;  concentrates  at  Troyes, 
398;  moves  from  Troyes,  405;  and 
headquarters,  at  Troyes,  416;  be- 
tween the  Seine  and  the  Yonne, 
416;  his  delay  after  Laon,  435-437; 
sets  out  to  occupy  Arcis-sur-Aube, 
but  is  anticipated  by  Napoleon, 
441;  guards  his  flank  well,  442;  at 
Arcis,  447-451. 

Science,  men  of,  1,  348,  466,  478;  512. 

Science  of  war,  4,  692;  writers  on,  720- 
741. 

Scindiah,  3,  40-43. 

Sebastiani,  3,  69,  97,  99;  beats  the 
Army  of  Andalusia  at  Ciudad  Real, 
340;  ordered  on  Toledo,  352;  at 
Talavera,  359-362  ; nearly  defeated 
by  Vanegas,  369;  in  Granada,  386; 
before  and  at  Bautzen,  4,  48-57;  at 
theKatzbach,  138, 139;  in  the  Leip- 
sic manoeuvre,  207  ff.;  at  Leipsic, 
251-262;  occupies  Arcis,  444;  at 
Arcis,  447-451. 

Sebottendorf,  1,  188,  194,  225,  228, 
291,  300. 

Sections,  the,  1,  171,  etc. 

Sediman,  battle  of,  1,  503;  2,  110. 

Segur,  at  the  pass  at  Somo-Sierra,  3, 

86. 


Sens,  4,  381. 

Serurier,  1,  125,  187,  194,  197,  204, 
222,  228,  234,  238,  255,  265,  279, 
400,  417,  etc.,  589;  2,  138. 

Sezanne,  4,  362. 

Shallow  order  of  battle,  3,  279-282. 

Sherbrooke,  3,  358  ff. 

Shubra,  Khet,  1,  480;  battle  of,  481, 
etc. 

Sieges,  improved,  1,  42. 

Sieyes,  2,  3,  6. 

Silesia,  overrun,  2,  455. 

Skirmishers,  1,  26;  2,  178,  179. 

“Skirmishers  in  Great  Bands,”  2,  170. 

Smith,  Sir  Sidney,  1,  533,  536,  537, 
546  564. 

Smolensk,  3,  497  ff.,  520  ff.,  531-541, 
547,  655  ff. 

Soeur  Marthe,  2,  316. 

Soissons,  4,  412-414,  424. 

Solagno,  1,  301. 

Sombreffe,  4,  540  ff. 

Somo-Sierra,  pass  at,  3,  85-87. 

Songis,  Chief  of  Artillery,  4,  697. 

Soria,  3,  73  ff. 

Souham,  3,  724  ff.;  in  the  battle  of 
Liitzen,  4,  34-36;  at  the  Katzbach, 
138-140;  in  the  Leipsic  manoeuvre, 
205  ff . ; at  Leipsic,  248  ff . 

Soult,  1,  616;  2,  20,  138,  140,  190;  at 
Ulm,  197,  etc.;  on  march  to  Vienna, 
221,  etc.;  248;  at  Austerlitz,  268, 
etc.;  important  duty,  277;  advances 
on  Pratzen,  284;  wheels  on  allied 
left,  291;  pursues  enemy,  295;  322, 
351,  etc.;  in  Jena  campaign,  361, 
etc.;  at  Jena,  387,  etc.;  406;  in  pur- 
suit, 413,  etc.;  on  Vistula,  440,  etc.; 
in  winter  quarters,  454;  466;  in  Ey- 
lau  campaign,  472,  etc.;  in  Fried- 
land  campaign,  508,  etc.;  at  Heils- 
berg,  519,  etc.;  at  Friedland,  529; 
in  command  of  Bessieres’  corps,  3, 
70;  from  Burgos  to  Tudela,  71- 
73;  movements  after  the  surrender 
of  Madrid,  90,  98  ff.;  in  danger 
from  Moore,  102;  prepares  to  fight, 
but  is  evaded  by  Moore,  110,  117; 
attacks  Moore  at  Corunna,  118; 
his  task  in  Portugal,  338;  captures 
Chaves,  339;  sacks  Oporto,  339; 
stranded  in  Oporto,  341,  342;  his 
campaign  with  Wellesley,  343-349; 
his  ambitions,  344,  349;  faction  in 
his  corps,  344;  evacuates  Oporto, 
345;  reaches  Plasencia,  366;  pro- 
poses to  march  on  Abrantes,  369; 


804 


INDEX. 


succeeds  Jourdan  as  military  ad- 
viser of  the  king,  370;  begins  the 
Andalusian  campaign,  382,  383; 
his  slowness,  384,  386;  blockades 
Cadiz,  385;  ordered  to  assist  Mas- 
sena,  396;  advances  on  Olivenza, 
401;  in  the  following  campaign, 
401-408;  marches  on  Badajoz,  408; 
at  Badajoz,  409-411;  beats  Blake, 
412;  his  plans  in  Andalusia  and 
Estremadura,  710;  his  labors  in 
Andalusia  nullified,  721;  marches 
toward  Granada,  721;  joins  Suchet 
and  Joseph  at  Almanza,  722;  in 
supreme  command,  724  ff.;  re- 
called, 733;  evacuates  Valencia, 
746;  at  Bautzen,  4,  71-76;  in  com- 
mand at  Dresden,  90;  sent  back  to 
the  Peninsula,  284;  reorganizes  the 
forces  there,  284;  his  movements  in 
Spain,  284-304;  plans  to  succor 
Pampeluna,  286-288;  at  Sauroren, 
288-290;  suffers  badly,  291,  292; 
retires,  293;  prepares  to  march 
along  the  Royal  Road  towards  Irun, 
294;  his  march,  296;  driven  back 
by  Wellington,  297,  298;  Welling- 
ton makes  a fresh  advance  against, 
299;  forced  back,  300;  his  head- 
quarters at  Bayonne,  300;  at  battle 
of  St.  Pierre,  301,  302;  overmatched 
by  Wellington,  473;  his  suggestion 
to  Napoleon,  475;  at  Orthez,  478- 
481;  his  position  after  Orthez  dis- 
heartening, 482;  reorganizes  the 
army,  484;  skirmishes  with  Hill’s 
outposts,  485;  at  St.  Gaudens,  486; 
withdraws  to  Toulouse,  487;  his 
position  strengthened,  488;  in  the 
battle  of  Toulouse,  489-493;  evac- 
uates Toulouse,  492;  sends  two 
dispatches  to  Grouchy  at  Wavre, 
636. 

Sources,  consulted,  4,  757-764. 

Spain,  treaty  with,  1,  284;  2,  503; 
status  of,  interfered  with,  bv  Na- 
poleon, 3,  2 ff.;  description  of,  11- 
15:  campaigns  in,  20-126,  378-418, 
705-747. 

Spandau,  2,  421. 

Spanish  Army,  the,  3, 15-17,  372,  381. 

Spanish  Army  of  the  Centre,  3,  91. 

Squares,  2,  174. 

Staff,  Central  General,  1,  5;  engineers 
as,  32;  badly  organized,  2,  138;  323: 
Napoleon’s,  3,  443;  4,  697,  698;  of 
Austria,  4,  142,  143. 


Standing  armies,  1,  6. 

States  General,  called  together,  1,  54 

Steingel,  1,  187,  206,  238. 

Steinheil,  3,  647. 

Stephenson,  3,  41. 

Stettin,  1,  422. 

Stockach,  1,  577;  battle  of,  578. 

Stofflet,  1,  129. 

Stradella,  1,  223;  Army  of  Reserve  at, 
2,  55. 

Stragglers,  1, 221;  3,  479,  554,  567. 

Strategy,  Biilow’s  definition  of,  4,  724. 

Stuart,  3,  40,  41. 

Studianka  ford,  3,  679-684. 

Stzarray,  1,  316,  etc.',  326,  575;  2,  82. 

Subsidies,  English,  1,  96,  109,  119. 

Suchet,  1,  191;  2,  20,  47,  63;  at  Aus- 
terlitz,  268,  etc. ; at  Saragossa,  3, 122, 
123;  defeats  Blake,  374;  in  Aragon, 
398;  defeats  O’Donnell  and  takes 
Lerida,  398;  reduces  Tarragona, 
413;  reduces  Valencia,  414;  holus 
his  own,  728,  729;  after  the  battle 
of  Vittoria,  4,  302,  303. 

Suez,  1,  509,  554. 

Supplies,  1,  31;  army,  121. 

Supply-train  of  an  army,  3,  479,  480. 

Suwarrov,  1,  573;  assumes  command 
of  allies  on  Po,  593;  moves  on  Tu- 
rin, 596;  wins  battle  of  Trebia,  601; 
ordered  to  capture  fortresses,  603; 
wins  at  Novi,  605;  ordered  to  Swit- 
zerland, 612;  difficulties  in  Switzer- 
land, 616,  etc.;  retires  to  Bavaria, 
618;  character,  618;  2,  127. 

Sweden,  2,  137;  3,  398,  515. 

Switzerland,  France  interferes  with, 

1,  452,  etc.;  becomes  Helvetian  Re- 
public, 454;  2,  10. 

Syria,  1,  520,  etc.;  climate  of,  527. 

Tactics,  1,  21,  etc.;  influence  of  Prus- 
sian, 22;  evolution  in,  22;  lineal,  24; 
rush,  26;  Biilow’s  definition  of,  4, 
724. 

Tactics,  of  European  armies,  1 , 7,  etc. 

Tactics,  of  French  army,  1,  9,  etc.; 

2,  310. 

Tagliamento,  1,  422. 

Tagus,  the,  3,  368. 

Talavera,  occupied  by  Cuesta,  3,  354; 
battle  of,  354-361. 

Talleyrand,  1,  454,  457,  515;  2,  2; 
at  the  Congress  of  Vienna,  4,  504 

Tarragona,  sacked,  3,  413. 

Tarvis,  1,  428,  etc. 

Taucha,  4,  225  ff . 


INDEX.  805 


Tauenzien,  2,  356;  at  Gross  Beeren, 
4,  134  ff.;  beaten  by  Ney  at  Zahna, 
183;  at  Dennewitz,  184. 

Tauroggen,  Convention  of,  3,  694. 

Taxes,  1,  491. 

Telegraphs,  1,  40. 

Tents,  abolished,  1,  36. 

Tettenborn,  and  his  Cossacks,  at  the 
Elbe,  4,  13. 

Texel,  1,  608. 

Thann,  battle  of,  3,  177. 

Tharreau,  3,  192,  224,  264. 

Thielemann,  4.  608,  609,  636,  657. 

Thierry,  3,  178,  183,  188. 

Third  Estate,  1,  54. 

Thomieres,  3,  715  ff. 

Thureau,  2,  20,  24. 

Tilsit,  peace,  of  2,  539;  consequence 
of  peace  of,  3,  2;  Alexander  adheres 
to,  36,  56. 

Tippoo  Sahib,  1,  461,  510,  521;  3,  38- 
40. 

Tirlemont,  4,  538. 

Titles,  created,  1,  33;  lists  of,  4,  744- 
746. 

Toll,  his  hope  to  destroy  the  French 
left,  3,  523. 

Torcy,  4,  445-450. 

Torgau,  4,  49,  51,  52,  188,  189. 

Tormasov,  3,  452,  515  ff.,  623,  624, 
663  ff.;  4,  21-29. 

Tormes,  the,  crossed,  3,  714. 

Torres  Vedras  lines,  3,  393-405. 

Toulon,  1,  95,  151,  etc.;  taken,  by 
English,  153;  its  defense,  154-160; 
captured,  161. 

Toulouse,  4,  482-493. 

Tournay,  1,  111. 

Trafalgar,  2,  212. 

Trains  limited,  1,  36;  size  of,  36. 

Transportation,  1,  319. 

Transports,  military,  3,  443. 

Traveling,  speed  of,  2,  144. 

Treaty,  of  Paris,  1,  212;  with  Spain, 
284;  in  1801,  2,  122;  of  Presburg, 
303;  Russia  refuses,  306;  of  Fon- 
tainebleau, October  27,  1807,  3,  4 ; 
of  Vienna,  334:  with  Prussia,  432; 
of  Bucharest,  434;  between  Russia 
and  England,  515;  between  Russia 
and  Sweden,  515;  of  Valen9ay,  4, 
303.  See  Peace. 

Trebia,  battle  of,  1,  599,  etc.;  losses 
at,  602,  607. 

Trent,  1,  252,  298,  358. 

Trieste,  1,  439. 

Tromelin,  1,  536. 


Troyes,  4,  351  ff.,  392,  398,  405,  407, 
416. 

Truce,  with  Piedmont,  1,  211;  on 
Rhine,  314;  of  Leoben,  437;  Pars- 
dorf,  2,  92;  Steyer,  102;  asked  by 
Francis,  229,  237,294;  after  Aus- 
terlitz,  296;  with  Austria,  4,  85- 
88. 

Tuchkov,  2,  477,  etc.;  3,  545. 

Tudela,  battle  of,  3,  75-77;  result  in- 
complete, 78-82. 

Tuileries,  stormed,  1,  59. 

Turcoing,  1.  111. 

Turkey,  makes  treaty  with  France,  3, 
434. 

Turks,  opposed  by  the  Russians  in, 
1811;  3,  417. 

Tuscany,  1,  256. 

Tyrol,  the,  subjugated,  3,  331,  335. 

Tyrolese,  the,  3,  141. 

Ucles,  battle  of,  3,  120. 

Udine,  1,  447;  negotiations,  450. 

Ulm,  Kray  and  Moreau  operate 
around,  2,  90,  etc.;  closed  in  by 
Bonaparte,  185,  etc. 

University  Forest,  4,  247  ff. 

Unter  Leuchling,  taken,  3,  201. 

Usha,  the,  reached,  3,  549. 

Vailly,  4,  419. 

Valen9ay,  treaty  of,  4,  303. 

Valence,  1,  76;  3,  90,  97,  99. 

Valencia,  capitulates,  3,  414. 

Valladolid,  3,  720,  723. 

Valmaseda,  taken  by  Lefebvre,  3,  71. 

Valmy,  battle  of,  1,  70,  etc. 

Valutino,  battle  of,  3,  544-546. 

Vandamme,  1,  272,  etc.,  291;  in  the 
Ratisbon  campaign,  3,  145-171;  at 
Abensberg  and  Eggmiihl,  182-209; 
on  march  to  Vienna,  222-248:  his 
position  in  March,  1813, 4,  9;  moves 
on  Hamburg,  89;  ordered  to  Baut- 
zen, 123;  to  cut  the  allied  commu- 
nications, 148;  at  Dresden,  155  ff.; 
takes  Pirna,  159;  pursues  the  allies, 
165  ff.;  attacked  on  all  sides,  168; 
defeated,  169,  170;  at  Waterloo, 
570-578,  595,  598. 

Vanegas,  3,  369. 

Vaubois,  1,  256,  292,  299,  350,  353, 
366,  373. 

Vaux,  4,  426. 

Veczay,  3,  183. 

Vedel,  3,  30,  31 ; court-martialed,  35. 

Vendeans,  shot  without  trial,  1,  39; 


806 


INDEX. 


their  troops,  99,  etc.;  their  method 
of  war,  100. 

Vendee,  troops  how  armed,  1,  7;  war 
in,  98,  etc.,  129. 

Venice,  1,  254,  346,  439,  446. 

Venta  de  Pozo,  3,  724. 

Vera,  4,  297 

Verdier,  1,  281;  3,  26,  27,  32;  lays 
siege  to  Saragossa,  121,  122. 

Vial,  1,  475,  485,  497. 

Viasma,  battle  of,  3,  641-643. 

Victor,  1,  118,  191,  439,  595;  2,  24, 
52,  57;  at  Marengo,  62,  etc.;  at 
Friedland,  531,  etc.;  movements 
up  to  Burgos,  3,  59-70;  from  Burgos 
to  Tudela,  71-82;  on  the  road  to 
Madrid,  85;  after  the  surrender  of 
Madrid,  91,  97,  99;  at  Toledo,  106; 
defeats  the  Army  of  Andalusia  at 
Ucles,  119,  120;  in  Portugal,  338  ff.; 
defeats  Cuesta,  340;  defeated  at 
Chiclana,  402;  on  the  retreat  from 
•Moscow,  646-649,  652,  668,  678, 
684,  686;  his  position  in  March, 
1813,  4,  9;  ordered  to  Sprottau,  83; 
at  Dresden,  155-163;  at  Leipsic, 
250-276;  in  command  of  the  Upper 
Rhine,  313;  in  the  invasion  of 
France,  329  ff.;  at  the  battle  of  La 
Rothiere,  347-350;  to  guard  Nogent, 
372;  behind  the  Yeres,  381,  387; 
defeats  La  Motte  at  Villeneuve, 
388;  at  Craonne,  421,  422. 

Victualing,  2,  220;  3,  446,  479-481, 
597,  599,  658,  696,  698. 

Vienna,  in  1805,  2,  238;  captured. 
239;  bridge  seized,  239;  march  on, 

3,  218-241;  bombarded,  242;  sur- 
render of,  243;  treaty  of,  334. 

Vilkoviski,  3,  462. 

Villa  Muriel,  3,  724. 

Villadrigo,  3,  724. 

Villatte,  movements  up  to  the  fall  of 
Burgos,  3,  59-69;  at  Madrid,  87,  88; 
after  the  surrender  of  Madrid,  99; 
at  Toledo,  106;  holds  the  Bidassoa, 

4,  287. 

Villeneuve,  4,  388. 

Vilna,  reached  by  Davout,  3,  468; 
headquarters  of  Napoleon,  471; 
fatal  delay  at,  495;  reached  by 
the  remnants  of  the  Grand  Army, 
691. 

Vimiero,  battle  of,  3,  45-48. 

Vitebsk,  3,  504-510. 

Vitry,  4,  335. 

Vittoria,  battle  of,  3,  736-743. 


Vives,  3,  57,  63;  defeated  by  St.  Cyr, 

120. 

Voltigeurs,  1,  6. 

Vop,  the,  3,  656. 

Voronzov,  at  Craonne,  4,  420-423. 

Vox  Populi  Vox  Dei,  3,  129. 

Wagram,  battle  of,  3,  301-319;  its 
conduct  in  natural  sequence  to  the 
battles  at  Ratisbon,  328. 

Walther,  at  Wagram,  3,  312. 

Walthier,  3,  99. 

War,  Minister,  1,  32;  Council,  32; 
Commission,  32;  Committee,  32; 
declared  by  France,  59,  81;  science 
of,  4,  692,  720-741. 

Warsaw,  2,  438,  454. 

Wartensleben,  1,  314,  316;  falls  back 
to  Wurzburg,  322;  beaten  at  For- 
scheim,  322;  on  Naab,  322,  328, 
337. 

Waterloo,  campaign  of,  4,  528-670. 

Wattigny,  1,  95. 

Wavre,  4,  540,  600  ff. 

“ Wavre-Perwez  ” dispatch,  4,  605, 
636. 

Wellesley,  Sir  Arthur,  his  early  life,  3, 
37,  38;  in  India,  38-43;  returns  to 
England,  43;  at  Hanover,  43;  in 
Parliament,  and  Chief  Secretary  for 
Ireland,  43;  at  Roskilde,  44;  sent 
to  Portugal,  44;  at  Vimiero,  45-48; 
his  tactics  at  Vimiero,  48-50;  returns 
to  England  and  is  sent  back  to  the 
Peninsula,  50;  in  the  Peninsula, 
1809,  341-371;  reaches  Lisbon,  342; 
and  Soult,  343-349;  and  Cuesta, 
351;  his  tactics  at  Talavera,  362, 
363;  made  a peer,  371.  See  Welling- 
ton. 

Wellington,  2,  324;  3,  9;  his  comment 
on  the  Spanish  army,  16;  in  the 
Peninsula,  371,  417,  705-747;  in 
the  Andalusian  campaign,  384-386; 
on  the  defensive  in  Portugal,  388, 
393,  394,  396;  pursues  the  retreating 
French  under  Massena,  403-405; 
defeats  Reynier  at  Sabugal,  404; 
at  Fuentes  d’Onoro,  406;  marches 
to  the  aid  of  Beresford,  411;  takes 
Ciudad  Rodrigo,  414;  takes  Bada- 
joz,  416;  his  position  in  Portugal, 
709  ff.;  at  Salamanca,  711-720; 
honors  conferred  on,  720;  enters 
Madrid,  722;  besieges  Burgos  cita- 
del, 723;  abandons  the  siege,  724; 
his  further  movements,  724-728; 


INDEX. 


807 


his  circular  on  the  deterioration  of 
discipline,  728;  improves  the  dis- 
cipline of  his  troops,  731 ; at  the  head 
of  two  hundred  thousand  men,  731 : 
begins  the  1813  campaign,  733,  734; 
advances  on  Palencia,  735;  estab- 
lishes a base  at  Santander,  736; 
moves  on  the  French  front,  738, 
739;  at  the  battle  of  Vittoria,  740- 
743;  in  position  to  cut  the  French 
line  of  retreat,  740;  detaches  Graham 
to  seize  Orduna,  741 ; moves  towards 
Mendosa,  742;  marches  to  Pam- 
peluna,  744;  does  not  pursue,  744, 
745;  conceives  and  conducts  the 
campaign  brilliantly,  745,  746; 

pushes  on  in  the  Peninsula,  4,  282; 
his  forces  and  his  position,  284,  285; 
at  Pampeluna,  285-288;  at  Sauro- 
ren,  288-291;  leads  his  troops,  292; 
reoccupies  lines  from  Roncevalles 
to  the  Bidassoa,  293  ; demonstrates 
towards  Maya,  295;  delayed,  296; 
crosses  the  Bidassoa,  297;  adopts 
Vera  as  headquarters,  297;  his  an- 
noyances and  difficulties,  298;  ad- 
vances on  Soult,  299;  forces  a pas- 
sage of  the  Nive,  301;  prepares  for 
further  advances,  302;  overmatches 
Soult,  473;  to  compass  the  capture 
of  Bayonne,  476;  pushes  the  offen- 
sive, 476-478;  moves  on  Toulouse, 
484,  485;  near  Toulouse,  487;  at  the 
battle  of  Toulouse,  488-493;  enters 
Toulouse,  492;  made  a duke,  493; 
sound  rather  than  brilliant,  493; 
always  studied  his  food  supply, 
494;  tenacious  in  purpose,  494;  an 
excellent  organizer  and  disciplina- 
rian, 495;  his  work  in  the  Penin- 
sula admirable,  495;  compared  with 
Hannibal,  496;  compared  with  Na- 
poleon, 496,  497 ; nearly  all  his  bat- 
tles indecisive,  496;  ungenerous  in 
criticising  his  subordinates,  497 ; was 
cautious,  498;  in  1815,  with  army 
based  on  Brussels  and  the  British 
Channel,  519;  appointed  ambassa- 
dor to  France,  526;  instructed  to 
report  on  the  defense  of  the  Belgian 
frontier,  526;  in  the  Congress  of 
Vienna,  527;  reaches  Brussels  and 
takes  command  of  the  Anglo-Dutch, 
527;  secures  the  fortresses  of  Bel- 
gium by  garrisons,  527;  calls  on  the 
English  for  troops,  528;  his  army, 
528-530;  at  the  beginning  of  June, 


1815,  532;  at  Tirlemont  with  Blu- 
cher,  538;  orders  a general  move- 
ment of  assembly  on  Nivelles, 
Braine  and  Enghisn,  549;  his  ar- 
rangement with  Blucher  before  the 
battle  of  Waterloo,  554,  555;  his 
mind  set  on  Nivelles,  557;  orders  a 
concentration  on  Quatre  Bras,  558; 
writes  to  Blucher  as  to  disposition 
of  forces,  558;  consults  with  Blucher 
at  Brye,  559;  misleads  Blucher,  559; 
gets  information  too  slowly,  559, 
560;  reaches  the  field,  584;  at  the 
battle  of  Quatre  Bras,  584-586; 
gets  out  of  Napoleon’s  reach,  592; 
his  design  to  stand  at  Mont  St.  Jean, 
602-606;  at  fault  in  his  detail  of 
seventeen  thousand  men,  606,  607 ; 
his  Memorandum  on  Clausewitz’s 
History,  607 ; his  position  at  Water- 
loo, 613;  Past  Master  of  Defensive 
Tactics,  622;  holds  himself  against 
the  first  massed  attack,  632;  resists 
Ney’s  cavalry  assault,  642-645; 
his  centre  weak,  649,  650;  not  at 
his  best  as  a strategist  in  the  Wa- 
terloo campaign,  661 ; his  tribute  to 
the  Prussians,  663 ; his  conduct 
as  commander  of  the  allied  forces 
in  France,  sound,  moderate,  and 
dignified,  668;  his  later  life,  668; 
his  ability  as  a battle  captain,  668, 
670. 

Werneck,  2,  209;  surrenders,  214. 

Wertingen,  combat  of,  2,  194. 

Wesel,  system  of,  4,  705. 

Westermann,  1,  102,  106. 

Wetzlar,  battle  of,  1,  315. 

Winzingerode,  before  the  battle  of 
Liitzen,  4,  21-29;  in  the  battle  of 
Liitzen,  34  ff.;  detailed  to  overrun 
Westphalia,  279;  enters  Holland, 
326;  crosses  the  Rhine,  330;  stand- 
ing from  Vailly  to  Bery-au-Bac,  418; 
to  cross  the  Lethe  and  push  on 
Fetieux,  420;  occupies  St.  Dizier, 
461. 

Wittenberg,  4,  9,  10,  49,  51,  52. 

Wittgenstein,  basing  on  St.  Petersburg, 
3,  515;  retires  towards  Sebesh,  517; 
takes  up  a position  at  Sokoliche, 
517;  beaten  by  St.  Cyr,  518;  as- 
saults Polotsk,  647;  on  the  Ulla,  657; 
drives  back  Victor,  678;  advances 
to  Baran,  680;  marches  on  Tilsit, 
693 ; advances  to  Elbing,  694 ; before 
the  battle  of  Liitzen,  4,  6-30;  ad- 


808 


INDEX. 


vances  on  Wachau,  250;  heads  for  j 
Probsthayda,  262;  in  the  invasion  of 
France,  326  ff.;  in  front  of  Nogent, 
380;  wounded,  416; 

Works  of  art,  seized  by  Bonaparte,  1, 
193;  seized,  226,  257,  285. 

Woronzov,  4,  21. 

Wrede,  2,  272;  during  the  Ratisbon 
campaign,  3,  149-178;  during  the 
Abensberg  and  Eggmiihl  campaign, 
182-205;  during  the  march  on 
Vienna,  225-237;  reaches  Hanau, 
4,  274-276;  at  the  battle  of  Hanau, 
276,  277;  in  the  invasion  of  France, 
326  ff.;  at  the  battle  of  La  Rothiere, 
348,  349;  driven  back  by  Marmont, 
351;  moves  on  Bray,  380;  at  Arcis, 
445-451. 

Wukassovich,  1,  188,  201,  294,  388, 
etc.;  2,  43. 

Wurmser,  1,  83;  captures  Weissem- 
burg,  87;  90,  121, 178,  258;  advances 
on  Army  of  Italy,  259,  269 ; at  Cas- 
tiglione,  279,  etc.;  retires,  282;  284; 
energy,  287;  new  plan,  291;  mis- 
take, 297;  surprised,  300;  escapes 
towards  Mantua,  303 ; reaches  Man- 
tua, 305;  in  Mantua,  308;  on  Rhine, 
312. 

Wurschen,  4,  71  ff. 


Wurtemberg,  2,  144. 

Wurtemberg,  Duke  of,  2,  414;  in  the 
invasion  of  France,  4,  326  ff.;  cap- 
tures Sens,  381;  at  Montereau  390; 
at  Arcis,  445-451. 

Wurzburg,  battle  of,  1,  327,  etc. 

Yorck,  with  Macdonald,  in  command 
of  the  Prussian  contingent  in  Napo- 
leon’s army,  3,  693,  694;  his  Con- 
vention, 694;  near  Berlin,  4,  14;  in 
the  battle  of  Lutzen,  35,  36;  at  the 
Katzbacli,  139;  in  the  invasion  of 
France,  327  ff.;  advances  on  Cha- 
lons, 359;  at  Montmirail,  367-370; 
sent  to  Laon,  420. 

York,  Duke  of,  1,  110,  115,  608. 

Zach,  at  Marengo,  1,  68,  etc. 

Zahna,  Ney  beats  Tauenzien  at,  4, 
183. 

Ziethen,  in  the  battle  of  Lutzen,  4,  34; 
in  the  Waterloo  campaign,  544  ff.; 
moves  to  the  support  of  Wellington, 
609;  road  opened  by,  for  Wellington 
to  retire,  651 ; comes  up  from  Ohain, 
655-656. 

Znaim,  battle  of,  3,  322-326. 

Zurich,  battle  of,  1,  586,  611,  614,  etc. 

Zyperdyk,  1,  609. 


THE  END. 


